The Maryland Election Interference Law Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
  • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

DOJ “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1998, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

 

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in March 2026.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation does not did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025 advanced his nomination.

 

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Todd Blanche to serve as attorney general in June 2026. The Senate confirmed Blanche as head of the DOJ in August.

 

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

 

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Core Election Interference Provisions

• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–201: Prohibits the following:
  • willfully and knowingly influencing or attempting to influence a voter’s vote through the use of force, threat, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer of reward, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor;
  • willfully and knowingly influencing or attempting to influence a voter’s decision whether to go to the polls through the use of force, fraud, threat, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer of reward, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor or subject to civil penalty if done without knowing it is illegal; or
  • engaging in conduct that results or intends to result in the denial or abridgement of any U.S. citizen’s right to vote on account of race, color, or disability, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor or subject to civil penalty if done without knowing it is illegal.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–203: Prohibits willfully disobeying the lawful command of an election official at a polling place on Election Day, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–204: Prohibits hindering or impeding the conduct of official election activities by breach of the peace, disorder, violence, or threat of violence, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–205: Prohibits interfering with an election official in the performance of their official duties or an individual lawfully present at a polling place or at the canvass of votes, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206: Prohibits the following as misdemeanors:
  • placing identifying marks on a ballot;
  • misrepresenting one’s ability to mark a ballot or operate voting equipment;
  • interfering with a voter inside the polling room, while marking a ballot, or while operating voting equipment;
  • inducing a voter to mark a ballot in a particular way;
  • unlocking a voting device without authorization;
  • destroying, defacing, removing, delaying delivery of, or improperly possessing a ballot;
  • canvassing, electioneering, or posting campaign material in the polling place or beyond the posted no-electioneering line, which must be as near as practicable to 100 feet from the entrance and exit closest to the voting area except in Montgomery County, where, with county elections board approval, it may be between 25 and 100 feet from the entrance and exit;
  • obstructing access to a ballot drop box through canvassing, electioneering, or posting campaign material; or
  • placing campaign or other unauthorized material on a ballot drop box.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–302: Prohibits tampering with election records, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–701: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • a person with custody of election records from willfully and knowingly destroying, defacing, falsifying, removing, or concealing any record related to voting or making a fraudulent entry or alteration of any record related to voting or permitting another person to do so; or
  • a person without custody of election items from willfully and knowingly destroying, defacing, falsifying, removing, or concealing any record related to voting or making a fraudulent entry or alteration of any record related to voting or abetting another person in doing so.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–801: Prohibits concealing, damaging, or destroying voting equipment used or intended to be used on the day of election, or removing voting equipment from the custody of election judges or other election officials, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–802: Prohibits tampering with, damaging, or attempting to damage any voting equipment that is used or will be used in an election, or preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of any voting equipment, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–803: Prohibits removing, defacing, or destroying equipment or supplies placed in a polling place by election officials during an election, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–804: Prohibits willfully and knowingly accessing an electronic voting system without authorization from the appropriate election authority, or willfully and knowingly tampering with or altering the hardware, system components, or software used by an electronic voting system for the purpose of affecting the vote count, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102: Prohibits carrying or possessing a firearm on public school property, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–111: Prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in certain sensitive locations, including private primary and secondary schools and their grounds, buildings or parts of buildings owned or leased by state or local government, buildings of public or private institutions of higher education, and locations currently being used as polling places or for canvassing ballots, and makes a willful violation a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203: Prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about one’s person, whether openly or concealed, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3–202: Prohibits assaulting another person with a firearm, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–903: Prohibits attiring or equipping an individual, or permitting an individual to be attired or equipped, in a manner that creates the appearance that they are performing an official or governmental function in connection with an election, including by wearing a public or private law enforcement or security-guard uniform, using an armband, or, except as required by law or State Board of Elections regulation for ballot security activities, carrying or displaying a gun or badge within 100 feet of a polling site on Election Day.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–904: Prohibits the following as misdemeanors:
  • knowingly and willfully making a threat to harm an election official or their immediate family member because of the official’s role in administering the election process; or
  • knowingly sending, delivering, parting with, or making for the purpose of sending or delivering such a threat.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.11.01.04: Prohibits the following within the no-electioneering boundary around a ballot drop box, which must generally be posted as near as practicable to 50 feet from the box:
  • electioneering by individuals;
  • observing or recording voter activities by groups of affiliated individuals;
  • communicating with, questioning, or otherwise interfering with voters while individually observing or recording ballot drop box activity;
  • visibly possessing, carrying, or brandishing a firearm; or
  • interfering with election officials removing materials from a ballot drop box.

