The purpose of this handbook is to provide election officials, their counsel, and others who support their election administration efforts with summaries of key legal authorities related to domestic interference in elections, both at the federal and state levels, including restrictions on such interference. It also offers scenarios and actions that officials should consider in developing their plans related to these issues.

This handbook is for informational purposes only. It does not provide legal guidance or include an exhaustive list of government agencies and departments, federal and state laws and regulations, or other authorities that may affect election administration. Nor is it an operational plan. Rather, it is for deliberative purposes and intended to inform the planning process.

Election Interference

Election Interference Generally

• 18 U.S.C. § 245 (Federally protected activities): Provides protection from interference in voting or participating in other election activities on account of race, color, religion, or national origin; and prohibits using force or threat of force to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with “any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person . . . from[,] participating [in voting or election activities], without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 594** (Intimidation of voters): Prohibits intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for the purpose of interfering with the right . . . to vote.”

Election Interference by Government Officials

In addition to the statutes above, some federal laws address election interference by government officials or those using government resources.

• 18 U.S.C. § 592 (Troops at polls): Prohibits U.S. military or federal officials from stationing “troops or armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” except when necessary “to repel armed enemies of the United States.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 593 (Interference by armed forces): Prohibits members of the U.S. military from interfering “in any manner with an election officer’s discharge of [their] duties.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 595 (Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments): Prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with or influence a federal election.
• 18 U.S.C. § 598 (Coercion by means of relief appropriations): Prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any person in the exercise of their right to vote.
• 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights): Prohibits anyone acting under the color of state law from violating the constitutional rights of any person.

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail): Requires each state’s chief election official to ensure implementation, “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner,” of “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the name, registration information, and an assigned unique identifier of every legally registered voter in the state. (Not applicable to North Dakota.)
• 52 U.S.C. § 21085 (Methods of implementation left to discretion of State): Leaves “the specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of [52 U.S.C. §§ 21081–102]” to each state’s discretion.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; . . . penalty for violation): Requires election officials to retain and preserve, for 22 months and with specific exceptions, all records relating to any application, registration, poll tax payment, and other act requisite to voting in any general, special, or primary election that includes candidates for president, vice president, senator, congressional representative, presidential elector, or resident commissioner of Puerto Rico, and provides criminal penalties for noncompliance.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20703 (Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose): Requires that any record or paper retained and preserved per 52 U.S.C. § 20701 be made available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of the legal custodian by the attorney general (or a designated representative) upon demand, provided said demand is in writing and contains a statement of the basis and the purpose for which it is made.

Election Observers

Congressional Observers

• 52 U.S.C. § 21083a (Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act):
  • Provides that, regardless of legislative action, Congress has the constitutional authority “to send congressional election observers to observe polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office,” per the authorities granted under U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
  • Requires that each state “shall provide each individual who is acting as a designated congressional election observer for an election for Federal office with full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures,” including (but not limited to) access to any area in which ballots are cast, processed, scanned, tabulated, canvassed, recounted, audited, or certified, during voting as well as during “pre- and post-election procedures.”
    • Provides that congressional observers may not “handle a ballot or election equipment (whether voting or nonvoting or whether tabulating or nontabulating), advocate for any position or candidate, take any action to reduce ballot secrecy or voter privacy, take any action to interfere with the ability of a voter to cast a ballot or an election administrator to carry the administrator’s duties, or otherwise interfere with the election administration process.”

Department of Justice (DOJ) “federal observers”

• 52 S.C. § 10302 (Proceeding to enforce the right to vote): Provides that whenever the attorney general “or an aggrieved person” institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce constitutional voting guarantees in any state or political subdivision, the court shall authorize the director of the Office of Personnel Management “to appoint federal observers . . . to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Unrest

• 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (Insurrection Act): Authorizes the president to deploy military forces inside the United States to suppress rebellion or domestic violence or to enforce the law in certain situations. This provision is the primary exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, under which federal military forces are generally barred from participating in civilian law enforcement activities.
• 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (National Guard in federal service: call): Authorizes the president to federalize and deploy National Guard forces when there is an invasion or threat of invasion or a rebellion against the authority of the U.S. government or threat of such rebellion, or when the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States. The issue of whether this law constitutes an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is currently in litigation.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (Anti-Riot Act): Prohibits using interstate or foreign commerce (such as crossing state lines or using the mail, phones, radio, TV, or the internet) with the intent to incite a riot; to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; to commit violent acts to further a riot; or to help someone else incite or take part in a riot or violent act related to a riot.
• 18 U.S.C. § 231 (Civil disorders): Prohibits any of the following in connection with civil disorder: teaching or showing someone how to make or use a gun, explosive, or dangerous device; transporting or manufacturing a gun or explosive; and obstructing or interfering with police or firefighters.

Threats and Voter Intimidation

• 18 U.S.C. § 115 (Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member): Prohibits threats “to assault, kidnap or murder” federal officials, employees, or their family members with the “intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with” the performance of official duties, or in retaliation for official duties.
• 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications): Prohibits knowingly making an interstate communication or transmitting “any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene” with the intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.
• 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Coercion of political activity): Prohibits intimidating or threatening federal employees “to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity.”
• 18 U.S.C. § 875 (Interstate communications): Prohibits threatening to kidnap or injure someone using certain interstate communications.
• 18 U.S.C. § 876 (Mailing threatening communications): Prohibits knowingly sending by mail “any communication . . . addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure”; includes additional penalties for mailing threats to federal officials.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Stalking): Prohibits interstate stalking and cyberstalking.
• 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil action for deprivation of rights), § 1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights): Prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to use “force, intimidation, or threat” to:
  • prevent a person from “discharging any duties” related to administering a federal election; or
  • deprive a person of equal protection, hinder state officials in securing equal protection for others, or prevent voters from engaging in lawful activity related to voting in federal elections.
• 52 U.S.C. § 20511** (Criminal penalties): Provides criminal penalties for any person, including an election official, who “knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for . . . urging or aiding any person” in voting or registering to vote in a federal election.
• 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Prohibited acts): Prohibits a person acting under the color of law or otherwise from intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person “for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote” or for enforcing the right to vote.

U.S. Mail

• 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally): Prohibits theft of U.S. mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Prohibits using the mail for fraud.
• 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (Hazardous material): Prohibits sending hazardous materials through the mail.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (Investigative powers of Postal Service personnel): Authorizes USPIS officials to make arrests, including warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, and to seize property as provided by law.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

** Only applicable to federal elections.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) is an executive cabinet–level department “responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was nominated by President Donald Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DOD plays an important role in military and overseas voter access. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) gives a “presidential designee” primary responsibility for the “federal functions” required under the act. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan designated the secretary of defense as the presidential designee in Executive Order 12642, which also authorized the secretary to delegate UOCAVA responsibilities, authority, and discretion “to any person or persons with the Department of Defense.” DOD Instruction 1000.04 delegates these responsibilities to the undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, a role currently held by Anthony J. Tata.

