Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
State law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, so long as the person does so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–31–215(O)(1)–(2)). However, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(A)(3) prohibits anyone from carrying a handgun, whether openly or concealed, into polling places on election days. This provision exempts “law enforcement officers or other authorized personnel of the federal government . . . when they are carrying out official duties while in [South Carolina],” active-duty military personnel, and retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926C (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(B)(1), (3)–(4)).
Furthermore, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(A) prohibits possessing a firearm of any kind, without express permission from the authorities in charge, at other sites that may serve as polling locations: a public or private school, college, university, or technical college, other post-secondary institution, and any other “publicly owned building.” This provision exempts “law enforcement officer[s]” and “member[s] of the armed forces” (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(D)). The statute does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might qualify for the exemption.
A separate provision specifically prohibits carrying a firearm on elementary and secondary school property and exempts “state, county, or municipal law enforcement officers or personnel authorized by school officials” (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–430(A)). This law-enforcement exemption appears unlikely to apply to military personnel. But it might cover certain federal law enforcement officials who may enforce South Carolina criminal laws in limited circumstances and have “the same powers as a South Carolina law enforcement officer” when doing so (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–1–212(B), (C)(1)–(2)).
In practice, if armed federal officials or military personnel appear at a polling location to vote, several state-law provisions may allow them to leave their firearms secured in a vehicle rather than bringing them into the polling place. For polling places on election days, places clearly marked with signs prohibiting “concealable weapon[s],” and courthouses, courtrooms, or other publicly owned buildings where court is held and while court is in session, and offices of local governing bodies, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(D) allows a person who is not otherwise prohibited from carrying a firearm to store a firearm anywhere in an occupied or unoccupied vehicle. For covered educational premises or property, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(A) and S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–430(B) allow firearms or weapons to remain inside an attended or locked vehicle if secured in a closed glove compartment, console, trunk, or closed and fastened container in the luggage compartment. These vehicle-storage exceptions may therefore provide a way for armed federal officials or military personnel to exercise their right to vote while avoiding firearm possession inside voting spaces where state law restricts it.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If an in-person voting site is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an election facility to conduct routine business
Summary
Federal officials or military personnel may arrive at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities to conduct routine business. State and federal law, however, may restrict whether they can carry firearms at election facilities. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
As an initial matter, South Carolina law permits voters to return absentee ballots only by mail to the main office of the county board of voter registration and elections, or by delivering them to an election official at the county board’s main office or an early voting center, either personally or through an immediate family member or authorized representative (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–15–385(A)(1)–(3)).
Federal officials or military personnel appearing at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities to conduct routine business are typically armed.
State law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, so long as the person does so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–31–215(O)(1)–(2)). However, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(A)(2)–(4), (11) prohibits anyone from carrying a handgun, whether openly or concealed, into polling places on election days, places clearly marked with signs prohibiting “concealable weapon[s],” and other locations that might serve as election facilities, including courthouses, courtrooms, or other publicly owned buildings where court is held and while court is in session, and offices of local governing bodies. This provision exempts “law enforcement officers or other authorized personnel of the federal government . . . when they are carrying out official duties while in [South Carolina],” active-duty military personnel, and retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926C (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(B)(1), (3)–(4)).
Additionally, while South Carolina law explicitly prohibits local governments from regulating firearm possession (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–31–510(1)), it prohibits knowingly carrying a “concealable weapon,” whether openly or concealed, onto the premises of a public or private employer where the employer has posted a “NO CONCEALABLE WEAPONS ALLOWED” sign (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–31–220(A)(1), (B)). Federal officials performing their duties are exempt under this provision, but military personnel do not appear to be exempted (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23–31–220(B), 16–23–20(B)(1), (4), 23–31–600(D)).
Furthermore, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(A) prohibits possessing a firearm of any kind, without express permission from the authorities in charge, at other sites that may serve as polling locations: a public or private school, college, university, or technical college, other post-secondary institution, and any other “publicly owned building.” This provision exempts “law enforcement officer[s]” and “member[s] of the armed forces” (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(D)). The statute does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might qualify for the exemption.
