CRIME IN 2016:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

Matthew Friedman, Ames C. Grawert, and James Cullen
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


The authors are grateful to Inimai Chettiar for her strategic guidance of the report’s analysis and methodology, and to Michael Waldman and John Kowal for their insights. They also thank Brenna Christensen, Nicole Fortier, Natalie Grieco, and Adureh Onyekwere for their research assistance; and Rebecca Autrey, Jim Lyons, Erik Opsal, and Jeanine Plant-Chirlin for their editing and communications assistance.
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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Earlier this year, the Brennan Center analyzed crime data from the 30 largest cities in 2015, finding that crime overall remained the same as in 2014. It also found that murder increased by 14 percent, with just three cities — Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. — responsible for half that increase. All told, 2015’s murder rate was still near historic lows. The authors concluded that reports of a national crime wave were premature and unfounded, and that “the average person in a large urban area is safer walking on the street today than he or she would have been at almost any time in the past 30 years.”

This report updates those findings. It collects midyear data from police departments to project overall crime, violent crime, and murder for all of 2016. Its principal findings are:

- **Crime:** The overall crime rate in 2016 is projected to remain the same as in 2015, rising by 1.3 percent. Twelve cities are expected to see drops in crime. These decreases are offset by Chicago (rising 9.1 percent) and Charlotte (17.5 percent). Nationally, crime remains at an all-time low.

- **Violence:** The violent crime rate is projected to rise slightly, by 5.5 percent, with half the increase driven by Los Angeles (up 13.3 percent†) and Chicago (up 16.2 percent†). Even so, violent crime remains near the bottom of the nation’s 30-year downward trend.

- **Murder:** The murder rate is projected to rise by 13.1 percent this year, with nearly half of this increase attributable to Chicago alone (234 of 496 murders). Significantly, other cities that drove the national murder increase in 2015 are projected to see significant decreases in 2016. Those cities include Baltimore (down 9.7 percent†) and Washington, D.C. (down 12.7 percent†). New York remains one of the safest large cities, even with the murder rate projected to rise 1.2 percent.†

Nationally, the murder rate is projected to increase 31.5 percent from 2014 to 2016 — with half of additional murders attributable to Baltimore, Chicago, and Houston. Since homicide rates remain low nationwide, percentage increases may overstate relatively small increases. In San Jose, for example, just 21 new murders translated to a 66.7 percent† increase in the city’s murder rate. Based on this data, the authors conclude there is no evidence of a national murder wave, yet increases in these select cities are indeed a serious problem.

- **Chicago Is An Outlier:** Crime rose significantly in Chicago this year and last. No other large city is expected to see a comparable increase in violence. The causes are still unclear, but some theories include higher concentrations of poverty, increased gang activity, and fewer police officers.³

- **Explanations for Overall Trends:** Very few cities are projected to see crime rise uniformly this year, and only Chicago will see significant, back-to-back increases in both violent crime and murder. The authors attempted to investigate causes of these spikes, but ultimately were unable to draw conclusions due to lack of data. Based on their research, however, the authors believe cities with long-term socioeconomic problems (high poverty, unemployment, and racial segregation) are more prone to short-term spikes in crime. Because the pattern across cities is not uniform, the authors believe these spikes are created by as-of-yet unidentified local factors, rather than any sort of national characteristic. Further, it is normal for crime to fluctuate from year-to-year. The increases and
decreases in most cities’ murder rates in 2015 and 2016, for example, are within the range of previous two-year fluctuations, meaning they may be normal short-term variations.

These findings undercut media reports referring to crime as “out of control,” or heralding a new nationwide crime wave. But the data do call attention to specific cities, especially Chicago, and an urgent need to address violence there. Notably, this analysis focuses on major cities, where increases in crime and murder were highest in preliminary Uniform Crime Reporting data for 2015, so this report likely overestimates any national rise in crime. It also represents a projection based on data available through early September 2016.

† Figures marked with this symbol were updated on September 21, 2016 to improve consistency or correct a transcription error. A full list of changes can be found in endnote 5.
I. CRIME AND MURDER IN 2016*

As shown in Figure 1, rates of overall crime in 2016 remain at the lowest point in a generation.

Figure 1: Crime in the 30 Largest Cities (1990-2016)

Table 1 (following page) displays crime in the 30 largest cities for 2015 and 2016. Some findings:

- The projected crime rate in the 30 largest cities for 2016 is nearly unchanged from 2015.

