Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
West Virginia law generally permits an adult to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, so long as the person does so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (W. Va. Code § 61–7–7(c); see also W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22). However, state law prohibits firearm possession at locations that may serve as polling sites.
First, W. Va. Code § 61–7–11a(b)(1) prohibits possessing a firearm in or on the grounds of a primary or secondary educational facility, including a school used as a polling place. The prohibition exempts any person currently employed as a “law-enforcement officer,” whether on or off duty, along with retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926C (W. Va. Code § 61–7–11a(b)(2)(A), (E)). State law defines “law enforcement officers” in terms of state and local officials (W. Va. Code § 30–29–1(6)).
That said, a separate provision gives full-time federal law enforcement officers employed by the United States and authorized to carry firearms while performing their duties — including certain military law enforcement personnel — the same authority to enforce West Virginia law as state or local law enforcement officers in specified circumstances: when requested by a state or local law enforcement agency to provide temporary assistance; when requested by a state or local law enforcement officer in exigent circumstances; or when a felony occurs in the federal officer’s presence or appears just to have occurred (W. Va. Code § 15–10–5(a)–(b)). The same provision also gives law enforcement personnel of the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service powers of arrest, search, and seizure under state law for offenses committed on specified federal lands (W. Va. Code § 15–10–5(c)–(d)). All of these federal officials have “the same authority and [are] subject to the same exemptions” to restrictions in West Virginia law as state or local law enforcement officers (W. Va. Code § 15–10–5(a), (b), (e)(1)). Thus, the law enforcement exemption in the school firearm restriction may apply to certain federal law enforcement officers but not to service members generally.
Second, W. Va. Code § 61–7–14(b)–(c) permits an owner, lessee, or other person charged with the care, custody, and control of real property to prohibit open or concealed carrying of firearms on such property and prohibits an armed person, after being asked, from refusing either to temporarily relinquish the weapon or to leave the premises. The provision purports to exempt, through cross-references to W. Va. Code § 61–7–6(a)(7), (9), members of the U.S. Armed Forces, the reserves, and the National Guard, as well as federal law enforcement or federal police officers authorized to carry a weapon in performing their duties, when acting in their official capacities (W. Va. Code § 61–7–14(c)). But, in 2026, Section 61–7–6 was restructured without a corresponding amendment to the property owner firearm restriction and no longer contains those exemptions (2026 W. Va. Acts, ch. 75 (H.B. 4106)). A court therefore may need to determine whether those exemptions continue to apply.
Additionally, W. Va. Code § 8–12–5a(c)(1) authorizes municipalities to enact ordinances prohibiting or regulating firearms carry or possession in municipally owned or operated buildings. For example, Morgantown prohibits carrying or possessing firearms in municipally owned or operated buildings, subject to specified exceptions (Morgantown, W. Va. Code § 545.18(b)). The ordinance exempts “law enforcement officer[s]” as defined in Section 30–29–1, discussed above. Accordingly, the ordinance might exempt certain federal law enforcement officers.
In practice, several provisions may allow armed federal officials or military personnel who arrive at a polling location to leave their firearms secured in a vehicle rather than carry them into the voting space. At primary or secondary schools, West Virginia law permits otherwise lawful firearms to be kept in motor vehicles in specified circumstances, including unloaded firearms and, for persons age 21 or older with a valid concealed handgun permit, concealed handguns subject to specified storage requirements (W. Va. Code § 61–7–11a(b)(2)(G), (L)). Separately, West Virginia law generally protects the storage of otherwise lawfully possessed firearms in vehicles in both covered private property parking lots and municipal public parking facilities, subject to requirements that the firearm be secured and kept out of view (W. Va. Code §§ 61–7–14(d)(1), 8–12–5a(c)(3)). These vehicle storage provisions may therefore provide a way for federal officials or service members to exercise their right to vote while avoiding firearm possession inside voting spaces where state law restricts it.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If an in-person voting site is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, it deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.”
