The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

Department of Justice (DOJ) “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI)critical infrastructure.

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process, such as ballots, voter registration cards, absentee ballot applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Election Interference

• Rev. Stat. § 16–1004: Prohibits interfering with an election officer in the discharge of their duty; inducing an election officer to violate or refuse to comply with their duty or any election law; modifying the “software, hardware, or source code for voting equipment without receiving approval or certification”; or impersonating “any election official, including an election board member or other poll worker or a challenger or party representative.”
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1018: Prohibits electioneering on Election Day within a “polling place or in a public manner within 75 feet of the main outside entrance of a polling place or on-site early voting location”; intentionally disabling or removing a voting machine or voting record from a polling place, on-site early voting location, or election official’s custody; knowingly removing an official ballot from a polling place before closing the polls; showing another voter’s completed ballot to anyone other than an authorized person lawfully assisting the voter; knowingly soliciting a voter to show their ballot or receiving a ballot prepared for voting from a voter unless authorized by law; or knowingly delivering an official ballot to a voter without authority.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1010: Prohibits a person charged with performing any duty under any law relating to elections from knowingly refusing to perform such duty or violating any provision of such law.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1016: Prohibits tampering with ballots, poll lists, and ballot boxes; and assisting anyone to vote illegally.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1003: Prohibits forging or falsifying the official endorsement of a ballot; destroying or defacing a ballot; or delaying a ballot’s delivery.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1005: Prohibits marking a ballot with the intent to fix an election; selling votes; soliciting ballots by misrepresenting oneself as an election official; collecting ballots and not turning them in to an election official or other authorized person; or engaging or participating in a pattern of ballot fraud.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1011: Prohibits knowingly forging, counterfeiting, substituting, or tampering with ballot tabulations, election returns, or electronic election results.
• Rev. Stat. § 13–2402: Prohibits knowingly using or threatening violence or physical force to obstruct, impair, or hinder a public servant performing official duties or a peace officer enforcing the law or preserving the peace.
• Rev. Stat. § 13–2406: Prohibits impersonating a public servant and any conduct intended to induce another to submit to their false authority or to rely on their “pretended official acts.”
• Rev. Stat. § 13–2407: Prohibits tampering with public records.
• Rev. Stat. § 13–2316: Prohibits tampering with a computer, computer system, or network.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–621: Prohibits unauthorized individuals from touching election materials and engaging in processing and counting of the ballots.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–624: Requires election officers, after an election, to deposit ballots in a secure facility managed by the county treasurer, who “shall keep it unopened and unaltered” for 24 months for elections for a federal office or for six months for all other elections, at which time the county treasurer shall destroy such records “without opening or examining the contents;” prohibits ballots from being opened and the contents examined unless there is a court order; and designates the court as the custodian of the ballots in the event of certain recounts and contests.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–625: Authorizes the officer in charge of elections to protect electronic ballot data and images from unauthorized physical or electronic access, ensuring protections equal to those required for paper ballots.
• Rev. Stat. § 13–2401: Prohibits doxxing election officers, public officials, and other protected employees, if doing so poses an imminent and serious threat to their safety or their family’s safety.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–515: Prohibits a person from remaining within 75 feet of a polling place while polls are open, except for the purpose of voting, and except election officials, one appointed representative of each political party, and challengers allowed by law; and prohibits electioneering or taking photos or videos within the same 75-foot limit.

Election Material Retention

Various Arizona laws, including Ariz. Admin. Code R2–12–602 and Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16–624, 41–151.12, 16–621, and 16–646, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain periods of time, as listed on the retention schedule published by the Arizona State Library. Table 5 summarizes key requirements under Arizona law.

• Rev. Stat. § 16–168: Prohibits the following:
  • Using precinct registers, voter lists, and information derived from voter registration forms for commercial purposes or purposes other than specified political, campaign, election, redistricting, or other legally authorized uses;
  • Providing access to information derived from voter registration forms or precinct registers on the internet, except as necessary for election officials to protect and maintain voter registration information in an auditable format;
  • Accessing or reproducing protected voter information—including the month and day of birth, social security number or any part of it, driver license or nonoperating identification number, Indian census number, the father’s name or mother’s maiden name, the state or country of birth, and the records containing a voter’s signature and a voter’s e-mail address—except by the voter; authorized government officials acting within the scope of their duties; voter registration agencies designated by the secretary of state; persons using the information for signature verification on petitions or candidate filings, for election purposes, or for news gathering; or pursuant to a court order; and makes such conduct a felony.

