The Michigan Election Interference Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

Department of Justice (DOJ) “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI)critical infrastructure.

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process, such as ballots, voter registration cards, absentee ballot applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Election Interference

• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931b(1): Prohibits intimidating an election official with the specific intent to interfere with the performance of that official’s election-related duties. Does not apply to constitutionally protected activities, such as reporting, protesting, and advocacy (§ 168.931b(4)).
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931(1)(g): Prohibits election officials from willfully failing to perform their duties under Michigan election law and from disobeying a lawful instruction or order of the secretary of state, board of county or city election commissioners, or board of election inspectors.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931(1)(j): Prohibits soliciting votes within 100 feet of a polling place’s entrance while polls are open on Election Day.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(b): Prohibits unauthorized possession, opening, concealment, or withholding of, or willful damage or destruction to, any ballot box or voting machine used in an election. Also prohibits fraudulently or forcibly adding to or diminishing the number of ballots legally deposited in a ballot box or the totals on a voting machine; and aiding or abetting in any of these acts.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(c): Prohibits an election inspector, clerk, or custodial officer of election records from destroying, mutilating, defacing, falsifying, or fraudulently removing or secreting those records; from fraudulently altering, erasing, or making an entry on those records; and from permitting any other person to do so.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(f): Prohibits any person other than an absent voter themself, a mail handler during the course of their employment, a clerk or assistant clerk, or an immediate family member of the absent voter from possessing an absent voter ballot mailed or delivered to another person, and from returning, soliciting to return, or agreeing to return an absent voter ballot to the clerk.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932a(a): Prohibits voting or attempting to vote under the name of another person; and inducing or attempting to induce a person to impersonate another person to vote or attempt to vote.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932a(e): Prohibits voting or attempting to vote more than once in an election.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.170: Prohibits disturbing any “any election or other public meeting where citizens are peaceably and lawfully assembled.”
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.678: Confers full authority on boards of election inspectors to maintain “peace, regularity and order” at polling places and “to enforce obedience to their lawful commands” during any election and during vote canvassing after polls close.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.939: Requires election inspectors to inform prosecuting attorneys of any reasonable belief that a punishable offense under Michigan election law has occurred.
• Mich. Const. art. II, § 4(1)(l): Requires the secretary of state to conduct election audits and to supervise and direct county election officials in the conduct of such audits. Also prohibits any officer or member of the governing body of a national, state, or local political party or any “political party precinct delegate” from having any role in the direction, supervision, or conduct of an election audit.

Election Material Retention

• Various Michigan laws and regulations, including Mich. Comp. Laws § 399.811 and Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.491, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain periods of time, as listed on the retention schedule published by the state’s Records Management Services office (which also publishes a supplemental guide on election records retention). Table 5 summarizes key requirements under Michigan law.

Emergency Powers

• Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403: In the event of “dangers to [the] state or [its] people presented by a disaster or emergency,” authorizes the governor to issue executive orders, proclamations, and directives “having the force and effect of law.” Under this statute, a state of disaster or emergency shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, or the disaster/emergency has been dealt with to the extent that disaster/emergency conditions no longer exist, or until the declaration of disaster/emergency has been in effect for 28 days.
• After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation terminating the state of disaster or emergency, unless both houses of the legislature approve a request by the governor for an extension.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.419: Allows the governor, after declaring a state of disaster or emergency, to authorize expenditures from the state’s disaster and emergency contingency fund to provide assistance to counties and municipalities when federal assistance is not available.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2251: Authorizes Michigan’s director of health and human services, on determining that an imminent danger to the health or lives of individuals exists in the state, to issue orders to avoid, correct, or remove the danger; and, if conditions in the state constitute a “menace to the public health,” to “take full charge of the administration of applicable state and local health laws, rules, regulations, and ordinances in addressing that menace.”
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 24.248: Authorizes the Michigan Department of State to issue an emergency rule proposed by a state agency, without following the notice and participation procedures typically required by the state’s Administrative Procedures Act if, the governor concurs with the agency that the preservation of the public health, safety, or welfare requires promulgation of such a rule.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Mich. Const. art. I, § 7: Subordinates the military to civil power.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.528a: Prohibits teaching or demonstrating to another person the use, application, or construction of a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder; and prohibits assembling with one or more people to train with or practice the use of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder. This section does not apply to any act of a law enforcement officer carried out “in the lawful performance of [their] official duties as a law enforcement officer,” or to “any activity of any hunting club, rifle club, rifle range, pistol range, shooting range, or other program or individual instruction” intended to teach the safe handling or use of firearms.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.215: Prohibits falsely assuming the duties of a peace officer (and defines that term for purposes of this statute).
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.401: Prohibits unauthorized wearing of an army, navy, or national guard uniform.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.402: Authorizes the governor to prohibit societies that confine membership to certain races from parading under arms “in times of public tumult.”

