The Virginia Election Interference Law Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI)critical infrastructure.

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Election Interference

• Code Ann. § 24.2–1000: Prohibits, whether by “bribery, intimidation, threats, coercion, or other means in violation of the election laws,” willfully and intentionally hindering or preventing, or attempting to hinder or prevent, an election official or employee of an election official from administering elections.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–1009: Prohibits stealing or “willfully, fraudulently, or wrongfully” tampering with any piece of voting or registration equipment, software, record, document, or part of any ballot container used in any way in the registration or election process.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–1005.2: Prohibits not permitting or refusing to permit a qualified voter from voting; and prohibits failing or refusing to tabulate, count, or report the vote of a qualified voter.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–604(A): Prohibits, during the times that polls are open and ballots are being counted and within one hour of a polling location opening or closing, hindering or delaying a qualified voter’s entry into or departure from a polling place; and prohibits possessing a firearm within 40 feet of “any building or part thereof used as a polling place” during those times.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–604(C): Prohibits any authorized representative permitted in the polling place pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–604.4, as well as any voter or other person in the room, from:
  • hindering or delaying a qualified voter;
  • giving, tendering, or exhibiting any ballot, ticket, or other campaign material to any person;
  • soliciting or in any manner attempting to influence any person in casting their vote;
  • hindering or delaying any election official;
  • being in a position to see the marked ballot of any other voter; or
  • otherwise impeding the orderly conduct of an election.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–605: Prohibits the use of a loudspeaker within 300 feet of a polling place on the day of an election.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–606: Allows election officials, with the consent of the chief county or city law enforcement official, to designate a law enforcement officer to “attend at the polling place and preserve order inside and outside the polling place.”
• Code Ann. § 24.2–1011: Prohibits any person from carrying an official ballot or copy of a ballot “beyond or away from the voting booth,” except to return it to election officials; and prohibits voting any ballot except one received from election officials.

Election Material Retention

Various Virginia laws, including Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–444 and the Virginia Public Records Act, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Library of Virgina maintains a complete list of election-related retention requirements, including schedules to assist state and local government agencies in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Election Observers

• Code Ann. § 24.2–604.5: Allows local electoral boards and general registrars to authorize neutral observers at polling locations.
• Code Ann. 24.2–604.4: Allows local political party chairs to designate certain individuals as election observers.

Emergency Powers

• Code Ann. § 24.2–603.1: In the event of a state of emergency, authorizes the governor to postpone an election by executive order in areas affected by the emergency to a date no more than 14 days from the original election date (notwithstanding the special election provisions of Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–682).

If a local governing body determines that a longer postponement is required, it may petition a three-judge panel of the Virginia Supreme Court, to include the chief justice as the presiding justice, for an extension. The court may postpone the election to a date no more than 30 days from the original election date (notwithstanding the provisions of Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–682).

• Code Ann. § 24.2–604.2: Authorizes an electoral board, subject to prior approval of the State Board of Elections, to modify the distance requirements for the prohibited area of a polling place (per Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–604) if an “emergency” (i.e., a state of emergency declared by the governor pursuant to Va. Code Ann. tit. 44, ch. 3.2 or declared by the president) is perceived as “increasing the risk of danger for persons outside the polling place.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Code Ann. § 18.2–433.2: Prohibits teaching or demonstrating the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death with the knowledge or intention that such training will be employed for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder.
• Code Ann. § 18.2–404: Prohibits unreasonably or unnecessarily obstructing the free passage of others to and from any public place or on any private property open to the public.
• Code Ann. § 18.2–405: Prohibits riots, defined as the unlawful use of force or violence that “seriously jeopardizes the public safety, peace, or order” by three or more persons acting together.
• Code Ann. § 18.2–406: Prohibits unlawful assembly, defined as the assembly of three or more persons when “assembled . . . to advance some lawful or unlawful purpose by the commission of an act or acts of unlawful force or violence likely to jeopardize seriously public safety, peace or order,” and when that assembly “actually tends to inspire persons of ordinary courage with well-grounded fear of serious and immediate breaches of public safety, peace or order.”
• Code Ann. § 18.2–410: Authorizes the governor to order law enforcement agencies, the National Guard, militias (as defined in Va. Code Ann. tit. 44, ch. 1), or other agencies of the Commonwealth or localities to preserve the peace if it appears to the governor that the sheriff or other officers of a locality are unable to suppress riots and preserve the peace.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• VA Code § 24.2–1005: Prohibits intimidating, threatening, coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other person into giving their vote or ballot, or for the purpose of deterring or preventing them from voting.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–607(A): Prohibits hindering, intimidating, or interfering with a voter in order to prevent them from casting a secret ballot; and allows election officials to order a person doing so to cease such action.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–607(B): Prohibits “noisy or riotous” conduct “at or about the polls so as to disturb” an election or “insult or abuse” an election official.
• Code Ann. § 18.2–174: Prohibits falsely acting as a local, city, county, state, or federal law enforcement officer; and prohibits falsely assuming or exercising the functions, powers, duties, or privileges of any such officer.
• Code Ann. § 24.2–1015: Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, intimidate, prevent, or hinder any Virginia citizen in the free exercise of any right or privilege secured by the provisions of Virginia’s Elections Code (Va. Code Ann. tit. 24.2), or for having exercised any such right or privilege.

