Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, early voting locations, or drop boxes under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
As an initial matter, Utah conducts elections primarily by mail (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3a-202(1)(a)). However, voters may also cast ballots in person at polling places during early voting or on Election Day (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3a-201(1)(b)–(c)). State law requires election officers to designate at least one polling place open on each day of early voting, and requires counties administering elections to maintain at least one Election Day voting center, plus an additional center for every 5,000 active voters who will not receive a ballot by mail (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-603(1)(a), 20A-3a-202(8)(a)).
Utah law generally permits persons age 21 or older to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, subject to restrictions on carrying firearms in certain locations (Utah Code Ann. § 53–5a-102.2(1)(b), (2)(b); see also Utah Const. art. I, § 6). Several of those restricted locations may serve as polling places — including public or private elementary or secondary schools, where open and concealed carry without a permit are generally prohibited, although qualifying permit holders age 21 or older may carry concealed firearms (Utah Code Ann. § 76–11–205(1)(a), (2), (4)(b)–(c)); and higher education institutions, where open carry is generally prohibited regardless of permit status, but concealed carry without a permit is generally permitted for individuals age 21 or older (Utah Code Ann. §§ 53–5a-102.2(1)(b), (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c)(ii)(B), 76–11–205.5(2), (4)).
However, U.S. marshals, “federal official[s] required to carry a firearm,” “peace officer[s] of any jurisdiction,” and “law enforcement official[s]” with the required certification are exempt from these restrictions (Utah Code Ann. §§ 53–5a-108(1)(a)–(d), 76–11–205(4)(a), 76–11–205.5(4)(a)). Federal law enforcement officers required to carry firearms appear to qualify for the exemption applicable to “federal official[s] required to carry a firearm.” Although the statute does not expressly exempt military personnel, service members whose duties similarly require them to carry firearms may also qualify for that exemption. And while the law enforcement official exemption appears to cover specified state and local officials (Utah Code Ann. § 53–5a-311(1)(c), (4)(a)), Utah law also recognizes “federal officers” as a category of officials who may exercise “peace officer authority,” and it identifies various federal officers with state law enforcement authority while allowing for the designation of additional federal peace officers (Utah Code Ann. §§ 53–13–102(4), 53–13–106(1)(c), (d)(i), (e)). Accordingly, the exemption for “peace officer[s] of any jurisdiction” may extend to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized, but not required, to carry firearms and therefore do not qualify for the separate exemption for federal officials required to carry them.
Additionally, polling places may be located on private property, and owners or lawful lessees of such property may generally prohibit individuals from carrying firearms on their premises (Utah Code Ann. § 53–5a-102.2(3)(b)). Utah law does not expressly exempt federal law enforcement officers or military personnel from such restrictions.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations or drop boxes. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Utah, where monitors were sent to San Juan County. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” In Utah, poll workers may not allow anyone other than election officials and individuals admitted to vote within six feet of voting devices, voting booths, or ballot boxes (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-5–605(8)(b)).
When polling place access has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations. After DOJ monitors reportedly attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). The act also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1–603(1)(b)(iii) prohibits engaging in riotous conduct at an election or interfering in any manner with election officials in the discharge of their duties. More broadly, Utah law prohibits using force, violence, intimidation, or any other unlawful act with the purpose of interfering with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function; denying public servants the use of public property owned, operated, or controlled by the state or a political subdivision by restricting their freedom of movement, use of the property or facility, or entry into or exit from the property or facility; and threatening to harm public servants or party officials — or persons or entities whose welfare they are interested in — in order to influence a vote, action, decision, recommendation, nomination, or other exercise of discretion (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76–8–301(2), 76–8–301.2(2), 76–8–104(2)).
