Testimony of Michael Waldman Before the Senate Rules Committee Hearing on Electronic Voting Systems

February 7, 2007

Download Testimony 

Committee on Rules and Administration

United States Senate

Testimony of

MICHAEL WALDMAN

Executive Director

Brennan Center
for Justice at New York
University School
of Law

February 7,
2007

The Brennan Center for Justice thanks the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration for holding this hearing.[1]  We appreciate the opportunity to share with
you the results of our extensive studies to ensure that our nation's voting
systems are more secure, reliable and accessible.[2]  The Brennan
Center for Justice is a
nonpartisan think tank and advocacy organization that focuses on democracy and
justice.  We are deeply involved in the
effort to ensure accurate and fair voting, voter registration, campaign finance
reform and a reformed redistricting system.

I. THE BRENNAN CENTER'S WORK ON VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY

Since the electoral debacle of
2000, the United States
has broadly moved toward using new electronic machines to conduct
elections.  This is as wide a shift in
voting technology as any in our history. 
The new systems promise fewer ambiguous votes (for example, in the case
of Florida in
2000, "hanging chads") and greater accessibility to the disabled.  But they spawned doubt and suspicion, leaving
many Americans uncertain whether their votes are securely cast and accurately
counted.  The issue became clouded in
partisanship and conspiracy thinking, marked by conjecture and anecdote. 

In 2005, in response to this widespread
confusion and concern, the Brennan Center assembled a Task Force of internationally
renowned government, academic and private-sector scientists, voting machine
experts, and security professionals to perform the nation's first methodical
threat analysis of the major electronic voting systems.[3]  The Task Force sought a simple goal: to determine,
quantify and prioritize the greatest threats to the integrity of our voting
systems, and to identify steps that we can take to minimize those threats.

Working with election officials,
the Task Force analyzed the nation's major electronic voting systems for two
years.  It issued The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World
(the "Brennan Center Security Report") in June 2006.[4]  The conclusions of the Brennan Center
Security Report are clear:

  • In
    fact, all of the nation's electronic voting systems - every single one -have
    serious security and reliability vulnerabilities (including especially,
    the malicious or accidental insertion of corrupt software or bugs).
  • The
    most troubling vulnerabilities of each system can be significantly
    remedied; but few jurisdictions have implemented any of the key security
    measures that could make the least difficult attacks against voting
    systems substantially more secure.[5]

Most importantly, the Task Force recommended:                                         

  • Automatic audits, done randomly and
    transparently, are necessary if voter verifiable paper records are to
    enhance security. 
    The report
    called into doubt basic assumptions of many election officials and the
    public, by finding that using voter-verified paper records without
    routinely comparing some portion of those paper records to the electronic
    tally - as is done in twenty-four states with voter-verified paper records
    - is of "questionable security value."
  • Wireless components on voting machines
    are particularly vulnerable to attack.
     
    The report finds that machines with wireless components could be
    attacked by "virtually any member of the public with some knowledge of
    software and a simple device with wireless capabilities, such as a PDA." 
  • The vast majority of states have not
    implemented election procedures or countermeasures to detect a software
    attack
    even though the most troubling vulnerabilities of each system
    can be substantially remedied.

Among the countermeasures advocated
by the Task Force are routine audits comparing voter-verified paper trails to
the electronic record and bans on wireless components in voting machines.  Currently only New York
and Minnesota ban wireless components on all
machines; California
bans wireless components only on DRE machines. 
The Task Force also advocated the use of "parallel testing": random,
Election Day testing of machines under real world conditions.  Parallel testing holds its greatest value for
detecting software attacks in jurisdictions with paperless electronic machines,
since, with those systems, meaningful audits of voter-verified paper records
are not an option.

Fortunately, steps can be taken to make electronic voting systems
substantially more secure.  For the most
part, they do not involve significant changes in system architecture.  But they do require legislative changes - and
resources, training, coordination and professionalization on a scale heretofore
not known in American election administration. 
These changes can be made while assuring that our voting systems are
fully accessible to all Americans.

II. BRENNAN CENTER
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS IN DETAIL 

There is a substantial likelihood
that the election procedures and countermeasures currently in place in the vast
majority of states would not detect a cleverly designed software attack
program.  The regimens for audits and
testing proposed in the Brennan Center Security Report are important tools for protecting
voting systems from many types of attack, including software attack programs.

