The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
  • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

 

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in March 2026.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025advanced his nomination.

 

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Todd Blanche to serve as attorney general in June 2026. The Senate confirmed Blanche as head of the DOJ in August.

 

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

 

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Core Election Interference Provisions

• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.160: Prohibits interfering with a voter attempting to vote in a voting center or with the operation of a voting center, including through unauthorized access to or handling of ballots or unauthorized access to voting equipment or election systems; clarifies that elected officials and county staff are prohibited from accessing systems in any manner not required by their job functions; and further specifies that voters are permitted to take printed or written material into the voting device to assist with voting, but not to electioneer.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.050: Prohibits knowingly damaging, concealing, or discarding a completed voter registration form, ballot declaration, or voted ballot without legal authority, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.250: Prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with the right of any voter to sign or not sign an initiative or referendum petition, or with the right to vote for or against an initiative or referendum measure by threats, intimidation, or any other corrupt means or practice.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.420: Prohibits examining, or assisting another to examine, any voter record, ballot, or official election material without lawful authority for the purpose of linking a voter’s identity to how they voted or identifying the voter associated with a known vote, and makes such conduct, and revealing information learned from such an examination, a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.510: Prohibits, during the voting period (beginning 18 days before and ending on the day of a primary, special election, or general election) and within a voting center or student engagement hub, within 100 feet of the entrance to a voting center or student engagement hub, or within 25 feet of a ballot drop box, suggesting or attempting to persuade any voter to vote for or against a candidate or ballot measure; circulating cards or handbills; soliciting petition signatures; engaging in conduct that interferes with voters’ freedom to vote or disrupts the administration of a voting center; using electronic amplification to engage in those activities where the speaker can be understood within 100 feet of a voting center or student engagement hub or within 25 feet of a ballot drop box; obstructing entry to or free access from a voting center or ballot drop location.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.540: Prohibits removing a ballot from a voting center or ballot drop location without lawful authority, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.550: Prohibits willfully damaging or removing any of the supplies or materials for use in a voting center, election office, ballot counting area, ballot storage area, or election system, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.555: Prohibits willfully and without authority accessing, assisting, or providing unauthorized access to another person or entity to a voting center, election office, ballot counting area, ballot storage area, or any election system — whether electronically or physically — and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.560: Prohibits tampering with or attempting to damage or prevent the operation of voting machines or devices, or assisting unauthorized access to a voting center, election office, ballot counting area, ballot storage area, or election system, voting machine, or device, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.610: Prohibits deceiving a voter in recording their vote, recording a vote other than as designated by the voter, or misrepresenting an unofficial ballot collection site or device as an official county ballot drop box, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.620: Prohibits using menace, force, threat, or any unlawful means toward any voter to hinder or deter such a voter from voting, or directly or indirectly offering a thing of value to a voter in exchange for the voter’s vote.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.720: Prohibits election officials from willfully neglecting or refusing to perform their duties, providing unauthorized access to election facilities or systems (including software and hardware), or knowingly violating laws governing those duties, and makes such conduct a felony with forfeiture of office.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.230: Prohibits, for conduct not amounting to an assault, aiming a firearm, whether loaded or not, at another person, or willfully discharging a firearm in a public place or other place where a person may be endangered, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor, or subject to the applicable homicide or assault provisions of the criminal code if injury results.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270: Prohibits carrying, exhibiting, displaying, or drawing any firearm “in a manner, under circumstances, and at a time and place that either manifests an intent to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons,” and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284: Prohibits possessing a firearm or dangerous weapon in a ballot counting center, voting center, student engagement hub, or a county elections and voter registration office, or areas of facilities while being used as such; requires elections officials to post signs providing notice of the restriction; and makes a first violation a misdemeanor and any second or subsequent violation a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.300: Prohibits carrying a firearm while at any permitted demonstration, including in a vehicle; also prohibits openly carrying a weapon within 250 feet of a permitted demonstration after being advised by law enforcement of the demonstration and directed to leave; and makes any violation of these provisions a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305: Prohibits carrying a weapon while inside any buildings on the state capitol grounds; or in city, town, county, or other municipality buildings used in connection with meetings of the governing body of that jurisdiction; or any location during a public meeting or hearing of the governing body of such jurisdictions; and makes a first violation a misdemeanor and any second or subsequent violation a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.011: Prohibits, with intent to inflict great bodily harm, assaulting another with a firearm or other deadly weapon or by force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death, or assaulting another and inflicting great bodily harm, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021: Prohibits intentionally assaulting another and thereby recklessly inflicting substantial bodily harm; assaulting another with a deadly weapon; assaulting another with intent to commit a felony; or knowingly inflicting bodily harm designed to cause pain or agony equivalent to torture; and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.070: Prohibits using a threat — including a direct or indirect communication of an immediate intent to use force against a person present at the time, or an intent to cause future bodily injury, damage another person’s property, or subject a person to physical confinement or restraint — to compel or induce a person to do something the person has a legal right not to do, or to refrain from doing something the person has a legal right to do; and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020: Prohibits — including through electronic communications — knowingly threatening, without lawful authority, to cause bodily injury, damage property, subject a person to physical confinement or restraint, or maliciously commit any other act intended to substantially harm a person’s physical health or safety when the threat places the person in reasonable fear that it will be carried out; makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor and elevates it to a felony when a threat to kill occurs, a qualifying prior harassment conviction exists, or the target is a “criminal justice participant” or an election official who is threatened in connection with official duties.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.48.070: Prohibits knowingly and maliciously causing or creating a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of a “service rendered to the public” by damaging or removing an official ballot deposit box or drop box or tampering with its contents, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.48.080: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • knowingly and maliciously creating a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by physically damaging or tampering with property of the state or a political subdivision; or
  • without lawful authority, damaging, destroying, or removing an official ballot deposit box or drop box, or damaging, destroying, removing, or tampering with its contents, when that conduct creates a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.60.040: Prohibits assuming a false identity or pretending to represent a person, organization, or public servant and doing an act in pretended capacity with intent to defraud or for any other unlawful purpose, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.80.010: Prohibits public servants, with intent to obtain a benefit or deprive another person of a lawful right, from intentionally committing an unauthorized act under “color of law” or refraining from performing a duty imposed, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.175: Prohibits making a false or misleading statement to a public servant that is reasonably likely to be relied upon in the discharge of their official duties, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.180: Prohibits threatening a public servant to attempt to influence their decision or official action, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.90.120: Prohibits “cyber harassment” of election officials, including by electronic communication, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor, but elevates it to a felony under specified circumstances, including prior convictions, threats to kill, or when the target is an election official or other protected public servant.

