Case Studies of State Redistricting Campaigns

Volume 3:
FLORIDA
FAIRDISTRICTSFLORIDA.ORG

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This volume and the previous two (covering Ohio and California) can be found at [http://bit.ly/1VONWB2](http://bit.ly/1VONWB2).

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# Case Studies of State Redistricting Campaigns

## Volume 3: FairDistrictsFlorida.org

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Case Studies of State Redistricting Campaigns: A Multi-Volume Series

Why Study Redistricting Reform Campaigns?

To ensure a healthy vibrant democracy, our political structures must engage citizens and be fair and transparent. Creating the districts that determine who will represent us is one of the fundamental processes of our democracy. If the process does not fairly reflect our views and preferences, then our democracy is at risk.

Objective: Existing redistricting models and the ways they can be abused for political ends have been well documented, as have ideas for improvements on those models (See for instance: Herbert, 2011; Levitt, 2010; Levitt, 2011; Litton, 2012; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, et al 2010; Stephanopoulos, 2007). What has not been examined in depth is the process through which states that have affected reform achieved that change.

This four volume series consists of three case studies and a comparative analysis of those cases to identify lessons from ballot initiative campaigns that can inform plans for other ballot initiatives. This series also aims to inform legislative reform efforts and to translate research findings into user-friendly suggestions for developing reform.

When completed, this series will consist of:

- **Volume 1:** Ohio Voters First, a citizen-initiated constitutional ballot initiative that failed to gain the support of the state’s voters.
- **Volume 2:** California Voters FIRST, a successful citizen-initiated ballot initiative resulting in a constitutional amendment for a citizen based independent commission.
- **Volume 3:** Florida FairDistricts Now, a successful citizen-initiated ballot initiative that led to a constitutional amendment laying out criteria for legislative use in determining legislative and congressional boundaries.
- **Volume 4:** An executive summary including:
  - Cross case analysis including identifying and analyzing similarities and differences in the cases.
  - Compendium of lessons learned, including successes, challenges and failures.
  - Compilation of strategies and tactics employed, including suggestions on coalition formation and engagement, communications strategy, and advocacy approaches, as well as a description of the unique circumstances that should be considered in designing state-based plans.

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1 Additional case studies on other state redistricting reform efforts may arise as needed. Analysis from an unsuccessful ballot initiative in Illinois will be included in the executive summary.
**Methodology:** Each case contains a review describing the state’s reform campaigns, coupled with an examination of websites, such as those created by the advocacy groups involved and news and media outlets, as well as documentary evidence in extant government documents. Telephone and onsite interviews with engaged activists and others identified as primary players provide additional context. The entirety of the data is then analyzed to discern activities and events contributing to the outcome of the effort.

A cross-case analysis takes the learnings to a deeper level by examining similarities and differences across the several redistricting efforts and reveals commonalities that advocates may use to analyze current or future reform efforts.

**Acknowledgements:** This work was conceived of and is primarily funded by the Brico Fund based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Brico Fund and its partner organizations realized their quest for “a Wisconsin where everyone has a fair shake; everyone does their fair share; everyone plays by the same rules and everyone has the opportunity to fully realize the American dream” would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve given the winner-take-all approach exhibited in the 2011 redistricting in our state.

To develop a plan for achieving reform in Wisconsin Brico Fund began looking for models of best practices in redistricting reform. What we found were many examples of “what” the policy implemented was but virtually nothing about “how” it was achieved. “Case Studies of State Redistricting Campaigns” is the result of that search. Our hope is that the documentation of the experience of each state provides lessons that advocates in our state and others find useful as they develop plans for redistricting reform.

Funding is also provided by the Bauman Foundation of Washington, D.C through their generous support of travel associated with gathering data for the series and in the editing of the series.

Redistricting reform ballot initiative campaigns are challenging and complex projects that are not for the faint of heart. To the members of the FairDistrictsFlorida.org steering committee, campaign and coalition effort, your efforts are greatly appreciated. A special word of thanks goes to those who shared their experiences so that others can learn and to those who reviewed this document to help ensure its accuracy.
FAIRDISTRICTSFLOREN.L.O: ADDING STANDARDS TO THE REDISTRICTING PROCESS

OVERVIEW

On November 2, 2010, nearly 63% of Florida voters approved two amendments to the state constitution to revamp the legislative and congressional redistricting process. The victory came after four years of work from bipartisan leaders and a coalition of organizations, called FairDistrictsFlorida.org. With such strong approval from Floridians across the state, Amendments 5 and 6 ("Florida Legislative District Boundaries" and "Florida Congressional District Boundaries," respectively) were an important step forward to ensure that Florida’s voting maps fairly reflect the will of the people.

Revisions to the state constitutional provision on voting maps had been attempted numerous times and over many years. For example, redistricting and reapportionment were the first issues the Florida League of Women Voters took on when the group was founded in 1939 (Macnab 2014).

Why, then, did the FairDistrictsFlorida initiative succeed where previous efforts did not? This case study examines the most important learnings, including:

- The role of strong leadership coupled with a clear and consistent structure and continuous communications.
- Openness to amending the content of the reform language to ensure buy-in by key coalition constituencies.
- The importance of preparedness for post-victory attacks by the opposition.

Prior to examining the FairDistrictsFlorida’s work, this report will review the history of redistricting reform efforts in the state since the decisions in two landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases, Baker vs. Carr (1962) and Florida-initiated Swann vs. Adams (1965). Together, the decisions in these two cases determined that reapportionment (and therefore redistricting) must be based on equal population – what is commonly referred to as the “one person, one vote” doctrine.

BACKGROUND: FLORIDA REDISTRICTING REFORM EFFORTS FOLLOWING BAKER V. CARR AND SWANN V. ADAMS

Through the 1961 decennial redistricting, Florida, like many other states, drew its state and congressional voting map lines based on geography. The following year, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Carr that states must use equal population, not geography, to draw new legislative and congressional districts. In 1967, a three-judge panel from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in Swann v. Adams that the state’s existing maps, in which districts varied by as much as 18% by population, were unconstitutional.

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2 Hereinafter “FairDistrictsFlorida.”
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, finalizing the shift from geography to population-based reapportionment and redistricting.3

The decision in *Swann v. Adams* led to an immediate massive transfer of power within the Florida state legislature; the number of Republicans increased from two to 20 in the Florida state senate and from 10 to 39 in the state house.

