The Texas Election Interference Law Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
  • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

 

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in March 2026.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025 advanced his nomination.

 

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Todd Blanche to serve as attorney general in June 2026. The Senate confirmed Blanche as head of the DOJ in August.

 

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

 

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Core Election Interference Provisions

• Tex. Const. art. VI, § 2: “The privilege of free suffrage shall be protected by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.”
• Tex. Elec. Code § 13.004: Prohibits the following:
  • publicly disclosing specified confidential voter registration information, including Social Security numbers, Texas driver’s license numbers, Department of Public Safety personal identification card numbers, and certain protected residence addresses and phone numbers; or
  • posting on a website voters’ phone numbers, Social Security numbers, driver’s license or personal identification card numbers, birth dates, and certain protected residence addresses.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.001: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, the following, from the time the presiding judge arrives at the polling place to make preliminary arrangements until the precinct returns are certified and election records are assembled for distribution:
  • a person from being present in the polling place unless they are:
    • an election judge or clerk;
    • a poll watcher;
    • the secretary of state or an Elections Division staff member performing official duties;
    • an election official, sheriff, or staff member of an election official or sheriff delivering election supplies;
    • a state inspector;
    • a person admitted to vote;
    • a child under 18 accompanying a parent admitted to vote;
    • a person providing voter assistance, as authorized by law;
    • a person accompanying a voter who has a disability;
    • a “special peace officer” appointed by the presiding judge;
    • a county chair of a political party conducting a primary election, as authorized by law;
    • a voting system technician, as authorized by law;
    • a county election officer, as necessary to administer the election; or
    • a person whose presence is otherwise authorized by the presiding judge in accordance with the election law; or
  • a candidate from being present in the polling place for a purpose other than voting or official business in the building, unless the candidate is outside the plain view and hearing of persons in the voting or voter acceptance areas and is not engaged in campaign activity.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.003: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, loitering or electioneering for or against a candidate, measure, or political party during the voting period within 100 feet of an outside polling place entrance door or within 20 feet of a designated curbside voting space.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.004: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, operating a sound amplification device or a vehicle with a loudspeaker during the voting period and within 1,000 feet of a polling place while the device or loudspeaker is being used to make a political speech or electioneer for or against a candidate, measure, or political party.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.006: Prohibits, as a felony, a person who is in a polling place for a purpose other than voting from knowingly communicating information obtained at the polling place about how a voter voted.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.008: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, indicating to a voter in a polling place, by word, sign, or gesture, how one desires the voter to vote or not vote.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.010: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, wearing in a polling place or within 100 feet of an entrance used by voters any badge, insignia, emblem, or similar communicative device relating to a candidate, measure, political party appearing on the ballot, or the conduct of the election.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014: Prohibits using a wireless communication device within a room where voting is taking place or using mechanical or electronic means to record images or sound within 100 feet of a voting station, except that the wireless device restriction does not apply where otherwise permitted under provisions governing accessible voting stations, and neither restriction applies to an election officer conducting official duties, to an employee of the polling-place location acting in the course of employment, and to the use of election equipment necessary for the conduct of an election.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 62.013: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor:
  • an election officer from knowingly posting at a polling place, including within 100 feet of an entrance used by voters, any sign, card, poster, or similar material that is not authorized or required by law or that contains information not authorized or required by law; or
  • any other person from posting a sign, card, poster, or similar material at a polling place, including within that 100-foot area.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 63.012: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, an election officer from knowingly refusing to allow an eligible voter to vote.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 85.036: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, electioneering for or against a candidate, measure, or political party while an early voting polling place is open, in or within 100 feet of an outside polling place entrance door, or within 20 feet of a designated curbside voting space.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 85.037: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, the following while an early voting polling place is open for the conduct of early voting:
  • a person from being present in the polling place unless they are:
    • an election judge or clerk;
    • a poll watcher;
    • the secretary of state or an Elections Division staff member performing official duties;
    • an election official, sheriff, or staff member of an election official or sheriff delivering election supplies;
    • a state inspector;
    • a person admitted to vote;
    • a child under 18 accompanying a parent admitted to vote;
    • a person providing voter assistance, as authorized by law;
    • a person accompanying a voter who has a disability;
    • a “special peace officer” appointed by the presiding judge;
    • a county chair of a political party conducting a primary election, as authorized by law;
    • a voting system technician, as authorized by law;
    • a county election officer, as necessary to administer the election; or
    • a person whose presence is otherwise authorized by the presiding judge in accordance with the election law; or
  • a candidate from being present in the polling place for a purpose other than voting or official business in the building, unless the candidate is outside the plain view and hearing of persons in the voting or voter acceptance areas and is not engaged in campaign activity.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 127.008: Prohibits a person from being present in a central counting station while ballots are being counted unless they are:
  • a counting station manager, tabulation supervisor, assistant to the tabulation supervisor, presiding judge, or clerk;
  • a poll watcher;
  • a state inspector;
  • a voting system technician, as authorized by law;
  • the county election officer, as necessary to administer an election; or