Law Enforcement or Security Services at Voting Facilities

• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.510: Requires any sheriff, deputy sheriff, or municipal law enforcement officer to stop activity prohibited within or near voting centers, student engagement hubs, and ballot drop boxes, and authorizes such officers to arrest violators.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.216: Requires county auditors to provide places, supplies, and materials for the conduct of primaries and elections.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284: Permits county-hired security personnel for election facilities to be armed only if they have successfully completed firearm training.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Washington state laws and regulations, including Wash. Rev. Code §§ 29A.12.085, 29A.60.050, and 29A.60.110, along with Wash. Admin. Code §§ 434–219–330, 434–262–200, and 434–661–030, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Washington State Archives maintains a schedule to assist election officials in maintaining and disposing of county records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Election Materials and Equipment Custody, Handling, and Access

• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.08.710: Limits public disclosure of voters’ information other than “name, address, political jurisdiction, gender, year of birth, voting record, date of registration, and registration number.”
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.08.720: Restricts use of voter lists to “any political purpose” and prohibits use “for the purpose of mailing or delivering any advertisement or offer for any property, establishment, organization, product, or service or for the purpose of mailing or delivering any solicitation for money, services, or anything of value.”
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.12.210: Requires county auditors to implement specified cybersecurity measures for election systems, including isolating ballot counting equipment and voting system components from other networks and prohibiting voting system configurations that connect to external networks or devices.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.110: Requires all received ballot return envelopes to be kept in secure locations until opened and ballots to be placed in secure storage after opening and until processing; also requires postmark and signature reviews before processing by the canvassing board or its designees, training for signature-verification personnel, and procedures to preserve ballot secrecy for faxed or emailed ballots returned by overseas and service voters.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.170: Requires the following ballot drop box measures:
• ballots must be removed from drop boxes by at least two people, with records kept of the date, time, and names of those removing them; and ballots from drop boxes must be returned to the counting center in secured transport containers, accompanied by collection records, and received with seal numbers verified by the county auditor or a designated representative.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.160: Requires the county auditor, as delegated by the county canvassing board, to process ballots and canvass votes on a daily basis in counties with populations of 75,000 or more, and at least every third day in smaller counties, whenever the auditor possesses more than 500 uncanvassed ballots; also requires that tabulation results be made available to the public immediately upon completion of each canvass.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.200: Requires the county canvassing board to verify ballot results and execute a certificate of the results signed by all members or their designees; provides that failure to certify returns that can be ascertained with reasonable certainty is a felony; and authorizes the secretary of state to examine election records, ballots, and results and certify the election if the county canvassing board refuses to do so “without cause.”
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.68.013: Requires, upon a voter’s affidavit showing a qualifying wrongful act by an election officer, qualifying neglect of duty by an election officer, or certification error or omission in an election, any justice of the Washington Supreme Court, judge of the Washington Court of Appeals, or judge of the superior court in the proper county to order the person charged to correct the error, desist from the wrongful act, perform the duty, or show cause why that order should not be issued.
• Wash. Admin. Code § 434–335–260: Prohibits county auditors from providing third parties with physical, electronic, or internal access to state-certified voting systems or their components — including “voting software and systems, tabulators, scanners, counters, automatic tabulating equipment, voting devices, servers, ballot marking devices, paper ballot printers, portable memory media devices, and any other hardware, software, or devices being used as part of the voting system” — for copying or examination; and provides that any such access renders the equipment no longer secure or reliable, is to be treated as a security breach, and may result in decertification by the secretary of state.

