Questions and Scenarios to Consider
This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.
Federal Presence
Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an in-person voting location to vote
Summary
Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether armed federal officials or service members may bring firearms into an in-person voting location. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal law enforcement officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at in-person voting locations may still raise questions about restrictions on their conduct and jurisdiction, particularly when an in-person voting location is located on federal property.
Connecticut recently enacted Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 57, which generally prohibits certain federal officials and service members from knowingly being within 250 feet of a polling place, though it expressly permits covered persons to enter the area to vote while off duty. The law covers officers and agents of any organization or entity authorized by the federal government or by any state to use force against, search, detain or arrest individuals, as well as persons authorized to command or control such officers or agents.
Separately, Connecticut law generally prohibits carrying a pistol or revolver outside one’s dwelling, property, or place of business without a permit, and prohibits knowingly carrying any firearm with intent to display it (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). Both restrictions exempt federal marshals and other federal law enforcement agents, as well as members of the U.S. or state armed forces while on duty or traveling to or from duty (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). However, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217b(a)(1) prohibits firearm possession “in or on the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school,” which may encompass polling sites. That statute exempts otherwise lawful firearm possession by a “peace officer” engaged in official duties — a term that includes U.S. marshals and deputy marshals and federal special agents authorized to enforce federal food, drug, and controlled substance laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code — but it does not expressly exempt other federal officials or members of the armed forces (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-217b(b)(3), 53a-3(9)).
If an in-person voting location is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot return locations, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an election facility to conduct routine business
Summary
Federal officials or military personnel may arrive at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities to conduct routine business. State and federal law, however, may restrict whether they may appear armed at election facilities. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when polling sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.
Discussion
As an initial matter, Connecticut law requires absentee ballots to be returned to the municipal clerk by mail, deposited in an official secure absentee ballot drop box, or delivered to the clerk’s office, either by the voter or, where authorized, by an immediate family member, a designee of an ill or physically disabled voter, or another person permitted by law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–140b(a)–(c)(1)).
Federal law enforcement officials or military personnel appearing at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities to conduct routine business are typically armed. Recently enacted state legislation may restrict their presence near election sites. Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 57 covers officers or agents of any organization or entity authorized by the federal government or by any state to use force against, search, detain or arrest individuals, as well as persons authorized to command or control such officers or agents. Covered individuals generally may not knowingly be within 250 feet of an election site, be within that area for the purpose of attempting to examine an individual’s qualifications to vote, knowingly loiter or remain within the area, or engage in conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 592, 593, or 595. Election sites include polling places, early voting and same-day registration locations, central ballot-counting locations, recanvass locations, and absentee ballot drop boxes during specified periods.
These restrictions do not prevent covered individuals from voting or engaging in protected political expression while off duty, passing through the restricted area only as long as necessary to travel to another location, or residing within the area. The prohibition on knowing presence also does not apply when the governor deems force necessary to repel armed enemies; when exigent circumstances require the person’s presence to protect against a serious threat to life or property; when the secretary of the state or election moderator requests force to suppress disorder or permits the person’s presence; or when, after at least 24 hours’ notice to the secretary of the state and attorney general, a judicial warrant or order specifically authorizes a search, detention, or arrest at that location, provided the person remains only as long as reasonably necessary.
Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 57 separately prohibits willfully wearing a mask or other covering that obscures the person’s face, head, or identity within 250 feet of an election site, subject to medical, religious, and weather-related exceptions, although a person relying on the weather exception must comply with a moderator’s request to remove the covering. It also generally prohibits requiring any person to present identification within 250 feet of an election site, but does not prohibit requiring identification when state law otherwise requires it, action taken by a covered officer or agent pursuant to the judicial-warrant-or-order exception described above, or election officials’ performance of their duties under the election law.
Separately, Connecticut law generally prohibits carrying a pistol or revolver outside one’s dwelling, property, or place of business without a permit, and prohibits knowingly carrying any firearm with intent to display it (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). Both restrictions exempt federal marshals and other federal law enforcement agents, as well as members of the U.S. or state armed forces while on duty or traveling to or from duty (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). However, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217b(a)(1) prohibits firearm possession “in or on the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school,” which may encompass polling sites. That statute exempts otherwise lawful firearm possession by a “peace officer” engaged in official duties — a term that includes U.S. marshals and deputy marshals and federal special agents authorized to enforce federal food, drug, and controlled substance laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code — but it does not expressly exempt other federal officials or members of the armed forces (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-217b(b)(3), 53a-3(9)).
