The New Hampshire Election Interference Law Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
  • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

 

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in March 2026.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025 advanced his nomination.

 

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Todd Blanche to serve as attorney general in June 2026. The Senate confirmed Blanche as head of the DOJ in August.

 

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

 

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Core Election Interference Provisions

• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting, vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or ballot measure, or refrain from registering to vote; or
  • knowingly attempting to prevent or deter another person from voting or registering to vote based on fraudulent, deceptive, misleading, or spurious grounds or information, including by challenging a person’s right to register or vote based on information known to be false or misleading; providing false or misleading information to induce a person not to register or vote; or providing false or misleading information about the date, time, place, or manner of an election to induce a person not to register or vote at the proper place or time.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40-b: Prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly discourage, interfere with, or compel an election officer or other appointed individual assisting at a polling place from engaging in or completing election-related duties, and makes such conduct a felony.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:37: Prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter within the “guardrail” ^† or attempting to induce a voter, before voting, to reveal how they mark or have marked a ballot, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor if committed by an individual or a felony if committed by an organization or other legal entity.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:21: Prohibits persons other than representatives of the secretary of state or attorney general, election officers, admitted voters, and persons authorized to assist a voter from entering within the “guardrail,”^† except when authorized by election officers for the purpose of keeping order or enforcing the law.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:42: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy an electronic ballot-counting device;
  • preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of an electronic ballot-counting device;
  • tampering with ballot-counting software or designing such software to cause incorrect tabulation; or
  • making or possessing a key to an electronic ballot-counting device without authorization.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:41: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • assaulting a town, city, or ward officer while they are performing election-related duties; or
  • taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy a ballot box or checklist while it is in use at an election.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1: Prohibits using intimidation, actual or threatened force or violence, a fake or fraudulent legal document or order, or other unlawful conduct with the purpose of hindering or interfering with a public servant performing official functions; or retaliating against a public servant for performing such functions, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3: Prohibits threatening harm to a public servant, party official, or voter for the purpose of influencing their action, decision, opinion, recommendation, nomination, vote, or other exercise of discretion, and makes such conduct a felony.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 654:31-a: Prohibits public disclosure of voter registration information other than a voter’s name, domicile address, mailing address, town or city, and party affiliation.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:13-a: Prohibits an unauthorized person from standing or sitting within six feet of a ballot clerk to observe voter check-in without the moderator’s express permission.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:36: Prohibits election officers and auditors from knowingly placing any unauthorized mark on a ballot, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:43: Prohibits the following:
  • electioneering within a polling place building;
  • affixing electioneering signs to a polling place building or grounds or leaving such signs unattended; or
  • distributing or posting electioneering communications within a no-electioneering corridor established outside the polling place by the moderator.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:44: Prohibits election officers from engaging in conduct designed to influence a voter’s vote on any candidate or ballot question while performing their official duties, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:38: Prohibits the following when done knowingly, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor if committed by an individual or a felony if committed by an organization or other legal entity:
  • delaying the delivery of any ballots; or
  • taking or removing a ballot outside the “guardrail”^† before the polls close.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:4: Prohibits purposely using physical conduct to place or attempt to place another person in fear of imminent bodily injury or physical contact, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor generally and a felony when a deadly weapon is used.

Police presence at the polls

• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 658:11-a: Requires a town or city seeking to operate a single polling location serving more than 15,000 registered voters in a presidential election to address the availability of law enforcement officers or contracted personnel for traffic management in its plan submitted to the secretary of state and attorney general.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:12: Requires election officials and law enforcement, when traffic congestion creates a line of cars at the time polls close, to identify the last person who joined the line by closing time and allow that person and all who joined earlier to park, enter the polling place, register if necessary, and vote.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various New Hampshire laws, including N.N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-A:3-a, 659:101, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. New Hampshire Election Procedure Manual published by the secretary of state includes an appendix to assist custodians in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Election Observers

• New Hampshire Election Procedure Manual: Provides that election observers may silently observe only so long as they are not disruptive; must raise questions or concerns with the moderator and not interfere with voters or election officials; must remain outside the “guardrail” ^† and at least five feet from the voter registration table; and may not stand or sit within six feet of a ballot clerk to observe voter check-in without the moderator’s permission.

