|Bill No.||Short Title||Sponsors||Date Introduced||Related Bills||Description|
|S. 17||Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2005||Dodd||January 24, 2005||Among other things, this bill would require voting machines to allow voters to verify their ballot selections via a paper record, an audio record, a pictoral record, or an electronic record.|
|S. 330||Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005||Ensign||February 9, 2005||H.R. 704||This bill contains similar voting system reforms as H.R. 550.|
|S. 450||Count Every Vote Act of 2005||Clinton||February 17, 2005||H.R. 939||This is an omnibus election reform bill that seeks to address a number of election administration problems that arose in the 2004 federal elections. Among other things, this bill contains a number of provisions to increase the security of voting systems. Its requirements are similar to those in H.R. 550, described elsewhere.
|S. 3943||Confidence in Voting Act of 2006||Boxer||September 26, 2006||H.R. 6187||The provisions of this election reform bill are very similar to those in S. 17 and would address many election administration problems in the same way. Like S. 17, this bill would require the preservation of voter-verifiable paper records where “none of the means of verification […] may employ cryptography in the record” for audits. Additionally, the EAC would be required to develop standards for voting machine software and for conducting recounts.
|S. Res. 588||Feingold||September 27, 2006||This resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that states should have backup systems in place during the November 2006 election in the event of any failure of electronic voting equipment.|
|S. 4034||Voter Suppression, Ballot Hacking, and Election Fraud Prevention Act||Reid||September 29, 2006||This bill would prohibit an individual from “knowingly and willfully interferes with, affects, attempts to interfere with, or attempts to interfere with, or attempts to affect an election of a candidate or a ballot initiative by tampering with a voting system, discarding ballots, or altering a vote.”|
|H.R. 278||Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005||King||January 6, 2005||This bill contains similar voting system reforms as H.R. 550.|
|H.R. 470||Improving Electronic Voting Standards and Disclosure Act of 2005||Larson||February 1, 2005||This bill would establish security and reliability standards for the software used in voting machines and prohibit conflicts of interest in the manufacturing and distribution of voting systems and software.|
|H.R. 533||Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2005||Conyers||February 2, 2005||The provisions of this election reform bill are very similar to those in S. 17 and would address many election administration problems in the same way. Like S. 17, this bill would require the preservation of voter-verifiable paper records where “none of the means of verification […] may employ cryptography in the record” for audits. Additionally, the EAC would be required to develop standards for voting machine software and for conducting recounts.|
|H.R. 550||Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005||Holt||February 2, 2005||This bill would amend the voting systems provisions in the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) for the purpose of increasing voting system security. Key provisions include:
Mandating Voter Verified Paper Records: This bill would require each voting system to produce a voter-verifiable paper record of each voter’s selections that enables the voter to inspect and correct the votes before they are cast and that is suitable for a manual audit.
Banning Wireless Components: This bill would prohibit voting systems from containing wireless, power-line, or concealed communication devices and require all software and source code in voting machines must be made available for inspection.
Mandatory Audits: This bill would require mandatory audits of voting systems in random precincts within 24 hours of announcing final vote counts. Those audits would require states to count by hand the voter-verified paper records and to compare those records with the announced count. If any audits show cause for concern about the accuracy of the results of an election, the bill provides for additional hand counts of the ballots.
|H.R. 704||Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005||Gibbons||February 9, 2005||S. 330||This bill contains similar voting system reforms as H.R. 550.|
|H.R. 939||Count Every Vote Act of 2005||Jones||February 17, 2005||S. 450||This omnibus election reform bill seeks to address a number of election administration problems that arose in the 2004 federal elections. The provisions of this bill are similar to those in S. 450.|
|H.R. 3094||Secure America’s Vote Act of 2005||Hoyer||June 28, 2005||Among other things, this bill would ban wireless, power-line, and concealed communication devices in voting systems and require that all technological information such as voting system software’s source code is available for inspection.|
|H.R. 3910||Verifying the Outcome of Tomorrow’s Elections Act of 2005||Feeney||September 27, 2005||Among other things, this bill would require regular testing of voting systems, as well as the production of a voter-verifiable paper record.|
|H.R. 6187||Confidence in Voting Act of 2006||Holt||September 26, 2006||S. 3943||This bill would require the EAC to make payments to jurisdictions that use electronic voting systems to pay for the cost of preparation, production, and use of contingency paper ballots in the November 2006 general election to a maximum of 75 cents per paper ballot. Jurisdictions would be required to post notices at polling places informing voters that paper ballots are available and that voters may request to one for any reason. Contingency ballots cast would be required to be treated as regular ballots and counted as such.|
|H.R. 6414||Vote Tabulation Audit Act of 2006||Holt||December 7, 2006||This bill would establish requirements for the tabulation of votes and aggregation of vote counts by polling place. Election officials would be required to record, among other things, the number of regular, emergency paper, and provisional ballots cast, the number of overvotes, undervotes, and blank votes for each candidate, and the number of people who were prohibited from casting ballots, including provisional ballots. Election officials would be required to publicly post certain vote tabulation information after an election.|