Furthermore, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2–1e(c)(1) prohibits possessing a firearm in buildings housing legislative chambers, offices, or committee hearings or where the General Assembly carries out certain election-related functions for state offices. It provides an exemption for a police officer “of the federal government, who is carrying out official duties in this state, or any person summoned by any such officer to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while [they are] actually engaged in assisting such officer, while such officer is in the performance of [the officer’s] official duties or any member of the armed forces of the United States” (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2–1e(c)(1)).
If an in-person voting location or absentee ballot drop-off site is located on federal property, that is, located on federal land (including a military installation) or in a federal building, jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) — which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility) — typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
- Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
- Update policies as necessary. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
- Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
- Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
- Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, absentee ballot drop-off sites, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Review in-person voting locations and absentee ballot drop-off sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
- Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
- Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the in-person voting period.
Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election
Summary
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.
Discussion
The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.
Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.
Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” For example, in November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. In November 2024, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”
While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”
In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Connecticut law prohibits allowing anyone “within any polling place for any purpose other than casting [their] vote” except persons otherwise permitted or exempt by law, primary and election officials, unofficial checkers, news media representatives, certain supervised students, and children age 15 or younger accompanying a parent or legal guardian (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–236(d)). When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that the DOJ had selected jurisdictions in their state for federal monitoring. In Texas — which, unlike St. Louis County, had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming, Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.
Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.
COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”
Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”
In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”
Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.
Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.
As for state law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–364a prohibits influencing or attempting to influence an election worker in the performance of an election administration duty by force, threat, or harassment; publicly disclosing an election worker’s personally identifying information with the intent to harass, terrorize, alarm, or improperly influence them; or willfully and fraudulently suppressing or destroying any properly cast vote or ballot. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–368n(a)(3) prohibits obstructing, impeding, or otherwise interfering with access to a polling place, absentee ballot drop box, or election official’s office or place of business, or with an elector or election official in a way that interferes with voting or delays the voting process. Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 57 prohibits requiring a person to present identification within 250 feet of an election site unless required by state law. Additional provisions prohibit tampering with ballots, voting tabulators, or other election appliances (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–367); and knowingly tampering with, altering, destroying, or unlawfully carrying away absentee ballot drop boxes, changing or destroying deposited ballots, or fraudulently adding ballots (Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 60).
Moreover, Connecticut law protects voters against intimidation. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9–368n, 9–364, and 9–364a prohibit using force or threats — and, depending on the provision, intimidation, bribery, corrupt means, or fraudulent or deliberately deceitful conduct—to influence or interfere with another person’s vote or an elector’s right to vote, while Section 9–364a also prohibits using force, threats, bribery, or corrupt means to influence another person’s speech at a primary, caucus, referendum, convention, or election. Section 9–368n separately prohibits knowingly using deceptive or fraudulent communications that interfere with voting, obstructing access to polling places or absentee-ballot drop boxes, and otherwise obstructing, impeding, or interfering with an elector or election official in a manner that interferes with voting or delays the voting process. An additional provision prohibits invading the secrecy of voting by inducing or attempting to induce an elector to reveal how they voted (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–366). Public Act No. 26–42, § 57 further prohibits covered federal- or state-authorized officers and agents, and persons authorized to command or control them, from being within 250 feet of an election site for the purpose of attempting to examine an individual’s qualifications to vote and prohibits any person from wearing a mask or other identity-obscuring covering or requiring a person to present identification within that area.
On top of these prohibitions, Connecticut law requires the moderator to evict any unofficial checker who interferes with the orderly process of voting or attempts to influence an elector (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–235(d)).
The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
- Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
- Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them with your staff.
- Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
- If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
- Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
- Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
- Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
- Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
- Contact your congressional representative or senator.
Election Interference or Disruption
Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.
Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voting equipment or election materials
Summary
State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.
Discussion
Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.
Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.
Federal and state laws may limit the information that Connecticut election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of personal information contained in voter registration lists, including birthdate, driver’s license number, identity card number, Social Security number, and any other unique identifier. (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–50d).
In August 2025, the Department of Justice requested Connecticut’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Connecticut declined to provide voters’ sensitive information, citing prohibitions under state and federal law among other reasons, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. In July 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.
In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to the state Senate’s audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed that it was investigating possible voter fraud and requested records of dozens of voters.
Connecticut law also imposes its own requirements governing election material and equipment custody, handling, and access. Before an election, the moderator must receive necessary election supplies, including the keys to each voting tabulator, from the registrars of voters; sign a receipt for the keys; and, before the polls open, examine the tabulator seals with the registrars or assistant registrars and produce a tape confirming that the public counter is set to zero (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–259). State law also restricts possession of official absentee ballots and ballot envelopes to the applicants to whom they were issued, authorized election officials, approved carriers, and the U.S. Postal Service (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–140b(d)).
