The Oregon Election Interference Law Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

Department of Justice (DOJ) “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process, such as ballots, voter registration cards, absentee ballot applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Core Election Interference Provisions

• Or. Const. art. II, § 1: “All elections shall be free and equal.”
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.235: Prohibits intentionally obstructing, impairing, or hindering the administration of law or another governmental or judicial function through intimidation, force, physical or economic interference, or obstacle, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.245: Prohibits unlawfully entering or remaining on premises, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065: Prohibits the following intentional conduct as harassment, subject to misdemeanor penalties, with enhanced penalties when committed against an election worker performing official duties or because of an action taken or decision made in performing those duties:
  • harassing or annoying another person through offensive physical contact;
  • alarming another person by knowingly conveying a false report concerning a death or serious physical injury that reasonably would be expected to cause alarm; or
  • alarming another person by conveying a telephonic, electronic, or written threat to inflict serious physical injury or commit a felony involving the person, the person’s property, or a member of the person’s family, where the threat reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 247.948: Prohibits the secretary of state or county clerks from disclosing specified information in an elector’s registration file, including the elector’s birth month and day, Social Security number, driver’s license number, signature, and information protected through the state’s Address Confidentiality Program.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 247.965: Prohibits county clerks from disclosing, upon request, the residence address of an elector and their resident family members when disclosure would endanger the elector or a resident family member, or when the elector has been identified as an election worker.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.645: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • tampering with, injuring, or attempting to injure a voting machine or vote tally system to be used or being used in an election;
  • tampering with a voting machine or vote tally system that has been used in an election except while performing election duties;
  • preventing or attempting to prevent the correct operation of a voting machine or vote tally system;
  • making or possessing a key to a voting machine or vote tally system without authorization; or
  • soliciting or accepting compensation, other than compensation paid by the appropriate governmental unit, in connection with the sale, lease, or use of a voting machine or vote tally system while serving as the secretary of state or as an officer or employee of a county, city, or district using the equipment.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.665: Prohibits directly or indirectly using “undue influence” — defined to include force; violence; restraint or threatened restraint; infliction or threatened infliction of injury, damage, harm, loss of employment, or other loss; or payment or promise of money, employment, or another thing of value — with intent to induce a person to:
  • register, vote, or refrain from registering or voting;
  • register or vote in a particular manner;
  • become, remain, or cease being a candidate;
  • contribute or refrain from contributing to, or provide or refrain from providing services to, a candidate, political party, or political committee;
  • challenge or refrain from challenging a person offering to vote;
  • apply or refrain from applying for an absentee ballot;
  • sign or refrain from signing a prospective petition, initiative, referendum, recall, or candidate-nominating petition; or
  • soliciting or accepting money or another thing of value as an inducement to engage in the foregoing prohibited conduct.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.675: Prohibits the following:
  • a person employed or authorized to print official ballots from giving or delivering any ballot, or knowingly permitting any ballot to be taken, by anyone other than the official under whose direction the ballots are printed;
  • a person from knowingly printing, causing, or permitting a ballot to be printed with names, spellings, or candidate arrangements different from that directed by the official overseeing the printing; or
  • an official responsible for distributing ballots, or a person acting for that official, from knowingly distributing or causing ballots to be distributed other than as provided by the election law.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.685: Prohibits an election official from knowingly failing to comply with the secretary of state’s interpretation of election law or with a directive, instruction, or rule issued under the secretary’s authority.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695: Prohibits the following:
  • printing or circulating an imitation ballot or sample ballot unless it prominently states that it is not a real ballot and displays “UNOFFICIAL” diagonally across the ballot;
  • printing or circulating, including electronically, an imitation voters’ pamphlet unless it prominently states that it is not the official voters’ pamphlet and displays “UNOFFICIAL” diagonally across each page;
  • electioneering, including distributing cards or handbills or soliciting petition signatures, inside a government election office designated for ballot deposit, or within 100 feet of the entrance to a building containing such an office, during the period beginning when ballots are mailed and ending at 8 p.m. on Election Day, or after all electors who began voting by 8 p.m. have finished;
  • obstructing an entrance to a building where ballots are issued, a designated ballot deposit location, or a voting booth during the same period;
  • voting or offering to vote while knowing that the person is not entitled to vote;
  • falsely claiming an inability to mark a ballot;
  • asking an elector at a ballot deposit or voting location whom they intend to vote for, or examining or attempting to examine the elector’s ballot, except when performing official election duties or providing authorized assistance;
  • disclosing information revealing how an elector voted, except when an elections official is performing official duties;
  • doing anything to a ballot that permits identification of the person who voted, except when an elections official is performing official duties;
  • for an elector, willfully leaving material at a ballot deposit or voting location showing how the elector’s ballot was marked;
  • removing a ballot from a designated ballot deposit or voting location, unless performing official election duties;
  • willfully defacing, removing, altering, or destroying a posted election notice without authorization;
  • willfully removing, altering, or destroying election equipment or supplies, or breaking the seal or opening a sealed package containing election supplies, unless performing official election duties;
  • providing “elections advice” or attempting to collect voted ballots inside a government election office designated for ballot deposit or within 100 feet of the entrance to a building containing such an office, unless performing official election duties; or
  • a person, except an elections official in performance of their duties, establishing a location to collect voted ballots unless the location prominently displays a sign stating “NOT AN OFFICIAL BALLOT DROP SITE” in the prescribed format.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.705: Prohibits a person from making public the results of the tally of votes from any precinct before 8 p.m. on the date of the election.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.715: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • knowingly making a false statement, oath, or affidavit required under election law;
  • requesting a ballot in another person’s name;
  • voting or attempting to vote more than once at elections held on the same date, including by voting or attempting to vote in both Oregon and another state;
  • willfully altering or destroying a cast ballot or election returns, unless performing official election duties;
  • willfully placing a fraudulent ballot among genuine ballots;
  • falsely writing anything on a ballot that purports to have been written by an election official performing official duties;
  • stealing a ballot, tally sheet, or return sheet, willfully hindering or delaying delivery of a tally or return sheet to the county clerk, or fraudulently breaking open a sealed tally or return sheet;
  • manufacturing or knowingly using a fraudulent ballot return identification envelope or secrecy envelope; or
  • selling, offering with actual intent to sell, purchasing, or offering with actual intent to purchase an official ballot, replacement ballot, ballot return identification envelope, or secrecy envelope for money or another thing of value.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.265: Prohibits entering or remaining unlawfully in or upon premises while possessing a firearm, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.250: Prohibits carrying a firearm concealed on one’s person, or possessing a concealed and readily accessible handgun in a vehicle without a concealed handgun license, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.370: Prohibits intentionally possessing a loaded or unloaded firearm in or on a “public building,” and makes such conduct a felony; and prohibits knowingly or recklessly discharging or attempting to discharge a firearm at a school, and makes such conduct a felony, but reduces possession on school grounds to a misdemeanor when the person holds a concealed handgun license and the school’s governing board has adopted and posted a policy making the license-holder defense unavailable.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.190: Prohibits intentionally attempting, by word or conduct, to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275: Prohibits compelling or inducing another person to engage in conduct they have a legal right to abstain from, or to abstain from conduct they have a legal right to engage in, by instilling fear that the actor or another person will, among other things, unlawfully cause physical injury, commit a crime, or unlawfully use or abuse a public position, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.220: Prohibits attempting to use a dangerous or deadly weapon unlawfully against another person, or carrying or possessing such a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another person, and makes such conduct a felony.
• H.B. 4138 § 4: Prohibits law enforcement officers, including federal or out-of-state officers, from the following:
  • wearing a facial covering that conceals or obscures the officer’s identity while performing official duties; or
  • wearing a facial covering under any circumstances while votes in a state or federal election are being collected or tabulated and the officer is within 250 feet of a ballot deposit site, ballot-marking location, or voting booth.

