Potential Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, ballot drop box sites, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Though federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations, reviewing applicable federal and state laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond to any issues that arise.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
New Jersey state law and federal law protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State laws that prohibit carrying firearms at polling places may not apply to certain federal officials when they vote in person.
Discussion
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.2 states that polling locations are sensitive places where the carrying of firearms may “be prohibited consistent with the Second Amendment” per the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)). N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6 generally prohibits knowingly carrying a firearm or possessing a “destructive device” — defined in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–1 as an “instrument or object designed to explode or produce uncontrolled combustion” — in locations being used as polling places or for ballot storage or tabulation during an election.
However, this prohibition does not apply to valid permit holders who are “lawfully authorized” in writing to provide polling site security “to the extent permitted by the entity responsible” for the site’s security (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6(e)(1)); or to authorized retired law enforcement officers whom the “owner or entity responsible for providing security” at a polling place allow to “carry a concealed handgun on the premises” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6(e)(2)). Valid permit holders “traveling along a public right-of-way that touches or crosses” a polling site or location used for ballot storage or tabulation and acting “in accordance with . . . other applicable provisions of law” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6(d)) are also exempt, as are others “otherwise expressly authorized by law” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6(g)).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6 also provides exemptions from New Jersey’s firearms prohibition for, among others, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(1), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(2), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(6):
- armed forces or National Guard members “while actually on duty, or while traveling between places of duty and carrying authorized weapons in the manner prescribed by the appropriate military authorities” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(1));
- federal law enforcement officers and “any other federal officers and employees required to carry firearms in the performance of their official duties” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(2)); and
- civilian employees of the U.S. government “under the supervision of the commanding officer of any post, camp, station, base or other military or naval installation” located in New Jersey who are “required, in the performance of . . . official duties, to carry firearms, and . . . authorized to carry firearms by the commanding officer, while in the actual performance of . . . official duties” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(6)).
Federal law also restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” At the same time, federal law provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”
Planning and Preparation
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with other state and local election officials about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide to help election administrators work with law enforcement.
- Update policies as necessary with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help get the word out.
- Contact your counsel and notify other state and local election officials of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers may not apply.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal election observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal election observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is election officials’ responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in their jurisdictions. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal election monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal election monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states.
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside polling places has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation between government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including the Missouri secretary of state and the Texas attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling places after learning that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.
Congressional election observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office.” The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Constitution’s Qualifications and Elections Clauses give Congress the authority for the program. The Qualifications Clause holds that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1); the Elections Clause grants state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but gives Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). The act states that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, [Congress] has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to officials in jurisdictions selected for election observation has been inconsistent. A lack of communication and improper credentialing have likely contributed to confusion when, for example, congressional observers arrive with credentials that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies the conditions under which state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against election interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 bars government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–11 forbids interfering “in any manner” with officials holding an election or with eligible voters voting in order to “to prevent the election or canvass from being fairly had and lawfully conducted.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:53A-15 bars interfering with the “correct operation” of voting devices and election equipment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–6 enjoins interfering with polling booths and voters on Election Day. And N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–18 prohibits interfering with clerks returning ballot boxes from poll sites to the office of the city clerk.
Planning and Preparation
- Review relevant federal law on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors arriving at a voting center with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies and communicate them with your staff.
- If DOJ or congressional staff contact your office about election observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location while conducting official business
Summary
Depending on the location of an in-person voting site, federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites at federal locations — that is, poll sites located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations. Nonetheless, state law may prohibit federal officials from being present at poll sites unless they are voting or are “officers connected with the election.” State restrictions on firearms at polling places may also apply.
Discussion
If an in-person voting location is on federal land or in a federal building, federal officials may appear frequently in the vicinity in the course of conducting routine business. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:15–8 provides that the only persons “permitted to be present” in polling places during an election are “officers connected with the election”; candidates; “duly authorized challengers”; voters “present for the purpose of voting” and their children; minors there to vote in an authorized simulated election and those running said simulated election (as provided for by the statute); and “officers as may be duly detailed to be present, pursuant to [Title 19], for preserving the peace or enforcing the provisions hereof.”
Title 19 also does not expressly authorize federal officials to be present at a polling place in their official capacity. Accordingly, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:15–8 may prohibit such officials’ presence unless they are voting or they qualify as “officers connected with the election.”
Meanwhile, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6 generally prohibits knowingly carrying a firearm or possessing a “destructive device” (as defined in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–1) in a location used as a polling place or for the storage or tabulation of ballots during an election — with certain exceptions, including:
- armed forces or National Guard members “while actually on duty, or while traveling between places of duty and carrying authorized weapons in the manner prescribed by the appropriate military authorities” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(1));
- federal law enforcement officers and “any other federal officers and employees required to carry firearms in the performance of their official duties” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(2)); and
- civilian employees of the U.S. government “under the supervision of the commanding officer of any post, camp, station, base or other military or naval installation” located in New Jersey who are “required, in the performance of . . . official duties, to carry firearms, and . . . authorized to carry firearms by the commanding officer, while in the actual performance of . . . official duties” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6(a)(6)).
