Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations. Nevertheless, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they may bring firearms into in-person voting locations. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
State law generally permits eligible individuals to carry firearms without a permit, so long as they do so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–125.1(2.1), 16–11–126(b), (g), 16–11–127). However, state law prohibits carrying firearms within 150 feet of a polling place when elections are being conducted (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127(b)(7), 21–2–413(i)). Additional provisions may apply at locations that may serve as polling sites. Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–127(b) prohibits carrying firearms in government buildings for persons who are not lawful weapons carriers, while Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–127.1(a)(3), (b) separately prohibits carrying weapons in school safety zones, including school buildings or grounds.
The firearms restrictions in Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127 and 16–11–127.1 are subject to exemptions listed in Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–130, which cover persons in the military service of Georgia or the United States, federal judges and certain former or retired federal judges, United States attorneys and assistant United States attorneys, and active or certain retired police officers of federal law enforcement agencies in Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127(f), 16–11–127.1(h), 16–11–130(a)(3), (12)–(13), (c)(2)(D)). The polling-place prohibition separately exempts “peace officers regularly employed by the federal, state, county, or municipal government [and] certified security guards” (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127(b)(7), 21–2–413(i)). The school-zone prohibition also separately exempts federal law enforcement officers and United States prosecuting attorneys acting in the performance of official duties or traveling to or from official duties, as well as participants in certain military or law enforcement training programs (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–127.1(c)(3)–(5)).
Although Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127 and 21–2–413 both address firearms near polling places, the exemptions are not identical. Section 16–11–127 preserves the broader exemptions in Section 16–11–130, while Section 21–2–413(i) expressly permits only regularly employed peace officers and certified security guards to carry firearms within that zone. Accordingly, there may be uncertainty about which exemptions apply when a person covered by § 16–11–130, such as military personnel, retired law enforcement, judge, or prosecutor, carries a firearm within 150 feet of a polling place.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2020, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to locations in 18 states, including Georgia, where monitors were sent to Fulton and Gwinnett Counties. In November 2024, the Department deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, once again including Georgia, where monitors were sent to Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, Gwinnett, and Macon-Bibb Counties. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary election
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation between state government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law permits poll managers to manage the number of persons allowed in the polling place to prevent confusion, congestion, and inconvenience to voters, but it does not authorize local election officials to admit more persons into the secured voting area than the law allows (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 21–2–413(h), 21–2–414(c)(2)). When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(2) prohibits using or threatening violence in a manner that would prevent a reasonable poll officer, election official, or poll watcher from performing their duties, or that actually prevents or materially interrupts or interferes with those duties. The same provision also prohibits willfully preventing — or attempting to prevent — a poll officer from holding a primary or election; willfully blocking — or attempting to block — the entrance of any polling place; and willfully tampering with any electors list, voter’s certificate, numbered list of voters, ballot box, voting machine, direct recording electronic equipment, electronic ballot marker, or tabulating machine (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(1), (3), (8)). More generally, Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–597 prohibits intentionally interfering with, hindering, delaying — or attempting to interfere with, hinder, or delay — another person in performing any act or duty authorized or required by the election law. Separately, Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–562(a)(2)–(3) prohibits materially altering or intentionally destroying lawful entries in election-related records or documents, or taking or removing election-related records or documents from lawful custody to prevent them from being used, inspected, or copied as required or permitted by law. And Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–583(1)–(3) prohibits willfully defacing, removing, or destroying required candidate notices before a primary or election, as well as willfully defacing, removing, or destroying instructional materials, penalty notices, instructional diagrams, or polling place supplies during a primary or election.
Moreover, Georgia law protects voters against intimidation. Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–567(a)(1), (b) prohibits using or threatening to use force and violence, or otherwise intimidating another person through a knowing and willful course of conduct that serves no legitimate purpose and places another person in reasonable fear for their safety or another person’s safety, to cause that person to vote or refrain from voting at any primary or election, or to vote or refrain from voting for or against any particular candidate or question submitted to electors. And Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(4) prohibits using or threatening violence in a manner that would prevent a reasonable elector from voting or that actually prevents an elector from voting. Additional provisions prohibit knowingly entering a voting compartment or voting machine booth while another elector is voting, or marking a ballot or registering a vote for another elector, except as authorized by law; knowingly interfering with an elector while they are marking a ballot or registering a vote; and knowingly trying to induce an elector to show how their ballot is marked (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568(a)(1)–(3)). Georgia law also prohibits intentionally observing an elector while they are casting a ballot in a way that would allow the observer to see who or what the elector is voting for (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568.1(a)–(b)). Also prohibited is using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, cameras, or cellular telephones, except as authorized by law, to photograph or record the face of an electronic ballot marker while a ballot is being voted or while an elector’s votes are displayed, or to photograph or record a voted ballot (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568.2(a)–(b)).