Police presence at the polls

• H.B. 4138 § 8: Prohibits an employee of a state or local law enforcement agency or other Oregon public body, acting within the scope of their employment, from intentionally assisting a federal or out-of-state law enforcement agency in investigating, apprehending, or arresting an individual when the employee knows that the action is based on constitutionally protected activity; protected-class membership or support; or an unlawful search, seizure, or surveillance activity, subject to specified exceptions.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Oregon laws, including Or. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 192.005–.170, 254.535, and 357.805–.895, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Oregon secretary of state maintains a schedule to assist custodians in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key records retention requirements.

Election Observers

• The Elections Division’s Vote by Mail Procedures Manual: Prohibits election observers from interfering with election workers, handling ballots or election materials, or disclosing election results before 8 p.m. on Election Day; requires observers to sign in, wear official observer badges, direct questions to designated supervisory staff and otherwise remain silent, comply with staff directions, and be escorted to and from designated observation stations; and provides that violations may result in removal and criminal or civil penalties.

Emergency Powers

• Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.165: Authorizes the governor to declare a state of emergency after determining that an emergency has occurred or is imminent.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.168: Authorizes the governor, during a declared emergency, to exercise complete authority over executive agencies and the state’s police powers within the affected area, and to suspend state agency orders or rules when strict compliance would prevent, hinder, or delay mitigation of the emergency.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.175: Authorizes the governor, during a declared emergency, to assume control of police and law enforcement activities in the affected area.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.471: Authorizes the governor, at the secretary of state’s request, to extend by up to seven calendar days the deadline for returning ballots in a state, county, city, or district election when an emergency makes it impossible or impracticable for electors to return ballots or election officials to tally them.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.710: Authorizes a county governing body, after consulting with the county clerk or county director of elections, to request that the governor declare a county elections emergency when “a state of fiscal distress” is compromising the county’s ability to conduct elections “at a minimally adequate level;” requires the governor, after consulting with the secretary of state, to decide within 14 days whether to issue the declaration; and, if an emergency is declared, requires the secretary of state to provide the services necessary to ensure minimally adequate election administration until the governor determines that the emergency has ended or two years have elapsed.

