Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they may bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
State law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit so long as that person is eligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law (Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–3–111(1), 45–8–316(3)). However, a qualifying permit is required to purposely or knowingly carry a concealed weapon in restricted portions of a building used for state or local government offices or related restricted areas (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–328(1)). The provision does not provide any separate exemption to that permit requirement.
Nevertheless, a concealed weapon permit does not itself authorize possession of a weapon in every facility that may serve as a polling site. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–361(1) prohibits purposely and knowingly possessing, carrying, or storing a weapon in a school building owned or leased by a local school district and used for instruction or student activities. There is some ambiguity as to whether the provision applies when a school building is used as a polling place at a time when no instruction or student activities are taking place. Assuming the provision applies, it exempts “law enforcement personnel” (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–361(3)(a)). The statute does not define “law enforcement personnel,” but Montana’s criminal code defines a “law enforcement officer” as a person who, by virtue of their office or public employment, is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order and make arrests for offenses while acting within the scope of their authority; or any other agent of a criminal justice agency (Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–8–209(a), 46–1–202(17)). Therefore, federal law enforcement officials might qualify for the exemption, though it is unlikely to extend to military personnel.
The above provision exempts a “school marshal” in the school district where the marshal is contracted or employed (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–361(3)(a)). Montana defines a “school marshal” as a person appointed by the district’s board of trustees and employed or retained by the district to protect persons and maintain order on public school property (Mont. Code Ann. § 20–7–1335(5)(c)). School marshals must also hold a concealed weapon permit, satisfy Montana’s peace officer qualifications, and be an active or retired peace officer (Mont. Code Ann. § 20–7–1335(1), (3)). Thus, federal officials or military personnel are unlikely to qualify for this exemption.
Additionally, Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–356(4)–(6), (8) prohibits restricting a person with a qualifying concealed weapon permit from carrying a concealed weapon anywhere in the state except, among other locations, in federally owned and occupied buildings; on federal military reservations; on private property where firearms are expressly prohibited; or in school buildings where firearms are restricted. This statute contains no other exemptions.
Separately, local jurisdictions retain limited authority to regulate firearms. Local governments may prevent or suppress the carrying of unpermitted concealed weapons or unconcealed weapons into publicly owned and occupied buildings under their jurisdiction (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–351(2)(a)). For example, the city of Helena prohibits carrying firearms in publicly owned and occupied buildings (Helena, Mont., Code § 5–1–3(B)). The provision exempts “peace officer[s]” and members of the U.S. Armed Forces who are “engaged in the discharge of the official duties of their employment,” as well as armed government agents, contractors, or employees who are “engaged in the discharge of their official work duties and [are] required to carry the weapon as part of those duties” (Helena, Mont., Code § 5–1–3(C)(1)–(3)). As such, federal officials and military personnel might qualify for exemptions from these restrictions.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
planning and preparation steps for consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If an in-person voting site is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Montana, where monitors were sent to Blaine County. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law does not authorize local election officials to grant permission to individuals who are not expressly authorized by federal or state law to enter a polling location.
When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming, Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–203 prohibits interfering with election officials or election workers in a manner that prevents, obstructs, impairs, or hinders an election or canvass from being fairly held and lawfully conducted. More generally, Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–102(1) prohibits purposely or knowingly threatening harm to a public servant, their spouse, child, parent, or sibling, or their property, for the purpose of influencing their decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, other exercise of discretion, or performance of their duty. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–203(1) prohibits communicating a threat of physical harm, physical confinement, or the commission of a felony for the purpose of causing another person to perform or not perform an act, under circumstances that would reasonably tend to produce fear that the threat will be carried out. Additionally, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–205 and 13–35–206 prohibit altering or destroying ballots, poll lists, election returns, or other election records; removing or destroying election supplies or equipment for purposes of changing, disrupting, or invalidating an election; altering recorded votes or vote totals; adding ballots to change an election result; tampering with or impairing a voting system with intent to alter the outcome of an election; or installing or using an unauthorized external communication device to transmit data to or from a voting system.
Moreover, Montana law protects voters against interference or intimidation. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–218 prohibits using or threatening force, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence to induce or compel a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate, party, or ballot issue; threatening “temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss” for the same purpose; using abduction, duress, or a fraudulent contrivance to impede the free exercise of the franchise or compel a voter’s choice; interfering with a voter lawfully exercising the right to vote in order to prevent an election from being fairly held and lawfully conducted; or obstructing a polling place entrance or otherwise interfering with the election process or voters’ access to or from the polling place. Additional provisions prohibit threatening harm to a person, specified members of their family, or their property for the purpose of influencing their vote or other exercise of discretion as a voter (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–102(1)); using menace, reward, or promise of reward, as an officer acting in an official capacity, to induce or attempt to induce a voter to cast a vote contrary to their original intention or desire (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–217); and knowingly or purposely disseminating information to voters about election procedures that is incorrect, misleading, or gives the impression that it was officially disseminated by an election administrator (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–235(1)).
