The California Election Interference Law Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It will also suggest questions, scenarios, and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election interference generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election interference by government officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of the right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election and Poll Observers

Congressional observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and manmade disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI)critical infrastructure.

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025.

* The availability of services and other support, if requested, is dependent on department resources and other factors.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Governor of California

The governor of California serves as the chief executive officer of the state. California’s executive office also includes elected officials and administrators. The governor represents California and handles the operation of California’s government. Gov. Gavin Newsom was elected in 2018 and is currently serving his second four-year term.

With respect to elections, according to the emergency procedures published by the California secretary of state, the governor has the power to cancel and reschedule an election “in the case of emergency or disaster” in accordance with Cal. Gov’t Code § 8571 (2024). In 2020, Governor Newsom used this authority to issue multiple executive orders modifying election procedures, including Executive Order N-64–20 and Executive Order N-67–20. This authority was challenged, and the court concluded that the issuance of such orders “did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”

Notably, according to the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, since 1975, the burden of paying for the associated cost of election-related requirements imposed on counties falls, in most cases, on the state. These requirements are called “reimbursable mandates.”

Separately, per the California Constitution (Cal. Const. art. V, § 7), Governor Newsom is the commander in chief of the state’s militia — which consists of the National Guard, the State Guard, and the Naval Militia — and “may call it forth to execute the law” (Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 120 (2024)).

California National Guard

Major General Matthew P. Beevers serves as the adjutant general of the California Military Department “at the pleasure of the Governor.” In this role, he is the “commander of all state military forces” (Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 160 (2024)), which include the California Army National Guard and the California Air National Guard. Governor Newsom appointed Beevers in June 2023.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), national guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command "runs from the President to the defense Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

The limits on the president’s authority to federalize the national guard are currently being litigated in federal court in California. On June 19, the Ninth Circuit held that the president could federalize members of the California National Guard to assist in executing federal law in Los Angeles after some protesters engaged in violent acts; however, the district court subsequently held that some of the Guard’s actions violated the Posse Comitatus Act, and it enjoined future violations (the district court’s order has been stayed pending appeal).

Select examples of California National Guard federalization

1992 – Los Angeles riots (after request from governor of California)

President George H.W. Bush authorized the Secretary of Defense to “call into the active military service of the United States units or members of the National Guard, as authorized by law, to serve in an active duty status for an indefinite period and until relieved by appropriate orders.” Executive Order 12804 and Proclamation 6427 (May 1, 1992). “The Pentagon activated ‘Operation Garden Plot’—the DoD’s civil disturbance plan—forming Joint Task Force-LA (JTF-LA). It was reported that 4,000 Army and Marine troops and 1,000 federal officers, including U.S. Marshals and Customs and Border Patrol agents, were deployed to maintain order.”

2025 – Los Angeles (contested federalization)

In a presidential memo to the Secretary of Defense dated June 7, 2025, President Trump wrote, “I hereby call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. [§] 12406 to temporarily protect ICE and other United States Government personnel who are performing Federal functions, including the enforcement of Federal law, and to protect Federal property, at locations where protests against these functions are occurring or are likely to occur based on current threat assessments and planned operations.”

The following day, Governor Newsom issued a press release stating that “President Trump — disregarding Governor Newsom — federalized California National Guard troops in Los Angeles at a time when there were no unmet law enforcement needs,” and filed suit against President Trump, arguing that “the [federal] takeover violates the U.S. Constitution and exceeds the President’s Title 10 authority, not only because the takeover occurred without the consent or input of the Governor, as federal law requires, but also because it was unwarranted.”

The situation continues to evolve. On or prior to July 1, the secretary of defense approved the release of approximately 150 California National Guard members from the “Federal Protection mission.” Then, on August 5, the DOD issued a new activation order to deploy troops in California for another 90 days.

On August 13, in a three-day trial before U.S. District Judge Breyer, “Newsom called Trump’s deployment of troops an unlawful use of the military and [asked] the judge to bar them from carrying out law enforcement activities.” Reuters summarized the arguments as follows:

The Justice Department has argued that the U.S. Constitution empowers a president to deploy troops domestically to protect federal personnel and property, citing Supreme Court precedent. California has said the troops deployed by Trump have strayed into law enforcement functions such as providing a ‘show of force’ at a park in Los Angeles to deter protests and taking part in a raid on a marijuana farm about 100 miles (160 km) from the city…. Justice Department lawyers told the judge that Trump acted within his powers and that the troops are not carrying out law enforcement duties. But military figures testified that armed troops and combat vehicles accompanied immigration agents on raids even when internal assessments showed low risk to personnel, and twice detained people for a short time.