  • a person whose presence has been authorized by the counting station manager in accordance with the election law.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 127.127: Prohibits any person other than the tabulation supervisor or their assistant from operating automatic tabulating equipment or handling ballots being automatically counted from the time the ballots are delivered for counting until the automatic count is completed.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 276.001: Prohibits, as a felony, knowingly retaliating against a voter who voted for or against a candidate or measure, or who refused to reveal how they voted, by:
  • harming or threatening to harm the voter through an unlawful act; or
  • subjecting or threatening to subject a voter over whom one has authority at work to a loss or reduction of wages or another employment benefit.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 276.003: Prohibits knowingly or intentionally removing or attempting to remove voted ballots from a ballot box in a manner not authorized by law, punishable as a felony unless the person is convicted of an attempt, in which case punishable as a misdemeanor.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 276.004: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, a person with authority over another in the scope of employment from knowingly refusing to permit the employee to be absent from work to vote on Election Day or during early voting, or subjecting or threatening to subject the employee to a loss of wages or other employment benefit for doing so, unless the polls are open for two consecutive hours outside the employee’s working hours.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013: Prohibits, as a felony, knowingly or intentionally attempting any of the following:
  • influencing another person’s independent exercise of the vote, including by altering a ballot or otherwise causing it not to reflect the voter’s intent;
  • preventing an eligible voter from casting a legal ballot, including by providing false information with intent to prevent them from voting;
  • discarding or destroying a voter’s completed ballot without their consent; or
  • counting invalid votes, refusing to count valid votes, or altering a report to include invalid votes or exclude valid votes.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 276.019: Prohibits a public official or election official from creating, altering, modifying, waiving, or suspending an election standard, practice, or procedure mandated by law or rule in a manner not expressly authorized by the election law.
• Tex. Penal Code § 22.01: Prohibits the following:
  • intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another person, and makes such conduct generally a misdemeanor, or a felony when committed against a person known to be a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retaliation for or because of the exercise of official power or performance of an official duty;
  • intentionally or knowingly threatening another with imminent bodily injury, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor; or
  • intentionally or knowingly making physical contact with another person, knowing or having reasonable basis to believe that the contact will be regarded as offensive or provocative, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Tex. Penal Code § 22.02: Prohibits, as a felony, engaging in any of the following conduct and either causing serious bodily injury to another person or using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the offense:
  • intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another person;
  • intentionally or knowingly threatening another with imminent bodily injury; or
  • intentionally or knowingly making physical contact with another person, knowing or having reasonable basis to believe that the contact will be regarded as offensive or provocative.
• Tex. Penal Code § 22.05: Prohibits the following:
  • as a misdemeanor, recklessly engaging in conduct that places another person in imminent danger of serious bodily injury; and
  • as a felony, knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of one or more individuals, or at or in the direction of a habitation, building, or vehicle while reckless as to whether it is occupied.
• Tex. Penal Code § 33.05: Prohibits, as a felony, knowingly accessing a computer, computer network, computer program, computer software, or computer system that is part of a system using direct recording electronic voting machines in order to prevent a person from lawfully voting, change a lawfully cast vote, prevent a lawfully cast vote from being counted, or cause an unlawfully cast vote to be counted.
• Tex. Penal Code § 36.03: Prohibits, by means of coercion, the following conduct, punishable as a misdemeanor unless the coercion involves a threat to commit a felony, in which case punishable as a felony:
  • influencing or attempting to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of official power or performance of an official duty, or influencing or attempting to influence them to violate a known legal duty; or
  • influencing or attempting to influence a voter not to vote or to vote in a particular manner.
• Tex. Penal Code § 36.06: Prohibits, as a felony:
  • intentionally or knowingly harming or threatening to harm a public servant by an unlawful act in retaliation for or because of their service or status as a public servant;
  • intentionally or knowingly harming or threatening to harm a public servant by an unlawful act to prevent or delay their service as a public servant; or
  • posting or electronically disclosing the residence address or phone number of a public servant or a member of their family or household with intent to cause harm or a threat of harm in retaliation for or because of the public servant’s service or status.
• Tex. Penal Code § 37.10: Prohibits, generally as a misdemeanor or, if committed with intent to defraud or harm another, as a felony, the following conduct involving governmental records:
  • knowingly making a false entry in or false alteration of a governmental record;
  • making, presenting, or using a record with knowledge of its falsity, including with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record;
  • intentionally destroying, concealing, removing, or otherwise impairing the accuracy, legibility, or availability of a governmental record; or
  • possessing, selling, or offering to sell a governmental record or blank governmental record form with intent that it be used unlawfully or with knowledge that it was obtained unlawfully.
• Tex. Penal Code § 39.03: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, a public servant acting or purporting to act in an official capacity, or taking advantage of that capacity, from:
  • intentionally subjecting another person to mistreatment or to an arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that the public servant knows is unlawful; or
  • intentionally denying or impeding another person’s exercise or enjoyment of a right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing that the conduct is unlawful.
• Tex. Penal Code § 42.01: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor, intentionally or knowingly engaging in various forms of “disorderly conduct,” including:
  • using abusive, indecent, profane, or vulgar language, or making an offensive gesture or display, in a public place that tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace;
  • abusing or threatening a person in a public place in an obviously offensive manner;
  • fighting with another person in a public place;
  • discharging a firearm in a public place other than a public road or sport shooting range; or
  • displaying a firearm or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm.
• Tex. Penal Code § 46.03: Prohibits, as a felony, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possessing a firearm in a polling place on Election Day or while early voting is in progress, excluding driveways, streets, sidewalks, walkways, parking lots, parking garages, and other parking areas, or on the grounds of a public or private primary or secondary school or postsecondary educational institution.