Most jurisdictions have not implemented these
security measures.  Of the 27 states that
require a voter-verified paper record, less than half require automatic audits
of those records after every election, and only two of these states - California and Washington
- conduct parallel testing.[6]  Moreover, even those states that have
implemented these countermeasures have not developed the best practices and
protocols that are necessary to ensure their effectiveness in preventing or
revealing attacks or failures in the voting systems.

Recommendation #1:
Conduct Automatic Routine Audit of Voter Verifiable Paper Records.

Advocates for voter-verified paper
records have been extremely successful in state legislatures across the
country.[7]  Currently, 27 states require their voting
systems to produce a voter-verified record, but 14 of these states do not
require automatic routine audits comparing the paper and electronic records.[8]  The Task Force concluded that an independent
voter-verified paper trail without an automatic routine audit is of
questionable security value.[9]

By contrast, a voter-verified paper
record accompanied by a solid automatic routine audit can go a long way toward
making the least difficult attacks much more difficult.  Specifically, the Task Force recommended the following
audit measures, which, it concluded, would render attacks far less likely
because they would force an attacker to involve hundreds of more informed
participants in her attack.

  • A
    small percentage of all voting machines and their voter-verified paper or
    audit records should be audited.
  • Machines
    to be audited should be selected in a random and transparent way.
  • The
    assignment of auditors to voting machines should occur immediately before
    the audits.  The audits should take
    place by 9 a.m. on the
    day after polls close.
  • The
    audit should include a tally of spoiled ballots, undervotes, and overvotes.
  • A statistical examination of anomalies, such as higher than
    expected cancellations or under-and overvotes, should be conducted.
  • Solid practices with respect to chain of custody and
    physical security of paper or other audit records prior to the audit of those
    records.

Recommendation #2:
Conduct Parallel Testing.

Although we strongly believe the
best current security measure is to use voter-verified paper records as the
basis for auditing the electronic record, steps can be taken to improve
security should jurisdictions fall short of that goal.

For paperless DRE voting machines, parallel testing
is probably the best way to detect most software-based attacks, as well as
subtle software bugs that may not be discovered during inspection and other
testing.  For DREs with voter-verifiable
paper trails and ballot-marking devices, parallel testing provides the
opportunity to discover a specific kind of attack (for instance, printing the
wrong choice on the voter-verified paper record) that may not be detected by
simply reviewing the paper record after the election is over.  However, even under the best of
circumstances, parallel testing is an imperfect security measure.  The testing creates an "arms-race" between
the testers and the attacker, but the race is one in which the testers can
never be certain that they have prevailed.

While a few local jurisdictions have taken it upon
themselves to conduct limited parallel testing, we know of only four states,
California, Georgia, Maryland and Washington, that have regularly performed
parallel testing on a statewide basis. 
It is worth noting that California and Washington employ
automatic routine audits and parallel
testing as statewide countermeasures against potential attack.

Recommendation #
3: Ban Wireless Components on All Voting Machines.

Our analysis shows that machines
with wireless components are particularly vulnerable to attack.  We conclude that this vulnerability applies
to all three types of electronic voting systems.  Only two states, New
York and Minnesota,
ban wireless components on all machines.[10]  California
also bans wireless components, but only for DRE machines.  Wireless components should not be permitted
on any voting machine.

Recommendation #
4: Mandate Transparent and Random Selection Procedures.

The development of transparently random selection
procedures for all auditing procedures is key to audit effectiveness.  This includes the selection of machines to be
parallel tested or audited, as well as the assignment of auditors
themselves.  The use of a transparent and
random selection process allows the public to know that the auditing method was
fair and substantially likely to catch fraud or mistakes in the vote
totals.  In our interviews with election
officials we found that, all too often, the process for picking machines and
auditors was neither transparent nor random. 

In
a transparent random selection process:

  • The whole process is publicly observable or videotaped.
  • The random selection is to be publicly verifiable, i.e., anyone observing is able to verify
    that the sample was chosen randomly (or at least that the number selected is
    not under the control of any small number of people).
  • The process is simple and practical within the context of
    current election practice so as to avoid imposing unnecessary burden on
    election officials.

Recommendation #
5: Ensure Local Control of Programming.

Where a single entity, such as a vendor or state or
national consultant, runs elections or performs key tasks (such as producing
ballot definition files) for multiple jurisdictions, attacks against statewide
elections become easier.  Unnecessary
centralized control provides many opportunities to implement attacks at
multiple locations.