Definitions

• See, e.g., Code Ann. § 24.2–101, Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1000, and Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–433.1.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia

The governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia serves as the chief executive officer of the state. Gov. Glenn Youngkin was elected in 2021 and is currently serving his first four-year term. Youngkin is ineligible to run for governor again in 2025, as Virginia’s constitution bars the chief executive from serving consecutive terms.

With respect to elections, the governor is charged with appointing the state commissioner of elections along with members of the State Board of Elections, all of whom are subject to confirmation by the General Assembly (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–102). Each year, the board submits an annual report to the governor and the General Assembly on the activities of the board and the Department of Elections in the previous year (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–103).

In accordance with Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–603.1, in the event of a state of emergency, “the governor may postpone an election by executive order in areas affected by the emergency” for up to 14 days (notwithstanding the special election provisions of Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–682). Such a state of emergency must be declared either by the president, by Virginia’s governor pursuant to the state’s Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 2000 (Va. Code Ann. tit. 44, ch. 3.2), or by the governor of another state pursuant to law and confirmed by the governor of Virginia in an executive order. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Gov. Ralph Northam exercised this power to postpone Virginia’s June 2020 primary elections for two weeks due to Virginia’s state of emergency and stay-at-home order.

The governor is the commander in chief of the armed forces of the Commonwealth (comprising the Virginia Army and Air National Guard and the Virginia Defense Force) and has the power “to embody such forces to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, and enforce the execution of the laws” (Va. Const. art. V, § 7).

Virginia Department of Elections

Commissioner of Elections

As head of the Department of Elections, the elections commissioner is the department’s principal administrative officer and is responsible for implementing Title 24.2, chapter 4 of the Virginia Code, which includes administering the National Voter Registration Act (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–404.1) and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–455). Governor Youngkin appointed Susan Beals as Virginia’s commissioner of elections in 2022.

State Board of Elections

The State Board of Elections is the regulatory board for the Virginia Department of Elections (Va. Code Ann. ch. 1, art. 2). The board consists of five members who are appointed by the governor and subject to confirmation by the General Assembly; board members must be qualified voters of the Commonwealth (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–102).

The board is tasked with supervising and coordinating the work of county and city electoral boards and registrars to ensure “uniformity in their practices and proceedings and legality and purity in all elections.” (The term registrar is generally synonymous with election official for the purposes of this handbook.) Among the board’s responsibilities are identifying and addressing risks to election integrity; making rules and regulations and otherwise assisting electoral boards and registrars in properly administering election laws; and establishing training standards and programs for election officials and ensuring that general registrars are certified (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–103).

Pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–234.1, the State Board of Elections may also institute proceedings to remove members of electoral boards or general registrars who fail to discharge their duties in accordance with the law. Such action requires a recorded majority vote of the board. Additionally, the board “may petition a circuit court or the Supreme Court, whichever is appropriate, for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or other available legal relief, for the purpose of ensuring that elections are conducted as provided by law” (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–103).