The DOD’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) “administers the federal responsibilities of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.” Scott Wiedmann is the director of FVAP.

FVAP recently made a change to the services it offers to UOCAVA voters: As of August 1, 2025, FVAP will no longer fax overseas voters’ election materials to county election officials, and UOCAVA voters may no longer send their voting materials to FVAP via email.

In the past, DOD entities have also helped to counter foreign threats to U.S. elections. For example, in 2022, the National Guard provided election cybersecurity support to several states.

Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an executive cabinet–level department that “works to improve the security of the United States.” DHS’s work includes customs, border, and immigration enforcement; emergency response to natural and man-made disasters; antiterrorism efforts; and cybersecurity. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate in January 2025.

DHS has played a supportive role in election security since 2017, when the DHS secretary designated election infrastructure — including voter registration databases and associated IT systems, voting systems, and polling locations — as critical infrastructure (CI).

Importantly, this designation “does nothing to change the role state and local governments have in administering and running elections.” Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service explained, the CI designation did not establish DHS regulatory authority over elections. Rather, it simply enables DHS to provide “assistance to election jurisdictions only on a voluntary basis,” affording election officials “greater access to DHS information and security resources.”

DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the department’s lead for providing election security support and services to state and local election officials under this designation. CISA Director Sean Plankey was nominated by President Trump and confirmed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2025 advanced his nomination.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) is an executive cabinet–level department charged with “enforc[ing] federal laws.” President Trump appointed Pam Bondi to serve as attorney general in January 2025. The Senate confirmed Bondi as head of the DOJ in February.

United States Postal Inspection Service

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is the law enforcement arm of the United States Postal Service (USPS). USPIS “enforces over 200 federal statutes related to crimes that involve the postal system, its employees, and its customers.” It is “responsible for ensuring the safety of all mail, including Election Mail.” The chief postal inspector is appointed by the postmaster general, in consultation with USPS’s board of governors, to oversee all operations of the Postal Inspection Service. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general. Current Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale was appointed to the position in 2019.

Postal inspectors (PIs) are sworn federal agents, specially chosen and trained to ensure that laws are enforced, crimes are prevented, and the nation’s election mail is securely delivered. Certain PIs, designated as election crime coordinators (ECCs), “coordinate closely with the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, USPS Office of the Inspector General, and local and state law enforcement” as needed.

United States Postal Service

The U.S. Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors. Nine of the board’s eleven members (or governors) are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to serve staggered seven-year terms; the remaining two are the postmaster general and deputy postmaster general, who have no set terms. The board appoints the postmaster general; the deputy postmaster general is selected by the board and the postmaster general. The current board of governors chair is Amber McReynolds, who also chairs the board’s election mail committee and serves on its operations committee.

The Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration: processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. The term election mail includes “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process, such as ballots, voter registration cards, absentee ballot applications and polling place notifications.”

The Postal Service has specific policies and procedures on the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, which includes explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize delivery of election mail.

According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days, and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for the Postal Service to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Congress

Congress’s election-related roles and responsibilities are established in the U.S. Constitution, which grants only Congress and the states the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of federal elections. However, Congress has delegated certain federal agencies limited roles in elections. For purposes of this handbook, the overview provided in this section is limited to information related to the congressional election observer program. In 2024, Congress enacted the Confirmation of Congressional Observer Access Act (COCOA), which codifies the program, through which congressional staff volunteer and are trained for the purpose of “monitoring key aspects of the election process and collecting information to build a record for the Committee in the case of a contested election.” According to the National Association of Counties (NACo), Congress has utilized this program since 2006, though Congress says the program has existed “for decades.”

Congress asserts that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant it the authority for this program.

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, Committee on House Administration chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking minority member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent NACo a letter outlining the program and its purpose. The letter acknowledged that “states have the important responsibility of administering . . . federal elections” and that congressional observers “play no role in the administration of the election or the vote counting process; they are to function exclusively as an observer.” It also stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary,” noting that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.”

Core Election Interference Provisions

• Wis. Stat. § 12.13:
  • Prohibits the following:
    • election officials from tampering with voting machines, voting devices, automatic tabulating equipment, or intentionally permitting or causing such equipment to incorrectly record a vote, and makes such conduct a felony;
    • unauthorized persons, during or after an election, from breaking open or violating the seals or locks on a ballot box containing ballots, unlawfully possessing, concealing, withholding, or destroying ballot boxes or ballots, tampering with those ballots, or aiding and abetting someone in doing so, and makes such conduct a felony;
    • any person from tampering with voting machines, voting devices, automatic tabulating equipment, or related ballots before or during an election; unlawfully breaking locks or seals, resetting counters, or disabling voting machines after an election; or tampering with automatic tabulating equipment, vote records, or computer programs in a manner intended to prevent votes from being accurately counted, and makes such conduct a felony;
    • soliciting a person to show how their vote was cast, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor;
    • removing or destroying any supplies placed in compartments or polling booths, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor;
    • refusing to obey a lawful order of an inspector made for the purpose of enforcing the election law, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor;
    • engaging in disorderly behavior at or near a polling place, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor; or
    • interrupting or disturbing voting or canvassing, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Wis. Stat. § 12.03: Prohibits, on Election Day, engaging in electioneering, defined as “any activity . . . intended to influence voting at an election,” at a polling place, within 100 feet of a building containing a polling place, or at other places where election activities occur, including sites where absentee ballots are delivered.
• Wis. Stat. § 12.035: Prohibits posting or distributing election-related materials at or within 100 feet of a polling place on Election Day.
• Wis. Stat. § 12.05: Prohibits knowingly making or publishing, or causing to be made or published, a false representation pertaining to a candidate or referendum that affects or intends to affect voting at an election.
• Wis. Stat. § 7.37: Prohibits an election official from intentionally failing to properly endorse a ballot or intentionally giving an elector a ballot not properly endorsed.
• Wis. Stat. § 946.69: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • acting in an official capacity or performing an official function, knowing that the person is not the public officer or public employee they assume to be; or
  • exercising any function of a public office, knowing that the person has not qualified to act or that their right to act has ceased.
• Wis. Stat. § 12.09: Prohibits the following either personally or through an agent:
  • using or threatening to use force, violence, or restraint to compel any person to vote or refrain from voting or to vote for or against a particular candidate or referendum;
  • using abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device to impede or prevent someone from freely voting; or
  • acting to compel, induce, or prevail on an elector either to vote or refrain from voting for or against a particular candidate or referendum.
• Wis. Stat. § 943.30: Prohibits threatening or committing any injury to a “person, property, business, profession, calling or trade, or the profits and income of any business, profession, calling or trade of another” with intent to compel the person threatened to act against their will.
• Wis. Stat. § 940.20: Prohibits intentionally causing bodily harm to a public officer in order to influence their actions or as a result of any action taken within an official capacity, and makes such conduct a felony.
• Wis. Stat. § 940.62: Prohibits the following as felonies:
  • intentionally causing bodily harm to a public officer in order to influence their actions or as a result of any action taken within an official capacity; or
  • causing bodily harm “to an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk who is acting in [their] official capacity if the person [causing said harm] knows or has reason to know that the victim is an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk.”
• Wis. Stat. § 941.235: Prohibits carrying a firearm in a building owned or leased by the state or any political subdivision, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Wis. Stat. § 941.23: Prohibits carrying “a concealed and dangerous weapon,” and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.
• Wis. Stat. § 175.60: Prohibits carrying “a concealed weapon, a weapon that is not concealed, or a firearm that is not a weapon” in any portion of a building that is a county, state, or federal courthouse or any portion of a building that is a municipal courtroom if court is in session, and makes such a misdemeanor.
• Wis. Stat. § 948.605: Prohibits the following:
  • knowingly possessing a firearm on school grounds, and makes such conduct a felony; or
  • knowingly possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of school grounds, and makes such conduct subject to a forfeiture.
• Wis. Stat. § 943.13: Prohibits a person, while carrying a firearm, from entering or remaining at a special event if the event’s organizers have notified the person not to enter or remain at the event while carrying a firearm or with that type of firearm, and makes such conduct a forfeiture.
• Wis. Stat. § 941.20: Prohibits intentionally pointing a firearm at or toward another, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.

