Roadmap to the Official Count in the 2026 Election

The results that you see on election night coverage are not final and official results. They are instead a combination of unofficial results reported by election officials and news organization projections. The full process for counting votes involves a series of steps that take place over the course of weeks. After these multiple checks ensure the accuracy of the results, the process ends when officials certify the election, as required by law.

Each of these steps has safeguards in place to protect the rights of voters and the integrity of our elections. They are conducted in public; representatives from both parties, citizens, and the media can observe that they are done properly. At each step, voters, candidates, and other interested parties can go to court to enforce these safeguards if needed.

This guide explains the key steps that election officials will go through to accurately determine and sign off on the final results of the election. The steps are generally explained in chronological order, but it is important to know that timelines vary by state and that many of these steps take place concurrently. And while our election systems have many safeguards to protect against fraud and disenfranchisement, this guide is specifically focused on the administrative steps that election officials take to ensure a secure and accurate vote count.

What happens: Through Election Day, registered voters will cast their ballots either at their polling place, by mail, or at drop-off locations. All in-person ballots must be cast by the time polls close on Election Day. Depending on the state, mail ballots must either be sent (postmarked) by Election Day or received before voting ends on Election Day. No voter can cast a ballot after Election Day ends.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: For both mail voting and in-person voting, election officials have developed contingency plans and security measures to ensure that technical failures and administrative errors do not prevent eligible voters from casting ballots.

Mail Voting

• If a voter requests a mail ballot but does not receive it by Election Day, states allow voters to cast a ballot in person instead. Election jurisdictions have different methods to ensure that the voter only casts one ballot. In some states, the voter must cast a provisional ballot at the polling place that is counted only after making sure that the voter never returned a mail ballot. In other states, the voter can cast a regular ballot at the polling place; if the voter returns a mail ballot afterward, election workers would cancel and not count that ballot.
• States have a number of measures that protect against malfeasance through tampering or impersonation. These include in-person or video surveillance of ballot drop-off locations, requirements for bipartisan or two-person teams to pick up and transport ballots, chain-of-custody records that track movement and access to ballots, verification of mail applications and ballots, individualized ballot envelopes, and ballot tracking.
• In many states, election workers must notify voters if there are any errors on their mail ballot envelopes and give voters an opportunity to correct these mistakes.

In-Person Voting

• Through a series of processes known collectively as Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Testing, election officials test voting equipment used for tabulation to uncover any issues and ensure that votes will be accurately counted. At least 47 states conduct pre-election L&A testing on every machine used in an election, and all states require testing on at least some of their voting equipment. Nearly every state conducts some or all of these tests in public.
• If a voter’s eligibility cannot be determined due to an administrative error, technical failure, or other reasons, federal law requires states to offer the voter a provisional ballot (or a suitable alternative, such as same-day registration), which can be counted once the election official is able to verify the voter’s eligibility.
• Beyond provisional ballots, most polling places also have backup paper materials that can be used if voting machines or electronic pollbooks malfunction. These measures ensure that equipment issues will not prevent eligible voters from casting their ballots.

What happens: Ballots that are returned by mail or dropped off at a designated location must be processed by an election worker before the ballot can be counted. While this procedure varies by state, processing generally involves confirming the identity and authenticity of the voter, verifying the voter’s information to confirm that they are registered and eligible to vote, and checking the signature on the ballot envelope against a signature on file. Once the information is verified, the ballot is removed from the envelope (and, if applicable, from the secrecy sleeve) and sorted to be tabulated. These extra steps to protect the integrity of mail voting help explain why mail ballots typically take longer to count than in-person ballots.

Processing timelines vary by state. Most states, including Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, and Nevada, allow election officials to begin processing mail ballots upon receipt or on a designated date before Election Day. This is often referred to as “pre-processing.” Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are two of just six states that do not allow election officials to begin processing until Election Day. States that do not begin processing mail ballots prior to Election Day are generally slower to release unofficial results than other states.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: Many states have procedures to ensure that ballots are not automatically rejected if there is a mistake discovered during processing. At least 25 states — including Georgia and Nevada — require election officials to notify voters about issues with their mail ballot (such as failing to sign the secrecy envelope) and to give voters an opportunity to “cure,” or fix, the error after Election Day. In some other states, election officials provide notice and an opportunity to cure if the issue can be resolved before Election Day.

What happens: Through tabulation, individual votes are totaled. Ballots cast at a polling place are typically tabulated using scanning machines located onsite at the polling place. In the small number of jurisdictions that still use direct recording electronic (DRE) machines, votes are tabulated directly on the machines that voters use to make their selections. Each voting machine generates a “results tape” (which frequently resembles a cash register receipt). While the process varies by state (or even by jurisdiction), poll workers generally calculate the total votes on election night by summing the totals for each candidate and ballot measure from the individual tapes at each polling site.

