Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal and state laws protect the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law that prohibits carrying firearms at polling places may not apply to certain federal officials when they vote in person.
Discussion
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(1)–(2) prohibits an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm in “a sensitive location,” which includes polling sites and “any place owned or under the control of federal, state or local government.” However, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)). It also exempts active-duty military personnel (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)).
Additionally, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 101(1) prohibits “police officers,” “peace officers,” and “federal law enforcement officers” from wearing face coverings that conceal their identities while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 102(1)–(3) similarly requires such officials to display identification — or, if not uniformed, an identifying logo — while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties, except when concealment is necessary for investigative, protective, or medical/emergency response purposes.
At the same time, federal law provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations. Speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement. Inform them of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary, with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights organizations and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute these policies.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Applicable restrictions will vary depending on the jurisdiction, the type of election, and other factors. Several federal and state laws prohibit interfering in an election.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. In November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states, including New York, where staff were sent to seven municipalities.
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, by litigation between state government officials and the DOJ. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law does not authorize local election officials to grant permission to individuals who are not expressly authorized by federal or state law to enter a polling location. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including the Missouri Secretary of State and the Texas Attorney General, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside of polling locations.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against election interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote[.]”
As for state law, N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05(1) prohibits obstructing governmental functions or “attempt[ing] to prevent a public servant from performing an official function” through intimidation, physical force, or “by means of any independently unlawful act.”
New York law also prohibits interference with voters and voting rights. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 40-c(2) prohibits a public entity from discriminating against an individual’s civil rights based on their protected status, while N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 17–102(7)–(8), 17–150(1)–(2), 17–154(1), and 17–212(1) specifically prohibit an individual from interfering with another’s right to vote. One of those provisions — N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212 — even applies to conduct occurring under the “color of law,” and therefore may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacity.
The application of state-law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal law on federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies and communicate them with your staff.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location or ballot drop boxes while conducting official business
Summary
Depending on the location of in-person voting sites or ballot drop boxes, federal officials conducting routine business may be stationed in the vicinity. Complex jurisdictional questions can arise in such situations. In particular, election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at voting sites or drop boxes located at federal locations — that is, located on or adjacent to federal land (including military installations) or in federal buildings — than at other locations.
Discussion
If an in-person voting location or drop box is located on or adjacent to federal land, federal officials may appear frequently in the vicinity while conducting routine business.
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(1)–(2) prohibits an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm in “a sensitive location,” which includes poling sites and “any place owned or under the control of federal, state or local government.” This provision would therefore cover drop boxes located in federal government buildings and on federal land. The provision might also cover drop boxes located outside of these areas as they are controlled by local government entities and are arguably polling sites themselves. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)). It also exempts active-duty military personnel (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)).
Federal law also restricts the conduct of federal officials related to elections. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 592 prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held.” Consistent with that restriction, New York law prohibits state entities and their employees and municipal governments and their employees from granting immigration agencies or their employees engaged in immigration enforcement permission to access — or otherwise facilitating access to — a “polling location” when doing so would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 592, 595, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, except to comply with a federal judicial order or federal warrant or when required to do so under existing law (N.Y. Exec. Law § 319-a(6)(a)(ii), (9); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 996-a(6)(a)(ii), (9)).
Additionally, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 101(1) prohibits “police officers,” “peace officers,” and “federal law enforcement officers” from wearing face coverings that conceal their identities while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 102(1)–(3) similarly requires such officials to display identification — or, if not uniformed, an identifying logo — while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties, except when concealment is necessary for investigative, protective, or medical/emergency-response purposes.
Moreover, N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 17–150(1)–(2), 17–154(1), and 17–212(1) specifically prohibit an individual from interfering with another’s right to vote. One of those provisions — N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212 — even applies to conduct occurring under the “color of law,” and therefore may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacity.
Finally, if an in-person voting location or drop box is located within a federal building, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying a firearm in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while carrying out “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on or adjacent to federal land or within federal buildings. Create a list.
- Review the list with your counsel and discuss applicable laws and potential jurisdictional issues.
- Review state laws limiting who may be lawfully present in a polling place.
- Meet with law enforcement to discuss state statutes and guidelines. The Committee for Safe and Secure Elections offers a guide for working with law enforcement to keep elections safe and secure.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Review and update current procedures, in-person voting location training materials, public communications, and other documents as necessary.
- Work with your counsel and relevant federal officials if concerns about federal presence arise at in-person voting locations located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings.