Emergency Powers

• Rev. Stat. § 26–303(A): Authorizes the governor, during a state of war emergency, to “suspend the provisions of any statute prescribing the procedure for conduct of state business, or the orders or rules of any state agency, if the governor determines and proclaims that strict compliance with the provisions of any such statute, order or rule would in any way prevent, hinder or delay mitigation of the effects of the emergency.”
• Rev. Stat. § 26–303(D)-(E): Authorizes the governor to declare a “state of emergency.” During a state of emergency, the governor:
  • “shall have complete authority over all agencies of the state government and the right to exercise, within the area designated, all police power vested in this state by the constitution and laws of this state in order to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.”
  • “may direct all agencies of the state government to use and employ state personnel, equipment and facilities to perform any activities designed to prevent or alleviate actual and threatened damage due to the emergency.”
• Rev. Stat. § 41–1026: Authorizes a state agency to adopt or amend a rule after finding that the measure is necessary as an emergency measure “without the notice prescribed by Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 41–1021 and 41–1022 and prior review by the council,” if the rule is first approved by the attorney general and filed with the secretary of state.”

Election Observers and Challengers

• Rev. Stat. § 16–515: Requires political party observers to obtain credentials from their county political party chairperson and to present those credentials at their assigned voting location; and authorizes one properly credentialed observer from each political party to remain within 75 feet of a polling place while polls are open.
• Rev. Stat. §§ 16–590–93: Requires voter challengers to be qualified electors of the county and political party challengers to be previously designated and credentialed as observers by their party. Identifies valid vote challenge procedures and the circumstances under which a challenger may be removed from the voting location.

Paramilitary Activity

• Const. art. II, § 20: “The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”
• Rev. Stat. § 26–123: Prohibits any person, partnership, or corporation from maintaining armed troops, with the exception of state and local law enforcement and armed security guards hired by a business.
• Rev. Stat. § 26‑170: Prohibits any person from wearing a uniform of the national guard or the U.S. army, navy or air force, or a similar uniform likely to be mistaken for it, unless the person is a member of the service, veteran organization member, or otherwise authorized.

Protest and Civil Disorders

• Rev. Stat. §§ 13–2902–07: Prohibits assembling with the intent to engage in conduct constituting a riot; disorderly conduct; obstructing thoroughfares; and false reporting of bombings, fires, or other emergencies.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• Rev. Stat. § 16–1013: Prohibits using force, violence, threats, intimidation, duress, or fraud to induce or compel a person to vote a certain way or refrain from voting, or to impede or interfere with voting.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1017: Prohibits a voter from destroying or removing certain election materials, interfering with other voters within 75 feet of a polling place, making false statements about needing assistance, hindering voters from voting, or voting in a county in which they no longer reside.
• Rev. Stat. § 16–1006: Prohibits using force, threats, bribery, or any corrupt means (direct or indirect) to attempt to influence, hinder, or restrain an elector in their “free exercise of the right to vote,” or to defraud or deceive an elector and cause them to vote differently than they intended or desired.

Police Presence at the Polls

• Rev. Stat. § 16–535: Requires the board of supervisors to appoint a qualified voter as precinct election marshal, who “shall preserve order at the polls and permit no violation of the election laws from the opening of the polls until the count of the ballots is completed.”
• Rev. Stat. § 16–564: Requires a law enforcement officer, if practicable and available, to aid in transferring a locked ballot box to a new polling place during an emergency and permits one election board member and one law enforcement officer to accompany the ballot box if two bipartisan board members from that polling place are unavailable, and otherwise prohibits opening a ballot box during voting and before the polls close or removing it until all ballots are counted.

