The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
  • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

 

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in March 2026.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025 advanced his nomination.

 

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Todd Blanche to serve as attorney general in June 2026. The Senate confirmed Blanche as head of the DOJ in August.

 

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

 

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Pennsylvania State Law: Summary of Key Provisions*

Core Election Interference Provisions

• 25 P.S. § 3527: Prohibits as a felony:
  • threatening an election officer or preventing, interrupting, or interfering with their election duties or operations;
  • blocking the entry to any polling place;
  • intimidating or threatening voters;
  • unlawfully adding ballots or tampering with election materials or equipment; or
  • conspiring to commit any of these offenses or in any manner to prevent a free and fair primary or election.
• 25 P.S. § 3508: Prohibits precluding an authorized election officer from performing their lawful rights and duties, including through threat, intimidation, or violence, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3549: Prohibits intentionally interfering with, hindering, or delaying the performance of any person’s lawful election duties (or attempting to do so), and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3060: During voting hours on Election Day:
  • prohibits anyone other than authorized poll workers, watchers, voters waiting to vote, and peace officers when necessary to preserve the peace from being inside or within 10 feet of the polling place;
  • prohibits electioneering inside or within 10 feet of the polling place;
  • charges the judge of election with enforcing these provisions and keeping order in the voting room; and
  • allows the judge of election to call on any constable, deputy constable, police officer, or other peace officer for assistance therein.
• 25 P.S. § 3518: Prohibits any person from unlawfully opening, tampering with, or injuring or attempting to injure any voting machine to be used or being used at any election; preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of such machine; or having unauthorized possession of a key to a voting machine to be used or being used in an election; and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3517: Prohibits willfully destroying or defacing any ballot, or willfully delaying the delivery of any ballots, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3536: Prohibits unlawfully removing any ballot, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3501: Prohibits willfully disobeying any lawful instruction or order of any county election board member, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3548: Prohibits any state, county, or precinct election official or staff member from willfully neglecting or refusing to perform their lawful duties, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3525: Prohibits, as a felony, any precinct official from:
  • committing fraud;
  • making a false return of votes, or adding fraudulent votes or election returns;
  • making any other false entries or actions, or omitting legitimate entries;
  • willfully destroying or altering any vote or related materials;
  • willfully tampering with any voting machine, or aiding in the perpetration of any such fraud;
  • failing to return to the county election board as required any votes, election materials, or other paper or record; or
  • conspiring with others to commit any of the above offenses, or “in any manner to prevent a free and fair election.”
• 25 P.S. § 2683: Privileges from arrest, on days of primaries and elections and “while engaged in making up and transmitting returns,” district election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, and overseers except upon the warrant of a court of record for an election fraud, felony, or “wanton breach of the peace.”
• 25 P.S. § 3547: Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or using force, restraint, duress, coercion, fraudulent device, or contrivance to induce a person with regard to voting, or to impede, prevent, or interfere with their free exercise of voting, whether directly or indirectly, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3529: Prohibits unlawfully striking, wounding, or committing an assault and battery on a voter at or near a polling place during an election, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3509: Prohibits any person from carrying out the duties of a judge, inspector, or clerk of election or machine inspector without first being sworn in, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701: Prohibits attempting by physical menace to put another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury — which state courts have interpreted to include pointing a gun at another person — and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3047: Provides that any election official or any three qualified voters of any district may call upon any mayor, sheriff, constable, or police officer to clear the entry to a polling place where obstructed or to maintain order and quell any disturbance; and prohibits:
  • any police officer, whether in uniform or plainclothes, from being within 100 feet of a polling place during an election, except while voting or serving warrants, when called upon to preserve the peace, or when assigned to a police station within 100 feet of a polling place;
  • any police officer from unlawfully using intimidation, threats, violence, or undue influence to prevent any voter from voting, or from electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place; and
  • any body of troops from being present, whether state or U.S. Army and whether armed or unarmed, at any polling place during an election, except to vote.
• 44 Pa.C.S. § 7152: Requires the constable or a deputy of each borough, township, or ward to be present “for the purpose of preserving the peace” at the polling place during each election and while votes are being counted.
• 25 P.S. § 3521: Prohibits any mayor, sheriff, constable, police officer, or other peace officer from failing to clear the obstructed entry of any polling place; refusing to maintain order or quell a disturbance at any polling place when called to do so; or willfully hindering, delaying, or attempting to hinder or delay any precinct official in the performance of any lawful duty; and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3511: Prohibits any sheriff, constable, police, or other peace officer from failing to render aid and assistance in keeping the peace requested by a county election board member or other precinct or election worker; or from willfully hindering or delaying or attempting to hinder or delay any election worker in the performance of any lawful duty; and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 912: Prohibits possession of a weapon on school property, except when in conjunction with a lawful supervised school activity or course or “for other lawful purposes,” and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 913: Prohibits possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a court facility, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor or summary offense; exceptions include the “lawful performance of official duties by an officer, agent or employee of the United States, the Commonwealth or a political subdivision who is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any violation of law.”

