Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations. Nevertheless, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they may bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
Illinois is one of three states that “generally prohibit people from openly carrying firearms in public.” Additionally, Illinois restricts carrying concealed firearms, requiring individuals to obtain a concealed carry license” (430 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 66/65). License holders are subject to further limitations, including prohibitions against carrying concealed firearms in locations frequently used as polling locations such as local government buildings and public schools (430 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 66/65).
These prohibitions, however, do not apply to U.S. armed forces or reserve members, Illinois National Guard or Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) members, or “peace officers” while performing their official duties (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24–2). Federal law enforcement officials qualify for this exemption pursuant to 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/2–13, which explains, “For purposes of [state laws] concerning unlawful possession of weapons . . . officers, agents, or employees of the federal government commissioned by federal statute to make arrests for violations of federal criminal laws shall be considered ‘peace officers’ under this Code.”
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. Here is a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If in-person voting is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state-law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations or election offices.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities across the country. In November 2024, for example, the DOJ sent monitors to voting locations in 27 states. And in November 2020, the DOJ deployed monitors to jurisdictions in 18 states, including Cook County and the city of Chicago. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Virginia during primary elections.
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation between government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law does not authorize local election officials to grant permission to individuals not expressly authorized by federal or state law to enter a polling location. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and emphasized that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to the confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies the conditions under which state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when they have “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law.”
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–9 prohibits threatening public officials, including election workers. Illinois law also prohibits interfering with elections, including “any breach of the peace” (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/18–7); interfering with the validity or accuracy of an election, tampering with voting machines, or removing, changing, or mutilating ballot labels (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24–20); unlawfully destroying or altering election records, ballots, tally sheets, computers, or related materials (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–6); and tampering with voting machines or other devices used to cast or tabulate votes in order to interfere with their operation, alter election results, or add illegitimate votes (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–7). During primary elections, also prohibits unauthorized persons from remaining near voting booths, permitting only election officers, legally authorized challengers, voters admitted to vote, and persons authorized by election officers to preserve order and enforce the law (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/7–41).
Illinois law protects voters against intimidation as well. The Illinois Constitution provides that no person may be denied the right to register to vote or cast a ballot based on race, color, ethnicity, status as a member of a language minority, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or income (Ill. Const. art. III, § 8). State law prohibits knowingly preventing another person from registering to vote, lawfully voting, or supporting or opposing the nomination or election of a person for public office (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–4). It also prohibits two or more people from conspiring to prevent a person from registering or voting through force, intimidation, threat, deception, forgery, or bribery, and provides for civil liability when an act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy injures another person or deprives that person of voting rights (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–18). Finally, it prohibits knowingly intimidating or unduly influencing another person to cast a mail ballot contrary to their intent, or marking, tampering with, or unlawfully taking another person’s mail ballot in a manner that creates “an opportunity for fraudulent marking or tampering” (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–20).
On top of these prohibitions, Illinois law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law, including prohibiting them from impinging on ballot secrecy, handling election materials, positioning themselves so close to election judges as to interfere with the orderly conduct of the election, or leaving and reentering in a manner that disrupts voting or the canvass (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/17–23).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state-law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer or monitor is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. Illinois state law requires that once the canvass is complete, election materials, including ballots, be returned to the office of the election authority — typically the county clerk or board of election commissioners — which has the responsibility of preserving them (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/17–20).
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Illinois election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while Illinois law makes the statewide voter registration list available for public inspection outside the 27 days immediately preceding an election, it allows for redaction of telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, home address street numbers, birth dates, identifiable portions of email addresses, and “other highly sensitive personal information” (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/1A-25).
In June 2025, the DOJ requested Illinois’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After the Illinois State Board of Elections declined to provide voters’ sensitive information, citing state and federal privacy laws, the DOJ sued the state. The lawsuit is ongoing — check with your local counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. And 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. As an example of state law, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–9 prohibits threatening public officials, including election workers.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Illinois Association of County Clerks and Recorders, the Illinois State Board of Elections, and other trusted state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other election officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed troops or federal officials are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the Army, Navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have] under his authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely prohibits federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, state laws that restrict the open and concealed carrying of firearms may not apply to certain federal law enforcement officials. So although Illinois law bars carrying firearms in state and local government buildings (430 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 66/65), these prohibitions do not apply to U.S. armed services or reserve members, Illinois National Guard or ROTC members, or “peace officers” while performing their official duties (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24–2).