A separate provision specifically prohibits carrying a firearm on elementary and secondary school property and exempts “state, county, or municipal law enforcement officers or personnel authorized by school officials” (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–430(A)). This law-enforcement exemption appears unlikely to apply to military personnel. But it might cover certain federal law enforcement officials who may enforce South Carolina criminal laws in limited circumstances and have “the same powers as a South Carolina law enforcement officer” when doing so (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–1–212(B), (C)(1)–(2)).
Federal law also prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592).
If an in-person voting location or absentee ballot drop-off site is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot return locations, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations and absentee ballot drop-off sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If in-person voting or absentee ballot drop-off sites are sited on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state-law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. In November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states, including South Carolina, where monitors were sent to Richland County. The department announced in July 2026 that it send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Virginia during upcoming primary elections.
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation between state government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” South Carolina law permits DOJ officials to observe elections on the same terms as other members of the public, but it does not appear to provide local officials with separate authority to grant them access beyond that framework. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate[.]” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–3–1040(A)–(B) prohibits knowingly and willfully communicating threats to kill or inflict bodily harm against public officials, public employees, or their immediate family members when the threat is directly related to the official’s or employee’s responsibilities; S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1920 prohibits willfully tampering with, attempting to tamper with, disarranging, defacing, impairing, or destroying a voting machine while it is in use at an election, or tampering with or attempting to tamper with a voting machine after it has been locked to preserve the election record, including instigating, aiding, or abetting such conduct with intent to destroy or change the record of votes; S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–770(A) prohibits anyone other than voters preparing their ballots, their minor children, and anyone authorized to assist them from entering the “guard rail,”; and S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1800 prohibits unauthorized persons from being in or about the voting place, in elections involving paper ballots and ballot boxes, except as otherwise permitted by law.
Moreover, South Carolina law protects voters against interference or intimidation. S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–80 prohibits “threaten[ing], mistreat[ing], or abus[ing] a voter with a view to control or intimidate [them] in the free exercise of [their] right of suffrage” at any primary, general, or special election. Additional provisions prohibit using “force, intimidation, deception, fraud, bribery, or undue influence” to obtain, procure, or control a vote for any candidate or measure other than one intended by the voter (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–190); using threats or intimidation to procure, offer, or promise to try to procure, another person’s vote for or against a particular candidate (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–70); speaking to a voter while the voter is preparing their ballot in a voting booth, unless authorized by law (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–740); and interfering with a voter inside the polling place, unduly influencing a voter while preparing their ballot, inducing a voter to reveal their ballot choices, or improperly aiding a voter in marking their ballot with a mechanical device (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–100(B)). More broadly, South Carolina also more broadly prohibits two or more persons from conspiring or banding together to injure, oppress, or interfere with a citizen or their property because of their political opinion or exercise of their constitutional or legal rights (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–5–10).
On top of these prohibitions, South Carolina law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law. As an initial matter, South Carolina’s Poll Managers Handbook distinguishes between election observers and poll watchers. Election observers “can be any member of the public who is neither working as a poll worker nor is designated by a political party or a candidate as a [p]oll [w]atcher,” while poll watchers are “individuals designated in writing by a political party, by a partisan candidate, or by a nonpartisan candidate to watch the election process inside a polling place” and must be qualified voters in the county where they are witnessing elections. Whereas election observers must be “stationed completely out of the way of the entire [election] process,” “limited to broadly viewing the activity within the polling place,” and may “not permitted at all if space is too limited,” poll watchers must “be stationed in an area designated by the Clerk where they can observe the entire election process[.]” S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–860 prohibits poll watchers from interfering in the orderly conduct of an election or influencing any voter in casting a ballot, while S.C. Code Ann. § 7–15–420 prohibits appointed watchers who are present during absentee ballot processing and tabulation from observing at a distance that would compromise ballot secrecy.
The application of state-law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local South Carolina election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it may prohibit disclosure of a voter’s social security number (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–5–170(1)).
In June 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested South Carolina’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After the courtsdeclined to block its release, the State Election Commission and DOJ entered into an agreement allowing transfer of the list. Unlike similar agreements between DOJ and other states, South Carolina’s agreement provides that voters may be removed only after DOJ identifies them as ineligible and the Commission confirms their ineligibility, and clarifies that the agreement does not override any federal or state-law notice requirements before removal.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter-registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
South Carolina law also imposes requirements governing the custody, handling, and access to election materials and equipment.