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Or. Const. art. I, § 27: “The military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power.”
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.015: Prohibits a person from participating with five or more other persons in tumultuous and violent conduct that intentionally or recklessly creates a grave risk of public alarm, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.025: Prohibits the following as misdemeanors when committed with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or while recklessly creating such a risk:
  • engaging in fighting or violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior;
  • making unreasonable noise;
  • disturbing a lawful assembly without lawful authority;
  • obstructing vehicular or pedestrian traffic on a public way;
  • knowingly initiating or circulating a false report concerning an alleged or impending fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe, or other emergency; or
  • creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition through conduct one is not licensed or privileged to undertake.
• Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.660: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • exhibiting, displaying, or demonstrating to another person the use or manufacture of a firearm, explosive, incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death with the intent or knowledge that it will be unlawfully used in a civil disorder; or
  • assembling with one or more other persons to train, practice, or receive instruction in the use of such a weapon, device, or technique with intent to employ it unlawfully in a civil disorder.

Definitions

• See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.205, 166.360, 247.948, and 401.025; and H.B. 4138 §§ 1, 2, 7.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Oregon

The governor of Oregon serves as the chief executive officer of the state (Or. Const. art. V, § 1). The governor represents Oregon and oversees the operation of the state’s government. Governor Tina Kotek took office on January 9, 2023 and is currently serving her first term.

The governor may declare a state of emergency after determining that an emergency has occurred or is imminent (Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.165(1)). During a declared emergency, the governor has complete authority over executive agencies and may exercise the state’s police powers to address the emergency within the area covered by the proclamation (Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.168(1)). The governor may also suspend provisions of a state agency order or rule if strict compliance would prevent, hinder, or delay mitigation of the emergency (Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.168(2)). In addition, the governor may assume control of police and law enforcement activities in the affected area (Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.175(2)).

The Oregon Supreme Court confirmed in Elkhorn Baptist Church v. Brown (2020) that when the governor declares a state of emergency under Or. Rev. Stat. § 401.165 — as opposed to merely a public health emergency under Or. Rev. Stat. § 433.441 — the governor’s authority is at its broadest, encompassing all actions authorized under Oregon’s Emergency Management and Services statutes (Or. Rev. Stat. ch. 401) as well as certain powers available during a public health emergency.

Oregon law separately grants the governor two narrower forms of election-specific emergency authority. First, the governor may extend the deadline for returning ballots in any state, county, city or district election by up to seven days at the secretary of state’s request if, after consulting with affected county clerks, the secretary determines that an emergency would make it impossible or impracticable for electors to return ballots, or for election officials to tally ballots (Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.471(1–2)).

Second, if a county governing body determines, after consulting with the county clerk or county director of elections, that “a state of fiscal distress” is compromising the county’s ability to conduct elections “at a minimally adequate level,” it may ask the governor to declare a county elections emergency (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.710(1)). After consulting with the secretary of state, the governor must decide within 14 days whether to issue the declaration (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.710(2)–(3)). If an emergency is declared, the secretary of state must provide the services necessary to ensure a minimally adequate level of election services in the county (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.710(4)). The county resumes conducting elections when the governor determines that the emergency no longer exists or, at the latest, two years have elapsed since the declaration (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.710(6)–(7)).

The governor is the commander in chief of the state’s military forces (Or. Const. art. V, § 9), which consist of organized and unorganized militias (Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.105(1)). The organized militia includes the Oregon National Guard, including army and air components,, the inactive National Guard, the Oregon Civil Defense Force when organized, and any additional forces created by the governor (Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.105(2)). The unorganized militia generally consists of able-bodied Oregon residents between the ages of 18 and 45 who are not serving in the organized militia or on the state retired list and who are U.S. citizens or have declared their intent to become citizens, subject to exemptions under federal law (Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.105(3)).

The governor may order all or any part of the organized militia into active state service in the event of invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, breach of the peace, or imminent danger of any of those conditions “for such period, to such extent and in such manner as the [g]overnor may deem necessary” (Or. Rev. Stat. § 399.065(1)). When the organized militia is activated on any of those grounds, the governor may, by proclamation, place the county or city in which the troops are serving — or any specified portion of that county or city — under martial law if the governor determines that martial law would promote the maintenance of law and order (Or. Rev. Stat. § 399.065(3)).

Secretary of State

Tobias Read was elected Oregon’s secretary of state in 2024 and is currently serving his first term. The office of the secretary of state is established by the Oregon Constitution (Or. Const. art. VI, § 1).

As the state’s chief election officer, the secretary of state is responsible for obtaining and maintaining uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of Oregon’s election laws (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.110). The secretary is responsible for assisting, advising, and instructing county clerks on voter registration and election procedures, and must prepare and distribute detailed written directives to county clerks, which county clerks must comply with (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.120). The secretary may seek a circuit court order compelling a county clerk or other local election official to comply with the secretary’s interpretations, rules, directives, or instructions (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.820).

