Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
Kentucky law generally permits a person age 21 or older to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a license so long as that person is eligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law (Ky. Const. § 1; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 237.109, 527.020(4)). It otherwise prohibits carrying a concealed firearm (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020(1), (10)). However, “peace officers” may carry concealed weapons in Kentucky in certain situations. Peace officers may carry concealed weapons when necessary for their protection in the discharge of their official duties (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020(2)). Retired peace officers who hold the required concealed-carry licenses may carry concealed weapons throughout Kentucky, subject to the statute’s detention facility limitation (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020(5)). Full-time, paid peace officers of a government agency from another state or territory may also carry concealed weapons in Kentucky, whether on or off duty, subject to reciprocity (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020(7)). The statute does not define “peace officer,” but state law defines the term to include a range of state and local officials and “other persons with similar authority to make arrests” (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.010(31)). Therefore, federal law enforcement officials may qualify as peace officers who are exempt from Kentucky’s prohibition against carrying concealed firearms.
Additionally, Kentucky law generally prohibits firearm possession in public or private elementary or secondary schools and on school grounds, which may serve as polling sites (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.070(1)). The statute exempts “persons employed by the Armed Forces of the United States or members of the National Guard or militia when required in the discharge of their official duties to carry arms or weapons” (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.070(3)(d)). It also exempts “any peace officer or police officer authorized to carry a concealed weapon” and “civil officers of the United States in the discharge of their official duties” (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.070(3)(c), (e)). This statute also does not define “peace officer,” but, as mentioned above, state law defines the term to include a range of state and local officials and “other persons with similar authority to make arrests” (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446.010(31)). Thus, federal law enforcement officials may qualify for the exemption.
Additionally, private business owners may prohibit persons, regardless of licensure, from carrying concealed deadly weapons on their premises, provided that they post signs on or about the premises (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 237.109(1); 237.110(17)). The provision contains no exemptions for law enforcement or service members. A business owner does not lose the ability to impose this restriction by allowing the premises to be used as a polling location.
Separately, Kentucky law authorizes certain postsecondary institutions and government units to restrict weapons on property they control. Colleges, universities, and other postsecondary education facilities may control the possession of deadly weapons on property they own or control, while specified state and local government units may prohibit or limit the carrying of concealed deadly weapons in portions of government buildings they own, lease, occupy, or control (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 237.115(1)–(2)). For example, the City of Louisville prohibits carrying a concealed deadly weapon into or on any portion of a building owned, leased, or controlled by the city government (Louisville, Ky., Code § 135.06(A)). The ordinance exempts Louisville Metro Police Department officers as well as “other law enforcement officers authorized to carry concealed deadly weapons” (Louisville, Ky., Code § 135.06(B)(2)). As such, federal law enforcement officials might qualify for exemptions from these restrictions, though military personnel might not.
In practice, if armed federal officials or military personnel appear at a polling location where the possession of a firearm is limited, several state law provisions may allow them to leave their firearms in a vehicle rather than bringing them into the polling place. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020(4) prohibits any public or private person or organization from prohibiting possession of a firearm, ammunition, or other deadly weapon in a vehicle, so long as the possession complies with applicable Kentucky carry laws, while Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.020(8) separately protects keeping a firearm or ammunition in a vehicle when the firearm is stored in an “enclosed container, compartment, or storage space installed as original equipment.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 237.106(1) likewise prohibits an owner, lessee, or occupant of real property from prohibiting a person who is legally entitled to possess a firearm from possessing a firearm, firearm part, ammunition, or ammunition component in a vehicle on the property. And Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.070(3)(a) exempts from Kentucky’s school property firearm prohibition an adult who is not a secondary school pupil and possesses a firearm contained within a vehicle, so long as the firearm is not removed from the vehicle or brandished while the vehicle is on school property.
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. For example, Kentucky’s protection for firearm possession in vehicles does not apply to real property owned, leased, or occupied by the U.S. government where possession or carrying of firearms is prohibited or controlled (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 237.106(5)(a)). Meanwhile, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility). However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- If an in-person voting site is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state-law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, it deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Kentucky, where monitors were sent to Jefferson and Kenton Counties. The DOJ announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, the department announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Kentucky law generally prohibits admitting anyone to a voting room while voting is underway except election officers, challengers, persons lawfully assisting voters, minor children accompanying voters, persons entering for the purpose of voting, persons authorized by election officers to keep order and enforce the law, and persons expressly approved by the county board of elections to repair or replace malfunctioning voting equipment or to provide additional voting equipment (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.235(1)).
When access has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. In 2026, the county attorney in Hennepin County, Minnesota, denied the DOJ’s request to send monitors. In response, the DOJ observers agreed to “remain outside a 100-foot boundary from the polling locations, in compliance with Minnesota law.” In Wyoming, after DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act, or COCOA (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). The act also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. As for state law, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.155(1)–(2) prohibits interfering with election officers in the discharge of their duties as well as obstructing or attempting to obstruct an election, while Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.255 prohibits intimidating or attempting to intimidate election officers, the State Board of Elections, or county election boards in the performance of their duties.