Weapons Restrictions

• Rev. Stat. § 13–3102: Prohibits knowingly entering a polling place on the day of any election carrying a deadly weapon without authorization. Exceptions to this prohibition include:
  • “a peace officer or any person summoned by a peace officer to assist in the performance of official duties”;
  • members of the U.S. military or the military forces of any state “in the performance of official duties”;
  • a warden, special investigator, or officer of the state department of corrections or the department of juvenile corrections; or
  • “a person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted [to carry a firearm] pursuant to a statute of this state or of the United States.”
• Rev. Stat. § 13–2308.01: Prohibits intentionally or knowingly engaging in, organizing, managing, directing, supervising, financing, soliciting, advising, inciting, or furthering an act of terrorism.

Definitions

• See Rev. Stat. § 16–691, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–105, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1–215.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should complete legal research to determine if and how the courts have interpreted it and consult with counsel.

Governor of Arizona

The governor of Arizona serves as the state’s chief executive and is responsible for overseeing state government operations and ensuring that the state’s laws are faithfully executed (Ariz. Const. art. V, § 4). Gov. Katie Hobbs was elected in 2022 and is currently serving her first four-year term.

Per the 1998 Citizens Clean Elections Act, the governor also selects candidates to serve five-year terms on the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission (a responsibility that alternates annually between the governor and the highest-ranking official holding a statewide office who is not a member of the same political party as the governor). The governor has the authority to remove members of the commission with the state senate’s concurrence (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–955).

According to the emergency powers assigned in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26–303, the governor has the power to “direct all agencies of the state government to use and employ state personnel, equipment and facilities to perform any activities designed to prevent or alleviate actual and threatened damage due to the emergency.”

The governor serves as the commander in chief of the state’s military forces –– comprising the Arizona National Guard, the Arizona state guard, and the unorganized militia –– “except when such forces shall be called into the service of the United States” (see Ariz. Const. art. V, § 3; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26–174; and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26–122).

Arizona Secretary of State

Adrian Fontes has been Arizona’s secretary of state since 2023 and is currently serving his first four-year term. The secretary of state is part of the state’s executive department, as established by Ariz. Const. art. V, § 1, and directs the Arizona Department of State (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41–121.02).

As the state’s chief election officer, the secretary is responsible for administering certain provisions of Arizona’s election laws (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–142). The secretary biennially issues the Arizona Elections Procedures Manual in order to “prescribe rules to achieve and maintain the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the procedures for early voting and voting, and of producing, distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating and storing ballots.” The manual, which must be approved by the governor and the attorney general prior to issuance, also covers rules for UOCAVA voter election materials and for internet receipt of federal postcard application requests (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–452).

The secretary of state is responsible for providing information on voter registration and absentee or early ballot procedures to absent uniformed and overseas voters (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–142), and for “provid[ing] personnel who are experts in electronic voting systems and procedures and in electronic voting system security to field check and review electronic voting systems and recommend needed statutory and procedural changes” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–452).

Additionally, the secretary oversees county administration of all federal and state elections within Arizona, including by administering a statewide database of voter registration information (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–168(J)); advising local election officials on how to administer elections (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–452); coordinating and compiling vote tabulations from each county (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–602); and certifying final election results (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–648). The secretary of state’s office is responsible for testing and certifying election equipment and for administering HAVA funds (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16–442, 16–449, and 41–129).

Arizona National Guard

Brigadier General John A. Conley serves as the adjutant general of Arizona and the director of the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs. In addition to heading the department, he serves as the governor’s military chief of staff and the commanding general of all branches of the militia (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26–102) —including the Arizona Army National Guard, the Arizona Air National Guard, the Arizona state guard, and the unorganized militia (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26–122). Governor Hobbs appointed Conley in June 2025.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to call National Guard forces into federal service (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

The courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the national guard under Title 10 § 12406, a law that permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October of 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December of 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, OR.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, ballot drop box locations, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations, reviewing the applicable federal and state laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

State law and federal laws protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, state law may require certain federal officials to be unarmed when they vote in person.

Discussion

Certain federal officials routinely carry firearms in the performance of their official duties. As Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102(A)(11) prohibits knowingly entering a polling place carrying a deadly weapon federal officials must be unarmed when they arrive at an in-person voting location to vote “unless specifically authorized by law” or they qualify for an exemption to this prohibition. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102(C) lists those who qualify for an exemption, including “peace officers,” members of the military while performing official duties, and “person[s] specifically licensed, authorized or permitted” to carry a firearm pursuant to federal or state law.