The secretary of state’s office also designs, prepares, and distributes state voter registration cards and distributes federal registration cards (Or. Rev. Stat. § 247.171(1)); examines voting machines and vote tally systems to determine whether they comply with state requirements and can safely be used by electors (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.550(1)); reviews county election security plans and must approve a county’s plan before the county may begin scanning ballots upon receipt (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 254.074(4), 254.478(1)); and prepares periodic compilations and digests of Oregon’s election statutes, distributes them to county clerks, and makes them publicly available without charge (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.160).

Oregon law empowers the secretary of state to adopt rules the secretary considers necessary to help achieve and maintain “a maximum degree of correctness, impartiality and efficiency in administration of the election laws” (Or. Rev. Stat. § 246.150). Select examples include:

• OAR 165–002–0025: Establishes filing procedures for candidate filings; initiative, referendum, and recall filings; campaign finance reports; and other election documents.
• OAR 165–005–0135: Establishes procedures for exempting election workers’ residence addresses from public disclosure.
• OAR 165–007–0310: Establishes requirements for county election security plans, including ballot security, audit trails, ballot drop site security, election observer procedures, and approval for scanning ballots before Election Day.

Under Oregon’s Administrative Procedures Act, the secretary of state may also adopt, amend, or suspend a temporary rule without the usual prior notice or hearing upon making the required findings that a failure to act promptly would result in serious prejudice to the public interest or the interests of the parties concerned (Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.335(5)). A temporary rule may remain effective for no more than 180 days (Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.335(6)).

Oregon National Guard

Brigadier General Alan R. Gronewold serves as the adjutant general of Oregon. The adjutant general commands the Oregon National Guard (Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.160(1)).

The governor appoints the adjutant general (Or. Const. art. X, § 3; Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.150(1)). The adjutant general may be removed “for cause to be determined by a court-martial” (Or. Rev. Stat. § 396.150(1)).Governor Kotek appointed Brigadier General Gronewold to be Oregon’s adjutant general on October 18, 2023.

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), National Guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts;” the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the National Guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Portland, Oregon, Los Angeles and Portland.

As for the Oregon National Guard’s involvement in elections, state officials planned for possible Guard support around the 2024 election in case voter intimidation, election interference, or civil unrest exceeded law enforcement capacity. The Guard was trained and ready, and the planning contemplated potential disruptions at post offices and ballot drop sites, but Oregon National Guard personnel were not ultimately activated or called on to support the election.

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at county offices, ballot drop sites, or other election facilities under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both federal and state limitations, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at a county office to vote

Summary

Federal law protects the voting rights of federal officials and military personnel. State law, however, may restrict whether they can bring firearms into county offices.

Discussion

Federal law protects federal employees’ voting rights: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.” Because federal officials and military personnel are typically armed, their presence at county offices may still raise questions about applicable firearm restrictions and jurisdiction.

Oregon conducts elections primarily by mail (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 254.470(2)(a)). As such, it does not use traditional precinct polling places. Nevertheless, county clerks must maintain voting booths at their offices to allow voters to complete their ballots in person and to obtain replacement ballots in person when their original ballots are destroyed, spoiled, lost, or not received ((Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.474(1)–(2)).

Oregon generally permits a person who is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms to carry a firearm openly without a license, and state law provides that a firearm carried openly in a belt holster is not considered concealed (Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.250(1)(c), (3)). Carrying a concealed firearm on one’s person and possessing a concealed and readily accessible handgun in a vehicle are both generally prohibited without a concealed handgun license (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.250(1)(a)–(b), 166.260(1)(i)). Persons exempt from that license requirement include, among others, federal officers acting within the scope of their employment, persons summoned by covered officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace, active or reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces or National Guard when on duty, and qualifying honorably retired law enforcement officers (Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.260(1)(b)–(d), (f)(A)).

Oregon law prohibits intentionally possessing a loaded or unloaded firearm in a “public building,” which encompasses a county clerk’s office (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.360(9)(a), 166.370(1)(a), 254.474). However, this prohibition does not apply, among others, to federal officers acting within the scope of their employment; persons summoned by a federal officer to assist in making an arrest or preserving the peace while providing that assistance; active or reserve members of Oregon or U.S. military forces while performing their duties; concealed handgun license holders, except where a county governing body has adopted a policy prohibiting license holders from possessing firearms in certain county-owned or -controlled buildings used for official meetings; and persons authorized by the officer or agency controlling the building (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.370(3)(c)–(d), (f)–(h), 166.377(3)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to county offices and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
  • Update policies as necessary and consider developing written procedures in advance for responding to potential issues. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during the voting period. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at county offices. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials or military personnel arrive at an election facility to conduct routine business

Summary

Federal officials or military personnel may arrive at county offices, ballot drop sites, or other election facilities to conduct routine business. State and federal law, however, may restrict whether they can carry firearms at election facilities.

Discussion

As an initial matter, voters may return marked ballots by U.S. mail or deposit them at the county clerk’s office, an official ballot drop site, or a location where ballots are issued or voting booths are maintained (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 254.470(6)(b), 254.472, 254.474).

