The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

Department of Justice (DOJ) “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025 advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process, such as ballots, voter registration cards, absentee ballot applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Election Interference

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269919: Prohibits marking or signing a mail ballot on behalf of a voter — or assisting a voter in doing so — unless the voter has a physical disability, is at least 65 years old, or is unable to read or write.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269935: Prohibits dissemination of mail ballot returns until all polling places are closed and all votes have been cast on Election Day, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.273: Prohibits access to the area inside the “guard rail” other than election board officers or “by authority of the election board as necessary to keep order and carry out the provisions” of the election law.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.361: Prohibits electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place during early voting, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.367: Prohibits an election board officer from marking any ballot other than a spoiled ballot.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.705: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • intentionally using or threatening to use “force, intimidation, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence” to interfere in an election official’s duties or retaliate against an election official for performing their duties, including attempts; or
  • knowingly disseminating an election official’s personal identifying or sensitive information without consent with intent to facilitate criminal conduct or cause harm knowing or recklessly disregarding the risk of death, bodily injury, or stalking, and when the dissemination would cause such harm to the official or a close relation.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.730: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • remaining inside or outside of a polling place so as to interfere with an election;
  • removing a ballot from a polling place before polls close;
  • asking a voter inside a polling place for their name, address, political affiliation, or for whom they intend to vote;
  • altering or damaging a voter’s mail ballot or military-overseas ballot, except as permitted by the voter; or
  • establishing unofficial ballot drop boxes.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740: Prohibits electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place, except for conduct occurring on or within commercial or residential property.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.750: Prohibits removing or destroying election supplies or equipment located in voting booths or posted instruction cards, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.755: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • intentionally interfering with the proper operation of election equipment, including attempts; or
  • intentionally interfering with election equipment to influence election outcomes, including attempts.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.760: Prohibits altering, removing, or damaging election results posted outside polling places, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.800: Prohibits public officers with election law duties from willfully neglecting their duties or willfully performing them in a manner that hinders the purposes of Nevada’s election laws, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.265: Prohibits carrying or possessing a firearm while in a public or private school, childcare facility, or on the property of the Nevada System of Higher Education, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.320: Prohibits drawing or exhibiting a deadly weapon “in a rude, angry, or threatening manner” in the presence of two or more people unless necessary for self-defense, or unlawfully using such a weapon in a fight or quarrel, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.350: Prohibits carrying a concealed firearm, and makes a first offense a gross misdemeanor and any subsequent offense a felony.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.3673: Prohibits individuals permitted to carry a concealed firearm from doing so while in a public building, or the portion thereof, located on the property of a public school, child care facility, or the Nevada System of Higher Education — absent written permission — or in a public building with metal detectors or posted no-firearms signage at each entrance, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.300: Prohibits intentionally inducing a public officer to act contrary to their duties by directly or indirectly threatening bodily injury, property damage, confinement, or other substantial harm, and makes such conduct a felony when physical force or the immediate threat of physical force is used, or a gross misdemeanor if no physical force or the threat of physical force is used.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.430: Prohibits impersonating a public officer, police officer, or private individual with legal authority to act on behalf of the government, or wearing the uniform or badge of such an official without authority, and performing an act purporting to be official that injures or defrauds another, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Nevada laws and regulations, including Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 239.125, 293.391, 293.503 and Nev. Admin. Code 239.155, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Nevada State Library, Archives, and Public Records maintains a schedule to assist county clerks in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Custody, Handling, and Access for Election Materials and Equipment