On September 2, Judge Breyer issued an order blocking the Trump administration from using the military to fight crime in California, finding that the administration violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Within hours of the ruling, California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a motion asking the judge to return the remaining National Guard troops to California’s command under Newsom. The administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which issued a stay, pausing Judge Breyer’s order pending appeal.

California Secretary of State

Shirley N. Weber has served as California’s secretary of state since January 2021, when she was appointed by Governor Newsom to replace former Secretary of State Alex Padilla. Secretary Weber was then elected to a full four-year term in November 2022. The office of the secretary of state is established by the California Constitution and detailed in the California Government Code (tit. 2, div. 3, pt. 2, ch. 3).

As the state’s chief election official, the secretary of state is responsible for administering the provisions of the California Elections Code. To ensure that state election laws are enforced, the secretary has certain investigative authorities, including examining ballots, vote-counting computer programs, mail ballot envelopes and applications, and other election records as deemed necessary (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12172.5).

The secretary of state’s office oversees county administration of all federal and state elections within California, advises local election officials on how to administer elections, coordinates and compiles vote tabulations from each county, and certifies final election results. The office is responsible for maintaining the statewide voter registration system, testing and approving all voting equipment used in the state, tracking and certifying initiatives for the statewide ballot, determining the order of candidates on the ballot, printing and mailing the statewide voter guide, maintaining campaign finance filings and lobbying disclosures, safeguarding the state archives, commissioning notaries, and maintaining business filings.

Additionally, the secretary of state has regulatory authority to promulgate election-related regulations and directives that ensure uniform standards and compliance (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12172.5). These typically require formal rulemaking under California’s Administrative Procedure Act (Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 11340–361) to be made permanent. Select examples include:

• Voting system certification. Establishes the security and certification requirements for voting system testing, hearings, and certification ( Code Regs. tit. 2, div. 7, ch. 6.1).
• Petition processing, signature verification, ballot processing, and ballot counting. Sets uniform standards for examining initiatives, referendums, and nominating petitions; verifying signatures; and processing ballots ( Code Regs. tit. 2, div. 7, ch. 8.3).
• Election observation procedures. Standardizes observer roles, election site protocols, definitions, and transparency (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, div. 7, ch. 8.2).

In exceptional circumstances, the secretary of state can also implement emergency regulations. If the secretary “makes a finding that the adoption of a regulation or order of repeal is necessary to address an emergency,” then the APA authorizes emergency rulemaking (Cal. Gov’t Code § 11346.1). For example, the secretary adopted emergency rules on September 28, 2020. Current regulations under the authority of the secretary of state can be found on the office’s official website.

In addition to formal regulations, the secretary of state may issue county clerk/registrar of voters advisories (CCROV Advisories). These formal memoranda have covered a wide range of topics, including voting technology protocols, ballot drop box requirements, and language access. CCROVs are also posted on the secretary of state’s website.

Election Interference

• Elec. Code § 18502: Prohibits interfering with election officials administering an election or conducting a canvass and interfering with voters lawfully exercising their right to vote in an election.
• Elec. Code § 18564: Prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with the correct operation of or willfully damaging voting equipment; interfering with or attempting to interfere with ballot software program source codes or the secrecy of voting; and knowingly and without authorization making or having passwords or access keys to a voting machine that is or will be used in an election.
• Elec. Code § 18570: Prohibits removing or defacing any posted copy of the results of votes cast within 48 hours of the polls closing and delaying delivery of or changing the copy of the result of votes cast that is to be delivered to the city or county elections official.
• Elec. Code § 18571: Prohibits refusing to obey any lawful order of the county elections official or their deputy when serving on a counting board.
• Elec. Code § 18575: Prohibits acting as an election officer or performing or discharging the ballot handling, counting, or canvassing duties of an election officer without having first been appointed as an election officer.

Election Material Retention

Various California laws and regulations, including Cal. Elec. Code §§ 17000–603, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain periods of time. The table below summarizes these requirements.

Election Observers

• Code Regs. tit. 2, § 20878: Prohibits election observers from interfering with or disrupting election administration activities and lists several prohibited activities, including touching or handling ballots or any voting equipment or voting materials; participating in any electioneering activities or displaying or wearing any political party or campaign material; wearing a security personnel uniform; and touching an election official.
• Code Regs. tit. 2, § 20876: Requires election officials to post election observer restrictions “conspicuously.”