Police presence at the polls

• Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10–201: Prohibits willfully acting in a disorderly manner that disturbs the public peace, or willfully failing to obey a reasonable and lawful order made by a law enforcement officer to prevent a disturbance to the public peace, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–303: Requires election judges to keep the peace at polling places and authorizes them to order the arrest of any person who breaches the peace, breaches any provision of the election law, or interferes with the work of election judges in conducting the election and carrying out their assigned tasks.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–304: Requires a police officer on duty at a polling place to obey the order of an election judge for that polling place; protects a police officer making an arrest under an election judge’s order as if the officer had received a valid warrant; and requires the officer to protect election challengers and watchers in the discharge of their duties.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–307.1: Authorizes the state elections administrator, the deputy state administrator, or a local election director, while in a polling place, to keep the peace and order the arrest of any person who breaches the peace, breaches any provision of the election law, or interferes with the work of election judges in conducting the election and carrying out their assigned tasks.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Maryland laws and regulations, including Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law §§ 2–106 and 3–505 and Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10–610 and 10–611, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Maryland State Archives maintains a schedule to assist election officials in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Custody, handling, and access for election materials and equipment

• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 3–205: Requires voter registration volunteers and individuals assisting others in registering to refrain from copying or collecting Maryland driver’s license numbers, Maryland identification numbers, Social Security numbers, or other information on a voter registration application that is protected from public disclosure.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 3–505: Requires voter registration records stored and retained in a county elections board office to be open to public inspection.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9–216: Requires each county elections board, subject to State Board of Elections approval, to establish and maintain a system to account for and maintain control over ballots from the beginning of production through postelection storage and disposition; and requires the State Board of Elections to monitor and periodically review local board compliance.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–206: Requires each local election director to manage the storage, security, maintenance, and preparation of voting system equipment and to ensure that equipment used by county elections board employees meets cybersecurity requirements.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–305: Requires county elections boards to ensure the security of ballot drop boxes, including through continuous security camera monitoring and periodic in-person visits; and to remove election-related materials from ballot drop boxes in accordance with State Board of Elections chain-of-custody procedures.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 11–202: Requires election judges, after the last voter has voted, to follow the election director’s instructions for closing the polls and performing post-closing tasks, including securing the voting system, completing required records and reports, assembling and accounting for materials to be returned to the county elections board, securely storing materials left for later retrieval, delivering materials and equipment to the county elections board, and obtaining receipts certifying delivery.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 11–403: Requires voting system equipment and documentation to remain secured until the recount period expires, any recount is completed, and any election contest is resolved; and permits a voting system to be opened and examined only by court order or by direction of a legislative committee investigating a contested election affected by that voting system.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.10.01.22: Requires precinct tabulators to be attended by at least one election judge from the time polls open until ballots are returned to the counting center; and requires election judges attending tabulators to ensure that only valid voted ballots are deposited, nothing is removed without a chief judge’s authorization, and ballot secrecy is preserved.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.08.03.06: Authorizes a county elections board to arrange for security guards to be present from the start to the end of the canvass and to assist in maintaining order.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.08.05.03: Requires completion of verification and audit procedures required by regulation before a local board of canvassers may certify election results.

Election Observers

• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–311: Prohibits accredited and nonaccredited challengers and watchers from attempting to ascertain how a voter voted or intends to vote, conversing with voters in a polling place or early voting center, assisting voters in voting, or physically handling original election documents or voting equipment; and authorizes an election judge or local election director to eject a challenger or watcher who violates these prohibitions.

Emergency Powers

• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8–103: Authorizes the following:
  • the governor, during a declared state of emergency that interferes with the electoral process, to postpone an election to a specific date, specify alternate voting locations, or specify alternate voting systems; and
  • the State Board of Elections, or a county elections board after conferring with the State Board of Elections, to seek circuit court relief when emergency circumstances short of a declared state of emergency interfere with the electoral process.
• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–303: Authorizes a county elections board, subject to State Board of Elections approval, to create a new precinct or change a precinct boundary or polling place if the county board determines that an emergency exists.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.09.01.07: Authorizes the State Board of Elections, when an emergency such as destruction of a voting system leaves insufficient time to certify a substitute system before the next election, to temporarily waive voting system certification requirements as needed to use a substitute system for the ensuing election, subject to procedures to ensure reliability and accuracy and limitations barring waiver of statutory requirements or use beyond the next general election after the emergency.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.11.01.02: Authorizes the State Board of Elections, during a national or local emergency such as a natural disaster or armed conflict, to issue special procedures or requirements to facilitate absentee voting for affected eligible voters when full compliance with absentee voting regulations or the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act is impossible or unreasonable, but does not authorize waiver of statutory requirements.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Md. Const. Decl. of Rts., art. 30: “That in all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to, and control of, the civil power.”
• Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 13–214: Prohibits associating as a military company or organization or parading in public as a military company or organization without the governor’s permission, except for units of the state’s organized militia and U.S. troops.
• Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3–803: Prohibits following another person in or about a public place, conducting visual surveillance of an area of another person’s residence where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, or maliciously engaging in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person, if done with intent to harass, alarm, or annoy, after a reasonable warning or request to stop, and without a legal purpose, provided that the prohibition does not apply to peaceable activity intended to express a political view or provide information to others, and makes such conduct misdemeanors.

