Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations. Nevertheless, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they may bring firearms into in-person voting locations. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
State law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit (Alaska Const., art. 1, § 19). However, Alaska Stat. § 11.61.210(a)(7) prohibits knowingly and without authorization possessing a deadly weapon or a defensive weapon within the buildings, grounds, or parking lots of public or private preschools or elementary, junior high, or secondary school, which may serve as a polling site. Separately, Alaska Stat. § 11.61.220(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii) prohibits possessing a firearm within a courtroom or office of the Alaska Court System, or within a courthouse occupied only by the Alaska Court System and other justice-related agencies.
Both of these restrictions exempt a “peace officer acting within the scope and authority of the officer’s employment” (Alaska Stat. §§ 11.61.210(c), 11.61.220(c)). Under Alaska Stat. § 01.10.060(a)(7), “peace officers” include “an officer of the state troopers,” “a member of the police force of a municipality,” “a village public safety officer,” “a regional public safety officer,” “a United States marshal or deputy marshal,” and “an officer whose duty it is to enforce and preserve the public peace.” Although U.S. marshals and their deputies are expressly included in the definition, other federal law enforcement officials may qualify if their duties fall within the statute’s catch-all provision for officers charged with enforcing and preserving the public peace.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2020, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Alaska, where monitors were sent to Bethel, Dillingham, and Kusilvak census areas and North Slope and Northwest Arctic boroughs. The department announced in July 2026 that it send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Virginia during upcoming primary elections. And in September 2026, the Department announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law does not authorize local election officials to grant permission to individuals who are not expressly authorized by federal or state law to enter a polling location. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming, Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a) and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and emphasized stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies the conditions under which state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers: when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Alaska Stat. § 15.56.060(a)(1) prohibits inducing or attempting to induce an election official, by force, threat, intimidation, or reward, to fail to perform their duties. Additional provisions prohibit possessing an official ballot outside the voting room unless the person is an election official or otherwise authorized by law; changing or attempting to change official election documents; intentionally delaying transmission of election certificates, registers, ballots, or other required election materials; printing unauthorized or incorrect official ballots; possessing marking devices while handling ballots; or removing ballots from the immediate vicinity of the polling area (Alaska Stat. §§ 15.56.035(a)(1), 15.56.060(a)(2)–(4), 15.15.350(a)).
Moreover, Alaska law protects voters against intimidation. Alaska Stat. § 15.56.030(a) prohibits using or threatening force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, or loss to induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting. State law also prohibits injuring, oppressing, threatening, or intimidating another person with intent to deprive the person of a constitutional or statutory right, or because the person exercised or enjoyed that right, and separately prohibits intentionally depriving another person of a constitutional or statutory right under color of law (Alaska Stat. § 11.76.110). In addition, Alaska law prohibits compelling another person to engage in conduct they have a legal right to abstain from — or to abstain from conduct they have a legal right to engage in — by instilling fear that noncompliance may result in physical injury, criminal accusation, exposure of confidential information, or a person taking or withholding official action as a public servant, or causing a public servant to take or withhold official action (Alaska Stat. § 11.41.530(a)).
On top of these prohibitions, Alaska law imposes restrictions on poll watchers subject to state law. Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.020(b)–(d) limits each candidate, political party, organization, or group to one poll watcher at a polling place at a time; bars watchers from sitting behind election workers’ tables or between workers handling precinct registers; prohibits interfering with the election process or handling election supplies or materials, including precinct registers; and requires watchers to remain far enough from voting machines and voting booths to protect ballot privacy.
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that Alaska election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it requires a voter’s age or date of birth, Social Security number or part thereof, driver’s license number, voter identification number, place of birth, and signature to remain confidential and closed to public inspection (Alaska Stat. § 15.07.195(a)). Alaska law also allows voters to elect to keep their residential addresses confidential if they provide separate mailing addresses; and permits release of confidential information only in specified circumstances, including to government agencies for authorized governmental purposes, in compliance with a court order, with the voter’s written consent, or to another state or multistate group for voter list accuracy and eligibility purposes if confidentiality protections are maintained (Alaska Stat. § 15.07.195(b)).