Emergency Powers

• Gov’t Code § 8571: Authorizes the governor to suspend any regulatory statute; any statute prescribing the procedure for conduct of state business; and the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency during emergencies.
• Gov’t Code § 11346.1: Authorizes state agencies to adopt emergency regulations and orders “if a state agency makes a finding that adoption . . . is necessary to address an emergency.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Const. art. I, § 5: Subordinates the military to civil power and prohibits the maintenance of a standing army during peacetime.
• Penal Code § 11460: Prohibits the “assembl[y] as a paramilitary organization for the purpose of practicing with weapons,” and the teaching or demonstration of “the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive, or destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death” with the knowledge or intent that they “will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in the furtherance of a civil disorder.”
• Mil. & Vet. Code § 422: Prohibits the unauthorized wearing of military uniform.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• Elec. Code § 18540: Prohibits using or threatening the use of force, violence, or tactics of coercion or intimidation to compel any person to vote or refrain from voting or because any person voted or refrained from voting.
• Elec. Code § 18544: Prohibits possessing a firearm in the vicinity of a polling place without an elections official’s written authorization.
• Elec. Code § 18545: Prohibits hiring a person in possession of a firearm to be stationed in the immediate vicinity of a polling location without the elections official’s written authorization.
• Elec. Code §§ 18580–82: Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce a voter, someone assisting a voter, or an election official. Private citizens, election officials, and the state’s attorney general may enforce this law, including by obtaining injunctive relief.

In lawsuits to enforce prohibitions on voter and election worker intimidation, a person who openly carries a firearm or imitation firearm while interacting with or observing any other person voting, attempting to vote, or exercising election administration duties (including counting votes, canvassing, or certifying an election) or while urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote is “presumed to have engaged in intimidation.”

• Penal Code § 171b: Prohibits bringing a firearm into or possessing a firearm within a state or local public building or at any meeting required to be open to the public.
• Penal Code § 26230: Prohibits a person who is licensed to carry a firearm from carrying a concealed firearm into a local or state government building or “a polling place, voting center, precinct, or other area or location where votes are being cast or cast ballots are being returned or counted, or the streets or sidewalks immediately adjacent to any of these places.”

Other Relevant Laws and Regulations

• Code Regs. tit. 2, § 20133: Assigns responsibility for determining the number and placement of ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations to county election officials.

Definitions

See Cal. Elec. Code, div. 0.5, ch. 4 and Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 20872.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering the application of any statute should consult with counsel who can complete legal research to determine if and how the courts have interpreted that statute.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, ballot drop-off locations, drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations, reviewing the applicable state laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

California state law and federal law protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, state law may require that they be unarmed and not in uniform when they vote in person.

Discussion

Cal. Elec. Code § 18544(a) prohibits “any person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel” from being stationed in the immediate vicinity of or posted at a polling place “without written authorization of the appropriate city or county elections official.” Cal. Elec. Code § 18544(b) lists exemptions to these prohibitions, which include a “peace officer . . . who is at the polling place to cast his or her vote.” Notably, Cal. Penal Code § 830.8(a) excludes federal law enforcement officials from the definition of peace officers (“Federal criminal investigators and law enforcement officers are not California peace officers.”).

Federal law also restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” At the same time, federal law provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review policies that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
• Update policies as necessary, with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute the policy.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers may not apply.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the department has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states.

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation between government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including the Missouri secretary of state and the Texas attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. The act provides express authorization for Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office.” The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1) grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, it has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated, “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to the confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on Committee on House Administration letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies the conditions under which state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Federal restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote. And Cal. Elec. Code § 18502 prohibits interfering with election officials administering an election or conducting a canvass.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal law on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers.
• Speak with other local election officials whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate policies.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location while conducting official business in the course of their public employment

Summary

Depending on the location of an in-person voting site, federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites at federal locations — that is, located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations.

Discussion

If an in-person voting location is located on federal land or in a federal building, federal officials may appear frequently in the vicinity in the course of conducting routine business. Cal. Elec. Code § 18544(a) prohibits “any person in possession of a firearm or any uniformed peace officer, private guard, or security personnel or any person who is wearing a uniform of a peace officer, guard, or security personnel” from being stationed in the immediate vicinity of or posted at a polling place “without written authorization of the appropriate city or county elections official.”

Cal. Elec. Code § 18544(b) lists exemptions to these prohibitions, which include a “peace officer who is conducting official business in the course of his or her public employment,” and a “private guard or security personnel hired or arranged for by the owner or manager of the facility or property in which the polling place is located if the guard or security personnel is not hired or arranged solely for the day on which an election is held.”

