Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, election offices, or other election facilities under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
Although Arkansas law protects the right to keep and bear arms (see Ark. Const. art. II, § 5), it prohibits carrying a handgun on or about one’s person, in an occupied vehicle, or otherwise readily available for use “with a purpose to attempt to unlawfully employ” it as a weapon against another person (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–120(a)). State law presumes that a “law enforcement officer” or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces acting in the course and scope of official duties is carrying a handgun for a lawful purpose (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–120(c)(2)). Arkansas law defines a “law enforcement officer” as “any public servant vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make an arrest for an offense” (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–1–102(10)). Federal law enforcement officers therefore might fall within that definition.
Additionally, Arkansas law presumes that a “certified law enforcement officer,” whether on or off duty, is carrying a handgun for a lawful purpose (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–120(c)(7)). The term “certified law enforcement officer” appears tied to Arkansas’s state law enforcement certification framework and therefore may not encompass federal officials merely by virtue of their federal positions (Ark. Code Ann. § 12–9–102(3)). At the same time, Arkansas expressly grants certain federal law enforcement officers authority to arrest persons for violations of Arkansas law and gives them the same immunity as certified state law enforcement officers (Ark. Code Ann. § 16–81–106(g)). Those federal officers therefore may have a basis for qualifying as certified law enforcement officers.
Finally, state law presumes a lawful purpose when a person carries a concealed handgun pursuant to a valid or recognized concealed carry license (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–120(c)(8)). However, a concealed handgun license does not authorize carrying a concealed handgun in locations that may serve as polling sites — including courthouses and other county buildings used for court proceedings or housing county offices, courtrooms, governmental bodies’ meeting places, state offices, and school, college, or university campus buildings — subject to exceptions that may apply to certain government-employed licensees whose principal place of employment is in a county building and who are authorized to carry there under a county-approved plan; persons authorized by a judge to carry in a courtroom; or licensed carriers permitted to carry in certain institutions of higher education, as discussed below (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–73–306(5)–(9), (13), 5–73–322(b)–(c), (g)). These exceptions are unlikely to apply to federal personnel merely by virtue of their federal status.
In addition to § 5–73–306’s limitations on where a concealed handgun licensee may carry, Arkansas law independently restricts firearm possession at certain locations that may serve as polling sites.
First, state law prohibits possession of a firearm on the developed property of a public or private K–12 school (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–119(b)(1)(A)). That restriction does not apply to a “law enforcement officer” or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces acting in the course and scope of official duties, and it separately permits possession by a “certified law enforcement officer whether on or off duty” (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–119(e)(2), (6)). As discussed above, federal law enforcement officers might qualify as “law enforcement officers” under Arkansas law’s broad definition, while application of the separate exemption for “certified law enforcement officers” may depend on whether that exemption extends to federal officers who are expressly authorized under Arkansas law to arrest persons for violations of state law and receive the same immunity as certified state law enforcement officers.
Second, state law prohibits possession of a handgun on or about the person, in an occupied vehicle, or otherwise readily available for use with the purpose of employing it as a weapon against another person at a public or private institution of higher education (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–119(c)(1)). This restriction does not apply to a concealed carry licensee who has completed additional training to carry a concealed handgun in the buildings and on the grounds of a public university, college, or community college, nor does it bar licensed concealed carry at a private university or college unless the institution has adopted a policy prohibiting it (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–322(b), (c), (g)). The restriction likewise does not apply to a “law enforcement officer” or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces acting in the course and scope of official duties, and the statute separately permits possession by a “certified law enforcement officer,” whether on or off duty (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–119(e)(2), (6)). The same considerations discussed above regarding whether federal law enforcement officers qualify under either exemption would apply here.
Third, state law prohibits knowingly carrying or possessing a loaded firearm in a publicly owned building or facility (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–122(a)(1)). This prohibition expressly does not apply to a “law enforcement officer,” whether on or off duty, or to “any state or federal military personnel” (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–122(a)(1)). However, as noted above, federal law enforcement officers might qualify for the “law enforcement officer” exemption.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If an in-person voting site is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, it deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Arkansas law generally prohibits a person from entering a polling site on Election Day during voting hours, but it expressly excepts an observer authorized by a federal agency with authority to place the observer at the polling site (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–310(a)(3)(G)).