Police presence at the polls

• Tex. Elec. Code § 32.075: Establishes rules governing the presiding judge’s authority to preserve order and enforce election law at the polling place, including:
  • requiring the presiding judge to preserve order and prevent breaches of the peace and election law violations in the polling place and within the area where electioneering and loitering are prohibited;
  • granting the presiding judge the powers of a district judge to enforce order and preserve the peace, including authority to issue arrest warrants;
  • authorizing the presiding judge to appoint licensed peace officers as “special peace officers” for the polling place;
  • prohibiting the presiding judge or a special peace officer from enforcing electioneering or loitering restrictions outside the statutorily prohibited area, and prohibiting a special peace officer from enforcing those restrictions unless the officer’s appointment is approved by the presiding officer of the local canvassing authority; and
  • prohibiting the presiding judge from removing a duly accepted poll watcher for an election law violation other than a Penal Code violation unless an election judge or clerk observed the violation, while authorizing the judge to call law enforcement to request removal if the watcher breaches the peace or violates the law.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Texas laws and regulations, including Tex.Tex. Elec. Code §§ 1.013 and 66.058(a) and Tex. Tex. Gov’t Code § 441.158, along with 13 Tex. Admin. Code § 7.135, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Texas State Library and Archives Commission maintains a schedule to assist custodians in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Election Observers

• Tex. Elec. Code § 33.0015: Prohibits a poll watcher from interfering in or obstructing the orderly conduct of an election.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 33.051: Prohibits accepting a watcher for service while they possess a device capable of recording images or sound unless they agree to disable or deactivate the device; and prohibits, as a misdemeanor, an election officer from intentionally or knowingly refusing to accept a watcher for service when acceptance is required by law.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 33.057: Prohibits a poll watcher from being present at a voting station while a voter is preparing their ballot or is being assisted by a person of the voter’s choice.
• Tex. Elec. Code § 33.058: Prohibits a poll watcher, while on duty, from conversing with a voter or otherwise communicating with a voter regarding the election, or from conversing with an election officer regarding the election except to call attention to an irregularity or violation of law.

Emergency Powers

• Tex. Elec. Code § 41.0011: Authorizes the governor, upon determining that an emergency warrants holding a special election before the applicable uniform election date, to order that the election be held on an earlier nonuniform date.
• Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.012: Authorizes the governor to issue, amend, or rescind executive orders, proclamations, and regulations during a declared disaster, which have the force and effect of law.
• Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.016: Authorizes the governor to suspend a regulatory statute prescribing procedures for conducting state business, or a state agency order or rule, if strict compliance would prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with a disaster.
• Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.018: Authorizes the governor to control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, as well as the movement of persons and the occupancy of premises within the area.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Tex. Const. art. I, § 24: “The military shall at all times be subordinate to the civil authority.”
• Tex. Gov’t Code § 437.208: Prohibits a group other than the regularly organized Texas military forces, U.S. armed forces, or active militia of another state from associating as a military company or organization or parading publicly with firearms in a Texas municipality, except that students at an educational institution where military science is part of the prescribed curriculum may drill and perform ceremonies with firearms in public with the consent of the governor or, if authorized by the governor, the adjutant general.
• Tex. Penal Code § 42.02: Prohibits, as a misdemeanor — or as a felony if a participant commits a felony in furtherance of a riotous assembly’s purpose, or a felony that should have been anticipated as a result of the assembly — knowingly participating in a “riot,” defined as an assemblage of seven or more persons resulting in conduct that:
  • creates an immediate danger of property damage or personal injury;
  • substantially obstructs law enforcement or other governmental functions or services; or
  • by force, threat of force, or physical action, deprives a person of a legal right or disturbs another person’s enjoyment of a legal right.

Other Relevant Laws

• Tex. Elec. Code § 273.081: Authorizes a person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation of the Election Code to obtain appropriate injunctive relief to prevent the violation from continuing or occurring.

Definitions

• See Tex. Elec. Code §§ 1.005, 33.001; Tex. Penal Code § 1.07; and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 2A.001–.002.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Texas

The governor of Texas serves as the chief executive officer of the state (Tex. Const. art. IV, § 1). The governor oversees the operation of Texas’s government. Governor Greg Abbott was first elected in 2014 and was most recently reelected to a third term in 2022.

State law authorizes the governor to declare a state of disaster upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or threat of disaster is imminent (Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.014(a)). During a declared disaster, the governor may issue executive orders, proclamations, and regulations, which “have the force and effect of law” (Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.012). The governor also may “suspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business or the orders or rules of a state agency if strict compliance with the provisions, orders, or rules would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with a disaster” (Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.016(a)). Additionally, the governor may “control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area and the movement of persons and the occupancy of premises in the area” (Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.018(c)).

In Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Southwest, & Texoma Regions, the Texas Supreme Court considered a challenge to Governor Abbott’s modification of an earlier proclamation altering state election procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic. The earlier proclamation suspended the election law’s restriction on hand delivery of mail ballots before Election Day (Tex. Elec. Code § 86.006(a-1)), thereby permitting earlier hand delivery, and extended the early voting period by six days. Governor Abbott subsequently modified that proclamation to limit pre-Election Day hand delivery to a single designated location per county, citing ballot security concerns. The plaintiffs challenged only the later proclamation and sought reinstatement of the earlier one. The court held that the governor had not exceeded his authority under Section 418.016(a), reasoning that the later proclamation merely adjusted the governor’s earlier response to the pandemic, and that Section 418.016(a) did not require each gubernatorial action to be directed solely toward alleviating the disaster itself. The court further relied on Section 418.012, which authorizes the governor to amend or rescind executive orders, in concluding that the governor may “balance a variety of competing considerations,” including ballot integrity, when amending or rescinding an emergency order.