Oregon law restricts facial coverings worn by law enforcement officers, including officers employed or contracted by federal or out-of-state law enforcement agencies. A law enforcement officer generally may not wear a facial covering that conceals or obscures the officer’s identity while performing official duties except when engaged in undercover duties, actively performing specified tactical-response duties for which a covering is necessary to protect the officer from physical harm, or working in extreme or severely inclement weather (H.B. 4138 §§ 1(4)(c), 2(2)–(3), 4(1)–(2)). The same law expressly prohibits an officer, under any circumstances, from wearing a facial covering while performing official duties within 250 feet of a ballot deposit site, ballot-marking location, or voting booth while votes in a state or federal election are being collected or tabulated (H.B. 4138 § 4(3)). This election-specific prohibition contains no exceptions.

The presence of federal officials or military personnel at election facilities may also implicate restrictions on firearms, because such personnel appearing at county offices, ballot drop sites, or other election facilities to conduct routine business are typically armed.

Oregon generally permits a person who is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms to carry a firearm openly without a license, and state law provides that a firearm carried openly in a belt holster is not considered concealed (Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.250(1)(c), (3)). Carrying a concealed firearm on one’s person and possessing a concealed and readily accessible handgun in a vehicle are both generally prohibited without a concealed handgun license (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.250(1)(a)–(b), 166.260(1)(i)). Persons exempt from that license requirement include, among others, federal officers acting within the scope of their employment, persons summoned by covered officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace, active or reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces or National Guard when on duty, and qualifying honorably retired law enforcement officers (Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.260(1)(b)–(d), (f)(A)).

Oregon law prohibits intentionally possessing a loaded or unloaded firearm in a “public building,” which encompasses a county clerk’s office (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.360(9)(a), 166.370(1)(a), 254.474). However, this prohibition does not apply, among others, to federal officers acting within the scope of their employment; persons summoned by a federal officer to assist in making an arrest or preserving the peace while providing that assistance; active or reserve members of Oregon or U.S. military forces while performing their duties; concealed handgun license holders, except where a county governing body has adopted a policy prohibiting license holders from possessing firearms in certain county-owned or -controlled buildings used for official meetings; and persons authorized by the officer or agency controlling the building (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.370(3)(c)–(d), (f)–(h), 166.377(3)).

Beyond these statewide restrictions, Oregon law permits cities and counties to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the possession of loaded firearms in “public places,” which might include county clerk offices, but those laws may not apply to persons exempted under the state’s public building firearm restriction described above, or to U.S. Department of Agriculture employees acting within the scope of their employment who possess loaded firearms while lawfully taking wildlife (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.015(10), 166.170(1), 166.173(1), (2)(d)–(e), 166.370(3)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review current policies that address access to election facilities in your county and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
• Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
  • Update policies as necessary and consider developing written procedures in advance for responding to potential issues. Additionally, discuss these policies with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community organizations, local military liaisons, and state officials.
• Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
• Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during the voting period. Consider working with community organizations, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions and restrictions at county offices, ballot drop sites, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during the voting period.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an election facility to observe or monitor an election

Summary

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. Federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.

Discussion

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. The deployed federal officials are often categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (City of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the DOJ has deployed federal monitors “to elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states. In November 2020, it deployed monitors to 18 states. The department announced in July 2026 that it would send election monitors to 15 jurisdictions across Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia during the primary elections. And in September 2026, it announced that it would send 1,000 monitors to “select locations around the country to observe the general election in November.”

While the DOJ monitors “both federal and non-federal elections,” it has usually limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

In the absence of a federal statute clearly providing DOJ staff monitors access to polling locations, these monitors are generally subject to state laws governing access to the polls, which may include rules on credentialing, conduct, and where observers may be stationed. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” State law does not authorize local election officials to grant permission to individuals who are not expressly authorized by state law to enter a county clerk’s office or other election facility. When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials, including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general, have requested a court order barring federal monitors inside polling locations when informed that jurisdictions in their state had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations. After DOJ monitors attempted to access polling locations and voting equipment during the 2026 primary in Laramie County, Wyoming, Governor Mark Gordon requested an investigation into their conduct.

Congressional observers. For “decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, it codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (COCOA), 52 U.S.C. § 21083a, and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). Observers must be “House or Senate employee[s] designated in writing by the chair or ranking minority member of the Committee on House Administration . . . or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(d)). COCOA establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions on handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that, under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, Congress has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has at times resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1), (4)(c) prohibits intentional harassment — including offensive physical contact, knowingly false reports of death or serious physical injury, and telephonic, electronic, or written threats to inflict serious physical injury or commit certain felonies — and imposes enhanced penalties when such conduct targets an election worker performing official duties or is based on an action taken or decision made while performing those duties. More generally, Oregon law prohibits intentionally obstructing, impairing, or hindering the administration of law or another governmental function through intimidation, force, physical or economic interference, or obstacle (Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.235(1)(a)).