Poll Watchers and Election Challengers

• Mich. Comp. § 168.733(4): Prohibits threatening or intimidating challengers; requires election officials to “protect a challenger in the discharge of his or her duties”; and prohibits challengers from threatening or intimidating an elector while the elector is entering the polling place, applying to vote, entering the voting compartment, voting, or leaving the polling place.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.727(3): Prohibits challengers from interfering with or unduly delaying the work of election inspectors; and prohibits challenging a voter’s qualifications for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter.
• The Michigan secretary of state’s office has published a summary and manual of election challengers’ and poll watchers’ respective rights and duties. According to the manual:
  • State law “has been interpreted to permit members of the public who are not credentialed challengers to observe elections.” Members of the public who wish to observe elections, often called poll watchers, do not enjoy the same rights as credentialed challengers.
  • Poll watchers are allowed to be present in a polling place, early voting site, or an absent voter ballot processing facility, and are not required to be registered voters in Michigan.
  • Poll watchers and election challengers may not take videos or photos in a polling place or clerk’s office.
  • Election officials have the authority to remove poll watchers and challengers if they fail to heed published instructions, disrupt the polling place, or threaten or intimidate voters or election workers.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931: Prohibits inducing or attempting to induce another person to vote in exchange for “valuable consideration,” including money, an office, a position, an appointment, or employment.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(a): Prohibits attempting to influence an elector in giving their vote, deter them from voting, or interrupt their voting in an election “by means of bribery, menace, or other corrupt means or device, either directly or indirectly.”
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(d): Prohibits obstructing or attempting to obstruct any elector in the exercise of their duties as an elector.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932e: Prohibits misrepresenting oneself as an election official.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411h(e): Prohibits stalking.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.540e: Prohibits, via a telecommunications service provider, terrorizing, frightening, intimidating, threatening, harassing, molesting, annoying, or disturbing the peace and quiet of another person.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227(2): Prohibits carrying a concealed pistol.
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.231(1)(a): Exempts “A peace officer of an authorized police agency of the United States, of this state, or of a political subdivision of this state, who is regularly employed and paid by the United States, this state, or a political subdivision of this state” from the concealed pistol prohibition in Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227(2).
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.237a: Prohibits possessing a weapon in a weapon-free school zone (with exceptions for security personnel hired by the school, peace officers, individuals licensed to carry a concealed weapon, and other limited exceptions pursuant to § 750.237a(5)).
• Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d: Prohibits possessing a firearm inside a polling place, or within 100 feet from any entrance to a building housing a polling place, while polls are open on Election Day; inside an early voting site, or within 100 feet from an entrance to a building housing an early voting site, on a day when early voting is conducted; and in or within 100 feet from the entrance of a city or township clerk’s office or satellite office, or within 100 feet from an absent voter ballot drop box, for the 40 days prior to an election. Exemptions, outlined in Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(4), include peace officers, individuals licensed to carry a concealed weapon, and persons lawfully transporting or possessing a firearm in a vehicle. (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.215(5)(l) defines peace officers to include federal law enforcement officers.) Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(6–7) also prohibits anyone except a “uniformed law enforcement officer acting in the course of the officer’s duties” from possessing a firearm in or within 100 feet of any entrance to location where absent voter ballots are counted while those ballots are being processed.
• The Michigan Department of State has published an overview of current voter intimidation and firearms laws, as well as an election crimes manual citing obligations and penalties imposed by state election laws.

Other Relevant Laws and Regulations

• Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.761d: Assigns responsibility to cities and townships for selecting the number and locations of absent voter ballot drop boxes; and stipulates minimum drop box numbers based on population, along with additional factors that clerks must consider (including population density, proximity to public transportation, and accessibility for electors with disabilities).