On top of these prohibitions, Georgia law imposes specific restrictions on poll watchers and absentee ballot monitors and observers. Poll watchers may not interfere with the conduct of an election and, while in the enclosed voting area, may not talk to voters, check electors lists, use photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, use cellular telephones, or participate in any form of campaigning (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–408(d)). Monitors and observers viewing absentee ballot processing or scanning may not interfere with the processing or scanning of ballots or with the conduct of the election; use or bring into the room photographic or electronic monitoring or recording devices, cellular telephones, or computers; campaign; endanger ballot secrecy or security; touch ballots or ballot containers; tally, tabulate, or estimate, or attempt to tally, tabulate, or estimate votes; or communicate ballot, vote, or selection information except to an election official who needs the information to perform official duties (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–386(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vii)).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them to your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Georgia election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” At the same time, although Georgia law makes registration records available for public inspection, it may prohibit disclosure of a voter’s Social Security number, driver’s license number, email address and day and month of birth (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–225(b)). Georgia’s Open Records Act imposes similar requirements, requiring agencies to redact specified personally identifiable information before disclosing public records, including Social Security numbers, personal email addresses, cellular telephone numbers, and day and month of birth (Ga. Code Ann. § 50–18–72(a)(20)). State law further prohibits unauthorized disclosure of voter registration information that is confidential or exempt from public inspection (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–561).
In July 2025, the Department of Justice requested Georgia’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive voter data. After Georgia refused to provide its complete list to the DOJ in response, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. Litigation is ongoing — check with your counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.
Additionally, in January 2026, the FBI executed a search warrant at the Office of the Clerk of Court, located at the Fulton County Election Hub and Operation Center, for records related to the 2020 election. A judge has denied the County’s motion to return the seized records.
In a separate demand involving Fulton County, a federal prosecutor issued a grand jury subpoena in April 2026 demanding the identities of every person who served as an election worker in the county during the 2020 presidential election. A judge has granted the county’s motion to quash the subpoena.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. And the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Georgia law also imposes requirements governing the custody and handling of and access to election materials and equipment.
Before an election, State Election Board regulations require voting system components — including electronic ballot markers, ballot scanners, electronic pollbooks, and election management systems — to be stored, maintained, secured, and transported in accordance with specified security requirements, including controlled access to storage spaces, electronic surveillance or protection measures, secure transport, protection from unauthorized access after delivery to polling places, and numbered seals on electronic ballot markers and ballot scanners in storage (Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 183–1–12-.04(1)–(6)).
During voting, Georgia law limits access to ballots and voting equipment. Polling places must be arranged to protect voter privacy and, where practicable, must include a guardrail or barrier so that only persons inside the enclosed voting area can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments, booths, or voting machines (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–267(a)). State law also restricts who may be present within the enclosed area at a polling place, and, from the time the polling place opens until ballots are delivered to the superintendent, ballots must remain in the custody of at least two poll officers at all times (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–413(f), (h)). For absentee voting, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk must safely keep all absentee ballots received prior to the close of polls unopened and stored in a manner that prevents tampering and unauthorized access; document authorized access to such ballots; and securely store accepted absentee ballots in sealed containers or access-controlled rooms (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–386(a)(1)(A)–(B)).
Once the polls close, in elections using optical scanners, the seal on each ballot container must be inspected and certified as unbroken before the container is opened at the tabulating center, ballots from each polling place must be plainly identified and may not be commingled, and only persons deputized by the superintendent may touch ballots, containers, papers, or machines used in the count or enter the designated counting area, although proceedings must remain open to public view (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–483(a)–(c)).
After the election, Georgia law requires the preservation and secure custody of election records and materials. For elections other than municipal elections, immediately upon completing the required returns, the election superintendent must deliver used and void ballots, ballot stubs, poll officer oaths, numbered lists of voters, tally papers, voting machine paper proof sheets, return sheets, voting machine ballot labels, ballot tabulation programming materials, and related electronic records in sealed containers to the superior court clerk or another designated records custodian, who must hold those materials under seal for at least 24 months unless otherwise directed by the superior court (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–500(a)). Additional court orders, subpoenas, or litigation holds may require election records or materials to be preserved for longer. For Open Records Act requests seeking higher-resolution ballot images made after final certification, the election superintendent must produce scans of the requested ballots and, for that purpose, may access sealed ballots maintained by the superior court clerk or another records custodian without obtaining a court order — provided that the ballots are returned immediately after scanning (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–493(j.1)–(j.2)).