If an in-person polling place is located within a federal building, additional jurisdictional issues may arise. In these circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation
- Review in-person voting sites to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
- Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
- Review state law provisions limiting who may be lawfully present in a polling place.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents as necessary.
- Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
- Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop box located on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building
Summary
Complex jurisdictional issues can also arise when ballot drop boxes are on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings. In these situations too, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence than they would at other locations.
Discussion
Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63–16.1, county election boards are charged with establishing ballot drop boxes and determining their locations in compliance with state law. Drop boxes must be available for voters to use 24 hours a day, and their locations must be “equipped with security cameras that allow for surveillance of the ballot drop box.”
The statute also mandates that at least one ballot drop box be sited at each of the following locations: at any county government building that houses the main office of the county clerk; in every “municipality with a population larger than 5,000 residents”; at the “main campus of each [s]tate college or university”; and at the main campuses of all independent four-year colleges or universities with more than 5,000 students enrolled. (If these requirements put two or more ballot drop boxes within less than 2,000 feet of each other, then the county election board is to determine via majority vote secondary locations for those drop boxes that comply with the statute’s requirements.)
County election boards must also situate ballot drop boxes “based on geographic location and population density to best serve the voters of each county,” consistent with the secretary of state’s guidelines. These and other factors may lead county election boards to select federal locations for some drop boxes.
If a ballot drop box is sited on federal property, then 18 U.S.C. § 930(a)’s prohibition on carrying firearms typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation
- Review your jurisdiction’s ballot drop box site list to determine whether any are on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building.
- Discuss siting decisions that result in a ballot drop box being placed at a federal location with your counsel. Consider informing voters that certain locations are on federal property or in a federally owned facility.
- Once drop box locations have been confirmed, meet with relevant federal facilities managers or other relevant federal officials to discuss potential issues and agree on rules and procedures that will apply.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop box location not on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building
Summary
Certain federal officials may qualify for exemptions from prohibitions against carrying firearms at or near voting locations that apply to ballot drop boxes not located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
Discussion
County election boards establish ballot drop boxes and determine their locations in accordance with New Jersey election law. State law mandates that at least one drop box be situated in each county building that houses a main county clerk office and on each state college main campus, among other locations (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63–16.1).
Unless an exemption applies, New Jersey’s prohibition against knowingly carrying guns and possessing “destructive device[s]” applies in polling locations and “places used for the storage or tabulation of ballots”; in places owned or leased by state, county, or municipal governments, or under the control of state, county, or municipal governments, and “used for the purpose of government administration”; and in schools, colleges, and other educational institutions (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6). Federal law enforcement officers would likely qualify for such an exemption, as would on-duty National Guard members (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6).
If a ballot drop box is inside a polling place, New Jersey’s limitation on persons permitted in polling places applies and may bar federal officials from approaching the drop box if they are not voting themselves or do not otherwise qualify as “officers connected with the election” (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:15–8).
Planning and Preparation
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to ballot drop box locations.
- Consider posting signage regarding weapon prohibitions at in-person voting locations, which ballot drop boxes are often adjacent to. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near ballot drop box locations.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office
Summary
If an election office is located in a state or local government building, then state law (including prohibitions against carrying firearms in these buildings) and local restrictions (which may include building-specific rules or access conditions) apply. However, certain federal officials may qualify for an exemption from state and local weapon ordinances.
Discussion
New Jersey law prohibits carrying guns and “destructive device[s]” in “places used for the storage or tabulation of ballots” and in places “owned, leased, or under the control of State, county or municipal government used for the purpose of government administration,” unless an exemption applies (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6). Federal law enforcement officers and on-duty National Guard members would likely qualify for an exemption (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6).
Other state laws may restrict federal officials’ access to election offices if they attempt to interfere with election administration. For example, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–11 prohibits interfering “in any manner” with officials “holding the election” or conducting the canvass so “as to prevent the election or canvass from being fairly had and lawfully conducted.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:53A-15 prohibits tampering with or intentionally damaging “any voting device, ballot cards, or other records or equipment used in the election,” as well as interfering or attempting to interfere with the “correct operation of such device or equipment.”
Planning and Preparation
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to your office.
- Consider including prohibitions on firearms and intimidation on signage at your office, consistent with state and federal law. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state law strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing applicable federal and state laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond to any issues that arise.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory frameworks that preserve state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
New Jersey state law also holds election officials and other local officials responsible for keeping and maintaining various election records, including voted ballots (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:18–4), statements of results (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:18–7), and other polling records (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:31–3.3).