Police presence at the polls

• Wis. Stat. § 7.22: Requires the police chief to station a police officer at polling places for each election.
• Wis. Stat. § 7.37: Permits inspectors to order a law enforcement officer to remove any person from the voting area who “is disorderly in the presence or hearing of the inspectors” or otherwise “interrupts or disturbs the proceedings,” and to take persons into custody if they refuse to obey the lawful commands of an inspector.
• Wis. Stat. § 947.06: Requires “[s]heriffs, their undersheriffs and deputies, constables, marshals and police officers . . . to suppress unlawful assemblies within their jurisdiction.”

Election Material Maintenance, Access, and Retention

Various Wisconsin laws and regulations, including Wis. Stat. § 7.23, require election officials to keep and preserve election records for certain durations. The Wisconsin Public Records Board maintains a schedule to assist custodians in maintaining and disposing of records in compliance with legal requirements. The table below lists key record retention requirements.

Custody, handling, and access for election materials and equipment

• Wis. Stat. § 6.36: Requires the official registration list to be open to public inspection, while restricting access to certain information, including dates of birth, license numbers, social security account numbers, addresses of electors with confidential listings, and indications of accommodations required to permit voting.
• Wis. Stat. § 7.10: Requires county clerks to provide and prepare ballots and election supplies and to distribute ballots to municipal clerks before each election, including according to the statutory timetable.
• Wis. Stat. § 7.15: Requires municipal clerks to have charge and supervision of elections and registration in their municipalities, including distributing ballots and supplies, delivering ballots to polling places before the polls open, keeping a record of when and in what condition ballot packages were received from the county clerk, and delivering unopened ballot packages to the proper officials the day before the election.
• Wis. Stat. § 7.51: Requires inspectors, after canvassing the results, to secure and seal ballots and voting machines and to transfer ballots, statements, tally sheets, lists, and envelopes to the county clerk by 4:00 p.m. on the day following the election.

Election Observers

• Wis. Stat. § 7.41: Restricts the observation area of election observers at a polling place to between three and eight feet from registration table; and grants election officials the right to remove any election observer who disrupts the operation of the voting site or clerk’s office or violates laws against electioneering.
• Wis. Stat. § 6.92: Prohibits high school–aged election inspectors from challenging a person’s vote.
• Admin. Code § EL 4.04: Prohibits election observers from
  • disobeying the designated election official’s commands;
  • engaging in “loud, boisterous, or otherwise disruptive behavior” that threatens the orderly conduct of the election or interferes with voting or registration;
  • engaging in electioneering or distributing election-related material;
  • engaging in any conversation concerning a candidate, party, or question appearing on the ballot; or
  • initiating a conversation with a voter.

Emergency Powers

• Wis. Stat. § 323.12: Authorizes the governor to:
  • call out the state traffic patrol or the conservation warden services without declaring an emergency upon determining that “a condition of civil disorder or a threat to the safety of persons on state property or damage or destruction to state property” exists;
  • during a declared state of emergency, issue any orders “deem[ed] necessary for the security of persons and property;” or
  • during a state of emergency, suspend any administrative rule if compliance with that rule “would prevent, hinder, or delay necessary actions to respond” to a declared disaster.
• Wis. Stat. § 227.24: Permits an agency to promulgate an emergency rule without complying with notice, hearing, and publication requirements if “preservation of the public peace, health, safety, or welfare” requires the rule to take effect before it otherwise would, and permits an agency to request no more than two 60-day extensions of an emergency rule.
• Wis. Stat. § 7.37: Permits inspectors, before any votes are received, to adjourn and hold an election at the nearest convenient place if it “becomes impossible or inconvenient to hold the election at the designated location.”

Paramilitary Activity and Civil Disorder

• Const. art. I, § 20: “The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”
• Wis. Stat. § 947.06: Prohibits unlawful assemblies “for the purpose of blocking or obstructing the lawful use by any other person, or persons of any private or public thoroughfares, property or of any positions of access or exit to or from any private or public building, or dwelling place, or any portion thereof,” and makes refusing to withdraw from an unlawful assembly when ordered to disperse a misdemeanor.
• Wis. Stat. § 947.01: Prohibits “violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or otherwise disorderly conduct” that causes or provokes (or may cause or provoke) a disturbance in a public or private place, and makes such conduct a misdemeanor.

Definitions

• See Wis. Stat. § 5.02.

* Case law may exist that provides further insight into how these statutes should be interpreted and applied beyond the scope of this handbook. Anyone considering how any particular statute may be applied should consult with counsel.

Governor of Wisconsin

The governor of Wisconsin serves as the chief executive officer of the state (Wis. Const. art. V, § 1). Governor Tony Evers was elected in 2018 and is currently serving his second four-year term.

State law authorizes the governor, during a declared state of emergency, issue any orders “deem[ed] necessary for the security of persons and property” or suspend any administrative rule if compliance with that rule “would prevent, hinder, or delay necessary actions to respond” to a declared disaster (Wis. Stat. § 323.12(4)(b), (d)).

When Governor Evers attempted to postpone the primary election in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that he lacked the authority to do so under his emergency authority. The order stated that only Wisconsin’s legislature has the authority to move or postpone an election through the “ordinary legislative process.”