Connecticut law further prohibits election officials from providing a voting tabulator or any part or appliance of one to a third party not authorized by the secretary of the state (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–352); prohibits non-election officials from tampering with ballots, voting tabulators, or related appliances (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–367); and prohibits unlawfully taking, altering, concealing, destroying, or mutilating records or other property in the custody of a state or local governmental body or official (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53–153). Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 60 prohibits knowingly tampering with, altering, destroying, or unlawfully carrying away absentee ballot drop boxes, changing or destroying deposited ballots, or fraudulently introducing additional ballots. The same act requires municipal officials who receive an election-related subpoena, warrant, or request for records or equipment to notify the secretary of the state and attorney general within 36 hours (Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 33).
After absentee ballots are counted, election officials must place them in sealed depository envelopes, endorse the envelopes with specified information, and deliver them to the moderator (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–150a). At the end of each day of early voting, the registrars must secure and seal that day’s ballots in a secure receptacle and transport it to the municipal clerk (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–163aa(f)). After voting is completed, the moderator must lock the voting tabulator, produce the vote totals, seal the tabulator and other election materials against tampering, and store them in a secure location designated by the registrars (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–309). Tabulators generally must remain sealed for 14 days, during which time the registrars must retain the keys and secure the tabulators against unauthorized access or tampering (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9–266, 9–310).
Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote. As an example of state law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–364a prohibits using force, threats, or harassment to influence or attempt to influence an election worker in the performance of any duty.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
- Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
- Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
- It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
- If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
- Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
- Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
- When appropriate, consult the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut, the State Elections Enforcement Commission, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.
Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to an election facility
Summary
Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.
Discussion
On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the Act.
Additionally, recently enacted state legislation may restrict the presence of armed federal officials and troops near election sites. Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 57 covers officers or agents of any organization or entity authorized by the federal government or by any state to use force against, search, detain or arrest individuals, as well as persons authorized to command or control such officers or agents. Covered individuals generally may not knowingly be within 250 feet of an election site, be within that area for the purpose of attempting to examine an individual’s qualifications to vote, knowingly loiter or remain within the area, or engage in conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 592, 593, or 595. Election sites include polling places, early voting and same-day registration locations, central ballot-counting locations, recanvass locations, and absentee ballot drop boxes during specified periods.
These restrictions do not prevent covered individuals from voting or engaging in protected political expression while off duty, passing through the restricted area only as long as necessary to travel to another location, or residing within the area. The prohibition on knowing presence also does not apply when the governor deems force necessary to repel armed enemies; when exigent circumstances require the person’s presence to protect against a serious threat to life or property; when the secretary of the state or election moderator requests force to suppress disorder or permits the person’s presence; or when, after at least 24 hours’ notice to the secretary of the state and attorney general, a judicial warrant or order specifically authorizes a search, detention, or arrest at that location, provided the person remains only as long as reasonably necessary.
Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 57 separately prohibits willfully wearing a mask or other covering that obscures the person’s face, head, or identity within 250 feet of an election site, subject to medical, religious, and weather-related exceptions, although a person relying on the weather exception must comply with a moderator’s request to remove the covering. It also generally prohibits requiring any person to present identification within 250 feet of an election site, but does not prohibit requiring identification when state law otherwise requires it, action taken by a covered officer or agent pursuant to the judicial-warrant-or-order exception described above, or election officials’ performance of their duties under the election law.
Separately, Connecticut law generally prohibits carrying a pistol or revolver outside one’s dwelling, property, or place of business without a permit, and prohibits knowingly carrying any firearm with intent to display it (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). Both restrictions exempt federal marshals and other federal law enforcement agents, as well as members of the U.S. or state armed forces while on duty or traveling to or from duty (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). However, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217b(a)(1) prohibits firearm possession “in or on the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school,” which may encompass polling sites. That statute exempts otherwise lawful firearm possession by a “peace officer” engaged in official duties — a term that includes U.S. marshals and deputy marshals and federal special agents authorized to enforce federal food, drug, and controlled substance laws under Title 21 of the U.S. Code — but it does not expressly exempt other federal officials or members of the armed forces (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-217b(b)(3), 53a-3(9)).
Furthermore, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2–1e(c)(1) prohibits possessing a firearm in buildings housing legislative chambers, offices, or committee hearings or where the General Assembly carries out certain election-related functions for state offices. It provides an exemption for a police officer “of the federal government, who is carrying out official duties in this state, or any person summoned by any such officer to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace while [they are] actually engaged in assisting such officer, while such officer is in the performance of [the officer’s] official duties or any member of the armed forces of the United States” (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2–1e(c)(1)).