Kentucky law further prohibits knowingly and willfully removing or attempting to remove a ballot from the election room; taking or removing a ballot from a place where it may lawfully be; and, as an election officer or other person entrusted with custody or control of a ballot, marking, mutilating, defacing, or placing a distinguishing mark on the ballot for the purpose of invalidating it (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.195(1), (3)–(4)). State law also prohibits unlawfully destroying or attempting to destroy a ballot box or ballot; obtaining or attempting to obtain possession of a ballot box or ballot by force, fraud, or other improper means while voting is underway or before the ballots have been removed and counted; and removing, mutilating, destroying, or adding ballots to ballots that have been counted so as to change the election result in a precinct or county (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.195(5), (8)).
Additional provisions prohibit persons permitted inside the voting room from recording the identity of voters, subject to specified exceptions (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.236(2)); stealing or willfully destroying election supplies, removing or defacing voter instruction cards, or destroying or removing voting booths or other conveniences provided for an election (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.105(1)–(3)); possessing a voting machine key without authorization (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.115(1)); and tampering or attempting to tamper with, disarranging, defacing, impairing, injuring, or destroying ballots, electronic poll books, election administration information systems, voting machines, voting equipment, or voting systems, or tampering or attempting to tamper with the record of the vote (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.115(2)).
Moreover, Kentucky law protects voters against interference or intimidation. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.155(1) prohibits any individual from unlawfully preventing or attempting to prevent a voter from casting their ballot, or intimidating or attempting to intimidate a voter so as to prevent them from voting. Additional provisions prohibit anyone who assists another person in completing an absentee ballot or federal provisional absentee ballot from soliciting or encouraging that person to vote for or against any candidate, party, or issue (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.0865); and voters from speaking with others in the election room about their position on any candidate, party, or issue (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.235(4)).
On top of these prohibitions, Kentucky law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law. Challengers may not electioneer or campaign; handle official election materials except as allowed during training; attempt to intimidate or harass any voter being challenged or any precinct election officer; attempt to interfere with the proper conduct of the election; or behave in any manner that disrupts activities at the polling place (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.317). If, after being warned by a precinct election officer, a challenger continues to violate provisions governing challenger training, appointment, or conduct, the challenger must be ordered from the polling place and may not serve as a challenger in any precinct for five years (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.318(1)).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Kentucky election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available to citizens for inspection, it requires Social Security numbers to be redacted (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 116.095).
In August 2025, the Department of Justice requested Kentucky’s statewide voter registration list, including sensitive personal information. After Kentucky refused to provide its complete set of data, the DOJ sued the state. In July 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.155(1)–(2) prohibits interfering with election officers in the discharge of their duties as well as obstructing or attempting to obstruct an election, while Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.255 prohibits intimidating or attempting to intimidate election officers, the State Board of Elections, or county election boards in the performance of their duties. Kentucky law further prohibits knowingly and willfully removing or attempting to remove a ballot from the election room; taking or removing a ballot from a place where it may lawfully be; and, as an election officer or other person entrusted with custody or control of a ballot, marking, mutilating, defacing, or placing a distinguishing mark on the ballot for the purpose of invalidating it (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.195(1), (3)–(4)).
State law also prohibits unlawfully destroying or attempting to destroy a ballot box or ballot; obtaining or attempting to obtain possession of a ballot box or ballot by force, fraud, or other improper means while voting is underway or before the ballots have been removed and counted; and removing, mutilating, destroying, or adding ballots to ballots that have been counted so as to change the election result in a precinct or county (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.195(5), (8)). Additional provisions prohibit persons permitted inside the voting room from recording the identity of voters, subject to specified exceptions (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.236(2)); stealing or willfully destroying election supplies, removing or defacing voter instruction cards, or destroying or removing voting booths or other conveniences provided for an election (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.105(1)–(3)); possessing a voting machine key without authorization (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.115(1)); and tampering or attempting to tamper with, disarranging, defacing, impairing, injuring, or destroying ballots, electronic poll books, election administration information systems, voting machines, voting equipment, or voting systems, or tampering or attempting to tamper with the record of the vote (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.115(2)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Kentucky County Clerk’s Association, the Kentucky secretary of state’s office, the Kentucky State Board of Elections, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As explained above, Kentucky law generally permits a person age 21 or older to carry a firearm, whether openly or concealed, without a license so long as that person is eligible to possess a firearm under state or federal law (Ky. Const. § 1; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 237.109, 527.020(4)). Kentucky law does not, however, necessarily authorize firearm possession at every facility that may serve as a polling place. State law generally prohibits firearms in public or private elementary and secondary schools, although it expressly exempts, among others, certain peace or police officers, federal civil officers acting in the discharge of their official duties, and U.S. Armed Forces, National Guard, or militia personnel when required to carry weapons in the discharge of their official duties (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.070(1), (3)(c)–(e)). Postsecondary institutions may restrict the possession of deadly weapons on property they own or control, and specified state and local government units may prohibit or limit concealed weapons in government buildings (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 237.115(1)–(2)). Private businesses may also restrict concealed carry on their premises, regardless of licensure, provided that they post signs on or about the premises (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 237.109(1); 237.110(17)).