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.3594: Requires, during early voting, the deputy clerk to secure voting machines at the close of each day to prevent unauthorized operation and to deliver all materials to the county clerk at the end of the early voting period.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.440: Requires political party committees to use voter registration lists only for election-related purposes and not to sell them.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.558: Requires certain voter information in registration records to remain confidential, including social security numbers, driver’s license or identification card numbers, email addresses, any other information made confidential under state or federal law, and, upon a voter’s request, physical addresses and telephone numbers.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.906: Requires personal information about certain election officials, including county clerks, registrars of voters, and their respective deputies, contained in secretary of state or county clerk records to remain confidential when a court has ordered such information be kept confidential.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.909: Requires personal information about individuals not otherwise specified in state law contained in secretary of state or county clerk records to remain confidential when a court has ordered such information to be kept confidential.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.916: Requires compliance with court-ordered confidentiality protections for information contained in secretary of state or county clerk records, and makes knowingly obtaining or disclosing such information a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.918: Requires compliance with court-ordered confidentiality protections for information in secretary of state or county clerk records, and makes it a misdemeanor to reveal such information when the person doing so knows or reasonably should know that doing so will create a substantial risk of bodily harm to the person to whom the information pertains.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.135: Requires a copy of each computer program certified by an accuracy certification board to be filed with the secretary of state before an election.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.330: Requires election board officers, after voting concludes, to secure voting devices, account for ballots, and seal and transport election materials to central counting locations in accordance with county clerk procedures.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.1045: Requires counties to only use election equipment approved by the secretary of state, including for any changes or improvements to that equipment, and requires such approval to be based on a determination that the equipment “can be used safely and properly.”

Election Observers

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.274: Prohibits members of the public from photographing or recording voting at polling places, except for members of the press.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.353: Prohibits election observers from interfering with ballot tabulation at a centralized counting place.
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.245: Prohibits election observers at polling places — through a required signed acknowledgment — from talking to voters; using a cell phone or computer; advocating for or against a candidate, political party, or ballot question; arguing for or against or challenging any decisions of county election personnel; or interfering with voting.
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.356: Prohibits election observers at a central counting place — through a required signed acknowledgment — from communicating with election workers other than the county clerk or the clerk’s designated representative; using a cell phone or computer; advocating for or against a candidate, political party, or ballot question; or interfering with the duties of county election personnel or with the processing and counting of ballots.

Emergency Powers

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.247: Authorizes the secretary of state to “take other actions necessary for the effective administration of statutes and regulations governing” elections.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2955: Authorizes the use of polling places that do not accommodate voters who are elderly or have a disability when necessary due to a natural disaster.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.3073: Authorizes county clerks, “in the case of an emergency” and with the secretary of state’s approval, to add additional polling places after the list of voting locations has been published.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.465: Authorizes boards of county commissioners to order a new election upon a candidate’s application if the original election cannot be held.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 414.070: Authorizes the governor “[t]o perform and exercise such other functions, powers and duties as are necessary to promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian population” during gubernatorially or legislatively declared emergencies and disasters.
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.202: Requires county clerks, at least 60 days before an election, to submit contingency plans to the secretary of state describing procedures to be used if election operations are significantly disrupted and for tabulating ballots if central counting equipment fails or a central counting place is unavailable.
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.321: Requires county clerks, at least 90 days before an election, to submit contingency plans to the secretary of state describing procedures to be used for the disposition of mail ballots in case of an emergency; and authorizes the secretary of state to order one or more polling places be used to accommodate voters who are unable to vote at their assigned polling places due to an emergency.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.010: Prohibits malicious and willful disturbances of the peace; and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.020: Prohibits two or more individuals from assembling to disturb the peace or commit an unlawful act and failing to disperse after being ordered to do so by a public officer, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.030: Prohibits willfully provoking another person to commit a breach of the peace by words, signs, or gestures, including attempts, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.040: Prohibits willfully publishing or knowingly distributing written or printed material that advocates, encourages, or incites, or has “a tendency to encourage or incite,” the commission of a crime, breach of the peace, or act of violence, or that promotes disrespect for the law or courts, and makes such conduct a gross misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.060: Prohibits two or more individuals from assembling to commit an unlawful act, even if they disperse without carrying out or advancing the act, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.070: Prohibits the following as misdemeanors:
  • two or more people from assembling based on a shared dispute or grievance and “mak[ing] advances toward” the commission of an unlawful act; or
  • two or more people from committing an unlawful act of violence or a lawful act in a violent, tumultuous, and illegal manner.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.080: Prohibits individuals from associating as an armed military group without the consent of the governor, except for municipal police, school or university cadets, the state militia, U.S. troops, and members of social or benevolent associations who are not prohibited from wearing swords; and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.090: Prohibits unlawfully and willfully disturbing lawful assemblies or meetings; and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.117: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • advocating or teaching, orally or in writing, the use of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful terrorism to accomplish industrial or political reform;
  • printing, publishing, or knowingly distributing materials that advocate or teach the use of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful terrorism to accomplish industrial or political reform;
  • justifying crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful terrorism, orally or in writing, with intent to promote “the doctrine of criminal syndicalism;”
  • organizing, assisting, joining, or voluntarily assembling with any group formed to teach or advocate the doctrine of criminal syndicalism;
  • assembling in groups of two or more to advocate or teach the “doctrine of criminal syndicalism;” or
  • willfully and knowingly permitting premises to be used for assemblies advocating criminal syndicalism, including permitting such activity to continue after notice that the premises are being used for that purpose.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.119: Prohibits committing — or assisting another in committing — any act in a public building or on the surrounding public grounds that interferes with the peaceful conduct of activities normally carried on there and from refusing to leave the building or grounds when requested by a proper official, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.596: Prohibits the unauthorized wearing of a Nevada National Guard uniform.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.604: Prohibits individuals from associating as a volunteer military group to drill or parade without the consent of the governor, except for the Nevada National Guard, U.S. troops, and members of social or benevolent associations who are not prohibited from wearing swords, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• Const. art. 2, § 1A: “Each voter who is a qualified elector under this Constitution and is registered to vote in accordance with [the Constitution] and the laws enacted by the Legislature pursuant thereto has the right . . . [t]o vote without being intimidated, threatened or coerced . . . [and] . . . [t]o equal access to the elections system without discrimination, including, without limitation, discrimination on the basis of race, age, disability, military service, employment or overseas residence.”
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2546: “[E]ach voter has the right . . . [t]o vote without being intimidated, threatened or coerced . . . [and] . . . [t]o have nondiscriminatory equal access to the elections system, including, without limitation, a voter who is elderly, disabled, a member of a minority group, employed by the military or a citizen who is overseas.”
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2555: Prohibits compelling a voter to disclose under oath how they voted and grants voters a legal privilege to refuse to disclose the substance of their vote.
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.710: Prohibits the following — whether committed directly or through another person and in connection with any election, petition, or voter registration — as felonies:
  • using or threatening force, intimidation, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence;
  • inflicting or threatening physical or mental injury, damage, harm, or loss to a person or property;
  • exposing or threatening to expose information about a person to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting;
  • impeding or preventing the free exercise of the franchise through abduction, duress, or fraud, or otherwise compelling or inducing a person’s vote; or
  • discharging or changing a person’s employment with the intent to impede or prevent that person’s exercise of the franchise.