Recommendation #
6: Implement Effective Procedures for Addressing Evidence of Fraud or
Error.

Both automatic routine audits and
parallel testing are of questionable security value without effective
procedures for action where evidence of machine malfunction and/or fraud is
uncovered.  Detection of fraud without an
appropriate response will not prevent attacks from succeeding.  In the Brennan Center's
extensive review of state election laws and practices, and in its interviews
with election officials for the threat analysis, we did not find any
jurisdiction with publicly-detailed, adequate, and practical procedures for
dealing with evidence of fraud or error discovered during an audit, recount or
parallel testing.

In addition, the security of our
voting systems would be enhanced by mandating good ballot chain of custody
practices to ensure that ballots are neither tampered with nor lost, and by
ending the exclusive private control that many vendors have over the code on voting
machines owned by local jurisdictions and enabling those jurisdictions to
access the firmware and software on their own voting machines.

III. DEVELOPMENTS
SINCE THE RELEASE OF THE REPORT

Since the Brennan
Center's Security Report
was released seven months ago, several jurisdictions have made significant
improvements.  In particular, Arizona, Utah and Wisconsin announced that
they would audit their voter-verified paper records in November 2006.  We are gratified that several counties have
explicitly used the report to craft their security procedures.

On December
1, 2006, scientists at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology issued two draft white papers.[11]  Specifically, the papers called upon the
Technical Guidelines Development Committee of the Election Assistance
Commission (the "EAC") to add two new requirements to the 2007 Voluntary Voting
System Guidelines: (1) to ban or severely restrict the use of wireless
components on all voting systems, and (2) to require that all voting systems provide
evidence of voter intent that is independent
of the voting system and that will allow for an independent audit of the vote totals provided by the voting system
(e.g., voting systems that include a
voter-verified paper record).  We note
that these reports reinforce the conclusions and many of the recommendations of
the Brennan Center Task Force.  We
believe there is a critical mass - nearing a consensus - of expert opinion on
the risks of these electronic systems, and the reforms that can vastly improve
them.

Despite this growing awareness of the problem, in the
communities where elections are administered, little has changed.  The vast majority of counties and states in
the United States
still have not implemented any of the key recommendations detailed in the
Brennan Center Security Report, leaving us vulnerable to serious security and
reliability problems on Election Day.

Moreover, to our knowledge, the EAC has not yet engaged in
a comprehensive threat analysis.  It is
dismaying that a private task force has conducted such a threat assessment while
the government agency charged with improving the nation's voting systems has
not
.  If we want the public to feel
confident that the guidelines actually make voting systems more secure, the EAC
must identify the most serious security and reliability threats and state how
each voting system guideline it authors addresses them.

Ultimately, Congress must consider the question of
resources.  The scope and speed with
which the nation has transformed the way it votes and counts votes is
unprecedented.  It would be unreasonable
to believe that such a transformation could be possible without adequate
funding.  The funding thus far has proven
insufficient.  Under HAVA, approximately
$3.9 billion was authorized for the states to help them purchase and adopt new
voting systems and to create new electronic statewide voter registration databases.  Even this amount was not fully distributed.  Complex voting security systems, in thousands
of jurisdictions, involving tens of thousands of lay people, cannot be properly
created in short order without a substantial new infusion of funds. 

I am often asked by citizens, "I go to my ATM every day.  Not once has it given me the wrong amount.  And certainly it's never given me too much
money!"  The fact is that banks spend considerably
more in a year to maintain their ATM systems than our nation has spent over six
years to entirely modernize its voting technology.[12]  In this instance, we got what we paid
for.  What is the appropriate amount for
new funding?  Representative Holt in his
recent bill envisions a $300 million funding stream. Although we have not studied
what would in fact be necessary, this amount seems to be the bare minimum
required to make the necessary improvements.

IV. ELECTRONIC VOTING
AND ACCURACY

Many voters
and public officials understandably are concerned about the accuracy of the new
electronic voting systems.  For example, these
concerns led Florida Governor Charlie Crist to support a move to optical scan machines.               

We must
make certain that the electronic systems are as accurate as possible.  In many instances, accuracy problems may be
less due to the design of the hardware (e.g.,
the touch screen) than the design of the software (e.g., the way voting choices are laid out on the screen).  The Brennan Center
examined these issues, as well.  We found
that there are sharp variations among the systems.  The best implemented electronic voting
systems are more accurate than earlier voting systems.

  • Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) and
    Scrolling Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems are more
    accurate at recording voter intention than older voting systems.  In 2004, residual vote rates were less
    than 1% for both technologies.
  • Full-Face DRE systems (i.e., systems where all candidates for all offices must be
    visible at all times) continue to be plagued with an unacceptably high
    residual vote rate.  In 2000, 2002
    and 2004, it exceeded that of either PCOS or scrolling DRE systems.

It bears repeating: we must not
romanticize earlier voting systems.  Paper
ballots, punch cards, and lever machines all are prone to grave accuracy
problems.  These problems range from "hanging
chads" to miscounted ballots to lost ballots. 
Properly functioning electronic voting systems can be far more accurate
than earlier systems.

V. ENSURING THAT
VOTING SYSTEMS ARE ACCESSIBLE AND USABLE

In addition to our Security Report, the Brennan Center
has also released reports on voting system usability and accessibility.[13]  As with the Security Report, these reports
drew on the experience and input of the nation's leading voting system
experts.  They provide policy makers with
practical and important recommendations to help ensure that voting systems are
as usable and accessible as possible.

The voting machines recently
purchased by most jurisdictions in the United States offer the promise of
much greater usability and accessibility than we have known in the past.  We have eliminated many usability problems
(think for instance, of the notorious "butterfly
ballot" in Palm Beach County,
Florida), and offered millions of
disabled voters the opportunity to vote independently for the first time in
their lives. 

This does not mean that our voting
systems are as usable or accessible as they should be.  All too often, vendors have offered
technological "fixes" that theoretically make voting easier, but, in fact, make
casting a ballot far more difficult for most voters.

As Congress considers ways to
ensure that our voting systems are secure and reliable, we urge you to remember
that the systems must also remain usable and accessible.  Usability and accessibility need not be
sacrificed in the name of security or reliability.

In
particular, we urge Congress to require the Election Assistance Commission to
study, develop and test best practices to increase voting system usability and
accessibility.  As we note in our
usability and accessibility reports, for voting systems to become truly usable
and accessible to all voters, members of both the general and disabled
populations should be included in empirical research of these systems. 

We also
urge Congress to mandate usability testing of all voting systems and ballot
designs used in federal elections.  And
to guard against disenfranchisement from inevitable breakdowns of new voting
systems, Congress should require all states to make available emergency ballots
in all polling places using electronic voting systems.

VI. CONCLUSION 

The Brennan Center
Task Force found that the voting systems most commonly purchased today are
vulnerable to attacks and errors that could change the outcome of statewide
elections.
  This finding should surprise no one.  A review of the history of both election
fraud and voting systems literature in the United States shows that voting
systems have always been vulnerable to attack. 
People have tried to "stuff the ballot box" since senators wore
togas.  Indeed, it is impossible to
imagine a voting system that could be entirely, infallibly impervious to
attack.

But straightforward countermeasures can
substantially reduce the most serious security risks presented by the three
systems.  Jurisdictions with the
political will can protect their voting systems from attack.
  The
measures identified here -  auditing
voter-verified paper records, banning wireless components, using transparent
and random selection processes for auditing, adopting effective policies for
addressing evidence of fraud or error in vote totals, and conducting parallel
testing - are achievable with effort.[14]  However it must be stressed that all these
require human coordination.  Our
system of elections, run in 13,000 separate jurisdictions largely by part-time
or volunteer officials, introduces numerous entry points for error, confusion
and mischief.  Fixing our electronic
voting systems requires more than a technical fix.  It requires a serious national
commitment to election administration.

Do all
the problems mean the United
States should abandon electronic voting and
return to paper ballots or other systems? 
We do not believe so.  Paper is
not a panacea.  The other, earlier voting
systems were rife with problems of their own, as we all recall.  Done right, electronic voting could be a true
improvement in the way we elect our leaders. 
Done wrong, electronic voting can create new opportunities for fraud, lost
votes and inaccurate counts - all while diminishing confidence.  So far, sad to say, America has not done this
transition well.  If Congress acts, we
can move measurably closer to the ideal of every vote counting.  The Brennan Center
urges members of Congress to adopt these recommended measures as soon as
possible.