Beyond Chapter 418 of the Government Code, Texas’s Election Code also gives the governor election-specific emergency authority. When the governor “determines that an emergency warrants holding a special election before the appropriate uniform election date,” the election may be held on an earlier nonuniform date (Tex. Elec. Code § 41.0011(a)).

The governor is also the commander in chief of the state’s military forces (Tex. Const. art. IV, § 7; Tex. Gov’t. Code § 437.002(a)), which include the Texas National Guard — comprising the Texas Army National Guard and Texas Air National Guard — the Texas State Guard, and “any other military forces organized under state law” (Tex. Gov’t. Code § 437.001(14)–(15)). The governor may call all or part of the state military forces to repel or suppress an actual or threatened invasion or insurrection or “if the governor considers it necessary to enforce state law” (Tex. Gov’t Code § 431.111(a)). The governor may also call such forces to assist civil authorities in executing the law or, through a unit commander, to suppress or prevent “tumult, riot, or the actions of a group of persons acting together by force” with intent to breach the peace, commit violence against a person or property, or otherwise violate state law (Tex. Gov’t Code § 431.111(b)–(c)).

Texas Secretary of State

Robert S. Howden is Texas’s secretary of state. The governor appoints the secretary of state with the advice and consent of the state Senate (Tex. Const. art. IV, § 21).

The secretary of state is Texas’s chief election officer and oversees the Elections Division (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.001(a)–(b)). The secretary is responsible for obtaining and maintaining uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election law and, in carrying out that responsibility, must prepare and distribute detailed written directives and instructions to appropriate state and local election authorities (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.003).

The secretary of state’s key election responsibilities include implementing and maintaining the statewide computerized voter registration list and taking steps to identify duplicate or outdated registrations (Tex. Elec. Code §§ 18.061(a)–(c), 18.062(a), (i), 18.0681); approving voting systems and equipment and prescribing additional voting system standards consistent with the election law (Tex. Elec. Code §§ 122.001(a), 122.031(a)); and supporting the statewide canvass by setting the time for the canvass, receiving county returns, and preparing the statewide tabulation (Tex. Elec. Code §§ 67.007, 67.012(a)–(b), 67.013).

The secretary of state may take appropriate action to protect citizens’ voting rights from abuse by election authorities and may order an election official to correct conduct that impedes the free exercise of voting rights or, absent a court order, delays or cancels an election without specific statutory authority (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.005(a)–(b)). If the official fails to comply, the secretary may seek enforcement of the order through the attorney general by temporary restraining order or writ of injunction or mandamus (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.005(c)). The secretary may also appoint state inspectors for an election and may personally or through staff conduct inspections whether or not an election law violation is suspected (Tex. Elec. Code §§ 34.001(a), 34.004). The secretary may refer a reported violation of law to the attorney general, if the attorney general has jurisdiction, or to a prosecuting attorney with jurisdiction; however, if the secretary determines that there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal conduct in connection with an election, then referral to the attorney general is mandatory (Tex. Elec. Code §§ 31.006(a), 34.005(a)). If a state inspector is unlawfully prevented or obstructed from performing their duties, the secretary may seek injunctive, mandamus, or other available relief (Tex. Elec. Code § 34.005(b)).

For counties with a population of more than four million, the secretary of state has additional administrative oversight authority when a qualifying election complaint has been filed, the county election official has received statutory notice, and an investigation gives the secretary good cause to believe that a recurring pattern of specified election administration or voter registration problems exists (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.017(a)). During such oversight, the secretary may require approval and review of county election policies and procedures and conduct in-person observations of activities involving election preparation, early voting, Election Day, and postelection procedures (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.020(b)). At the conclusion of oversight, if the recurring pattern of problems has not been rectified or continues to impede the free exercise of voting rights, the secretary may petition for removal of the applicable county officer and, where the county uses a county elections administrator, may enter a written order terminating that administrator’s employment (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.021(a)–(b)). Any resulting vacancy among county elections administrators is filled via appointment by the county election commission (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.038(a)).

Additionally, the secretary of state has authority to promulgate rules on specified election-related matters, including technologies and procedures for digitally submitting changes to voter registration information (Tex. Elec. Code § 15.021(e)); implementation of the secretary’s election information website requirements (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.016(e)(2)); Help America Vote Act implementation and complaint procedures (Tex. Elec. Code § 31.010); polling place opening and closing procedures (Tex. Elec. Code § 66.004); reconciliation of votes and voters at central counting stations (Tex. Elec. Code § 127.131(f)); and risk-limiting audits (Tex. Elec. Code § 127.303). Select examples of regulations include:

• 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 81.39: Establishes procedures for emailing unmarked ballots to eligible military and overseas voters in federal elections, including eligibility requirements, transmission and return procedures, ballot processing and rejection, and a statewide system for tracking ballot status.
• 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 81.60: Establishes procedures for certification of voting systems, including application and documentation requirements, examination procedures, a public hearing and written comment period, and a determination by the secretary whether to approve or disapprove the system.
• 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 81.70: Establishes specifications for voting booths that may be used without individual approval, and requires specified booths that do not satisfy those standards to be submitted to the secretary for individual approval.