Electoral Boards and General Registrars

The Code of Virginia requires that each county and city have a three-member electoral board; that those members be appointed by the chief judge of the county or city’s judicial circuit or that judge’s designee; and that they be qualified voters of that county or city (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–106). Each electoral board must appoint a general registrar for its city or county along with election officers for each precinct to serve in all elections, including town elections (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–109). In Virginia, a general registrar functions as the director of elections for the locality in which they serve and is responsible for all aspects of voter registration (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–101).

Local electoral boards and registrars are required to provide information requested by the State Board of Elections, to follow all elections laws, and to adhere to State Board of Elections rules and regulations as long as they do not conflict with Virginia or federal law (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–103). Pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–234.1, local electoral boards may institute proceedings to remove any election official or general registrar “who fails to discharge the duties of his office according to law. Such actions require a recorded majority vote of the board instituting the proceedings (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–109).

Virginia National Guard

Major General James W. Ring serves as the adjutant general of the Virginia Department of Military Affairs (Va. Code Ann. § 44–11), which oversees the Virginia Army National Guard, the Virginia Air National Guard, and the Virginia Defense Force. The adjutant general serves “at the pleasure of the Governor for a term coincident with that of the Governor” (Va. Code Ann. § 44–11). Governor Youngkin appointed Major General Ring in March 2023.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., activated for federal service under Title 10 authority, or federalized), national guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command runs from the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary of defense to the commander of the combatant command.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, ballot drop-off locations, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations, reviewing the applicable federal and state laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

Virginia state law and federal law protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, state law may require federal officials to be unarmed when they vote in person.

Discussion

Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–604(A) prohibits knowingly possessing a firearm within 40 feet of “any building, or part thereof, used as a polling place” while the polls are open and ballots are being counted or within one hour of a polling site opening or closing. But this prohibition does not apply to any law enforcement officer or a licensed security guard “whose employment or performance of his duties occurs within 40 feet of any building, or part thereof, used as a polling place” (Va. Code Ann. §24.2–604(F)). The Virginia Code’s definition of law enforcement officer includes any state, county, and municipal law enforcement official and certain employees of “private police department[s]” (Va. Code Ann. § 9.1–101). Federal law enforcement officers are not included in the definition and therefore may not qualify for this exemption.

Federal law also restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” At the same time, federal law provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

Planning and Preparation

• Review policies that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
• Update policies as necessary with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute these policies.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. State restrictions on election observers may not apply.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states.

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation between government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including the Missouri secretary of state and the Texas attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office.” The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1) grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, it has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and emphasized that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to the confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on Committee on House Administration letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies the conditions under which state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when they have “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law.”

Federal restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–604(C) prohibits any person inside a polling place from hindering a voter, giving or exhibiting any campaign material, attempting to influence a person’s vote, being in a position to see how a voter marks their ballot, or impeding the orderly conduct of an election. And Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1000 prohibits hindering or preventing “an election official or the employee of an election official from administering elections.”

Planning and Preparation

• Review relevant federal laws on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers.
• Speak with other local election officials across the country who have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies and communicate them with your staff.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about election observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel from across the country.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location while conducting official business

Summary

Depending on the location of an in-person voting site, federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites at federal locations — that is, located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations.

Discussion

If an in-person voting location is located on federal land or in a federal building, federal officials may appear frequently in the vicinity in the course of conducting routine business. Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–604(A) prohibits knowingly possessing a firearm . . . within 40 feet “of any building, or part thereof, used as a polling place” while the polls are open and ballots are being counted or within one hour of the polling place opening or closing.

However, this prohibition does not apply to any law enforcement officer or licensed security guard “whose employment or performance of his duties occurs within 40 feet of any building, or part thereof, used as a polling place” (Va. Code Ann. §24.2–604(F)). Federal law enforcement officers are not included in Va. Code Ann. § 9.1–101’s definition of law enforcement officer and therefore may not qualify for this exemption.

If an in-person voting location is located within a federal building, additional jurisdictional issues may arise. In these circumstances, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation

• Review in-person voting sites to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
• Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
• If there are polling locations where the concerns outlined above may arise, here is a guide working with law enforcement to keep elections safe and secure.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents as necessary.
• Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
• Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop-off location on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building

Summary

Complex jurisdictional issues can also arise when ballot drop-off locations are on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings. In these situations too, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence than they would at other locations.