- Crime is not rising or falling evenly. Some cities that saw increases in 2015 have become safer in 2016; others have had the opposite experience.
  - San Francisco is projected to see crime fall significantly (down 12.8 percent†), with violent crime also decreasing (down 5.5 percent). This is a reversion from last year, when crime and violent crime rose in tandem.
  - Oklahoma City became safer in 2015, with crime and violent crime both falling. This year, both are expected to increase, with violent crime rising 6.9 percent.
  - Last year’s analysis showed crime, violence, and murder all rising significantly in Baltimore. This year, the city’s overall crime rate is projected to fall 6.2 percent, but its violent crime rate is expected to rise 5.8 percent.

- The cities with the highest projected increases in violent crime are Charlotte (up 22.5 percent) and Chicago (up 16.2 percent.) Both cities also saw increases in 2015.

* This report relies on city-level crime data from 2015 and 2016, to allow for more accurate comparisons between those years. Since previous Brennan Center reports have relied on UCR data, which was not available for 2015 at the time of publication, the data in Tables 1 and 2 should not be compared to data from previous UCR releases or Brennan Center reports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>2015 Crime Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>2016 Crime Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>Percent Change in Crime Rate</th>
<th>2015 Violent Crime Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>2016 Violent Crime Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>Percent Change in Violent Crime Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1,266.3</td>
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<td>470.2</td>
<td>469.7</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>2,900.9</td>
<td>3,052.3</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>575.4</td>
<td>652.1</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>3,947.6</td>
<td>4,305.7</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>996.0</td>
<td>1,157.6</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
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<td>Houston</td>
<td>5,332.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>5,521.4</td>
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<td>513.3</td>
<td>783.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>4,753.8</td>
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<td>702.7</td>
<td>860.6</td>
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<td>3,797.4</td>
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<td>528.1</td>
<td>516.8</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
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<td>585.4</td>
<td>589.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
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<td>1,865.9</td>
<td>1,734.4</td>
<td>-7.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>5,449.1</td>
<td>5,084.4</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>896.4</td>
<td>866.9</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>3,009.6</td>
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<td>-5.1%</td>
<td>684.3</td>
<td>639.9</td>
<td>-6.5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>3,905.5</td>
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<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>4,371.0</td>
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<td>11.9%</td>
<td>687.4</td>
<td>734.5</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>6,446.3</td>
<td>6,049.7</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
<td>1,576.9</td>
<td>1,668.1</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>6,160.4</td>
<td>6,403.6</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2,233.0</td>
<td>2,407.1</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police department and city reports. See endnotes for specific sources. Cities are ordered by population size.

* These cities did not respond to requests for data in time for publication.
Figure 2 shows the murder rate over the last 26 years.

**Figure 2: Murder in the 30 Largest Cities (1990-2016)**

Table 2 (following page) displays this data for each city in 2015 and 2016:

- The national murder rate is projected to increase by 13.1 percent. Nearly half of the increase (234 out of 496 new homicides) will occur in Chicago.

- In many cities, percentage increases in murder appear large since homicide rates are relatively low. For example, the 21 new murders in San Jose projected here will raise its murder rate by 66.7 percent, † and 28 new murders in Austin will increase its rate by 106.3 percent. †

- In last year’s analysis, increases in murder in Baltimore, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., were responsible for half the national increase. ‡ This year, the murder rates in Baltimore and Washington are projected to fall — by 9.7 percent ‡ and 12.7 percent, ‡ respectively. Murder in both cities remains relatively high compared to recent history.

*Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports & Brennan Center Analysis.*
### Table 2: Murder in the 30 Largest Cities (2015-2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>2015 Total Murders</th>
<th>2016 Projected Total Murders</th>
<th>Percent Change in Murder</th>
<th>2015 Murder Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>2016 Projected Murder Rate per 100,000</th>
<th>Percent Change in Murder Rate†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
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<td>Houston</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>204</td>
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<td>18.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
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<td>Fort Worth</td>
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<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>-7.4%</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
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<td>Seattle</td>
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<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
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<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-10.9%</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>-12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
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<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>34.5%</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
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<td>Unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>-9.9%</td>
<td>55.2</td>
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<td>-9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>14.4%</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>13.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police department and city reports. See endnotes for specific sources. Cities are ordered by population size.

* These cities did not respond to requests for data in time for publication.

† The figures in this column were updated on September 19, 2016 to correct a transcription error.
How can we tell if these increases are significant?

Crime tends to fluctuate greatly in the short-run. Annual increases and decreases are normal, and generally do not indicate underlying trends. Figure 3 demonstrates this variation in New York and Los Angeles crime trends. For example, although murder rose and fell in various years from 1999 to 2007, it was on a continuous longer-term downward trend during the period.