Police presence at the polls

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.217: Permits county clerks to request sheriffs to appoint deputy sheriffs — or deputize election board officers as deputy sheriffs — for each polling place in the county and for the Central Election Board or the Mail Ballot Central Counting Board, and requires deputy sheriffs to “preserve order during hours of voting and attend closing of the polls.”
• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.305: Permits deputy sheriffs to “allow other persons to enter the polling place after the doors have been closed . . . for the purpose of observing or any other legitimate purpose if there is room within the polling place and the admittance of the other persons will not interfere unduly with the registration of the electors and the voting by the registered voters and electors.”

Other Relevant Laws and Regulations

• Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.127: Requires election laws to be liberally construed to ensure that all voters have an opportunity to participate in elections and cast ballots privately, and that the voters’ “real will” is not defeated by any failure to substantially comply with laws pertaining to conducting elections and certifying results.
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.015: Defines “polling place” for purposes of electioneering prohibitions to include any location designated for in-person voting, including ballot drop box sites.

Definitions

• See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 193.019, 193.3025, 293.040, 293.044, 293.904, 414.0335, 414.0345; Nev. Admin. Code 293.015.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes and regulations should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute or regulation may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Nevada

The governor of Nevada serves as the chief executive officer of the state (Nev. Const. art. 5, § 1). The governor oversees the operation of Nevada’s government. Governor Joe Lombardo took office in 2023 and is currently serving his first four-year term.

State law authorizes the governor “[t]o perform and exercise such other functions, powers and duties as are necessary to promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian population” during gubernatorially or legislatively declared emergencies and disasters (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 414.070). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Nevada Legislature enacted A.B. 4, which includes procedures ensuring that Nevada’s elections are conducted safely and securely during emergencies or disasters declared under Section 414.070.

