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Analysis

Evaluating the Privacy and Equity Concerns Posed by Digital Vaccine Credentials

There’s still much to be done to ensure privacy in vaccine verification systems.

November 18, 2021

As vaccin­a­tion rates increase and vaccine mandates are imple­men­ted to reduce the spread of Covid-19 and save lives, digital vaccine creden­tials are the latest public health tech innov­a­tion to emerge from the pandemic. These creden­tials make it easier to provide proof of Covid-19 vaccin­a­tion status, compared to carry­ing around paper cards from the Centers for Disease Control and Preven­tion, and may play an import­ant role in support­ing efforts to return to normalcy.

But we must ensure that privacy and equity concerns are addressed in order to maxim­ize the adop­tion of digital creden­tials. States that choose to release digital vaccine creden­tials should proact­ively address these concerns rather than scram­bling to fix them on the back end — an approach that contrib­uted to the fail­ure of expos­ure noti­fic­a­tion apps in the United States.

By way of back­ground, digital vaccine creden­tials are gener­ally app- or web-based certi­fic­a­tions of Covid-19 vaccin­a­tion status. They may also include inform­a­tion docu­ment­ing whether someone has tested negat­ive or recovered from Covid-19. Several digital creden­tials, includ­ing the Docket app used by New Jersey, Utah, and Minnesota, are designed to verify a user’s iden­tity and health records against a govern­ment data­base. Some, like New York State’s Excel­sior Pass and the Virginia system, also gener­ate a scan­nable QR code. Others, such as NYC Covid Safe, are simply places where users can store photos of their paper CDC vaccine cards. Because the term “vaccine pass­port” has become some­what conten­tious, some states are describ­ing their systems as digital vaccine records instead.

So far, paper CDC cards are the only stand­ard­ized, national vaccine creden­tial. However, they can be easily damaged, lost, or forged. Digital creden­tials are a conveni­ent, less destruct­ible altern­at­ive for those with a smart­phone, although they will not neces­sar­ily prevent fraud. The NYC Covid Safe app made head­lines when an advoc­ate success­fully uploaded a picture of Mickey Mouse instead of his CDC card as proof of his vaccine status. Reports of false veri­fic­a­tions being stored in New York State’s Excel­sior Pass (a vulner­ab­il­ity that has since been patched) and secur­ity bugs allow­ing users to access other people’s QR codes in the Docket app (also fixed) suggest that issues related to forgery remain a prob­lem. Thus, the ques­tion for the public and state govern­ments to resolve is whether the conveni­ence of supple­ment­ing the paper CDC system with digital creden­tials outweighs the costs, partic­u­larly when it comes to privacy.  

User privacy has emerged as a touch­stone issue in the debate about digital vaccine veri­fic­a­tion, cutting across polit­ical affil­i­ation. Citing concerns about privacy, the Biden admin­is­tra­tion chose not to develop a national vaccine pass­port, instead deleg­at­ing the issue to indi­vidual states and local­it­ies. At least 20 states with Repub­lican governors have chosen to limit or ban vaccine pass­ports through exec­ut­ive order or legis­la­tion. While partisan polit­ics and messaging around indi­vidual free­dom appear to be the primary reason for these restric­tions, privacy concerns are often cited, suggest­ing that elec­ted lead­ers recog­nize that privacy is a signi­fic­ant concern for many users. A number of states remain unde­cided. Only 10 states and cities — includ­ing New York, New Jersey, Utah, Cali­for­niaHawaiiColor­ado, and Louisi­ana — have released digital vaccine creden­tials.

All vaccine creden­tials contain sens­it­ive health inform­a­tion that must be protec­ted against data breaches or misuse. However, the design of some digital pass­ports raises addi­tional privacy vulner­ab­il­it­ies.

For example, Illinois’s Covid-19 immun­iz­a­tion portal asks users to provide their social secur­ity number to facil­it­ate iden­tity veri­fic­a­tion through Experian, which has had several high-profile data breaches. Users were some­times asked to unfreeze their credit for 24 hours to complete the regis­tra­tion process (although the Illinois Depart­ment of Health says that this is no longer neces­sary). Requir­ing users to jump through hurdles like unfreez­ing their credit — a labor-intens­ive process — and asking them to provide more data than is on their paper CDC cards creates barri­ers to util­iz­a­tion. It also creates inequit­ies for those who wish to use the app but do not have a social secur­ity number or access to credit or are worried about protect­ing their credit.    