Utah law also prohibits taking, concealing, or destroying ballots, pollbooks, or other election materials from polling places or lawful custody, or removing, concealing, or destroying ballot drop boxes or their contents; willfully defacing ballots or delaying their delivery; suppressing official ballots except as authorized by law; knowingly possessing or controlling another individual’s voted manual (or paper) ballot, except as an election official, postal worker acting in an official capacity, individual lawfully handling emergency or military-overseas ballots, individual authorized to assist voters who need help delivering their ballots because of age, illness, or disability, or member of the same household; and examining ballots offered or cast at the polls or found in ballot boxes or ballot drop boxes except to determine which candidate was elected (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-1–603(1)(b)(v)–(vi), 20A-1–605(1)(f)–(h), 20A-3a-501(5), 20A-5–702(1)).
Related provisions prohibit willfully and without lawful authority altering, defacing, destroying, tearing down, or removing candidate lists, voter instructions, sample ballots, or supplies furnished to enable voters to prepare their ballots (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1–604(1)). Utah law further prohibits intentionally or knowingly damaging, modifying, stealing, tampering with, or destroying voting equipment and restricts election officers from allowing anyone other than election officials to access election equipment except when it is being serviced or disposed of (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-5–706(1), 20A-5–902(1)).
Other provisions prohibit altering election returns or willfully adding to or subtracting from votes actually cast (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4–502(1))m and intentionally ascertaining or attempting to ascertain the state of the count in a voting precinct before the count is completed or before 8 p.m., whichever is later (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4–504(1)).
Utah law also restricts access to cameras, videos, and recordings used to monitor ballot processing and unattended ballot drop boxes, and prohibits viewing of those recordings except by authorized individuals for specified compliance or investigative purposes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-401.1(6)(c), (7)(a), 20A-5–403.5(1)(f), (2)(a)).
Moreover, state law protects voters against interference or intimidation. State law prohibits interfering with voters lawfully exercising their voting rights so as to prevent an election from being fairly held; willfully hindering the voting of others; disrupting polling places or interfering with individuals marking ballots; using force, fraud, intimidation, violence, restraint, or abduction to influence or impede voting; and threatening harm to voters — or persons or entities whose welfare they are interested in — to influence their votes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-1–603(1)(b)(ii), 20A-1–604(1), 20A-3a-501(2)(iv), 20A-3a-502(1), (2), 20A-3a-504(1)(c), 76–8–104(2)). Utah law also prohibits soliciting voters to show their ballots; intentionally displaying one’s own ballot to reveal an intended vote; inducing individuals in voting booths or marking ballots to reveal their selections; and photographing another person’s ballot at a polling place (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-501(4), 20A-3a-504(1)(a), (d), (e)).
On top of these prohibitions, Utah law imposes certain restrictions on election watchers subject to state law. Watchers may not record election activities in a manner that reveals votes or violates ballot secrecy or voter privacy; interfere with election processes they are authorized to observe, except to challenge voter eligibility as authorized by law; divulge information about votes counted, tabulated, or cast for a candidate or ballot proposition before an election officer makes that information public; or reveal how a voter voted or communicate any opinion, belief, or impression about how or for whom a voter voted (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-801(7)(i), (iii), (iv), 20A-3a-806, 20A-5–705). Election officers may remove watchers who violate any of their duties or restrictions, or who otherwise interfere with election processes, from the polling place (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3a-801(8)(ii), (iii)).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and locaml control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Utah election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while Utah law requires the lieutenant governor and county clerks to disclose certain “standard voter data” upon request, including voters’ names, addresses, age ranges, registration status, party affiliation, electoral districts, and voting history, it generally prohibits disclosing other information from those records, including birth dates, driver’s license or identification numbers, Social Security numbers, email addresses, phone numbers, and information concerning proof of citizenship (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-2–601(14), 20A-2–603(1)(a), (b)(i), 63G-2–302(1)(j)). State law separately prohibits disclosing any voter registration information concerning at-risk voters, except as otherwise authorized by law (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2–603(1)(b)(ii)). The law also prohibits disclosure when the lieutenant governor or county clerk has probable cause to believe that a requester has misrepresented their identity or authority or intends to use or share the information unlawfully, and restricts recipients’ use and sharing of voter registration information (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2–603(3)(c), (2)(a)–(d)).