To begin, South Carolina law requires voting systems, including electronic ones, to be approved by the State Election Commission before use, requires changes or improvements to approved systems to be submitted to the Commission for approval, and requires decertification of approved systems that no longer meet the election law’s requirements (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 7–13–1620(A), (G)–(H)). Separate provisions impose additional requirements for vote recorders and optical scan voting systems, including approval before use, revocation of approval when a reexamined vote recorder can no longer be “accurately and efficiently used,” and maintenance of ballot images in a manner that protects data integrity and voter anonymity (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1330(B)–(C), (M)). Counties and municipalities must also keep voting machines “in complete and accurate working order and in proper repair” and maintain custody of voting machines and other polling-place equipment when not in use at an election (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1680). Before an election, political party representatives must be given an opportunity to inspect voting machines, confirm that counters are set to zero, and witness the machines being locked or sealed for the election (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1750).
During voting, voting-machine counter compartments may not be opened or exposed “except for good and sufficient reasons” (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1800). For absentee voting, return-addressed absentee ballot envelopes must be securely stored in locked boxes within the county elections board’s main office (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–15–385(F)). At the close of each early voting day, all ballots must be transported to the county elections board and stored in a secure location (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–25(J)).
Once the polls close, election managers must secure or inactivate marking devices, seal voted ballots in ballot containers, and transport election materials to the designated counting location (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1410(E), (G)). Election managers must also lock or seal voting machines against further voting (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1880).
After the election, election managers must return to the county elections board a sealed envelope containing all used machine seals and a certificate identifying the voting machine, precinct, seal numbers, and protective-counter numbers (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1890). Voting machines must remain locked or sealed “for as long as may be necessary or advisable” because of any election contest, subject to exceptions for preparing the machines for another election or examining data to verify machine results after notice to affected candidates or by court order (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1890). Separately, once canvassing and counting are complete, election managers must deliver poll lists, ballot boxes, and written precinct returns to the county elections board and account for all ballots delivered to them (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1150). The county board must retain unused and spoiled ballots until the time limit for contesting the election has expired (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1150).
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” As an example of state law, S.C. Code Ann. § 16–3–1040(A)–(B) prohibits knowingly and willfully communicating threats to kill or inflict bodily harm against public officials, public employees, or their immediate family members when the threat is directly related to the official’s or employee’s responsibilities.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the South Carolina Association of Registration and Election Officials, the South Carolina Election Commission, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to an election facility
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, South Carolina law generally allows carrying firearms openly or concealed without a permit, but several firearm restrictions may apply to locations commonly used for voting or election administration. South Carolina law prohibits carrying a handgun into polling places on election days; courthouses, courtrooms, or other publicly owned buildings where court is held and while court is in session; offices of local governing bodies; and places marked with signs prohibiting concealable weapons (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(A)(2)–(4), (11)). However, these restrictions do not apply to “law enforcement officers or other authorized personnel of the federal government . . . when they are carrying out official duties while in [South Carolina],” active-duty military personnel, or retired federal law enforcement officers authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926C (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–20(B)(1), (3)–(4)).
South Carolina also prohibits knowingly carrying a “concealable weapon,” whether openly or concealed, onto the premises of a public or private employer where the employer has posted a “NO CONCEALABLE WEAPONS ALLOWED” sign (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23–31–220(A)(1), (B)). Federal officials carrying out their duties are exempt under this provision, but military personnel do not appear to be excluded (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23–31–220(B), 16–23–20(B)(1), (4), 23–31–600(D)).
In addition, South Carolina prohibits possessing firearms at schools, colleges, universities, other post-secondary institutions, and any other “publicly owned buildings” (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(A)). The same provision separately prohibits entering those premises or property “to display, brandish, or threaten” others with a firearm (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(B)). But both restrictions exempt “law enforcement officer[s]” and “member[s] of the armed forces” (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–420(D)). The statute does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be covered.
A separate provision prohibits carrying firearms on elementary or secondary school property and exempts “state, county, or municipal law enforcement officers[.]” This law-enforcement exception appears unlikely to apply to military personnel. But it might cover certain federal law enforcement officials who, in limited circumstances, may enforce South Carolina criminal laws with “the same powers as a South Carolina law enforcement officer” (S.C. Code Ann. § 23–1–212(B), (C)(1)–(2)).
