Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive to vote or conduct official business at an in-person voting location, ballot drop box, election office, or other election facility
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at election facilities may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
Colorado law imposes no generally applicable restriction on openly carrying firearms (see Colo. Const. art. II, § 13). It does, however, prohibit knowingly carrying a concealed firearm without a valid permit issued by a Colorado county sheriff to a legal resident or “a person who is a member of the armed forces and is stationed pursuant to permanent duty station orders” at a Colorado military installation, or by a state with reciprocity to a resident of that state or a resident of Colorado for 90 days or less (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–12–203(1)(a), 18–12–213(1)(a)–(b), 18–12–105(1)(b), (2)(c)).
The Colorado Vote Without Fear Act prohibits carrying a firearm within any polling location or central count facility, or within 100 feet of a ballot drop box or any building in which a polling location or central count facility is located, while an election or any related, ongoing election administration activity is in progress (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–724(3)). Although the provision does not expressly exempt military personnel, it does exempt a peace officer acting within the scope of their authority and in the performance of their duties (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–724(4)).
Under Colorado law, certain federal officers are considered “peace officers” with limited authority — including agents of the FBI or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); deputy and special deputy U.S. marshals; officers of the U.S. Federal Protective Service, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and Secret Service agents — so long as they are empowered to make arrests for violations of federal law and are authorized to carry firearms and use deadly force in performing their official law enforcement duties (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16–2.5–147(1)–(2), 16–2.5–151(1)–(2)).
Those federal officers may carry firearms openly or concealed if they are acting in accordance with their agency’s rules and regulations and are responding to a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor committed in their presence; responding to an emergency in which they have probable cause to believe that a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor involving injury or threatened injury to a person or property has been or is being committed, and immediate action is required to prevent escape, serious bodily injury, or destruction of property; rendering assistance at the request of a Colorado peace officer; or effecting an arrest or providing assistance as part of a bona fide task force or joint investigation with Colorado peace officers (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16–2.5–147(1)(a)(I)–(IV), (1)(b), 16–2.5–151(1)(a)(I)–(IV), (1)(b)). Accordingly, those federal officers may be able to carry firearms at polling places or drop box sites under the peace officer exception only when they are acting within Colorado’s limited peace officer authority.
Additional restrictions apply to other locations that typically serve as polling locations, including schools and certain government buildings. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–12–105.5(1)(a.5) prohibits knowingly carrying a firearm, whether openly or concealed, on the grounds or in the building of any public or private elementary, middle, junior high, high, or vocational school, or any public or private college, university, or seminary. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–12–105.3(1)(b), (4)(b), meanwhile, prohibits carrying firearms absent permission from a local government in certain government buildings and adjacent parking areas, including any building where “the chambers or galleries of a local government’s governing body are located” and “[t]he official office of any elected member of a local government’s governing body.” Both provisions exempt “peace officers,” meaning, as noted above, that certain federal officials may be entitled to carry a firearm in those locations (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–12–105.3(2)(a), 18–12–105.5(3)(e), 16–2.5–147(1)–(2), 16–2.5–151(1)–(2)). And while the educational facilities prohibition does not explicitly exempt military personnel, the government buildings prohibition exempts members of the U.S. armed forces or the Colorado National Guard lawfully acting in their official capacity (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–12–105.3(2)(b)).
Separately, local jurisdictions can adopt firearm prohibitions that are more restrictive than state law (see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29–11.7–103(1)). For instance, Boulder County passed an ordinance that bars firearms within 500 feet of a polling site or drop box (Boulder Cnty. Ordinance No. 2022–4(1)(a)(5)). As noted above, state law only prohibits carrying a firearm within 100 feet of such locations. Boulder County’s ordinance explicitly exempts federal law enforcement and military personnel “when engaged in official duties” (Boulder Cnty. Ordinance No. 2022–4(1)(c)(1)–(2)).
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Policies and coordination
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- In-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
- Federal-property locations
- Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Responding to challenges
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during voting or election processes.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. Several federal and state laws prohibit interfering in an election.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations or election offices.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. The Department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, the Department announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
The DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” but it has typically limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Colorado law does not authorize local election officials to wave poll watcher access requirements. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Colorado generally prohibits interfering in any manner with an election official in the discharge of their duties; inducing an election official to violate or refuse to comply with their duties; and threatening, coercing, or intimidating an election official, whether verbally, in writing, or in person, with the intent to impede or interfere with the official while they are performing their duties or retaliate against the official for performing those duties (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–701(1)–(2)). Other state law provisions prohibit various forms of tampering with, mutilating, destroying, or improperly removing election materials and equipment from poll sites (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1–13–703(1)–(2), 1–13–707.5, 1–13–708(1)–(2), 1–13–716(1)–(2), 1–13–717).