**Figure 3: Murder in New York and Los Angeles (1990-2016)**

This phenomenon makes it difficult to distinguish between normal year-to-year variations and truly troubling increases in crime.

*Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports & Brennan Center Analysis.*

This phenomenon makes it difficult to distinguish between normal year-to-year variations and truly troubling increases in crime.
To shed light on this question, the authors analyzed the change in murder rates between 2014 and 2016 in selected cities alongside each city’s historic, average two-year change. As shown in Figure 4, in most cases — where the dark and light bars are of roughly equal height — recent increases in murder rates were within the range of normal fluctuation. Notably, in Baltimore, Chicago, and Oklahoma City, murder rose more in recent years than it has in the past. And together, Baltimore, Chicago, and Houston are projected to account for 50 percent (517 of 1041) of new homicides between 2014 and 2016.

**Figure 4: Two-Year Change in Murder Rates (2014-2016)**

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports & Brennan Center Analysis.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Change in Murder Rate (2014-2016)</th>
<th>Average 2-Year Change in Murder Rate (1990-2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports & Brennan Center Analysis.
What’s Going On In Chicago?

As shown in Figure 5, increases in Chicago dwarf, in absolute terms, changes in other major cities.

Figure 5: Changes in Number of Murders in Cities (2015-2016)

Chicago also loomed large in last year’s crime analysis. Why has crime in this one city risen so significantly in the past two years? Some theories are considered below:

- One explanation, offered by the Chicago Police Department, is the disproportionate impact of a small number of repeat gun offenders, flagged for special attention on the “Strategic Subject List.” According to a May report, “more than 70 percent of the people who [had] been shot in Chicago” so far in 2016 “were on th[is] list” of about 1,400 people, “as were more than 80 percent of those arrested in connection with shootings.” “We know we have a lot of violence in Chicago,” said Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson, “but we also know there’s a small segment that’s driving” it.

- The Chicago Police Department has also lost more than 300 detectives since 2008, contributing to the city’s low clearance rate for homicides — 46 percent in 2015, compared to a national average of 63.5 percent. Research has shown that more police officers, using smarter investigative techniques, can help bring down crime. Without those resources, Chicago’s low clearance rates may contribute to a vicious cycle, where communities are less willing to work with police departments they view as ineffective, thereby emboldening criminals and further worsening clearance rates.
Chicago homicides are concentrated in the most segregated and poorest areas of the city, such as the South Side and the Austin vicinity. Lack of socioeconomic opportunity has long been credited with high levels of crime. “You show me a man without hope, I'll show you a man who’s willing to pick up a gun,” Superintendent Johnson said recently. Additionally, high poverty is correlated with gang activity, which may in turn explain some of Chicago’s recent increase in violence. The authors believe this factor contributed to the city’s spike in murders.

The “national” increase in murders identified by this report, in other words, may owe more to profound local problems in a few Chicago neighborhoods than national trends.
II. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF CRIME

What may be causing murder to rise in some cities?

To answer that question, the authors first examined whether crime and murder trends are moving together, a change that could be consistent with a trend toward higher crime nationwide.

Figure 6: Change in Crime Rates vs. Murder Rates (2015-2016)†

Instead, Figure 6 illustrates there is no even trend toward increasing crime. Only in a few cities are crime and murder projected to increase significantly together: Chicago, Louisville, Oklahoma City, and San Antonio.‡ Other cities are projected to see murder rise while overall crime falls (San Diego), and others will see higher crime without any increase in murders (Charlotte). This indicates there may be a problem with murder in these specific cities, not that there is a national trend of rising crime.
Additionally, as shown in Table 3, the five cities that drove increases in murder last year are not projected to see corresponding increases in 2016. Instead, murder is projected to significantly decrease this year in Baltimore, Charlotte, and Washington, D.C. Only Chicago’s murder rate will grow at a faster pace than it did in 2015.

### Table 3: Cities with Most Significant Murder Increases in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Change in Murder Rate (2014-2015)</th>
<th>Percent Change in Murder Rate (2015-2016)†</th>
<th>Percent Local Poverty Rate Exceeded Nat'l Average (2005-2014)</th>
<th>Percent Local Unemployment Rate Exceeded Nat'l Average (2005-2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>-9.7%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>-12.7%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brennan Center Analysis.83

With the exception of Chicago, the five cities projected to contribute most significantly to 2016’s murder rate were not outliers in last year’s analysis. These cities, shown in Table 4, saw murder fall or increase mildly in 2015, only to rise dramatically in 2016.