First, whether federal officials — including federal law enforcement officers — qualify for the “peace officer” exemption to the firearm prohibition depends primarily on the Arizona statutory definition. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–105 defines a “peace officer” as “any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order and make arrests.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1–215 contains a consistent definition of “peace officer” that applies “unless the context otherwise requires,” and does not include federal officials. Importantly, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41–1823 limits the ability to “exercise the authority or perform the duties of a peace officer” to certain state and local officials and to those certified by the Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training (AZPOST) board. Because federal law enforcement officials do not routinely obtain AZPOST certification, federal law enforcement officials likely do not qualify for the firearm prohibition exemption enjoyed by Arizona “peace officers.” However, Arizona state law does authorize county sheriffs to cross-certify certain federal law enforcement officials (Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 13–3875), so these “federal peace officers” may qualify for an exemption to the firearm prohibition.

Next, whether certain federal officials qualify for the “person specifically licensed, authorized or permitted” to carry a firearm pursuant to federal law exemption depends primarily on whether federal law expressly authorizes specific officials to carry weapons. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3052 authorizes agents of the FBI and the DOJ to “carry firearms.” Also important is whether federal law limits this authority. For example, Federal Protective Service agents are only authorized to carry weapons “while engaged in the performance of official duties” (40 U.S.C. § 1315). If a federal official lacks federal statutory authority to carry firearms or has limited authority that does not include activity inside a polling location, then that official may be subject to the Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102 firearm prohibition.

Separately, federal law restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” At the same time, federal law provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

Precinct election marshals are also important in this scenario because they have an important role in responding if an armed federal official arrives at the polls to vote. These individuals are appointed by the county board of supervisors and are required to “preserve order at the polls and permit no violation of the election laws from the opening of the polls until the count of the ballots is completed” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–535).

Planning and Preparation

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
• Update policies and protocols as necessary based on these discussions, bearing in mind that uniform statewide policies are advantageous for you and your voters. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise circulate these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help disseminate these policies.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
• Ensure proper training for precinct election marshals.Consider posting signage at your office noting the election marshal’s responsibility to “preserve order at the polls and permit no violation of the election laws from the opening of the polls until the count of the ballots is completed” ( Rev. Stat. § 16–535).

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers and challengers may not apply.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations or election offices.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. And in November 2020, the DOJ deployed monitors to 18 states, including three counties in Arizona.

The DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” but it has typically limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers.For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, it has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, the House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated, “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to the confusion that has resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on Committee on House Administration letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against federal election interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16–1004, 13–2402, 16–1013, and 16–1017, which prohibit interference, intimidation, and coercion with regard to election officials and voting, as well as obstruction of governmental operations.

Although state restrictions may not apply to congressional observers, state policies do prohibit election interference by political party observers. For example, according to Guidance on Polling Place Conduct and Preventing Voter Intimidation published by the Arizona secretary of state’s office, observers are prohibited from obstructing poll workers or the voting process, interacting with voters, taking videos or photos, acting unprofessionally, or “otherwise fail[ing] to obey the polling place inspector or rules established by the county.” Observers who violate these guidelines may have their credentials revoked by the county and may be asked to leave the polling place.

Planning and Preparation

• Review relevant federal law on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers (as well as general election interference), and state laws pertaining to other observers and challenges.
• Speak with other local election officials in jurisdictions previously selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional or DOJ election observers or monitors arriving at a polling location with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies and communicate them with your staff.
• If the DOJ or Congress contacts your office about sending observers or monitors to your jurisdiction, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election administration colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated election officials’ counsel.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location or ballot drop box site located on or adjacent to federal property while in the performance of official duties

Summary

Depending on the location of an in-person voting site or ballot drop box location, federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites at federal locations — that is, located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations.