The governor is the commander in chief of the state’s armed forces (Nev. Const. art. 5, § 5; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.034) — and may “call out the Militia to execute the laws of the State” (Nev. Const. art. 12, § 2). The militia consists of the Nevada National Guard, including reservists, along with volunteer forces authorized by the governor (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.026). The governor may call the National Guard into active service in the event of — or in imminent danger of — an “invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, breach of the peace;” in response to “other substantial threat to life or property;” upon a request for assistance from “a political subdivision or governmental utility, as defined [by state law], that has experienced a significant cybersecurity incident;” or to protect the “welfare of the public” (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.122(1), (3)(b)).

Secretary of State

Francisco Aguilar was elected Nevada’s secretary of state in 2022 and is currently serving his first term. The office of the secretary of state is established by the Nevada Constitution (Art. 5, § 19).

As the state’s chief election officer, the secretary of state is responsible for the execution and enforcement of Nevada’s election laws, Title 24 (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.124). The secretary of state’s office fields complaints alleging election law violations (Nev. Admin. Code 293.025), investigates potential campaign-finance violations (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.410) and threats against candidates (Nev. Rev. Stat. A.B. 123, § 3), prescribes the form of all ballots (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.250), and oversees the compilation of election results (Nev. Const. art. 5, § 4; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.395). Through the Elections Division, the secretary of state’s office establishes and maintains the centralized statewide voter registration database in consultation with county and city clerks (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.675), and also provides information regarding voter registration and absentee voting for military and overseas voters (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.4685).

The secretary’s office also trains county clerks on election procedures (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2504) and is required to prepare, maintain, and publish an election procedures manual at least every two years (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2502). The current manual can be found here.

Nevada law empowers the secretary of state to promulgate election-related regulations and to take “other actions necessary for the effective administration of the statutes and regulations governing” elections (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.124; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.247). Select examples of regulations include:

• Nev. Admin. Code 293.245, which standardizes the procedures for observing elections;
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.348, which establishes procedures for county clerks to submit lists of ballot drop boxes; and
• Nev. Admin. Code 293.481, which establishes procedures for conducting risk-limiting audits of voting equipment.

County Clerks and Election Boards

County Clerks

Nevada law assigns responsibility for local election administration to county clerks, who are elected by the voters (Nev. Const. art. 4, § 32; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 246.010) and serve as registrars of voters in an ex officio capacity (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.503). However, in counties with populations of 100,000 or more, boards of county commissioners can create a separate registrar’s office to handle all election administration tasks that a county clerk would normally handle, except issuing election certificates (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 244.164, 293.044). Currently, Clark and Washoe are the only two counties with separate registrars of voters who handle election administration and voter registration. Clerks and registrars may be removed via a judicial proceeding for “neglect[ing] to perform the[ir] official duties” or for “malpractice or malfeasance” (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 283.440).

Clerks have a comprehensive set of duties, including processing voter registration applications (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.5235); updating Nevada’s statewide voter registration database (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.675); distributing, verifying, and auditing mail ballots (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.269927, 293.269937); establishing polling places and ballot drop boxes (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269921); testing voting equipment (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.155); submitting plans for public observation of ballot handling and counting (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.354); and canvassing election returns and preparing certified abstracts of votes (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.387).

County clerks may appoint deputies, who are authorized to perform all of the clerk’s election-related duties (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 246.030). Clerks must appoint deputies to oversee polling places during early voting (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.358). They must also employ qualified assistants to prepare voting equipment (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.235).

Election Boards

Election board officers (EBOs) are appointed by county clerks (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.217), who may appoint replacements as necessary (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.223). EBOs are also subject to generally applicable state law governing removal of public officials (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 283.440). They perform a broad range of duties to assist county clerks in conducting elections, including operating polling places (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.273); determining voter eligibility and verifying voter identity and signatures before issuing ballots (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.3075, 293B.295); maintaining required records of voters and challenges throughout Election Day (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.303, 293.040); and securing voting equipment, accounting for ballots, and preparing materials for transfer to central counting locations once polls close (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.330).

Additionally, county clerks can assign EBOs to election boards, which perform specific tasks, such as running polling places or tabulating ballots. The following is a list of the most common election boards and their membership requirements:

Mail Ballot Central Counting Board

This board centrally tabulates mail ballots in each county (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269931(1)). Board members cannot all be members of the same political party (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.269929(2)).