### Table 4: Cities with Most Significant Projected Murder Increases in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percent Change in Murder Rate (2014-2015)</th>
<th>Percent Change in Murder Rate (2015-2016)†</th>
<th>Percent Local Poverty Rate Exceeded Nat'l Average (2005-2014)</th>
<th>Percent Local Unemployment Rate Exceeded Nat'l Average (2005-2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Vegas</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>-22.7%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brennan Center Analysis.84

To explore why murder may have risen in these cities, the authors examined several theories.

- **Long-Term Socioeconomic Conditions:** To begin, the authors theorized that cities with higher poverty, unemployment, and other forms of socioeconomic disadvantage (such as low household income and declining population) are more vulnerable to the kinds of short-term “shocks” or local crises that may cause crime to rise. As Table 3 shows, the five cities that experienced significant murder spikes in 2015 generally have seen higher rates of poverty and unemployment for at least a decade. This trend generally continued in 2016, as Table 4 demonstrates, though some cities with relatively low poverty also saw higher crime. (Official poverty and employment data for 2015 and 2016 have not been released.)
• **Historic Level of Violence:** Cities with historically high levels of violence generally saw violence continue to increase in 2015 and 2016. Baltimore and Chicago saw significant two-year changes in their murder rates, but both also reported murder rates in 2014 — 33.9 and 17.0 per 100,000 persons, respectively — that are significantly higher than the national average of 4.5.85

• **Changes in Arrest Rates:** The authors sought to collect monthly arrest and crime data from major cities to determine how short-term policing trends affect crime. However, arrest data was only available from Baltimore and Chicago. Future reports will return to this analysis, incorporating data from additional cities.

• **Other Causes.** Other factors may contribute to crime trends, and merit further research:
  
  o **Gang Violence in Select Cities:** Rising violence in Chicago is the main driver of the national murder increase this year. Two trends indicate that local gang activity may be a contributing factor. First, the perpetrators and victims of Chicago homicides are both drawn disproportionately from Chicago’s “Strategic Subject List,” which both tracks former firearm offenders, and includes many known gang members.86 Second, Chicago’s clearance rate for homicides is significantly lower than the national average.87 Because gang-related crimes are often harder to solve — since witnesses often feel intimidated and refrain from speaking with police about such crimes — these lower clearance rates could also point to increasing gang activity.88

  o **Police Numbers.** According to the FBI, the number of law enforcement officers decreased by 6 percent between 2012 and 2014 nationally (more recent data is unavailable).89 The numbers of police officers in Chicago has also decreased. Previous Brennan Center reports have shown that more police officers can measurably reduce crime.90 This could also be a contributing factor.

  o **Decrease in Police Legitimacy.** The last two years have seen profound tensions between police and the public.91 Police officers cannot fight crime on their own. They rely on tips and cooperation from community members to solve crimes, and to know how best to stop crimes before they occur. When communities distrust police, this vital relationship frays, making it harder for police to solve old crimes or prevent new ones. This could explain rising violence in some cities. Still, crime has not risen or fallen uniformly in the cities most affected by this trend — in Baltimore, for example, murders rose last year, but are projected to fall through the end of 2016. Meanwhile, crime in New York remains at record lows. More time and data are needed to determine whether there is a causal relationship.

These findings do not explain what caused murder to rise in some cities between 2014 and 2016. But uneven changes in crime and murder rates are not consistent with a national crime wave. Instead, they call for careful attention to problems in a few, select cities.
CONCLUSION

The data analyzed for this report suggest that most Americans will continue to experience low rates of crime. A few cities are seeing murders increase, causing the national murder rate to rise.

In Chicago, murder is projected to rise significantly, while crime rates fluctuate unevenly in the rest of the country. These local challenges call for close attention. But there is not a nationwide crime wave, or rising violence across American cities. Warnings of a coming crime wave may be provocative, but they are not supported by the evidence.
METHODOLOGY

Crime Data

Annual data on crime through 2014 are from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). However, final UCR data for 2015 and 2016 have not yet been released. For both years, the authors collected crime data directly from police departments in the 30 largest American cities. Not all cities responded to the authors’ data requests in time for publication. Data could not be secured from these cities: Phoenix, Ariz.; Jacksonville, Fla; Indianapolis, Ind.; Columbus, Ohio; Fort Worth, Tex.; El Paso, Tex.; Memphis, Tenn.; and Portland, Ore. Partial data was received from one city: Las Vegas, Nev.