Since then, there were at least eight attempts to reform the redistricting process prior to the successful citizen-initiated constitutional amendments of 2010. Below is a timeline of key developments in the modern Florida redistricting and elections landscape.

**1967:** In light of the decision in *Swann v. Adams* invalidating the state’s existing voting maps, the governor called a special session to revise the state constitution, including creating a new reapportionment plan (Dauer, Maggiotto and Koven 1981). Adopted by voters in 1968, the new rules set parameters for the total number of senators and representatives statewide, and required that each district have less than 5% deviation from the average population of all districts. Districts could be single- or multi-member, a feature that had long been part of the state’s electoral system.

The special session also established a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to periodically assess the constitution’s continued relevance and efficacy in meeting Floridians’ political, social, and economic needs. As established, the CRC was comprised of 37 citizen commissioners who were required to gain public input on any proposed changes to the state constitution. Prior to adoption, any recommended constitutional changes were then subject to approval through a statewide referendum of the state’s voters. The state legislature directed the CRC to issue its first report in 1978 and then every 20 years thereafter.

**1972:** The state Attorney General sent recommendations to the state legislature to lower the population deviation threshold between districts from 5% to 1%. He also emphasized that districts could be single- or multi-member, and that they must be compact but could divide cities and counties. The Florida NAACP filed a lawsuit against the recommendations, claiming that multi-member districts had long been used as a tactic to suppress the votes of people of color. Despite the challenge, Florida district court upheld the plan and multi-member districts remained intact (Dauer, Maggiotto and Koven 1981).

**1975:** In light of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Department of Justice (DOJ) found that five Florida counties with large Latino populations were subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the VRA. The immediate impact was an order requiring the counties to distribute ballots in Spanish. It also required that the DOJ approve any subsequent changes to election-related laws prior to their going into effect.

**1978:** The first CRC proposed a series of changes to the state redistricting process. The plan included the creation of a bipartisan reapportionment commission and the prohibition of multi-member districts and gerrymandering, as well as the condition that any new voting maps respect city and county boundaries whenever possible. In testimony to the CRC, Republican

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3 In December 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in *Evenwel v. Abbott*, which questions whether states should use total population or total voting population in applying the “one person, one vote” principle of the 14th Amendment.
elected officials, the Association of Florida Conservatives, Common Cause and other advocacy organizations all supported the proposal. Once the CRC approved the proposal, it moved to the ballot for voter approval. Voters defeated the proposed constitutional amendment by 130,647 votes out of 2.1 million total ballots cast (Dyckman 2014).

1980: A coalition including Common Cause, the NAACP, the Florida Republican Party, and the Association of Florida Conservatives pressed the state legislature to put the attempted 1978 redistricting plan on the ballot. The legislature staunchly refused. Common Cause attempted to move forward with a ballot measure on its own, but failed to collect the 250,000 signatures required to place the measure on the ballot (Dauer, Maggiotto and Koven 1981).

1992: Senate Joint Resolution 328 would have created a seven-member bipartisan redistricting commission requiring geographic and racial diversity among commissioners (Van Gieson 1993). The chief justice of the State Supreme Court would have appointed the first six members, who would then choose the seventh to serve as chair. The proposal passed unanimously in an evenly split state senate. The state house amended the bill dramatically, recommending a 21-member, politician-appointed commission if lawmakers failed to complete the voting maps within 30 days of receiving updated census data (Indigo 1993). The measure died for lack of action.

1998: The second CRC proposed to amend the state constitution to create a seven-member, politically appointed redistricting commission and would have required public hearings during the map-drawing process. Representatives from Common Cause, League of Women Voters of Florida, and AARP, as well as a state senator and a number of Florida citizens testified in support of the changes.

The amendment would have prohibited public officials, party officers, lobbyists, legislative or congressional employees, or relatives of state legislators from serving on the commission. It also would have prohibited any plans that favored a particular political party or incumbent, or that diluted the voting strength of any racial or language minority. The proposal failed by one vote when, as W. Dexter Douglass, chair of the CRC, told the Sun Sentinel, Republican members of the CRC threatened to abandon the commission if “there was no other way to keep that proposal off the ballot” (Dyckman 2014).

Later that year, a similar plan passed in the state senate would have created a seven-member, politician-appointed redistricting commission for both state and congressional redistricting. The bill required less than 1% population deviation for all districts, as well as compactness and contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. The proposed plan also prohibited any plans that favored a particular political party or incumbent, or that diluted the voting strength of any racial or language minority.

The bill initially garnered support from organizations like People for the American Way, Common Cause, the League of Women Voters of Florida, and the Florida Education Association. Ultimately, the Republican state house speaker opposed the bill, and purportedly “twisted just enough arms” (Dyckman 2002) to prevent the recommendations of an independent commission; the bill died in committee.

1998: The “People Over Politics” campaign formed to pursue redistricting reform on the November 2000 ballot. Led by Dexter Douglass, the former chair of the CRC, and Marilyn Evans-
Jones, a member of the CRC and former member of the Florida House, the campaign sought two fixes to the redistricting process. The first proposal would have created an 11-member commission, appointed by the legislature, to draw district lines; the other would have strengthened the state constitution’s redistricting standards by requiring compactness and respect for city and county boundaries, and prohibiting favoring any political party, group, or individuals. The effort failed to raise the funds needed to collect approximately 500,000 signatures to qualify the measures for the ballot.

2005: The Committee for Fair Elections was created to add standards to the congressional and legislative redistricting process. The initiative would have established a 15-member citizen commission to draw legislative lines, and would have required compact districts “geared toward representing voters rather than re-electing incumbents” (Orlando Sentinel Editorial Board 2005). Betty Castor, a 2004 Democratic candidate for the U.S. Senate and former Florida State Education Commissioner, launched the campaign in partnership with a former Republican State Comptroller, Common Cause, and the League of Women Voters. The campaign collected and submitted over 900,000 signatures to the state board of elections, and raised $3.5 million. The proposed amendment qualified for the ballot with 689,325 valid signatures (Florida League of Women Voters 2015).