In July 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested Utah’s complete statewide voter registration list, including sensitive voter data. After Utah provided only its publicly available list and raised privacy concerns about disclosing the entire set of data, the DOJ proposed a memorandum of understanding in December 2025 to address those concerns. When Utah had still not produced its complete list by February 2026, the DOJ sued the state. Litigation is ongoing — check with your counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1–603(1)(b)(iii) prohibits engaging in riotous conduct at an election or interfering in any manner with election officials in the discharge of their duties. More broadly, Utah law prohibits using force, violence, intimidation, or any other unlawful act with the purpose of interfering with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function; denying public servants the use of public property owned, operated, or controlled by the state or a political subdivision by restricting their freedom of movement, use of the property or facility, or entry into or exit from the property or facility; and threatening to harm public servants or party officials — or persons or entities whose welfare they are interested in — in order to influence a vote, action, decision, recommendation, nomination, or other exercise of discretion (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76–8–301(2), 76–8–301.2(2), 76–8–104(2)).
Utah law also prohibits taking, concealing, or destroying ballots, pollbooks, or other election materials from polling places or lawful custody, or removing, concealing, or destroying ballot drop boxes or their contents; willfully defacing ballots or delaying their delivery; suppressing official ballots except as authorized by law; knowingly possessing or controlling another person’s voted manual (or paper) ballot, except as an election official, postal worker acting in an official capacity, individual lawfully handling emergency or military-overseas ballots, individual authorized to assist voters who need help delivering their ballots because of age, illness, or disability, or member of the same household; and examining ballots offered or cast at the polls or found in ballot boxes or ballot drop boxes except to determine which candidate was elected (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-1–603(1)(b)(v)–(vi), 20A-1–605(1)(f)–(h), 20A-3a-501(5), 20A-5–702(1)).
Related provisions prohibit willfully and without lawful authority altering, defacing, destroying, tearing down, or removing candidate lists, voter instructions, sample ballots, or supplies furnished to enable voters to prepare their ballots (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1–604(1)). Utah law further prohibits intentionally or knowingly damaging, modifying, stealing, tampering with, or destroying voting equipment and restricts election officers from allowing anyone other than election officials to access election equipment except when it is being serviced or disposed of (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-5–706(1), 20A-5–902(1)).
Other provisions prohibit altering election returns or willfully adding to or subtracting from votes actually cast (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4–502(1)), and intentionally ascertaining or attempting to ascertain the state of the count in a voting precinct before the count is completed or before 8 p.m., whichever is later (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4–504(1)).
Finally, state law restricts access to cameras, videos, and recordings used to monitor ballot processing and unattended ballot drop boxes, and prohibits viewing of those recordings except by authorized individuals for specified compliance or investigative purposes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-401.1(6)(c), (7)(a), 20A-5–403.5(1)(f), (2)(a)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult with the Utah Association of Counties, the office of Utah’s lieutenant governor, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to voting locations
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, Utah law generally permits a person age 21 or older to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, subject to restrictions on carrying firearms in certain locations (Utah Code Ann. § 53–5a-102.2(1)(b), (2)(b); see also Utah Const. art. I, § 6). Several of those restricted locations may serve as polling places — including public or private elementary or secondary schools, where open and concealed carry without a permit are generally prohibited, although qualifying permit holders age 21 or older may carry concealed firearms (Utah Code Ann. § 76–11–205(1)(a), (2), (4)(b)–(c));and higher education institutions, where open carry is generally prohibited regardless of permit status, but concealed carry without a permit is generally permitted for individuals age 21 or older (Utah Code Ann. §§ 53–5a-102.2(1)(b), (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c)(ii)(B), 76–11–205.5(2), (4)).