Other Relevant Laws and Regulations

• Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–1004: Authorizes the attorney general to seek circuit court injunctive relief to prevent specified imminent or ongoing voting offenses from affecting a pending election.

Definitions

• See Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law §§ 1–101, 11–101; and Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 3–201, 10–201.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Maryland

The governor of Maryland serves as the chief executive officer of the state (Md. Const. art. II, § 1). Governor Wes Moore took office in 2023 and is currently serving his first four-year term.

Maryland law authorizes the governor, during a declared state of emergency that interferes with the electoral process, to postpone an election to a specified date, designate alternate voting locations, or authorize alternate voting systems (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 8–103). In October 2012, then-Governor Martin O’Malley invoked this authority to cancel early voting after determining that Hurricane Sandy’s declared emergency would interfere with the electoral process and that altering the early voting schedule was necessary to protect public safety.

The governor is the commander in chief of the state’s armed forces and “may call out the Militia to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and enforce the execution of the Laws; but shall not take the command in person, without the consent of the Legislature” (Md. Const. art. II, § 8). The militia is divided into an organized component, comprising the Maryland National Guard, reservists, and the Maryland Defense Force, and an unorganized component, which includes other able-bodied Maryland residents eligible for militia service (Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 13–202). The governor may call the National Guard into active service “in times of or on reasonable apprehension of imminent public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, insurrection, invasion, tumult, or breach of peace;” to enforce civilian or martial law; or to carry out any function of the state militia (Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 13–702).

Maryland State Board of Elections and State Administrator of Elections

The Maryland State Board of Elections is responsible for statewide oversight of election administration (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–102). The Board consists of five members who serve four-year terms and represent both principal political parties (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–101(a), (e), (f)(1)). Members are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Maryland Senate, and may be removed by the governor for incompetence, misconduct, or other good cause after the member has been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–101(c)(1)).

The current members are:

• Victoria Jackson-Stanley (chair)
• Jim Shalleck (vice chair)
• Diane Butler
• Ben Hovland

In addition to directing, supporting, monitoring, and evaluating the activities of each county elections board, the State Board of Elections adopts regulations to implement its powers and duties (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–102(b)(1)–(4)). Select examples include:

• Md. Code Regs. 33.05.05.03: Establishes procedures for issuing voter notification cards to newly registered voters, including when registration is complete and when an applicant must be removed from the statewide voter registration list after an undeliverable notice.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.11.02.04: Establishes procedures for in-person absentee ballot requests, including requests submitted by a voter’s authorized agent, issuance of the appropriate ballot, documentation of agent authorization, and acceptance of returned ballots.
• Md. Code Regs. 33.16.01.02: Establishes a process for periodic State Board of Elections review and revision of provisional voting regulations before each statewide primary election.

Under Maryland’s Administrative Procedure Act, a state agency may adopt a proposed regulation immediately on an emergency basis if the agency declares emergency adoption necessary; submits the proposed regulation and required fiscal impact statement to the General Assembly’s Joint Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review and the Maryland Department of Legislative Services; and obtains the Committee’s approval (Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10–111(b)(1)). Emergency approval must include a time limit of no more than 180 days (Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10–111(b)(4)(ii)).

The State Board of Elections is also charged with receiving or auditing campaign finance reports, independent-expenditure reports, electioneering communication reports, and related records; canvassing and certifying election results; and making information about voter registration and the electoral process available to the general public (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–102(b)(5), (9)–(10)).

The Board, with the advice and consent of the Maryland Senate, appoints a state administrator of Elections, who serves at the pleasure of the Board and is the state’s chief election official (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–103(a), (b)(1), (9)). The state administrator supervises the operations of county elections boards and implements a single, uniform, centralized, computerized statewide voter registration list (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–103(b)(4), (7)). The current state administrator of elections is Jared DeMarinis.