In March 2006, the coalition encountered a barrier that proved deadly for the effort. The state Supreme Court ruled 6-1 that the ballot measure violated the “single-subject” requirement of the Florida constitution, because it contained language to both create a commission and impose new standards for redistricting. The court thus struck the measure from the ballot (Dyckman 2014).

Although the Committee for Fair Elections work ended, the effort showed significant public support for reform and led to the FairDistrictsFlorida campaign.

PATH TO VICTORY: FAIRDISTRICTSFLORIDA

Despite past failed attempts to pass redistricting reform through ballot initiative, advocates for fair redistricting saw victory in November 2010. Amendments 5 and 6, which established strong criteria to eliminate racial and partisan gerrymandering for both legislative and congressional districts, passed with 63% of the vote. The following section examines what was different about the FairDistrictsFlorida campaign, and why it succeeded where previous efforts had faltered.

**Learning from Past Efforts**

After the 2005 initiative failed, the effort’s leader, Betty Castor, and other state officials, recruited attorney Ellen Freidin to help draft a new initiative that would pass constitutional muster. A bipartisan group of attorneys had already begun the process when Freidin stepped in. She had been active in state politics since 1972 and had served on the 1998 Constitutional

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4 A successful 2006 ballot initiative raised the threshold for a ballot initiative to pass from 50% to 60% of the vote.
Revision Commission, and was therefore intimately familiar with previous redistricting reform efforts.

Serving on the CRC had provided Freidin with a unique behind-the-scenes perspective on the issues associated with achieving redistricting reform. In particular, she learned more about the partisan nature of Florida’s redistricting debate, noting that she “began to understand how important it was to Republicans, who were then in control of both houses of the legislature, not to have any reform” (Freidin 2014).

The 2005 effort had also provided important insights into how to proceed with a renewed reform effort. One important lesson was that obtaining agreement of key constituencies early in the process, well before the initiative language was finalized or achieved ballot status, was critical to the effort.

In an interview during the 2010 FairDistrictsFlorida campaign, Freidin charted the considerable momentum the coalition had built upon since 2005: “We have an incredible coalition that has amassed nearly 1.75 million signatures to put this on the ballot” (Outzen 2010). That kind of support did not happen without significant effort. Throughout 2006 and 2007, Freidin met with voting rights experts, legislative leaders, members of the minority party, and organization leaders from a diverse array of constituency groups, including communities of color, to develop a shared strategy for reform. She learned that the NAACP’s concerns regarding the 1998 and 2005 proposals to establish a redistricting commission were still active and shared. “People of color and advocacy organizations vigorously opposed the citizen’s commission approach,” said Freidin. “They just didn’t trust it to protect the rights of minority voters.” (Freidin 2014). As a result, the coalition decided not to pursue formation of a commission. FairDistrictsFlorida instead opted “to establish rules [for fair redistricting] where there haven’t been any...and keep [geographical] communities together with districts that make sense” (Outzen 2010).

Along with building support among partner institutions, the coalition conducted a poll to test how the creation of map-drawing criteria would resonate with voters. FairDistrictsFlorida would eventually need over 60% of voters to cast a ballot in favor of their proposed constitutional amendments, and the initial poll results indicated that they would be able to meet that threshold.

With a broad base of organizational and likely voter support, FairDistrictsFlorida drafted the following ballot language that was used for both Amendment 5, targeting legislative districts, and Amendment 6, targeting congressional districts:

*Legislative [Congressional] districts or districting plans may not be drawn to favor or disfavor an incumbent or political party. Districts shall not be drawn to deny racial or language minorities the equal opportunity to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. Districts must be contiguous. Unless otherwise required, districts must be compact, as equal in population as feasible, and where feasible must make use of existing city, county and geographical boundaries (Florida Department of Elections 2010).*

In reviewing the language of the FairDistrictsFlorida amendments, the Brennan Center for Justice, a leading expert on redistricting issues found the initiatives “well-crafted” and “easy to
read and to explain,” adding that they avoided “some of the most contentious debate about the institutions of redistricting reform” (Levitt 2010).

After FairDistrictsFlorida settled on its ballot language, the coalition shifted its focus to developing and implementing a campaign plan. The first step was to collect enough signatures – the equivalent of 8% of the total votes cast in the most recent Presidential election from more than half of the state’s congressional districts – to qualify the amendments for ballot status. That translated to 676,811 signatures.

FairDistrictsFlorida decided to outsource the signature collection to PCI Consultants, Inc., a California firm that specializes in ballot initiative signature gathering, noting that an outside firm had “the right mechanisms and quality control to do the checks and balances” (Lee 2014). Rather than waiting until all signatures were collected, the group took advantage of a provision that allowed the state supreme court to review ballot language after 10% of the required signatures in each of one-half of the state’s congressional districts had been collected. Freidin describes the coalition’s quick work during this process: “We got the 10%, submitted it to the court and stopped and waited for approval just in case there was a problem like there had been with the [2005] effort.” In January 2009, the Supreme Court of Florida approved the initiative language for both Amendments 5 and 6 (Florida Department of Elections 2010).

A Professional Campaign Coupled with a Coalition

While the Supreme Court of Florida was considering the language, FairDistrictsFlorida created a campaign structure. It included a professionally managed campaign; a bipartisan steering committee; and, knowing how important external groups would be to foster support for the amendments among voters, a coalition of advocacy organizations (Lee 2014).

Freidin served as the campaign manager. “Throughout the process, Ellen did the fundraising, communications, strategizing, marketing,” said Deirdre Macnab, then the state president of the Florida League of Women Voters (2014). The group also hired Jackie Lee, a seasoned campaign manager with extensive knowledge of Florida politics and experience in both candidate and issue campaigns. Consultant specialists filled out the remainder of the campaign team. “To get the best consultants who were focused on this project, we solicited proposals from media firms and mail vendors to lead the other parts of the campaign” (Lee 2014).

In order to build credibility with the public and news media, the coalition intentionally recruited bipartisan and nonpartisan political leaders. Co-chairs of the steering committee included former Miami Mayor Manny Diaz (Ind), former Senator and Governor Bob Graham (D), former State Senator Daryl Jones (D), former State Comptroller Bob Milligan (R), former Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nat Reed (R), former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno (D), and former Judge Thom Rumberger (R). “Because of this [broad membership] we had the support of every editorial board in the state. That meant at every milestone, every time we filed something, every time we achieved anything every editorial board wrote about it and they always mentioned it was a bipartisan effort. Each editorial board probably wrote on the project 6 to 8 times,” said Freidin.