Election Observers

• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.100: Prohibits observers from touching any ballots, ballot materials, or election systems.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.170: Prohibits any person other than authorized county personnel from touching ballots or ballot containers or operating a vote-tallying system at a counting center.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.64.041: Prohibits anyone other than the county canvassing board or its authorized representatives from handling recount ballots; and prohibits observers from recording names, addresses, or other information on ballots, declarations, or voter lists unless authorized by the superior court.
• Wash. Admin. Code § 434–264–030: Prohibits observers from interrupting the recount process to object to a decision to count or not count a ballot.
• Wash. Admin. Code § 434–335–290: Prohibits an observer from hindering or disturbing the logic and accuracy test process.
• Wash. Admin. Code § 434–261–010: Prohibits anyone except those authorized by the county auditor from touching a ballot or ballot container or operating the tabulation system.
• Wash. Admin. Code § 434–261–020: Prohibits observers from touching or recording images of voted ballots, challenging signature verification decisions, objecting to decisions to count or not count ballots or votes, or otherwise disrupting ballot processing; and authorizes the county auditor to require observers who do not follow established rules to leave the counting center.

Emergency Powers

• Wash. Rev. Code §§ 43.06.010, 43.06.220: Authorize the governor, after proclaiming a state of emergency, to issue orders, proclamations, and directives to address disasters or preserve the public peace, including the authority to waive or suspend specified statutory or regulatory obligations when strict compliance would prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.350: Authorizes the secretary of state to issue an emergency rule to take effect immediately, if they find for good cause that immediate adoption or repeal of a rule is necessary for the general welfare or public safety, and that observing the time requirements of notice and comment would be contrary to the public interest.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Wash. Const. art. I, § 18]: “The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”
• Wash. Const. art. I, § 24: “The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.”
• Wash. Rev. Code § 38.08.110: Prohibits another state’s armed military forces from entering Washington state for the purpose of doing military duty therein without the governor’s permission, unless such force has been called into active service of the United States and is acting under authority of the president.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 38.40.120: Prohibits any organized body other than the recognized state militia organizations, the U.S. armed forces, or valid military science students or bona fide veterans organizations from associating themselves together as a military company or organizing or parading in public with firearms.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.48.120: Prohibits teaching or demonstrating to another person the use or making of any device or technique capable of causing significant bodily injury or death while knowing, having reason to know, or intending that the device or technique will be unlawfully used in or in furtherance of a civil disorder.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.60.045: Prohibits falsely claiming to be a law enforcement officer, or creating the impression that one is a law enforcement officer, and acting with intent to convey that one is acting in an official capacity; falsely assuming the identity of an active-duty member of the U.S. armed forces with intent to facilitate unlawful activity; or knowingly distributing a forged digital likeness or audio recording of another person with intent to defraud, harass, threaten, or intimidate, or for another unlawful purpose; and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.020: Prohibits willfully hindering, delaying, or obstructing any law enforcement officer in the discharge of their official powers or duties.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.84.010: Prohibits four or more persons from unlawfully using or threatening to use force, or participating in the use of such force, against any other person or property; and makes such criminal mischief a gross misdemeanor, or a felony if armed with a deadly weapon.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.84.020: Prohibits four or more persons from congregating when conduct within the group creates a substantial risk of injury to persons or harm to property, and refusing to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in executing the law.
• Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.84.030: Prohibits intentionally disrupting any lawful assembly or meeting of persons or intentionally obstructing vehicular or pedestrian traffic without lawful authority.