County Boards of Elections and Election Judges

County Boards of Elections

Maryland primarily assigns responsibility for local election administration to county boards of elections. Most county elections boards have five regular members, three from the majority party and two from the principal minority party (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–201(b)(1)). Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties also have substitute members, and Prince George’s County has four majority-party regular members and one principal-minority-party regular member (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–201(2)–(3)).

County elections board members are appointed by the governor from lists submitted by the relevant county central committee and are generally subject to Maryland Senate confirmation, though House of Delegates confirmation applies in Caroline, Dorchester, and Kent Counties if there is no resident senator (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–201(g)(1), (4)). If the governor rejects all nominees as unfit or incompetent, the governor may request additional lists, and may appoint any eligible member of the appropriate party if a list of four eligible nominees is not submitted within 20 days, or if all nominees on three lists are rejected (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–201(g)(2), (3)). The governor may also remove county elections board members for incompetence, misconduct, or other good cause, upon written charges and after affording the member notice and an opportunity to be heard (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–201(f)).

Under Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–202(b)(1), (4), (6)–(12), county elections boards must:

• oversee the conduct of all elections in its county and ensure that the election process is conducted in an open, convenient, and impartial manner;
• maintain an office and warehouse and provide the supplies and equipment necessary for voter registration and elections, subject to the statutory cost-sharing rules;
• establish and alter precinct boundaries and numbers, provide a suitable polling place for each precinct, and assign voters to precincts;
• serve as the local board of canvassers and certify the results of each election it conducts;
• provide the public with timely information and notice concerning voter registration and elections;
• make determinations and hear and decide challenges and appeals as provided by law;
• aid in the prosecution of offenses under the election law and, upon a finding of probable cause, refer matters to the appropriate prosecutorial authority;
• maintain and dispose of records in accordance with the State Board of Elections’ records management plan; and
• administer voter registration and absentee voting for nursing homes and assisted living facilities in accordance with procedures established by the state administrator and approved by the State Board of Elections.

Each county elections board must appoint an election director to manage its operations and supervise its staff, and must confer with the state administrator of elections in making that appointment (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–202(b)(2), (3)). County elections boards may also adopt regulations considered necessary to perform their duties, subject to State Board of Elections approval (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–202(b)(5)).

Election Judges

Election judges assist county elections boards in running elections.

Each county elections board must generally provide at least four election judges to staff each polling place, although a polling place in a precinct with fewer than 200 registered voters may have two election judges (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–201(a)(1)). Election judges are appointed by the election director with the approval of the county board (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–203(a)). To the extent practicable, each polling place must have an equal number of election judges, including chief judges, from the majority party and the principal minority party (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–201(b)(1)). One or two election judges in each precinct must be designated as chief judges, who are charged with supervising the staff at the polling place (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–203(b)).

To qualify as an election judge, an individual generally must be a registered voter residing in the county where they are appointed and must be able to speak, read, and write English (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–202(a)(1), (b)). If a qualified county resident cannot be found with reasonable effort, the county elections board may appoint a registered voter from another Maryland county, and minors who are at least 16 years old and registered to vote may also serve as election judges (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–202(a)(2)). Election judges may not engage in partisan or political activity proscribed by state election law (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–202(c)).

A county board must investigate any complaint it receives regarding the fitness, qualifications, or performance of an election judge, and must remove any judge found to be unfit or incompetent (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–207). During voting hours, if a vacancy arises, the county board may fill it with a substitute election judge who has been recruited and trained, or an election judge present at the polling place may fill the position by appointing a person registered with the same party affiliation as the absent judge (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–203(d)).

Election judges perform a broad range of duties to assist county boards in conducting elections, including opening and closing the polling place; verifying voter identity and registration information upon check-in; instructing voters on the use of the voting system and assisting voters who require help voting; ensuring that each voter’s right to cast a ballot in privacy is maintained, the integrity of the voting process is preserved, order in the polling place is maintained, and all election laws are observed; and, after polls close, recording votes, producing vote totals, announcing results, and completing required documents, records, and reports (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law §§ 10–303(a)(1), (2), 10–309(a), 10–310(a), (c), 11–202(a)(2), (b)).

Maryland National Guard

Major General Janeen L. Birckhead serves as the adjutant general of Maryland and oversees the Maryland Military Department, which includes the Maryland National Guard and the Maryland Defense Force. The adjutant general serves until the appointment and qualification of their successor or until removed by a court martial (Md. Const. art. IX, § 2). Governor Wes Moore appointed Major General Birckhead on April 7, 2023.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts;” the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon.

As for the Maryland National Guard’s involvement in elections, members of the Guard worked closely with U.S. Cyber Command’s Cyber National Mission Force in 2020 to “protect the election process by countering adversarial bad actors throughout 2020.”