West Virginia law generally prohibits persons from being or remaining within 100 feet of the outside entrance to a building housing a polling place while the polls are open, except for election officers, voters going to or returning from the polls, persons residing or conducting legitimate business within the area or those whose business requires them to pass through it, and certain persons dropping off or picking up voters (W. Va. Code § 3–1–37(a)–(b)). In the voting area itself, West Virginia law generally restricts persons other than voters, election officials, and persons otherwise authorized by law from coming within five feet of a voting booth or ballot box (W. Va. Code § 3–1–37(c)). State law does not authorize local officials to waive statutory polling location access restrictions.
When access to polling sites has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. After DOJ monitors reportedly attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, W. Va. Code § 3–9–10 prohibits using force, menace, fraud, or intimidation to prevent or attempt to prevent an election officer from performing duties related to holding an election or counting, certifying, or returning election results, as well as obstructing or attempting to obstruct the holding of an election. More broadly, W. Va. Code § 61–5–27(b)(1) prohibits using or threatening intimidation, physical force, harassment, or fraudulent legal process with intent to impede or obstruct a public official or employee in performing official duties, or attempting to do so. In addition, West Virginia law prohibits repeated visits to the polling room to deliver messages, food, or drink or for any other purpose, and prohibits “checkers” who keep lists of persons who vote, attempt to question voters, or urge voters to vote one way or another from remaining within the 100-foot restricted area (W. Va. Code R. §§ 153–8–9, 153–8–10).
State law also prohibits unauthorized persons from opening or violating the seals or locks of ballot containers; obtaining possession of such containers and withholding or destroying ballots; fraudulently or forcibly adding to or reducing ballots; or fraudulently altering tally sheets, pollbooks, voter lists, or election returns (W. Va. Code § 3–9–1). Additional provisions prohibit removing or destroying election supplies or materials, removing or defacing voter instruction cards, or destroying or removing voting booths or other conveniences provided for an election (W. Va. Code § 3–9–5); unlawfully taking or removing a ballot from the place where it is lawfully kept or from the election room (W. Va. Code § 3–9–2); and, by a person who is not an election officer or other public official, tampering or attempting to tamper with, intentionally impairing or attempting to impair the use of, or engaging in or attempting a dishonest practice involving specified voting equipment and election materials (W. Va. Code § 3–4A-33(a)).
Moreover, West Virginia law protects voters against interference and intimidation. W. Va. Code §§ 3–8–11(a) and 3–9–10 prohibit using or threatening force, violence, restraint, menace, fraud, intimidation, or other coercive means to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting, interfere with the free exercise of the vote, or prevent a voter from attending an election. W. Va. Code § 61–6–21(b) also prohibits using force or threats of force to willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten a person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any state or federal constitutional or statutory right or privilege because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, or sex. Additionally, W. Va. Code § 3–9–21 prohibits intentionally physically interfering with a voter’s travel on walkways, driveways, or parking areas adjacent to a polling place with intent to delay, hinder, interrupt, harass, or intimidate the voter, and W. Va. Code § 3–4A-23 generally prohibits communicating with a voter while they are voting.
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local West Virginia election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” West Virginia law generally places postelection custody and preservation of ballots and other election records with the clerk of the county commission (W. Va. Code §§ 3–1–34(g), 3–4A-19(g), (i), (k)–(l), 3–6–9(i)).
In September 2025, the Department of Justice requested West Virginia’s complete statewide voter registration list, including sensitive voter data. After West Virginia refused to provide its complete list, citing state privacy laws, the DOJ sued the state. In May 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.”
As for state law, W. Va. Code § 3–9–10 prohibits using force, menace, fraud, or intimidation to prevent or attempt to prevent an election officer from performing duties related to holding an election or counting, certifying, or returning election results, as well as obstructing or attempting to obstruct the holding of an election. More broadly, W. Va. Code § 61–5–27(b)(1) prohibits using or threatening intimidation, physical force, harassment, or fraudulent legal process with intent to impede or obstruct a public official or employee in performing official duties, or attempting to do so. In addition, West Virginia law prohibits repeated visits to the polling room to deliver messages, food, or drink or for any other purpose, and prohibits “checkers” who keep lists of persons who vote, attempt to question voters, or urge voters to vote one way or another from remaining within the 100-foot restricted area (W. Va. Code R. §§ 153–8–9, 153–8–10).