- Share challenges and successes with local and state colleagues.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at a ballot drop box location not on or adjacent to federal land or in a federal building
Summary
Certain federal officials qualify for an exemption to prohibitions on carrying weapons near ballot drop boxes not located on or adjacent to federal land or in federal buildings. Nevertheless, state law prohibits interfering with the right to vote.
Discussion
County election boards can establish ballot drop boxes for early mail and absentee ballots at locations of their choosing, subject to State Board of Elections rules and regulations (N.Y. Elec. Law § 8–416(2)–(3)).
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(1)–(2) prohibits an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm in “a sensitive location,” which includes polling sites and “any place owned or under the control of federal, state or local government.” This provision would therefore cover drop boxes located in state or local government buildings and at polling sites. The provision might also cover drop boxes located outside of these areas as they are controlled by local government entities and are arguably polling sites themselves. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)). It also exempts active-duty military personnel (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)).
Additionally, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 101(1) prohibits “police officers,” “peace officers,” and “federal law enforcement officers” from wearing face coverings that conceal their identities while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 102(1)–(3) similarly requires such officials to display identification — or, if not uniformed, an identifying logo — while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties, except when concealment is necessary for investigative, protective, or medical/emergency response purposes.
Moreover, N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 17–150(1)–(2), 17–154(1), and 17–212(1) specifically prohibit an individual from interfering with another’s right to vote. One of those provisions — N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212 — even applies to conduct occurring under the “color of law,” and therefore may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacity.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to ballot drop box or drop-off locations.
- Consider posting signage regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, especially those with adjacent ballot drop boxes and drop-off locations. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near ballot drop box locations.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election office
Summary
Certain federal officials qualify for an exemption from prohibitions on carrying weapons in election offices. Nevertheless, federal officials cannot interfere with election administration.
Discussion
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(1)–(2) prohibits an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm in “a sensitive location,” which includes “any place owned or under the control of federal, state or local government.” This provision would therefore cover election offices. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)). It also exempts active-duty military personnel (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)).
Other state laws may restrict federal officials’ access to election offices if they attempt to interfere with election administration. For example, N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05(1) prohibits obstructing governmental functions or “attempt[ing] to prevent a public servant from performing an official function” through intimidation, physical force, or “by means of any independently unlawful act.” N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–102(6) further prohibits an individual from attempting to induce or inducing an election official to act in contravention of their duties at a primary election or when registering voters.
Finally, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 101(1) prohibits “police officers,” “peace officers,” and “federal law enforcement officers” from wearing face coverings that conceal their identities while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 102(1)–(3) similarly requires such officials to display identification — or, if not uniformed, an identifying logo — while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties, except when concealment is necessary for investigative, protective, or medical/emergency-response purposes.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to your office.
- Consider including prohibitions on firearms and intimidation on signage at your office, consistent with federal and state laws. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access. Additionally, various New York laws, including N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 3–220, 3–222, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. A complete list of requirements can be found in the New York State Archives’ Retention and Disposition Schedule.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that local New York election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of a voter’s sensitive information, including a driver’s license number, non-driver photo ID number, social security number, and facsimile number (N.Y. Elec. Law § 3–220(1)).
In June 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested New York’s statewide voter registration list including all private voter data. After New York State provided its publicly available statewide voter registration list — which does not include voters’ sensitive information — to the DOJ in response, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. The lawsuit is ongoing — please check with your counsel on the current status of the lawsuit.
Federal law prohibits government actors from engaging in election interference. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.”
New York law also prohibits interference with elections and election administration. For instance, N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–116 prohibits willfully damaging voting booths, willfully removing or destroying voting booth supplies and equipment, willfully damaging candidate lists before polls close, and willfully removing or defacing voter instruction cards. N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05(1) further prohibits obstructing governmental functions or “attempt[ing] to prevent a public servant from performing an official function” through intimidation, physical force, or “by means of any independently unlawful act.”
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review internal policies and protocols for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment.
- Consult with your counsel to review any recent court rulings and discuss the applicability of these policies to uninvited law enforcement who lack a warrant signed by a judge. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Update any policies and protocols as necessary based on these discussions, with the understanding that a uniform statewide policy has many advantages for you and your voters.
- Ensure that physical access is structured such that public areas, restricted zones, and designated observation points are clearly marked, and establish or review procedures for managing in-person requests. Measures such as appointment policies and signage in public areas to indicate employee-only spaces can help maintain order and protect secure environments.