In July 2025, the Department of Justice requested Alaska’s statewide voter registration list and information about the state’s compliance with federal list maintenance laws. Alaska later agreed to provide the full list pursuant to a memorandum of understanding, in response to which civil rights advocates sued Alaska officials. A spokesperson for the state said that the lawsuit ignores a state law that allows Alaska to share confidential information with other governments for legitimate purposes authorized by law. Litigation is ongoing —check with your counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter-registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Alaska law also imposes requirements governing the custody, handling, and access to election materials and equipment.
Before voting begins, election supervisors and election board chairs must secure polling places, ballot boxes, voting booths or screens, and other election supplies, and election supervisors must secure official ballots received from printers, using locked rooms with access limited to election personnel wherever possible (Alaska Stat. § 15.15.060(a); Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.040(a)). Ballot-counting programs and memory cards must be tested before each election. This includes logic-and-accuracy testing by the state ballot counting review board and regional counting board or regional area coordinator, certification that precinct tabulators print zero-total reports before polls open on Election Day, and verification that a zero-total report is printed before any tabulator is used to count absentee or questioned ballots (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.045(1)–(4))
During the election, the election board must maintain the security of the polling place and electronic voting equipment, inspect tamper-evident seals on electronic voting equipment, and report any evidence of tampering to the election supervisor (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.040(c)). Alaska law also prohibits possessing an official ballot outside the voting room unless the person is an election official or otherwise authorized by law (Alaska Stat. § 15.56.035(a)(1)). Voted absentee ballots received in the regional and director’s offices must be secured, with access limited to Division of Elections personnel and district absentee review board members (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.040(b)). Access to the regional counting centers in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Nome, and Wasilla is restricted to persons approved by the election supervisor, who must prepare a list of those authorized to enter restricted areas and provide them with appropriate identification (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.040(e)).
Once counting is complete, election boards must seal voted ballots in provided envelopes and initial the seals (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.040(d)). Boards must then prepare duplicate certificates of results; send one sealed package containing the certificate and register — and a separate sealed package containing all properly cast ballots — to the election director; and send the duplicate certificate to the appropriate election supervisor (Alaska Stat. § 15.15.370). Hand-counted ballots must be mailed to the director no later than the day after the election and logged and placed in a designated secured area upon arrival at the election director’s office; ballots counted by precinct tabulators must either be transported on election night to a prearranged secured storage area or mailed to the election director’s office (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.050(a)–(b)). Precinct tabulator ballots that are transported to secured storage rather than mailed must then be transported by air to the election director on the day following the election, or on another day determined by the director, and must be accompanied by a licensed and bonded courier service or licensed security officer from the secured storage area to the departure airport and from the destination airport to a designated secured storage area (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.050(c)).
Each ballot shipment must be accompanied by chain-of-custody documentation, and access to secured areas is limited to election personnel, state troopers, and authorized licensed security officers (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.050(d)). Separately, after certification, absentee and questioned ballots must be transported from regional election offices to the election director’s office by a licensed and bonded air courier service, accompanied by chain-of-custody documentation. Upon arrival, an elections official or licensed security officer must transport the ballots to the secured area in the election director’s office (Alaska Admin. Code tit. 6, § 25.050(g), (i)).
Alaska law prohibits intentionally changing, attempting to change, or causing a change to an official election document, including ballots, tallies, and returns (Alaska Stat. § 15.56.060(a)(2)).
Additionally, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” As an example of state law, Alaska Stat. § 15.56.060(a)(1) prohibits inducing or attempting to induce an election official, by force, threat, intimidation, or reward, to fail to perform their duties.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, or election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Alaska Association of Municipal Clerks, the Alaska Division of Elections, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, Alaska law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, but specific location-based restrictions may apply at polling sites located in schools or certain court facilities. Alaska Stat. § 11.61.210(a)(7) prohibits knowingly possessing a firearm within the buildings, grounds, or parking lots of public or private preschools or elementary, junior high, or secondary schools without authorization. And Alaska Stat. § 11.61.220(a)(4)(B)(i)–(ii) prohibits possessing a firearm within a courtroom or office of the Alaska Court System, or within a courthouse occupied only by the Alaska Court System and other justice-related agencies. However, both restrictions exempt a peace officer acting within the scope and authority of their employment. As discussed above, U.S. marshals and deputy marshals are expressly included in Alaska’s definition of “peace officer,” and other federal law enforcement officials may qualify if they fall within the statute’s catch-all provision (Alaska Stat. §§ 01.10.060(a)(7), 11.61.210(c), 11.61.220(c)).
