The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI)critical infrastructure.

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Election Interference

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–166.3: Prohibits anyone from entering the voting enclosure except those specifically authorized, including election officials, observers, runners, persons seeking to vote, voters entering or explaining a challenge, persons authorized to assist voters, minor children accompanying voters, persons conducting or participating in an approved simulated election, and “any other person determined by election officials to have an urgent need to enter the voting enclosure but only to the extent necessary to address that need”; prohibits photographing or recording voters within the voting enclosure without the required permission and recording the image of a voted official ballot except as permitted by law.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–166.4(a): Prohibits, within the voting place and no more than 50 feet and no less than 25 feet from the entrance, hindering access, harassing others, distributing campaign literature, placing political advertising, soliciting votes, or otherwise engaging in election-related activity in the voting place or buffer zone around it.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–271: Prohibits “any person holding any office, position, or employment in the State government, or . . . any department, institution, bureau, board, commission, or other State agency, or . . . any county, city, town, district, or other political subdivision, directly or indirectly,” from discharging, intimidating, or oppressing any other person in such employment based on a vote such person or member of their family may cast, consider or intend to cast, or not cast (or threatening to do so).
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–273: Prohibits the following:
  • Voters from allowing their ballots to be seen by others except as allowed by state election law;
  • Taking, removing, or attempting to take or remove any ballot from the voting enclosure;
  • Interfering or attempting to interfere with any voter while inside the voting enclosure;
  • Interfering with or attempting to interfere with any voter when marking their ballot;
  • Remaining longer than the specified time allowed in a voting booth, after being notified that time has expired;
  • Attempting to induce any voter — while within the voting enclosure and before depositing their ballot — to show how they marked their ballot; and
  • Aiding or attempting to aid any voter in marking their ballot, by means of any mechanical device or any means, while within the voting enclosure.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(4): Prohibits interfering with “the holding of any primary or election” or the possession of any ballot box, election book, ballot, or return sheet by those lawfully entitled to possess such materials; prohibits interfering “in any manner” with any election officer or board of elections member in the performance of their lawfully imposed election administration duties.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(5): Prohibits disturbing, through “boisterous conduct,” any member of any election board or any chief judge or judge of election in the performance of their lawful duties.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(b)(2): Prohibits impersonating a chief judge, judge of election, or other precinct official while discharging their duties relating to registering voters or conducting any primary or election.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275(9): Prohibits anyone (election official or otherwise) from making, certifying, delivering, or transmitting false returns of any primary or election; from making any erasure or alteration to such returns; and from concealing or destroying any election ballot, book, record, return, or process with the intent to commit fraud.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275(10): Prohibits assaulting any chief judge, judge of election, or other election officer while discharging their duties relating to registering voters or conducting any primary or election.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275(11): Prohibits intimidating or attempting to intimidate any chief judge, judge of election, or other election officer while discharging their duties relating to registering voters or conducting any primary or election.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–34: Prohibits any person from refusing to obey the lawful commands of a county board of elections or, “by disorderly conduct in its hearing or presence,” interrupting or disturbing its proceedings.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–34: Prohibits pointing a gun or pistol at any person.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269.2: Prohibits possessing or carrying, whether openly or concealed, any firearm on educational property — which includes any school building or bus, school campus, grounds, recreational area, athletic field, or other property owned, used, or operated by any board of education, school of board trustees, or directors for the administration of any school, unless a specific exception applies.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269.4: Prohibits possessing or carrying, whether openly or concealed, any deadly weapon not used solely for instructional or officially sanctioned ceremonial purposes in the state capitol building, the executive mansion, the western residence of the governor, or on the grounds of any of these buildings, or in any courthouse, unless a specific exception applies.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, Retention

Various North Carolina laws and regulations, including N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–33, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain time periods unless documents are being held through judicial order or independent guidance from the State Board of Elections. Those requirements are listed in State Board of Elections Numbered Memo 2024–03 and a records retention and disposition schedule for county boards of elections. Key requirements are summarized below.