Signature Audit Election Board

This board reviews signatures as part of daily audits of electronic devices used to verify signatures on mail ballots (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.339(2)). Board members cannot all be members of the same political party (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.339(2)).

Accuracy Certification Board

This board observes testing of voting equipment before, during, and after an election and must certify the results of tests conducted immediately before the start of ballot tabulation and within 24 hours after ballot tabulation is complete (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293B.145(1), 293B.150,293B.165). The Board also must certify whether ballots are accurately counted after an election. It consists of three EBOs, not more than two of whom can be from the same political party (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.140).

Vote Adjudication Board

This board is charged with determining voter intent when a voting machine is unable to read a ballot (Nev. Admin. Code 293B.015(2)). Board members must be from different political parties, if practicable (Nev. Admin. Code 293B.015(1)).

Special Purpose Election Boards

Nevada law permits county clerks to create special purpose election boards to facilitate the processing of votes. Board members “must represent all political parties as equally as possible” and serve at the pleasure of the county clerks (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.360(2), (4)). These Boards include:

• Computer Program and Processing Accuracy Board
  • This board verifies that voting systems and tabulation programs function correctly, including ensuring that invalid ballots are rejected, votes are properly counted, and the entirety of a voter’s ballot will not be rejected merely because one part is invalid (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.385). Unlike other special purpose election boards, this board is mandatory (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.360(1)).
• Central Ballot Inspection Board
  • Receives and inspects sealed ballot containers, organizes ballots by precinct, facilitates the duplication of damaged ballots, and segregates and documents damaged or rejected ballots (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.365).
• Ballot Duplicating Board
  • Creates and tracks exact duplicate ballots for damaged ballots or ballots submitted electronically, ensuring each duplicate is identical to the original and properly logged for tabulation (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.375; Nev. Admin. Code 293B.017).
• Ballot Processing and Packaging Board
  • Manages ballot processing and tabulation, including validating testing materials, maintaining processing logs, documenting irregularities, allowing public observation, and packaging and delivering election materials to county clerks for storage (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.380).

Clerks may create any additional boards required to expeditiously process ballots.

Nevada National Guard

Major General D. Rodger Waters serves as the adjutant general of Nevada “at the pleasure of the Governor” (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.044(1)). The adjutant general oversees the Nevada National Guard (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 412.048(1)). Governor Joe Lombardo appointed Major General Waters on September 3, 2024.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406(3)). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), national guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts;” the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the national guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon.

As for the Nevada National Guard’s involvement in elections, in 2024, Governor Lombardo activated 60 Guard members “to support existing law enforcement preparations for Election Day on things like traffic enforcement and building security, and to coordinate and facilitate communication across the state if additional support is needed.”

Separately, in 2025, Governor Lombardo temporarily activated 35 Guard members to provide U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with “clerical, administrative, and logistical support.” The governor activated these troops under Title 32 of the U.S. Code (32 U.S.C. § 502(f)), allowing them to perform federal functions using federal funds while remaining under the governor’s command and control.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location, ballot drop box, or election office to vote or while conducting official business

Summary

Federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices. While certain federal officials and military personnel are exempt from Nevada’s concealed-carry permitting requirements, Nevada law separately prohibits firearms in educational settings that often serve as polling locations. Even where firearm possession is permitted, federal and state laws prohibit interference with election administration and intimidation of voters. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.

Discussion

Federal officials who appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices to vote or conduct official business are typically armed.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.350(1)(d)(3) prohibits carrying a concealed firearm without a permit. However, this prohibition does not apply to “[a]ny full-time paid peace officer of an agency of the United States . . . when carrying out official duties,” active-duty military personnel, federal law enforcement officers authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or qualified retired federal law enforcement officers authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.350(4)(c)–(d), (7)). Because neither armed federal officials nor troops require a permit to carry a concealed firearm, they likely fall outside the scope of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.3673’s prohibition on permittees carrying concealed firearms in certain public buildings.

Separately, Nevada law prohibits an individual from carrying or possessing a firearm at sites that often serve as polling locations, including public or private schools and property of the Nevada System of Higher Education (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.265(1)(f)). While the statute exempts “peace officers,” Nevada law defines that term to include specified categories of state and local law enforcement personnel and does not expressly include federal officials (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 193.3025, 289.150-.360). Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.265 also operates as an exception to the general right to openly carry firearms in Nevada.