Additionally, Colorado law protects against voter intimidation. The Colorado Constitution provides that, except in the case of “treason, felony or breach of the peace,” voters shall be “privileged from arrest during their attendance at elections, and in going to and returning therefrom” (Colo. Const. art VII, § 5). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–713 prohibits directly or indirectly interfering with the free exercise of the elective franchise; or compelling, inducing, or prevailing on an elector to vote, refrain from voting, or vote for or against a particular person or measure. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–726(3)(a)–(d) additionally prohibits — whether acting under the “color of law or otherwise” — intimidating, threatening, or coercing any individual for voting or attempting to vote; urging or aiding another person to vote or attempt to vote, “whether as part of official election administration activity or otherwise;” administering elections; or previously participating in election administration.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer or monitor is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). Colorado law goes further, requiring the “designated election official” to retain ballots from federal, state, and local election for 25 months (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–802). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that state and local Colorado election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–2–302(8), meanwhile, prohibits the secretary of state from disclosing or otherwise releasing voters’ Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, numbers associated with state-issued identification, or “the unique identification number assigned by the secretary of state to the voter.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24–72–204(3.5) requires public officials to withhold from public inspection the addresses of certain voters who have requested confidentiality, but permits inspection by the voter, persons authorized in writing by the voter, and specified entities with an authorized need for the information, and allows accredited news media representatives to verify but not inspect whether a protected address is correct. And Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–1–110(5)(b) requires election officials to refrain from disclosing email addresses submitted by voters to election offices for election-related correspondence.
In response to a May 2025 request from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for “all records” pertaining to the 2024 federal election, Colorado provided “a current version of its publicly available voter file, a historical one capturing what the file looked like roughly two years ago, as well as a dataset showing voter history.” In December 2025, Secretary Griswold declined to sign a memorandum of understanding designed to facilitate the transfer of Colorado’s unredacted statewide voter registration list — containing sensitive voter information — to the federal government. The DOJ then sued the state for refusing to provide the complete data set. In August 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.
In July 2025, a former federal employee claiming to be a federal official also sought access to election equipment in 10 Colorado counties, but county clerks rejected those requests as unauthorized under Colorado law.
Comparable federal efforts to obtain election materials or access election systems have arisen elsewhere. In Arizona, the state senate produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested the records of dozens of voters.
Colorado law also imposes requirements governing the custody, handling, and access to election materials and equipment. To begin, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–5–607(1.5) makes it unlawful, in any political subdivision with a population greater than 100,000, for any elected official, candidate for elective office, or the secretary of state to be in a room with components of a voting system without an authorized person present or to have key card access to such a room, except when the components are deployed for use or stored at a voter service and polling center. Colorado law also requires designated election officials to keep all components of a voting system in a location where entry is controlled by a key card access system and under recording video surveillance, and to maintain access logs and surveillance recordings as election records for 25 months (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–513.5(1)–(2). 8 C.C.R. § 1505–1–20 sets out county election security procedures, including requirements for county security plans, background checks, and security training; restricted physical access to secure ballot and equipment areas through codes, locks, identification requirements, and entry logs; video surveillance of secure areas; uninterrupted chain of custody, seal verification, and transport and storage protocols for voting system components and ballots; limits on who may access voting system components, accounts, passwords, and removable media; voting system access logging; and incident reporting, inspection, and remedial procedures.
At the polling place, Colorado requires ballot boxes for nonmachine voting to be constructed to prevent tampering and to have locking lids, and requires designated election officials to keep ballot boxes and keys and deliver them to election judges before polling locations open (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–5–502). Voting equipment, voting booths, and ballot boxes must be situated in plain view of election officials and poll watchers, and only election officials and persons admitted for the purpose of voting may enter the immediate voting area — defined as within six feet of the voting equipment or voting booths and the ballot box — except by authority of the election judges or designated election official when necessary to keep order and enforce the law (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–5–503).
At counting centers, all proceedings are under the direction of the designated election official and party representatives or poll watchers, and no unauthorized person may touch any ballot, ballot card, electronic device, or return (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–507(1)). The designated election official is responsible for receiving, opening, and preserving transfer boxes and their contents, and any indication of tampering must be immediately reported to the district attorney (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–507(7)). Once votes are counted, election judges must prepare a precinct certificate and written statement documenting ballots voted, spoiled, unused, not delivered, and returned, and all unused ballots, spoiled ballots, and ballot stubs must be returned with the statement (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–601(1)–(2)). The canvass board must then reconcile the number of ballots counted to the number of ballots cast, reconcile precinct ballots cast to the number of registered electors, and certify the abstract of votes cast for transmission to the secretary of state (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–10–101.5(1)).
After the election, designated election officials must preserve election records for at least 25 months or until the records are no longer needed for any contest proceeding, whichever is later, although unused ballots may be destroyed after the challenge period passes (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–802). When a federal candidate was on the ballot, voted ballots and other required election materials must be kept for at least 25 months (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–802).
