Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations. Nevertheless, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location, ballot drop box, or election office to vote or while conducting official business
Summary
Federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices. Minnesota law prohibits firearms in some public settings that may serve as polling locations. Even where firearm possession is permitted, federal and state laws prohibit interference with election administration and intimidation of voters. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when these sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal and state laws protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Additionally, Minnesota law holds that individuals, including federal officials, “must be allowed to go to and from the polling place for the purpose of voting without unlawful interference” (Minn. Stat. § 204C.06).
Federal law also prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). Although federal law enforcement officials are typically armed while on official business, state law may require certain federal officials to be unarmed when voting at particular locations. Specifically, Minn. Stat. § 624.7181 restricts carrying rifles, shotguns, and BB guns in “public places,” defined as government-owned, leased, or controlled property and private property regularly and frequently open to the public, though the statute excludes certain private premises and locations where firearms can be lawfully possessed, transported, displayed, or used. The provision separately exempts federal law enforcement officers and military personnel “authorized by law to carry firearms and . . . acting in the scope of their official duties” (Minn. Stat. § 624.7181(3)).
Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 624.714 requires a permit to carry a pistol in a public place, whether openly or concealed, but that requirement does not apply to peace officers (as defined by Minn. Stat. § 626.84(1)). Because that definition requires licensure by the Minnesota Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board and is limited to state, local, tribal, railroad, and other specified officers, federal officials are unlikely to qualify as peace officers under this exception.
Even so, qualified current and retired law enforcement officers, including federal officials, may have separate authority under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) to carry concealed firearms notwithstanding certain state or local restrictions (18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C). Notably, however, LEOSA does not supersede state laws restricting firearms on “any State or local government property, installation, building, base, or park” (18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(b)(2), 926C(b)(2)). One such law is Minn. Stat. § 609.66, which restricts possession of dangerous weapons at several locations that may serve as polling places — including school property, courthouse complexes, and state buildings within the Capitol area — subject to statutory exceptions. For school property, those exceptions include “active licensed peace officers” and military personnel or students participating in military training who are on duty and performing official duties (Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1d)(f)(1)–(2)). For courthouse complexes and covered state buildings, exceptions include licensed peace officers and military personnel performing official duties (Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1g)(b)(1)).
Although Minn. Stat. § 609.66 does not define a “licensed peace officer,” Minn. Stat. § 626.84 defines a “peace officer” as a position (either an employee or elected or appointed official of a political subdivision or law enforcement agency) requiring licensure by the POST Board. Because federal officials are not licensed peace officers under Minnesota law, they are unlikely to qualify for the Section 609.66 exemptions noted above. However, armed federal officials may qualify for other exemptions — such as Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1g)(b)(4), which allows “persons” with the county sheriff’s or public safety commissioner’s express consent to possess dangerous weapons in courthouses or state buildings, respectively.
Minnesota law also gives federal law enforcement officers certain authorities akin to those of peace officers in limited circumstances, including when acting within the scope of a special purpose task force (Minn. Stat. § 626.8453) or when acting on a request for assistance from and under the direction of a Minnesota peace officer (Minn. Stat. § 626.77).
If in-person voting locations or drop boxes are located on federal property (including military installations) or in federal buildings, then jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit intimidating voters, hindering or interfering with the voting process, or using or threatening the use of force, duress, fraud, or restraint to influence a person’s vote (18 U.S.C. §§ 595, 598; Minn. Stat. § 211B.075; Minn. Stat. § 211B.07; see also Election Interference or Disruption below). Minnesota law also targets those who attempt to interfere with election administration, including by intimidating or threatening election officials: Minn. Stat. § 211B.076 prohibits interfering with or preventing an election official’s performance of an election duty, intimidating or threatening an election official in an attempt to influence their performance of an election duty, and obstructing an election official’s access to or egress from any place where they perform election duties.
Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1)(a)(1)–(2) prohibits recklessly handling or using a gun to endanger the safety of another or intentionally pointing a gun, whether loaded or unloaded, toward another, respectively. The provision does not contain any exemptions. And Minn. Stat. § 624.72 prohibits interfering with another person’s lawful free access to or egress from public buildings or property, or with “the transaction of public business therein.”
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- To safeguard in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, and other election facilities:
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at or near in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
- To safeguard federal property locations:
- Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during voting or election processes.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations or election offices.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. For many years, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to in elections in communities across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the department deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Minnesota. And in November 2020, the DOJ deployed monitors to jurisdictions in 18 states, including Minneapolis. The DOJ announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Virginia during upcoming primary elections.
The DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” but it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (52 U.S.C. § 21083a), and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on Committee on House Administration letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Minn. Stat. § 211B.076 prohibits interfering with or preventing an election official’s performance of an election duty, intimidating or threatening an election official in an attempt to influence their performance of an election duty, and obstructing an election official’s access to or egress from any place where the official performs election duties. Minn. Stat. § 624.72 prohibits interfering with another person’s lawful free access to or egress from public buildings or property, or with “the transaction of public business therein.”