- If a request, subpoena, or other demand is presented, consult with your counsel as soon as possible. Please note that a warrant signed by a judge presents a special case. Judicially approved warrants require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist the execution of such a warrant.
- When appropriate, consult with the Election Commissioners Association of New York, the State Board of Elections, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other election officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials arrive at a voting location
Summary
Federal law clearly states that, unless “necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States,” no officer of the Army, Navy, “or other person in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States” shall “order, bring, keep, or [have] under his authority or control any troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held (18 U.S.C. § 592). This proscription likely bars federal law enforcement officials from being stationed at in-person voting locations. State and federal voter intimidation laws may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.
As for state law, N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(1)–(2) prohibits an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm in “a sensitive location,” which includes polling sites and “any place owned or under the control of federal, state or local government.” However, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, or retired federal law enforcement officers who are authorized to carry concealed firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 926C (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)). It also exempts active-duty military personnel (N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01-e(3)).
That said, N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14(1) prohibits “intentionally plac[ing] or attempt[ing] to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm[.]” This provision contains no exemptions, and thus might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Furthermore, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. New York law contains two similar protections. The first, N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212(1), prohibits an individual — whether acting under the “color of law or otherwise” — from threatening, deceiving, or obstructing an individual to interfere with their right to vote. It entitles any “[a]ny aggrieved persons, organization whose membership includes aggrieved persons or members of a protected class, organization whose mission, in whole or in part, is to ensure voting access and such mission would be hindered by a violation of this section, or the attorney general” to enforce the provision (N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212(2)). The second, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 85(1), authorizes an injured party to sue an individual acting under “color of law” who subjects a U.S. citizen or other person within the United States’ jurisdiction “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by” the U.S. Constitution. Because both N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212 and N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 85 apply to conduct occurring under “color of law,” they may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacities.
Additionally, New York law prohibits state entities and their employees and municipal governments and their employees from granting immigration agencies or their employees engaged in immigration enforcement permission to access — or otherwise facilitating access to — a “polling location” when doing so would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 592, 595, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, except to comply with a federal judicial order or federal warrant or when required to do so under existing law (N.Y. Exec. Law § 319-a(6)(a)(ii), (9); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 996-a(6)(a)(ii), (9)).
Finally, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 101(1) prohibits “police officers,” “peace officers,” and “federal law enforcement officers” from wearing face coverings that conceal their identities while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 102(1)–(3) similarly requires such officials to display identification — or, if not uniformed, an identifying logo — while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties, except when concealment is necessary for investigative, protective, or medical/emergency response purposes.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and ballot drop-off sites. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates. Ensure that signage comports with federal and state laws.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at in-person voting locations.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and around Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. New York law contains two similar protections. The first, N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212(1), prohibits an individual — whether acting under the “color of law or otherwise” — from threatening, deceiving, or obstructing an individual to interfere with their right to vote. It entitles any “[a]ny aggrieved persons, organization whose membership includes aggrieved persons or members of a protected class, organization whose mission, in whole or in part, is to ensure voting access and such mission would be hindered by a violation of this section, or the attorney general” to enforce the provision (N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212(2)). The second, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 85(1), authorizes an injured party to sue an individual acting under “color of law” who subjects a U.S. citizen or other person within the United States’ jurisdiction “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by” the U.S. Constitution. Because both N.Y. Elec. Law § 17–212 and N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 85 apply to conduct occurring under “color of law,” they may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacities.
Finally, N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 101(1) prohibits “police officers,” “peace officers,” and “federal law enforcement officers” from wearing face coverings that conceal their identities while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties. N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law § 102(1)–(3) similarly requires such officials to display identification — or, if not uniformed, an identifying logo — while interacting with the public in the performance of their duties, except when concealment is necessary for investigative, protective, or medical/emergency response purposes.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office or school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those carrying out immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with your counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. USPS policies establish special handling requirements that prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, but such issues would likely only result from changes to current USPS policies (which would almost certainly require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure offers some protection against hasty policy and leadership shifts.
Discussion
People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, the Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration. Mail voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail and issues that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.
Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could occur for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201).
This means that the board, guided by statute and its bylaws, “directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.” The board selects and has the authority to remove the postmaster general (39 U.S.C. § 202), who serves as USPS’s chief executive officer and is responsible for Postal Service operations. The postmaster general, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”
Specific policies and procedures dictate the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, including explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize election mail delivery. According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for USPS to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by shoring up election mail processes and procedures over which they have control — such as providing alternative options like drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as ballot drop box locations and ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
- Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
- If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
- Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.