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Pennsylvania laws, including 25 P.S. §§ 2649 and 3065, require elections officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission issues summaries of retention schedules for the County Records Committee.

The table below lists key records retention requirements. The Pennsylvania County Records Manual has a more complete list of election-related retention requirements.

^† Minority inspectors of election are also required to retain one set of tally papers, voter list, and election officer oaths for 1 year (25 P.S. § 3065(b)).

• Pennsylvania Department of State Directive 3 of 2026: Sets forth numerous rules concerning access to voting systems, including the following:
  • Prohibits county boards of elections from providing unauthorized third-party access to voting systems or any components, including but not limited to any hardware, software, or devices being used as part of election systems.
  • Authorizes the secretary of the commonwealth to prohibit use voting equipment or components if unauthorized access occurs.
  • Explicitly includes requests for unauthorized access “made by (or on behalf of) any federal, state, or local government officials without a valid judicial warrant.”
  • Directs election officials, if served with a judicial warrant by a law enforcement officer, to take the following steps “to preserve, to the best of their ability, the security of sensitive equipment and materials and the public’s interest in voter privacy and the timely certification of elections”:
    1. confirm that the warrant is a valid judicial warrant (i.e., a warrant signed by a judge rather than an administrative warrant);
    2. request to speak to their attorneys, or have the law enforcement officer speak to their attorneys, to ensure proper compliance with the warrant and other legal duties, and that the warrant is executed with the least disruption possible;
    3. document, to the maximum extent practicable, the execution of the warrant, including by videotaping the transfer of any data or seizure of equipment, and create and retain an inventory detailing precisely what equipment and data are seized, from where, and by whom; and
    4. make every effort to create and retain a copy of all software and data on any equipment subject to seizure.
  • Directs county boards of elections to notify the secretary of the commonwealth immediately upon receipt of any written or verbal request for unauthorized access to a voting system, including the service of warrants or any other requests from government officials, or any breach or attempted breach in the chain of custody of voting system components.
  • See also County of Fulton et al. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (addressing litigation arising after Fulton County permitted unauthorized third-party access to voting equipment and the secretary of the commonwealth subsequently decertified that equipment).
• 25 Pa.C.S. § 1404: Prohibits using public lists or legally acquired names of registered voters for purposes unrelated to elections, political activities, or law enforcement.
• 4 Pa. Code § 183.14: Prohibits the Department of State from sharing certain sensitive information belonging to registered voters, including signatures, unique identifiers such as driver’s license numbers and the last four digits of Social Security numbers, and certain designated individuals’ home addresses.
• 25 P.S. § 3031.16: Requires that all ballots, absentee ballots, and related materials be securely packaged, labeled, sealed, and delivered to the county election board after vote counting is completed; and that all such materials be preserved and maintained by the board in accordance with 25 P.S. § 2649.
• 25 P.S. § 2648: After canvassing is complete and election records are no longer in use, requires that county election board records — including returns, tally papers, reports, and other records but not including the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines or records of assisted voters — be open to public inspection, but only in the presence of an authorized county election board employee and subject to proper regulation for safekeeping of the records.
• 25 P.S. §§ 3031.13, 3065: Require that:
  • immediately following an election, the district register, numbered lists of voters, unused ballots, spoiled and canceled ballots, and rejected voters’ certificates be placed in separate packages and sealed before the tabulation of any ballots;
  • after tabulation and completion of the count, voting system components be locked and sealed, packaged, secured for storage, and held for delivery to the county election board;
  • each ballot box also be locked and sealed and immediately delivered by the judge and minority inspector of election^† to the county election board’s custody; and
  • by 2 a.m. on the day after the election, all returns, envelopes, supplies, and cast and uncast ballots be returned to the county board.
• 25 P.S. § 3070: Requires, after vote counting is completed, voting machines to be properly boxed and removed to storage by the county board as soon as possible, and to remain locked for 20 days following each election (and “as much longer as may be necessary” due to existing or threatened contest over the election result); and mandates that voting machines may only be opened and their data examined by order of a court or direction of a legislative committee to investigate a contested election — and only in the presence of the officer having custody of the machines.