Definitions

• See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 29A.04.008, 29A.04.019, 29A.04.055, 29A.04.058, 29A.40.160, 29A.40.170, 29A.40.180; Wash. Admin. Code §§ 434–261–010, 434–261–020.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Washington

The governor of Washington serves as the chief executive officer of the state (see Wash. Const. art. III, § 1), representing the state and handling the operation of its government. Gov. Bob Ferguson was elected in 2024 and is currently serving his first four-year term.

Wash. Rev. Code § 43.06.010 outlines the governor’s powers and duties, including the conditions that authorize a state of emergency declaration. Once an emergency is declared pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 43.06.010, Wash. Rev. Code § 43.06.220 authorizes the governor to issue executive orders, proclamations, and directives to address disasters or preserve the public peace — including the authority to suspend certain statutory and regulatory requirements where strict compliance would “prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency.”

In 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic, former Gov. Jay Inslee declared a statewide emergency and issued numerous proclamations affecting business operations, public gatherings, and aspects of election administration.

Under the Washington Constitution, the governor is commander in chief of the military (Wash. Const. art. III, § 8). Wash. Rev. Code § 38.04.030 defines the state militia to include able-bodied state residents over 18 who are U.S. citizens or have declared an intent to become citizens, expressly including members of the National Guard and the State Guard as defined in Wash. Rev. Code § 38.04.010, and divides the militia into “organized” and “unorganized” classes.

The governor may order the organized militia, which comprises the National Guard and the State Guard, into active state service to execute state or U.S. laws and address emergencies, including civil disorder, public safety threats, disasters, or situations wherein civil authorities are unable to maintain order (Wash. Rev. Code § 38.08.040). The governor may also declare a county or city or portion thereof to be under either complete or limited martial law to the extent deemed necessary to reestablish or maintain law and order (Wash. Rev. Code § 38.08.030).

Secretary of State

Steve Hobbs has served as Washington’s secretary of state since November 2021. He was first appointed by Governor Inslee when former Secretary of State Kim Wyman left office to join the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency. Secretary Hobbs was subsequently elected in the 2022 special election to serve the remainder of the term, and in 2024 was reelected to serve a full four-year term.

The office of the secretary of state is established by the Washington Constitution (Wash. Const. Art. III, § 17) and governed by Wash. Rev. Code ch. 43.07. The secretary’s responsibilities include overseeing state and local elections and certifying county returns as to candidates for statewide and federal office and all legislative and judicial candidates whose districts extend beyond a single county (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.250).

As the state’s chief election official, the secretary “shall keep records of elections held for which [they are] required by law to canvass the results, make such records available to the public upon request, and coordinate those state election activities required by federal law” (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.230). The secretary must also issue rules to ensure that county election officials implement the state election code in an orderly, timely, and uniform manner (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.611). Beyond those duties, the secretary is responsible for approving voting equipment (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.12.020); and for overseeing voter registration (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.08.125), ballot initiatives (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.250), voter education (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.32.010), and election operations and security (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.12.020).