Emergency Powers

• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:45: Authorizes the governor to declare a state of emergency and, during the emergency, to enforce emergency management laws and orders, assume control of forces and personnel assisting with the emergency response, compel evacuations, remove certain public officers with emergency management responsibilities, and exercise other powers necessary to protect the civilian population.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:47: Authorizes the governor, when a disaster is beyond local control, to make, amend, suspend, or rescind orders, rules, and regulations necessary to respond to the disaster.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 657:21-a: Requires the secretary of state, with assistance from the attorney general and the Department of Safety, to make every reasonable effort to provide and transport absentee voting materials to emergency services workers who are called into service shortly before a state election and therefore cannot vote in person or obtain an absentee ballot before leaving; and authorizes the secretary to issue a statewide-offices-only absentee ballot if there is insufficient time to obtain and transport the appropriate local ballot.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 657:1: Authorizes voters to vote absentee on the day before a state election when the National Weather Service has issued a qualifying winter weather warning and the voter reasonably cannot vote in person because of safety concerns or anticipated caregiving responsibilities; and requires clerks to make absentee voting available for specified hours that day.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 26: “In all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 111:15: Prohibits private groups or their members from “assuming any semblance of military organization or character” by bearing or possessing firearms or other military weapons or wearing military uniforms, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor if committed by an individual or a felony if committed by an organization or other legal entity.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 104:28-a: Prohibits knowingly and falsely assuming or exercising the functions, powers, duties, or privileges of a law enforcement officer or investigator, or wearing or displaying without authority a law enforcement uniform, badge, or other identification with the intent to be recognized as such an officer, and makes such conduct a felony.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:1: Prohibits the following as misdemeanors or felonies when the conduct results in physical injury or substantial property damage or arson, involves a deadly weapon, or involves knowingly throwing or propelling an object or substance at a uniformed law enforcement officer or emergency responder:
  • engaging with two or more other persons in tumultuous or violent conduct that purposely or recklessly creates a substantial risk of public alarm;
  • assembling with two or more other persons for the purpose of soon engaging in tumultuous or violent conduct;
  • assembling with two or more other persons for the purpose of committing an offense against another person or property believed to have violated the law; or
  • refusing to comply with a lawful order to withdraw immediately before, during, or immediately after a riot.
• N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:2: Prohibits the following as misdemeanors when the conduct continues after a request to desist:
  • engaging in fighting or violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior in a public place;
  • obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic or the entrance to a public building;
  • refusing to comply with a peace officer’s lawful order to move from or remain away from a public place;
  • disrupting the orderly conduct of business in a public or governmental facility or disrupting a lawful assembly or meeting without lawful authority; or
  • knowingly entering or remaining in an area lawfully closed by a peace officer because of a riot, ongoing criminal activity posing a risk of bodily injury, or other specified public safety threat.

Definitions

• See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 652:1–16h.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

^†The New Hampshire Election Procedure Manual defines “guardrail” as a “rope, ribbon, or other material[]” that “segregates the voting area from the public” and must be positioned so that only persons inside the guardrail can come within six feet of voting booths, privacy screens, ballot-counting devices, or ballot boxes.

Governor of New Hampshire

The governor of New Hampshire serves as the chief executive officer of the state (see N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 41). Governor Kelly Ayotte was elected to her first term in office in 2024.

State law authorizes the governor to declare a state of emergency by executive order if the governor finds “that a natural, technological, or [human-made] disaster of major proportions is imminent or has occurred” within the state, and “that the safety and welfare of the inhabitants . . . require an invocation of [emergency powers]” (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:45(I)). New Hampshire law defines “state of emergency” as “that condition, situation, or set of circumstances deemed to be so extremely hazardous or dangerous to life or property that it is necessary and essential to invoke, require, or utilize extraordinary measures, actions, and procedures to lessen or mitigate possible harm” (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-P:35(VIII)).

During a state of emergency, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:45(III) authorizes the governor to:

• enforce all laws, rules, and regulations relating to emergency management and assume control of any or all emergency management forces and helpers in the state;
• provide for and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the state;
• subject to the state constitution, remove from office any public officer having administrative responsibilities under New Hampshire’s emergency management laws, upon charges and after providing an opportunity to be heard; or
• perform and exercise such other functions, powers, and duties as are necessary to promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian population.

Additionally, in the event of a “disaster beyond local control,” the governor may make, amend, suspend, and rescind orders, rules, and regulations necessary to carry out the state’s emergency management laws (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4:47(III)).

The governor of New Hampshire is the commander in chief of the state’s armed forces (N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 51), which consists of the National Guard (with army, air, and inactive components), the state guard, and the unorganized militia (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 110-B:1–110-B:2). The governor may call the National Guard into active service in the event of — or imminent danger of — “invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, breach of the peace, resistance to process of this state” or “for the safety of the inhabitants of the state” (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-B:6).

Secretary of State

David M. Scanlan is New Hampshire’s secretary of state. The secretary is chosen every two years by joint legislative ballot (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:1(I), 14:2-b).