When access to polling sites has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. AfterDOJ monitors reportedly attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). The act also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(i) prohibits using force, intimidation, harassment, or coercion to interfere with an election official’s duties. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–103(a)(19)(G) likewise prohibits interfering with officials lawfully conducting an election or canvass, while Ark. Code Ann. § 5–54–102(a) prohibits knowingly obstructing, impairing, or hindering the performance of a governmental function. State law also prohibits removing, tearing down, or destroying voting booths, supplies, or other materials placed at a polling site to enable voters to prepare their ballots (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–103(a)(12)). Additional provisions bar tampering with a voting machine or fraudulently affecting or attempting to affect its results; fraudulently changing, altering, or obliterating pollbooks or other election books or breaking a seal on a ballot box, voting machine, or stub box without legal authorization; altering, detaining, mutilating, stealing, concealing, or destroying election returns or materials for the purpose of hindering, preventing, or falsely reporting a tabulation or check of returns; and violating the requirements governing the preservation, storage, opening, or destruction of ballots, ballot stubs, certificates, or other election materials (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7–1–104(a)(9), (16)–(18), 7–5–702).
Moreover, Arkansas law protects voters against interference or intimidation. The Arkansas Constitution states that “[n]o power, civil or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage” (Ark. Const. art. III, § 2). Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–104(a)(5)–(6) prohibits threatening or attempting to intimidate a voter or their family, business, or profession, as well as interfering with, preventing, or attempting to interfere with or prevent a qualified voter from voting, other than through a good faith challenge authorized by law. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(i) separately prohibits using force, intimidation, harassment, or coercion to interfere with a registered voter’s ability to vote.
On top of these prohibitions, Arkansas law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law. As an initial matter, Arkansas law distinguishes between poll watchers and certified election monitors. Poll watchers are qualified Arkansas electors who generally serve as authorized representatives of candidates, political parties, or groups supporting or opposing ballot measures (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(a)(1)–(4), (b)(1)). Certified election monitors, by contrast, are appointed by the State Board of Election Commissioners to serve as observers and report to the board on the conduct of elections (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–4–101(f)(6)(A), (C)). State law prohibits poll watchers from interfering with a voter in preparing or casting a ballot; hindering or preventing an election official from performing official duties; being within six feet of a voting machine or booth used by voters; speaking to or attempting to influence voters inside a polling site or within 100 feet of its primary exterior entrance; or disrupting the orderly conduct of an election (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(f)(2)–(3), (m)). Arkansas regulations further prohibit poll watchers from positioning themselves where they can see how a voter is marking a ballot; taking physical possession of an absentee ballot; using document inspection rights in bad faith to impede the canvassing process; or accessing, touching, manipulating, or otherwise taking physical possession of a ballot during counting (7 Ark. Code R. § 91–105(b)(4)(ii), (c)(1)(C), (F)(ii), (c)(2)(B)(ii), (C)(iii)). On the other hand, restrictions on certified election monitors only require them to maintain strict impartiality; undertake their duties unobtrusively without interfering with the election process, polling procedures, or vote count; and refrain from displaying or wearing partisan symbols, colors, or banners (7 Ark. Code R. § 51–106(b)(1)–(2), (4)).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. In Arkansas, county boards of election commissioners are the custodians of ballots, ballot stubs, certificates, voting machines, and electronic vote tabulation devices (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7–5–301(m)(1), 7–5–702(a), (d)).
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Arkansas election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law requires county clerks that maintain computerized voter registration lists to provide those lists upon request, it prohibits disclosure of address information for voters with secure voter status, which is available to qualifying victims of domestic violence (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7–5–109(c)(1), 7–5–112(a), (c), (e)). Additionally, Ark. Const. amend. LI, § 7(j)(2)(E) requires the secretary of state to ensure that “all confidential voter registration information and data remains confidential and protected under state and federal law.”