Beyond these location-specific firearm restrictions, South Carolina also prohibits presenting or pointing a loaded or unloaded firearm at another person (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–410). The provision does not contain any exemptions. Consequently, this provision might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While South Carolina law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–80 prohibits “threaten[ing], mistreat[ing], or abus[ing] a voter with a view to control or intimidate [them] in the free exercise of [their] right of suffrage” at any primary, general, or special election. Additional provisions prohibit using “force, intimidation, deception, fraud, bribery, or undue influence” to obtain, procure, or control a vote for any candidate or measure other than one intended by the voter (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–190); using threats or intimidation to procure, offer, or promise to try to procure, another person’s vote for or against a particular candidate (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–70); speaking to a voter while the voter is preparing their ballot in a voting booth, unless authorized by law (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–740); and interfering with a voter inside the polling place, unduly influencing a voter while preparing their ballot, inducing a voter to reveal their ballot choices, or improperly aiding a voter in marking their ballot with a mechanical device (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–100(B)). South Carolina also more broadly prohibits two or more people from conspiring or banding together to injure, oppress, or interfere with a citizen or their property because of the citizen’s political opinion or exercise of constitutional or legal rights (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–5–10).
Additionally, South Carolina law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. S.C. Code Ann. § 16–3–1040(A)–(B) prohibits knowingly and willfully communicating threats to kill or inflict bodily harm against public officials, public employees, or their immediate family members when the threat is directly related to the official’s or employee’s responsibilities. S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1920 prohibits willfully tampering with, attempting to tamper with, disarranging, defacing, impairing, or destroying a voting machine while it is in use at an election, or tampering with or attempting to tamper with a voting machine after it has been locked to preserve the election record, including instigating, aiding, or abetting such conduct with intent to destroy or change the record of votes. S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–770(A) prohibits anyone other than voters preparing their ballots and anyone assisting them from entering the “guard rail,” which contains the table used by election inspectors and voting equipment; and S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1800 prohibits unauthorized persons from being in or about the voting place, except as otherwise permitted by law in elections involving paper ballots and ballot boxes.
Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Election managers may exercise the “police powers” necessary to “maintain good order at the polls” and enforce lawful commands “during an election and during the canvass and counting of the votes,” and “peace officers” must respond to managers’ requests for help in preserving order (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–140). Election managers may also specifically call on “any law-enforcement officer” for assistance in protecting vote recorders, and such officers must provide that assistance when requested (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–1400). S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–160 requires sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, police officers, and “other officers” to remain outside the polling place unless entering to vote or summoned by a majority of election managers, who may seek the arrest of officers who fail to comply.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to an election facility.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, or nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
South Carolina law prohibits presenting or pointing a loaded or unloaded firearm at another person (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–23–410). The provision does not contain any exemptions. Consequently, this provision might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While South Carolina law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–80 prohibits “threaten[ing], mistreat[ing], or abus[ing] a voter with a view to control or intimidate [them] in the free exercise of [their] right of suffrage” at any primary, general, or special election. Additional provisions prohibit using “force, intimidation, deception, fraud, bribery, or undue influence” to obtain, procure, or control a vote for any candidate or measure other than one intended by the voter (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–190); using threats or intimidation to procure, offer, or promise to try to procure, another person’s vote for or against a particular candidate (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–70); speaking to a voter while the voter is preparing their ballot in a voting booth, unless authorized by law (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–13–740); and interfering with a voter inside the polling place, unduly influencing a voter while preparing their ballot, inducing a voter to reveal their ballot choices, or improperly aiding a voter in marking their ballot with a mechanical device (S.C. Code Ann. § 7–25–100(B)). South Carolina also more broadly prohibits two or more people from conspiring or banding together to injure, oppress, or interfere with a citizen or their property because of the citizen’s political opinion or exercise of constitutional or legal rights (S.C. Code Ann. § 16–5–10).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their rights to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also issued new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; informing voters that they may return absentee ballots to their county elections board’s main office or to an early voting center, either personally or through an immediate family member or authorized representative; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review your office’s policies for handling election mail and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as absentee ballot drop-off sites.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election-mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.