The secretary of state is New Hampshire’s chief election officer (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 652:23(I)). The secretary prepares and delivers ballots for all state elections and plans, develops, and maintains the statewide centralized voter registration database (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 656:1, 654:45(I)(a), (III)). The secretary also must provide security measures for the registration database and issue guidelines for its implementation (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 654:45(V)). Before each state general election, the secretary, with the advice and approval of the attorney general, prepares and distributes an up-to-date manual on New Hampshire election laws and procedures (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 652:22). The secretary also canvasses and declares primary election results, issues certificates of election, conducts recounts, and oversees postelection audits of electronic ballot-counting devices (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 659:84, 659:86, 660:5, 660:35). Finally, the secretary must resolve any conflicting interpretations of state and federal law arising between a city or town clerk and other election officials (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:9-a).

New Hampshire National Guard

Major General David J. Mikolaities serves as adjutant general of New Hampshire. The adjutant general directs the planning and employment of the National Guard and establishes unified command of state forces when they are jointly engaged (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 110-B:8(II)). The adjutant general is appointed by the governor in concurrence with the Executive Council and may serve until age 65 (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 110-B:8(I); N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 47).

Former Governor Chris Sununu appointed Major General Mikolaities as adjutant general on September 23, 2017.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon.

The New Hampshire National Guard assisted during the 2020 election amid the COVID-19 pandemic by delivering personal protective equipment and other election materials to polling places across the state, including masks, face shields, gloves, gowns, and hand sanitizer.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. New Hampshire law does not generally restrict their presence at in-person voting locations. If a polling location is situated on federal property, however, additional federal rules governing firearms may apply.

Discussion

Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.

State law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit so long as they do so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6(III)). New Hampshire law does not otherwise restrict the possession of firearms at polling places.

If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, additional federal rules governing firearms may apply. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility). However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
  • Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” New Hampshire law generally prohibits persons from entering within the “guardrail” except representatives of the secretary of state or attorney general, election officers, admitted voters, and persons authorized to assist a voter; other persons may enter only when authorized by election officers for the purpose of keeping order or enforcing the law (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:21). When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40-b(I) prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly discourage, interfere with, or compel an election officer or other appointed individual assisting at a polling place from engaging in or completing election-related duties, while N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:41 prohibits assaulting a town, city, or ward officer while they are performing election-related duties or taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy a ballot box or checklist while it is in use at an election. More generally, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1(I) prohibits using intimidation, actual or threatened force or violence, a fake or fraudulent legal document or order, or other unlawful conduct to hinder or interfere with a public servant performing an official function, or to retaliate against a public servant for doing so. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3(I)(a) likewise prohibits threatening harm to a public servant for the purpose of influencing their action, decision, opinion, recommendation, nomination, vote, or other exercise of discretion. Additionally, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:42 prohibits taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy an electronic ballot-counting device; preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of such a device; tampering with ballot-counting software; or making or possessing a key to such a device without authorization. And N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:38 prohibits knowingly delaying the delivery of ballots or knowingly taking or removing a ballot outside the guardrail before the polls close.

Moreover, New Hampshire law protects voters against interference or intimidation. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40(II) prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting, vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or ballot measure, or refrain from registering to vote. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40(III)(a)–(c) also prohibits knowingly attempting to prevent or deter another person from voting or registering based on fraudulent, deceptive, misleading, or spurious grounds or information, including by providing false or misleading information about a voter’s eligibility or the date, time, place, or manner of an election. Additional provisions prohibit interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter within the “guardrail” or attempting to induce a voter, before voting, to reveal how they mark or have marked a ballot (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:37); and threatening harm to a voter for the purpose of influencing their vote or other exercise of discretion (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3(I)(a)).

On top of these prohibitions, New Hampshire law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law. According to the New Hampshire Election Procedure Manual, an “observer” is a member of the public exercising the right to watch the conduct of an election and has “no special status in law.” The manual specifically contemplates individuals sent by the federal government as observers. It states that observers may “silently observe the election so long as they are not disruptive,” must bring any questions or concerns to the moderator, and cannot “interfere with voters or election officials.” They also must remain outside the guardrail, may not come within five feet of the voter registration table, and may not stand or sit within six feet of a ballot clerk to observe voter check-in without the moderator’s express permission. By contrast, the manual explains that “challengers” are formally appointed by a state political party or the New Hampshire attorney general and have additional statutory rights, including to be positioned where they can hear voters check in, see and hear the hand counting of ballots, and maintain a line of sight on electronic ballot-counting devices, although they too must remain outside the guardrail.

The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them to your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

Federal and state laws may limit the information that local New Hampshire election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes certain voter registration information — including a voter’s name, addresses, town or city, and party affiliation — available to the public, it treats all other information on voter registration forms as confidential and exempt from public disclosure (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 654:31-a).

In June 2025, the DOJ requested New Hampshire’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After New Hampshire refusedto provide full access to its complete statewide voter registration list, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. In June 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.