State law also protects election sites, voting equipment, ballots, and other election materials against interference. It prohibits obstructing an entrance to a building where ballots are issued, a designated ballot deposit location, or a voting booth during the period beginning when ballots are mailed and ending at 8 p.m. on Election Day, or after voters already in line have finished voting (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(4)). Oregon law further prohibits tampering with or damaging voting machines or vote tally systems, interfering with their correct operation, possessing an unauthorized key, and improperly printing, delivering, or distributing official ballots (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 260.645(1)–(4), 260.675(1)–(3)). Additional provisions prohibit removing ballots from designated ballot deposit or voting locations; defacing election notices; damaging election equipment or supplies; altering or destroying cast ballots or election returns; inserting fraudulent ballots; and stealing or interfering with the delivery of ballots, tallies, or return sheets (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 260.695(11)–(13), 260.715(5)–(6), (8)).

Oregon law also protects voters against interference and intimidation. It prohibits directly or indirectly using “undue influence” — including force; violence; restraint or threat of restraint; infliction of injury, harm, loss of employment, or other loss; or payment or promise of money, employment, or another thing of value — with intent to induce a person to register, vote, refrain from registering or voting, vote in a particular manner, challenge or refrain from challenging another voter, or apply or refrain from applying for an absentee ballot (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.665(1), (2)(a)–(c), (g)–(h)). Oregon law further prohibits asking an elector at a ballot deposit or voting location whom they intend to vote for; examining or attempting to examine the elector’s ballot, except while performing authorized election duties or providing authorized assistance; disclosing information revealing how an elector voted; doing anything to a ballot that permits identification of the elector; or leaving material showing how a ballot was marked (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(7)–(10)).

On top of these prohibitions, Oregon imposes restrictions on election observers. The Elections Division’s Vote by Mail Procedures Manual prohibits observers from interfering with election workers, handling ballots or election materials, or disclosing election results before 8 p.m. on Election Day. Observers must also sign in, wear official observer badges, remain at designated observation stations and be escorted to and from those stations, direct questions to designated supervisory staff and otherwise remain silent, and comply with staff directions. Violations may result in removal and potential criminal or civil penalties.

The application of state law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether and to what extent these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of federal observers, federal monitors, and congressional observers with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies — including whether any of the state law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable — and communicate them with your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
  • Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
  • Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
  • Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
  • Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere in elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to appropriately prepare and respond, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment

Summary

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

Discussion

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” and requires them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701). The Department of Justice (DOJ) has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

Federal and state laws may limit the information that local Oregon election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian,” but only if the attorney general makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it may prohibit disclosure of specified information in an elector’s registration file, including the elector’s birth month and day, Social Security number, driver’s license number, signature, information protected through the state’s Address Confidentiality Program, and the residence address of an elector and their resident family members when disclosure would endanger them or the elector has been identified as an election worker (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 247.948(2)(a)–(f); 247.965(1)–(2), (7)).

In July 2025, the DOJ requested Oregon’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Oregon refused to provide full access to its complete statewide voter registration list, the DOJ sued the state for refusing to provide the complete set of data. In February 2026, a judge dismissed the case. An appeal is pending. Check with your counsel as to the status of the appeal.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere in a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual” in the exercise of their right to vote. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1), (4)(c) prohibits intentional harassment — including offensive physical contact, knowingly false reports of death or serious physical injury, and telephonic, electronic, or written threats to inflict serious physical injury or commit certain felonies — and imposes enhanced penalties when such conduct targets an election worker performing official duties or is based on an action taken or decision made while performing those duties.

State law also protects election sites, voting equipment, ballots, and other election materials against interference. It prohibits obstructing an entrance to a building where ballots are issued, a designated ballot deposit location, or a voting booth during the period beginning when ballots are mailed and ending at 8 p.m. on Election Day, or after voters already in line have finished voting (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(4)). Oregon law further prohibits tampering with or damaging voting machines or vote tally systems, interfering with their correct operation, possessing an unauthorized key, and improperly printing, delivering, or distributing official ballots (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 260.645(1)–(4), 260.675(1)–(3)). Additional provisions prohibit removing ballots from designated ballot deposit or voting locations; defacing election notices; damaging election equipment or supplies; altering or destroying cast ballots or election returns; inserting fraudulent ballots; and stealing or interfering with the delivery of ballots, tallies, or return sheets (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 260.695(11)–(13), 260.715(5)–(6), (8)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
• It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult the Oregon Association of County Clerks, the Oregon secretary of state’s office, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Armed federal officials or troops are deployed to an election facility

Summary

Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities may implicate federal and state restrictions on armed personnel and firearms. Laws prohibiting voter intimidation and election interference may also apply.

Discussion

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would usually prohibit their deployment to county offices when they are being used as in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after the passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

As explained above, Oregon law generally prohibits law enforcement officers, including officers employed or contracted by federal or out-of-state agencies, from wearing facial coverings that conceal their identities while performing official duties, subject to exceptions for undercover work, specified tactical-response duties, and extreme or severely inclement weather (H.B. 4138 §§ 2(2)–(3), 4(1)–(2)). The same law expressly prohibits an officer, without exception, from wearing such a covering while performing official duties within 250 feet of a ballot deposit site, ballot-marking location, or voting booth while votes are being collected or tabulated (H.B. 4138 § 4(3)).

