Anticipating Election Misinformation in the 2026 Midterms

For years now, voters have faced false and misleading claims about the integrity of elections. However, past experience with when and how certain false information appears allows voters an opportunity to know ahead of time which inaccurate claims they’re likely to see.

Misinformation may develop from a lack of understanding about how elections work, especially where procedures vary from state to state. In addition, politically motivated actors spread disinformation — false information that intentionally seeks to undermine confidence in elections or to lay the groundwork to challenge legitimate results. Voters should prepare for both in the 2026 midterms.

And this year, there are two additional challenges.

First, the federal government has cut many of the resources and programs that previously helped support state election security. Those cuts make it harder for state and local officials to respond to coordinated disinformation efforts and leave them with fewer partners to help rebut false claims.

Second, the Trump administration has made the U.S. government itself a driver of false and misleading information about elections, using federal agencies to advance disinformation about voting systems, election processes, and results. For example, the administration has redirected law enforcement to investigate elections, sued states over access to voter data, and released and mischaracterized intelligence reports. It has also shared flawed data on noncitizen voting and attempted to alter state voting processes by issuing unconstitutional executive orders and unlawfully withholding federal funds.

While presidential contests tend to drown out other races and focus attention on a handful of familiar swing states, midterm elections bring more attention to the far greater number of states and counties that could determine control of Congress. State and local election officials who may not be accustomed to heightened scrutiny could find themselves facing a flood of attention and ensuing misinformation.

Despite these challenges, the predictability of election misinformation makes it possible for Americans to anticipate when they will most likely see certain false claims and what those claims will be. Deceptive content often reflects what voters are experiencing and thinking at each step of an election; understanding these key dates and the likely narratives around them can help build resilience. And because these false and misleading claims tend to focus on the same themes year after year, such as false claims of widespread fraud, we can anticipate the rumors likely to emerge at different points in the election process.

Researchers at the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public have found that election misinformation often tracks the election timeline, taking advantage of voters’ attention and ongoing events to form false or misleading narratives. By understanding how the election process unfolds, from registering and casting ballots to counting votes and certifying final results, public officials, media, civil society, and others can prepare voters to recognize misinformation and make sure they have the information they need to vote with confidence.

Preelection

In the months leading up to Election Day, mis- and disinformation begin to spread as voters form opinions about contests and make plans for how, when, and where to vote.

By October, mail voting is underway in every state. Federal law requires states to send mail ballots to military and overseas voters 45 days before Election Day. States typically begin sending regular mail ballots around this time as well (though some begin even earlier) and continue to send ballots to new voters who request them in the following weeks. In 2024, 29 percent of all voters cast a mail ballot.

At the same time, many first-time voters or voters who have recently moved are registering to vote in the upcoming election. Some states have registration deadlines as early as 30 days before Election Day, while others continue to allow registration through Election Day.

During this time period, we are likely to see — and already have seen — the top-down spread of disinformation from high-profile public officials and influential political personalities. These claims may be made to preemptively diminish confidence in elections in case of unfavorable results, to deter participation in elections, or to signal to followers what they should be on the lookout for in the election. They also pre-seed narratives that can then be referenced later in the election cycle. For example, early misleading claims about voting system vulnerabilities may later motivate investigations into those systems, and alleged noncitizen registration, even when disproven, can be used to cast doubt on results.

Specific false claims may focus on ineligible voters registering to vote, illegal ballot collection activities, voters submitting counterfeit or duplicate mail ballots, and other claims related to registration and mail voting.

Early Voting and Election Day

While some states begin offering in-person early voting at the same time mail voting starts, in-person voting will significantly increase in the two weeks leading up to Election Day, especially on the first few days that each state offers early voting, and continue through Election Day. In 2024, 31 percent of votes were cast early in person and 40 percent were cast in person on Election Day.

As more voters begin casting ballots in person, the sources of rumors are likely to become more diffuse as people observe and misinterpret events on the ground. Influence operations may also deliberately push fake images, video, and audio created by AI that purport to show wrongdoing, or share instances of isolated but real election issues out of context or to advance a misleading narrative. In 2024, NewsGuard found that 22 percent of claims it tracked included AI-generated deepfakes or other digital manipulations. Political leaders and influencers then amplify these diffuse claims to a broader audience.