Definitions

• See Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.2, Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.3, and Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.4.

* Caselaw may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should complete legal research to determine if and how the courts have interpreted it and consult with counsel.

Governor of Michigan

As Michigan’s chief executive officer, the governor’s primary responsibility is to enforce state laws and maintain order. Gov. Gretchen Whitmer was elected in 2019 and is currently serving her second four-year term.

With respect to elections, according to the emergency powers outlined in the Emergency Management Act of 1976 (Mich. Comp. Laws § 30401–421), the governor has the power to declare a state of emergency and issue executive orders, proclamations, and directives to cope with a disaster or emergency. In 2020, during the Covid-19 pandemic, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and suspended certain rules and procedures to allow the May 5, 2020, elections to be “conducted by absent voter ballot to the greatest extent possible.”

In response to a lawsuit (Midwest Institute of Health v. Governor) challenging the governor’s emergency powers, the Michigan Supreme Court declared certain unilateral powers used by the governor during that emergency unconstitutional.

Per the Michigan Constitution, the governor serves as commander in chief of the state’s armed forces — which include the Michigan Army National Guard, the Michigan Air National Guard, and (when called into existence) the Michigan Defense Force — and “may call them out to execute the laws, suppress insurrection and repel invasion” (Mich. Const. art. V, § 12).

Mich. Comp. Laws § 32.551 states that the governor may order to active service any members of the state’s national guard “in case of riot, tumult, breach of the peace, or resistance of process, or for service in aid of civil authority, whether state or federal, or in time of actual or imminent public danger . . . within th[e] state.”

Mich. Comp. Laws § 32.555 further states that the governor “may order into the defense force” any members of the unorganized militia “in case of riot, tumult, breach of the peace, resistance of process, or for service in aid of civil authority . . . or in time of actual or imminent public danger.” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 32.509 defines the unorganized militia as all able-bodied citizens or residents who have declared their intention to become citizens between the ages of 17 and 60 who are not otherwise part of the state’s armed forces.)

Michigan Secretary of State

Jocelyn Benson has been Michigan’s secretary of state since 2019 and is currently serving her second four-year term. The office of the secretary of state is established by Mich. Const. art. V, § 3 and is detailed in Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 11.4–5.

As the state’s chief election officer, the secretary of state is responsible for administering certain provisions of Michigan’s election laws — including advising and directing local election officials on properly conducting elections; publishing instruction materials on election procedures; publishing indexed copies of the election laws; prescribing uniform forms, notices, and supplies for use in elections; preparing ballots for proposed constitutional amendments and referendums; requiring reports from local election officials as necessary; and establishing a comprehensive training curriculum and continuing election education program for all county, city, township, and village clerks responsible for conducting elections (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.21; Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.31).

The secretary of state’s office oversees the Bureau of Elections. The secretary also supervises local election officials in the performance of their election-related duties. Because of Michigan’s decentralized election system, other departments and agencies oversee different aspects of the state’s electoral system:

• The Bureau of Elections, under the auspices of the secretary of state ( Comp. Laws § 168.32), is responsible for overseeing county, city, and township clerks, county canvassing boards, and election commissions. Specifically, the bureau trains county clerks; compiles election results; accepts and reviews petition filings; conducts statewide instructional programs on elections; assists local election officials with their administrative duties; oversees the operation of Michigan’s Qualified Voter File (QVF) system; publishes manuals and newsletters; and monitors legislation affecting election administration. The bureau also administers Michigan’s Campaign Finance Act and Lobby Registration Act. Jonathan Brater has served as director of elections since 2019.
• The Board of State Canvassers, as established by Const. art. II, § 7, certifies statewide elections, cross-county elections, and elections for all judicial offices (except probate court judges); conducts recounts for state-level offices; assigns ballot designations and adopts ballot language for statewide ballot proposals; and approves electronic voting systems for use in the state. The board also canvasses nominating petitions filed with the secretary of state as well as state-level ballot proposal petitions. The board consists of four members, two Republicans and two Democrats, who serve staggered terms. Although the Board of State Canvassers is separate from the secretary of state’s office, the director of elections serves as the board’s secretary, a nonvoting position.
• Boards of county canvassers are responsible for canvassing each of their respective counties’ precincts and certifying election results “based solely on the statements of returns from election day precincts, early voting sites, and absent voter counting boards in the county and any corrected returns” ( Comp. Laws § 168.822(3)). Each board of county canvassers consists of four appointed members, two Democrats and two Republicans. Each county’s board of commissioners approves the appointments by vote (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.24c). Boards of county canvassers do not have the authority to “refuse to certify election results based on third party claims alleging election irregularities, or a general desire to conduct election investigations.”
• County election commissions consist of the county clerk, the chief probate judge of the county or probate court district, and the county treasurer ( Comp. Laws § 168.23). County commissions provide election supplies, including ballots for federal, state, and county elections. Commission members are also responsible for holding hearings to determine the clarity of the wording used on recall petitions.
• City and township election commissions perform duties related to “the preparation, printing, and delivery of ballots as are required by law of the boards of county election commissioners” ( Comp. Laws § 168.719). City and township commissions also are responsible for determining precinct boundaries (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.661) and for appointing precinct inspectors (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.674).
• Local municipal clerks conduct local elections and operate polling places. Unless otherwise determined by a city charter, each city’s election commission consists of the city clerk, the city attorney, and the city assessor ( Comp. Laws § 168.25). Each township’s election commission consists of the township clerk, the township supervisor, and the township treasurer, or the township clerk and two trustees appointed by the township board in a charter township (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.26; Mich. Comp. Laws § 42.4).