Election Observers

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–45.1(g): Prohibits election officials from restricting certain actions by election observers — including taking notes, listening to conversations between a voter and election official taking place in the voting place, moving about the voting place, leaving and reentering the voting enclosure, communicating via phone outside the voting enclosure, and witnessing any opening or closing procedures at the voting place — provided the observer does not interfere with any voter’s privacy or the conduct of the election.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–45.1(h): Prohibits observers from looking at, photographing, videotaping, or otherwise recording the image of any voter’s marked ballot; impeding any voter entering or exiting the voting place; inhibiting or interfering with the transport of sealed ballot boxes, election equipment, or election results to the county board of elections; engaging in electioneering; and making or receiving phone calls while in the voting place.

Emergency Powers

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–27.1: Authorizes the State Board of Elections to exercise emergency powers to conduct an election in a district where the normal election schedule is disrupted by a natural disaster, extremely inclement weather, or an armed conflict involving the U.S. Armed Forces or mobilization of those forces, including the North Carolina National Guard or reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–258.31: Authorizes the State Board of Elections to prescribe emergency rules as necessary to facilitate absentee voting by absent uniformed services voters or overseas voters directly affected by a situation that makes substantial compliance with the state’s Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act or the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act impossible or unreasonable.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• N.C. Const. art. I, § 30: “The military shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power.”
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 127A-151: Prohibits organizing unauthorized militias.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–288.20: Prohibits teaching or demonstrating to another person the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive, or incendiary device, or any technique capable of causing injury or death; prohibits assembling with one or more persons to train, practice, or be instructed in the use of such weapons or techniques when done in furtherance of a civil disorder.

Police Presence at the Polls

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–48: Authorizes chief judges and judges of election to enforce peace and good order at polling places; to prevent and stop improper practices, including attempts to obstruct, intimidate, or interfere with any person registering or voting; protect challengers and witnesses from molestation or violence; eject challengers or witnesses who violate election laws; and deputize persons as police officers to assist in maintaining order at the voting place.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–34: Authorizes each county board of elections to maintain order and enforce obedience to its lawful commands during its sessions.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–47(a): Authorizes chief judges and judges of elections to enforce peace and good order “in and about” the place of registration and voting.
• Additionally, the Election Official Resource Guide published by the State Board of Elections advises that chief judges and judges of election may call on the sheriff, police, or other peace officers to aid in enforcing election law, but that police officers may only be present in the voting enclosure when assigned to keep the peace and requested by the county board of elections, chief judge, or judges of election for the purpose of preventing disorder.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(7): Prohibits intimidating or opposing any legally qualified voter based on a vote that voter may cast, or consider or intend to cast, or not cast.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275(17): Prohibits directly or indirectly misrepresenting the law to the public through mass mailing or any other means of communication with the intent and effect of intimidating or discouraging potential voters from voting.
• N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126–14.1: Prohibits coercing a state employee to support or contribute to a political candidate, political committee, or political party or to change the party designation of their voter registration by explicitly threatening change in employment status, disciplinary action, or preferential treatment.

Definitions

• See e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163–165, 163–182.

* Case law or legislative amendments may exist that provide further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of North Carolina

The governor of North Carolina serves as the state’s chief executive. North Carolina’s executive office also includes elected officials and administrators. The governor represents North Carolina and oversees the operation of North Carolina’s government. Gov. Josh Stein was elected in November 2024 and is currently serving his first four-year term.

The governor’s power over the State Board of Elections, which is responsible for elections, is currently being litigated. In December 2024, during a special session for hurricane recovery relief, the state legislature passed N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–19, which transferred the power to appoint a majority of State Board of Elections members from the governor to the state auditor. On April 30, 2025, a North Carolina appellate court stayed a lower court’s ruling that the law was unconstitutional. A few weeks later, the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed the appeals court’s order to stand while litigation on the law’s constitutionality continues.