Election Observers

• 25 P.S. § 2687: Allows each candidate to appoint two watchers for each election district in which they are running, but only one per polling place at any time; bars watchers from entering the “enclosed space”; but allows watchers to, upon request, inspect but not mark or alter the voting checklist and numbered lists of voters.
• 25 P.S. § 2650: Permits any candidate or political party to appoint watchers during any public session or proceeding of the county election board, and at any computation, canvassing, or recount of returns of any primary or election.
• 25 P.S. § 3146.8: Permits watchers to be present when envelopes containing absentee and mail ballots are opened, counted, and recorded.
• 25 P.S. § 3506: Prohibits election official from barring the presence of any authorized representative or candidate at any session of a county election board, computation, canvassing, or recount of returns, or polling place, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 25 P.S. § 3507: Prohibits using violence or intimidation to threaten or drive away any authorized watcher, attorney, candidate, board of elections representative, or the secretary of the commonwealth, who is required or permitted to be present at any polling place, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.

Emergency Powers

• 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301: Authorizes the governor to declare a “disaster emergency” upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or threat of a disaster is imminent; states that no state of disaster emergency may continue for longer than 90 days unless renewed by the governor; allows the General Assembly by concurrent resolution to terminate a state of disaster emergency at any time; and, in addition to any other powers conferred upon the governor by law, allows the governor to:
  • suspend the provisions of any regulation, statute, orders, or rules prescribing the procedures for conduct of commonwealth business if strict compliance with the provisions would in any way prevent or delay necessary action in the emergency;
  • utilize all available resources of the commonwealth and each political subdivision as reasonably necessary to cope with the emergency;
  • control movement of persons to and from and within a disaster area; and
  • temporarily confer the power of arrest on law enforcement personnel serving as part of emergency forces, placing such personnel under the operational control of the Pennsylvania State Police commissioner and requiring compliance with the terms and conditions of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Const. art. 1, § 22: Subordinates the military to civil power.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 5515: Defines civil disorder as “any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which causes an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual.”
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503: Prohibits partaking in disorderly conduct with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor or summary offense.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 5508: Prohibits intentionally disturbing or interrupting a lawful meeting, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101: Prohibits intentionally obstructing, impairing, or interfering with the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 4912: Prohibits holding a position in the public service under false pretense with intent to induce another person to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise act in reliance upon that pretense, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706: Prohibits directly or indirectly communicating a threat to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another person; causing evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation; or otherwise causing serious public inconvenience or terror with reckless disregard; and makes such conduct a felony or misdemeanor.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 2717: Prohibits terrorism as a felony or misdemeanor; defines “terrorism” as a violent offense intending to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government; and defines “violent offense” to include an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any such offense, which is punishable by imprisonment of more than one year and involves an act dangerous to human life or property.
• 18 Pa.C.S. § 5515: Prohibits as a misdemeanor paramilitary activity training, defined as teaching, making, or demonstrating the use of “any firearm, explosive or incendiary device or technique capable of causing injury or death” for unlawful use in or furtherance of a civil disorder, or assembling “with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with or being instructed in the use of” any such weapon for unlawful use or in furtherance of a civil disorder; exempts law enforcement officers when performing their lawful official duties; and defines “law enforcement officer” as “any officer or employee of the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state or the District of Columbia” — specifically including but not limited to members of the National Guard, the organized militia of any state or territory, and the armed forces of the United States.