In the final days before the election, election officials begin accounting for ballots cast. State and local officials report early turnout rates, which can become the source of premature claims about the outcome of the race that bad actors may use to discourage participation. Almost all states also allow election workers to preprocess mail ballots before Election Day, which includes verifying voter eligibility on returned envelopes and scanning (but not counting) ballots, speeding results reporting after polls close. False claims often focus on election officials tallying and disclosing the results of these votes before Election Day, which is prohibited.

During this period, specific false claims may focus on illegal voting, election worker malfeasance, issues with voting systems, and other narratives related to in-person voting.

Postelection

Finally, when polls close, states will begin taking a series of steps to count ballots, report and confirm vote totals, and certify final results. Political leaders, influential figures, government officials, and losing candidates who are unhappy with the election results may start to coalesce around theories or claims that emerged through Election Day to protest results, investigate claims, file lawsuits, or pressure officials to interfere with lawful election process.

In recent elections, misinformation has been particularly active when there is a long wait between when voting ends and when the media is able to report the projected outcome of high-profile races. Specific claims may allege rigged results, especially if there are lead changes as votes are counted.

More Resources

What to Expect When We’re Electing: An Election Rumoring Timeline (Center for an Informed Public)
2026 Administrative Dates & Deadlines (National Association of State Election Directors) 
Roadmap to the Official Count in the 2026 Election (Brennan Center for Justice) 
Election Rumors (Brennan Center for Justice)

False and misleading claims about elections tend to focus on the same core themes year after year, making it possible to anticipate the rumors that will spread. And while the federal government promoting election misinformation presents a new challenge, officials’ statements and actions over the past two years foreshadow some of the most likely claims from that source as well. Below are some of the likely themes that will emerge during the 2026 midterm elections.

Illegal Registration and Voting

Studies consistently show that noncitizens on voter rolls are exceedingly rare, thanks in part to rigorous and continuous voter roll maintenance that states perform and checks in place to prevent ineligible voters from registering. Moreover, to register to vote in federal and state elections, voters must swear they are citizens under penalty of criminal prosecution and deportation. On the occasions where ineligible voters are found on the voter rolls, the fault is often clerical error, not conspiracy.

Instances of voter fraud are even less frequent, because each state has layers of safeguards to prevent ineligible voters from casting a ballot. For mail ballots, these safeguards may include individualized envelopes with unique barcodes, ballot design elements to detect counterfeits, ballot tracking systems, signature verification, and secure drop-off locations.

Despite being unfounded, noncitizen voting is a salient narrative. That is especially true this year, as the Trump administration has repeatedly pushed the false idea that noncitizens are registering to vote and cast ballots in large numbers. The Department of Homeland Security, for example, claimed to find 250,000 noncitizens illegally registered to vote across four states — a claim immediately disputed by these states and based on faulty matches of incomplete data.

The Trump administration has likewise targeted mail voting, with an executive order that would have prevented the U.S. Postal Service from sending ballots to voters who were not on a preapproved list. Courts have blocked this executive order and it will not be in effect for 2026.

False or misleading claims about illegal voting could include:

• Noncitizens are voting in large numbers.
• Mail ballots are being illegally collected and returned on behalf of other voters (often referred to as “ballot harvesting”).
• Ineligible voters are submitting mail ballots, or voters are submitting more than one mail ballot.

More Resources

Noncitizen Voting and Registration Tracker (Declare)
Four Things to Know about Noncitizen Voting (Bipartisan Policy Center)
Mail Ballot Security Features: A Primer (Brennan Center for Justice) 

Foreign Interference

Over the past decade, foreign influence has become a persistent concern for American elections and elections globally, as nation-states push political narratives and exploit division to sway voters. But there is no evidence of foreign interference that altered vote counts, impacted vote counting systems, or otherwise affected the accuracy of elections. Nevertheless, purveyors of election misinformation frequently and sometimes intentionally blur foreign influence (efforts to sway participants in elections) with foreign interference (disrupting election systems and processes).

At a July press conference, President Trump alleged that China had interfered in the 2020 election because Chinese actors had acquired data on over 200 million voters from state voter files — files that in most states are either public information or can be legally purchased by political campaigns and other interested parties. In previous elections, groups linked to nation-states have themselves falsely taken credit for hacking election systems when no such activity occurred, demonstrating a familiar tactic for undermining confidence. 