Separately, per the North Carolina Constitution, Governor Stein is the commander in chief of the state’s militia and may call out those forces to “execute the law, suppress riots and insurrections, and repel invasion” (N.C. Const. art. XII, § 1). North Carolina’s militia is divided into the organized and unorganized militia. The organized militia consists of the North Carolina Army and Air National Guard, the naval militia, and the state defense militia (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 127A-2). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 127A-7 defines the unorganized militia as “all other able-bodied citizens of the State and of the United States and all other able-bodied persons who have or shall declare their intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be at least 17 years of age, except those who have been convicted of a felony or discharged from any component of the military under other than honorable conditions.”

North Carolina State Board of Elections

The State Board of Elections is the state administrative agency responsible for elections. The board’s executive director serves as the chief state elections official (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–27). Sam Hayes was appointed executive director by the board on May 7, 2025, and is currently serving his first two-year term.

According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–22(a), the Board is responsible for supervising the state’s primaries and elections and for making “such reasonable rules and regulations with respect to the conduct of primaries and elections as it may deem advisable.” Included in its purview is overseeing the instruction, preparation, and distribution of ballots; determining the form and content of ballots; advising county boards of elections on the proper methods of conducting primaries and elections; and ensuring that counties have adequate personnel with technical expertise relating to voting equipment on Election Day (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–22). The Board appoints four of the five members of each county election board; the state auditor appoints the fifth member of each county board to serve as chair (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–30).

The Board also makes recommendations to the legislature regarding the conduct and administration of primaries and elections (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–22(i)), and it may make rules regarding elections and campaign finance provided they do not contradict the law. The Rules Review Commission of the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings reviews agency rules to determine whether they comply with requirements in the state’s Administrative Procedure Act. (See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-21.1.) After rules are proposed, a public comment period follows, along with a public hearing in certain cases.

North Carolina law gives the State Board of Elections further authority to make reasonable interim rules and regulations in the event that any portion of Chapter 163 of General Statutes or “any State election law or form of election of any county board of commissioners, local board of education, or city officer is held unconstitutional or invalid by a State or federal court or is unenforceable because of objection interposed by the United States Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and such ruling adversely affects the conduct and holding of any pending primary or election” (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–22.2).

Periodically, the Board’s executive director issues numbered memos — legal resources that provide guidance and updates about election administration to county boards of elections. For example, in 2024, the director issued Numbered Memo 2024–07, which detailed election law changes ahead of the 2024 General Election in response to Hurricane Helene.

The Board also holds investigative authority that includes examining “the administration of election laws, frauds, and irregularities” in elections in any county, municipality, or special district. When election law violations are identified, the Board is required to report them to the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation for further investigation and potential prosecution (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–22(d)). The Board also has authority to assist any county board of elections in such litigation (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–25(a)).

Additionally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–27.1 authorizes the State Board of Elections to conduct emergency elections in districts where an election’s normal schedule is disrupted by a natural disaster, extremely inclement weather, or “an armed conflict involving the Armed Forces of the United States, or the mobilization of those forces, including North Carolina National Guard and reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States.”

North Carolina National Guard

Major General M. Todd Hunt serves as the adjutant general of the North Carolina National Guard, which includes the North Carolina Army National Guard and the North Carolina Air National Guard. The adjutant general is appointed by and serves “at the pleasure of the governor” (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 127A-19). Former Governor Roy Cooper appointed Major Hunt in November 2019.

In response to cybersecurity concerns surrounding the 2016 election, National Guard units activated cyber operations teams nationwide to support election-related missions. In 2020, 18 North Carolina National Guard cyber specialists reported for state active duty to “defend the integrity of the North Carolina electoral system from cyberattack before and during ‘Super Tuesday’ elections.” In 2024, North Carolina was one of 15 states that activated National Guard members to advise local officials on how to respond to cyber threats. According to the North Carolina National Guard’s Cyber Security Response Force, the Guard’s primary role in addressing election cybersecurity issues is “to monitor security systems for the State Board of Elections to receive timely information to defend their network.”

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), national guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command “runs from the President to the defense Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the national guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, a law that permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October of 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December of 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “at this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, OR. 

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot return locations, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

SUMMARY

Federal and state law both protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, state law may require federal officials to be unarmed when they vote in person.