Oregon law generally permits open carry but restricts carrying concealed firearms without a license, subject to exceptions that include federal officers acting within the scope of their employment, persons assisting covered officers, and on-duty military personnel (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.250(1), (3), 166.260(1)(b)–(d), (i)). State law also prohibits firearm possession in public buildings — including county clerks’ offices — subject to exceptions that may apply to federal officers acting within the scope of their employment; persons summoned by covered officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace; military personnel performing their duties; concealed handgun license holders except where a county governing body has adopted a policy prohibiting license holders from possessing firearms in certain county-owned or -controlled buildings used for official meetings; and persons authorized by the officer or agency controlling the building (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.360(9)(a), 166.370(1)(a), (3)(c)–(d), (f)–(h), 166.377(3)).

Cities and counties may also regulate, restrict, or prohibit loaded firearms in “public places,” which might include county offices, but their laws may not apply to persons exempted from the state’s public building firearm restriction discussed above or to U.S. Department of Agriculture employees acting within the scope of their employment who possess loaded firearms while lawfully taking wildlife (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.015(10), 166.170(1), 166.173(1), (2)(d)–(e), 166.370(3)).

Beyond these location-specific firearm restrictions, Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.220(1)(a), (2)(a) prohibits attempting to use a dangerous or deadly weapon unlawfully against another person, or carrying or possessing such a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another, but that statute does not apply to “police officers” or to military personnel lawfully performing their official duties. The statute does not define “police officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be exempted.

Additionally, Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.190(1) prohibits intentionally attempting, by word or conduct, to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury. And Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275(1)(a), (d), (h) prohibits compelling or inducing another person to act or refrain from acting by instilling fear that the actor or another person will, among other things, unlawfully cause physical injury, commit a crime, or unlawfully use or abuse a public position. Neither provision contains any exemptions. Consequently, these restrictions might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

While Oregon law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.665(1), (2)(a)–(c), (g)–(h) prohibits directly or indirectly using “undue influence” — including force; violence; restraint or threat of restraint; infliction of injury, harm, loss of employment, or other loss; or payment or promise of money, employment, or another thing of value — with intent to induce a person to register, vote, refrain from registering or voting, vote in a particular manner, challenge or refrain from challenging another voter, or apply or refrain from applying for an absentee ballot. Oregon law further prohibits asking an elector at a ballot deposit or voting location whom they intend to vote for; examining or attempting to examine the elector’s ballot, except while performing authorized election duties or providing authorized assistance; disclosing information revealing how an elector voted; doing anything to a ballot that permits identification of the elector; or leaving material showing how a ballot was marked (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(7)–(10)).

Additionally, Oregon law targets those who would interfere with election administration, including by intimidating election officials. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065(1), (4)(c) prohibits intentional harassment — including offensive physical contact, knowingly false reports of death or serious physical injury, and telephonic, electronic, or written threats to inflict serious physical injury or commit certain felonies — and imposes enhanced penalties when such conduct targets an election worker performing official duties or is based on an action taken or decision made while performing those duties. More generally, Oregon law prohibits intentionally obstructing, impairing, or hindering the administration of law or another governmental function through intimidation, force, physical or economic interference, or obstacle (Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.235(1)(a)).

State law also protects election sites, voting equipment, ballots, and other election materials against interference. It prohibits obstructing an entrance to a building where ballots are issued, a designated ballot deposit location, or a voting booth during the period beginning when ballots are mailed and ending at 8 p.m. on Election Day, or after voters already in line have finished voting (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(4)). Oregon law further prohibits tampering with or damaging voting machines or vote tally systems, interfering with their correct operation, possessing an unauthorized key, and improperly printing, delivering, or distributing official ballots (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 260.645(1)–(4), 260.675(1)–(3)). Additional provisions prohibit removing ballots from designated ballot deposit or voting locations; defacing election notices; damaging election equipment or supplies; altering or destroying cast ballots or election returns; inserting fraudulent ballots; and stealing or interfering with the delivery of ballots, tallies, or return sheets (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 260.695(11)–(13), 260.715(5)–(6), (8)).

Finally, the Oregon attorney general’s office has advised that county election officials may alert law enforcement to possible criminal conduct, such as disorderly conduct, occurring at county election offices.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of armed federal officials or troops being deployed to a county clerk’s office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at election facilities.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of armed federal officials or troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted. Consider developing written procedures in advance for responding to potential issues.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Federal agents are deployed to communities

Summary

Increased and visible deployment of federal agents to communities during the early voting period and on Election Day could have a chilling effect on eligible voters. State and federal voter intimidation laws may apply.

Discussion

Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.220(1)(a), (2)(a) prohibits attempting to use a dangerous or deadly weapon unlawfully against another person, or carrying or possessing such a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another, but that statute does not apply to “police officers” or to military personnel lawfully performing their official duties. The statute does not define “police officer,” so federal law enforcement officials might be exempted.

Additionally, Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.190(1) prohibits intentionally attempting, by word or conduct, to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury. And Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275(1)(a), (d), (h) prohibits compelling or inducing another person to act or refrain from acting by instilling fear that the actor or another person will, among other things, unlawfully cause physical injury, commit a crime, or unlawfully use or abuse a public position. Neither provision contains any exemptions. Consequently, these restrictions might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Separately, Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the intent is to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation.