Discussion

Access considerations may result in a polling place or ballot drop boxes being located inside a federal building or on or adjacent to federal land. In these circumstances, federal officials, including armed federal law enforcement and military members, may appear frequently in the vicinity while performing official duties. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102(A)(11) prohibits knowingly entering a polling place on the day of any election carrying a deadly weapon. However, this prohibition does not apply to “person[s] specifically licensed, authorized or permitted” to carry a firearm pursuant to state or federal law, members of the military while performing official duties, or peace officers (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102(C)).

If an in-person voting location or drop box is located within a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. In these circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation

• Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
• Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
• Meet with law enforcement to discuss state statutes and guidelines if there are polling locations where the concerns outlined above may arise. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement to keep elections safe and secure.
• Discuss siting decisions that result in a ballot drop box location being located at or adjacent to a federal location with your counsel. Consider informing voters that certain locations are on federal property or in a federally owned facility.
• Once the locations have been confirmed, meet with relevant federal facilities managers or other relevant federal officials to discuss potential issues and agree on rules and procedures that will apply.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents as necessary.
• Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
• Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office

Summary

If an election office is located in a state or local government building, state law allows building operators to create certain building-specific access restrictions, such as firearm prohibitions. However, certain federal officials may qualify for an exemption to weapon restrictions.

Discussion

Arizona law prohibits entering any public establishment — which includes a county office building — or public event carrying a deadly weapon after a reasonable request by the operator of the establishment or the event to remove the weapon (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102(A)(10)). Local jurisdictions may also have their own restrictions: For example, the City of Maricopa prohibits “any person within the limits of the city to possess, carry or display a weapon in any public building or facility” (Maricopa, Ariz., City Code § 9.60.010(A)(2)).

However, certain individuals are exempt from these prohibitions. Specifically, state law exempts peace officers, members of the military while performing official duties, and “person[s] specifically licensed, authorized or permitted” to carry a firearm pursuant to federal or state law (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3102(C)). The City of Maricopa’s ordinance (for example) incorporates these exemptions through reference to the state statute (Maricopa, Ariz., City Code § 9.60.010(B)(1)(a)). Importantly, local governments cannot pass firearms ordinances that are inconsistent with or more restrictive than state law (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13–3108(D)).

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials arriving at your office.
• Consider including prohibitions on firearms, if any, and intimidation on signage at your office. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite Rev. Stat. § 16–1004 when responding to concerns about armed federal officials arriving at your office.

Federal Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond to any issues that may arise.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory frameworks that preserve state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. Arizona state law designates the county treasurer as the custodian of certain election materials – specifically ballots – that federal law requires election officials to safeguard after the canvass has been completed (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–624(A)). While federal law authorizes the states to make such designations (52 U.S.C. § 20701), if the state places such records in the custody of other officials, then the DOJ “interprets the Civil Rights Act to require that covered elections records ‘be retained either physically by election officials themselves, or under their direct administrative supervision.’”

State and federal law may limit conditions regarding the information that local election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of a voter’s confidential information, including the month and day of birth, social security number or any part of it, driver license or nonoperating identification number, Indian census number, the father’s name or mother’s maiden name, the state or country of birth, and the records containing a voter’s signature and a voter’s e-mail address (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–168(F)).

Since May, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has demanded that nearly every state and the District of Columbia hand over election-related records and data. After Arizona refused to provide its publicly available statewide voter registration list until the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division demonstrated compliance with privacy laws, DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide its complete statewide registration list. The lawsuit is ongoing — please check with your local counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.

In addition, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–1018(2) prohibits intentionally disabling or removing a voting machine or a voting record from a polling place or on-site early voting location or from the custody of an election official. And Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–1004(B) prohibits knowingly modifying the software, hardware, or source code for voting equipment without authorization. Arizona law also prohibits unauthorized third-party access to voting materials and lays out strict chain of custody requirements. These include the following:

• Only the board of supervisors and election officials have control over the chain of custody at counting centers. Though observers and members of the public may observe, only authorized individuals may touch, process, or tabulate ballots ( Rev. Stat. § 16–621).
• After counting is completed, the election officer in charge must deposit the ballots in a secure facility managed by the county treasurer, who must retain them “unopened and unaltered” for 24 months for elections for federal office or for six months for all other elections, and then destroy it “without opening or examining the contents.” Ballots may only be opened and examined if there is a court order ( Rev. Stat. § 16–624).
• If a recount is ordered or a contest begins within six months, the county treasurer may be court-ordered to deliver the ballots to the court, in which case the court assumes custody and control of the ballots ( Rev. Stat. § 16–624).
• The election officer is responsible for ensuring that electronic data from ballots and electronic or digital images of ballots are “protected from physical and electronic access, including unauthorized copying or transfer, and that all security measures are at least as protective as those prescribed for paper ballots” ( Rev. Stat. § 16–625).
• Early ballots have similar chain of custody restrictions and specific processes maintaining control and possession by the local election officer or board ( Rev. Stat. § 16–552).