DISCUSSION

Although North Carolina law does not restrict possession of firearms at or near voting locations specifically, it does restrict or prohibit firearms possession at locations that often serve as polling locations. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269.2 prohibits possession of firearms on educational property, including schools. However, certain exemptions apply per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269(b), including:

• officers and enlisted armed forces personnel “when in discharge of their official duties”;
• federal civil and law enforcement officers;
• officers and soldiers of the militia and National Guard “when called into actual service”;
• members of the North Carolina National Guard who are “designated in writing” by the state adjutant general, have a concealed handgun permit, and are “acting in the discharge of his or her official duties”; and
• off-duty law enforcement, “provided that an officer does not carry a concealed weapon while consuming alcohol or an unlawful controlled substance” or while such substance “remains in the officer’s body.”

Thus, armed federal personnel are likely exempt from the prohibition on firearms possession in schools and courthouses. However, members of the U.S. military and the National Guard may only be exempt from the prohibition while acting in the course of their official duties. Local governments may further restrict the possession of firearms in public buildings, but they must do so in keeping with state law and may not override state firearms statutes (see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–409.40).

Federal law also restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” At the same time, federal law provides substantial protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Review policies and State Board of Elections memos that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with the State Board of Elections or other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure. Consult the North Carolina State Board of Elections reference guide for working with North Carolina law enforcement.
• Update policies as necessary with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute these policies.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

SUMMARY

Both the Department of Justice and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers may not apply.

DISCUSSION

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the department has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including certain counties in North Carolina.

The DOJ monitors both federal and non-federal elections, but it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election authorities of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers. “For decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (52 U.S.C. § 21083a) and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1) grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, [Congress] has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated, “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on Committee on House Administration letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against federal election interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, North Carolina specifically prohibits election observers from impeding any voter entering or exiting a polling place; inhibiting or interfering with the transport of sealed ballot boxes, election equipment, or election results to county boards of elections; engaging in electioneering; or making or receiving phone calls while in the voting place (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–45.1(h)).

Further, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(4) prohibits interfering with “the holding of any primary or election”; interfering with the possession of any ballot box, election book, ballot, or return sheet by those lawfully entitled to possess such materials; or interfering “in any manner” with an election officer or board of elections member in the performance of their lawfully imposed election administration duties. And N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(5) prohibits disturbing, through “boisterous conduct,” an election board member or a chief judge or judge of election in the performance of their lawful duties. Similarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275 prohibits intimidating, attempting to intimidate, or assaulting any chief judge, judge of election, or other election officer while discharging their duties relating to registering voters or conducting elections.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Review relevant federal laws on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers.
• Review Numbered Memo 2023–06, which sets out guidance on election observers.
• Speak with other local election officials across the country who have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies and communicate them with your staff, including election officials at all polling and ballot locations.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about election observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel from across the country.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an early voting site or absentee ballot return location on or near federal property while conducting official business

SUMMARY

Depending on the location of an early voting site or a county board of elections office (the only locations where absentee ballots may be returned in-person, per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–231), federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites at federal locations — that is, located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations.

DISCUSSION

Due to various factors, including access considerations, election officials may site an early voting site in or near a federal building or on or near federal land. Local election officials determine the number and locations of early voting sites, subject to approval by the State Board of Elections (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–166.35(a)). The county board of elections is not required to offer early voting at its office but must propose at least one early voting site reasonably proximate to its office, provided that all sites collectively provide adequate coverage for the county’s electorate (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–166.35). Access considerations may result in an election official deciding to locate an early voting site on or adjacent to federal property or in a federal building.

If an early voting site or county board of elections office is located on federal land or in a federal building, federal officials may appear frequently in the vicinity in the course of conducting routine business. In these circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Review early voting sites and county board of election office locations to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
• Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
• If there are polling locations where the concerns outlined above may arise, here is a working with law enforcement to keep elections safe and secure.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents, as necessary.
• Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
• Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an early voting site or absentee ballot return location not on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building

SUMMARY

Prohibitions on carrying weapons at or near certain sites used for early voting or absentee ballot drop-off may apply, as may local restrictions against carrying weapons. However, these prohibitions may not apply to certain federal officials.