While Oregon law lacks a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.665(1), (2)(a)–(c), (g)–(h) prohibits directly or indirectly using “undue influence” — including force; violence; restraint or threat of restraint; infliction of injury, harm, loss of employment, or other loss; or payment or promise of money, employment, or another thing of value — with intent to induce a person to register, vote, refrain from registering or voting, vote in a particular manner, challenge or refrain from challenging another voter, or apply or refrain from applying for an absentee ballot. Oregon law further prohibits asking an elector at a ballot deposit or voting location whom they intend to vote for; examining or attempting to examine the elector’s ballot, except while performing authorized election duties or providing authorized assistance; disclosing information revealing how an elector voted; doing anything to a ballot that permits identification of the elector; or leaving material showing how a ballot was marked (Or. Rev. Stat. § 260.695(7)–(10)).

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Reach out to community organizations, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office and school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their rights to vote.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with local counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: Ongoing shifts in USPS operations may increase delays in mail-ballot delivery

Summary

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. Ongoing operational changes may delay delivery of mail ballots.

Discussion

Public confidence in election mail is a crucial component of free and fair U.S. elections. The Postal Service plays a vital role in sustaining that confidence by reliably delivering election mail. Election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Ongoing operational changes in how USPS handles election mail could affect delivery of mail ballots.

One such change is that USPS has consolidated processing into fewer regional facilities, which means that mail in many areas now travels farther to reach a regional processing center. Another change is that mail dropped off at post offices or collection boxes more than 50 miles from a regional hub now may not be collected until the next day. Because mail is postmarked when it reaches a processing facility — not when it is dropped off — these changes may delay postmarking and, in turn, ballot delivery. USPS itself has acknowledged that the gap between mailing and postmarking “has and will become more common” as a result of these changes.

USPS has also adopted new requirements that, if implemented, could affect the timing of ballot delivery. In August 2026, the Postal Service issued a final rule to implement an executive order. The rule imposes new design and tracking requirements for ballots mailed during federal general, special, and runoff elections and requires state-specific participation lists containing voter names and associated, individualized barcodes. USPS would use those lists and barcodes to verify outbound ballot mail before accepting it. Litigation over the final rule and underlying executive order remains ongoing, but these requirements are currently blocked. Check with your counsel as to the status of the litigation.

Even if this rule takes effect, USPS’s governance structure may make rapid implementation uncertain. Unlike most executive agencies, which are led by a single presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed head, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201). Guided by statute and its bylaws, which require USPS to deliver all mail inducted into its network across all delivery points in the U.S. (39 U.S.C. § 101), the board directs USPS’s powers, reviews Postal Service practices and policies, controls Postal Service expenditures, and selects and may remove the Postmaster General (39 U.S.C. § 202). The Postmaster General, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for [d]ecision by the [b]oard.”

Taken together, these operational developments make planning for potential delays in mail-ballot delivery challenging, as illustrated by recent experience in Wisconsin. After the state’s April 2026 election, nearly two-thirds of Wisconsin county and municipal clerks responding to a survey reported mail delivery issues, and many said that mail ballots took seven to ten business days to arrive rather than the standard three to five. USPS has stated that it plans to take “extraordinary measures” in the days leading up to the 2026 general election to “accelerate the delivery of ballots when the Postal Service is able to identify the mail piece as a ballot,” as it says it has done in every general election since 2020. Although extraordinary measures can expedite ballot handling and allow for extra deliveries and special pickups, they would not alter the underlying changes in postal operations affecting ballot delivery that are discussed above.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail-service interruptions or delays such as these by strengthening the parts of the process they can control — for example, by mailing ballots to voters as early as possible; informing voters that they may return mail ballots to their county clerk’s office, an official ballot drop site, or a location where ballots are issued or voting booths are maintained; and publicly communicating when voters should return ballots to ensure they are counted.

Planning and Preparation Steps for Consideration

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as voted ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster and identify and establish relationships with the USPS election mail managers or specialists at the processing facilities that handle ballots from your jurisdiction. Share bulk-mailing drop-ship dates and estimated mail volume; troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles and identify any challenges that could arise under current USPS delivery policies; and discuss whether and how “extraordinary measures” will be implemented in your jurisdiction during the upcoming general election. Consider establishing regular check-ins with those USPS contacts and other election officials during the weeks leading up to the election.
• Encourage voters to confirm that their address information is up-to-date and make a plan for how they will vote. If that plan includes using a mail ballot, encourage them to return completed ballots as early as possible and to use alternatives to the mail where available, such as ballot drop sites.
• If your office uses ballot-tracking services or tools, regularly monitor the data for service anomalies and trends, and communicate any issues promptly to USPS officials.
• Consult your counsel right away if you observe significant or unexpected delays in election mail delivery, or if federal officials seek to withhold election mail.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem, and be proactive in following up with USPS officials regarding service issues.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.