Offense data was then categorized according to UCR definitions. Violent crime included murder, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crime included burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Murder included only murder. Overall crime included all of the above.

Rape was excluded from this analysis because its UCR definition has changed over time, creating inaccuracies when data over time is compared. While most city crime reports use UCR definitions of offenses, some variation between cities may exist based on state or local laws.

2016 Projections and 2015 Comparisons

2015 crime data in Tables 1 and 2 of this report may differ from 2015 crime data in Tables 1A and 1B of Crime in 2015: A Final Analysis. There are two reasons for this. First, Crime in 2015: A Final Analysis collected year-end data from local police departments in April 2016. Crime data for this report was collected in August 2016. Some departments updated or corrected their final 2015 numbers in the intervening four months.

Second, projections in previous reports were based on UCR data from the immediately preceding year (2014). That was not possible for this report, since the FBI has not yet released its final 2015 analysis. To minimize assumptions and ensure the most accurate possible comparison, the authors instead used raw data reported by cities for both 2015 year-end numbers and 2016 projections.

To estimate year-end crime data for 2016, the authors started with raw data from cities on crimes that have occurred so far this year. Next, the authors took the proportion of the year’s crimes committed to date last year and multiplied that by the 2016 crime rates. For example, if a city had 100 murders through July 2015 and 200 by the end of 2015, then if the same city had 150 murders by July 2016, the author’s projected the city would have 300 murders this year. While this method is empirically accepted for rough projections, it is biased by last year’s monthly trends.

Lastly, for rate calculations, the authors projected city population assuming the average rate of population growth between 2010 and 2014 remained constant through 2016.
ENDNOTES


5 On page 1, in the executive summary, the percentage increase in the violent crime rate of Los Angeles was changed from 17 percent to 13.3 percent, and Chicago’s was changed from 16 percent to 16.2 percent, to correct a transcription error. (They appeared correctly in Table 1.) To improve consistency, references in the executive summary to changes in the number of murders were replaced with references to changes in murder rates, as follows: Baltimore (changed from a 9.9 percent to a 9.7 percent decrease), Washington, D.C. (from a 10.9 percent to a 12.7 percent decrease), New York (from a 2.1 percent to a 1.2 percent increase), and San Jose (from a 70.6 percent to a 66.7 percent increase). The decrease in San Francisco’s crime rate on page 3 was corrected from 12.2 percent to 12.8 percent. To improve consistency, on page 5, murder rate increases were corrected for San Jose (70.6 percent to 66.7 percent) and Austin (115.4 percent to 106.3 percent), and murder rate decreases were corrected for Baltimore (9.9 percent to 9.7 percent) and Washington, D.C. (10.9 percent to 12.7 percent). They previously showed the change in the number of murders. Table 2’s rightmost column (page 6), and the second numerical columns of Tables 3 and 4 (page 12), were corrected to show percentage changes in murder rates instead of change in murders. The horizontal axis of Figure 6 (page 11) was changed to show murder rates, rather than percentage change in murders. The chart and text were also updated to include San Antonio, Texas.


9 Chicago Police Dep’t, CompStat Citywide, 12 Months Ending 15-Aug (2016) (on file with the authors).


12 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.


18 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.


20 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

21 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

22 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.


26 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials responded that data would not be released to persons or entities outside of Texas. See Email from Cynthia Macias, Open Records Desk, El Paso Police Department, to authors (Apr. 1, 2016) (indicating that city crime data would be shared only with Texas residents) (on file with the authors).

27 CITY OF DETROIT, DPD: ALL CRIME INCIDENTS 2009-PRESENT (2016), http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/Police/Statistics/DPD2015%20YTD%20numbers.pdf?ver=201601-06-180707-157. When this information was accessed, the Department report characterized its information as preliminary, and subject to change before being reported for the UCR program.


30 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

31 See Email from Jessica Olsen, Police Data Production Control Coordinator, Metro Nashville Police Dep’t to the authors (Aug. 24, 2016) (on file with the authors).

32 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

33 OKC.gov, Police: Crime Information (2016), https://www.okc.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=4899. Like Houston, this city source reported crime data by month. Therefore, the authors added together monthly totals.


35 Open Baltimore, BPD Part 1 Victim Based Crime Data (2016), https://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/2015/sjx4-nd4t (from the raw spreadsheet, data was exported and then filtered by date to remove all years other than 2015 and 2016, and then filtered again by crime type to include only Part 1 index crimes).