On top of these prohibitions, Montana law imposes certain restrictions on election observers. Election judges are required to permit one poll watcher from each political party to be stationed near the poll lists and to observe vote-counting procedures and the recording of results, but Montana law prohibits stationing poll watchers where they would interfere with election procedures (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–13–120(1)). State law also permits candidates and other interested groups to request additional poll watchers at a polling place or designated mail-ballot deposit location, and the election administrator must allow them so long as their number would not interfere with election procedures (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–13–121).
Finally, Montana law may constrain efforts to interfere with federal monitors or observers performing official duties. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–302(1) prohibits knowingly obstructing, impairing, or hindering the performance of a governmental function. Accordingly, efforts by election officials to obstruct federal monitors or observers acting in an official capacity could implicate this provision.
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
planning and preparation steps for consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Montana election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–1–109), it may prohibit disclosure of certain voter information, including driver’s license numbers, whole or partial Social Security numbers, and certain protected residential addresses (Mont. Admin. R. 44.3.1102(1)(e), (3)(a)–(b), 44.3.2005(2)(c); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–2–115(6)–(7)).
In August 2025, the Department of Justice requested Montana’s complete statewide voter registration list, including private voter data. In December 2025, Montana provided a publicly available copy of its list but declined to enter into a proposed agreement with the DOJ concerning the sharing and review of unredacted voter information. At the same time, Montana invited the DOJ to provide information identifying individuals it suspected of being ineligible to vote, along with the reasons and sources supporting those determinations, and stated that it would evaluate any potential removals under state and federal law and communicate the results to local election administrators. In September 2026, a state legislative committee voted to subpoena Secretary of State Jacobsen for details about what information was shared with the federal government, noting that the precise scope of the disclosure remained unclear.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Montana law also imposes additional requirements governing custody, handling, and access related to election materials and equipment. To begin, Montana law requires voting systems to be approved by the secretary of state before use (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–17–101). To be approved, voting systems, among other requirements, must be protected from tampering for fraudulent purposes, must use paper ballots to allow manual counting of votes, and must be certified by the manufacturer as free of modems or other unauthorized external communication devices, with that certification validated by third-party testing (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–17–103). Election administrators must also deliver to each polling place or chief election judge all supplies necessary to conduct the election (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–12–102).
During voting, the exterior of voting systems, or the booths in which they are placed, and every part of the polling place must remain in plain view of the election judges (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–3–105(5)). Returned absentee ballots must be kept safely and securely in an election administrator’s office until delivered by the election administrator to the election judges (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–13–241(10)). During tabulation, all documents must be kept secured, and no person may be allowed access outside regular business hours (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–15–101(1)(c)(iii)). Making the results of a precinct vote tally public prior to the polls closing is prohibited (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–241(1)).
After an election, election judges must securely package the precinct register, list of individuals challenged, pollbook, and tally sheets and separately securely package all unused ballots and all voted ballots, including ballots not counted or allowed and detached stubs from counted or rejected absentee ballots (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–15–205(1)–(3)). Each election judge must sign their name across all seals (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–15–205(4)). The containers must then be delivered to the election administrator by the chief election judge or another judge appointed by the chief judge (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–15–205(6)). During the applicable retention period, voted and unvoted ballots, detached stubs, and unused ballots must remain in the unopened packages received from election judges (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–1–303(1)(a)–(b)). Those packages may only be opened upon proper authorization for a recount or to process provisional ballots, except for packages from federal elections, which may also be opened for a postelection random-sample audit (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–1–303(1)(a)–(b)).
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. As an example of state law, Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–203 prohibits interfering with election officials or election workers in a manner that prevents, obstructs, impairs, or hinders an election or canvass from being fairly held and lawfully conducted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Montana secretary of state and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, Montana generally permits individuals who may lawfully possess firearms to carry them openly or concealed without a permit, although a qualifying permit is required to carry a concealed weapon in certain restricted portions of state or local government buildings (Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–3–111(1), 45–8–316(3), 45–8–328(1)). A concealed weapon permit does not, however, necessarily authorize possession in every facility that may be used as a polling place. State law prohibits weapons in school buildings, although there is some ambiguity as to whether that prohibition applies when school is not in session. Assuming it does, federal law enforcement officials might qualify for the statute’s exemption for “law enforcement personnel” (Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–8–361(1), (3)(a), 45–2–101(55)). Additionally, even permit holders are prohibited from carrying concealed firearms in federally owned and occupied buildings, on federal military reservations, on private property where firearms are expressly prohibited, and in school buildings where firearms are restricted (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–356(4)–(6), (8)). Local jurisdictions may also prevent or suppress the carrying of unpermitted concealed weapons or unconcealed weapons into publicly owned and occupied buildings under their jurisdiction (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–8–351(2)(a)).