Connecticut’s threatening and reckless endangerment statutes may also apply. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-62(a) prohibits, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, or threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person or in reckless disregard of that risk. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61aa(a)(3) prohibits committing that offense while using a firearm, being armed with and threatening its use, displaying it, or representing through words or conduct that one possesses it. Additionally, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-63 prohibits, “with extreme indifference to human life,” recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person. These provisions do not contain any exemptions. Consequently, this provision might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-63).
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Connecticut law contains a similar prohibition: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–368n(b)(1)–(3) bars using or threatening force or other intimidating conduct, or knowingly using deceptive or fraudulent means, that causes or reasonably can be expected to cause interference with an elector’s right to vote; obstructing, impeding, or otherwise interfering with access to a polling place, absentee-ballot drop box, or election official’s office or place of business; or obstructing, impeding, or otherwise interfering with an elector or election official in a manner that causes or reasonably can be expected to cause interference with an elector’s right to vote or delay voting or the voting process.
Additionally, Connecticut law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–364a(b)–(c) prohibits influencing or attempting to influence an election worker in the performance of an election administration duty by force, threat, or harassment; publicly disclosing an election worker’s personally identifying information with the intent to harass, terrorize, alarm, or improperly influence them; or willfully and fraudulently suppressing or destroying any properly cast vote or ballot. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–368n(b)(3) prohibits obstructing, impeding, or otherwise interfering with an election official or access to a polling place, absentee-ballot drop box, or election office when that conduct interferes with voting or delays the voting process. Additional provisions prohibit tampering with ballots, voting tabulators, or other election appliances (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–367); knowingly tampering with, altering, destroying, or unlawfully carrying away absentee ballot drop boxes; changing or destroying deposited ballots; or fraudulently introducing ballots (Pub. Act No. 26–42, § 60).
Because Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–368n(a), as discussed above, applies to conduct occurring under the “color of law,” it may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacity.
Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to preserve order and regulate access at polling sites and during recanvasses. Registrars of voters may request police protection at polling places where they anticipate disorder; when disorder arises and an offender refuses to submit to lawful authority, the moderator may direct an officer with arrest authority to take the offender into custody and, if necessary, remove them until order is restored or the election closes (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–230). Moderators or their assistants must also have police officers, constables, or designated election officials mark the area within 75 feet of each polling place entrance, and moderators, police officers, and constables must prohibit loitering and peddling within that area (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–236(b)(1)). At the close of voting, an election official or municipal police officer designated by the moderator must stand at the end of the voting line and prevent anyone not already in line from joining; comparable requirements apply at same-day registration and early voting locations (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–174). During a recanvass, the moderator may order the removal of anyone causing disorder that interferes with the proceeding, including by attempting to participate in the recanvass or communicate with a recanvass official without authorization and refusing to submit to the moderator’s lawful authority (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–311(d)).
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to election facilities.
- Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those engaged in immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
- Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
- Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
- Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities
Summary
Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.
Discussion
Connecticut law generally prohibits carrying a pistol or revolver outside one’s dwelling, property, or place of business without a permit, and additionally prohibits knowingly carrying any firearm with intent to display it, subject to specified exceptions (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). Both restrictions exempt federal marshals and other federal law enforcement agents, as well as members of the U.S. or state armed forces while on duty or traveling to or from duty (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29–35(a)). However, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-62(a) prohibits, by physical threat, intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, or threatening to commit a crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another person or in reckless disregard of that risk. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61aa(a)(3) prohibits committing that offense while using a firearm, being armed with and threatening its use, displaying it, or representing through words or conduct that one possesses it. And Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-63 prohibits, “with extreme indifference to human life,” recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person. These provisions do not contain any exemptions. Consequently, this provision might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.
Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. Connecticut law contains a similar prohibition: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–368n(b)(1)–(3) bars using or threatening force or other intimidating conduct, or knowingly using deceptive or fraudulent means, that causes or reasonably can be expected to cause interference with an elector’s right to vote; obstructing, impeding, or otherwise interfering with access to a polling place, absentee-ballot drop box, or election official’s office or place of business; or obstructing, impeding, or otherwise interfering with an elector or election official in a manner that causes or reasonably can be expected to cause interference with an elector’s right to vote or delay voting or the voting process.
Because Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9–368n(a) applies to conduct occurring under the “color of law,” it may expressly extend to federal officials acting in their official capacity.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
- Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
- Contact your counsel if any issues arise.
Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery
Summary
The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.
Discussion
Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.
One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.
USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.
Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”
Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail-in ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.
Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; providing alternative ballot return options, such as absentee ballot drop boxes; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.
Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration
- Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
- Meet with your local postmaster to share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election.
- Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using an absentee ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop boxes.
- If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
- Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election-mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
- Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
- Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.