In addi­tion, in the absence of adequate safe­guards, digital pass­ports that gener­ate scan­nable QR codes create oppor­tun­it­ies for prolonged surveil­lance of people’s move­ments. For instance, New York’s Excel­sior Pass does not track loca­tion, but experts have poin­ted out that a user’s move­ments could poten­tially be traced by the separ­ate veri­fic­a­tion apps that busi­nesses use to scan the pass. Monit­or­ing every time someone’s QR code is scanned at a movie theater, sports stadium, bar, museum, gym, or restaur­ant (all places where proof of vaccin­a­tion is now required in New York City) implic­ates civil liber­ties like free­dom of asso­ci­ation. The risk that this data might be retained and then sold to a third party or provided to law enforce­ment compounds these concerns. For example, digital pass­ports or veri­fic­a­tion apps that track a user’s gran­u­lar loca­tion data might become a source of market­ing data for commer­cial advert­isers or a tool to track indi­vidu­als for immig­ra­tion or poli­cing purposes.

The surveil­lance consequences of vaccine pass­port track­ing could dispro­por­tion­ately affect certain communit­ies. Undoc­u­mented indi­vidu­als, many of whom have already struggled to obtain access to the vaccine, may either avoid using the digital pass­ports or restrict their own move­ments out of fear of immig­ra­tion penal­ties.

The privacy and equity issues posed by digital vaccine creden­tials are likely to persist. Those states that have released digital vaccine pass­ports currently allow for analog proof as well. It is crit­ical that this remain the case for those that do not have a smart­phone or choose not to use the digital options. A system of digital-only vaccine pass­ports would exclude those without smart­phones from economic and social oppor­tun­it­ies. Low-income people and older indi­vidu­als are less likely to have a smart­phone capable of gener­at­ing a QR code or support­ing pass­port apps.

In addi­tion, poli­cy­makers should agree upon uniform privacy stand­ards that tran­scend state lines. While the General Data Protec­tion Regu­la­tion (GDPR) sets baseline stand­ards for protec­tion of personal data in the EU (and efforts have been made to ensure that the EU’s Digital Green Certi­fic­ate complies with these stand­ards), the absence of a federal data privacy law in the US means that privacy protec­tions vary by state. Moreover, because there is no national vaccine registry in the United States, unlike in other coun­tries such as the United King­dom, there are many differ­ent parties collect­ing and dissem­in­at­ing immun­iz­a­tion records. The lack of stand­ard­iz­a­tion under­mines the inter­op­er­ab­il­ity of those digital pass­ports that verify signa­tures from health author­it­ies. While cent­ral­iz­a­tion of data creates privacy vulner­ab­il­it­ies, partic­u­larly with respect to hack­ers and data breaches, decent­ral­iz­a­tion does as well because diverse parties have access to sens­it­ive health inform­a­tion.

In this envir­on­ment, imple­ment­a­tion of federal legal protec­tions for vaccine pass­port data will foster public trust by estab­lish­ing baseline privacy and secur­ity stand­ards. There should be clear limits on data collec­tion, reten­tion, and shar­ing not only for pass­port developers, but also for veri­fic­a­tion apps and those busi­nesses that scan QR codes or other­wise use the apps. The Biden admin­is­tra­tion said last spring that it would work with compan­ies to develop national stand­ards, but has provided little inform­a­tion on such efforts since.

Finally, public­a­tion of inde­pend­ent privacy and secur­ity assess­ments would go a long way in reas­sur­ing a skep­tical public. At a minimum, these assess­ments should eval­u­ate what data is collec­ted by digital vaccine creden­tials, how it is stored, and if it is shared with any third parties. This inform­a­tion should be presen­ted in a user-friendly format and reflect whether the pass­ports comply with minimum stand­ards. The CDC recom­men­ded similar assess­ments be conduc­ted for expos­ure noti­fic­a­tion apps, but states gener­ally either did not perform them or kept the results private.

Whether in digital or paper form, vaccine creden­tials will undoubtedly have a role to play in veri­fy­ing compli­ance with vaccine mandates and will factor into reopen­ing plans for states and cities. For the digital version to be success­ful, it is imper­at­ive that safe­guards are put in place to protect user data. And for equity reas­ons, analog options should also always be accep­ted.