Other Relevant Laws and Regulations

• 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953: Governs when Pennsylvania municipal police officers may exercise authority to act outside their territory.
• 25 P.S. § 1904: Prohibits Philadelphia sheriffs from appointing any deputies for preserving the peace or for any other purpose at any election polls within the city.
• 25 P.S. § 3146.6: Requires that absentee ballots be received by the county board of elections by 8 p.m. on the day of an primary or election.
• 25 P.S. § 3150.16: Requires that mail ballots be received by the county board of elections by 8 p.m. on the day of an primary or election.
• 25 Pa.C.S. § 3511(a): Requires that military and overseas absentee ballots be received by the county board of elections no later than 5 p.m. on the seventh day after an election.
• 25 P.S. § 3146.2a: Requires that absentee ballot applications be received no later than 5 p.m. on the Tuesday prior to an election.
• 25 P.S. § 3150.12a: Requires that mail ballot applications be received no later than 5 p.m. on the Tuesday prior to an election.

Definitions

• 18 Pa.C.S. § 501: Defines “peace officer” as “any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses.”

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Pennsylvania

The governor of Pennsylvania serves as the commonwealth’s chief executive officer (Penn. Const. art. 4, § 2). Gov. Josh Shapiro took office in 2023 and is currently running for his second four-year term.

Per the Pennsylvania Constitution (Pa. Const. art. 4, § 7) and state law (51 Pa.C.S. § 501), Governor Shapiro is the commander in chief of the commonwealth military, including the Pennsylvania National Guard when not federalized and the Pennsylvania Guard when formed, organized, and equipped under the governor’s order. Whenever the Pennsylvania National Guard or any part thereof is federalized, the governor may organize units of the Pennsylvania Guard “for the internal security of [the] Commonwealth” (51 Pa.C.S. § 506). The governor may activate the Pennsylvania National Guard — or when unavailable due to federalization, the Pennsylvania Guard — when an emergency in the commonwealth occurs or is threatened, or when tumult, riot, or disaster exists or is imminent (51 Pa.C.S. § 508).

State law authorizes the governor to declare a “disaster emergency” upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or threat of a disaster is imminent (35 Pa.C.S. § 7301). During an emergency, the governor may suspend the provisions of any regulation, statute, orders, or rules relating to the conduct of commonwealth business or agencies if strict compliance with the provisions would prevent or delay necessary action (35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)). The governor may also utilize all available resources, transfer personnel, and control ingress and egress in the area of a disaster; law enforcement personnel involved in managing the disaster fall be under the operational control of the state police commissioner (35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)). No declaration of disaster emergency may last for longer than 90 days unless renewed by the governor, and the General Assembly may at any time terminate a declared disaster emergency by passing a concurrent resolution (35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c)).

During the Covid-19 pandemic, then-Gov. Tom Wolf declared and extended disaster emergency declarations ordering school, government, and business closures and ordering citizens to stay at home, among other restrictions. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf challenged the constitutionality of the law and governor’s powers to issue these restrictions before for Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which upheld the governor’s emergency authority.