Beyond these location-specific firearms restrictions, Kentucky law prohibits menacing or intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.050(1)). State law also prohibits wantonly engaging in conduct, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.060(1)), and wantonly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial danger of physical injury to another person (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.070(1)). Kentucky law further prohibits intentionally threatening, by use of a firearm, any act likely to result in death or serious physical injury to any person with respect to a scheduled, publicly advertised event open to the public, a place of worship, school function, or workplace, or a gathering of three or more persons (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.078(1)(a)). None of these provisions contains an express exemption for federal officials or military personnel, so they might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Kentucky law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.155(1) prohibits any individual from unlawfully preventing or attempting to prevent a voter from casting their ballot, as well as intimidating or attempting to intimidate a voter so as to prevent them from voting. Additional provisions prohibit anyone who assists another person in completing an absentee ballot or federal provisional absentee ballot from soliciting or encouraging that person to vote for or against any candidate, party, or issue (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.0865); voters from speaking with others in the election room about their position on any candidate, party, or issue (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.235(4)); and anyone other than a duly appointed challenger from recording the identity of voters within the voting room (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.236(2)).
Kentucky law also targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.155(1)–(2) prohibits interfering with election officers in the discharge of their duties as well as obstructing or attempting to obstruct an election, while Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.255 prohibits intimidating or attempting to intimidate election officers, the State Board of Elections, or county election boards in the performance of their duties. Kentucky law further prohibits knowingly and willfully removing or attempting to remove a ballot from the election room; taking or removing a ballot from a place where it may lawfully be; and, as an election officer or other person entrusted with custody or control of a ballot, marking, mutilating, defacing, or placing a distinguishing mark on the ballot for the purpose of invalidating it (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.195(1), (3)–(4)).
State law further prohibits unlawfully destroying or attempting to destroy a ballot box or ballot; obtaining or attempting to obtain possession of a ballot box or ballot by force, fraud, or other improper means while voting is underway or before the ballots have been removed and counted; and removing, mutilating, destroying, or adding ballots to ballots that have been counted so as to change the election result in a precinct or county (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.195(5), (8)). Additional provisions prohibit stealing or willfully destroying election supplies, removing or defacing voter instruction cards, or destroying or removing voting booths or other conveniences provided for an election (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.105(1)–(3)); possessing a voting machine key without authorization (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.115(1)); and tampering or attempting to tamper with, disarranging, defacing, impairing, injuring, or destroying ballots, electronic poll books, election administration information systems, voting machines, voting equipment, or voting systems, or tampering or attempting to tamper with the record of the vote (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.115(2)).
Additionally, Kentucky law gives election officials and law enforcement officials authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.235(5) authorizes election officers, county clerks, deputy county clerks, and “any law enforcement official” to enforce the election laws and maintain law and order at the polls and within 100 feet of any entrance to a building in which voting is conducted, and to request the assistance of any law enforcement officer. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.237 authorizes a county election board, clerk, judge or executive, sheriff, fiscal court, attorney general, grand jury, or qualifying county political party chair to request that the Kentucky State Police patrol voting precincts while the polls are open to maintain order and enforce the election laws; permits candidates to petition those officials or bodies to make such a request; and requires the Kentucky State Police to investigate reported election law violations and report the results of those investigations to the appropriate commonwealth’s attorney and county attorney.
More broadly, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.125 requires sheriffs to cause elections to be held as required by law and to perform their other election-related duties. And Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.185 prohibits willfully disobeying any lawful command of election officers given in the execution of their duties. At the same time, the exercise of this authority might be constrained by Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 519.020(1), which prohibits intentionally obstructing, impairing, or hindering the performance of a governmental function by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical interference. Thus, where federal officials assert law enforcement authority at a polling place, election officials should be mindful that efforts to exercise their own authority to prevent election interference could potentially implicate this provision.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to an election facility.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access for those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Kentucky law prohibits menacing or intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.050(1)). State law also prohibits wantonly engaging in conduct, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.060(1)), and wantonly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial danger of physical injury to another person (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.070(1)). Kentucky law further prohibits intentionally threatening, by use of a firearm, any act likely to result in death or serious physical injury to any person with respect to a scheduled, publicly advertised event open to the public, a place of worship, school function, or workplace, or a gathering of three or more persons (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.078(1)(a)). None of these provisions contains an express exemption for federal officials or military personnel, so they might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.
While Kentucky law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.155(1)–(2) prohibits unlawfully preventing or attempting to prevent a voter from casting their ballot, intimidating or attempting to intimidate a voter so as to prevent them from voting, unlawfully interfering with an election officer in the discharge of their duties, or obstructing or attempting to obstruct the lawful holding of an election. And Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119.255 prohibits intimidating election officers, the State Board of Elections, and county boards of elections, including conspiracies to “go forth armed” to intimidate those officials.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Recent operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” under these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; reminding voters that absentee ballots may be hand-delivered to their county clerk or deposited in a ballot drop box or receptacle; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop boxes.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.