To ensure that state election laws are enforced, the secretary of state has certain investigative authorities, including the duty to investigate the administration of election laws and report violations of those laws to the state attorney general for prosecution (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.31(1)(h)). The secretary may also audit election precincts (or direct local authorities to do so), which may include reviewing documents, ballots, and procedures used during an election (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.31a). In the past, Michigan officials have conducted tabulation and procedural audits of precincts and absentee ballot counting boards across jurisdictions.

Additionally, the secretary of state has regulatory authority to promulgate election-related regulations and directives that ensure uniform standards and compliance (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.31(2)). These typically require formal rulemaking under Michigan’s Administrative Procedures Act (Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 24.201–328) to be made permanent. Separately, Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.765a(17) requires the secretary to develop instructions for absent voter counting boards. Select examples of the secretary of state’s election-related rulemaking authority include:

• Standards for electronic voting systems. Establishing uniform standards for preparation, delivery, and maintenance of electronic ballots, tabulators, early voting equipment, election materials, and more ( Admin. Code R. 168.771–793).
• Signature-matching for absent voter ballot applications and envelopes. Setting uniform standards for determining whether ballot application and envelope signatures match signatures on file, allowing for considerations of possible explanations for signature discrepancies; providing methods to cure signature deficiencies; and setting timelines for signature review ( Admin. Code R. 168.21–26).
• Conduct of election recounts. Standardizing recount procedures, including time and place requirements, among others ( Admin. Code R. 168.901–930).

In exceptional circumstances, the secretary of state can also implement emergency regulations if the governor concurs “that preservation of the public health, safety, or welfare requires promulgation of an emergency rule without following the notice and participation procedures” set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act. Such rules are effective until a date fixed in the rule or six months after the date of its filing, whichever is earlier (Mich. Comp. Laws § 24.248).

In addition to formal regulations, the secretary of state may issue interpretive statements, guidelines, informational pamphlets, or other explanatory materials that do not have the force and effect of law (Mich. Comp. Laws § 24.207(h)). For example, in September 2024, Secretary Benson relaunched the State of Michigan Election Fact Center, “an official source of nonpartisan information on elections and voting in Michigan.”

Additionally, in 2022, the secretary issued a requirement that election challengers use a uniform form for their credentials. After this authority was challenged, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the guidance in 2024, finding that the requirement did not amount to a formal rule and was therefore within the secretary of state’s remit.

Michigan National Guard

Major General Paul D. Rogers serves as the adjutant general of the Michigan National Guard “at the pleasure of the governor” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 32.702). In this role, he is the “commanding general of the military establishment” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 32.700), which includes the Michigan National Guard and the Michigan Air National Guard. Governor Whitmer appointed Rogers in December 2018.

Separately, under certain narrow circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to call National Guard forces into federal service. Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command "runs from the President to the defense Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

In addition to deployment under State Active Duty status and federalization/deployment under Title 10, National Guard forces may be deployed in “hybrid” status under Title 32. More specifically, under section 502(f) of Title 32, the president or secretary of defense can request that governors deploy their National Guard forces to perform federal missions. Governors may decline such requests. If they accept them, they retain command and control of the Guard forces during the deployment, and the Guard forces remain subject to state, but the cost of the deployment is borne by the federal government.

The courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the national guard under Title 10 § 12406, a law that permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October of 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December of 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, OR. 

Select Examples of Michigan National Guard Mobilizations

In 1967, protests broke out following a Detroit police raid on an unlicensed bar. The resulting riots overwhelmed law enforcement, including local and state police. Detroit’s mayor appealed to the governor, who called in several brigades of the Michigan National Guard. Amid escalating violence, the mayor and governor consulted with the federal government to send more troops to Detroit. At the governor’s request, President Lyndon Johnson federalized the Michigan National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 331 and § 334 (now 10 U.S.C. § 251 and § 254; see Executive Order 11364 and Proclamation 3795). In total, 8,500 Michigan National Guard members responded to the riots, which caused 42 fatalities (including one guard member). After five days, the guard was returned to state control and demobilized.

In 2020, President Trump granted Governor Whitmer’s request to use the Michigan National Guard for humanitarian purposes during the Covid-19 pandemic. Under Title 32, section 502 of the U.S. Code, the president may request (but not require) that governors deploy their states’ national guard forces to perform certain federal missions (32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A)); such requests allow for federal funding of a state national guard for certain activities. As the governor’s office stated at the time, the use of federal funding for Title 32 did not federalize command of the activated national guard personnel.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, absent voter ballot drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations, reviewing the applicable state laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

Federal and state law protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, state law may require federal officials to be unarmed when they vote in person.

Discussion

Uniformed federal law enforcement officers and military personnel are typically armed. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d prohibits “possess[ing] a firearm in a polling place or within 100 feet from any entrance to a building in which a polling place is located.” However, this prohibition does not apply to “peace officers” or to people licensed to carry a concealed pistol in Michigan or another state. Under the Michigan Penal Code (which includes Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d), federal law enforcement officials are included in the definition of a “peace officer” found in Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.215(5)(l). Thus, if this definition applies to “peace officer” as used in Section 234d, federal law enforcement officers are exempt from the state prohibition on firearm possession in a polling place.

Federal law also restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” At the same time, federal law provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

Planning and Preparation

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure. The Michigan Department of State has also published an overview of current voter intimidation and firearms laws.
• Update policies and protocols as necessary based on these discussions, bearing in mind that uniform statewide policies are advantageous for you and your voters. Discuss policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise circulate these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help disseminate these policies.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers and challengers may not apply.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the department has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. And in November 2020, the DOJ deployed monitors to 18 states, including seven municipalities in Michigan.

The DOJ monitors both federal and non-federal elections, but it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election authorities of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers. “For decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1) grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, it has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, the House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated, “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on Committee on House Administration letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against federal election interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote. And Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931b prohibits intimidating an election official with the intent of interfering with their performance of election-related duties.

Planning and Preparation

• Review relevant federal laws on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers (as well as general election interference).
• Speak with other local election officials in jurisdictions previously selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional or DOJ election observers or monitors arriving at a polling location with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies and communicate them with your staff.
• If the DOJ or Congress contacts your office about sending observers or monitors to your jurisdiction, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election administration colleagues.
  • Identify other jurisdictions selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated election officials’ counsel.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location or absent voter ballot drop box located on or adjacent to federal sites while conducting official business in the course of their duties

Summary

Depending on the location of an in-person voting site or absentee ballot drop box (“drop box”), federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites or drop boxes at federal locations — that is, located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations.

Discussion

Access considerations, state law requirements, and various other factors can lead election officials to site in-person voting locations or drop boxes in or near federal buildings or on or near federal land. Specifically, each election jurisdiction in Michigan must have at least one drop box, and jurisdictions with more than 15,000 registered voters must have at least one drop box for every 15,000 registered voters. Local clerks determine the locations of drop boxes; in doing so, they must consider population density, proximity to public transportation, and accessibility (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.761d).

While state law prohibits possessing a weapon within 100 feet of a drop box, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(c), and the entrance of a polling location, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(3)(a), if an in-person voting location or drop box is located on federal land or in a federal building, federal officials, including armed federal law enforcement officials, may appear frequently in the vicinity in the course of conducting routine business. In these circumstances, complex jurisdictional issues can arise and election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence than they would at other locations.