Pennsylvania governors from both parties have applied emergency powers to election rules. In 2012 after Hurricane Sandy, Republican Gov. Tom Corbett used his emergency powers to extend the deadline for returning absentee ballots for impacted voters (Exec. Order. No. 2016–12). In 2020, due largely to Covid-related civil unrest, travel restrictions, and curfews in several regions, Gov. Wolf, a Democrat, used his emergency powers to extend the deadline for receipt of absentee and mail ballots in impacted counties (Exec. Order No. 2020–02).

Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth

Al Schmidt currently serves as the secretary of the commonwealth. He was appointed by Governor Shapiro and confirmed by the Pennsylvania Senate in 2023. The duties of the office of the secretary of the commonwealth are detailed in 71 P.S. §§ 243, 271–79, and other statutes. The secretary of the commonwealth is head of the Pennsylvania Department of State and a member of the governor’s executive department (71 P.S. § 61).

As the state’s chief election official, the secretary of the commonwealth is responsible for overseeing election administration and helping protect the integrity of the electoral process. The secretary’s election-related duties include examining and reexamining voting machines; certifying elections; approving nomination petitions; receiving election returns, reports, and other matters from county election boards; developing training programs; ordering recanvasses; and other duties (25 P.S. § 2621; 71 P.S. § 273).

The office of the secretary oversees election administration, which is carried out at the county level by county boards of elections (25 P.S. § 2641). The commonwealth secretary has limited directive authority over multiple aspects of the election process, including operation of, access to, and certification of voting systems; design of ballot materials; and election returns, audits, and recounts (25 P.S. §§ 2621, 3031.5, 3146.4, 3150.14). Additionally, the secretary regularly produces guidance for local election officials on election rules, processes, and best practices, including:

• guidance on voter intimidation and discriminatory conduct;
• guidance on rules in effect at the polling place on Election Day; and
• guidance concerning poll watchers and authorized representatives.

County Boards of Elections

In Pennsylvania, county boards of elections are responsible for administering elections within their respective counties and serve as the primary local authorities overseeing voter registration, polling place operations, ballot security, canvassing, and certification of results (25 P.S. § 2642).

County boards are charged with preparing and furnishing ballots and election supplies, appointing and training election officers, maintaining voting systems, processing absentee and mail ballots, and conducting the canvassing and certification of results following an election (25 P.S. § 2642). They also oversee the custody and preservation of election records and materials, investigate certain election irregularities and challenges, and implement directives and guidance issued by the Pennsylvania Department of State (25 P.S. § 2649).

Pennsylvania National Guard

Major General John R. Pippy has served as Pennsylvania’s adjutant general since February 2025. Reporting to the governor, he oversees the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs and commands the nearly 18,000 Pennsylvania Army and Air National Guard members (51 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 902).

The adjutant general is appointed by the governor and confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate (51 Pa.C.S. § 901). Adjutants general and their deputies must have served at least 10 years as commissioned officers in the Pennsylvania National Guard or armed forces (51 Pa.C.S. § 902). They may be removed at the pleasure of the governor or following conviction for misbehavior in office or “any infamous crime” (Pa. Const. art. VI, § 7).

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts;” the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at voting locations, ballot drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. Federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations. Nevertheless, reviewing the applicable state laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a voting location, ballot drop box, or election facility to vote or while conducting official business

Summary

Federal and state laws protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. However, state and federal laws may also restrict whether and how they may bring firearms into or around voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election facilities. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when these sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings or on military installations.

Discussion

Federal and state laws protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Pennsylvania law also protects the voting rights of federal and state military personnel and police officers (25 P.S. § 3047).

Federal officials or military personnel conducting routine business are typically armed. However, federal law prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). Additionally, state law restricts carrying weapons on school property and in court facilities — locations that may be used for voting or other election activities in Pennsylvania (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 912, Pa.C.S.913). But both statutes have exceptions for possessing a weapon for a “lawful purpose” on school property (18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c)) and for officers performing official duties within a court facility (18 Pa.C.S. § 913(c)). Federal officers carrying firearms in the course of their official duties may meet these exceptions.