Appendix
A: About the Task Force

In 2005, the Brennan Center convened a Task Force of
internationally renowned government, academic, and private-sector scientists,
voting machine experts and security professionals to conduct the nation's first
systematic analysis of security vulnerabilities in the three most commonly
purchased electronic voting systems.  The
Task Force spent more than a year conducting its analysis and drafting this report.
During this time, the methodology, analysis, and text were extensively peer
reviewed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST").

The
members of the Task Force are:

Chair
Lawrence
D. Norden, Brennan
Center for Justice 

Principal
Investigator

Eric
L. Lazarus, DecisionSmith.

Experts
Georgette
Asherman, independent statistical consultant, founder of Direct Effects

Professor
Matt Bishop, University of California at Davis

Lillie
Coney, Electronic Privacy
Information Center

Professor
David Dill, Stanford
University

Jeremy
Epstein, PhD, Cyber Defense Agency LLC

Harri
Hursti, independent consultant, former CEO of F-Secure PLC

Dr.
David Jefferson, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Chair of the
California Secretary of State's Voting Systems Technology Assessment and
Advisory Board

Professor
Douglas W. Jones, University
of Iowa

John
Kelsey, PhD, NIST

Rene
Peralta, PhD, NIST

Professor
Ronald Rivest, MIT

Howard
A. Schmidt, Former Chief Security Officer, Microsoft and eBay

Dr.
Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Internet Security

Joshua
Tauber, PhD, formerly of the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory at MIT

Professor
David Wagner, University of California at Berkeley

Professor
Dan Wallach, Rice
University

Matthew Zimmerman, Electronic Frontier Foundation
 

Appendix B: Methodology

In developing the study of voting
system security vulnerabilities, the Brennan
Center brought together
some of the nation's leading election officials, as well as a Task Force of
internationally recognized experts in the fields of computer science, election
policy, security, voting systems, and statistics.  After considering several approaches to measuring
the strength of election security, this group unanimously selected a model
that: (a) identified and categorized the potential threats against voting
systems, (b) prioritized these threats based upon an agreed-upon metric (which
would identify how "difficult" each threat is to accomplish from the attacker's
point of view), and (c) determined (utilizing the same metric employed to
prioritize threats) how much more difficult each of the catalogued attacks
would become after various sets of countermeasures were implemented.

After several months of work,
including a public threat analysis workshop hosted by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, the Task Force identified and categorized more than
120 threats to the three voting systems. 
The threats generally fell into one or more of nine broad categories:
(1) the insertion of corrupt software into machines prior to Election Day; (2)
wireless and other remote attacks on voting machines on Election Day; (3)
attacks on tally servers; (4) mis-calibration of voting machines; (5) shut-off
of voting machine features intended to assist voters; (6) denial-of-service
attacks; (7) actions by corrupt poll workers or others at the polling place to
affect votes cast; (8) vote buying schemes; and (9) attacks on ballots or voter-verified
paper trails.

The Task Force determined that the
best single metric for determining the "difficulty" of each of these attacks
was the number of informed participants necessary to execute the attack
successfully.  An "informed participant"
is someone whose participation is needed to make the attack work, and who knows
enough about the attack to foil or expose it.

For each attack, Task Force members
looked at how many informed participants would be necessary to change the
outcome of a reasonably close statewide election in which all votes were cast
on one of the three voting systems analyzed. 
The statewide election we looked at was a fictional gubernatorial race
between Tom Jefferson and Johnny Adams in a composite jurisdiction, Pennasota.  Pennasota was created by aggregating the
results of the 2004 presidential election in 10 "battleground" states, as
determined by Zogby International polls in the spring, summer, and fall of
2004.

Election for Governor
/ State of Pennasota 2007

Candidate

Party

Total Votes

Percentage of Votes

Tom Jefferson

Dem.-Rep.

1,769,818

51.1

Johnny Adams

Federalists

1,689,650

48.8

To figure out how many informed
participants would be needed to change the outcome of this election and make
Johnny Adams the next Governor of Pennasota, the experts broke down each attack
into its necessary parts, assigned a value representing the minimum number of
persons they believed would be necessary to accomplish each part, and then determined
how many times the attack would need to be repeated to reverse the election
results.

At the conclusion of this process,
election officials were interviewed to determine whether they agreed with the
assigned steps and values.  When
necessary, the steps and values were modified to reflect feedback from the
officials. 

After the attacks were prioritized
by level of difficulty, Task Force members reviewed how much more difficult
each attack would become if various sets of countermeasures were
implemented.  The process for determining
the difficulty of overcoming countermeasures was exactly the same as the
process for determining attack difficulty: each step necessary to overcome the
countermeasure was identified and given a value equal to the number of persons
necessary to accomplish that step. 
Election officials were again consulted to confirm that the steps and
values assigned were reasonable.