Notably, Cal. Penal Code § 830.8(a) excludes federal law enforcement officials from the definition of peace officers. Therefore, federal officials do not typically qualify for the “official business” exemption in Cal. Elec. Code § 18544(b)(2). However, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 830.8(b), federal officials may qualify as California peace officers under certain circumstances when they have “written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police” and are on federal property or “on any street, sidewalk, or property adjacent thereto.”

If an in-person voting location is located within a federal building, additional jurisdictional issues may arise. In these circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review in-person voting location sites to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
• Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
• If there are polling locations where the concerns outlined above may arise, meet with local law enforcement to determine whether any federal officials have their consent to serve as California peace officers and the terms of any agreements with federal officials. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to keep elections safe and secure.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents as necessary.
• Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
• Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop box or drop-off location on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building

Summary

Complex jurisdictional issues can also arise when ballot drop boxes or drop-off locations are on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings. In these situations too, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence than they would at other locations.

Discussion

Local election officials determine the number and locations of ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 20133). Appropriate factors to consider when making siting decisions include voter convenience and proximity to public transportation. These factors may lead election officials to select federal locations.

If a ballot drop box or drop-off location is in a federal facility, then 18 U.S.C. § 930(a)’s prohibition on carrying firearms typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review your jurisdiction’s ballot drop box and drop-off location list to determine whether any are on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building.
• Discuss siting decisions that result in a ballot drop box or drop-off location being located at a federal location with your counsel. Consider informing voters that certain locations are on federal property or in a federally owned facility.
• Once the locations have been confirmed, meet with relevant federal facilities managers or other relevant federal officials to discuss potential issues and agree on rules and procedures that will apply.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop box or drop-off location not on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building

Summary

Certain federal officials may qualify for an exemption to prohibitions against carrying weapons and being stationed near voting locations that apply to ballot drop box and drop-off locations not located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.

Discussion

Ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations are often inside or in the vicinity of polling places, many of which are located in and adjacent to public schools, public libraries, and other public buildings often used as voting centers or precinct-based voting locations. Ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations are also places where voting is occurring. Thus, various prohibitions on carrying guns in the vicinity of voting locations, near where voting is taking place, and in government buildings would apply to federal officials carrying firearms near ballot drop-off locations and drop boxes — unless they qualify for an exemption.

For instance, Cal. Penal Code § 26230(a)(25) prohibits anyone licensed to carry a concealed firearm from carrying a firearm into “a polling place, voting center, precinct, or other area or location where votes are being cast or cast ballots are being returned or counted, or the streets or sidewalks immediately adjacent to any of these places.” However, Cal. Penal Code § 26230(g) states that “nothing in this section shall prohibit the carrying of a firearm where it is otherwise expressly authorized by law.” A federal official carrying a weapon may qualify for this exemption.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to ballot drop box or drop-off locations.
• Consider posting signage regarding weapon prohibitions at in-person voting locations, especially those with adjacent ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations. A guide with customizable gun safety signage templates by the Center for Civic Design is available here.
• Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near ballot drop box or drop-off locations.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office

Summary

If an election office is located in a state or local government building, then state law (including prohibitions against carrying weapons in these buildings) and local restrictions (which may include building-specific rules or access conditions) apply. However, certain federal officials may qualify for an exemption.

Discussion

Cal. Penal Code § 171b prohibits anyone from carrying guns into local and state government buildings and at meetings required to be open to the public unless they qualify for an exemption to this prohibition. As federal law enforcement officials typically carry guns, state law would prohibit federal law enforcement officials from entering an election office located in a state or local government building. However, Cal. Penal Code § 171b(b)(2)(A) exempts “a full-time paid peace officer of another state or the federal government who is carrying out official duties while in California” from this prohibition.

Other state laws may restrict federal officials’ access to election offices if they attempt to interfere with election administration. For example, Cal. Elec. Code § 18502 prohibits interfering with an election official who is “holding an election or conducting a canvass.” In addition, Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18580–82 prohibit intimidating, threatening, or coercing anyone for “exercising any powers or duties to administer elections.”

Although Cal. Elec. Code § 18581(b)(1) states that anyone “who openly carries a firearm or imitation firearm while interacting with or observing” election-related activity is “presumed to have engaged in intimidation prohibited by this section,” Cal. Elec. Code § 18581(b)(2) qualifies that “a law enforcement officer acting within the scope of their official duties is not subject to the presumption.” That being said, federal law enforcement may not qualify for this exemption: Cal. Elec. Code § 18580(c) holds that the definition of law enforcement officer in Cal. Penal Code § 13519.05 (which does not include federal law enforcement officers) applies. In any event, the provision exempts a law enforcement officer from the presumption of intimidation, not from liability if they are intimidating.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to your office.
• Consider including prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, and presumptions of intimidation on signage at your office. A guide with customizable gun safety signage templates by the Center for Civic Design is available here.
• Provide or cite Elec. Code §§ 18580–82 when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at your office.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state law strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting” (52 U.S.C. § 20701). Election officials must “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. Separately, California state law designates “election officials” as responsible for “keep[ing]” and “preserv[ing]” election records, including voted ballots (Cal. Elec. Code § 17302), voter rosters (Cal. Elec. Code § 17300), and certain voter registration materials (Cal. Elec. Code § 17001).