To the extent that the secretary of state has authority to promulgate a rule in a particular election-related area, the Texas Administrative Procedure Act permits adoption of an emergency rule without prior notice or hearing, or with abbreviated notice and a practicable hearing, if the secretary finds that an imminent peril to public health, safety, or welfare — or a requirement of state or federal law — requires adoption on fewer than 30 days’ notice and states the reasons for that finding in writing (Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.034(a)).

Texas National Guard

Major General Thomas Suelzer serves as the adjutant general of Texas. The adjutant general commands all “Texas military forces,” which include the Texas National Guard — comprising the Texas Army National Guard and Texas Air National Guard — the Texas State Guard, and “any other military forces organized under state law” (Tex. Gov’t. Code § 437.001(2), (14)–(15)). If the governor is unable to perform the duties of commander in chief, the adjutant general commands the Texas military forces unless the state constitution or other state law requires the lieutenant governor or president of the senate to perform the governor’s duties (Tex. Gov’t Code § 437.002(b)).

The adjutant general is appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the state Senate (Tex. Gov’t. Code § 437.003(a)). The adjutant general may be removed for failing to possess or maintain the required qualifications for service; failing to obtain approval from the General Officer Federal Recognition Board or its successor; violating applicable federal, state, or department ethical standards; or being unable to discharge the duties of the position because of illness or disability (Tex. Gov’t Code § 437.061(a)(1)–(5)).

Governor Greg Abbott appointed Major General Suelzer on March 2022.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts”; the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked Title 10 to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment. Approximately 200 Texas National Guard members were ultimately deployed to Chicago but were demobilized in November 2025 while the litigation continued.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “at this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon.

During the 2024 general election, Texas National Guard members were placed on standby at a state military installation to provide emergency management support if needed, while two additional service members provided liaison support at an emergency operations center.

The Texas National Guard has also played a significant role in Operation Lone Star, a state border security initiative launched by Governor Abbott in March 2021 in response to a rise in illegal immigration and supported since May 2021 by a continuously renewed disaster declaration directing state resources toward border enforcement. In January 2025, Texas and U.S. Customs and Border Protection entered into a memorandum of understanding authorizing designated active-duty Texas National Guard personnel to perform immigration-officer functions, including investigating and arresting individuals for civil immigration violations and transporting them for detention, removal, or repatriation.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.

Discussion

Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.

State law permits most adults age 21 or older to carry a handgun, whether openly or concealed, without a license (Tex. Penal Code § 46.02(a)). However, a handgun intentionally displayed in plain view in a public place generally must be carried in a holster (Tex. Penal Code § 46.02(a-5)). Additionally, Texas law prohibits intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possessing a firearm in a polling place on Election Day or while early voting is in progress, excluding driveways, streets, sidewalks, walkways, parking lots, parking garages, and other parking areas (Tex. Penal Code § 46.03(a)(2), (c)(4)).

Members of the U.S. armed forces or National Guard may invoke a defense to prosecution under these restrictions when they possess a firearm “in the actual discharge of [their] official duties” (Tex. Penal Code § 46.03(b)). “Peace officers” are also exempt from Section 46.03’s restrictions (Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(1)). Texas law defines “peace officers” to include numerous state and local law enforcement personnel, including sheriffs and their deputies, constables and their deputies, municipal police officers, and Department of Public Safety officers (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2A.001(1)–(4)). This exemption is therefore unlikely to apply to federal law enforcement officers. State law further exempts “special investigators” from Section 46.03’s restrictions (Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(1)). According to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 2A.002(a)(1)–(18), (b), (d)–(e), the term “special investigators” encompasses the following federal officials:

• special agents of the FBI, the Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
• inspectors of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service;
• special agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation division;
• civilian Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) special agents;
• U.S. marshals and deputy marshals;
• State Department Diplomatic Security Service special agents;
• special agents of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration and the offices of inspector general of the Social Security Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Agriculture;
• special agents of the Commerce Department’s Office of Export Enforcement;
• special agents of the ArmyCriminal Investigation Division (formerly the Criminal Investigation Command);
• Air Force Office of Special Investigations special agents;
• police officers with the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Security and Law Enforcement; and
• subject to specified conditions, certain federal officers designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to protect federal property, National Park Service law enforcement officers, and U.S. Forest Service agents and officers.

Other exemptions may also apply to certain federal officials.

Texas law exempts an active or retired judicial officer licensed to carry a handgun, a category that includes a federal judge who is a Texas resident and a retired federal judge who is a Texas resident (Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(4); Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.201(a)(1)(B), (a)(3)(C)).

State law also exempts qualifying retired federal law enforcement officers, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 926C, who hold the required Texas certificate of proficiency and carry qualifying photo identification verifying their retired status (Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(5)).

Finally, Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(6)–(7) expressly exempts a U.S. attorney or assistant U.S. attorney who is licensed to carry a handgun under Texas law.