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal law enforcement officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote

Summary

Federal law protects the voting rights of federal law enforcement officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they may bring firearms into in-person voting locations. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.

Discussion

Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(a)(1)(i), (b)(2) prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about one’s person, whether openly or concealed, unless an individual has a permit to carry a concealed weapon. However, the provision exempts federal law enforcement and military personnel who are “authorized at the time and under the circumstances to wear, carry, or transport the handgun as part of the person’s official equipment” (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(b)(1)(i), (ii)). And it permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun “in connection with an organized military activity” if the handgun is unloaded and carried in an enclosed case or enclosed holster (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(b)(4)).

Additionally, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–111(a)(4)(iii), (d)(1) prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in locations currently being used as polling places, but this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officials, on-duty employees of law enforcement agencies, or service members who are on duty or traveling to or from duty (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–111(a)(5), (6), (8), (b)(1)–(3)).

Furthermore, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(b) prohibits carrying or possessing a firearm, on public school property, which may also serve as a polling site. The provision exempts “a law enforcement officer in the regular course of the officer’s duty” (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(a)(1)). The statute does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be covered. The provision also exempts as an off-duty or retired law enforcement officer in good standing from a U.S. law enforcement agency who is a parent, guardian, or visitor of a student attending a school located on the public school property, provided that the officer displays a badge or credential, the weapon is concealed, and the officer is authorized to carry a concealed handgun in Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(a)(2)).

Separately, local jurisdictions can regulate firearm possession “within 100 yards of or in a park, church, school, public building, and other place of public assembly” (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–209(a), (b)(1)(iii)). For instance, Montgomery County prohibits possessing or transporting firearms in or within 100 yards of a “place of public assembly,” defined to include schools, government buildings, polling places, courthouses, and associated property such as parking lots and grounds (Montgomery Cnty., Md., Code §§ 57–1, 57–11(a)). The ordinance exempts “law enforcement officer[s]” and security guards licensed to carry firearms but does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be covered.

If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel, law enforcement, and the State Board of Elections, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
  • Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal law enforcement officials or military personnel arrive at an election facility to conduct routine business

Summary

Federal law enforcement officials or military personnel may arrive at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities to conduct routine business. State and federal laws, however, may restrict whether they may appear armed at election facilities. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when these sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.

Discussion

As an initial matter, Maryland law permits voters to return absentee ballots by mailing them to their county elections board office; delivering them to a county board office, early voting center, or polling place; or depositing them in a ballot drop box (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9–310.1(a); Md. Code Regs. 33.11.03.06(G)).

Federal law enforcement officials or military personnel appearing at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities to conduct routine business are typically armed.

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(a)(1)(i), (b)(2) prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about one’s person, whether openly or concealed, unless an individual has a permit to carry a concealed weapon. However, the provision exempts federal law enforcement and military personnel who are “authorized at the time and under the circumstances to wear, carry, or transport the handgun as part of the person’s official equipment” (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(b)(1)(i), (ii)). And it permits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun “in connection with an organized military activity” if the handgun is unloaded and carried in an enclosed case or enclosed holster (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(b)(4)).

Additionally, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–111(a)(4)(iii), (d)(1) prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a firearm in locations currently being used as polling places and ballot canvassing sites. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officials, on-duty employees of law enforcement agencies, or service members who are on duty or traveling to or from duty (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–111(a)(5), (6), (8), (b)(1)–(3)).

Furthermore, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(b) prohibits carrying or possessing a firearm, on public school property, which may also serve as a polling site. The provision exempts “a law enforcement officer in the regular course of the officer’s duty” (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(a)(1)). The statute does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be covered. The provision also exempts as an off-duty or retired law enforcement officer in good standing from a U.S. law enforcement agency who is a parent, guardian, or visitor of a student attending a school located on the public school property, provided that the officer displays a badge or credential, the weapon is concealed, and the officer is authorized to carry a concealed handgun in Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(a)(2)).

Maryland regulations separately prohibit an individual from visibly possessing, visibly carrying, or brandishing a firearm within the electioneering boundary around a ballot drop box, which generally must be posted as near as practicable to 50 feet from the receptacle unless the drop box is within a polling place’s electioneering boundary (Md. Code Regs. 33.11.01.04(D), (F)(1)). The regulation permits “[a] law enforcement officer or security guard who is on duty or traveling to or from duty” to drop off materials at the drop box (Md. Code Regs. 33.11.01.04(F)(2)).