In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40-b(I) prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly discourage, interfere with, or compel an election officer or other appointed individual assisting at a polling place from engaging in or completing election-related duties, while N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:41 prohibits assaulting a town, city, or ward officer while they are performing election-related duties or taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy a ballot box or checklist while it is in use at an election. More generally, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1(I) prohibits using intimidation, actual or threatened force or violence, a fake or fraudulent legal document or order, or other unlawful conduct to hinder or interfere with a public servant performing an official function, or to retaliate against a public servant for doing so. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3(I)(a) likewise prohibits threatening harm to a public servant for the purpose of influencing their action, decision, opinion, recommendation, nomination, vote, or other exercise of discretion. Additionally, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:42 prohibits taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy an electronic ballot-counting device; preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of such a device; tampering with ballot-counting software; or making or possessing a key to such a device without authorization. And N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:38 prohibits knowingly delaying the delivery of ballots or knowingly taking or removing a ballot outside the guardrail before the polls close.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, or election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
• It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult with the New Hampshire City and Town Clerks Association, the New England Association of City and Town Clerks, the New Hampshire secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location

Summary

Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal restrictions on armed personnel and firearms, as well as state restrictions on the threatening use of firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

As explained above, New Hampshire law generally permits a person to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a permit so long as they do so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:6(III)). New Hampshire does not otherwise restrict the possession of firearms at polling places.

That said, state law prohibits purposely using physical conduct to place or attempt to place another person in fear of imminent bodily injury or physical contact — except when a person responding to a threat that a reasonable person would consider likely to cause serious bodily injury or death displays a firearm or other means of self-defense with the intent to warn away the person making the threat (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:4(I)(a), (IV)).

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

While New Hampshire law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40(II) prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting, vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or ballot measure, or refrain from registering to vote. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40(III)(a)–(c) also prohibits knowingly attempting to prevent or deter another person from voting or registering based on fraudulent, deceptive, misleading, or spurious grounds or information, including by providing false or misleading information about a voter’s eligibility or the date, time, place, or manner of an election. Additional provisions prohibit interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter within the “guardrail,” or attempting to induce a voter, before voting, to reveal how they mark or have marked a ballot (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:37); and threatening harm to a voter for the purpose of influencing their vote or other exercise of discretion (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3(I)(a)).

Additionally, New Hampshire law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40-b(I) prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly discourage, interfere with, or compel an election officer or other appointed individual assisting at a polling place from engaging in or completing election-related duties, while N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:41 prohibits assaulting a town, city, or ward officer while they are performing election-related duties or taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy a ballot box or checklist while it is in use at an election. More generally, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:1(I) prohibits using intimidation, actual or threatened force or violence, a fake or fraudulent legal document or order, or other unlawful conduct to hinder or interfere with a public servant performing an official function, or to retaliate against a public servant for doing so. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3(I)(a) likewise prohibits threatening harm to a public servant for the purpose of influencing their action, decision, opinion, recommendation, nomination, vote, or other exercise of discretion. Additionally, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:42 prohibits taking away, tampering with, injuring, attempting to injure, destroying, or attempting to destroy an electronic ballot-counting device; preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of such a device; tampering with ballot-counting software; or making or possessing a key to such a device without authorization. And N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:38 prohibits knowingly delaying the delivery of ballots or knowingly taking or removing a ballot outside the guardrail before the polls close.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to an election facility.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

New Hampshire law prohibits purposely using physical conduct to place or attempt to place another person in fear of imminent bodily injury or physical contact — except when a person responding to a threat that a reasonable person would consider likely to cause serious bodily injury or death displays a firearm or other means of self-defense with the intent to warn away the person making the threat (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:4(I)(a), (IV)).

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

While New Hampshire law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40(II) prohibits using or threatening force, violence, coercion, or intimidation to knowingly induce or compel another person to vote or refrain from voting, vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or ballot measure, or refrain from registering to vote. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:40(III)(a)–(c) also prohibits knowingly attempting to prevent or deter another person from voting or registering based on fraudulent, deceptive, misleading, or spurious grounds or information, including by providing false or misleading information about a voter’s eligibility or the date, time, place, or manner of an election. Additional provisions prohibit interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter within the “guardrail,” or attempting to induce a voter, before voting, to reveal how they mark or have marked a ballot (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:37); and threatening harm to a voter for the purpose of influencing their vote or other exercise of discretion (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 640:3(I)(a)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.

Discussion

Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.

One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.

USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.

Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”

Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; informing voters that they may return absentee ballots by mail or by personal delivery to the appropriate city or town clerk, either themselves or through an authorized delivery agent, as permitted by state law; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
• Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, including through personal delivery to the appropriate city or town clerk.
• If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
• Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election-mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.