The governor is the commander in chief of the state’s military and naval forces (Wis. Const. art. V, § 4), which consists of the Wisconsin National Guard, the State Defense Force, and the organized naval militia of the state, or any other military force organized under the Constitution and laws of the state, but does not include the unorganized militia (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 322.001(23)). The governor may order members of the National Guard into state active duty in certain cases, including “war, insurrection, rebellion, riot, invasion, terrorism, or resistance to the execution of the laws of [Wisconsin] or of the United States,” along with a natural disaster or a state of emergency related to public health (Wis. Stat. § 321.39).

Wisconsin Elections Commission

The Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) is responsible for administering all state election-related laws other than laws relating to campaign finance (Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1)). The WEC is comprised of three members representing the Democratic Party and three members representing the Republican party. The WEC’s administrator, who serves as the state’s chief election official, is appointed by a majority of commission members and confirmed by the state Senate (Wis. Stat. § 15.61(1)(b)(1)).

Meagan Wolfe has served as WEC administrator since her appointment in 2018. She was unanimously confirmed by the Wisconsin State Senate in May 2019 for a four-year term. Although her term expired in July 2023, no successor has been appointed and confirmed. In 2025, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Wolfe may continue serving as a holdover administrator until the WEC appoints, and the Senate confirms, a successor.

To ensure that state election laws are enforced, the WEC has the authority to investigate violations of the laws it administers, prosecute alleged civil violations of those laws, and seek injunctive relief or other legal and equitable remedies to enforce election laws and ensure their proper administration (Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1), (2m)(a)). The WEC is also responsible for conducting trainings for state and local election officials; maintaining and enforcing the statewide use of a voter registration list; providing financial assistance for election administration to eligible counties and municipalities; overseeing voter education; and publishing links to county election returns on its website (Wis. Stat. § 5.05(7), (11), (12), (14)(c), (15)).

Additionally, the WEC issues guidance for local election officials and has the authority to promulgate rules to interpret or implement laws that regulate elections or campaigns for public office (Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1)(f)). Those rules must go through the formal rulemaking process, including gubernatorial approval and legislative review (Wis. Stat. §§ 227.185, 227.19(2), (4)). Select examples include:

• Admin. Code ch. EL 3: Establishes required content for voter registration application forms and voter registration eligibility criteria.
• Admin. Code ch. EL 4: Requires election officials to establish an observation area for members of the public to observe the voting process and outlines permitted conduct for election observers.
• Admin. Code ch. EL 12: Outlines the certification process for municipal clerks and outlines content for clerk trainings.

As a state agency, WEC may also promulgate emergency rules when “preservation of public peace, health, safety, or welfare” necessitates doing so (Wis. Stat. § 227.24(1)(a)). Those rules remain in effect for 150 days unless the state legislature grants an extension, which may not exceed an additional 120 days (Wis. Stat. § 227.24(2)(a)).

The Wisconsin Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) is a legislative committee that reviews administrative rules proposed by state agencies (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 227.26(2)(a)). In 2025, the Wisconsin Supreme Court curtailed JCRAR’s powers in Evers v. Marklein, holding that statutes allowing the committee to pause, object to, and suspend administrative rules by committee action alone violated the Wisconsin Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.

Wisconsin National Guard

Major General Matthew Strub serves as the adjutant general of Wisconsin. The adjutant general is appointed by the governor (Wis. Stat. § 15.31) and can be removed by the governor only “for cause for withdrawal of federal recognition of [their] commission” (Wis. Stat. § 17.07(5)). The adjutant general oversees the Wisconsin National Guard (Wis. Stat. § 321.04). Governor Evers appointed Major General Strub on April 8, 2025. 

Under certain circumstances, Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows the president to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” (10 U.S.C. § 12406(3)). Once lawfully called by the president (i.e., “activated for federal service under Title 10 authority,” or federalized), national guard members “are in an equivalent active-duty status as their active component counterparts;” the chain of command “runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”

Federal courts recently addressed the limits on the president’s authority to federalize the national guard under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, a law that permits federalization when (among other circumstances) “the president is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” In October 2025, President Trump invoked this law to federalize approximately 300 members of the Illinois National Guard in the Chicago area. After an additional 400 members of the Texas National Guard were slated for deployment in the area, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul sued to halt the deployment.

In December 2025, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6–3, rejected a request from the Trump administration to put the temporary restraining order issued by a lower court judge on hold while litigation continued. The majority held that the president may federalize National Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 12406 only in situations where he has legal authority to deploy active-duty troops and has determined that active-duty troops are insufficient. The majority concluded that, “[a]t this preliminary stage, the government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois,” given that President Trump had not invoked the Insurrection Act and the government did not cite an applicable constitutional authority. Shortly after this ruling, President Trump announced that he would end efforts to deploy the National Guard in Chicago, as well as in Los Angeles and Portland, Oregon. 

This section offers a list of scenarios that involve federal officials and election administration. As this handbook does not provide legal advice, these scenarios may result in questions that are outside the scope of this document and should be addressed to an attorney.

Federal Presence

Federal officials — including armed, uniformed federal law enforcement officers or military personnel — could appear at in-person voting locations, drop boxes, or election offices under various circumstances. Regardless of the reason, their appearance may cause concern or confusion. As federal presence in election settings has historically been rare and is subject to both state and federal limitations, reviewing the applicable state laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location, ballot drop box, or election office to vote or while conducting official business

SUMMARY

Federal and state laws may restrict armed federal personnel at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, and election offices. Wisconsin state law prohibits firearms in some public settings that may serve as polling locations. Even where firearm possession is permitted, federal and state laws prohibit interference with election administration and intimidation of voters. Additional jurisdictional questions may arise when these sites are located on federal property, including within federal buildings.

DISCUSSION

Uniformed federal law enforcement officers and military personnel are typically armed.

Although Wisconsin law does not expressly prohibit firearms in polling places, it does restrict firearms in locations that are often used as polling places, including public buildings and schools. Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 941.235 prohibits carrying a firearm “in any building owned or leased by the state or any political subdivision of the state.” However, the statute exempts both armed troops and “peace officers” acting in the line of duty (Wis. Stat. § 941.235(2)(a)). Wis. Stat. § 939.22(22) defines a “peace officer” as “any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime.” Thus, the public building restriction might not apply to armed federal officials acting in their official capacity.

Wisconsin law also prohibits knowingly possessing firearms in school zones — which are often used as polling places or drop box locations — including on and within 1,000 feet of school grounds, subject to several exemptions (Wis. Stat. § 948.605(2)(a)). One exemption incorporated from the Gun-Free School Zones Act applies to “law enforcement officer[s] acting in [their] official capacity” (Wis. Stat. § 948.605(2)(b)(1m) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(vi)). By contrast the statute does not explicitly exempt military personnel.