State law also gives the secretary of state a central role in election security. County auditors and county information technology directors participating in the shared voter registration system or operating a voting system certified by the secretary, as well as certain vendors and support organizations, must disclose specified malicious activity and security breaches to the secretary of state and the attorney general immediately upon discovery (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.12.180). The secretary must also annually consult with the Washington State Fusion Center, the state chief information officer, and each county auditor to identify security breaches involving election systems or election data and, to the extent possible, identify whether the source of any breach is foreign, domestic, or both (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.12.200).

Additionally, the secretary of state’s office has authority to review a county’s “election-related policies, procedures, and practices” when a recount appears likely and at least once every five years, in connection with a county primary or special or general election, either at the secretary’s direction or at the honored request of the county auditor (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.570; Wash. Admin. Code § 434–260–030). A Washington resident may file a complaint with the secretary if they believe that an aspect of a primary or election was conducted inappropriately in a county, and the secretary must consider such complaints in scheduling periodic reviews (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.570). The secretary’s review team may also “make unannounced on-site visits to county election offices and facilities to observe the handling, processing, counting, or tabulation of ballots” (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.575).

The secretary of state is also required to maintain an election assistance and clearinghouse program that provides regular communication with local election officials and political parties “regarding newly enacted elections legislation, relevant judicial decisions affecting the administration of elections, and applicable attorney general opinions,” and responds to inquiries from elections administrators, political parties, and others regarding election information (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.590). These clearinghouse communications include notices and election advisories posted on the secretary of state’s website that provide policy guidance and best practices for election officials on election administration topics.

The secretary of state has rulemaking authority to promulgate regulations consistent with federal and state election law in order “to effectuate any provision of [the Washington state election code] and to facilitate the execution of its provisions in an orderly, timely, and uniform manner relating to any federal, state, county, city, town, and district elections” (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.611). Such regulations require formal rulemaking under Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Wash. Admin. Code ch. 1–21 to become permanent.

Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.04.611 also requires the secretary to “make rules” about certain election-related practices, such as ballot design standards and voting equipment evaluations.

The secretary of state’s office publishes proposed and recently adopted election rules on its website. Adopted rules can be found in Wash. Admin. Code tit. 434. Select examples include:

• Admin. Code § 434–230–015: Establishes rules for ballots and instructions
• Admin. Code § 434–335–330: Establishes rules for logic and accuracy testing
• Admin. Code § 434–335–260: Establishes standards for decertification of voting systems and vote tabulating systems

If the secretary, for good cause, finds that immediate adoption or repeal of a rule is necessary “for the preservation of the public health, safety, or general welfare,” and that complying with the notice and comment requirements and other APA procedures would be contrary to the public interest, the secretary may forgo those procedures and issue an emergency rule (Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.350).

With regard to elections, in the case of a natural or human-caused disaster, the secretary may adopt emergency rules and procedures to facilitate election administration (Wash. Admin. Code § 434–208–120). For example, the state law provision barring unauthorized third-party access to voting systems was originally an emergency rule amendment issued by the secretary of state that became effective the same day it was filed. It later was codified as a permanent rule amendment at Wash. Admin. Code § 434–335–260.

Washington National Guard

Major General Gent Welsh serves as the adjutant general of Washington. The adjutant general commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard forces within the Washington Military Department.

The adjutant general is appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the state senate and may be removed by the governor “at will” (Wash. Rev. Code § 38.12.010). Major General Welsh was originally appointed by Governor Inslee in June 2024 and was reappointed by Governor Ferguson in December 2024.

As adjutant general, General Welsh also oversees the state’s Emergency Management and programs; serves as homeland security advisor to the governor; and serves as the state administrative agent for all Department of Homeland Security grants awarded to Washington’s state, local, tribal, and nonprofit agencies and organizations (Wash. Rev. Code § 38.12.020; Wash. Rev. Code ch. 38.52).

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked Title 10 to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “at this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon.

As for the Washington National Guard’s involvement in elections, Governor Inslee activated the Guard for several days before and after the 2024 general election to support local law enforcement after an in Vancouver, Washington.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations. Nevertheless, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location, ballot drop box, or election office to vote or while conducting official business

Summary

Federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at in-person voting locations, and election offices. Even where firearm possession is permitted, federal and state laws prohibit interference with election administration and intimidation of voters. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.