That said, Illinois has several additional laws that might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel. The first is 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–1, which prohibits assault, defined as knowingly and without lawful authority placing another person “in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.” A related provision elevates the offense to aggravated assault when a firearm is used without being discharging (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–2). Illinois law also prohibits knowingly or intentionally discharging a firearm at or into an occupied building or in the direction of another person or an occupied vehicle (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24–1.2).
Further, state law prohibits intimidation, defined as communicating a threat—with the intent to cause another person to act or refrain from acting—to inflict physical harm, physically confine or restrain a person, or take or withhold official action without lawful authority (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–6). This provision contains no exemptions and thus might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
Illinois law contains several related provisions. Under 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–17, any person who subjects, or causes to be subjected, an Illinois citizen or other person within Illinois to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal or state law “relating to registration to vote, the conduct of elections, voting, or the nomination or election of candidates for public or political party office” is liable to “the party injured or any person affected” in “any action or proceeding for redress.” Separately, 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–18 allows an injured party or any person affected to bring an action for redress against two or more persons who conspire to prevent voting or other protected election-related activity through force, intimidation, threat, deception, forgery, or bribery, where an act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy injures another person or deprives that person of election-related rights. Additionally, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 16/5–10 permits bringing a civil action against any person who, while conducting civil immigration enforcement, knowingly violates the Illinois Constitution or the U.S. Constitution, but excludes actions by “law enforcement officer[s]” or “peace officer[s]” acting within their powers and duties “consistent with Illinois law.”
Additionally, Illinois law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. State law prohibits threatening public officials, including election workers (720 ILCS 5/12–9). It also prohibits breaches of the peace or interference with elections (10 ILCS 5/18–7); interfering with the validity or accuracy of an election, tampering with voting machines, or removing, changing, or mutilating ballot labels (10 ILCS 5/24–20); unlawfully destroying or altering election records, ballots, tally sheets, computers, or related materials (10 ILCS 5/29–6); and tampering with voting machines or other devices used to cast or tabulate votes in order to interfere with their operation, alter election results, or add illegitimate votes (10 ILCS 5/29–7). During primary elections, it also prohibits unauthorized persons from remaining near voting booths, permitting only election officers, legally authorized challengers, voters admitted to vote, and persons authorized by primary officers to preserve order and enforce the law (10 ILCS 5/7–41).
Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at the polling place. Election judges must preserve peace and order and direct the arrest of anyone who breaches the peace or interferes with an election (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/18–7). A “peace officer” is also authorized to arrest without a warrant any person who, after being warned to desist, continues to engage in riotous or disorderly conduct (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/13–16). Uniformed police officers assigned to polling place duty must follow all lawful instructions of election judges (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/17–23).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to in-person voting locations.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, or nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting process.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. Here is a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–1, which prohibits assault, defined as knowingly and without lawful authority placing another person “in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.” A related provision elevates the offense to aggravated assault when a firearm is used without being discharging (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–2). Illinois law also prohibits knowingly or intentionally discharging a firearm at or into an occupied building or in the direction of another person or an occupied vehicle (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24–1.2).
Further, state law prohibits intimidation, defined as communicating a threat—with the intent to cause another person to act or refrain from acting—to inflict physical harm, physically confine or restrain a person, or take or withhold official action without lawful authority (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12–6). This provision contains no exemptions and thus might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
Illinois law contains several related provisions. Under 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–17, any person who subjects, or causes to be subjected, an Illinois citizen or other person within Illinois to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal or state law “relating to registration to vote, the conduct of elections, voting, or the nomination or election of candidates for public or political party office” is liable to “the party injured or any person affected” in “any action or proceeding for redress.” Separately, 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/29–18 allows an injured party or any person affected to bring an action for redress against two or more persons who conspire to prevent voting or other protected election-related activity through force, intimidation, threat, deception, forgery, or bribery, where an act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy injures another person or deprives that person of election-related rights. Additionally, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 16/5–10 permits bringing a civil action against any person who, while conducting civil immigration enforcement, knowingly violates the Illinois Constitution or the U.S. Constitution, but excludes actions by “law enforcement officer[s]” or “peace officer[s]” acting within their powers and duties “consistent with Illinois law.”
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their rights to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also issued new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to 10 business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible, providing alternative return options, including in-person delivery to the election authority, delivery by an authorized person or licensed carrier, and ballot drop boxes where available, and publicly communicating how voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review your policies for handling election mail and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume, to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies, and to discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up to date and to make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes the use of a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop-off sites.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate promptly with USPS officials about any issues.
- Consult counsel promptly if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.