Beyond these location-based restrictions, Alaska Stat. § 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) prohibits recklessly placing another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument, while Alaska Stat. § 11.41.230(a)(3) prohibits recklessly placing another person in fear of imminent physical injury by words or other conduct. Alaska law also prohibits recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person (Alaska Stat. § 11.41.250), and it prohibits discharging a firearm with reckless disregard for a risk of property damage or physical injury (Alaska Stat. § 11.61.210(a)(3)). Moreover, Alaska Stat. § 11.56.810 prohibits threats that a dangerous situation involving human life or property exists or is imminent, if made with reckless disregard that the threat may place a person in reasonable fear of serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument, cause an evacuation or serious public inconvenience, or cause fear of serious physical injury among the public or a substantial group. None of these provisions appears to contain an express exemption for armed federal officials or troops. Consequently, they may apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Alaska law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits certain conduct that interferes with the free exercise of voting rights. For example, Alaska Stat. § 15.56.030(a) prohibits using or threatening force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, or loss to induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting.
Alaska law also prohibits injuring, oppressing, threatening, or intimidating another person with intent to deprive the person of a constitutional or statutory right, or because the person exercised or enjoyed that right; and prohibits intentionally depriving another person of a constitutional or statutory right under color of law (Alaska Stat. § 11.76.110). In addition, state law prohibits compelling another person to engage in conduct they have a legal right to abstain from — or to abstain from conduct they have a legal right to engage in — by instilling fear that noncompliance may result in physical injury, criminal accusation, exposure of confidential information, or a person taking or withholding official action as a public servant, or causing a public servant to take or withhold official action (Alaska Stat. § 11.41.530(a)).
Finally, Alaska law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Alaska Stat. § 15.56.060(a)(1) prohibits inducing or attempting to induce an election official, by force, threat, intimidation, or reward, to fail to perform their duties. Additional provisions prohibit possessing an official ballot outside the voting room unless the person is an election official or otherwise authorized by law; changing or attempting to change official election documents; intentionally delaying transmission of election certificates, registers, ballots, or other required election materials; printing unauthorized or incorrect official ballots; possessing marking devices while handling ballots; or removing ballots from the immediate vicinity of the polling area (Alaska Stat. §§ 15.56.035(a)(1), 15.56.060(a)(2)–(4), 15.15.350(a)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to election facilities.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Alaska Stat. § 11.41.220(a)(1)(A) prohibits recklessly placing another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument, while Alaska Stat. § 11.41.230(a)(3) prohibits recklessly placing another person in fear of imminent physical injury by words or other conduct. Alaska law also prohibits recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person (Alaska Stat. § 11.41.250), and it prohibits discharging a firearm with reckless disregard for a risk of property damage or physical injury (Alaska Stat. § 11.61.210(a)(3)). Moreover, Alaska Stat. § 11.56.810 prohibits threats that a dangerous situation involving human life or property exists or is imminent, if made with reckless disregard that the threat may place a person in reasonable fear of serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument, cause an evacuation or serious public inconvenience, or cause fear of serious physical injury among the public or a substantial group. None of these provisions appears to contain an express exemption for armed federal officials or troops. Consequently, they may apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Alaska law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits certain conduct that interferes with the free exercise of voting rights. For example, Alaska Stat. § 15.56.030(a) prohibits using or threatening force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, or loss to induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting.
Alaska law also prohibits injuring, oppressing, threatening, or intimidating another person with intent to deprive the person of a constitutional or statutory right, or because the person exercised or enjoyed that right; and prohibits intentionally depriving another person of a constitutional or statutory right under color of law (Alaska Stat. § 11.76.110). In addition, state law prohibits compelling another person to engage in conduct they have a legal right to abstain from — or to abstain from conduct they have a legal right to engage in — by instilling fear that noncompliance may result in physical injury, criminal accusation, exposure of confidential information, or a person taking or withholding official action as a public servant, or causing a public servant to take or withhold official action (Alaska Stat. § 11.41.530(a)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible and publicly communicating how voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.