In addition to support from former elected officials, FairDistrictsFlorida had a diverse base of organizational partners. For example, the Florida Education Association and the League of
Women Voters signed on to help build a coalition in 2007, and were key leaders of the 2010 effort. Additional organizational partners included the Florida State Conference of the NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Common Cause, AARP Florida, Florida League of Cities, Florida Association of Counties, Florida School Board Association, SEIU, Democracia Ahora, and, during the get-out-the-vote campaign, America Votes Florida.

With signature gathering underway, the campaign worked backwards from the November 2010 election to create a strategic timeline. The group had to juggle several moving parts across 67 counties, and ultimately “determined to get the signature gathering completed in December 2009 so there would be enough time for validation and some time to spare for November 2010 ballot status” (Lee 2014).

After the Supreme Court of Florida approved the ballot language, the campaign returned to signature gathering. In addition to the paid effort, coalition partners also collected approximately 50,000 of the total signatures and used the process to educate their own members and the public about redistricting reform (Macnab 2014).

On January 22, 2010, the Florida Department of Elections certified Amendments 5 and 6, with 686,016 and 681,562 valid signatures respectively (Florida Department of Elections 2010). The combined cost of the signature gathering campaign was $3.5 million.

With a poll indicating significant public support, ballot status, a campaign plan, a leadership team and coalition in place, plus the support of virtually every news media outlet in the state, FairDistrictsFlorida appeared to be on track for success. It was at this point that the first of two major impediments appeared.

A Set of Hurdles

In April 2010, on the last day they were able to do so, the Florida legislature voted to add another redistricting amendment to the November ballot. Claiming the need to clarify the FairDistrictsFlorida amendments, Amendment 7 was titled “Standards for establishing legislative and congressional district boundaries.” The amendment asked “voters to put certain requirements for redrawing districts in the constitution, regardless of what is required” by Amendments 5 and 6 (Michael Peltier News Service of Florida 2010).

FairDistrictsFlorida contended the title was intended to sow confusion. On May 21, 2010, FairDistrictsFlorida supporters, including the Florida State Conference of the NAACP, the Florida League of Women Voters, Democracia Ahora, and former State Comptroller General Bob Milligan, filed a lawsuit asking to have Amendment 7 removed from the ballot since it violated the requirement that ballot language and titles not mislead voters. “In placing it on the ballot, the Legislature wants the people to think it does one thing when it clearly does another,” said Milligan. He added, “The present system was designed by those ‘in power.’ So, it would be no surprise that those in power placed Amendment 7 on the ballot to confuse voters to try to hold

5 Now part of National Council of La Raza (NCLR).
6 At the time, the coalition technically had four years within which to collect enough signatures to qualify for the ballot. In 2011, state legislators passed a bill to reduce the collection time to two years. See Florida Statutes, Title IX, Chapter 100.371, Section 3.
on to their power” (The Reid Report Blog 2010). On July 8, a Leon County Circuit Court judge agreed with the plaintiffs, holding the “wording was ill-presented and voters would have no idea what [the amendment] would actually do” (Sunshine State News 2010). Amendment 7 was thus removed from the ballot; the ruling was affirmed by the State Supreme Court.

Having cleared one hurdle, FairDistrictsFlorida faced a second legal challenge. On May 24, 2010, U.S. Representatives Corrine Brown (D) and Mario Diaz-Balart (R) filed a request in state court in Tallahassee for summary judgment to remove Amendment 6 from the ballot. They alleged that it was “riddled with inconsistencies and, if passed, would set unworkable standards in drawing [congressional] districts” (John Kennedy News Service of Florida 2010). Leon Russell, Legislative Chairman of the Florida NAACP, summarized the rationale for the organization’s position for the Florida Times Union, “It really boils down to one thing. All politicians have their own self-interest in mind” (Dixon 2010). The case worked its way through the state court even as the ballot campaign was underway and was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Supreme Court. ⁷

THE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES

Throughout the legal battles described above, FairDistrictsFlorida carried on with its advocacy campaign. The group’s campaign manager conducted weekly calls to keep coalition partners up to date on activity and the message strategy the campaign team had developed (Lee 2014). The regular updates allowed partners to promote a common message in support of the redistricting amendments, particularly with their own members and the public.

Several partners played critical roles in the FairDistrictsFlorida campaign. The Florida League of Women Voters filled several important roles for the coalition, including:

- Coalition-building: Florida LWV helped with a coalition sign-on effort and ran a volunteer program to collect a portion of the signatures needed to get the amendments on the ballot.
- Public Education: The League trained more than 100 volunteers to give presentations on the redistricting amendments to over 23,000 citizens at community-based groups, in individual conversations, at book clubs, and homes for the aged.
- Media Outreach: Representatives from the 31 local chapters across the state conducted editorial board visits, held press teleconferences and Q&A sessions with expert presenters, and wrote Letters to the Editor.

As Macnab noted, “We never played defense and we disabused any falsehood that came up. Whenever a negative comment came up, we pivoted to offense. When the opposition suggested we were acting in a partisan manner we reminded them we had worked on this issue for over 70 years and under both parties of the legislature” (2014).

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⁷ The Florida Supreme Court ultimately resolved the case, ruling against Reps. Brown and Diaz-Balart. The two members of Congress filed another suit in federal court on November 3, 2010, following the successful passage of the FairDistrictsFlorida amendments. A summary judgment was denied September 9, 2011 (Mario Diaz-Balart and Corrine Brown v. Kurt Browning et al 2011). Upon appeal, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court Appeals dismissed the challenge to Amendment 6 (Miami Herald, 2012).
Groups like the ACLU and state conference of the NAACP “held hundreds of voter education events, engaged the media,” and helped to secure legislative endorsements (American Civil Liberties Union of Florida 2010, Lee 2014). Most of the members of the state’s Legislative Black Caucus supported the amendments.