False or misleading claims about foreign interference could include:

• Foreign adversaries successfully hacked into voter registration systems, voting machines, or other election systems.
• Foreign governments or citizens of other countries requested or returned mail ballots.
• Agents of foreign governments are infiltrating election processes.
• Foreign governments are responsible for political narratives, content, or actions during the election that are carried out by Americans.

More Resources

Countdown to the Midterms: Reexamining Foreign Influence in 2020 Elections (Center for Democracy & Technology) 
Foreign Influence vs. Foreign Interference in Elections (Brennan Center for Justice)

Voting Machines

In all but the smallest jurisdictions, election officials use voting machines to count ballots because they are more accurate, faster, and cheaper than counting all ballots by hand. States have multiple safeguards in place to ensure their accuracy and security. Voting machines are certified to federal and state standards and tested before and after elections. And for nearly every vote, there is a paper record that can be double-checked if there is any doubt about electronic vote counts.

Voting machine error and fraud rumors are common and have been recycled for over a decade. The Trump administration has repeatedly attacked the integrity of voting machines, attempted to change federal standards for voting machines through executive order, and vowed to withhold federal funds from states that use particular machines. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin has seized on the fact that voting machines contain components that can only be sourced from China to argue, without evidence, that Chinese actors could therefore hack voting machines and alter vote counts.

False or misleading claims about voting machines could include:

• All voting machines, or a certain type of voting machine, contain vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to hacking.
• Voting machines were successfully hacked by a foreign adversary or other external actor to alter vote counts.
• Election workers or vendors who perform maintenance on voting machines rigged these machines to alter vote counts.
• Machines are “flipping” votes or altering candidate lists.

More Resources

FAQ: Voting System Vulnerabilities and How They Can Be Weaponized (Center for Democracy & Technology) 
United in Security: How Every State Protects Your Vote in 2026 (Bipartisan Policy Center)

Election Worker Malfeasance

Elections are run at the local level, where voters are served by members of their own community. The processes are transparent, open to observation, bipartisan by design, and built with multiple layers of redundancy and verification.

After the 2020 election, election officials faced a wave of harassment, intimidation, and abuse as political leaders accused them of rigging elections. The pattern has continued this year, escalating to include severe pressure from the federal government. Mullin warned earlier this year that election officials could be “held accountable by fines, by penalties, and even . . . prison time” if they did not cooperate with the administration.

False and misleading claims about election worker malfeasance may include:

• Election workers are registering noncitizens or failing to maintain clean voter rolls.
• Election workers are creating fake mail ballots or destroying real mail ballots.
• Election officials are suppressing votes through polling place closures, technical failures, resource shortages, and/or mismanagement.
• Election workers are stuffing ballots or rigging vote counts.

More Resources

Poll Workers (Brennan Center for Justice) 
Poll Watchers and Challengers (National Conference of State Legislatures)
The Election Chain of Custody Blueprint (Verified Voting)

Claims About Results

Election results are never final on election night — states complete a series of administrative steps over the course of weeks to ensure every vote is counted, to double check totals, and to certify complete and final results. Additionally, some states have needed more time to count ballots in recent elections due to increased mail voting and state laws that outline how election workers must verify those ballots. Because media companies have needed more time to “call” races, many have lamented the fact that they don’t always know who the winner is on election night.

Election denial is widespread and often takes advantage of the slow process of finalizing results. With a quarter of Americans believing that the 2020 election was stolen, it’s clear that such narratives can find widespread purchase. States that are slow to count mail ballots — or that accept mail ballots that are postmarked by Election Day and arrive during a postelection grace period — have been a frequent target of election disinformation, especially when the leads shift as results are reported. The Trump administration has attacked states with these policies and threatened to withhold funding from states that accept mail ballots that arrive after Election Day. (The Supreme Court upheld such state policies earlier this year.)

False or misleading claims about election results could include:

• Shifts as votes are counted after Election Day are evidence of voter fraud or rigged results.
• Victory may be claimed prematurely before results are certified.

More Resources

Roadmap to the Official Count in the 2026 Election (Brennan Center for Justice)
Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for Absentee/Mail Ballots (National Conference of State Legislatures) 
How Election Results Coverage Really Works (Center for Election Innovation & Research)
The ‘Blue Shift’ and ‘Red Mirage’ in Election Results, Explained (Protect Democracy) 

Tim Harper leads the Elections and Democracy Project at the Center for Democracy and Technology.