To ensure that the results of our
analysis were robust and not limited to the composite jurisdiction of
Pennasota, we ran our threat analysis against the actual results of the 2004
presidential election in Florida, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania.  All of the results and findings discussed in
this summary applied to our analyses of these three states.


[1] Michael
Waldman was Special Assistant to the President for Policy Coordination and
Assistant to the President and Director of Speechwriting for President Bill
Clinton.  During his government service,
he was the top administration policy aide on political reform.  He was a Lecturer in Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of
Government, former executive director of Public Citizen's Congress Watch, and
is the author or editor of five books on government, the presidency and the
law.  He is a graduate of Columbia University and New York University
School of Law.

[2] Lawrence
Norden et al., The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System
Security, Accessibility, Usability and Cost (Brennan Center
for Justice ed., 2006), available at http://brennancenter.org/subpage.asp?key=38&init_key=105

[3] For a
list of Task Force members see Appendix
A of this Statement. The study's methodology is described in Appendix B.

[4] See Lawrence Norden et
al.
, supra, note 2.

[5] Id.
at 3.

[6] The
states that have some kind of statutory requirement for audits are: AZ, CA, CO,
CT, HI, IL, ME, MN, NM, NY, NC, WA, and WV.

[7] The Brennan Center recommends voter-verified audit
records that are independent of the software used in voting machines.  The only such technology currently available
and in use - and the only technology studied by the Task Force - is voter-verified
paper records.  Non-paper technologies
that meet this standard may be developed and available in the future.

[8] The 27
states are: AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, HI, ID, IL, ME, MI, MN, MO, MT, NC, NH, NJ, NM,
NV, NY, OH, OR, SD, UT, VT, WA, WI, and WV.

[9] Laws
providing for inexpensive candidate-initiated recounts might also add security
for voter-verified paper trails.  The Brennan
Center Security Report did not examine such recounts as a potential
countermeasure.

[10] Two other states, West Virginia and Maine, ban networking of machines without banning wireless components themselves.  Banning the use of wireless components (even when that involves disabling them), rather than requiring removal of these components, still leaves voting systems unnecessarily insecure.

[11] See Requiring
Software Independence in VVSG 2006: STS Recommendations for the TGDC
and Wireless Issues and STS Recommendations for
the TGDC
, available at http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf
and http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnWirelessInVVSG2007-20061120.pdf
respectively.

[12]
According to the American Bankers Association, a conservative estimate for the annual
maintenance of the country's ATMs is more than $4.5 billion.  Source: http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/80468433-4225-11D4-AAE6-00508B95258D/41737/2ATMFacts1.pdf.

[13] Lawrence
Norden et al., The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System
Security, Accessibility, Usability and Cost (Brennan Center
for Justice ed., 2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/stack_detail.asp?key=97&subkey=38150&proj_k...

[14] Even
routine parallel testing and audits of voter verified paper records - perhaps
the most costly and time consuming countermeasures reviewed in the joint threat
analysis - have been shown to be quite inexpensive.  Jocelyn Whitney, Project Manager for parallel
testing activities in the State of California, provided the Brennan Center with
data showing that the total cost of parallel testing in California was
approximately 12 cents per vote cast
on DREs.  E-mail from Jocelyn Whitney
(February 25, 2006) (on file with the Brennan Center).  Harvard L. Lomax, Registrar of Voters for Clark County, Nevada,
estimates that a Task Force of auditors can review 60 votes on a voter-verified
paper trail in four hours.  Assuming that
auditors are paid $12 per hour and that each Task Force has two auditors, the
cost of such audits should be little more than 3 cents per vote, if 2% of all votes are audited.  Telephone Interview with Harvard L. Lomax
(March 23, 2006).  Each of these costs
represents a tiny fraction of what jurisdictions already spend annually on
elections.  The Brennan Center's study of
voting system costs shows that, for instance, most jurisdictions spend far more
than this on printing ballots (as much as $0.92 per ballot), programming
machines (frequently more than $0.30 per vote, per election), or storing and
transporting voting systems.  Lawrence
Norden et al., The Machinery of Democracy: Voting System
Security, Accessibility, Usability and Cost (Brennan Center for Justice
ed., 2006).