DISCUSSION

In North Carolina, absentee ballots may only be “voted and transmitted” (i.e., executed and turned in) at county election board offices or early voting sites, where they must be physically handed to an election official for processing (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–231).

Polling locations, including early voting sites, are often located in or adjacent to public schools, public libraries, and other public buildings. Although North Carolina law does not restrict possession of firearms at or near voting locations specifically, it does restrict or prohibit firearms possession at locations that often serve as polling locations. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269.2 prohibits possession of firearms on educational property, including schools. However, certain exemptions apply per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269(b), including:

• officers and enlisted armed forces personnel “when in discharge of their official duties”;
• federal civil and law enforcement officers;
• officers and soldiers of the militia and National Guard “when called into actual service”;
• members of the North Carolina National Guard who are “designated in writing” by the state adjutant general, have a concealed handgun permit, and are “acting in the discharge of his or her official duties”; and
• off-duty law enforcement, “provided that an officer does not carry a concealed weapon while consuming alcohol or an unlawful controlled substance” or while such substance “remains in the officer’s body.”

Thus, armed federal personnel are likely exempt from the prohibition on firearms possession in schools and courthouses. However, members of the U.S. military and the National Guard may only be exempt from the prohibition while acting in the course of their official duties. Local governments may further restrict the possession of firearms in public buildings, but they must do so in keeping with state law and may not override state firearms statutes (see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–409.40).

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to absentee ballot return locations.
• Consider posting signage regarding weapon prohibitions at early voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near absentee ballot return locations.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office

SUMMARY

Local election officials have a duty to preserve order at their offices and may remove individuals who disrupt the electoral process. If an election office is located in a state government building, then state law (including prohibitions on carrying weapons in certain state government buildings) and local restrictions (which may include local prohibitions on carrying weapons in local government buildings) apply. However, certain federal officials may qualify for an exemption to local weapon ordinances.

DISCUSSION

Although North Carolina law does not restrict possession of firearms at or near voting locations specifically, it does restrict or prohibit firearms possession at locations that often serve as polling locations. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269.2 prohibits possession of firearms on educational property, including schools. However, certain exemptions apply per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269(b), including:

• officers and enlisted armed forces personnel “when in discharge of their official duties”;
• federal civil and law enforcement officers;
• officers and soldiers of the militia and National Guard “when called into actual service”;
• members of the North Carolina National Guard who are “designated in writing” by the state adjutant general, have a concealed handgun permit, and are “acting in the discharge of his or her official duties”; and
• off-duty law enforcement, “provided that an officer does not carry a concealed weapon while consuming alcohol or an unlawful controlled substance” or while such substance “remains in the officer’s body.”

Thus, armed federal personnel are likely exempt from the prohibition on firearms possession in schools and courthouses. However, members of the U.S. military and the National Guard may only be exempt from the prohibition while acting in the course of their official duties. Local governments may further restrict the possession of firearms in public buildings, but they must do so in keeping with state law and may not override state firearms statutes (see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–409.40).

North Carolina law also targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(4) prohibits interfering “in any manner” with an election officer or board of elections member in the performance of their lawful duties. And N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275 prohibits intimidating, attempting to intimidate, or assaulting any chief judge, judge of election, or other election officer while discharging their duties relating to registering voters or conducting elections.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to your office.
• Consider including prohibitions on firearms and intimidation on signage at your office. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials

SUMMARY

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that various levels of government play in election administration.

DISCUSSION

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

Federal and state laws may limit the information that local election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while North Carolina law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of a voter’s personal identifying information, such as a social security number, driver’s license number, date of birth, or photographs used for identification (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–82.10(a1)).

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. And N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(4) prohibits interfering with “the holding of any primary or election”; interfering with the possession of any ballot box, election book, ballot, or return sheet by those entitled to possess them; or interfering “in any manner” with an election officer or board of elections member in the performance of their lawful duties.