In litigation over the DOJ’s demand for California’s full, unredacted statewide voter registration list, the DOJ represented at a hearing that several states, including Arkansas, had already voluntarily complied with a similar demand.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(i) prohibits using force, intimidation, harassment, or coercion to interfere with an election official’s duties. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–103(a)(19)(G) likewise prohibits interfering with officials lawfully conducting an election or canvass, while Ark. Code Ann. § 5–54–102(a) prohibits knowingly obstructing, impairing, or hindering the performance of a governmental function. State law also prohibits removing, tearing down, or destroying voting booths, supplies, or other materials placed at a polling site to enable voters to prepare their ballots (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–103(a)(12)). Additional provisions prohibit tampering with a voting machine or fraudulently affecting or attempting to affect its results; fraudulently changing, altering, or obliterating pollbooks or other election books or breaking a seal on a ballot box, voting machine, or stub box without legal authorization; altering, detaining, mutilating, stealing, concealing, or destroying election returns or materials for the purpose of hindering, preventing, or falsely reporting a tabulation or check of returns; and violating the requirements governing the preservation, storage, opening, or destruction of ballots, ballot stubs, certificates, or other election materials (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7–1–104(a)(9), (16)–(18), 7–5–702).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Arkansas Association of County Clerks, the Elections Division of the Arkansas secretary of state’s office, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, although Arkansas law protects the right to keep and bear arms (see Ark. Const. art. II, § 5), it prohibits carrying a handgun with a purpose to unlawfully employ it as a weapon against another person (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–120(a)). The statute presumes a lawful purpose when the person is a “law enforcement officer,” a member of the U.S. Armed Forces acting within the scope of official duties, an on- or off-duty “certified law enforcement officer,” or a person carrying a concealed handgun pursuant to a valid or recognized concealed carry license who is not in a prohibited location (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–73–120(c)(2), (7), (8), 5–73–306). Federal law enforcement officers might qualify as “law enforcement officers” under Arkansas law’s broad definition, while application of the separate “certified law enforcement officer” presumption may depend on whether that category extends to federal officers who are expressly authorized under Arkansas law to arrest persons for violations of state law and receive the same immunity as certified state law enforcement officers.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5–73–306(5)–(9), (13) separately limits where a concealed handgun licensee may carry, including certain courthouses and county buildings, courtrooms, government meeting places, state offices, and school, college, or university campus buildings or events. The statute contains several exceptions, but none applies merely by virtue of an individual’s federal status.
In addition to § 5–73–306’s limitations on where a concealed handgun licensee may carry, Arkansas law independently restricts firearm possession at certain locations that may serve as polling sites. State law prohibits firearm possession on developed K–12 school property; restricts handgun possession at public and private institutions of higher education, while permitting specified licensed concealed carry; and generally prohibits knowingly carrying or possessing a loaded firearm in a publicly owned building or facility (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–73–119(b)(1)(A), (c)(1), 5–73–122(a)(1), 5–73–322(b), (c), (g)). The school and higher education restrictions do not apply to a “law enforcement officer” or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces acting in the course and scope of official duties, and separately permit possession by a “certified law enforcement officer,” whether on or off duty (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–73–119(e)(2), (6)). The public building restriction likewise exempts an on- or off-duty “law enforcement officer” as well as “any state or federal military personnel” (5–73–122(a)(1)).
Beyond these location-specific restrictions, Arkansas law prohibits purposely displaying a firearm, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, in a manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–204(a)(2)). The prohibition does not apply to a “law enforcement officer” acting within the scope of duty or to a person acting in self-defense or defense of a third party (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–204(c)). As discussed above, federal law enforcement officers might qualify as “law enforcement officers” under Arkansas law’s broad definition. Additionally, state law prohibits threatening another person with death, physical injury, or property damage with the purpose of terrorizing that person (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–301(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)). This provision contains no exemptions and therefore might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Arkansas law similarly makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with an individual “in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of . . . having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of . . . having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of” the right to vote and participate fully in the political process (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16–123–107(a)(5), 16–123–108(b)). “[A]ggrieved parties” may enforce this provision (Ark. Code Ann. § 16–123–108(c)(1)).