Even if an in-person voting location or ballot drop box site is not subject to the firearms restrictions discussed above, local governments might be able to restrict the ability to carry weapons at polling places under Wisconsin’s Trespass to Land statute. For instance, organizers of a “special event” may bar individuals from entering or remaining at the event while carrying a firearm (Wis. Stat. § 943.13(1m)(c)(3)), and owners or occupants of certain nonresidential buildings — including state and local governmental entities — may prohibit individuals from entering or remaining in specified buildings while carrying a firearm if statutory signage requirements are satisfied (Wis. Stat. § 943.13(1m)(c)). The statute contains exceptions for certain law enforcement personnel, including law enforcement officers employed in Wisconsin by a public agency and qualified out-of-state law enforcement officers (Wis. Stat. § 943.13(4m)(bm)). Because this exception does not expressly refer to federal law enforcement officers, they might fall under a properly noticed firearms restriction adopted under the trespass statute.

Federal law also prohibits federal officials from deploying “armed men at any place where a general or special election is held” (18 U.S.C. § 592). At the same time, it provides significant protections to federal officials’ and employees’ right to vote: 18 U.S.C. § 610 makes it a felony for “any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any employee of the Federal Government . . . to engage in, or not to engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, voting or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any election.”

If an in-person voting location or drop box is located on federal property — that is, on federal land (including military installations) or in a federal building — then jurisdictional issues may arise. Election officials may have less legal authority to mitigate potential concerns about federal presence at such sites than at other locations. In that setting, 18 U.S.C. § 930(a), which prohibits carrying firearms in a federal facility (other than a federal court facility), typically applies. However, this prohibition does not apply to federal officials, employees, and agents or to state and local law enforcement officers while undertaking “the lawful performance of official duties” (18 U.S.C. § 930(d)(1)).

State law also prohibits conduct that interferes with or intimidates voters. Wis. Stat. § 12.09 prohibits personally or through an agent, using or threatening force, violence, or restraint, or otherwise acting, to compel, induce, or prevail on a person to vote, refrain from voting, or vote for or against a particular candidate or referendum; or using abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device to impede or prevent a person from freely voting.

Additionally, Wisconsin law targets those who would intimidate election officials. Wis. Stat. § 940.20 and Wis. Stat. § 940.62 prohibit intentionally causing bodily harm to a public officer in order to influence their actions. Wis. Stat. § 940.62 also specifically prohibits causing bodily harm “to an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk who is acting in [their] official capacity if the person [causing said harm] knows or has reason to know that the victim is an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk.”

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Policies and coordination
  • Review current policies that address access to in-person voting locations and speak with other election officials in your state about their policies.
  • Discuss your office’s policies with your counsel and law enforcement, including any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction. Here is a guide for working with law enforcement to help keep elections, voters, and election infrastructure safe and secure.
    • Update policies as necessary. Discuss these policies with local law enforcement and with relevant stakeholders as appropriate, including federal government employee groups, local voting rights groups and other community groups, local military liaisons, and state officials.
  • Incorporate these policies into your training materials and other relevant documents.
  • Publish, post, and otherwise distribute these policies before and during in-person voting. Consider working with community groups, military and veterans’ groups, and federal officials in your area to help distribute this information.
• In-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, and other election facilities
  • Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials being deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
  • Consider posting signage, where appropriate, regarding weapons prohibitions at in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates.
  • Provide or cite state statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and carrying firearms when responding to concerns about armed federal officials near in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, election offices, or other election facilities.
• Federal-property locations
  • Review in-person voting locations and drop box sites to determine whether any are located on federal property, including within federal buildings, and discuss the resulting list with your counsel to identify any special considerations that apply to these locations.
  • Meet with relevant federal officials in advance to discuss potential jurisdictional issues and agree on the rules and procedures that will apply during in-person voting. Formalize agreements as appropriate.
• Responding to challenges
  • Contact your counsel and notify other election officials in your state of challenges that arise during election processes.

Scenario: Federal officials arrive at an in-person voting location to observe or monitor an election

SUMMARY

Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Congress may deploy election observers or monitors. At the same time, federal and state laws prohibit interfering with election administration and intimidating voters. The application of these state-law restrictions to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law.

DISCUSSION

The DOJ may deploy federal employees to in-person voting locations. These federal officials are generally categorized as either federal observers or federal monitors. Congress has a separate program that may deploy congressional observers to in-person voting locations or election offices.

Federal observers. The DOJ has clear authority to deploy federal observers to locations “where there is a court order under Section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act authorizing their presence.” Currently, the only jurisdictions that meet this requirement are in Louisiana (St. Landry Parish), New Jersey (Union County), and Rhode Island (city of Pawtucket). It is your responsibility to know whether a relevant court order is in place in your jurisdiction. Absent a court order, the DOJ lacks clear authority to deploy federal observers inside in-person voting locations.

Federal monitors. In the past, the department has deployed federal monitors “to monitor for compliance with federal civil rights laws in elections in communities all across the country.” In November 2024, for example, the DOJ deployed monitors to voting locations in 27 states, including four Wisconsin jurisdictions. In November 2020, the DOJ deployed monitors to 18 states, including Wisconsin, where staff were sent to Milwaukee.

The DOJ monitors both federal and non-federal elections, but it has typically limited federal monitor deployments to Election Day. Deployed federal monitors have included DOJ attorneys and other department personnel. Federal election monitoring by the DOJ is typically coordinated by the Civil Rights Division, which informs the relevant election officials of any plans to send federal monitors and “maintain[s] contact with state and local election officials.”

Whether these monitors can be stationed inside a particular polling location has been decided by negotiation and, on occasion, litigation. According to a 2018 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the DOJ can “send its own staff to monitor elections, but they can only enter the polls if they have permission from the local jurisdiction.” Wisconsin law permits DOJ officials to observe elections on the same terms as other members of the public, but it does not appear to provide local officials with separate authority to grant them access beyond that framework (Wis. Stat. § 7.41). When permission has not been granted or is in question, some state election officials (including Missouri’s secretary of state and Texas’s attorney general) have requested court orders barring federal monitors inside polling locations after learning that jurisdictions in their states had been selected for federal monitoring. In Texas — which unlike St. Louis County had no prior settlement agreement with the DOJ authorizing federal monitoring — the department agreed to station observers outside polling locations.

Congressional observers. “For decades,” Congress has deployed election observers “to watch the administration of congressional elections in the states.” In 2024, Congress codified this practice by enacting the Confirmation of Congressional Observers Act (52 U.S.C. § 21083a) and published guidance on the congressional Election Observer Program. COCOA expressly authorizes Congress to send observers to “polling locations, any location where processing, scanning, tabulating, canvassing, recounting, auditing, or certifying voting results is occurring, or any other part of the process associated with elections for Federal office” (52 U.S.C. § 21083a(a)). The statute also establishes “specific guidelines for conduct and interactions between observers and election staff” and places restrictions on congressional election observers, including prohibitions against handling ballots or voting equipment.