18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — generally applies to in-person voting locations and drop boxes located within federal buildings. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents, or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation

• Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
• Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
• Meet with law enforcement to discuss state statutes and guidelines. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure. The Michigan Department of State has also published an overview of current voter intimidation and firearms laws.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents as necessary.
• Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
• Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an absent voter ballot drop box location not on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building

Summary

Certain federal officials may qualify for exemptions from prohibitions against carrying firearms in and near in-person voting locations that also apply to absent voter ballot drop boxes (“drop boxes”) not located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.

Discussion

Uniformed federal law enforcement officers and military personnel are likely armed. Michigan law prohibits possessing a firearm within 100 feet from any drop box for the 40 days before an election (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(c)). However, this prohibition does not apply to “peace officers,” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(4)(a)), which, as discussed above, under Michigan law may include federal law enforcement officers. (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.215(5)(l)).

Prohibitions on voter and election official intimidation may also apply to federal presence and activity at drop box locations. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(a) prohibits any attempt to menace, bribe, or by “other corrupt means or device” (whether direct or indirect) influence or interrupt a voter casting their vote or deter them from voting. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931b(1) prohibits intimidating an election official with the intent to interfere with the performance of their election-related duties. Depending on the circumstances, armed federal presence could deter voters from casting their vote or intimidate election officials.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(6) also prohibits possessing a firearm in or within 100 feet of the entrance to a location where absent voter ballots are counted while those ballots are being processed. Notably, this prohibition does not apply to a “uniformed law enforcement officer acting in the course of the officer’s duties” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(7)). At least one definition of “law enforcement officer” found in state law does not include federal law enforcement officers. Mich. Comp. Laws § 776.21 defines a “law enforcement officer [as] a police officer of a county, city, village, township, or this state; a college or university public safety officer; a prosecuting attorney, assistant prosecuting attorney, or an investigator for the office of prosecuting attorney; or any other person whose duty is to enforce the laws of this state.” As such, federal law enforcement officials may not enjoy an exemption to this prohibition, and may be prohibited from possessing a weapon within 100 feet of the entrance of certain absentee ballot tabulation centers.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials arriving at drop box locations.
• Consider posting signage regarding firearm prohibitions near drop boxes inside polling locations adjacent to drop box sites. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite state statutes (including to local law enforcement) that prohibit voter intimidation and firearm possession when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near ballot drop boxes.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office

Summary

State law prohibits possessing a firearm within 100 feet of the entrance to a city or township clerk’s office during the 40 days prior to an election. However, this prohibition may not apply to certain federal officials.

Discussion

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(3)(d) prohibits possessing a firearm within 100 feet of a city or township clerk’s office for the 40 days before an election when an absent voter can vote in person in those offices. Under Michigan law, this prohibition does not apply to “peace officers.” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.234d(4)(a)). As discussed above, federal law enforcement may qualify as “peace officers,” and therefore may be exempt from this prohibition. (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.215(5)(l)).

Outside of the 40-day window, state law does not specifically restrict possessing firearms in government buildings or offices (except for court facilities). For instance, Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.425o, which lists the premises that restrict carrying concealed weapons, does not include government buildings. However, this list may not be exhaustive: Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.425c(3)(a), a license to carry a concealed weapon is subject to section 28.425o “and as otherwise provided by law.” Additionally, a “local unit of government” — defined as a city, village, township, or county (Mich. Comp. Laws § 123.1101) — is not permitted to enact or enforce any laws regulating the ownership or possession of firearms “except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state” (Mich. Comp. § 123.1102).

Other state laws may restrict federal officials’ access to election offices if they attempt to interfere with election administration. For example, Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931b(1) prohibits intimidating an election official with the intent of interfering with the performance of their election-related duties. Additionally, if a state or local official fails to execute their election administration duties as a result of federal interference, then that official may face legal consequences: Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931(1)(g) prohibits Michigan election officials from willfully failing to perform election-related duties or disobeying a lawful order from state or county election officials.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to your office.
• Consider including prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, and presumptions of intimidation on signage at your office. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931b when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at your office.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory frameworks that preserve state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. Various Michigan laws and regulations, including Mich. Comp. Laws § 399.811 and Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.491, also require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain periods of time, as listed on the retention schedule published by the state’s Records Management Services office.