In addition, Georgia law restricts interference with election records, ballots, voting equipment, and other election materials. For example, state law prohibits willfully inserting or permitting the insertion of any fictitious name, false figure, false statement, or other fraudulent entry in election-related records or documents; materially altering or intentionally destroying lawful entries in such records or documents; or taking or removing election-related records or documents from lawful custody to prevent them from being used, inspected, or copied as required or permitted by law (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–562(a)(1)–(3)). Georgia law also prohibits possessing official ballots outside a polling place without authorization, willfully destroying or defacing ballots, willfully delaying ballot delivery, removing ballots from official ballot books except as authorized, or prying into ballots before they are deposited in the ballot box to discover how they were marked (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 21–2–574, 21–2–576, 21–2–577, 21–2–578).
Georgia law further prohibits possessing voting machine keys without authorization or tampering with, damaging, unlawfully opening, improperly preparing, altering without approval, or preventing the correct operation of voting machines, electronic ballot markers, tabulating machines, or related voting equipment (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 21–2–566(8), 21–2–580(1)–(3), 21–2–581, 21–2–582, 21–2–582.1(a)–(b)). And Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–587(4)–(8) prohibits poll officers from willfully making false entries in an electors lists; destroying or altering ballots, voter’s certificates, or electors lists; tampering with voting machines, electronic ballot markers, or tabulating machines or devices; preparing or filing false voter’s certificates; or failing to return required keys, ballot boxes, return sheets, tally papers, oaths, affidavits, voter records, ballots, memory cards, or other required election papers or records after a primary or election.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. As an example of state law, Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(2) prohibits using or threatening violence in a manner that would prevent a reasonable poll officer, election official, or poll watcher from performing their duties, or that actually prevents, materially interrupts, or improperly and materially interferes with those duties.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, or election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult with the Georgia Association of Voter Registration and Election Officials, the Elections Division of the Georgia secretary of state’s office, the Georgia State Election Board, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
State law generally permits eligible individuals to carry firearms without a permit, so long as they do so in a manner not otherwise prohibited by law (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–125.1(2.1), 16–11–126(b), (g), 16–11–127). However, state law prohibits carrying firearms within 150 feet of a polling place when elections are being conducted (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127(b)(7), 21–2–413(i)). Additional provisions may apply at locations that may serve as polling sites. Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–127(b) prohibits carrying firearms in government buildings for persons who are not lawful weapons carriers, while Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–127.1(a)(3), (b) separately prohibits carrying weapons in school safety zones, including school buildings or grounds.
The firearms restrictions in Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127 and 16–11–127.1 are subject to exemptions listed in Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–130, which cover persons in the military service of Georgia or the United States, federal judges and certain former or retired federal judges, United States attorneys and assistant United States attorneys, and active or certain retired police officers of federal law enforcement agencies in Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127(f), 16–11–127.1(h), 16–11–130(a)(3), (12)–(13), (c)(2)(D)). The polling-place prohibition separately exempts “peace officers regularly employed by the federal, state, county, or municipal government [and] certified security guards” (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127(b)(7), 21–2–413(i)). The school-zone prohibition also separately exempts federal law enforcement officers and United States prosecuting attorneys acting in the performance of official duties or traveling to or from official duties, as well as participants in certain military or law enforcement training programs (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–127.1(c)(3)–(5)).
Although Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16–11–127 and 21–2–413 both address firearms near polling places, the exemptions are not identical. Section 16–11–127 preserves the broader exemptions in Section 16–11–130, while Section 21–2–413(i) expressly permits only regularly employed peace officers and certified security guards to carry firearms within that zone. Accordingly, there may be uncertainty about which exemptions apply when a person covered by § 16–11–130, such as military personnel, retired law enforcement, judge, or prosecutor, carries a firearm within 150 feet of a polling place.
Beyond these location-specific firearm restrictions, Georgia law prohibits attempting to commit a violent injury to another person or committing an act that places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–5–20(a)). A separate provision prohibits assaulting another person with intent to murder or with a deadly weapon (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–5–21(a)(1)–(2)). State law also prohibits intentionally and without legal justification pointing or aiming a gun or pistol at another person, whether loaded or unloaded (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–102), and threatening to commit a crime of violence intended to terrorize another person, cause evacuation of a building or place of assembly, cause “serious public inconvenience,” or in reckless disregard of those risks (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–37(b)). These provisions do not contain exemptions for federal officials or service members, and so may apply to their conduct that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Though Georgia law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it does prohibit certain conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–567(a)(1), (b) prohibits using or threatening to use force and violence, or otherwise intimidating another person through a knowing and willful course of conduct that serves no legitimate purpose and places another person in reasonable fear for their safety or another person’s safety, to cause that person to vote or refrain from voting at any primary or election, or to vote or refrain from voting for or against any particular candidate or question submitted to electors. And Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(4) prohibits using or threatening violence in a manner that would prevent a reasonable elector from voting or that actually prevents an elector from voting. Additional provisions prohibit knowingly entering a voting compartment or voting machine booth while another elector is voting, or marking a ballot or registering a vote for another elector, except as authorized by law; knowingly interfering with an elector while they are marking a ballot or registering a vote; and knowingly trying to induce an elector to show how their ballot is marked (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568(a)(1)–(3)). Georgia law also prohibits intentionally observing an elector while they are casting a ballot in a way that would allow the observer to see who or what the elector is voting for (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568.1(a)–(b)). Also prohibited is using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, cameras, or cellular telephones, except as authorized by law, to photograph or record the face of an electronic ballot marker while a ballot is being voted or while an elector’s votes are displayed, or to photograph or record a voted ballot (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568.2(a)–(b)).