State law also prohibits unauthorized persons from opening or violating the seals or locks of ballot containers; obtaining possession of such containers and withholding or destroying ballots; fraudulently or forcibly adding to or reducing ballots; or fraudulently altering tally sheets, pollbooks, voter lists, or election returns (W. Va. Code § 3–9–1). Additional provisions prohibit removing or destroying election supplies or materials, removing or defacing voter instruction cards, or destroying or removing voting booths or other conveniences provided for an election (W. Va. Code § 3–9–5); unlawfully taking or removing a ballot from the place where it is lawfully kept or from the election room (W. Va. Code § 3–9–2); and, by a person who is not an election officer or other public official, tampering or attempting to tamper with, intentionally impairing or attempting to impair the use of, or engaging in or attempting a dishonest practice involving specified voting equipment and election materials (W. Va. Code § 3–4A-33(a)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult with the West Virginia Association of Counties, the West Virginia secretary of state’s office, the State Election Commission, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, West Virginia law generally permits an adult to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit, so long as the person does so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (W. Va. Code § 61–7–7(c); see also W. Va. Const. art. III, § 22). However, state law prohibits firearm possession at certain locations that may serve as polling sites. In particular, it prohibits possessing firearms on the grounds of primary or secondary schools, subject to a “law-enforcement officer” exemption (W. Va. Code § 61–7–11a(b)(1), (2)(A), (E)). Certain federal law enforcement officers, including specified military law enforcement personnel, may qualify for that exemption when exercising the state law authority conferred by W. Va. Code § 15–10–5, which provides that covered federal officers are subject to the same exemptions from West Virginia law restrictions as state or local law enforcement officers in specified circumstances.
Property owners may also prohibit firearms on their premises and require an armed person either to relinquish the weapon temporarily or leave (W. Va. Code § 61–7–14(b)–(c)), although that provision’s purported exemptions for federal law enforcement officers and members of the armed forces rely on cross-references to exemptions in Section 61–7–6 that no longer exist, leaving their continued application uncertain. Finally, municipalities may prohibit or regulate the carrying or possession of firearms in municipally owned or operated buildings (W. Va. Code § 8–12–5a(c)(1)).
Beyond these location-specific firearm restrictions, W. Va. Code § 61–7–11 prohibits a person armed with a firearm, whether licensed to carry it or not, from carrying, brandishing, or using the weapon in a manner that causes or threatens a breach of the peace. Additionally, W. Va. Code § 61–7–12 prohibits wantonly performing any act with a firearm that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. And W. Va. Code § 61–2–9 prohibits, among other conduct, unlawfully attempting to inflict a violent injury on another person or committing an act that places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. None of these provisions contains any exemptions, so they might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While West Virginia law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. W. Va. Code §§ 3–8–11(a) and 3–9–10 prohibit using or threatening force, violence, restraint, menace, fraud, intimidation, or other coercive means to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting, interfere with the free exercise of the vote, or prevent a voter from attending an election. W. Va. Code § 61–6–21(b) also prohibits using force or threats of force to willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten a person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any state or federal constitutional or statutory right or privilege because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, or sex. Additionally, W. Va. Code § 3–9–21 prohibits intentionally physically interfering with a voter’s travel on walkways, driveways, or parking areas adjacent to a polling place with intent to delay, hinder, interrupt, harass, or intimidate the voter, and W. Va. Code § 3–4A-23 generally prohibits communicating with a voter while they are voting.
