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Electoral College reform is in the air following the blue tsunami of Election Night, which not only gave Democrats both houses of Congress and a majority of governorships, but also (as I explain in a New York Times op-ed that will be running shortly) opened the door to what would be one of the most transformational reforms ever in American politics — the shift to a national popular vote for president.
The short version: The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is an agreement among states to award their electors to the winner of the most votes nationwide, rather than within their state (as 48 of 50 states do today). The compact takes effect once it is joined by states with 270 electoral votes, the majority required to win the presidency. Right now, 18 states and DC are members, totaling 222 electoral votes. On November 3, five more states with a total of 61 electoral votes (Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) gained Democratic trifectas, which means they could join the compact as soon as 2027, and the presidential election in 2028 would be the first popular-vote election in American history.
For the broader case in favor of a popular vote and an in-depth examination of legal and political issues around the compact (such as why only Democratic-led states have passed it so far), read my upcoming Times piece. But Major Questions is a newsletter about the Supreme Court, so I want to focus here on three cases where the Court took on the design and function of the Electoral College. While the cases are spread over more than 125 years, they were all effectively unanimous: 9–0 in two of them and a rejection of a complaint without recorded comment in the third.
This suggests that while the Court’s Electoral College jurisprudence is not extensive, neither is it equivocal. People may hotly debate the merits of the way we choose our president (I wrote a whole book about it!) but as a legal matter, at least, there’s not much to dispute. As I’ll explain, the results of these three cases speak to the heart of the debate over the popular vote compact, which will very likely be playing out over the next couple of years in the lead-up to the 2028 election.
The first time the Supreme Court took up a case involving the Electoral College was during a period of turmoil in presidential elections not unlike the one we’re living through now: The popular vote loser had won the presidency twice in the previous 16 years (1876 and 1888), and in both of those elections, the Republican candidate prevailed. This was top of mind for Democrats in Michigan when, in the 1890 midterms, they won control of the state legislature and decided to change how the state awarded its electors in advance of the 1892 election from the winner-take-all method (then called “general ticket”) to the district method. In their case, that meant one elector would be chosen by each congressional district, and the final two would be chosen based on the vote total in the eastern and western halves of the state. With this change, Democrats hoped to pick off a few electors in what was then a Republican-dominated state. At the time, every state used the winner-take-all method, and Republicans sued, arguing that the Democrats’ move violated the Constitution.
The Court disagreed unanimously. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Melville Fuller cataloged the lengthy history of states adopting different methods for allocating their electors over the previous century, a history that pointed to only one possible legal conclusion: “From the formation of the government until now the practical construction of the clause [Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution] has conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the appointment of electors,” Fuller wrote.
The Constitution does not direct the states to award their electors based on any specific method, he added. It says only that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.” This means, he wrote, that “the appointment and mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the states under the Constitution of the United States.”
A little over a century later, the Supreme Court relied on McPherson in deciding Bush v. Gore, citing the 1892 case for what many people found to be a shocking proposition: “The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College,” the Bush v. Gore Court wrote. Alas it’s true, and yet another reminder of how removed the people actually are from the selection of the nation’s leader.
By the mid-1960s, the country was in the midst of a massive democratic awakening. The Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act had passed, ending the Jim Crow regime and making the promises of the 14th and 15th Amendments real for the first time; the Constitution had just been amended twice more to expand democratic rights; and the Supreme Court had laid down the landmark principle of “one person, one vote,” transforming the American political landscape.
It was against this background that Delaware decided to sue the other 49 states, with a focus on New York. Their offense? That winner-take-all rule for awarding electors, under which “the total number of presidential electoral votes of a state is arbitrarily misappropriated for the candidate receiving a bare plurality of the total number of citizens’ votes cast within the state,” as Delaware argued. Using winner-take-all, Delaware pointed out, the 11 largest states could combine to award 269 electoral votes, just one shy of the majority needed to win the presidency. This was not just unfair, Delaware argued; it was unconstitutional. The small states “as virtual bystanders do little more than watch while the large states serve as the fields of contest in national elections.”
Delaware acknowledged the states have “some discretion” in choosing how to award their electors but argued that they are still bound by the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection in making that choice. The winner-take-all method, Delaware said, “is a collective unconstitutional abridgement of all citizens’ reserved political rights to associate meaningfully across state lines in national elections.”
The real solution, Delaware admitted, would be a constitutional amendment, but that was sure to be blocked by “entrenched political interests which are satisfied with a voting device that suits their purposes.” Citing the “one person, one vote” cases, Delaware pleaded with the Court to use its equitable power to require all states to award their electors “by a method reasonably calculated to reflect the will of all the people of the state as shown by their popular voting.”
Because the case involved one state suing another, it fell under the Court’s original jurisdiction, meaning Delaware could go directly to the justices, no lower courts necessary. That only meant Delaware’s loss came quicker; the justices rejected the petition without comment.
“It’s a Hail Mary dude, but it’s all we got.”
This was the text message Bret Chiafalo, a Democratic elector in Washington State, sent to Micheal Baca, a Democratic elector in Colorado, in the early-morning hours of November 9, 2016. (This is the short version of the story, which I tell at length in the introduction to my book, Let the People Pick the President — it’s a crazy tale.) The “Hail Mary” was a plot to use their electoral votes to deny the presidency to Donald Trump, who had just improbably won the election despite a popular vote loss to Hillary Clinton that would end up at nearly 3 million ballots.
Chiafalo and Baca envisioned a movement of “faithless” electors — that is, Republicans and Democrats who were horrified that someone like Trump might sit in the Oval Office. If enough electors joined together to use their constitutional powers of discernment and cast their ballots not for the candidate they were pledged to but for a third-party candidate everyone could agree on, they could stop Trump. They settled on John Kasich, a moderate Republican who had run for president that year but dropped out early for lack of support.
This wasn’t some half-baked scheme cooked up by angry liberals; as the plotters eagerly pointed out, the nation’s founders had intended electors to act in precisely this way. As Federalist 68 put it, “Men chosen by the people for the special purpose” of selecting the president “will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.” The 2016 electors even dubbed themselves “Hamilton electors,” after the author of that essay.
The problem was that the Electoral College has never actually worked that way, a historical detail illustrated by the fact that most of these electors — Chiafalo and Baca among them — had not merely pledged to vote for their party’s candidate; they were required to do so by state law (at the time, 32 states had laws requiring their electors to vote for the candidate they had pledged to vote for). When both men, along with a handful of others, actually went through with the plan, they were immediately disqualified and replaced with “faithful” electors. They then faced fines, investigations, and even potential prosecution for breaking the law.
Chiafalo and Baca sued, arguing that these state laws violated their constitutional right to cast their electoral ballots as they chose. The Supreme Court, as you can guess, said no. It ruled unanimously against the electors and in favor of the states. As in McPherson v. Blacker and Delaware v. New York, the rationale was simple and clear: States can do pretty much whatever they want with their electors, including punishing them for refusing to do the job they agreed to do. “The Constitution’s text and the nation’s history both support allowing a state to enforce an elector’s pledge to support his party’s nominee — and the state voters’ choice — for president,” Justice Elena Kagan wrote in her opinion for the Court.
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The point of this brief tour through history is to highlight the Court’s consistent and unanimous agreement about the exclusive power states have over their presidential electors.