The FairDistrictsFlorida coalition garnered support for the redistricting amendments among voters and helped the group weather a series of legal challenges. However, the amendments started to face more heat in mid-September 2010 as the election season got fully underway.

**The Opposition**

An opposition group called Protect Your Vote emerged in September 2010, only two months prior to the election. In various interviews, organizational representatives engaged in the campaign speculated that the late emergence of opposition was of benefit to FairDistrictsFlorida and may have been due to Constitutional Amendment 4. The Hometown Democracy amendment, if approved, would have required a referendum for all changes to local government land use plans. Many of the business groups that eventually opposed FairDistrictsFlorida led the fight against Amendment 4. At about the same time Amendment 4 waned in the polls, Protect Your Vote emerged. There were other coalition partners, however, that saw the Hometown Democracy amendment as having little bearing on the FairDistricts Florida effort.

Former Secretary of State Kurt Browning (R) and the Florida Chamber of Commerce led the Protect Your Vote effort. U.S. Representatives Corrine Brown (D) and Mario Diaz-Balart (R) used earned media to continue to voice their concern over the effects the proposed amendments might have on minority-influenced districts (Larrabee 2010). Protect Your Vote’s expenditures went almost exclusively to media firms (Florida Division of Elections 2015), meaning it was largely an on-air campaign.

**The Final Weeks**

Knowing that the two most significant factors in a victory were favorable media coverage and targeted, consistent voter education the final weeks, FairDistrictsFlorida’s strategic plan was for a late communications campaign. “We didn't want them to know what our game plan so they would have ammunition to attack us with.” (Lee 2014). The strategy had its risks. As the campaign to adopt Amendments 5 and 6 neared its end, a public poll suggested the measures would not meet the 60% voting threshold required to pass. *The Miami Herald/St. Petersburg Times* and Bay News 9 conducted a poll from October 15-19, which showed public support at only 45%, with 21% opposed and 31% undecided (Ipsos Public Affairs 2010). FairDistrictsFlorida “did not read the poll as saying we would lose. We realized that if the undecided voters broke in the general proportions of those who had mad up their minds, we would have an excellent chance to win” (Freidin 2015).

The strategy resulted in earned media as newspaper editorials began in late September. FairDistrictsFlorida won endorsements from *The Miami Herald, Orlando Sentinel, Florida Today,*

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8 On Election Day, Amendment 4 received support from only 33% of voters.
The Tampa Tribune, The Palm Beach Post, the Bradenton Herald, the Pensacola News Journal, the Naples Daily News, The News Herald (Panama City), The Northwest Daily News, the St. Petersburg Times, The South Florida Sun-Sentinel, The Florida Times-Union, and The Ledger. The authors could not find any mainstream media editorial against either amendment.

Comments from The Tampa Tribune were typical of newspaper editorials across the state: “Amendments 5 and 6 would make it more difficult for lawmakers to stack the deck for incumbents and bring sanity to a loopy reapportionment process” (2010). Similarly, the Florida Sun-Sentinel urged readers to “Take power to draw new political districts away from the Florida legislature.” The paper added, “Under our current system, elections are essentially rigged before the ballots are even printed. Districts are designed to favor a particular incumbent” (2010).

Concurrent with the positive media coverage, FairDistrictsFlorida undertook a persuasion and get-out-the-vote campaign. The coalition’s paid field campaign was limited due to funding, likely the result of a significant gubernatorial race that attracted the majority of available funding. Still, the group raised enough money to employ five staff people who conducted a telephone canvass and sent a three-piece vote-by-mail program to targeted voters. America Votes partner organizations also conducted door-to-door canvassing in central Florida cities like Jacksonville and Tampa. As one organizational coalition partner noted, “It was a simple message: ‘take politics out of redistricting.’ That was an easy sell to the public” (Geise 2014).

For FairDistrictsFlorida’s television campaign, the group relied on two cartoon advertisements depicting representatives of the AARP, NAACP, Democracia Ahora, and the League of Women Voters cheering “giving power back to the people” (FairDistricts Florida 2010) and then showcasing the editorial support. The advertisements ran during the last two weeks before the election in the Tampa, Orlando, Palm Beach and Miami media markets. Radio advertisements featured well-known personalities like Julian Bond, former chair of NAACP and founding President Southern Poverty Law Center, and Reverend Joseph Lowery, both of whom recorded messages for the campaign that reached more than 500,000 African American voters through recorded calls and radio ads (Freidin 2014). Spanish language radio communication was also employed.

Election Day Results

Following a long, well-coordinated campaign, FairDistrictsFlorida achieved victory on November 2, 2010. Both Amendments 5 and 6 received nearly 63% of the vote, comfortably above the 60% required for passage. Amendment 5, which set standards for legislative redistricting, obtained 3,155,149 out of 5,041,009 votes (62.59%). Amendment 6, which set standards for congressional redistricting, received 3,153,199 out of 5,010,947 votes (62.93%) (Florida Division of Elections 2015). One FairDistrictsFlorida supporter celebrated: “This was the first offensive victory for progressives in a very long time” (Odio 2014).

FairDistrictsFlorida raised $9,101,583 plus $49,186 in in-kind contributions including the $3.5 million spent on research, ballot language development, coalition building and signature collection. While over 3,500 donations came from donations under $1,000, those donations
only amounted to 4.5% of the total raised. Over two-thirds of the total amount raised (67.5%), however, came through contributions of $100,000 and over (Florida Division of Elections 2015). While FairDistrictsFlorida successfully mobilized a broad base of small donors, it is clear that the contributions from a few large donors were crucial to the ballot measures’ success.

Protect Your Vote, the opposition group, raised $3,934,000 from 20 contributors. The largest organizational donors included the Republican Party of Florida at $2,607,500. Business interest groups like Florida Association of Realtors, the Chamber of Commerce, Associated Industries of Florida, Florida Crystals Corporation, and U.S. Sugar Corporation all contributed in excess of $100,000. Only six donations came from individuals, and their combined contributions were only $332,500 – less than 10% of the total amount raised. (Dixon 2010, Florida Division of Elections 2015). Protect Your Vote’s funding also came very late. The earliest recorded contribution was made September 22, 2010 (Florida Department of Elections 2010).

While FairDistrictsFlorida had much to celebrate on November 2, 2010, victory at the ballot box is not the end of the story.