North Carolina law also prohibits erasing, altering, concealing, or destroying any election ballot, book, record, return, or process “with intent to commit a fraud” (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–275(9)). And N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–273(a)(2) prohibits a voter from taking or removing (or attempting to take or remove) any ballot from the voting enclosure.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
• Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of these policies to uninvited law enforcement personnel who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Update any policies and protocols as necessary based on these discussions with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters. Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a request for election materials.
• Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only spaces can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
• If a request, demand, subpoena, or other demand is presented, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Please note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case. Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
• When appropriate, consult with the North Carolina Association of Directors of Elections, the North Carolina State Board of Elections, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other election officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location

SUMMARY

Federal law clearly states that unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the army, navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have under their] authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely bars federal law enforcement officials from being ordered to or stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

DISCUSSION

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials to any polling location unless that location is under attack by “armed enemies of the United States.” Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are usually armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269.2 prohibits possession of firearms on educational property, including schools. However, certain exemptions apply per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–269(b), including:

• officers and enlisted armed forces personnel “when in discharge of their official duties”;
• federal civil and law enforcement officers;
• officers and soldiers of the militia and National Guard “when called into actual service”;
• members of the North Carolina National Guard who are “designated in writing” by the state adjutant general, have a concealed handgun permit, and are “acting in the discharge of his or her official duties”; and
• off-duty law enforcement, “provided that an officer does not carry a concealed weapon while consuming alcohol or an unlawful controlled substance” or while such substance “remains in the officer’s body.”

Thus, armed federal personnel are likely exempt from the prohibition on firearms possession in schools and courthouses. However, members of the U.S. military and the National Guard may only be exempt from the prohibition while acting in the course of their official duties.

This said, North Carolina law does prevent pointing a gun at another person without legal justification, and that statute contains no exemptions (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–34). Moreover, local governments may further restrict the possession of firearms in public buildings, but they must do so in keeping with state law and may not override state firearms statutes (see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–409.40).

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation, including menacing or obstructing voters, may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates voters or people from urging or aiding others to vote (or attempts to do so) — whether such conduct is intended to intimidate or not. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs (including voters) to obtain relief against voter intimidation. While North Carolina does not contain a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(7) prohibits intimidation based on a vote that a person may cast, consider or intend to cast, or not cast. Additionally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–273(a) prohibits interfering with any voter when inside the voting enclosure or marking their ballot, and endeavoring to induce any voter, while in the voting enclosure, to show how they marked their ballot.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at in-person voting locations, including ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at in-person voting locations.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

SUMMARY

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

DISCUSSION

State and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation, including menacing or obstructing voters, may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote (or attempts to do so) — whether such conduct is intended to intimidate or not. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs (including voters) to obtain relief against voter intimidation. While North Carolina does not contain a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–274(a)(7) prohibits intimidation based on a vote that a person may cast, consider or intend to cast, or not cast. Additionally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163–273(a) prohibits interfering with any voter when inside the voting enclosure or marking their ballot, and endeavoring to induce any voter, while in the voting enclosure, to show how they marked their ballot.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (office of mayor, school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their rights to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (schools, community centers, nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and applicability of those policies during the voting process.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

SUMMARY

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. USPS policies establish special handling requirements that prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, but such issues would likely only result from changes to current USPS policies (which would almost certainly require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure offers some protection against hasty policy and leadership shifts.

DISCUSSION

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, the Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration. Mail voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail and issues that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could occur for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201).

This means that the board, guided by statute and its bylaws, “directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.” The board selects and has the authority to remove the postmaster general (39 U.S.C. § 202), who serves as USPS’s chief executive officer and is responsible for Postal Service operations. The postmaster general, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “approval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “reserved for decision by the Board.”

Specific policies and procedures dictate the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, including explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize election mail delivery. According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for USPS to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by shoring up election mail processes and procedures over which they have control — such as providing alternative options like drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as absent voter ballot drop box locations and ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
• Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.