Beyond these location-specific firearm restrictions, Montana prohibits purposely or knowingly causing another person reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury by use of a weapon or what reasonably appears to be a weapon (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–213(1)). This provision contains no exemptions and therefore might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Montana law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–218 prohibits using or threatening force, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence to induce or compel a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate, party, or ballot issue; threatening “temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss” for the same purpose; using abduction, duress, or a fraudulent contrivance to impede the free exercise of the franchise or compel a voter’s choice; interfering with a voter lawfully exercising the right to vote in order to prevent an election from being fairly held and lawfully conducted; or obstructing a polling place entrance or otherwise interfering with the election process or voters’ access to or from the polling place. Additional provisions prohibit threatening harm to a person, specified members of their family, or their property for the purpose of influencing their vote or other exercise of discretion as a voter (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–102(1)); using menace, reward, or promise of reward, as an officer acting in an official capacity, to induce or attempt to induce a voter to cast a vote contrary to their original intention or desire (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–217); and knowingly or purposely disseminating information to voters about election procedures that is incorrect, misleading, or gives the impression that it was officially disseminated by an election administrator (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–235(1)).
Additionally, Montana law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–203 prohibits interfering with election officials or election workers in a manner that prevents, obstructs, impairs, or hinders an election or canvass from being fairly held and lawfully conducted. More generally, Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–102(1) prohibits purposely or knowingly threatening harm to a public servant, their spouse, child, parent, or sibling, or their property, for the purpose of influencing their decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, other exercise of discretion, or performance of their duty. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–203(1) prohibits communicating a threat of physical harm, physical confinement, or the commission of a felony for the purpose of causing another person to perform or not perform an act, under circumstances that would reasonably tend to produce fear that the threat will be carried out. Additionally, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–205 and 13–35–206 prohibit altering or destroying ballots, poll lists, election returns, or other election records; removing or destroying election supplies or equipment for purposes of changing, disrupting, or invalidating an election; altering recorded votes or vote totals; adding ballots to change an election result; tampering with or impairing a voting system with intent to alter the outcome of an election; or installing or using an unauthorized external communication device to transmit data to or from a voting system.
Finally, state law gives election officials authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–13–122 permits an election official, sheriff, constable, or other peace officer to clear the passageway, prevent any obstruction, or arrest anyone obstructing the passageway to a polling place. However, the exercise of this authority might be constrained by Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–302(1), which prohibits knowingly obstructing, impairing, or hindering the enforcement of criminal law, the preservation of the peace, or the performance of a governmental function. In a prosecution for obstructing a peace officer, it is not a defense that the officer acted illegally, so long as the officer was acting under their official authority (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–302(2)). Thus, if federal officials assert law enforcement authority at a polling place, election officials should be mindful that efforts to exercise their own authority to prevent election interference could implicate this provision.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to a voting location.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at voting locations.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Montana prohibits purposely or knowingly causing another person reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury by use of a weapon or what reasonably appears to be a weapon (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–213(1)). This provision contains no exemptions and therefore might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Montana law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–218 prohibits using or threatening force, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence to induce or compel a person to vote or refrain from voting for a candidate, party, or ballot issue; threatening “temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss” for the same purpose; using abduction, duress, or a fraudulent contrivance to impede the free exercise of the franchise or compel a voter’s choice; interfering with a voter lawfully exercising the right to vote in order to prevent an election from being fairly held and lawfully conducted; or obstructing a polling place entrance or otherwise interfering with the election process or voters’ access to or from the polling place. Additional provisions prohibit threatening harm to a person, specified members of their family, or their property for the purpose of influencing their vote or other exercise of discretion as a voter (Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–102(1)); using menace, reward, or promise of reward, as an officer acting in an official capacity, to induce or attempt to induce a voter to cast a vote contrary to their original intention or desire (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–217); and knowingly or purposely disseminating information to voters about election procedures that is incorrect, misleading, or gives the impression that it was officially disseminated by an election administrator (Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–235(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Recent operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” under these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plansto take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; reminding voters that they may return absentee ballots in person at election offices, polling places, or other authorized locations, either personally or through certain other individuals; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as absentee ballot drop-off sites.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.