**FAIRDISTRICTS NOW AND THE CONTINUING COURT BATTLE**

FairDistrictsFlorida may have succeeded at the polls in 2010, but the congressional and legislative maps the state legislature drew in 2011 did not result in fair districts. The state director of America Votes Florida reflected on how he felt about the legislature’s actions, “We were hopeful we would get better maps…but it didn’t turn out that way” (Geise 2014). FairDistrictsFlorida disbanded and FairDistricts Now was formed to defend the new amendments, work for their full and complete implementation and, if necessary, challenge the new maps in court.

The state legislature adopted new voting maps on February 9, 2012 that clearly defied the FairDistricts amendments. Nonetheless, the governor signed the congressional map into law on February 16, 2012 and FairDistricts Now filed suit the next day.\(^9\) The legislative maps, however, moved to the state supreme court for a facial review. FairDistricts Now challenged the senate map and made a minimalistic challenge to the state house map. The Supreme Court upheld the house districts but agreed with the FairDistricts Now coalition and struck down the senate districts due to their violation of the FairDistricts amendments. The legislature revised the invalidated senate districts and sent the map back to the court on March 27, 2012, which the court then approved. DOJ pre-cleared the maps on April 30, 2012.

Even though the new maps went into effect, they did not adhere to the spirit or the letter of the FairDistricts amendments. Registered Democrats (41%) outnumbered Republicans (36%) by almost 500,000 (Poshusta 2014), yet the legislature drew maps that allowed Democrats to win just 10 of Florida’s 27 congressional seats. Additionally, the state senate saw a 12-28 split between Democrats and Republicans, and Republicans in the house outnumbered Democrats by a factor higher than 2 to 1. “The maps were rife with intent to favor the Republican Party and certain incumbents and did not follow the requirements that districts be compact and

\(^9\) The state legislative maps were passed by a joint resolution that did not require the governor’s approval.
follow established boundaries. On the senate map the senators manipulated the district numbers to extend the terms of returning senators thus violating the provision against incumbency favoritism” (Freidin 2015).

The League of Women Voters of Florida, Common Cause, and National Council of La Raza10 filed a suit on February 9, 2012 to challenge the congressional map, alleging that the new districts violated Amendment 6 of the Florida state constitution. “Florida voters made their intent clear when they voted in 2010 to put new redistricting standards in the state constitution,” said former LWV President Macnab. “The Florida League believes that the Senate plan does not comply with those standards” (Florida League of Women Voters 2015).

On July 10, 2014, state circuit court Judge Terry Lewis found that two of the districts in the congressional map violated the FairDistricts amendments, and required that they be redrawn. The state legislature provided minor tweaks, which that judge then approved, but several advocates for the FairDistricts amendments argued that these changes were merely superficial (Sexton and Smythe 2014). The Vice President of the Florida NAACP, however, told ThinkProgress that the changes to Rep. Corrine Brown’s district the plaintiffs proposed were “no fix,” adding that they were “more harmful to African American voters” (Ollstein 2014). Despite this tension between former coalition partners, the plaintiffs appealed the ruling and received a notable victory from the Supreme Court of Florida. In July 2015, the court ruled that the circuit court had not gone far enough in its original decision, holding that at least eight congressional districts violated the intent of the constitution (Madigan 2015). The Supreme Court then ordered the legislature to redraw the congressional map by August 25, 2015 and gave the trial court until October 17 to review the proposal.

Despite the court-imposed mandate, the Florida legislature descended into chaos during its special session to draw new congressional lines to comply with the FairDistricts amendments (Sweeney 2015). After the senate approved its maps, the house passed a different map, refusing to accept the other chamber’s proposal or extend the special session. At this impasse, house lawyers requested that the state supreme court give up its jurisdiction over the case for 60 days, shifting it back to Judge Lewis who would then decide which of the proposed maps, the senate or the house version, to approve. The senate balked, noting that it would prefer to try to resolve the maps via another special session.

On August 25, 2015, the day the maps were supposed to be completed, Judge Lewis, concerned that it was beyond his authority to resolve the rising tensions between the two legislative chambers, asked the Supreme Court for guidance. The Supreme Court, however, declined to intervene and instead sent the case back to Judge Lewis. The Chairman of the Senate Reapportionment Committee then issued a revised plan, but members of the Florida House showed little interest in moving forward with those maps either. Ultimately, the case ended up back in Judge Lewis’ hands, with the senate and the house each submitting their own proposals for the new congressional lines. There were seven maps submitted for Judge Lewis’ review, including three plans from FairDistricts Now. At the time of this report, Judge Lewis

10 While a part of the original filing, NCLR withdrew from the case shortly thereafter.
recommended one of the FairDistricts Now proposals for the state’s congressional districts to the Supreme Court of Florida for final approval (Klas 2015).

In addition to the suit against the legislature, proponents of the FairDistricts amendments have also faced continued opposition from Rep. Corrine Brown. The long-time Congresswoman filed a suit in federal court on August 6, 2015, arguing that the new maps dilute minority voting strength in violation of the Voting Rights Act. State Rep. Mike Hill (R-Pensacola Beach) also mounted a challenge in federal court to the FairDistricts amendments themselves, arguing they violate both free speech and due process provisions of the U.S. Constitution. A judge for the Northern District of the U.S. District Court threw out the case in October 2015. As of the publication of this report, another case from a group of conservative voters that seeks to challenge the FairDistricts amendments on free speech claims is still active in federal court.

The League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and several individual voters also filed a suit arguing that the 2012 state senate map was unconstitutional. They alleged that the state senate deliberately engaged in partisan gerrymandering, and that their maps violate the requirements of compactness and adherence to political boundaries laid out in the FairDistricts amendments (League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner 2012). The plaintiffs also filed a claim requesting depositions from state legislators and their staff, based on evidence that lawmakers had intentionally defied the constitution when drawing legislative maps. In the first ruling of its kind, the Supreme Court of Florida ultimately decided that the constitutional requirements on redistricting superseded the legislature’s claims of legislative privilege, thus allowing the depositions (League of Women Voters et. al vs. The Florida House of Representatives et. al. 2013). This was a huge win for FairDistricts Now, as the decision affirmed the Supreme Court’s commitment to enforcing the FairDistricts amendments.