Moreover, Minnesota law protects voters against intimidation. Minn. Stat. § 211B.075(2) prohibits, whether directly or indirectly, using force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, or employment-related action against a person seeking to vote or register to vote.
On top of these prohibitions, Minnesota law imposes certain restrictions on challengers, including conversing with a voter; handling or inspecting registration cards, files, or lists; preparing lists about voter participation; or attempting to influence voting in any manner (Minn. Stat. § 204C.07(4)).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be limited by federal law, and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer or monitor is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Minnesota election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of “a voter’s date of birth or any part of a voter’s Social Security number, driver’s license number, identification card number, military identification card number, or passport number,” including in response to response to a law enforcement inquiry (Minn. Stat. § 201.091).
In June 2025, the Department of Justice requested Minnesota’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Minnesota declined to provide voters’ sensitive information, citing among other reasons prohibitions under state and federal law, the DOJ sued the state. The lawsuit is ongoing — please check with your local counsel on the current status of the litigation.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed that it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested the records of dozens of voters.
Minnesota law imposes specific requirements governing access to and custody and handling of election materials and equipment. Before, during, and after every election, Minn. Stat. § 211B.076 criminally prohibits unauthorized access to or tampering with electronic voting systems, electromechanical voting equipment, election night reporting systems, ballot boxes and drop boxes, the statewide voter registration system, registration lists, and polling place rosters.
Additionally, county auditors must develop chain-of-custody plans for all elections, including plans for the physical and cybersecurity of election-related materials, and file those plans with the secretary of state (Minn. Stat. § 204B.182). County auditors and municipal clerks must secure ballot recording and tabulating systems physically and electronically against unauthorized access, and they may not create or disclose an electronic image of the hard drive of any vote recording or tabulating system or other voting-system component (or allow anyone else to do so) unless authorized by the secretary of state or expressly authorized by law (Minn. Stat. § 206.845). State law also prohibits publishing passwords or other confidential information related to an electronic voting system and aiding, abetting, or conspiring to violate these protections (Minn. Stat. § 211B.076).
During voting, election judges are responsible for preserving election materials until they are returned to the appropriate election officials after voting has ended (Minn. Stat. § 204B.29). State law also restricts who may be present in polling places; prohibits unauthorized individuals from approaching within six feet of voting equipment or booths unless authorized by an election judge; and prohibits intentionally damaging, mutilating, or removing election materials, including ballots, election files, and election registers (Minn. Stat. § 204C.06).
For precincts using electronic voting systems, election judges must secure those systems after polls close, place voted ballot cards and defective ballots in sealed containers, and have two judges of different political parties deliver them immediately to the counting center; at the counting center, only authorized personnel may touch ballot cards, ballot containers, or absentee ballot results (Minn. Stat. § 206.86).
After counting is completed, election judges must seal the ballots and deliver the ballots, summary statements, spoiled ballots, and other required materials to the county auditor, municipal clerk, or school district clerk within the statutory timeframe (Minn. Stat. §§ 204C.25, 204C.27). If election judges fail to deliver returns as required, the appropriate official must dispatch a special messenger to obtain them (Minn. Stat. § 204C.29). State law also makes it a felony to damage election returns or take action to prevent their delivery (Minn. Stat. § 204C.29(3)).
Once ballots and other election materials are returned, county auditors generally must store ballots and election materials in a locked container or other secure, locked space for 22 months (Minn. Stat. § 204B.40). Sealed envelopes containing voted ballots must generally be retained unopened unless opened for a court-authorized or statutory recount or examination, and county auditors must keep ballots and related records in a safe and secure place, maintain the seals unbroken, strictly control access, and maintain accountability and a record of access (Minn. Stat. §§ 204B.40, 204C.28).
The County Elections Administration Guide published by the Minnesota secretary of state details these and other chain-of-custody procedures, along with access controls for voting systems and election materials.
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 211B.076 prohibits interfering with or preventing an election official’s performance of an election duty, as well as using intimidation or threats to try to influence an election official.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, or election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Minnesota Association of County Officers, the Minnesota secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to an election facility
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are usually armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
State law restricts carrying rifles, shotguns, and BB guns in “public places,” defined as government-owned, leased, or controlled property and private property regularly and frequently open to the public, though the statute excludes certain private premises and locations where firearms can be lawfully possessed, transported, displayed, or used (Minn. Stat. § 624.7181). The provision separately exempts federal law enforcement officers and military personnel “authorized by law to carry firearms and . . . acting in the scope of their official duties” (Minn. Stat. § 624.7181(3)).
Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 624.714 requires a permit to carry a pistol in a public place, whether openly or concealed, but that requirement does not apply to peace officers (as defined by Minn. Stat. § 626.84(1)). Because that definition requires licensure by the Minnesota Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board and is limited to state, local, tribal, railroad, and other specified officers, federal officials are unlikely to qualify as peace officers under this exception.
Even so, qualified current and retired law enforcement officers, including federal officials, may have separate authority under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) to carry concealed firearms notwithstanding certain state or local restrictions (18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C). Notably, however, LEOSA does not supersede state laws restricting firearms on “any State or local government property, installation, building, base, or park” (18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(b)(2), 926C(b)(2)). One such law is Minn. Stat. § 609.66, which restricts possession of dangerous weapons at several locations that may serve as polling places — including school property, courthouse complexes, and state buildings within the Capitol area — subject to statutory exceptions. For school property, those exceptions include “active licensed peace officers” and military personnel or students participating in military training who are on duty and performing official duties (Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1d)(f)(1)–(2)). For courthouse complexes and covered state buildings, exceptions include licensed peace officers and military personnel who are performing official duties (Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1g)(b)(1)).
Although Minn. Stat. § 609.66 does not define a “licensed peace officer,” Minn. Stat. § 626.84 defines a “peace officer” as a position (either an employee or elected or appointed official of a political subdivision or law enforcement agency) requiring licensure by the POST Board. Because federal officials are not licensed peace officers under Minnesota law, they are unlikely to qualify for the Section 609.66 exemptions noted above. However, armed federal officials may qualify for other exemptions — such as Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1g)(b)(4), which allows “persons” with the county sheriff’s or public safety commissioner’s express consent to possess dangerous weapons in courthouses or state buildings, respectively.
Minnesota law also gives federal law enforcement officers certain authorities akin to those of peace officers in limited circumstances, including when acting within the scope of a special purpose task force (Minn. Stat. § 626.8453) or when acting on a request for assistance from and under the direction of a Minnesota peace officer (Minn. Stat. § 626.77).
Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1)(a)(1) prohibits recklessly handling or using a gun to endanger the safety of another person, and Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1)(a)(2) prohibits intentionally pointing a gun, whether loaded or unloaded, “at or toward” another person. Neither provision contains any exemptions, and as such they may apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation and menacing or obstructing voters also apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing (or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those urging or aiding others to vote — whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs (including voters) to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Minnesota law contains a similar prohibition: Minn. Stat. § 211B.075 prohibits an individual from intentionally hindering, interfering with, or preventing another person from voting or registering to vote. The statute also creates a private right of action to “prevent or restrain” the prohibited acts and to recover damages (Minn. Stat. § 211B.075(5)(b)).
Furthermore, Minnesota law prohibits “directly or indirectly” using or threatening “force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, loss, . . . undue influence, or temporal or spiritual injury” to compel voting behavior, as well as using “abduction, duress, or fraud” to “obstruct or prevent the free exercise of the right to vote” (Minn. Stat. § 211B.07). Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 624.72 prohibits interfering with another person’s lawful free access to or egress from public buildings or property, or with “the transaction of public business therein.”
Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Election judges may appoint a sergeant-at-arms when necessary to keep the peace or otherwise assist them, and an election judge may request that a sergeant-at-arms or peace officer arrest or remove from the polling place any individual who, despite a warning to desist, engages in disorderly conduct (Minn. Stat. § 204C.06(5).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to election facilities.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, or nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting process.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. Here is a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1)(a)(1) prohibits recklessly handling or using a gun to endanger the safety of another person, and Minn. Stat. § 609.66(1)(a)(2) prohibits intentionally pointing a gun, whether loaded or unloaded, “at or toward” another person. Neither provision contains any exemptions, and as such they may apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation and menacing or obstructing voters also apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing (or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those urging or aiding others to vote — whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs (including voters) to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Minnesota law contains a similar prohibition: Minn. Stat. § 211B.075 prohibits an individual from intentionally hindering, interfering with, or preventing another person from voting or registering to vote. The statute also creates a private right of action to “prevent or restrain” the prohibited acts and to recover damages (Minn. Stat. § 211B.075(5)(b)).
Furthermore, Minnesota law prohibits “directly or indirectly” using or threatening “force, coercion, violence, restraint, damage, harm, loss, . . . undue influence, or temporal or spiritual injury” to compel voting behavior, as well as using “abduction, duress, or fraud” to “obstruct or prevent the free exercise of the right to vote” (Minn. Stat. § 211B.07). Additionally, Minn. Stat. § 624.72 prohibits interfering with another person’s lawful free access to or egress from any public building or property owned by or in control of the state or any of its political subdivisions, or with “the transaction of public business therein.”
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also issued new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took 7–10 business days to arrive rather than the standard 3–5. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible, providing alternative ballot return options such as additional ballot drop box sites, and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure that they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review your office’s policies for handling election mail and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop box sites.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.