COCOA states that the Qualifications Clause, holding that each house “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1), and the Elections Clause, granting state legislatures authority over “the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” but giving Congress the right to “at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1), grant Congress the authority for the program. The act explains that under this authority, “regardless of legislative action, it has the authority to send congressional election observers.”

Shortly after COCOA’s passage, House Administration Committee chair Bryan Steil (R-WI) and ranking member Joseph Morelle (D-NY) sent a letter to the National Association of Counties outlining the congressional election observer program and the new legislation. While acknowledging that “states have the important responsibility of administering our federal elections,” the letter emphasized Congress’s “duty to ‘Judge the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,’” and stated that “the House’s constitutional and statutory authority in this area supersedes state law.” More specifically, it stated that congressional observers “are to be provided ‘full access to clearly observe all elements of election administration procedures’ throughout the election process . . . even if state law credentialing, partisan quota, or access requirements exist to the contrary.”

In the past, program outreach to election officials in jurisdictions selected for congressional election observation has been inconsistent. This has likely contributed to confusion that has resulted when congressional observers arrive with “credentials” that are issued by congressional committees but do not comport with state law — which often requires written authorization from a state or local political party or campaign official. On at least one occasion, after a congressional observer failed to provide credentials required under state law (but did provide a copy of a letter on House Administration Committee letterhead), a member of Congress publicly accused local election officials of “blocking entrance of Official House Election Observers.”

Importantly, COCOA also specifies that state and local election officials can lawfully remove congressional election observers when “a reasonable basis to believe that the designated congressional election observer has engaged in or imminently will engage in intimidation or deceptive practices prohibited by Federal law” exists.

Restrictions against interference. Federal and state laws prohibit federal officials from interfering or attempting to interfere in an election. 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election. 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing” any individual in the exercise of their right to vote.

As for state law, Wis. Stat. § 940.20 and Wis. Stat. § 940.62 prohibit intentionally causing bodily harm to a public officer in order to influence their actions. Wis. Stat. § 940.62 also specifically prohibits causing bodily harm “to an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk who is acting in [their] official capacity if the person [causing said harm] knows or has reason to know that the victim is an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk.”

Moreover, Wisconsin law protects voters against intimidation. Wis. Stat. § 12.09 prohibits personally or through an agent, using or threatening force, violence, or restraint, or otherwise acting, to compel, induce, or prevail on a person to vote, refrain from voting, or vote for or against a particular candidate or referendum; or using abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device to impede or prevent a person from freely voting.

On top of these prohibitions, Wisconsin law limits election observers’ interactions with voters. Wis. Stat. § 7.41 requires observers to remain in designated observation areas and permits election officials to remove any observer who disrupts the operation of the voting site or clerk’s office or violates electioneering restrictions. Further, Wis. Admin. Code § EL 4.04 prohibits observers from engaging in “loud, boisterous, or otherwise disruptive behavior” that “threatens the orderly conduct of the election or interferes with voting or registration,” initiating conversations with voters, or engaging in “any conversation concerning a candidate, party, or question appearing on the ballot.”

The application of these state-law requirements to federally authorized observers or monitors may be limited to the extent they are preempted by federal law. Contact your counsel to assess whether, and to what extent, these requirements may apply to federally authorized observers or monitors in your jurisdiction.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Review relevant federal and state laws governing federal observers, federal monitors, congressional observers, and other observers and challengers.
• Ask for a list of the names of the federal monitors or congressional election observers that are being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Speak with other local election officials (including those in other states) whose jurisdictions have been selected by the DOJ or Congress for observation or monitoring.
• Discuss the possibility of congressional and DOJ election observers or monitors with your counsel. Discuss appropriate responses and policies, including whether any of the state-law requirements discussed above may be preempted by federal law and therefore unenforceable, and communicate them with your staff.
• Develop a public communications plan in case a federal observer, federal monitor, or congressional observer is denied access, including procedures for responding to media, voters, and other stakeholders.
• If your office is contacted by the DOJ or Congress about observers or monitors, consider the following actions:
  • Contact your counsel. Inform local and state election official colleagues.
• Ask for a list of the names of the monitors or observers being deployed to your jurisdiction.
• Identify other jurisdictions that have been selected for observation or monitoring. Communicate challenges and successes.
• Connect your counsel with similarly situated local election officials’ counsel.
• Contact your congressional representative or senator.

Election Interference or Disruption

Attempts to interfere with the administration of safe and secure elections can take many forms, including unlawful attempts to seize election materials and voter intimidation. Federal and state laws strictly prohibit federal interference in elections. Historically, federal efforts to interfere with elections have been exceptionally rare. However, reviewing the applicable laws and regulations will help you to prepare and respond appropriately, if necessary.

Scenario: Law enforcement officials (or others) demand access to or attempt to seize voter data, election materials, or election equipment

SUMMARY

State and local election officials are the custodians of election records and equipment. They operate within a complex legal framework that includes state statutes, federal law, and constitutional boundaries. Responding to requests for access, subpoenas, orders, and other demands for custody of election-related materials or equipment with clarity and consistency requires careful attention to those rules, and to the roles that different levels of government play in election administration.

DISCUSSION

Under the U.S. Constitution, both states and Congress have responsibilities related to elections. Though Congress may set rules for federal elections, in practice, states manage voter registration, voting systems, and the broader infrastructure of election administration. No federal agency has blanket authority to intervene in or access election systems without legal process or specific statutory authorization. All requests — from any requestor — must respect the constitutional and statutory framework that preserves state and local control.

Federal law designates election officials as the custodians of “all records and papers which come into [their] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting,” requiring them to “preserve and maintain” these records for 22 months (52 U.S.C. § 20701).The Department of Justice has advised that election-related records must remain under election officials’ supervision, thereby limiting conditions under which others may be granted access.

State and federal law may limit the information that Wisconsin election officials are required to or prohibited from providing to federal officials. For example, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 requires custodians to make election records “available for inspection, reproduction, and copying at the principal office of such custodian” but only if the Attorney General makes a demand “in writing . . . [that includes] a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” And while state law makes registration records available for public inspection, it prohibits disclosure of dates of birth, license numbers, social security account numbers, addresses of electors with confidential listings, and indications of accommodations required to permit voting. (Wis. Stat. § 6.36(1)(b)(1)(a)).

In June 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested Wisconsin’s statewide voter registration list, including all private voter data. After Wisconsin declined to provide voters’ sensitive information, citing state privacy laws, DOJ sued the state. In May 2026, a judged dismissed the case. Check with your counsel as to whether an appeal is pending.

Separately, the FBI has contacted current and former Wisconsin election officials as part of an inquiry that appears to concern the 2020 election, though the inquiry’s scope remains unclear.