The Elections Procedures Manual published by the Arizona secretary of state’s office details these and other strict chain of custody processes and restricted access controls for voting systems and other equipment.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–1004 prohibits interfering with election officials administering an election. See alsoAriz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13–2402, 16–1013, and 16–1017, which prohibit interference, intimidation, and coercion with regard to election officials and voting, as well as obstruction of governmental operations.

Planning and Preparation

• Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
• Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of these policies to uninvited law enforcement personnel who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Update any policies and protocols as necessary on the basis of these discussions, bearing in mind that uniform statewide policies are advantageous for you and your voters.
• Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only access can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
• If your office is presented with a request, subpoena, or other demand, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case: Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
• When appropriate, consult with the Arizona secretary of state and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on how best to handle such requests. Sharing information may also help other election officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location

Summary

Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the Army, Navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have under their] authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely prohibits federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates, threatens, or coerces (or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or anyone urging or aiding others in voting. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs (including voters) to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 16–1013 prohibits using force, threats, intimidation, duress, or fraud to induce or compel a person to vote a certain way or refrain from voting, or to impede or interfere with voting. Similarly, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–1006 prohibits using force, threats, bribery, or any corrupt means to attempt to influence an elector in their vote, hinder their “free exercise of the right of suffrage,” or defraud or deceive them into voting differently.

In addition, federal and state laws prohibit interference with and obstruction of voting and election operations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 595 (prohibiting government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or affect a federal election); and 18 U.S.C. § 598 (prohibiting the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote”). State law also prohibits interfering with election officers in their duties and obstructing governmental operations by threats or use of force (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–1004).

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of troops or armed federal officials arriving at in-person voting locations or at your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms and intimidation on signage posted at in-person voting locations, including ballot drop box locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the abovementioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at in-person voting locations.
• Consult with local law enforcement about the possibility of troops or armed federal officials arriving at in-person voting locations or your office. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Arizona state law prohibits voter intimidation. Specifically, Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 16–1013 prohibits using force, threats, intimidation, duress, or fraud to induce or compel a person to vote a certain way or refrain from voting, or to impede or interfere with voting. Similarly, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16–1006 prohibits using force, threats, bribery, or any corrupt means to attempt to influence an elector’s vote, hinder their “free exercise of the right of suffrage,” or defraud or deceive them into voting differently.

Planning and Preparation

• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (such as the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding providing on-site access to immigration enforcement officials, and make sure that you understand the applicability of those policies during the voting period. Discuss with your counsel as necessary.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with your counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel promptly if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. USPS policies establish special handling requirements that serve to prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, but such issues would likely only result from changes to current USPS policies (which would almost certainly require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure offers some protection against hasty policy and leadership shifts.

Discussion

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, USPS plays a vital role in election administration. Mail-in voting is central to that role, but election mail also encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process, such as ballots, voter registration cards, absentee ballot applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail and issues that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could occur for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch,” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201).

This means that the board, guided by statute and its bylaws, “directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.” The board selects and has the authority to remove the postmaster general (39 U.S.C. § 202), who serves as USPS’s chief executive officer and is responsible for Postal Service operations. The postmaster general, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”

Specific policies and procedures dictate the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.”

In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, including explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize election mail delivery. According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Election officials’ ability to prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays is largely limited to the election mail processes and procedures over which they have control — such as providing alternative options like drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

Planning and Preparation

• Familiarize yourself and your staff with USPS resources available for election officials.
• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as ballot drop box locations and voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report any issues or concerns to USPS.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with colleagues and other election officials.
• Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.