Discussion

Federal presence at voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices raises overlapping questions about firearms restrictions, jurisdiction, and the limits on interference with election administration. Federal officials who appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices to vote or conduct official business may be armed.

While Washington generally permits a person to openly carry firearms, it requires a license to carry a concealed weapon (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.050). Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284 also prohibits knowingly possessing a firearm in a ballot counting center, voting center, student engagement hub, county elections and voter registration office, or areas or facilities while they are being used for those purposes. The statute exempts federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, however, as well as certain county-hired security personnel engaged in election security, although non-commissioned county security personnel may possess a firearm only if they have completed specified training (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284(3)(b)). The statute also allows licensed concealed carry in voting centers, student engagement hubs, and county elections and voter registration offices, but not in ballot counting centers (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284). Members of the armed forces and federal officials who are not considered law enforcement officials are not expressly exempted from this prohibition.

Separately, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305 prohibits knowingly carrying a firearm into any city, town, county, or other municipal building used for meetings of the jurisdiction’s governing body. As such, if a voting center is located in such a building or location, this prohibition typically applies. However, “duly authorized federal, state, or local law enforcement officers or personnel” are exempt from this prohibition when carrying a weapon in conformance with their agency’s policy, as are members of the U.S. military or Washington’s armed forces when carrying a weapon in the discharge of or traveling to or from official duties (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305(3)). Additionally, this statute does not apply to the lawful concealed carry of a firearm by a person who has a valid concealed pistol license (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305(5)).

Federal law also prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). At the same time, it provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

Local election officials generally determine the locations of ballot drop boxes, although federally recognized Indian tribes have certain rights in designating ballot collection locations (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.170). Additionally, if an in-person voting location or drop box is located on federal property — that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in a federal building — then jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Separately, state and federal laws prohibit interference with and obstruction of voting and election operations. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 29A.84.510, 29A.40.160, and 29A.84.630 prohibit interfering with, hindering, threatening, or bribing voters and interfering with voting center operations. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.180 prohibits intimidating or threatening public servants to attempt to influence their decisions or official actions. And Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.48.070 and 9A.48.080 prohibit, without lawful authority, damaging, destroying, or removing an official ballot deposit box or ballot drop box or tampering with its contents where that conduct causes an “interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public,” or a substantial risk thereof.

Under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote. See also the questions and scenarios on Election Interference and Disruption below.

Planning and Preparation

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
• Update policies as necessary. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• To safeguard in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, and other election facilities:
  • Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
  • Ensure continued compliance with Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284, which requires election officials to “post signs providing notice of the restriction on possession of firearms and other weapons at each counting center, voting center, student engagement hub, or county elections and voter registration office” or areas of facilities while being used as such. Here is a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
  • Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at or near in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
• To safeguard federal property locations:
  • Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
  • Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during voting or election processes.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers may not apply.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. In November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. The department announced in July 2026 that it send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Virginia during upcoming primary elections.

The DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections.” It has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation between state government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Washington law permits DOJ officials to observe ballot tabulation on the same terms as other members of the public, but it does not appear to provide local officials with separate authority granting them access beyond that framework (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.170).

When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 29A.84.510, 29A.40.160, and 29A.84.630 prohibit interfering with, hindering, threatening, or bribing voters and interfering with voting center operations. And Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.180 prohibits intimidating or threatening a public servant to attempt to influence their decision or official action.

On top of these prohibitions, Washington law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law, including touching ballots, ballot materials, ballot containers, voted ballots, or election systems; recording images of voted ballots; operating vote tallying systems; challenging signature verification decisions; objecting to ballot counting decisions; or otherwise disrupting ballot processing (Wash. Rev. Code §§ 29A.40.100, 29A.60.170). Wash. Admin. Code § 434–261–020 authorizes the county auditor to require observers who do not follow established rules to leave the counting center.

The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of federal election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be limited by federal law, and communicate them with your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer or monitor is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
• Ask for a list of the names of monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
• Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
• Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

Federal and state laws may limit the information that Washington election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it may prohibit disclosure of voter information except “the voter’s name, address, political jurisdiction, gender, year of birth, voting record, date of registration, and registration number” (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.08.710).