If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
  • Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
• If an in-person voting site is located on federal property, meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2020, for example, the department deployed monitors to 18 states, including Texas, where monitors were sent to Harris and Waller counties. In November 2024, it deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Atascosa, Bexar, Dallas, Frio, Harris, Hays, Palo Pinto, and Waller counties in Texas. The DOJ announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, the department announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Questions about the scope of monitors’ access have continued to arise in recent elections. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct. In Texas, state law generally prohibits being present inside a polling place unless permitted by the election law, which includes “a person whose presence has been authorized by the presiding judge” (Tex. Elec. Code §§ 61.001(a), (a-1)(15), 85.037). It similarly prohibits being present in a central counting station while ballots are being counted unless permitted by the election law, which includes persons whose presence the counting station manager has authorized (Tex. Elec. Code § 127.008(a), (b)(6)). In a lawsuit challenging the deployment of monitors during the 2024 election, Texas officials took the position that these provisions do not authorize monitors to enter either polling places or central counting stations. In that case, the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate[.]” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(1) prohibits using coercion to influence or attempt to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of official power or performance of an official duty, or to induce them to violate a known legal duty. Tex. Penal Code § 36.06(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) further prohibits intentionally or knowingly harming or threatening to harm a public servant by an unlawful act to prevent or delay their service or in retaliation for their service or status. Additional provisions prohibit knowingly accessing a computer or computer system that is part of a system using direct-recording electronic voting machines in order to prevent lawful voting, change a lawfully cast vote, prevent a lawful vote from being counted, or cause an unlawful vote to be counted (Tex. Penal Code § 33.05(b)(1)–(4)); anyone other than the tabulation supervisor or an assistant from operating automatic tabulating equipment or handling ballots being automatically counted while the count is underway (Tex. Elec. Code § 127.127); knowingly or intentionally removing or attempting to remove voted ballots from a ballot box in a manner not authorized by law (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.003(a)); knowingly or intentionally attempting to discard or destroy a voter’s completed ballot without consent, count invalid votes or refuse to count valid votes, or alter an election report to include invalid votes or exclude valid votes (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013(a)(9)–(11)); and knowingly making a false alteration of a governmental record or intentionally destroying, concealing, removing, or otherwise impairing its accuracy, legibility, or availability (Tex. Penal Code § 37.10(a)(1), (3)).

Moreover, Texas law protects voters against intimidation. Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(2) prohibits using coercion to influence or attempt to influence a voter not to vote or to vote in a particular manner. Relatedly, Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013(a)(1), (5) prohibits knowingly or intentionally attempting to influence another person’s independent exercise of the vote, including by altering a ballot or otherwise causing it not to reflect the voter’s intent, and prohibits providing false information with the intent to prevent an eligible voter from voting. Texas also prohibits retaliating against a voter because they voted for or against a candidate or measure, or refused to reveal how they voted, by harming or threatening to harm them through an unlawful act (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.001(a)(1)). Additionally, Tex. Elec. Code § 61.008(a) prohibits indicating to a voter in a polling place, by word, sign, or gesture, how one desires the voter to vote or not vote, while Tex. Elec. Code § 61.006(a) prohibits a person present for a purpose other than voting from knowingly communicating information obtained at the polling place about how a voter voted. Finally, Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014(a)–(b)Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014(a)–(b), (d) prohibits using a wireless communication device within a room where voting is taking place or using mechanical or electronic means to record images or sound within 100 feet of a voting station, except that the wireless device restriction does not apply where otherwise permitted under provisions governing accessible voting stations, and neither restriction applies to an election officer conducting official duties, to an employee of the polling-place location acting in the course of employment, and to the use of election equipment necessary for the conduct of an election.

On top of these prohibitions, Texas law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law. Tex. Elec. Code § 33.0015 prohibits a poll watcher from interfering in or obstructing the orderly conduct of an election. Additional provisions prohibit a poll watcher from being present at a voting station while a voter is preparing a ballot or receiving assistance from a person of the voter’s choice (Tex. Elec. Code § 33.057(b)), and prohibit a watcher on duty from conversing with a voter or otherwise communicating with a voter regarding the election, or conversing with an election officer regarding the election except to call attention to an irregularity or violation of law (Tex. Elec. Code § 33.058(a)(1)–(3)). Tex. Elec. Code § 33.051(c) further prohibits accepting a watcher for service while they possess a device capable of recording images or sound unless they agree to disable or deactivate the device.

The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. In Texas, the county clerk is the general custodian of election records for elections ordered by the governor or a county authority and for primary elections (Tex. Elec. Code § 66.001(1)).

Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Texas election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes voter registration lists available to the public on request (Tex. Elec. Code § 18.008(a)), it prohibits disclosure of voters’ Social Security numbers, Texas driver’s license numbers, and Department of Public Safety personal identification card numbers (Tex. Elec. Code § 13.004(c)(1)–(3), (c-1)), and prohibits voter registrars and other county officials from posting on a website voters’ phone numbers, Social Security numbers, driver’s license or personal identification card numbers, birth dates, and certain protected residence addresses (Tex. Elec. Code § 13.004(d)(1)–(5)).

In July 2025, the Department of Justice requested Texas’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. Texas later agreed to provide the full list pursuant to a memorandum of understanding.

In April 2026, Lubbock, Brazos, and Montgomery Counties reportedly either received or were told they would soon receive DHS administrative subpoenas seeking detailed voter records, including voter registration applications, signatures, and voter history.