Discussion

Va. Code Ann. tit. 24.2, ch. 7 authorizes voters to return their absentee ballots by mail or at a ballot drop-off location. Local election officials determine the number and locations of absentee ballot drop-off locations (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–707.1). General registrars are required to maintain drop-off locations at the general registrar’s office, at any satellite offices in the locality, and at each polling place on Election Day. Access considerations may result in an election official deciding to locate a ballot drop-off location on or adjacent to federal property or in a federal building.

If an absentee ballot drop-off location is in a federal facility, then 18 U.S.C. § 930(a)’s prohibition on carrying firearms typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while engaged in“the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation

• Review your jurisdiction’s absentee ballot drop-off location list to determine whether any are on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building.
• Discuss siting decisions that result in a ballot drop-off location being located at a federal location with your counsel. Consider informing voters that certain locations are on federal property or in a federally owned facility.
• Once the locations have been confirmed, meet with relevant federal facilities managers or other relevant federal officials to discuss potential issues and agree on rules and procedures that will apply.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop-off location not on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building

Summary

Prohibitions against carrying weapons at or near polling locations may apply to ballot drop-off locations. Local restrictions against carrying weapons may also apply. However, these prohibitions may not apply to certain federal officials.

Discussion

Ballot drop-off locations are often inside or in the vicinity of polling places, many of which are located in and adjacent to public schools, public libraries, and other public buildings used as polling locations. Thus, various prohibitions on carrying guns in the vicinity of polling locations, near where voting is taking place, and in government buildings would apply to federal officials carrying firearms near ballot drop-off locations so located — unless they qualify for an exemption. For instance, Loudoun County Ordinance 684.04 prohibits carrying firearms on county property, but that prohibition does not apply to “active duty military personnel acting within the scope of their official duties” or to “sworn law enforcement personnel” (which the ordinance does not define).

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to ballot drop-off locations.
• Consider posting signage regarding weapon prohibitions at in-person voting locations, especially those with adjacent ballot drop-off locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near ballot drop-off locations.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office

Summary

Local election officials have a duty to preserve order at their offices and may remove individuals who disturb the voter registration process. If an election office is located in a state government building, then state law (including prohibitions against carrying weapons in state government buildings) and local restrictions (which may include local prohibitions against carrying weapons in local government buildings) apply. However, certain federal officials may qualify for an exemption to local weapon ordinances.

Discussion

The general registrar’s office is the “principal office for voter registration” (Va. Code Ann. 24.2–411), and local election officials are required to “preserve order at and in the vicinity of the place of registration” (Va. Code Ann. 24.2–114). For purposes of maintaining the peace, Virginia law allows local election officials to “exclude from the place of registration persons whose presence disturbs the registration process.” A registrar may appoint up to three “special officers . . . for a place of registration and may summon persons in the vicinity to assist whenever, in [the registrar’s] judgment, it is necessary to preserve order” (Va. Code Ann. 24.2–114).

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–283.2 prohibits carrying a firearm within any building owned or leased by the Commonwealth or any state agency, or in any office where employees of the Commonwealth or any state agency are regularly present for the purpose of performing their official duties. However, law enforcement officers are exempt from this prohibition while conducting official duties (Va. Code Ann. §18.2–283.2(D)). Federal law enforcement officers are not included in the Virginia Code’s definition of law enforcement officer (Va. Code Ann. § 9.1–101) and therefore may not qualify for this exemption.

Local ordinances may prohibit federal officials who are armed from entering an election office located in a local government building. Va. Code Ann. § 15.2–915(E) allows localities to pass an ordinance that “prohibits the possession, carrying, or transportation of any firearms, ammunition, or components or combination thereof . . . in any building, or part thereof, owned or used by such locality, or by any authority or local governmental entity created or controlled by the locality, for governmental purposes.” Loudoun County, for instance, prohibits possessing a firearm in any county-owned building (Loudoun County Ordinance 684.04). However, this prohibition does not apply to “sworn law enforcement personnel,” which the ordinance does not define (Loudoun County Ordinance 684.04(d)(1)).