Federal law also prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). At the same time, it provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

If an in-person voting location or drop box is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

Additionally, state law bars conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.710(1) prohibits — whether directly or indirectly — using or threatening to use force, intimidation, harm, exposure of information, fraud, or employment actions to interfere with or influence voting, voter registration, or petition activity.

Nevada law also targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.705(1)(a) prohibits threatening, using, or attempting to use “force, intimidation, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence” to interfere with an election official’s duties, while Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.300(1) prohibits intentionally inducing a public officer to act contrary to their duties by directly or indirectly threatening bodily injury, property damage, confinement, or other substantial harm. Additional provisions prohibit unauthorized access to the areas inside the “guard rail,” which contains the table used by election inspectors and voting equipment (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.273(3)); remaining in or around a polling place in a manner that interferes with an election (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.730(1)(a)); intentionally interfering with the proper operation of election equipment, including to influence election outcomes (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.755(1)–(2)); and committing or assisting acts in public buildings or surrounding grounds that interfere with normal activities and refusing to leave when directed (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.119(1)–(3)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Policies and coordination
  • Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
  • Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
    • Update policies as necessary. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
  • Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
  • Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• In-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices
  • Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices.
  • Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
  • Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices.
• Federal-property locations
  • Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings. Discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
  • Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Responding to challenges during voting
  • Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state-law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. In November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states, including New York, where staff were sent to seven municipalities.

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation between state government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law does not authorize local election officials to grant permission to individuals who are not expressly authorized by federal or state law to enter a polling location. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including the Missouri Secretary of State and the Texas Attorney General, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.705(1)(a) prohibits threatening, using, or attempting to use “force, intimidation, coercion, violence, restraint, or undue influence” to interfere in an election official’s duties, while Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.300(1) prohibits intentionally inducing a public officer to act contrary to their duties by directly or indirectly threatening bodily injury, property damage, confinement, or other substantial harm. Additional provisions prohibit remaining in or around a polling place in a manner that interferes with an election (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.730(1)(a)); intentionally interfering with the proper operation of election equipment, including to influence election outcomes (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.755(1)–(2)); and committing or assisting acts in public buildings or surrounding grounds that interfere with normal activities and refusing to leave when directed (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 203.119(1)–(3)).

Moreover, Nevada law protects voters against intimidation. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2546(3) proclaims that “each voter has the right . . . [t]o vote without being intimidated, threatened or coerced,” while Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.710(1) prohibits — whether directly or indirectly — using or threatening to use force, intimidation, harm, exposure of information, fraud, or employment actions to interfere with or influence voting, voter registration, or petition activity.

On top of these prohibitions, Nevada law imposes certain restrictions on election observers subject to state law, including photographing or recording voting at polling places; interfering with ballot tabulation at centralized counting places; and, through required signed acknowledgments, limiting observers at polling places and central counting locations from interacting with voters, communicating with election workers outside designated channels, using electronic devices, engaging in electioneering, or otherwise interfering with voting or election workers (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.274, 293B.353; Nev. Admin. Code 293.245, 293.356).

The application of state-law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state-law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate those responses and policies with your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
• Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
• Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
• Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. In Nevada, the county clerks or registrars of voters who handle election administration and voter registration are the custodians of election records (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.391(1)–(3), 293.503(1)(b)).

Federal and state laws may limit the information that Nevada election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of a voter’s confidential information, including driver’s license or identification card numbers, social security numbers, email addresses, and, upon a voter’s request, physical addresses and telephone numbers (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.558(1), (2)–(4)).

In June 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested Nevada’s statewide voter registration list. After Nevada provided its publicly available statewide voter registration list — which does not include voters’ sensitive information — to DOJ in response, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. Litigation is ongoing — please check with your counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.

Nevada law also imposes strict controls over the custody of, handling of, and access to election materials and equipment, further limiting when and how such materials may be obtained or used.

To begin, no county may use election equipment unless it has been approved by the secretary of state, including any changes or improvements to that equipment, and approval is contingent on a determination that the equipment “can be used safely and properly” (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.1045(1), (5)(b)–(6)). Prior to an election, a copy of each computer program certified by an accuracy certification board must be filed with the secretary of state (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.135(1)).