In several other states, federal officials have also sought access to election-related materials beyond statewide voter registration lists, including voter data, election materials, and election equipment. For example, a DOJ official reportedly requested access to voting machines in two Missouri counties. In Arizona, a state senator produced records related to its audit of the 2020 election in Maricopa County in response to an FBI grand jury subpoena. The DOJ has also demanded 2024 ballots and other election materials from Wayne County, Michigan. The FBI has seized materials related to the 2020 federal election from Fulton County, Georgia. And DHS reportedly sought and obtained voter records from at least six Ohio counties; in Franklin County, DHS confirmed that it was investigating possible voter fraud and has requested the records of dozens of voters.

Wisconsin law also imposes requirements governing the custody, handling, retention, and access to election materials and equipment.

Prior to an election, county clerks provide and prepare ballots and election supplies and distribute ballots to municipal clerks according to the statutory timetable (Wis. Stat. § 7.10(1)–(3)). Municipal clerks have “charge and supervision of elections and registration” in their municipalities, including distributing ballots and supplies, delivering ballots to polling places before the polls open, keeping a record of when and in what condition ballot packages were received from the county clerk, and delivering unopened ballot packages to the proper officials the day before the election (Wis. Stat. § 7.15(1), (1)(c), (5)).

During an election, Wis. Stat. § 12.13(3)(d), (f), and (l) prohibits removing or destroying supplies placed in polling booths; tampering with voting machines, voting devices, automatic tabulating equipment, or related ballots before or during an election; and, during or after an election, breaking open or violating the seals or locks on ballot boxes containing ballots, tampering with those ballots, or unlawfully possessing, concealing, withholding, or destroying ballot boxes or ballots.

After canvassing results, inspectors must secure and seal the ballots and machines (Wis. Stat. § 7.51). Ballots, statements, tally sheets, lists, and envelopes must be transferred to the county clerk by 4:00 p.m. on the day following the election (Wis. Stat. § 7.51(5)(b)). Wisconsin law also prohibits, after an election, unlawfully breaking locks or seals, resetting counters, disabling voting machines, or tampering with tabulating equipment, vote records, or related programs in a manner intended to prevent votes from being accurately counted (Wis. Stat. § 12.13(3)(y)–(z)).

At the conclusion of each election, election materials must be stored and preserved in accordance with the Wisconsin Public Records Board’s schedule.

Separately, federal and state laws prohibit anyone, including federal officials, from interfering or attempting to interfere with an election. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 595 prohibits government employees from using official authority in connection with federally financed activity to interfere with a federal election, and 18 U.S.C. § 598 prohibits the use of congressional appropriations “for the purpose of interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote.” As an example of state law, Wis. Stat. § 940.62 prohibits causing bodily harm “to an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk who is acting in [their] official capacity if the person [causing said harm] knows or has reason to know that the victim is an election official, election registration official, county clerk, or municipal clerk.”

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Consult with your counsel to review policies and protocols for restrictions on and best practices for managing access to voter data, election materials, and election equipment, along with any recent court rulings addressing law enforcement demands or attempts to obtain such access. Inform your counsel of any relevant past concerns, challenges, or special considerations in your jurisdiction.
• Consider documenting a procedure plan in consultation with counsel and other election officials if presented with a demand for voter data, election materials, or election equipment.
• Any response to federal efforts to access or obtain voter data, election materials, and election equipment should be structured in a way that preserves the security of election materials and equipment, protects voter privacy, and avoids unnecessary disruption to voting, canvassing, or certification processes.
• It is important to note, however, that if federal officials present a warrant signed by a judge, judicially approved warrants generally require prompt compliance, and it may be a crime to resist or interfere with their execution. Nonetheless, you should still concurrently contact your counsel without delay.
• If access to voter data, election materials, or election equipment is provided in response to a subpoena or warrant, consult with counsel on how to obtain judicial oversight to ensure the security of those records, materials, and systems.
• Prepare a communications plan to address public concerns, media inquiries, or disinformation about the custody, storage, or security of election materials and equipment, including by explaining applicable legal obligations and safeguards where appropriate.
• Clearly mark public areas, restricted zones, employee-only spaces, and designated observation points to help manage in-person requests, maintain order, and protect secure environments.
• When appropriate, consult with the Wisconsin Municipal Clerks Association, the Wisconsin County Clerks Association, the Wisconsin Elections Commission, and other trusted and experienced state and local election officials for advice on efficiently fielding similar requests. Sharing information may also help other officials facing similar situations.

Scenario: Troops or armed federal officials are deployed to in-person voting locations, ballot drop boxes, or communities

SUMMARY

Deployments of armed federal officials or military personnel to election facilities and elsewhere in communities may implicate federal and state restrictions governing armed personnel and firearms, as well as laws prohibiting voter intimidation.

DISCUSSION

On its face, 18 U.S.C. § 592 makes it a felony for federal civil servants to order, bring, keep, or have under their control armed federal law enforcement officials at any polling location unless that location is under armed foreign attack. Given that federal law enforcement officials — including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents — are typically armed, this prohibition would typically prohibit their deployment to in-person voting locations. Notably, although 18 U.S.C. § 592 was enacted well after passage of the Insurrection Act, it does not provide an exemption for troops deployed pursuant to the act.

Although Wisconsin law does not expressly prohibit firearms in polling places, it does restrict firearms in locations that are often used as polling places, including public buildings and schools. Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 941.235 prohibits carrying a firearm “in any building owned or leased by the state or any political subdivision of the state.” However, the statute exempts both armed troops and “peace officers” acting in the line of duty (Wis. Stat. § 941.235(2)(a)). Wis. Stat. § 939.22(22) defines a “peace officer” as “any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime.” Thus, the public building restriction might not apply to armed federal officials acting in their official capacity.

Wisconsin law also prohibits knowingly possessing firearms in school zones — which are often used as polling places or drop box locations — including on and within 1,000 feet of school grounds, subject to several exemptions (Wis. Stat. § 948.605(2)(a)). One exemption incorporated from the Gun-Free School Zones Act applies to “law enforcement officer[s] acting in [their] official capacity” (Wis. Stat. § 948.605(2)(b)(1m) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(vi)). By contrast the statute does not explicitly exempt military personnel.

Even if an in-person voting location or ballot drop box site is not subject to the firearms restrictions discussed above, local governments might be able to restrict the ability to carry weapons at polling places under Wisconsin’s Trespass to Land statute. For instance, organizers of a “special event” may bar individuals from entering or remaining at the event while carrying a firearm (Wis. Stat. § 943.13(1m)(c)(3)), and owners or occupants of certain nonresidential buildings — including state and local governmental entities — may prohibit individuals from entering or remaining in specified buildings while carrying a firearm if statutory signage requirements are satisfied (Wis. Stat. § 943.13(1m)(c)). The statute contains exceptions for certain law enforcement personnel, including law enforcement officers employed in Wisconsin by a public agency and qualified out-of-state law enforcement officers (Wis. Stat. § 943.13(4m)(bm)). Because this exception does not expressly refer to federal law enforcement officers, they might fall under a properly noticed firearms restriction adopted under the trespass statute.