State and federal law may limit the information that local election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians of election records to make them “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general (or their representative) makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose” of the demand. Some state and local entities are currently in discussions with the DOJ regarding the bounds of what data they are either obligated to or prohibited from providing.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–29 forbids interference with voting. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–11 makes it unlawful to interfere “in any manner” with officers “holding the election” or conducting the canvass so “as to prevent the election or canvass from being fairly had and lawfully conducted.” And N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:53A-15 prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with the “correct operation” of election equipment and devices, including voting machines.
Planning and Preparation
- Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
- Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss whether these policies apply to uninvited law enforcement who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Update any policies and protocols as necessary on the basis of these discussions with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters.
- Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only spaces can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
- If your office is presented with a request, subpoena, or other demand, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case: Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
- When appropriate, consult the New Jersey Association of Election Officials, the secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials. These officials may have advice on efficiently fielding similar requests, and sharing this information may help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location
Summary
Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the army, navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” may “order, bring, keep, or [have under their] authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely prohibits military personnel and armed federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony to station military personnel or armed federal law enforcement officials at a polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that troops and federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are usually armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although it was enacted well after the Insurrection Act’s passage, 18 U.S.C. § 592 does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
Although N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:58–4.6 generally prohibits knowingly carrying a firearm in a polling location or place where ballots are stored and tabulated, federal law enforcement officers and on-duty military personnel (including on-duty National Guard members) would likely qualify for an exemption (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39–6).
State and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation may apply in this scenario. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates, threatens, or coerces (or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote — whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
New Jersey law reflects similar prohibitions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–1.1 prohibits knowingly and willfully intimidating, threatening, or coercing (or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those attempting to vote. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–28 forbids using (or threatening to use) “force, violence, or restraint”; inflicting (or threatening to inflict) “injury, damage, harm, or loss”; and intimidating “in any manner” a person for voting, for refraining from voting (at all or for a particular candidate), or to induce or compel them to vote for or against a candidate.
Further, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–29 prohibits, “by abduction, duress, or any forcible or fraudulent device or contrivance,” impeding, preventing, or otherwise interfering with any voter’s “free exercise of the elective franchise” or compelling or inducing anyone to vote or abstain from voting or to vote for or against a candidate. And N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–20 makes it illegal to “willfully hinder or prevent” a voter from voting, knowing such voter to be eligible to vote.
Planning and Preparation
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of military personnel or armed federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms and intimidation, consistent with state and federal law, on signage posted at in-person voting locations, including ballot drop box sites. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the abovementioned statutes when responding to concerns about troops or armed federal officials at in-person voting locations.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
Scenario: Deployment of federal agents to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period or on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
As discussed above, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–1.1 prohibits knowingly and willfully intimidating, threatening, or coercing (or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those attempting to vote. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–28 bars using or threatening “force, violence, or restraint,” inflicting or threatening “injury, damage, harm, or loss,” and “practic[ing] intimidation upon or against any person in order to induce or compel [them] to . . . refrain from voting.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–29 prohibits employing “abduction, duress, or any forcible or fraudulent device or contrivance” to impede, prevent, or interfere with eligible voters’ “free exercise of the elective franchise” or to “compel, induce, or prevail upon” eligible voters to abstain from voting. And N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34–20 makes it illegal to “willfully hinder or prevent” an eligible voter from casting a ballot knowing such a voter to be eligible to vote.
Planning and Preparation
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office or school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding on-site access for immigration enforcement and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with your counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel promptly if any issues arise.
Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes jeopardize mail delivery or diminish public confidence
Summary
U.S. Postal Service policies establish special handling requirements that serve to prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, but those would require changes to current USPS policies, which would likely require leadership changes. The Postal Service’s unique governance structure provides some protection against hasty policy and leadership changes.
Discussion
People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, USPS plays a vital role in election administration. Mail voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.
Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could arise for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly.
Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an independent establishment of the executive branch, overseen by a bipartisan board of governors that is guided by statute and by its own bylaws. This means that the board — rather than a single, potentially partisan agency head acting alone — directs the Postal Service, reviews its practices and policies, and controls its expenditures. The governors have the power to appoint and remove the postmaster general, who is responsible for USPS’s operations. The postmaster general serves as USPS’s chief executive officer (“at the pleasure of the governors”), but decisions and statements on major policy positions and legislative proposals “having a major impact on USPS” are reserved for the board.
Election officials’ ability to prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays is largely limited to state and local election mail processes and procedures over which they have authority, such as including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes, providing alternative options like ballot drop boxes for returning voted ballots, and publicly communicating those options.
Planning and Preparation
- Familiarize yourself and your staff with USPS resources available for election officials.
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share important information, including design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume, and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
- Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
- If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
- Report any problems to org.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with colleagues and other election officials.
- Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications and on your website.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.