In June 2025, the Department of Justice requested Washington’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Washington’s secretary of state declined to provide voters’ sensitive information, citing prohibitions under state and federal law among other reasons, the DOJ sued the state. The lawsuit is ongoing — please check with your local counsel on the current status of the litigation.

In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter-registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed that it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested the records of dozens of voters.

Washington law imposes specific requirements governing access to and custody and handling of election materials and equipment. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.555 criminally prohibits willful and unauthorized physical or electronic access to voting centers, election offices, ballot counting areas, ballot storage areas, and election systems, along with willfully and without authority assisting or providing such access. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.560 also prohibits assisting unauthorized access to those locations or to election systems, voting machines, or devices, and more specifically criminalizes tampering with or attempting to damage or prevent the operation of voting machines or devices. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.550 separately criminalizes willfully damaging, removing, or destroying supplies or materials intended for use in a voting center, election office, ballot counting area, ballot storage area, or election system.

Wash. Admin. Code § 434–335–260 prohibits county auditors from providing third parties with “physical, electronic, or internal” access to state-certified voting systems or their components — including voting software and systems, tabulators, scanners, counters, automatic tabulating equipment, voting devices, servers, ballot marking devices, paper ballot printers, portable memory media devices, and other hardware, software, or devices used as part of the voting system — for copying or examination. The statute calls for such incidents to be treated as a security breach, provides that any such access renders the equipment no longer secure or reliable, and allows the secretary of state to decertify the system or component’s use (Wash. Admin. Code § 434–335–260).

State law also requires county auditors to implement specified cybersecurity measures for election systems, including isolating ballot counting equipment and voting system components from other networks and prohibiting voting system configurations that connect to external networks or devices (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.12.210).

During voting, Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.160 prohibits interfering with a voter attempting to vote in a voting center, or interfering with the operation of a voting center — including through unauthorized access to or handling of ballots or unauthorized access to voting equipment or election systems. The statute clarifies that this prohibition extends to elected officials and county staff accessing systems in any manner not required by their job functions (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.160(8)).

Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.160 requires the county auditor, as delegated by the county canvassing board, to process ballots and canvass votes on a daily basis in counties with populations of 75,000 or more, and at least every third day in smaller counties, whenever the auditor possesses more than 500 uncanvassed ballots. Tabulation results must be made available to the public immediately upon completion of each canvass (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.160(4)).

Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.170 requires that ballots be removed from drop boxes by at least two people; that records be kept of the date, time, and names of those removing them; and that they be returned to counting centers in secured transport containers, accompanied by collection records, and with seal numbers verified by the county auditor or a designated representative. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.110 requires that all received ballot return envelopes be kept in secure locations until opened, and that ballots be placed in secure storage after opening and until processing. The same statute requires signature and postmark examinations before processing by the canvassing board or its designees, training for signature-verification personnel, and procedures to maintain ballot secrecy for ballots faxed or emailed from overseas and service voters (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.110(4)).

After counting is completed, the county canvassing board must verify the results from the ballots received and execute a certificate of the results signed by all members of the board or their designees (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.200). Failure to certify the returns when they can be ascertained with reasonable certainty is a crime, and if the county canvassing board refuses without cause to certify the results, the secretary of state may examine the election records, ballots, and results and certify the election within two business days after the certification deadline (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.200(3)). Additionally, upon a voter’s affidavit showing a qualifying error, wrongful act, neglect of duty, or certification error or omission in an election, any justice of the Washington Supreme Court, judge of the Washington Court of Appeals, or judge of the superior court in the proper county must order the person charged to correct the error, desist from the wrongful act, perform the duty, or show cause why that order should not be issued (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.68.013).

Once ballots and other election materials are returned, county auditors must seal ballots in containers identifying the applicable election and retain them for at least 60 days for state and local elections and 22 months for federal elections (Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.60.110; 52 U.S.C. § 20701).