After processing, election workers typically tabulate mail ballots for the entire jurisdiction at the local election office or other central location. In some jurisdictions, poll workers tabulate mail ballots at polling places instead. Most states (including Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, and North Carolina) allow election workers to begin inserting mail ballots into scanners early as long as results are not released before Election Day. Others prohibit scanning until Election Day.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count:

• Nearly all — about 98 percent — of the votes cast this year will have a paper record. This paper record is most often the ballot itself that has been hand-marked by a voter, but it may instead be a paper printout that shows a voter’s choices after they have been selected on a voting machine. If election officials have reason to believe that there is an error with the software vote totals produced by scanners, these paper records can be used to verify the accuracy of the tabulation process.
• Poll workers must complete a number of steps before closing and leaving each polling location. The individual processes will vary based on factors such as the equipment used, but they generally include printing a results tape from each tabulating machine before the polls open to ensure and document that there are zero votes stored on the machine (often called “zero tapes”) and resolving or, at minimum, documenting the cause for any minor discrepancies in
  • the number of voters checked in;
  • the total number of votes cast;
  • the total number of paper ballots at the opening of the polls; and
  • the total number of remaining paper ballots and spoiled ballots.
• Poll workers typically must sign these documents and affirm their accuracy. All forms, worksheets, and other paperwork that poll workers complete are public documents available for review. Election officials thoroughly review the documents during the canvass process.
• Poll-closing procedures generally require election workers to print two copies of the results tape from scanners. Poll workers often must sign the tapes to ensure their legitimacy.
• Most states allow representatives of campaigns and both major political parties to observe polling place closure and tabulation procedures. Many election officials set up cameras and live feeds as additional transparency measures.
• All ballots and records are sealed in secure containers and documented to maintain a clear chain of custody as materials are transported from polling places to the central election office.

What happens: Also referred to as election night reporting, unofficial results reporting presents the first opportunity for the general public to see vote totals. At this step, election officials transfer vote totals from individual polling places to a central office by phone, electronically, or by transporting a memory device. These totals, along with mail ballot totals, are then aggregated and posted on local and state election websites. Election officials generally post unofficial results beginning on election night and continue updating the totals until all votes are tabulated and aggregated.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: The election websites with unofficial results are not connected to the machines used for tabulation. Instead, election workers separately report results from polling places to local election offices, and then to state election offices, often using multiple methods — for example, by calling in results and transporting a physical memory card with vote totals. That way, if there is an error with one reporting method, officials can fall back on the secondary one for unofficial results.

Most importantly, unofficial results are just that: unofficial. While many people have lamented the lack of election results on election night in recent years, the fact is that results reported by election officials on election night are never complete and final. As outlined below, there are always ballots left to count after election night and additional processes to go through before certifying the official numbers. If a technical failure involving a state or local website interrupts unofficial results reporting or if the reported results are erroneous, there is an opportunity for election officials to verify the accuracy of all vote totals before the results are final. Some of the sources that can be used to check and confirm election night reporting data include the following:

• Paper copies of results posted at polling locations during the closing process.
• Poll materials and results that are delivered to the local election office on election night.
• Records of aggregated results that local election officials keep before reporting to the state to be posted on election reporting websites.
• Outside sources such as the Associated Press, which hires thousands of reporters stationed at polling places and election offices across the country to call in vote totals as they come in. These totals are reported to data entry clerks, who aggregate the individual reports, compare these totals to information reported on state and local websites, inquire about irregularities, and question any results that appear erroneous (this work is aided by abundant information about each jurisdiction’s demographics, polling, mail voting trends, and voting history).

And of course, for nearly all votes, there is a paper record of each vote that officials can check if needed.

What happens: When voters cast provisional ballots, their ballots are placed in an envelope with their information and a signed affirmation that they are eligible to vote. These ballots are kept separate from regular ballots. In the days following Election Day, election officials examine the information on the envelope or affirmation form and review every provisional voter’s eligibility to determine whether the ballot can be counted. Because of this adjudication process, provisional ballots cast by eligible voters are almost always counted after Election Day and are typically among the last ballots counted.

Provisional ballots are given to voters on Election Day (or during early voting) when there is some uncertainty about whether the voter is eligible to cast a regular ballot and further review is required. Typically, this is because the voter does not have the right identification, the voter is at the wrong polling place, the pollbook does not show that the voter is registered, or there is an administrative error in the pollbook.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count:

• For voters who cast provisional ballots because they had already requested a mail ballot, provisional ballots are counted as soon as election officials determine that the voter did not also return their mail ballot.
• Likewise, provisional ballots from voters whose registration status is uncertain are counted as soon as the election official can verify the voter’s registration.
• In other cases, such as when a voter does not have the right identification, the voter is typically given additional time to show ID or swear an affidavit before the ballot is rejected.
• In all cases, federal law requires election officials to establish a resource for provisional voters to determine whether their ballot was counted, and if not, the reason for rejection.