Other state laws may restrict federal officials’ access to election offices if they attempt to interfere with election administration. For example, Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1000 prohibits “willfully and intentionally” hindering or preventing (or attempting to hinder or prevent) an election official or the employee of an election official from administering elections by bribery, intimidation, threats or coercion.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to your office.
• Consider including the general registrar’s responsibility to keep the peace and authority to remove those who disturb the registration process on signage at your office.
• Consider including prohibitions on firearms and intimidation on signage at your office. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state law strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond to any issues that may arise.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. Virginia state law designates the circuit court clerk as the custodian of certain election materials— specifically ballots — that federal law requires election officials to safeguard (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–669). While federal law authorizes the states to make such designations, “if the state places such records in the custody of other officials, then the Department [of Justice] views interprets [the Civil Rights Act] as requiring that covered elections records “‘be retained either physically by election officials themselves, or under their direct administrative supervision,’” including when such records are handed over to legislators or other officials.

State and federal law may establish or limit conditions regarding the information that local Virginia election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” Some state and local entities are currently in discussions with the DOJ regarding the bounds of what data they are either obligated to or prohibited from providing. The department has filed at least one civil lawsuit against a local election official in California as well as a civil lawsuit against the California secretary of state.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. And Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1000 prohibits interfering with election officials administering an election.

Virginia state law also prohibits stealing or tampering with any piece of voting or registration equipment, software, record, document, or part of a ballot container used in any way in the registration or election process (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1009).

Planning and Preparation

• Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
• Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of this policy to uninvited law enforcement personnel who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Update any policies and protocols as necessary on the basis of these discussions with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters.
• Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only spaces can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
• If your office is presented with a request, subpoena, or other demand, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case: Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
• When appropriate, consult with the Virginia State Board of Elections and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other election officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location

Summary

Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the Army, Navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have under their] authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely prohibits federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates, threatens, or coerces (or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or anyone urging or aiding others in voting.

Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Virginia law contains a similar prohibition: Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1005(A) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing (or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) a person into voting or with the intent to deter or prevent a person from voting; Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1005(B) entitles any voter “who is intimidated, threatened, or coerced” by another person in violation of § 24.2–1005(A) to obtain relief. Additionally, Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–607(A) prohibits hindering, intimidating, or interfering with any qualified voter in order to prevent them from casting a secret ballot.

Planning and Preparation

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of troops or armed federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms and intimidation on signage posted at in-person voting locations, including ballot drop-off locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the abovementioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at in-person voting locations.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.

Scenario: Deployment of federal agents to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Virginia state law prohibits voter intimidation. As noted in the previous section, Va. Code Ann. § 24.2–1005 prohibits intimidating, threatening, coercing, deterring, or preventing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, coerce, deter, or prevent — a person from voting. The statute also creates a private right of action, allowing a voter whose rights are thus violated by another person to obtain relief.

Planning and Preparation

• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (office of mayor, school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their rights to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (schools, community centers, nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and applicability of those policies during the voting process.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

Summary

U.S. Postal Service policies establish special handling requirements that serve to prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only, or largely only, impact election mail are possible, but would require changes to current USPS policies (which would likely require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure provides some protection against hasty policy and leadership changes.

Discussion

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, USPS plays a vital role in election administration. While mail-in voting is central to that role, “election mail” also encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could arise for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Election officials’ ability to prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays is largely limited to state and local election mail processes and procedures over which they have authority, such as publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

USPS governance

Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by “single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency head[s],” USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch,” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). “Guided by statute and its bylaws, the [B]oard ‘directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.’” The Governors select the U.S. Postmaster General (PMG) and “have the power to remove the [PMG].” The PMG “serves as chief executive officer of USPS and is responsible for USPS operations. The postmaster general, as directed by the board, directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”

Current USPS election mail policies

“The Postal Service’s role is clear — [to] deliver the mail… USPS is responsible for processing, transporting and delivering the nation’s Election Mail safely, securely and on time.” The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which included explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Planning and Preparation

• Familiarize yourself and your staff with USPS resources available for election officials.
• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share important information, such as design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume, and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop-off locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report any issues or concerns to org.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with colleagues and other election officials.
• Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.