Following these decisions, the legislature admitted that members of the Republican leadership worked directly with outside political operatives to violate the state constitution intentionally – an unprecedented and unexpected admission. The legislature ultimately settled with the plaintiffs on July 28, 2015. State lawmakers reconvened in another special session during October and November 2015 to redraw the state senate maps (Caputo 2015).

The legal fights over the FairDistricts amendments have been nearly as expensive as the effort to pass the measures in the first place. FairDistricts Now and other participants have spent millions of dollars on legal fees defending the amendments approved by a supermajority of the electorate. But even more staggering is the amount of money the state legislature has spent defending itself in court—$11 million of taxpayer dollars as of July 13, 2015 (Klas and Wallace 2015).

Although the prolonged legal battles to protect the 2010 victory at the ballot box have been costly, FairDistricts Now recognizes the importance of fighting to ensure “that the amendments are fully interpreted and implemented. The court interpretations are as important in the long run as the language of the amendments themselves” (Freidin, Email exchange 2015).” And thanks to their persistence and the strength of the FairDistricts amendments, the group has continued to triumph in the courtroom as well.
ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED

After several failed attempts to reform redistricting, the FairDistrictsFlorida coalition passed two constitutional amendments with almost 63% of the vote. This section will examine some of the factors that made success possible.

In a nationwide review, Nicholas Stephanopoulos found that between 1936 and 2005, only four of twelve attempts to reform redistricting through ballot initiative were successful. There were also four initiatives between 2008 and 2014, three of which passed (Stephanopoulos 2007).

Previous Research – Criteria for Success

Stephanopoulos’ study identified a number of characteristics that may contribute to a successful campaign. The table below lists the criteria and the standing of the FairDistrictsFlorida effort in relation to them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stephanopoulos’ Criteria for Success</th>
<th>FairDistrictsFlorida</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporters outspend the opposition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters out-frame the opposition</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative majority is split or weakly opposes the effort</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The governor is strongly supportive of the effort</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The legislative minority is strongly supportive of the effort</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A preponderance of newspapers endorse the reform</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A preponderance of interest groups endorse the reform</td>
<td>Yes, of those participating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a recent blatant gerrymander in the state</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent national events create an impetus for reform (e.g., the Watergate scandal)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The work of FairDistrictsFlorida conformed to most criteria of successful efforts; however, there are some caveats that may refine the definition. Below is an analysis of each of the criteria, as well as observations on a number of other variables that may have contributed to the success of Amendments 5 and 6.

Supporters outspend the opposition: FairDistrictsFlorida spent just over $9 million, including in-kind contributions. To make a comparison with the opposition’s spending, the $3.5 million of that went to getting the amendment on the ballot must be subtracted from the total. Protect Your Vote, the opposition committee, spent nearly $4 million. Comparing that with the $5.5 million spent on the campaign, FairDistrictsFlorida outspent the opposition by about $1.5 million.

Other funding issues: The core of FairDistrictsFlorida’s donor base was diverse and included major donors; institutions like foundations, public interest groups, and organized labor; and

11 It is important to note that Stephanopoulos’ study examined redistricting commissions, whereas the Florida approach added standards to the state’s legislative and congressional redistricting criteria.
hundreds of small dollar individual donors as well as a few large individual donors. In contrast, Protect Your Vote received contributions from just 20 funders, all of whom gave at a high level and only six of whom were individuals.

**Supporters out-frame the opposition**: Message discipline was core to the FairDistrictsFlorida campaign. The campaign staff organized weekly telephone calls with coalition partners to address messaging and to delineate tasks clearly.

Both the coalition’s public education and paid media efforts were successful. A media map tracking the redistricting debate in the mainstream media showed the FairDistrictsFlorida campaign had well-aligned messages among coalition partners and a strong, central messenger in Ellen Freidin (Lowe 2014). The campaign team and consultants also designed and coordinated mail pieces, telephone and door canvass scripts, as well as the television and radio advertising (Lee 2014).

On the opposition side, early disagreements over messaging split traditionally allied groups and came across as elected officials’ attempt to protect their own seats. For instance, during the campaign, African American Democratic U.S. Representative Brown was at odds with the State Conference of the NAACP when she and Representative Diaz-Balart filed a lawsuit trying to block Amendment 6 from the ballot. In response, leaders of the state conference of the NAACP publicly accused the lawmakers of being interested in protecting their own seats (Dixon 2010) (Larabee 2010).

**Legislative majority is split or weakly opposes the effort**: Republicans controlled both the State Assembly and Senate and were strongly opposed to the amendments.

**The governor is strongly supportive**: Governor Charlie Crist was supportive of Amendments 5 and 6. When asked, he spoke publicly in favor of the amendments, but much of his effort was out of the public’s eye. For instance, he actively lobbied against the “poison pill” Amendment 7. While both Amendments 5 and 6 passed on the November 2, 2010 election, Florida voters also elected a governor who was opposed to the measures. Concerned about political tactics that might block implementation of the new constitutional requirements, then-lame-duck Governor Crist submitted the FairDistricts Amendments to the U.S. Department of Justice for preclearance of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (Freidin 2015).

**The legislative minority is strongly supportive**: Democrats, who comprised the legislative minority, were largely supportive of the effort (Freidin 2015).

**A preponderance of newspapers endorse the reform**: All of the mainstream media endorsements were in favor of Amendments 5 and 6.

**A preponderance of interest groups endorse the reform**: Public interest groups, several major labor unions and the Florida Democratic Party were a part of FairDistrictsFlorida. Interest groups from the opposition included the Republican Party and an array of businesses and

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12 See page 7 for description.
13 In litigation following the adoption of Amendment 6, the State Conference of the NAACP joined their national organization and Representative Brown in supporting the maps as drawn by the state legislation (League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner, 2012).
business membership groups. A caveat on the opposition was the late date that it entered the public arena.

**There is a recent blatant gerrymander in the state**: The public and many organizations viewed the 2001 redistricting process as a blatant gerrymander. That in itself was nothing new, however, as allegations of geographic, racial or political gerrymandering arose nearly every redistricting cycle since at least the 1960s.  