37 For data through 2014, see endnote 6 and accompanying text. For data through 2015 and 2016, see Tables 1 & 2.


41 Chicago Police Dep’t, CompStat Citywide, 12 Months Ending 15-Aug (2016) (on file with the authors).


44 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

(from the drop-down boxes, select “Jan / 2016” for “Begin Date,” “Aug / 2016” for “End Date,” and “San Diego” for “Agency”).

47 Memorandum, City of Dallas, Weekly Crime Briefing Report (Sept. 2, 2016),

48 SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, UCR – PART ONE CRIMES REPORTED (2016),


50 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

51 SF OPENDATA, MAP: CRIME INCIDENTS FROM 1 JAN 2003 (2016),

52 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

53 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

54 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

55 CHARLOTTE POLICE DEP’T, CRIME STATISTICS: RELEASED AUGUST 11, 2016 (2016),

56 SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEASTAT SLIDES 7 (Aug 3, 2016),

57 DENVER POLICE DEP’T, CITYWIDE DATA – UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, PART 1: CRIMES IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER BASED ON UCR STANDARDS (2016),

58 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials responded that data would not be released to persons or entities outside of Texas. See Email from Cynthia Macias, Open Records Desk, El Paso Police Department, to authors (Apr. 1, 2016) (indicating that city crime data would be shared only with Texas residents) (on file with the authors).

59 CITY OF DETROIT, DPD: ALL CRIME INCIDENTS 2009-PRESENT (2016),
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/Police/Crime%20Statistics/DPD2015%20YTD%20numbers.pdf?ver=2016-01-06-180707-157. When this information was accessed, the Department report characterized its information as preliminary, and subject to change before being reported for the UCR program.

60 METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, DISTRICT CRIME DATA AT A GLANCE: 2015 YEAR END CRIME DATA (2016),

61 BOSTON REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PART 1: CRIME REPORTED BY THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2016),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/579a5f2e03596c3f0e04996/1469734700742/Weekly+Crime+Overview+7-18-16+3.pdf.
62 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

63 See Email from Jessica Olsen, Police Data Production Control Coordinator, Metro Nashville Police Dep’t to the authors (Aug. 24, 2016) (on file with the authors).

64 The authors were unable to locate a public, reliable, government source for crime statistics, and city officials did not respond to requests for information.

65 OKC.GOV, POLICE: CRIME INFORMATION (2016), https://www.okc.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=4899. Like Houston, this Oklahoma City source reported crime data by month. Therefore, the authors added monthly totals from 2015 to arrive at a total for the year.

66 At the time of publication, Las Vegas had released complete statistics only for homicides. Accordingly, Las Vegas statistics appear in Table 2, but not Table 1. See LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEPT, CRIME STATISTICS: HOMICIDE STATS (2016), http://www.lvmpd.com/ProtectYourself/CrimeStatistics/tabid/566/Default.aspx.

67 OPEN BALTIMORE, BPD PART 1 VICTIM BASED CRIME DATA (2016), https://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/2015/sjx4-nd4t (from the raw spreadsheet, data was exported and then filtered by date to remove all years other than 2015 and 2016, and then filtered again by crime type to include only Part 1 index crimes).


69 For data through 2014, see endnote 6 and accompanying text. For data through 2015 and 2016, see Tables 1 & 2.

70 Average two-year change in each city’s murder rate between 1990 and 2016 is the average of absolute changes, positive or negative, for that time period. For data through 2014, see endnote 6 and accompanying text. For data through 2015 and 2016, see Tables 1 & 2.

71 See Table 1 and Table 2 of this document.


82 For the values used to construct this scatter plot, see Tables 1 and 2.

83 For 2014-2015 murder rates, see Ames Grawert & James Cullen, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Crime in 2015: A Final Analysis 5 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/crime-2015-final-analysis. For 2015-2016 murder rates, see Table 2, supra. Columns 4 and 5 were compiled by averaging each city’s rates of poverty and unemployment between 2005 and 2014, then averaging the national rates for the same period of time, and lastly, reporting the percentage by which each city’s unemployment or poverty rate for that period exceeded the national average. See United States Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2005-2014), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (from the landing page, select “get data” next to “American Community Survey,” input the desired values and geographies, and then sort by dataset to obtain data for each year through 2005).

84 See endnote 83, supra.


87 See “What’s Going On In Chicago?”, supra.


92 For data through 2014, see endnote 6 and accompanying text. For data through 2015 and 2016, see Tables 1 & 2.

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