What happens: At least 25 states have a postelection cure process in which voters who cast mail ballots can fix certain errors (such as a missing or mismatched signature, depending on the state) after Election Day. The time that voters have to cure errors varies by state, but it can be as much as two or three weeks.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: Cure processes help ensure that eligible voters do not have their ballots rejected for technical reasons.

What happens: In the weeks following Election Day, local election officials from a given county or municipality meet to determine an official count. This step is called the canvass. As the Election Assistance Commission states, “The purpose of the canvass is to account for every ballot cast and ensure that the official results include each valid vote.” This step is where election officials review tabulation totals along with the documentation from polling places on the number of votes cast, number of voters checked in, number of ballots remaining, and other key information. Election officials can then compare these numbers to resolve (or explain) any minor discrepancies in vote totals.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: The canvass process provides an opportunity to discover and address any issues that come about on Election Day or during the initial reporting of unofficial results. To promote transparency during the process, canvass meetings are generally open for public observation. Representatives of both major political parties typically observe the canvass. And some officials livestream these proceedings online.

Some states also log and publish all changes made to the unofficial vote totals after election night. The reasons for the changes are reported along with additional comments, such as “caught during canvass.” Most often, the changes correct simple human errors, such as mathematical mistakes, reporting the wrong precinct, or reporting incomplete results. These mistakes are easily identified and corrected when reviewing all documents and reports in context.

What happens: States conduct routine postelection audits in which election officials automatically check a sample of paper ballots — regardless of whether problems are suspected — to ensure the accuracy of software vote totals. These audits often occur concurrently as part of the canvass process. While most states require a postelection audit in some form, some states, including Georgia and Pennsylvania, will conduct “risk-limiting audits,” which use statistical analyses to determine how many ballots must be hand-counted in order to produce a high level of confidence that the paper ballots and software tallies show the same winner. These audits are considered the “gold standard” by security experts.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: In addition to pre-election logic and accuracy testing, postelection audits are one of the primary measures to ensure that software vote totals are accurate and reliable. Whereas L&A testing ensures that the tabulators are working properly before an election, postelection audits confirm that the voting machines accurately tabulated ballots cast during the election. As with logic and accuracy testing, many states allow political parties or members of the public to observe postelection audits.

What happens: Results may be subject to a recount during or after the canvass. If the recount discovers a discrepancy, election officials may update the results and, in some states, recertify the final numbers. Twenty-five states (including Arizona, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) require an automatic recount whenever the margin of victory falls within a designated range. Forty-one states allow a losing candidate to request a recount. But even within these states, timelines vary widely, with some recounts taking place before certification and others taking place after certification (with the possibility of updating the certified results).

Depending on the state and the reason the recount was ordered, recounts may be conducted by machine, by hand, or some combination of both.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: Recounts provide another opportunity to correct vote counts if the election was very close or if a losing candidate has reason to believe that there may be an error in the results. But states also have requirements to keep candidates or parties from abusing recount processes, which include limiting the acceptable reasons for a recount, the individuals who can request a recount, and the timeline for a recount, and/or requiring candidates who request a recount to bear the cost if no issues are discovered.

What happens: State and local officials certify election results only after a multistep process that involves counting all votes, checking for any discrepancies in the vote totals, and ensuring that the results are accurate.

Upon completion of the canvass, local election officials formally approve and sign off on the final results for local elections. Results for statewide elections and other elections that cross multiple election boundaries are generally presented to the state — typically the governor, chief election official, or a state board — for certification. Certified results represent the complete and final results of an election (unless updated by a recount). Each state sets its own deadline for certification, usually between two weeks and a month after Election Day.

Key administrative steps to safeguard an accurate count: In addition to the work done by local election officials to validate the final results, state officials responsible for certification compare information that has been provided during the process and account for any changes that have occurred between unofficial results and the final certified results. State officials also aggregate local results to obtain certified statewide election totals. The state canvass and certification process may involve comparing total votes cast to reported turnout, confirming all local paperwork was properly completed and submitted, and reviewing any reported problems that may impact final vote totals.

In some cases, recounts, postelection audits, or legal challenges may be conducted after certification, and after those are completed, officials will confirm the vote totals and may recertify the results if needed. Once the totals are final, the act of certifying the election is mandatory — it doesn’t matter if the person charged with this duty doesn’t like the results. State officials are required by law to certify the candidate with the most votes as the winner. If there is any attempt to interfere or delay the certification process, there are processes in place to ensure that the results will be certified on time. State officials and the courts will step in to ensure that the certification process is completed.

A guide to certification in battleground states is available here >>

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All of these rigorous, time-tested, and transparent processes ensure that election results are accurate and trustworthy.