During an election, Nevada law prohibits removing or destroying election supplies or equipment located in voting booths or posted instruction cards (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.750) and intentionally interfering with the proper operation of election equipment, including to influence election outcomes (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.755(1)–(2)).

Once voting concludes, election board officers must secure voting devices, account for all ballots, and seal and transport election materials to central counting locations in accordance with procedures established by county clerks (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293B.330(1)(a)–(b)). In addition, during early voting, the deputy clerk must secure voting machines at the close of each day to prevent unauthorized operation and deliver all materials to the county clerk at the end of the early voting period (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.3594(2)–(3)).

After canvassing is complete, election materials must be sealed, stored, and preserved in accordance with the  local government records retention schedule published by the Nevada State Library, Archives, and Public Records agency.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” As an example of state law, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.705(1), (3) prohibits directly or indirectly using or threatening force, intimidation, coercion, or similar means to interfere with or retaliate against election officials, as well as knowingly disseminating their personal or sensitive information without consent to facilitate criminal conduct or cause harm.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
• Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of this policy to uninvited law enforcement who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Update any policies and protocols as necessary on the basis of these discussions, with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters.
• Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only spaces can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
• If a request, subpoena, or other demand is presented, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Please note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case. Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
• When appropriate, consult with the Nevada Association of County Clerks and County Election Officials, the Nevada secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location

Summary

Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the Army, Navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have under their] authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely bars federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.350(1)(d)(3) prohibits carrying a concealed firearm without a permit. However, this prohibition does not apply to “[a]ny full-time paid peace officer of an agency of the United States . . . when carrying out official duties,” active-duty military personnel, federal law enforcement officers authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or qualified retired federal law enforcement officers authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.350(4)(c)–(d), (7)). Because neither armed federal officials nor troops require a permit to carry a concealed firearm, they likely fall outside the scope of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.3673’s prohibition on permittees carrying concealed firearms in certain public buildings.

That said, Nevada has two additional gun laws that might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel at polling sites and ballot drop boxes. The first is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.265(1)(f), which prohibits carrying or possessing a firearm while in a public or private school, childcare facility, or on the property of the Nevada System of Higher Education. The second is Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.320(1), which prohibits drawing or exhibiting a deadly weapon “in a rude, angry, or threatening manner” in the presence of two or more people, unless necessary for self-defense, or unlawfully using such a weapon in a fight or quarrel. Both statutes exempt “peace officers,” but Nevada law defines that term to include specified categories of state and local law enforcement personnel and does not expressly include federal officials (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 193.3025, 289.150-.360). Further, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.320’s exemption applies only when such officers are acting in the lawful discharge of their duties, which may not encompass conduct that is threatening or intimidates voters or election officials. 

Additionally, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not their actions are intended to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Although Nevada law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it does prohibit conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2546(3) proclaims that “each voter has the right . . . [t]o vote without being intimidated, threatened or coerced,” while Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.710(1) prohibits — whether directly or indirectly — using or threatening to use force, intimidation, harm, exposure of information, fraud, or employment actions to interfere with or influence voting, voter registration, or petition activity.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at in-person voting locations and ballot drop box sites. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at in-person voting locations.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and around Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not their actions are intended to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Although Nevada law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it does prohibit conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.2546(3) proclaims that “each voter has the right . . . [t]o vote without being intimidated, threatened or coerced,” while Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.710(1) prohibits — whether directly or indirectly — using or threatening to use force, intimidation, harm, exposure of information, fraud, or employment actions to interfere with or influence voting, voter registration, or petition activity.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office or school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those carrying out immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with your counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. USPS policies establish special handling requirements that prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, such issues would likely only result from changes to current USPS policies (which would almost certainly require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure offers some protection against hasty policy and leadership shifts.

Discussion

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, the Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration. Mail voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail and issues that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could occur for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201).

This means that the board, guided by statute and its bylaws, “directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.” The board selects and has the authority to remove the postmaster general (39 U.S.C. § 202), who serves as USPS’s chief executive officer and is responsible for Postal Service operations. The postmaster general, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”

Specific policies and procedures dictate the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, including explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize election mail delivery. According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for USPS to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by shoring up election mail processes and procedures over which they have control — such as providing alternative options like drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as ballot drop box locations and ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
• Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.