These restrictions exempt U.S. marshals, federal officials required to carry firearms, peace officers of any jurisdiction, and qualifying law enforcement officials (Utah Code Ann. §§ 53–5a-108(1)(a)–(d), 76–11–205(4)(a), 76–11–205.5(4)(a)). Federal law enforcement officers required to carry firearms appear to qualify for the exemption applicable to federal officials required to carry firearms. Although the statute does not expressly exempt military personnel, service members whose duties similarly require them to carry firearms may also qualify for that exemption. And while the law enforcement official exemption appears to cover specified state and local officials (Utah Code Ann. § 53–5a-311(1)(c), (4)(a)), the separate peace officer exemption may extend to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized but not required to carry firearms, because Utah law recognizes “federal officers” as a category of officials who may exercise “peace officer authority” (Utah Code Ann. §§ 53–13–102(4), 53–13–106(1)(c), (d)(i), (e)). Finally, owners or lawful lessees of private property used as polling places may generally prohibit firearms, and Utah law does not expressly exempt military personnel or federal law enforcement officers from such restrictions (Utah Code Ann. § 53–5a-102.2(3)(b)).
Beyond these location-specific firearms restrictions, Utah law prohibits unlawfully drawing or exhibiting a dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner in the presence of two or more individuals (Utah Code Ann. § 76–11–207(2)(a)). However, this prohibition exempts U.S. marshals, federal officials required to carry firearms, peace officers of any jurisdiction, and qualifying law enforcement officials when acting in the performance of their duties (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76–11–207(4)(b), 53–5a-108(1)(a)–(f)). As with the exemptions discussed above, this exemption may cover military personnel whose duties require them to carry firearms, federal law enforcement officers required to carry firearms, and federal law enforcement officers authorized but not required to carry firearms who qualify as peace officers — but unlike those exemptions, this exemption would only apply when they are acting in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, federal personnel who unlawfully draw or exhibit dangerous weapons in a threatening manner outside the scope of their official duties may be subject to the prohibition.
Utah law also prohibits threatening, with a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another, or committing an act involving unlawful force or violence that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury, where the conduct involves a dangerous weapon or other qualifying means (Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–103(2)(a)(ii), (iii), (b)). State law further prohibits threatening to commit an offense involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage with the intent to place an individual in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or death (Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–107(2)(a)). Neither provision contains an express exemption for federal officials or military personnel. Therefore, they might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Utah law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. State law prohibits interfering with voters lawfully exercising their voting rights so as to prevent an election from being fairly held; willfully hindering the voting of others; disrupting polling places or interfering with individuals marking ballots; using force, fraud, intimidation, violence, restraint, or abduction to influence or impede voting; and threatening harm to voters — or persons or entities whose welfare they are interested in — to influence their votes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-1–603(1)(b)(ii), 20A-1–604(1), 20A-3a-501(2)(iv), 20A-3a-502(1), (2), 20A-3a-504(1)(c), 76–8–104(2)). Utah law also prohibits soliciting voters to show their ballots; intentionally displaying one’s own ballot to reveal an intended vote; inducing individuals in voting booths or marking ballots to reveal their selections; and photographing another person’s ballot at a polling place (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-501(4), 20A-3a-504(1)(a), (d), (e)).
Moreover, Utah law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1–603(1)(b)(iii) prohibits engaging in riotous conduct at an election or interfering in any manner with election officials in the discharge of their duties. More broadly, Utah law prohibits using force, violence, intimidation, or any other unlawful act with the purpose of interfering with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function; denying public servants the use of public property owned, operated, or controlled by the state or a political subdivision by restricting their freedom of movement, use of the property or facility, or entry into or exit from the property or facility; and threatening to harm public servants or party officials — or persons or entities whose welfare they are interested in — in order to influence a vote, action, decision, recommendation, nomination, or other exercise of discretion (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76–8–301(2), 76–8–301.2(2), 76–8–104(2)).