State law also prohibits individuals other than authorized poll workers, watchers, voters, constables, and authorized peace officers (“when necessary for the preservation of the peace”) from being in or within 10 feet of polling place (25 P.S. § 3060, 44 Pa.C.S. § 7152) (18 Pa.C.S. § 501 defines a “peace officer” as “any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses.”) And 25 P.S. § 3047 bans police officers, whether in uniform or plainclothes, from being within 100 feet of a polling place during an election except while voting or serving warrants, or when called upon to preserve the peace. (25 P.S. §3047). 25 P.S. § 3047 also bans any body of troops from being present, whether armed or unarmed, at any polling place during an election except to vote.

Under state law, judges of elections are responsible for enforcing state law governing the conduct of elections and for keeping order in the polling place (25 P.S. § 3060). A constable or their deputy must “be present at the polling place in each election district” during each election and while the votes are being counted “for the purpose of preserving the peace” (44 Pa.C.S. § 7152).

If voting locations or ballot drop boxes are located on federal property (including military installations) or in federal buildings, then jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Regardless of polling location or ballot drop box siting, federal and state laws prohibit intimidating, coercing, impeding, or threatening voters (25 P.S. §§ 3527, 3547; 18 U.S.C. §§ 593, 594) as well as interfering with voting and election operations (25 P.S. §§ 3527; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101; 18 U.S.C. §§ 593, 595, 598). For further analysis on election interference or disruption, see below scenarios.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to voting locations, election facilities, and ballot drop boxes, and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including constables — especially any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
• Update policies as necessary. Discuss these new policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• To safeguard voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and other election facilities:
  • Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and other election facilities.
  • Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions that apply at certain voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices and facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
  • Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices.
• To safeguard federal property locations specifically:
  • Review polling place and election facility locations and ballot drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings or on military installations, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
  • Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of any challenges that arise during the voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent that they are preempted by federal law.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations or election offices.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Allegheny, Luzerne, and Philadelphia Counties in Pennsylvania. In November 2020, the DOJ deployed monitors to locations in 18 states, including Allegheny, Lehigh, and Philadelphia Counties in Pennsylvania. The department announced in July 2026 that it would unveil an “expanded” monitoring program for the November 2026 elections.

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has typically limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Under Pennsylvania state law, local election officials may not have the authority to grant DOJ officials access to enter polling locations. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (52 U.S.C. § 21083a) and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and affirmed that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, 25 P.S. § 3527 prohibits interrupting, intimidating, or interfering with election officials and voting, including by blocking entry to a polling place. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101 prohibits intentionally obstructing, impairing, or interfering with the administration of law or other governmental function. And 25 P.S. § 3549 prohibits attempting to or intentionally interfering with, hindering, or delaying any person in the performance of any act or duty authorized or imposed by the election code.

Pennsylvania state law also protects voters against intimidation. 25 P.S. § 3547 prohibits intimidating, threatening, or using force, duress, or contrivance to induce a person with regard to voting or to impede, prevent, or interfere with their free exercise of voting. Judges of election are obligated to remove poll watchers who engage in prohibited activities (Guidance Concerning Poll Watchers and Authorized Representatives; 25 P.S. § 3060(f)).

The application of these state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent that they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional or DOJ observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be limited or preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable. Communicate with your staff about these prospects and policy determinations.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer or monitor is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
• Ask for a list of the names of federal monitors or congressional observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
• Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
• Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment, election materials, or voter data

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

Similarly, under state law, county boards of elections are the designated custodians of election materials and records after they are delivered from the polling places or, in the case of mail ballots, received by the county board (25 P.S. §§ 2648, P.S.3146.8, P.S.3146.9, P.S.3150.17). All voting systems in use in Pennsylvania must be certified both by the federal government and the secretary of the commonwealth (25 P.S. § 3031.5). County election boards are responsible for overseeing elections in their respective counties, including preparing and furnishing ballots, equipment, and other election materials, as well as canvassing ballots and certifying election returns (25 P.S. § 2642).