Separately, local jurisdictions can regulate firearm possession “within 100 yards of or in a park, church, school, public building, and other place of public assembly” (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–209(a), (b)(1)(iii)). For instance, Montgomery County prohibits possessing or transporting firearms in or within 100 yards of a “place of public assembly,” defined to include schools, government buildings, polling places, courthouses, and associated property such as parking lots and grounds (Montgomery Cnty., Md., Code §§ 57–1, 57–11(a)). The ordinance exempts law enforcement officer[s] and security guards licensed to carry firearms but does not define “law enforcement officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be covered.

If an in-person voting location or or ballot drop box is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel, law enforcement, and the State Board of Elections, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
  • Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Review in-person voting locations and ballot drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
• Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states, including Maryland, where monitors were sent to Montgomery County. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including Maryland, where monitors were sent to Prince George’s County. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” In Maryland, election judges must limit access to the voting room at a polling place to voters; individuals assisting or accompanying voters as permitted by law; polling place staff; members or representatives of the State Board of Elections or local board; accredited watchers or challengers; and any other individual authorized by the State Board of Elections or local board (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–308(a), (b)). When access to polling sites has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference.Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Md. Code Ann., Elect. Law § 16–204(a) prohibits hindering or impeding the conduct of official election activities by breach of the peace, disorder, violence, or threat of violence; Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–205(a) prohibits interfering with election officials in the performance of their official duties or with individuals lawfully present at a polling place or at the canvass of votes; and Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–904(b) prohibits knowingly and willfully making a threat to harm an election official or their immediate family member because of the official’s role in administering election processes. Additional provisions prohibit tampering with election records (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–302(a)); unlocking any locked compartment of a voting device unless instructed to do so by the election director, or removing a ballot from a building in which voting occurs without authorization (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206(a)(5), (7); destroying, defacing, falsifying, removing, or concealing any record related to voting, or making a fraudulent entry or alteration of any record related to voting or abetting another person in doing so (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–701(a)); concealing, damaging, or destroying voting equipment used or intended to be used on Election Day, or removing voting equipment from the custody of election judges or other election officials (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–801(a); tampering with, damaging, or attempting to damage any voting equipment that is used or will be used in an election, or preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of any voting equipment (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–802(a)); and willfully and knowingly accessing or tampering with the hardware, system components, or software of an electronic voting system for the purpose of affecting the vote count (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–804(a)).

Moreover, Maryland law protects voters against intimidation. Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–201(b)(5)–(7) prohibits willfully and knowingly using force, fraud, threats, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or an offer of reward to influence or attempt to influence a voter’s vote or their decision whether to go to the polls, and it also prohibits conduct that results in or is intended to result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race, color, or disability. State law also prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter inside the polling room, marking a ballot, or operating voting equipment, or inducing or attempting to induce a voter to mark their ballot in a particular way (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206(a)(3)–(4)).

On top of these prohibitions, Maryland law imposes certain restrictions on election challengers and watchers subject to state law. As an initial matter, Maryland distinguishes between accredited and nonaccredited challengers and watchers. Accredited challengers and watchers are registered voters formally designated by the State Board of Elections, a local board, a candidate, a political party, a political committee, or a person required to file independent-expenditure or electioneering-communication reports, and they may enter a polling place or early voting center one-half hour before the polls open, be present while the polls are open, and remain until completion of the poll-closing process and the election judges leave the polling place or early voting center (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–311(a)(1), (b)(1)–(3)). Nonaccredited challengers and watchers may enter the polling place or early voting center only to challenge a voter’s right to vote, may be limited in number, and must leave once the challenge is decided (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–311(e)(1)–(3)). Maryland law prohibits accredited and nonaccredited challengers and watchers from attempting to ascertain how a voter voted or intends to vote, conversing with voters in the polling place or early voting center, assisting voters in voting, or physically handling original election documents or voting equipment (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–311(d)(1), (e)(4)). It also authorizes an election judge or local election director to eject a challenger or watcher who violates these prohibitions (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–311(d)(2)).

The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel and the State Board of Elections to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel and the State Board of Elections. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them with your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in consultation with the State Board of Elections in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel and the State Board of Elections. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel and ensure that your counsel has also consulted with the State Board of Elections.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) request, demand, or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Maryland election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while Maryland law requires voter registration records stored and retained in county elections board offices to be open to public inspection, it requires voter registration volunteers and individuals assisting others in registering to refrain from copying or collecting Maryland driver’s license numbers, Maryland identification numbers, Social Security numbers, or other information on a voter registration application that is protected from public disclosure (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law §§ 3–205(1), 3–505(b)(1)).