Importantly, state law restricts the information that election officials may provide in response to requests for information. For example, according to Wash. Admin. Code § 434–250–380, election officials who receive a public records request for ballot return envelopes, ballot declarations, or signature correction forms may only “offer the requestor the option of receiving redacted copies or inspecting unredacted versions in-person.” Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.425 also exempts from disclosure certain information relating to election security, including certain records “which may increase risk to the integrity of election operations or infrastructure,” along with personally identifiable information such as voter signatures and phone numbers.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” As an example of state law, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.180 prohibits threatening a public servant to attempt to influence their decision or official action.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
• It is important to note that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult with the Washington State Association of County Auditors, the Washington secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, or communities

Summary

Federal interference or intimidation may take the form of armed federal officials or troops appearing at voting locations or of visible federal deployments in surrounding communities that chill voter participation. Federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at voting locations. Even where firearm possession is otherwise permitted, federal and state laws prohibit intimidation of voters.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

As explained above, although Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284 generally restricts firearms in election facilities, it exempts federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and certain county-hired election security personnel. (Members of the armed forces and non–law enforcement federal officials are not expressly exempted.) The statute also permits licensed concealed carry in voting centers, student engagement hubs, and county elections and voter registration offices, (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.284(4)).

State law also prohibits knowingly carrying a firearm into any city, town, county, or other municipal building or any location of a public meeting or hearing of the governing body of a city, town, county, or other municipality during the hearing or meeting (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305). However, that prohibition exempts duly authorized federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and personnel acting in conformance with their agency’s policy, as well as federal and state military personnel while discharging their official duties or traveling to or from those duties (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305(3)). The statute also does not apply to concealed carry by a person with a valid concealed pistol license (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.305(5)).

Beyond these location-based restrictions, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270 prohibits carrying, exhibiting, displaying, or drawing any firearm “in a manner, under circumstances, and at a time and place that either manifests an intent to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.” The provision exempts persons engaged in military activities sponsored by the federal or state governments (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270(3)(e)). It also contains two exemptions that may apply to armed federal officials. The first exempts “[a]ny person who by virtue of [their] office or public employment is vested by law with a duty to preserve public safety, maintain public order, or to make arrests for offenses, while in the performance of such duty,” which may cover federal law enforcement officers acting within their lawful authority (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270(3)(b)). The second exempts any person making or assisting in making a lawful arrest for the commission of a felony (Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270(3)(d)).

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020 also prohibits knowingly and without lawful authority threatening to cause bodily injury, damage property, subject a person to physical confinement or restraint, or maliciously commit any other act intended to substantially harm a person’s physical health or safety, where the threat “places the person threatened in reasonable fear that [it] will be carried out.” Moreover, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.070 prohibits using a direct or indirect threat to compel or induce a person to do something the person has a legal right not to do, or to refrain from doing something the person has a legal right to do.

Washington law additionally covers assault with firearms or other deadly weapons; assault intended to inflict great bodily harm or that recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; and conduct that does not amount to assault but that may endanger, such as aiming a firearm at another person or willfully discharging a firearm (Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.36.011, 9A.36.021, 9.41.230). None of these provisions contain any exemptions; as such, they may apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation and menacing or obstructing voters may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone intimidating, threatening, or coercing (or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote — whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

While Washington law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. For example, Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.620 makes it a felony to use “menace, force, threat, or any unlawful means toward any voter to hinder or deter” them from voting; to offer “any bribe, reward, or any thing of value to a voter in exchange for the voter’s vote for or against any person or ballot measure” (either directly or indirectly); or to authorize any person to do so.

Finally, state law provides election officials with a statutory basis to seek law enforcement assistance in responding to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.84.510 requires any sheriff, deputy sheriff, or municipal law enforcement officer to stop activity prohibited within or near voting centers, student engagement hubs, and ballot drop boxes, and authorizes such officers to arrest violators.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to voting locations or to communities.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, or nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. Here is a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail ballot delivery

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.

Discussion

Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Recent operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.

One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.

USPS has also issued new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.

Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws — which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the United States (39 U.S.C. § 101) — the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”

Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took 7–10 business days to arrive rather than the standard 3–5. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020.

Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above. Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible, providing alternative ballot return options such as additional ballot drop box sites, and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.

Planning and Preparation

• Review your office’s policies for handling election mail and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
• Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. Encourage them to return mail ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop boxes.
• If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
• Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election-mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.