Colorado law also criminalizes breaches of these custody and access safeguards. It prohibits destroying, defacing, altering, delaying delivery of, or removing ballots or election records, or aiding others in doing so (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–716(1)–(2)); accessing without authorization or tampering with voting equipment or election night reporting systems or knowingly publishing voting system passwords or other confidential information (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–708(1)–(2)); and tampering with or breaking open a ballot box, including a drop-off receptacle (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–707.5).
Finally, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–7–803(1) prohibits designated election officials from transferring “custody or control of election records or other election materials, as designated by the secretary of state, to a third party” unless the secretary of state or a court-imposed order authorizes or requires such transfer.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote. As an example of state law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–701(1) prohibits interfering in any manner with an election official in the discharge of their duties.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, or election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- Consult with the Colorado secretary of state’s office, the Colorado County Clerks Association, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials are deployed to in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, or communities
Summary
Federal interference or intimidation may take the form of armed federal officials or troops appearing at voting locations or of visible federal deployments in surrounding communities that chill participation. Federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at voting locations. Even where firearm possession is otherwise permitted, federal and state laws prohibit intimidation of voters.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
Colorado law prohibits carrying firearms — whether openly or concealed — within polling locations and central count facilities and within 100 feet of drop boxes or buildings housing polling locations or central count facilities during active elections and related election administration activity (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1–13–724(3)(a)–(b)). That prohibition contains a “peace officer” exception that includes certain federal officers: FBI, ATF, DHS, ICE, and Secret Service agents; deputy and special deputy U.S. marshals; and officers of the U.S. Federal Protective Service — when they are acting within Colorado’s limited peace officer authority, as described above (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1–13–724(4), 16–2.5–147(1)–(2), 16–2.5–151(1)–(2)).
Additional firearms restrictions also apply at other locations that often serve as polling places, including public and private schools, colleges and universities, seminaries, and certain government buildings and adjacent parking areas (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–12–105.3, 18–12–105.5). Those provisions likewise contain exceptions for peace officers that include certain federal officials, and the government buildings prohibition also expressly exempts members of the U.S. armed forces or the Colorado National Guard lawfully acting in their official capacity (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–12–105.3(2), 18–12–105.5(3)).
Beyond these location-based restrictions, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–12–106(1) prohibits knowingly and unlawfully aiming a firearm at another person, and discharging a firearm recklessly or with criminal negligence. The provision does not contain any exemptions. Consequently, this provision might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidating, menacing, or obstructing voters may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Colorado law contains a similar prohibition. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–726(3) prohibits — whether acting under the “color of law or otherwise” — intimidating, threatening, or coercing any individual for voting or attempting to vote; urging or aiding another person to vote or attempt to vote, “whether as part of official election administration activity or otherwise;” administering elections; or previously participating in election administration. The statute entitles “any aggrieved individual,” an election official, including the secretary of state, or the Colorado attorney general” to bring suit (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–726(5)). Although the provision exempts a “law enforcement officer acting within the scope of [their] official duties” from the presumption that visibly carrying a firearm while interacting with or observing election-related activities protected by Section 1–13–726 violates the statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–726(4)(b)), it does not expressly cover federal officials. In any event, the provision exempts law enforcement officers only from the presumption of intimidation, not from liability for otherwise violating the law.
Colorado also targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Colorado generally prohibits interfering in any manner with an election official in the discharge of their duties; inducing an election official to violate or refuse to comply with their duties; and threatening, coercing, or intimidating an election official, whether verbally, in writing, or in person, with the intent to impede or interfere with the official while they are performing their duties or retaliate against the official for performing those duties (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–701(1)–(2)). Colorado law also prohibits, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, intimidating, threatening, coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any individual for exercising powers or duties to administer elections, including vote counting, canvassing, and certification, or because of that individual’s status as a past or present participant in election administration (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1–13–726(3)(c)–(d)). Additional provisions prohibit tampering with or breaking open a ballot box, including a drop-off receptacle; accessing without authorization, tampering with, or facilitating unauthorized access to or tampering with voting equipment or election night reporting systems; knowingly publishing passwords or other confidential voting system information; destroying, defacing, or altering any ballot or election record; delaying delivery of any ballot or election record; taking, concealing, or removing any ballot, ballot box, or election record from a polling location, drop-off location, or lawful custodian, or aiding another person in doing so; or willfully defacing, removing, or destroying voter instructions, sample ballots, or voter supplies during an election or otherwise willfully hindering the voting of others (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1–13–707.5, 1–13–708(1)–(2), 1–13–716(1), 1–13–717).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to voting locations or communities.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at in-person voting locations and ballot drop box and drop-off locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at in-person voting locations.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also proposed new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In June 2026, the Postal Service issued a proposed rule to implement an executive order. The rule would impose new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and require state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as practicable; informing voters that they may deliver their ballot to their election supervisor’s office or drop it off in a ballot drop box at any early voting location; and publicly communicating when voters should return mail ballots to help ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as a ballot drop box.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.