In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(1) prohibits using coercion to influence or attempt to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of official power or performance of an official duty, or to induce them to violate a known legal duty. Tex. Penal Code § 36.06(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) further prohibits intentionally or knowingly harming or threatening to harm a public servant by an unlawful act to prevent or delay their service or in retaliation for their service or status. Additional provisions prohibit knowingly accessing a computer or computer system that is part of a system using direct-recording electronic voting machines in order to prevent lawful voting, change a lawfully cast vote, prevent a lawful vote from being counted, or cause an unlawful vote to be counted (Tex. Penal Code § 33.05(b)(1)–(4)); anyone other than the tabulation supervisor or an assistant from operating automatic tabulating equipment or handling ballots being automatically counted while the count is underway (Tex. Elec. Code § 127.127); knowingly or intentionally removing or attempting to remove voted ballots from a ballot box in a manner not authorized by law (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.003(a)); knowingly or intentionally attempting to discard or destroy a voter’s completed ballot without consent, count invalid votes or refuse to count valid votes, or alter an election report to include invalid votes or exclude valid votes (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013(a)(9)–(11)); and knowingly making a false alteration of a governmental record or intentionally destroying, concealing, removing, or otherwise impairing its accuracy, legibility, or availability (Tex. Penal Code § 37.10(a)(1), (3)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
• It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult the Texas Association of County Election Officials, the Texas secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to a voting location

Summary

Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to voting locations may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

As explained above, Texas generally permits most adults age 21 or older to carry a handgun without a license but prohibits possessing firearms at polling places while voting is underway (Tex. Penal Code §§ 46.02(a), 46.03(a)(2), (c)(4)). Members of the U.S. armed forces or National Guard may invoke a defense to prosecution under this restriction when they possess a firearm in the actual discharge of their official duties (Tex. Penal Code § 46.03(b)). Texas also exempts “peace officers” and “special investigators” from Section 46.03, although the former category generally encompasses state and local law enforcement personnel, while the latter includes numerous federal law enforcement officers including FBI, Secret Service, ICE, ATF, DEA, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S. marshals and other specified federal agents and officers (Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(1); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 2A.001–.002). Additional exemptions may apply to certain federal judges, qualifying retired federal law enforcement officers, and U.S. attorneys and assistant U.S. attorneys licensed to carry a handgun under Texas law (Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(a)(4)–(7)).

Beyond these location-specific firearm restrictions, Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1)–(3) prohibits intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another person; intentionally or knowingly threatening another person with imminent bodily injury; or intentionally or knowingly making physical contact with another person, knowing or having reasonable basis to believe that the contact will be regarded as offensive or provocative. Relatedly, Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a) prohibits causing serious bodily injury to another person or using or exhibiting a deadly weapon when violating Section 22.01. These provisions do not contain any exemptions. Consequently, these provisions might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Additionally, Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(a)–(b) prohibits recklessly engaging in conduct that places another person in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, as well as knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of one or more individuals, or at or in the direction of a habitation, building, or vehicle while reckless as to whether it is occupied. The statute generally presumes recklessness and danger when a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another person, but that presumption does not apply to a “peace officer” lawfully discharging official duties (Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(c)). It also exempts from the prohibition on knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of an individual a “peace officer” who is actually discharging official duties and reasonably believes that the firearm discharge is justified under Texas law (Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(f)). As explained above, however, Texas’s statutory definition of “peace officer” generally encompasses state and local law enforcement personnel but not federal officers, so these peace officer exceptions are unlikely to apply to federal law enforcement officers.

Furthermore, Tex. Penal Code § 42.01(a)(1)–(2), (4), (6)–(8) prohibits using language or making a gesture or display in a public place that tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace, abusing or threatening a person in a public place in an obviously offensive manner, fighting with another person in a public place, discharging a firearm in a public place other than a public road or sport shooting range, and displaying a firearm or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm. The provision includes narrow exemptions for certain Texas Parks and Wildlife Department employees and students under 12, neither of which applies to armed federal personnel.

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Similarly, Texas law entitles a person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation of the election law to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the violation from continuing or occurring (Tex. Elec. Code § 273.081).

Texas law also prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(2) prohibits using coercion to influence or attempt to influence a voter not to vote or to vote in a particular manner. Relatedly, Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013(a)(1), (5) prohibits knowingly or intentionally attempting to influence another person’s independent exercise of the vote, including by altering a ballot or otherwise causing it not to reflect the voter’s intent, and prohibits providing false information with the intent to prevent an eligible voter from voting. Texas also prohibits retaliating against a voter because they voted for or against a candidate or measure, or refused to reveal how they voted, by harming or threatening to harm them through an unlawful act (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.001(a)(1)). Additionally, Tex. Elec. Code § 61.008(a) prohibits indicating to a voter in a polling place, by word, sign, or gesture, how one desires the voter to vote or not vote, while Tex. Elec. Code § 61.006(a) prohibits a person present for a purpose other than voting from knowingly communicating information obtained at the polling place about how a voter voted. Finally, Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014(a)–(b)Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014(a)–(b), (d) prohibits using a wireless communication device within a room where voting is taking place or using mechanical or electronic means to record images or sound within 100 feet of a voting station, except that the wireless device restriction does not apply where otherwise permitted under provisions governing accessible voting stations, and neither restriction applies to an election officer conducting official duties, to an employee of the polling-place location acting in the course of employment, and to the use of election equipment necessary for the conduct of an election.

Additionally, Texas law targets those who would interfere with election administration.

Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(1) prohibits using coercion to influence or attempt to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of official power or performance of an official duty, or to induce them to violate a known legal duty. Tex. Penal Code § 36.06(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A) further prohibits intentionally or knowingly harming or threatening to harm a public servant by an unlawful act to prevent or delay their service or in retaliation for their service or status. Additional provisions prohibit knowingly accessing a computer or computer system that is part of a system using direct-recording electronic voting machines in order to prevent lawful voting, change a lawfully cast vote, prevent a lawful vote from being counted, or cause an unlawful vote to be counted (Tex. Penal Code § 33.05(b)(1)–(4)); anyone other than the tabulation supervisor or an assistant from operating automatic tabulating equipment or handling ballots being automatically counted while the count is underway (Tex. Elec. Code § 127.127); knowingly or intentionally removing or attempting to remove voted ballots from a ballot box in a manner not authorized by law (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.003(a)); knowingly or intentionally attempting to discard or destroy a voter’s completed ballot without consent, count invalid votes or refuse to count valid votes, or alter an election report to include invalid votes or exclude valid votes (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013(a)(9)–(11)); and knowingly making a false alteration of a governmental record or intentionally destroying, concealing, removing, or otherwise impairing its accuracy, legibility, or availability (Tex. Penal Code § 37.10(a)(1), (3)).

Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. The presiding election judge must preserve order and prevent breaches of the peace and violations of the election law in the polling place and within the area where electioneering and loitering are prohibited; may appoint licensed peace officers as “special peace officers” to assist in performing those duties; and has the powers of a district judge to enforce order and preserve the peace, including the authority to issue arrest warrants (Tex. Elec. Code § 32.075(a)–(c)). The presiding judge may not enforce electioneering or loitering restrictions outside the statutorily protected area, and a special peace officer may not enforce those restrictions unless the officer’s appointment is approved by the presiding officer of the local canvassing authority (Tex. Elec. Code § 32.075(e)–(f)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to voting locations.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at voting locations.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1)–(3) prohibits intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another person; intentionally or knowingly threatening another person with imminent bodily injury; or intentionally or knowingly making physical contact with another person, knowing or having reasonable basis to believe that the contact will be regarded as offensive or provocative. Relatedly, Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a) prohibits causing serious bodily injury to another person or using or exhibiting a deadly weapon when violating Section 22.01. These provisions do not contain any exemptions. Consequently, these provisions might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Additionally, Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(a)–(b) prohibits recklessly engaging in conduct that places another person in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, as well as knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of one or more individuals, or at or in the direction of a habitation, building, or vehicle while reckless as to whether it is occupied. The statute generally presumes recklessness and danger when a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another person, but that presumption does not apply to a “peace officer” lawfully discharging official duties (Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(c)). It also exempts from the prohibition on knowingly discharging a firearm at or in the direction of an individual a “peace officer” who is actually discharging official duties and reasonably believes that the firearm discharge is justified under Texas law (Tex. Penal Code § 22.05(f)). As explained above, however, Texas’s statutory definition of “peace officer” generally encompasses state and local law enforcement personnel but not federal officers, so these peace officer exceptions are unlikely to apply to federal law enforcement officers.

Furthermore, Tex. Penal Code § 42.01(a)(1)–(2), (4), (6)–(8) prohibits using language or making a gesture or display in a public place that tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace, abusing or threatening a person in a public place in an obviously offensive manner, fighting with another person in a public place, discharging a firearm in a public place other than a public road or sport shooting range, and displaying a firearm or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm. The provision includes narrow exemptions for certain Texas Parks and Wildlife Department employees and students under 12, neither of which applies to armed federal personnel.

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Similarly, Texas law entitles a person who is being harmed or is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation of the election law to obtain injunctive relief to prevent the violation from continuing or occurring (Tex. Elec. Code § 273.081).

Texas law also prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(2) prohibits using coercion to influence or attempt to influence a voter not to vote or to vote in a particular manner. Relatedly, Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013(a)(1), (5) prohibits knowingly or intentionally attempting to influence another person’s independent exercise of the vote, including by altering a ballot or otherwise causing it not to reflect the voter’s intent, and prohibits providing false information with the intent to prevent an eligible voter from voting. Texas also prohibits retaliating against a voter because they voted for or against a candidate or measure, or refused to reveal how they voted, by harming or threatening to harm them through an unlawful act (Tex. Elec. Code § 276.001(a)(1)). Additionally, Tex. Elec. Code § 61.008(a) prohibits indicating to a voter in a polling place, by word, sign, or gesture, how one desires the voter to vote or not vote, while Tex. Elec. Code § 61.006(a) prohibits a person present for a purpose other than voting from knowingly communicating information obtained at the polling place about how a voter voted. Finally, Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014(a)–(b)Tex. Elec. Code § 61.014(a)–(b), (d) prohibits using a wireless communication device within a room where voting is taking place or using mechanical or electronic means to record images or sound within 100 feet of a voting station, except that the wireless device restriction does not apply where otherwise permitted under provisions governing accessible voting stations, and neither restriction applies to an election officer conducting official duties, to an employee of the polling-place location acting in the course of employment, and to the use of election equipment necessary for the conduct of an election.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.

Discussion

Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.

One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” under these changes.

USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.

Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”

Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; reminding voters that they may personally return their mail ballots to the early voting clerk’s office on Election Day while the polls are open; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
• Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and remind them that they may personally return their mail ballot to the early voting clerk’s office on Election Day while the polls are open.
• If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
• Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.