Additionally, Georgia law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(2) prohibits using or threatening violence in a manner that would prevent a reasonable poll officer, election official, or poll watcher from performing their duties, or that actually prevents or materially interrupts or interferes with those duties. The same provision also prohibits willfully preventing — or attempting to prevent — a poll officer from holding a primary or election; willfully blocking — or attempting to block — the entrance of any polling place; and willfully tampering with any electors list, voter’s certificate, numbered list of voters, ballot box, voting machine, direct recording electronic equipment, electronic ballot marker, or tabulating machine (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(1), (3), (8)). More generally, Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–597 prohibits intentionally interfering with, hindering, delaying — or attempting to interfere with, hinder, or delay — another person in performing any act or duty authorized or required by the election law. Separately, Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–562(a)(2)–(3) prohibits materially altering or intentionally destroying lawful entries in election-related records or documents, or taking or removing election-related records or documents from lawful custody to prevent them from being used, inspected, or copied as required or permitted by law. And Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–583(1)–(3) prohibits willfully defacing, removing, or destroying required candidate notices before a primary or election, as well as willfully defacing, removing, or destroying instructional materials, penalty notices, instructional diagrams, or polling place supplies during a primary or election.
Finally, state law identifies circumstances in which election officials and law enforcement may act to preserve order and prevent disruption at polling places. The chief manager must secure compliance with polling-place rules, keep order in the polling place, and ensure that only authorized persons are admitted within the voting areas, including “peace officers when necessary for the preservation of order” (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–413(f), (h)). Poll managers may manage the number of persons allowed in a polling place to prevent confusion, congestion, and inconvenience to voters, although that authority does not extend to credentialed poll watchers, poll workers, or law enforcement officers (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–414(c)(2)). Law enforcement officers also must clear obstructed entrances to polling places and maintain order or quell disturbances when called on to do so by a poll officer or elector, and may not willfully hinder or delay poll officers in performing their duties (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–593). Separately, Ga. Code Ann. § 15–16–10(a)(3) requires the sheriff, either personally or through a deputy, to attend the place or places within their jurisdiction where an election is being held during the hours that polls are open, and to take subordinate officers present under their charge as police to preserve order.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to voting locations.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Georgia law prohibits attempting to commit a violent injury to another person or committing an act that places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–5–20(a)). A separate provision prohibits assaulting another person with intent to murder or with a deadly weapon (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–5–21(a)(1)–(2)). State law also prohibits intentionally and without legal justification pointing or aiming a gun or pistol at another person, whether loaded or unloaded (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–102), and threatening to commit a crime of violence intended to terrorize another person, cause evacuation of a building or place of assembly, cause “serious public inconvenience,” or in reckless disregard of those risks (Ga. Code Ann. § 16–11–37(b)). These provisions do not contain exemptions for federal officials or service members, and so may apply to their conduct that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
Though Georgia law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it does prohibit certain conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–567(a)(1), (b) prohibits using or threatening to use force and violence, or otherwise intimidating another person through a knowing and willful course of conduct that serves no legitimate purpose and places another person in reasonable fear for their safety or another person’s safety, to cause that person to vote or refrain from voting at any primary or election, or to vote or refrain from voting for or against any particular candidate or question submitted to electors. And Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–566(4) prohibits using or threatening violence in a manner that would prevent a reasonable elector from voting or that actually prevents an elector from voting. Additional provisions prohibit knowingly entering a voting compartment or voting machine booth while another elector is voting, or marking a ballot or registering a vote for another elector, except as authorized by law; knowingly interfering with an elector while they are marking a ballot or registering a vote; and knowingly trying to induce an elector to show how their ballot is marked (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568(a)(1)–(3)). Georgia law also prohibits intentionally observing an elector while they are casting a ballot in a way that would allow the observer to see who or what the elector is voting for (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568.1(a)–(b)). Also prohibited is using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, cameras, or cellular telephones, except as authorized by law, to photograph or record the face of an electronic ballot marker while a ballot is being voted or while an elector’s votes are displayed, or to photograph or record a voted ballot (Ga. Code Ann. § 21–2–568.2(a)–(b)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible and publicly communicating how voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review your office’s policies for handling election mail and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.