**Recent national events create an impetus for reform**: While state-based rather than national, controversies may have had an impact on Florida voters’ desire for fair elections. The first dates to the 2000 presidential ballot count that focused on “hanging chads” in Florida and that led to a U.S. Supreme Court decision awarding Florida’s 25 electoral votes to George Bush (Bush v. Gore 2000). While ten years had passed, the incident set the tone for election activities. The purging of voters from the election rolls, that began in 2000 and continued through the current case, could have also had an impact (Perez 2008). Finally, the 2005 citizen initiated constitutional amendment, the popular supported it engendered, and the fact that it did not achieve ballot status due to a technicality may have increased support for the 2010 effort.  

It is difficult to assess the “voter hangover,” however – all three of these events may have helped set the mood for adoption of Amendments 5 and 6.

**Additional Criteria for Successful Redistricting Reform**

The in-person and telephone interviews conducted for this case study expand upon the previous research, which was developed largely from documentary evidence. The findings below reveal additional considerations for those seeking to pass redistricting reform.

**Once passed, the work is not over**: “Passing a constitutional amendment is one thing. Implementation,” said one coalition partner, “is another” (Geise 2014). The 2011 voting maps that the Florida legislature created did not adhere to the standards enacted in the constitutional amendments. The group was prepared for this. FairDistrictsFlorida immediately disbanded and FairDistricts Now formed as soon as the election results were final to fight to ensure that the legislature adhered to the new standards.

An additional lesson from this case is that the cost of redistricting reform goes beyond the active campaign. In order to secure the win at the ballot box, FairDistricts Now had to battle the state legislature, which used millions in taxpayer dollars to fund expensive litigation in an attempt to override the will of the people.

**Organizational structure**: The combination of a professionally run political campaign and an issue coalition was crucial to a high-functioning operation.

- **Clear, consistent structure**: Similar to the structure of a political campaign, the FairDistrictsFlorida effort had paid staff, including a director and a campaign manager, as well as a number of political professional consultants, who established the message, literature and campaign materials. The campaign manager served as the connector to a

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14 See pages 1-3.
15 See page 3.
coalition of interest groups who conducted public education with their members and with the public. The manager’s linking role kept the two groups aligned.\(^\text{16}\)

**Bipartisan appeal:** The public face of the campaign was intentionally bipartisan. “We were very cautious in the composition of the leadership group,” said Ellen Freidin. The strategy was successful from a media perspective. “All of the newspapers wrote it up as bipartisan leadership,” she concluded.

**Strong, respected leadership:** Ellen Freidin, the chair of the FairDistrictsFlorida effort, was well known in the political community. The leader of the previous reform effort in 2005 had personally selected Freidin, who worked tirelessly on the effort from 2006 until the present date. As Deirdre Macnab of the League of Women Voters put it, “She was our General Washington” (2014).

**Openness to compromise:** There had been several previous efforts to take redistricting power away from the legislature and to create a commission to conduct the process. In meeting with coalition partners from communities of color, FairDistrictsFlorida leaders found a high amount of distrust for commissions. The diverse group of stakeholders reached a compromise, ultimately deciding on a strategy to strengthen the standards for legislative and congressional redistricting.\(^\text{17}\)

**Unforeseen events – You can’t plan for them but must be ready to act:** Redistricting is an inherently political process. Those in power may respond to reform efforts in a manner that is more about protecting their position than in providing for fair representation of residents. The opposition used both a “poison pill” amendment and court challenges to derail the citizen-initiated amendments. In both cases, FairDistrictsFlorida responded immediately and with force. Not all unforeseen events are negative, however. When the grassroots group Hometown Democracy pushed a ballot initiative that would have required a referendum for all changes to local government land use plans, some members of the coalition believe it distracted the opposition, keeping them from fully engaging in their anti-redistricting reform campaign until late in the process.\(^\text{18}\) FairDistrictsFlorida’s communications plan hit at almost the same time that the opposition changed course to fight Amendments 5 and 6, which may have inadvertently increased the media’s attention to the redistricting fight and helped to augment the impact of the editorial endorsements of the FairDistricts Amendments. While there is debate among coalition members on this point, one possible lesson to draw from this is to be on the lookout for opportunities to gain an advantage over the opposition.

\(^\text{16}\) It is of note that the structure likely resulted in one of the few differences of opinion in the coalition. A leader in one organization said, “the give-and-take dialogue that we had up front needed to continue throughout. We wanted to be an ally but I didn’t understand the impact of the amendments well enough to explain it to our allies. We raised issues and tried to be helpful, but are concerned those conversations get interpreted as being distracting. We need to figure out together how to build the trust for this work” (Anonymous 2014).

\(^\text{17}\) See page 4.

\(^\text{18}\) See page 11.
SUMMARY

A combination of issues led to the adoption of Amendments 5 and 6. The repeated attempts at reform made the issue familiar to voters. The well-known individuals who gave FairDistrictsFlorida its bipartisan public face provided the media with newsworthy sources and a positive message to write about. The professionally managed, strategically run campaign engaged advocacy groups and kept them abreast of the progress of the campaign, and reinforced strong message discipline among partners. All of these factors were crucial to the success of Amendments 5 and 6 at the ballot box. Nearly five years have passed since voters approved Amendments 5 and 6, and FairDistricts Now and partner organizations have been waging a court battle virtually ever since. Inch by inch they are gaining the ground the voters approved in 2010. “When you take on power, you have to be prepared to fight to the end. We were and we still are! The Florida Supreme Court has considered and interpreted the amendments 12 times and the FairDistricts coalition has won 11 cases! The last case (July 9) gave full and fair vindication to the amendments and has provided interpretation and precedent that will not only ensure constitutionally drawn districts for the rest of this decade but also for decades to come” (Freidin 2015).
Appendix A: FairDistrictsFlorida Coalition

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<th>Organization</th>
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<td>AARP Florida</td>
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<td>America Votes Florida (and partner organizations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common Cause</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracia Ahora (now part of National Council of La Raza)</td>
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<td>Florida Association of Counties</td>
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<td>Florida Education Association</td>
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<td>Florida League of Cities</td>
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<td>Florida School Board Association</td>
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<td>Florida State Conference NAACP</td>
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<td>League of Women Voters of Florida</td>
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<td>SEIU</td>
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