State and federal laws may limit the information that local Michigan election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” Some state and local entities are currently in discussions with the DOJ regarding the bounds of what data they are either obligated to or prohibited from providing. For example, in July 2025, the Civil Rights Division requested Michigan’s statewide voter registration list. In September, Michigan provided the list but excluded personal information that cannot be shared under state law. The Civil Rights Division subsequently sued Michigan and its secretary of state for refusing to provide the complete dataset. Litigation is ongoing — make sure to check with your counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.931b(1) also prohibits intimidating an election official with the intent of interfering with the performance of their election-related duties.

In addition, Michigan state law prohibits unauthorized persons from breaking open, willfully damaging or destroying, or unduly possessing any ballot box or voting machine used in an election (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(b)).

Planning and Preparation

• Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
• Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of these policies to uninvited law enforcement who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Update policies and protocols as necessary on the basis of these discussions, bearing in mind that uniform statewide policies are advantageous for you and your voters.
• Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas indicating employee-only access can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
• If your office is presented with a request, subpoena, or other demand, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case: Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
• When appropriate, consult with the Michigan Association of County Clerks, the Michigan Department of State, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on how best to handle such requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location

Summary

Federal law clearly states that unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the army, navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have under their] authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely bars federal law enforcement officials from being ordered to or stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials to any polling location unless that location is underattack by “armed enemies of the United States.” Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are usually armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation, including menacing or obstructing voters, may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote (or attempts to do so) — whether such conduct is intended to intimidate or not. Courts have consistently recognized that section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs (including voters) to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(a) similarly prohibits attempting to influence or interrupt an elector casting their vote or deter them from voting — either directly or indirectly — through menace, bribery, or “other corrupt means or device.” And Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932(d) prohibits obstructing or attempting to obstruct “any elector in the exercise of [their] duties as an elector.”

State laws also provide state election officials with authority to respond to instances that may involve voter intimidation. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.678 gives boards of election inspectors “full authority to maintain peace, regularity and order” at their respective polling locations and to “enforce obedience to their lawful commands” during elections and vote canvassing. According to the Michigan Bureau of Elections, Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.678 empowers local clerks, members of their staff, and election inspectors to ask a person engaging in prohibited conduct to leave a voting location or to request that law enforcement remove that person from the premises.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of troops or armed federal officials arriving at in-person voting locations or at your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms and voter intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the abovementioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal presence at in-person voting locations. The Michigan Department of State has also published an overview of current voter intimidation and firearms laws.
• Train election inspectors on these statutes and other guidance issued by the Michigan Bureau of Elections.
• Consult with local law enforcement about coordinating with election inspectors and their staff. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal officials or troops to election offices around the country and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployments of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and around Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Michigan state law prohibits, “by means of bribery, menace, or other corrupt means or device,” directly or indirectly attempting to influence voters casting their vote, deter them from voting, or interrupt them in casting their vote; or “in any manner obstruct[ing] or attempt[ing] to obstruct any elector in the exercise of [their] duties as an elector” (Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.932).

Planning and Preparation

• Reach out to community groups (including immigrants’ rights groups) and local leadership (such as the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited to discuss their policies regarding providing on-site access to immigration enforcement officials, and make sure that you understand the applicability of those policies during the voting period. Discuss with your counsel as necessary.
• Review any public education materials that you intend to circulate about this subject in advance with your counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel promptly if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. USPS policies establish special handling requirements that prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, such issues would likely only result from changes to current USPS policies (which would almost certainly require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure offers some protection against hasty policy and leadership shifts.

Discussion

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, the Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration. Mail voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail and issues that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could occur for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201).

This means that the board, guided by statute and its bylaws, “directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.” The board selects and has the authority to remove the postmaster general (39 U.S.C. § 202), who serves as USPS’s chief executive officer and is responsible for Postal Service operations. The postmaster general, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”

Specific policies and procedures dictate the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, including explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize election mail delivery. According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for USPS to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by shoring up election mail processes and procedures over which they have control — such as providing alternative options like drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

Planning and Preparation

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as absent voter ballot drop box locations and ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
• Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Always consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.