In July 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested Maryland’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Maryland questioned the reason for the request and noted that voters’ personal information is typically not subject to disclosure, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. In June 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.

In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.

Maryland law also imposes its own requirements governing election material and equipment custody, handling, and access.

State law requires each county elections board to establish and maintain a system to account for, and maintain control over, ballots from the beginning of production through postelection storage and disposition, subject to State Board of Elections approval and periodic review (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9–216(a), (b)). In addition, the election director for each county elections board must manage the storage, security, maintenance, and preparation of voting system equipment and ensure that equipment used by board employees meets cybersecurity requirements (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–206(10), (12)).

During voting, Maryland law strictly limits who may handle voting equipment and election materials. Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206(a)(5)–(9) prohibits anyone other than an authorized person servicing a voting device from unlocking any locked compartment of the device unless instructed to do so by the election director; and also prohibits destroying or defacing a ballot, removing a ballot from a building in which voting occurs except as otherwise provided by law, delaying the delivery of a ballot, or possessing an official ballot printed for an election on or before Election Day unless possession is necessary and appropriate for carrying out the election process. State Board of Elections regulations further require that the precinct tabulator be attended by at least one election judge from the time polls open until ballots are returned to the counting center; and that election judges attending the tabulator ensure that only valid voted ballots are deposited, nothing is removed from the tabulator without a chief judge’s authorization, and ballot secrecy is preserved (Md. Code Regs. 33.10.01.22(B), (C)). Separately, Maryland law requires county boards to ensure the security of ballot drop boxes and to remove election-related materials from them in accordance with State Board of Elections chain-of-custody procedures (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 2–305(a)(1), (b)).

Once voting concludes, election judges must follow the election director’s instructions for closing the polls and performing post-closing tasks. Those tasks include securing the voting system to prevent further voting; completing required documents, records, and reports; assembling and accounting for all materials to be returned to the county elections board, such as voted ballots, removable data storage devices, precinct registers, voting authority cards, signs and posters, records, reports, logs, affidavits, certificates, keys to voting devices, poll books, and any other materials specified by the election director; securely storing any materials left in the polling place for later retrieval; and delivering all materials and equipment to the county elections board and obtaining receipts certifying delivery (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 11–202(b)(1), (3), (5)–(7)).

During the canvass, State Board of Elections regulations impose additional safeguards at the counting center. County elections boards may arrange for security guards to be present from the start to the end of the canvass to assist in maintaining order (Md. Code Regs. 33.08.03.06(A), (B)). Maryland regulations further prohibit a local board of canvassers from certifying election results until required verification and audit procedures have been completed (Md. Code Regs. 33.08.05.03(A)).

After the verification of the vote count, voting system equipment and documentation must remain secured until the recount period expires, any recount is completed, and any election contest is resolved; during that period, the voting system may be opened and examined only by court order or direction of a legislative committee investigating a contested election affected by that voting system (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 11–403(a)(1), (b)).

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” As an example of state law, Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–205 prohibits interfering with election officials in the performance of their official duties, or with individuals lawfully present at a polling place or at the canvass of votes.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel and the State Board of Elections to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel and the State Board of Elections of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
• It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel and the State Board of Elections on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan in consultation with the State Board of Elections to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult the Maryland Association of Election Officials, the State Board of Elections, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Armed federal law enforcement officials or troops are deployed to an election facility

Summary

Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state prohibitions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

As explained above, Maryland law generally prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun on or about one’s person, whether openly or concealed, unless the individual has a permit to carry a concealed weapon; but the law also exempts federal law enforcement and military personnel authorized to carry the handgun as part of their official equipment and permits unloaded, enclosed handguns used in connection with organized military activity (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–203(a)(1)(i), (b)(1)(i), (ii), (b)(2), (4)). State law also prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting firearms at locations currently being used as polling places or ballot-canvassing sites, subject to exceptions for federal law enforcement officials, on-duty employees of law enforcement agencies, and service members on duty or traveling to or from duty (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–111(a)(4)(iii), (a)(5), (6), (8), (b)(1)–(3), (d)(1)). Additionally, Maryland law prohibits carrying or possessing a firearm on public school property, but exempts “a law enforcement officer in the regular course of the officer’s duty,” which may cover federal law enforcement officials (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(a)(1), (b)). The provision also exempts certain off-duty or retired U.S. law enforcement officers who are parents, guardians, or visitors of students on the property, provided they display a badge or credential, keep the weapon concealed, and are authorized to carry a concealed handgun in Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–102(a)(2)). Maryland regulations further prohibit visibly possessing, visibly carrying, or brandishing a firearm within the electioneering boundary around a ballot drop box, while allowing an on-duty law enforcement officer or security guard, or one traveling to or from duty, to drop off materials at the box (Md. Code Regs. 33.11.01.04(D), (F)(1), (2)). And state law permits local jurisdictions to regulate firearm possession within 100 yards of or in a park, church, school, public building, or other place of public assembly (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4–209(a), (b)(1)(iii)).