Further, Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c) prohibits intentionally pointing a firearm at or toward another person. And Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) prohibits violent or otherwise disorderly conduct that causes or provokes — or may cause or provoke — a disturbance in a public or private place. Neither provision provides exceptions for peace officers or federal officials. Consequently, these provisions might apply to conduct by armed federal personnel that exceeds lawful authority.

Separately, state and federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation, or menacing or obstructing voters may apply. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10307(b)) prohibits anyone from intimidating, threatening, or coercing — or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce — voters or those who are urging or aiding others to vote, whether or not the actor intends to intimidate. Courts have consistently recognized that Section 11(b) creates a private right of action, allowing private plaintiffs, including voters, to obtain relief against voter intimidation. While Wisconsin law does not include a similar provision containing a private right of action, it prohibits personally or through an agent, using or threatening force, violence, or restraint, or otherwise acting, to compel, induce, or prevail on a person to vote, refrain from voting, or vote for or against a particular candidate or referendum; or using abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device to impede or prevent a person from freely voting (Wis. Stat. § 12.09).

Finally, state law provides election officials with authority to respond to conduct that may involve voter intimidation or disruption at polling places. Wis. Stat. § 7.41(3) empowers the chief inspector or municipal clerk to order the removal of an individual observing the election process if that person disrupts the operation of the polling place or violates election laws banning electioneering. If the individual refuses to leave, the election official may call law enforcement to have them removed (Wis. Stat. § EL 4.03(11)(b)). Wis. Stat. § 7.22 requires the police chief to station a police officer at polling places for each election.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Consult with your counsel about the possibility of federal officials or military personnel being deployed to in-person voting locations or to your office.
• Consider listing prohibitions on firearms, intimidation, deterrence, and obstruction on signage posted at in-person voting sites and ballot drop boxes. The Center for Civic Design offers a guide with customizable gun safety signage templates. Ensure that signage comports with federal and state laws.
• Provide or cite the above-mentioned statutes when responding to concerns about armed federal officials or troops at in-person voting locations.
• Keep abreast of developments in cases involving deployment of federal troops and evaluate with your counsel to determine whether policy changes are warranted.
• Reach out to community groups, including immigrants’ rights groups, and local leadership (e.g., the mayor’s office or school superintendent) to understand your role in helping eligible voters in your community feel safe exercising their right to vote.
• Reach out to entities where voting locations are sited (e.g., schools, community centers, and nursing homes) to discuss their policies regarding access to those carrying out immigration enforcement on site and the applicability of those policies during the voting period.
• Review any public education materials on this matter with your counsel to ensure accuracy and legality.
• Contact your counsel if any issues arise.

Scenario: USPS election mail policy changes impact mail delivery or public confidence

SUMMARY

The U.S. Postal Service is responsible for processing, transporting, and delivering the nation’s election mail safely, securely, and on time. USPS policies establish special handling requirements that prioritize election mail while in USPS custody. Election officials do their part to help USPS officials easily identify election mail by voluntarily printing highly visible election mail logos on envelopes used for election materials, including ballots. Mail service interruptions or delays that only (or largely only) affect election mail are possible, but such issues would likely only result from changes to current USPS policies (which would almost certainly require leadership changes). The Postal Service’s unique governance structure offers some protection against hasty policy and leadership shifts.

DISCUSSION

People’s confidence in election mail is a crucial component of public trust in U.S. elections. As such, the Postal Service plays a vital role in election administration. Mail voting is central to that role, but election mail encompasses “any item mailed to or from authorized election officials that enables citizens to participate in the voting process — including ballots, voter registration cards, absentee voting applications and polling place notifications.” Understanding the relevant laws and regulations governing election mail can help election officials anticipate and, if necessary, navigate concerns about election mail and issues that may arise before, during, or after the voting period.

Although policy changes that target or otherwise disrupt election mail service could occur for multiple reasons — such as natural or human-caused disasters, leadership changes, or budget constraints — USPS’s governance structure (and that of the USPIS, the Postal Service’s law enforcement arm) make it unlikely that such changes could be implemented quickly or suddenly. Unlike other executive agencies, which are led by single, presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed agency heads, USPS is an “independent establishment of the executive branch” overseen by a bipartisan board of governors (39 U.S.C. § 201).

This means that the board, guided by statute and its bylaws, “directs the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service, reviews the practices and policies of the Postal Service, and directs and controls the expenditures of the Postal Service.” The board selects and has the authority to remove the postmaster general (39 U.S.C. § 202), who serves as USPS’s chief executive officer and is responsible for Postal Service operations. The postmaster general, “as directed by the board . . . directs the powers of USPS except for those matters reserved for either the board or the governors.” For example, the “[a]pproval of official statements adopting major policy positions and of official positions on legislative proposals having a major impact on USPS” is a responsibility “[r]eserved for decision by the Board.”

Specific policies and procedures dictate the proper acceptance, processing, delivery, and documentation of election mail. In 2022, USPS formed a permanent, full-time election and government mail services team to formalize and centralize proven strategies, processes, and procedures. The Postal Service now operates a year-round education and compliance program to ensure that employees are fully trained and applying “all policies and procedures to properly handle mail-in ballots and other Election Mail.” In 2024, the Postal Bulletin published a comprehensive guide to these policies and procedures, including explanations about how the official election mail logo and other identifiers help USPS to monitor, track, and prioritize election mail delivery. According to the Postal Service’s 2024 postelection analysis report, USPS successfully processed, transported, and delivered 99.88 percent of ballots from voters to election officials within seven days and 99.64 percent within five days. On average, it took one day for USPS to deliver ballots from voters back to local election boards.

Election officials can prepare for and respond to mail service interruptions or delays by shoring up election mail processes and procedures over which they have control — such as providing alternative options like drop boxes for returning voted ballots and publicly communicating those options, and including election mail logos and tracking codes on election mail envelopes.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

• Identify election mail policies and procedures that your office can control, such as ballot drop box locations and ballot return envelope design. Review these policies and assess whether changes are appropriate in your jurisdiction.
• Meet with your local postmaster to share design updates, bulk mailing drop-ship dates, and estimated mail volume and to troubleshoot issues from previous election cycles.
• Consider increasing the number of ballot drop box locations to offer voters with election mail reliability concerns alternative ballot return options.
• If your office uses ballot tracking services or tools, regularly monitor tracking data for service anomalies and trends.
• Report problems to USPS at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/report-a-problem.
• Share information about service interruptions or delays with local colleagues and other election officials.
• Encourage voters to return their voted ballots as early as possible in public communications.

The information in this handbook is provided for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. You should consult a qualified attorney for advice regarding your particular situation.