Additionally, West Virginia law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. W. Va. Code § 3–9–10 prohibits using force, menace, fraud, or intimidation to prevent or attempt to prevent an election officer from performing duties related to holding an election or counting, certifying, or returning election results, as well as obstructing or attempting to obstruct the holding of an election. More broadly, W. Va. Code § 61–5–27(b)(1) prohibits using or threatening intimidation, physical force, harassment, or fraudulent legal process with intent to impede or obstruct a public official or employee in performing official duties, or attempting to do so. In addition, West Virginia law prohibits repeated visits to the polling room to deliver messages, food, or drink or for any other purpose, and prohibits “checkers” who keep lists of persons who vote, attempt to question voters, or urge voters to vote one way or another from remaining within the 100-foot restricted area (W. Va. Code R. §§ 153–8–9, 153–8–10).
State law also prohibits unauthorized persons from opening or violating the seals or locks of ballot containers; obtaining possession of such containers and withholding or destroying ballots; fraudulently or forcibly adding to or reducing ballots; or fraudulently altering tally sheets, pollbooks, voter lists, or election returns (W. Va. Code § 3–9–1). Additional provisions prohibit removing or destroying election supplies or materials, removing or defacing voter instruction cards, or destroying or removing voting booths or other conveniences provided for an election (W. Va. Code § 3–9–5); unlawfully taking or removing a ballot from the place where it is lawfully kept or from the election room (W. Va. Code § 3–9–2); and, by a person who is not an election officer or other public official, tampering or attempting to tamper with, intentionally impairing or attempting to impair the use of, or engaging in or attempting a dishonest practice involving specified voting equipment and election materials (W. Va. Code § 3–4A-33(a)).
Finally, West Virginia law provides election officials and law enforcement officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. W. Va. Code § 3–1–38 requires election commissioners to preserve order at and near the polls and keep access to the polls free from obstruction, and authorizes election commissioners to direct the removal of disorderly persons and, when necessary and proper, have such persons taken into custody without a warrant by a sheriff, constable, or other persons the commissioners designate, subject to protections for persons entitled to vote. Relatedly, W. Va. Code § 3–1–37(c) permits boards of election commissioners to authorize a person to be within five feet of a ballot box to keep order and enforce the law. W. Va. Code § 3–9–10 further requires any person, when commanded by an election commissioner, to provide whatever assistance is “necessary or proper to prevent intimidation, disorder or violence at the polls.” And W. Va. Code § 3–1A-8(a)–(b) authorizes a secretary of state employee who has completed specified law enforcement training to exercise the lawful powers of the state police to enforce election and criminal laws statewide, and authorizes state and local law enforcement officers to assist the secretary of state or the secretary’s appointee in such enforcement upon request.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to an election facility.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Va. Code § 61–7–11 prohibits a person armed with a firearm, whether licensed to carry it or not, from carrying, brandishing, or using the weapon in a manner that causes or threatens a breach of the peace. Additionally, W. Va. Code § 61–7–12 prohibits wantonly performing any act with a firearm that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. And W. Va. Code § 61–2–9 prohibits, among other conduct, unlawfully attempting to inflict a violent injury on another person or committing an act that places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. None of these provisions contain any exemptions, so they might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While West Virginia law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. W. Va. Code §§ 3–8–11(a) and 3–9–10 prohibit using or threatening force, violence, restraint, menace, fraud, intimidation, or other coercive means to induce a person to vote or refrain from voting, interfere with the free exercise of the vote, or prevent a voter from attending an election. W. Va. Code § 61–6–21(b) also prohibits using force or threats of force to willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten a person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any state or federal constitutional or statutory right or privilege because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, or sex. Additionally, W. Va. Code § 3–9–21 prohibits intentionally physically interfering with a voter’s travel on walkways, driveways, or parking areas adjacent to a polling place with intent to delay, hinder, interrupt, harass, or intimidate the voter, and W. Va. Code § 3–4A-23 generally prohibits communicating with a voter while they are voting.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; reminding voters that absentee ballots may be hand-delivered to the official designated to supervise and conduct absentee voting; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and remind them that they may return their absentee ballot directly to the official designated to supervise and conduct absentee voting.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election-mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.