Additionally, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3–202(b)(2) prohibits assaulting another person with a firearm. This provision does not contain any exemptions, and therefore might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate, and courts have recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to seek relief against voter intimidation (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)).

While Maryland law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–201(b)(5)–(7) prohibits willfully and knowingly using force, fraud, threats, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or an offer of reward to influence or attempt to influence a voter’s vote or their decision whether to go to the polls, and it also prohibits conduct that results in or is intended to result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race, color, or disability. State law also prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter inside the polling room, marking a ballot, or operating voting equipment, or inducing or attempting to induce a voter to mark their ballot in a particular way (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206(a)(3)–(4)). To enforce certain state law voting protections, the attorney general may seek circuit court injunctive relief to prevent specified imminent or ongoing voting offenses from affecting a pending election (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–1004(a)).

Maryland law also targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Md. Code Ann., Elect. Law § 16–204(a) prohibits hindering or impeding the conduct of official election activities by breach of the peace, disorder, violence, or threat of violence; Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–205(a) prohibits interfering with election officials in the performance of their official duties or with individuals lawfully present at a polling place or at the canvass of votes; and Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–904(b) prohibits knowingly and willfully making a threat to harm an election official or their immediate family member because of the official’s role in administering election processes. Additional provisions prohibit tampering with election records (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–302(a)); unlocking any locked compartment of a voting device unless instructed to do so by the election director, or removing a ballot from a building in which voting occurs without authorization (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206(a)(5), (7); destroying, defacing, falsifying, removing, or concealing any record related to voting, or making a fraudulent entry or alteration of any record related to voting or abetting another person in doing so (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–701(a)); concealing, damaging, or destroying voting equipment used or intended to be used on Election Day, or removing voting equipment from the custody of election judges or other election officials (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–801(a); tampering with, damaging, or attempting to damage any voting equipment that is used or will be used in an election, or preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of any voting equipment (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–802(a)); and willfully and knowingly accessing or tampering with the hardware, system components, or software of an electronic voting system for the purpose of affecting the vote count (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–804(a)).

Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Election judges, along with the state administrator of elections, the deputy state administrator, and local election directors when in a polling place, have authority to keep the peace and order the arrest of any person who breaches the peace, violates the election law, or interferes with the work of election judges in conducting the election and carrying out their assigned tasks (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law §§ 10–303(c), 10–307.1(a)). A police officer on duty at a polling place must obey the order of an election judge for that polling place, and, when making an arrest under such an order, is protected as if the officer had received a valid warrant (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 10–304(a)(1), (2)). Maryland law prohibits willfully failing to obey a reasonable and lawful order by a law enforcement officer to prevent a disturbance to the public peace (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10–201(c)(3)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel and the State Board of Elections about the possibility of armed federal law enforcement officials or troops being deployed to election facilities.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal law enforcement officials or troops at election facilities.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
• Contact your counsel and the State Board of Elections if any issues arise.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3–202(b)(2) prohibits assaulting another person with a firearm. This provision does not contain any exemptions, and therefore might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate, and courts have recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to seek relief against voter intimidation (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)).

While Maryland law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–201(b)(5)–(7) prohibits willfully and knowingly using force, fraud, threats, menace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or an offer of reward to influence or attempt to influence a voter’s vote or their decision whether to go to the polls, and it also prohibits conduct that results in or is intended to result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race, color, or disability. State law also prohibits interfering or attempting to interfere with a voter inside the polling room, marking a ballot, or operating voting equipment, or inducing or attempting to induce a voter to mark their ballot in a particular way (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–206(a)(3)–(4)). To enforce certain state law voting protections, the attorney general may seek circuit court injunctive relief to prevent specified imminent or ongoing voting offenses from affecting a pending election (Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 16–1004(a)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel and the State Board of Elections to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel and the State Board of Elections if any issues arise.

Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.

Discussion

Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.

One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.

USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.

Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”

Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; informing voters that they may return absentee ballots to their county elections board office, an early voting center, or a polling place, or deposit them in a ballot drop boxen; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume, to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies, and to discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
• Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up to date and to make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop boxes.
• If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate promptly with USPS officials about any issues.
• Promptly consult your counsel and the State Board of Elections if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem and to the State Board of Elections, and proactively follow up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.