Utah law also prohibits taking, concealing, or destroying ballots, pollbooks, or other election materials from polling places or lawful custody, or removing, concealing, or destroying ballot drop boxes or their contents; willfully defacing ballots or delaying their delivery; suppressing official ballots except as authorized by law; knowingly possessing or controlling another person’s voted manual (or paper) ballot, except as an election official, postal worker acting in an official capacity, individual lawfully handling emergency or military-overseas ballots, individual authorized to assist voters who need help their delivering ballots because of age, illness, or disability, or member of the same household; and examining ballots offered or cast at the polls or found in ballot boxes or ballot drop boxes except to determine which candidate was elected (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-1–603(1)(b)(v)–(vi), 20A-1–605(1)(f)–(h), 20A-3a-501(5), 20A-5–702(1)).
Related provisions prohibit willfully and without lawful authority altering, defacing, destroying, tearing down, or removing candidate lists, voter instructions, sample ballots, or supplies furnished to enable voters to prepare their ballots (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1–604(1)). Utah law further prohibits intentionally or knowingly damaging, modifying, stealing, tampering with, or destroying voting equipment and restricts election officers from allowing anyone other than election officials to access election equipment except when it is being serviced or disposed of (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-5–706(1), 20A-5–902(1)).
Other provisions prohibit altering election returns or willfully adding to or subtracting from votes actually cast (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4–502(1)), and intentionally ascertaining or attempting to ascertain the state of the count in a voting precinct before the count is completed or before 8 p.m., whichever is later (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4–504(1)). Utah law also restricts access to cameras, videos, and recordings used to monitor ballot processing and unattended ballot drop boxes, and prohibits viewing of those recordings except by authorized individuals for specified compliance or investigative purposes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-401.1(6)(c), (7)(a), 20A-5–403.5(1)(f), (2)(a)).
Finally, state law requires sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, and municipal law enforcement officers to prevent the obstruction of entrances to polling places, including ballot drop box locations, and authorizes those officers to arrest individuals creating such obstructions (Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3a-501(1)(b), (3)(b)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to a voting location.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, or nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and around Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Utah law prohibits unlawfully drawing or exhibiting a dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner in the presence of two or more individuals (Utah Code Ann. § 76–11–207(2)(a)). However, this prohibition exempts U.S. marshals, federal officials required to carry firearms, peace officers of any jurisdiction, and qualifying law enforcement officials when acting in the performance of their duties (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76–11–207(4)(b), 53–5a-108(1)(a)–(f)). As with the exemptions discussed above, this exemption may cover military personnel whose duties require them to carry firearms, federal law enforcement officers required to carry firearms, and federal law enforcement officers authorized but not required to carry firearms who qualify as peace officers — but unlike those exemptions, this exemption would only apply when they are acting in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, federal personnel who unlawfully draw or exhibit dangerous weapons in a threatening manner outside the scope of their official duties may be subject to the prohibition.
Utah law also prohibits threatening, with a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another, or committing an act involving unlawful force or violence that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury, where the conduct involves a dangerous weapon or other qualifying means (Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–103(2)(a)(ii), (iii), (b)). State law further prohibits threatening to commit an offense involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage with the intent to place an individual in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or death (Utah Code Ann. § 76–5–107(2)(a)). Neither provision contains an express exemption for federal officials or military personnel. Therefore, they might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Utah law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. State law prohibits interfering with voters lawfully exercising their voting rights so as to prevent an election from being fairly held; willfully hindering the voting of others; disrupting polling places or interfering with individuals marking ballots; using force, fraud, intimidation, violence, restraint, or abduction to influence or impede voting; and threatening harm to voters — or persons or entities whose welfare they are interested in — to influence their votes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-1–603(1)(b)(ii), 20A-1–604(1), 20A-3a-501(2)(iv), 20A-3a-502(1), (2), 20A-3a-504(1)(c), 76–8–104(2)). State law also prohibits soliciting voters to show their ballots; intentionally displaying one’s own ballot to reveal an intended vote; inducing individuals in voting booths or marking ballots to reveal their selections; and photographing another person’s ballot at a polling place (Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-3a-501(4), 20A-3a-504(1)(a), (d), (e)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Recent operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” under these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; reminding voters that they may return mail ballots in person by delivering them to the election officer or depositing them in a ballot drop box at a polling place or at another designated location; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and to make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop boxes.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.