Pennsylvania law mandates stringent chains of custody for election materials. Local election officials (including judges of election and other poll workers) oversee the conduct of voting in polling places on Election Day (25 P.S. § 2671–74). During voting hours, no person is allowed in or within 10 feet of the polling place except poll workers, authorized watchers, voters waiting to vote, and peace officers when necessary to preserve the peace (25 P.S. § 3060). Judges of election are charged with keeping order and ensuring that these rules are followed, and they are authorized to call on constables or other peace officers to aid in doing so (25 P.S. § 3060(f)).

Once voting concludes, the election board in each district must publicly canvass and compute the votes cast and prepare the election returns (25 P.S. §§ 3061, 3065). Once vote counting is completed, all ballots and related materials must be securely packaged, labeled, sealed, and delivered to county election boards (25 P.S. § 3031.16). After tabulation and completion of the count, the voting system components must also be locked, sealed, packaged, secured for storage, and held for delivery to the county election board (25 P.S. §§ 3031.13, P.S.3065). Each ballot box must also be locked and sealed, and the judge of election and minority inspector must immediately deliver the ballot boxes to the county board’s custody (25 P.S. § 3065).

Once mail and absentee ballots are received, county boards of elections must keep the ballots in sealed or locked containers until they are canvassed, follow secure processes during canvassing and any challenges, and safely keep the ballots and related materials for two years (25 P.S. §§ 3146.8, P.S.3146.9, P.S.3150.17).

After the count is complete, county election boards must have voting machines properly boxed and removed to storage as soon as possible. The voting machines shall remain locked for 20 days following each election, and as much longer as may be necessary due to contests over the election result. A voting machine may only be opened and its data examined by order of a court or direction of a legislative committee to investigate a contested election — and only in the presence of the officer having custody of the machines (25 P.S. § 3070). All election documents, papers, and records, including ballots, must be preserved securely in the county election board’s office per state and federal law requirements (25 P.S. § 2649; 52 U.S.C. § 20701).

After canvassing is complete and election records are no longer in use, county election boards’ records — including returns, tally papers, reports, and other records, but not including the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines — shall be open to public inspection, but only in the presence of an authorized employee of the county board and subject to proper safekeeping procedures (25 P.S. § 2648).

Federal and state laws limit the information that Pennsylvania election officials are permitted to provide to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of a voter’s confidential information, including signatures, unique identifiers such as driver’s license numbers and the last four digits of Social Security numbers, and home addresses of certain registrants whose information is confidential (25 Pa.C.S. § 1404; 4 Pa. Code § 183.14).

Additionally, the Pennsylvania secretary of the commonwealth recently updated Directive 3 of 2026, which prohibits county election boards from providing unauthorized access to electronic voting systems or any of their components to third parties — including “any federal, state, or local government officials without a valid judicial warrant.” It also directs that if served with a judicial warrant by a law enforcement officer, election officials must “preserve, to the best of their ability, the security of sensitive equipment and materials and the public’s interest in voter privacy and the timely certification of elections.” Such measures include confirming the validity of the judicial warrant, requesting to speak with the relevant attorney, documenting and videotaping the transfer or seizure of any data or equipment, and making an effort to retain a copy of all software and data on any equipment seized.

Directive 3 of 2026 also mandates that county boards of elections notify the secretary of the commonwealth immediately upon receipt of any request for unauthorized access to a voting system, including the service of warrants or any other requests from government officials, or any breach or attempted breach in the chain of custody of the voting system components under their control.

In August 2025, the Department of Justice requested Pennsylvania’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Pennsylvania declined to provide voters’ sensitive information, citing prohibitions under state and federal law among other reasons, the DOJ sued the state. The lawsuit is ongoing — please check with your local counsel on the current status of the litigation.

In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines used in 2020 in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, the state senate produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, Ohio, DHS confirmed that it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested dozens of voter records.