State and federal law may limit or establish access conditions to the information that local California election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” but only if the Attorney makes a demand “in writing… [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” Some state and local entities are currently in discussions with the DOJ regarding the bounds of what data they are either obligated to or prohibited from providing. The department has filed at least one civil lawsuit against a local election official in California, and has filed a civil lawsuit against the California secretary of state.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” Cal. Elec. Code § 18502 prohibits interfering with election officials administering an election or conducting a canvass.

California state law also prohibits “interfering or attempting to interfere with the correct operation of or willfully damaging voting equipment, or interfering with or attempting to interfere with ballot software program source codes or the secrecy of voting” (Cal. Elec. Code § 18564).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
• Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of this policy to uninvited law enforcement who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Update any policies and protocols as necessary on the basis of these discussions, with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters.
• Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only spaces can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
• If a request, demand, subpoena, or other demand is presented, consult with your your counsel as soon as possible. Please note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case. Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
• When appropriate, consult with the California Association of Clerks and Election Officials, the office of the secretary of state, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location

Summary

Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the Army, Navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have] under his authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely prohibits federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether it was intended to intimidate or not. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, such as voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. California law contains a similar prohibition, but according to Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18580–82, in lawsuits to enforce the state prohibition on voter and election worker intimidation, a person who openly carries a firearm or imitation firearm while interacting with or observing another person voting, attempting to vote, counting or canvassing votes, or certifying an election, or while urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, is “presumed to have engaged in intimidation.”

While law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their official duties are not subject to the presumption of intimidation attached to openly carrying firearms, a court may nevertheless consider firearm possession in determining whether such an officer violated the law. Moreover, Cal. Elec. Code § 18580(c) adopts the definition of law enforcement officer from the California Penal Code — which does not include federal law enforcement officials (Cal. Penal Code § 13519.05).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, and presumptions of intimidation on signage posted at in-person voting locations, including ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations. A guide with customizable gun safety signage templates by the Center for Civic Design is available here.
• Provide or cite the abovementioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at in-person voting locations.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.

Scenario: Deployment of federal agents to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

California state law prohibits voter intimidation. Cal. Elec. Code § 18580.According to Cal. Elec. Code §§ 18580–82, in lawsuits to enforce the prohibition on voter and election worker intimidation, a person who openly carries a firearm or imitation firearm while interacting with or observing another person voting, attempting to vote, counting or canvassing votes, or certifying an election, or while urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, is “presumed to have engaged in intimidation.”

While law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their official duties are not subject to the presumption of intimidation attached to openly carrying firearms, a court may nevertheless consider firearm possession in determining whether such an officer violated the law. Moreover, Cal. Elec. Code § 18580(c) adopts the definition of law enforcement officer from the California Penal Code — which does not include federal law enforcement officials (Cal. Penal Code § 13519.05).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (office of mayor, school superintendent) to understand your role in helping voters in your community feel safe exercising their rights to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (schools, community centers, nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and applicability of these policies during the voting process.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

Summary

U.S. Postal Service policies establish special handling requirements that serve to prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only, or largely only, impact election mail are possible, but would require changes to current USPS policies (which would likely require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure provides some protection against hasty policy and leadership changes.

Discussion

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, USPS plays a vital role in election administration. Mail-in voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could arise for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Election officials’ ability to prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays is largely limited to state and local election mail processes and procedures over which they have authority, such as providing alternative options like ballot drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

USPS governance

Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by “single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency head[s],” USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch,” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). “Guided by statute and its bylaws, the [B]oard ‘directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.’” The Governors select the U.S. Postmaster General (PMG) and “have the power to remove the [PMG].” The PMG “serves as chief executive officer of USPS and is responsible for USPS operations. The postmaster general, as directed by the board, directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”

Current USPS election mail policies

“The Postal Service’s role is clear — [to] deliver the mail… USPS is responsible for processing, transporting and delivering the nation’s Election Mail safely, securely and on time.” The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which included explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share important information, such as design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume, and troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report any problems to org.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with colleagues and other election officials.
• Continue to encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

This information is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.