Arkansas law also prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. The Arkansas Constitution states that “[n]o power, civil or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage” (Ark. Const. art. III, § 2). Additionally, Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–104(a)(5)–(6) prohibits threatening or attempting to intimidate a voter or their family, business, or profession, as well as interfering with, preventing, or attempting to interfere with or prevent a qualified voter from voting, other than through a good faith challenge authorized by law. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(i) separately prohibits using force, intimidation, harassment, or coercion to interfere with a registered voter’s ability to vote.
Additionally, Arkansas law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(i) prohibits using force, intimidation, harassment, or coercion to interfere with an election official’s duties. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–103(a)(19)(G) likewise prohibits interfering with officials lawfully conducting an election or canvass, while Ark. Code Ann. § 5–54–102(a) prohibits knowingly obstructing, impairing, or hindering the performance of a governmental function. State law also prohibits removing, tearing down, or destroying voting booths, supplies, or other materials placed at a polling site to enable voters to prepare their ballots (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–103(a)(12)). Additional provisions prohibit tampering with a voting machine or fraudulently affecting or attempting to affect its results; fraudulently changing, altering, or obliterating pollbooks or other election books or breaking a seal on a ballot box, voting machine, or stub box without legal authorization; altering, detaining, mutilating, stealing, concealing, or destroying election returns or materials for the purpose of hindering, preventing, or falsely reporting a tabulation or check of returns; and violating the requirements governing the preservation, storage, opening, or destruction of ballots, ballot stubs, certificates, or other election materials (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7–1–104(a)(9), (16)–(18), 7–5–702).
Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Arkansas requires each polling site to have an election sheriff (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–4–107(b)(2)(A)). Despite the title, an election sheriff serves as an election official rather than a law enforcement officer (see Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–101(12)). Poll watchers may call to the election sheriff’s attention any occurrence they believe to be an irregularity or violation of election law (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(m)). And while state law generally restricts who may enter a polling site on Election Day during voting hours, it expressly permits “a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty” to enter (Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–310). Consistent with these provisions, the State Board of Election Commissioners’ poll worker manual instructs poll workers to contact their county election commission or local law enforcement agency if a polling place disruption is occurring.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to an election facility.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, or nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Arkansas law prohibits purposely displaying a firearm, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, in a manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–204(a)(2)). The prohibition does not apply to a “law enforcement officer” acting within the scope of duty or to a person acting in self-defense or defense of a third party (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–204(c)). As discussed above, federal law enforcement officers might qualify as “law enforcement officers” under Arkansas law’s broad definition. Additionally, state law prohibits threatening another person with death, physical injury, or property damage with the purpose of terrorizing that person (Ark. Code Ann. § 5–13–301(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)). This provision does not contain any exemptions and therefore might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Arkansas law similarly makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with an individual “in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of . . . having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of . . . having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of” the right to vote and participate fully in the political process (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16–123–107(a)(5), 16–123–108(b)). “[A]ggrieved parties” may enforce this provision (Ark. Code Ann. § 16–123–108(c)(1)).
Arkansas law also prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. The Arkansas Constitution states that “[n]o power, civil or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage” (Ark. Const. art. III, § 2). Additionally, Ark. Code Ann. § 7–1–104(a)(5)–(6) prohibits threatening or attempting to intimidate a voter or their family, business, or profession, as well as interfering with, preventing, or attempting to interfere with or prevent a qualified voter from voting, other than through a good-faith challenge authorized by law. Ark. Code Ann. § 7–5–312(i) separately prohibits using force, intimidation, harassment, or coercion to interfere with a registered voter’s ability to vote.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Recent operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” under these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; reminding voters that they may return their absentee ballots directly to the county clerk’s office in person or through an authorized representative; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and remind them that they may return their absentee ballots directly to the county clerk’s office in person or through an authorized representative.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.