Pennsylvania law imposes specific requirements governing access to and custody and handling of election materials, equipment, and ballots before, during, and after every election. These include criminal penalties for unauthorized tampering with or access to voting systems or ballots; unlawful altering, delaying delivery of, or destroying votes; preventing, interrupting, or interfering with an election official’s performance of election duties or operations; or conspiracy to take any such action (25 P.S. §§ 3517, 3518, 3525, 3527, 3536, 3549).

As discussed above, federal and state laws also prohibit anyone — including federal officials — from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote. As for state law, 25 P.S. § 3549 prohibits attempting to or intentionally interfering with, hindering, or delaying any person in the performance of any election act or duty. Pennsylvania law also prohibits interference, intimidation, or coercion with regard to election officials and voting, as well as obstruction of governmental operations and lawful meetings (25 P.S. §§ 3527, P.S.3547; 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101, 5508).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, and certification processes.
• It is important to note that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult with the Pennsylvania secretary of the commonwealth and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on how best to handle such requests. Sharing information may also help other election officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location or election facility or are deployed to communities.

Summary

Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply. Additionally, increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no military officer or civil servant may order, bring, keep, or have under their control any troops or armed federal law enforcement officials at place where a general or special election is being held unless that location is under attack by “armed enemies of the United States” (18 U.S.C. § 592). Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are usually armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Furthermore, under Pennsylvania state law, “no body of troops in the Army of the United States or of this Commonwealth shall be present, either armed or unarmed, at any place of election within this Commonwealth during the time of any primary or election” (25 P.S. § 3047). Additionally, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701 prohibits attempting by physical menace to put another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. State courts have repeatedly recognized that brandishing or pointing a firearm can satisfy the “physical menace” element of this prohibition. In Commonwealth v. Repko, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reiterated that “the pointing of a gun at a person constitutes simple assault by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury under section 2701(a)(3).”

State law also restricts carrying weapons at certain locations that may be used for voting, including on school property and in court facilities (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 912, Pa.C.S.913). However, 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c) contains an exception for weapons possessed on school property for or in conjunction with “lawful purposes.” And 18 Pa.C.S. § 913(c) excepts officers lawfully performing officials duties within a court facility. Thus, federal officers carrying firearms in the course of their official business may meet this exception.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation and menacing or obstructing voters may also apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from engaging in conduct that intimidates, threatens, or coerces (or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce) voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote — whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing plaintiffs to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

Meanwhile, Pennsylvania law prohibits an individual from intimidating, threatening, or using force, restraint, duress, coercion, fraudulent device, or contrivance to induce a person with regard to voting, or to impede, prevent, or interfere with their free exercise of voting, whether directly or indirectly (25 P.S. § 3547). State law also prohibits intimidating or threatening voters, including by blocking the entry to a polling location (25 P.S. § 3527), or by intentionally obstructing, impairing, or interfering with the administration of law or other governmental function (18 Pa.C.S. § 5101).

Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption of elections. In addition to 25 P.S. § 3527 prohibiting interfering with or interrupting election officers in their duties and operations, 25 P.S. § 3047 authorizes election officers, or any three qualified electors of any election district, to call upon any mayor, chief burgess, sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, deputy constable, or police officer, to clear entry to any polling place that is obstructed in a way that prevents electors from approaching, or “to maintain order and quell any disturbance.”

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials of troops being deployed to voting locations, election facilities, or communities.
• Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions that apply at certain voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices or facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the abovementioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials at voting locations, ballot drop boxes, or election facilities or in communities.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office or school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.

Discussion

Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.

One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.

USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked for the November 3, 2026, and earlier federal elections. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.

Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”

Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; informing voters that they may return absentee and mail-in ballots in person to their county board of elections, including at any satellite office or secure drop box made available by the county; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review your office’s policies for handling election mail and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
• Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail or absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as a ballot drop box.
• If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
• Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election-mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.