

EXHIBIT A

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
MICHIGAN, ROGER J. BRDAK,
FREDERICK C. DURHAL, JR., JACK
E. ELLIS, DONNA E. FARRIS, WILLIAM
“BILL” J. GRASHA, ROSA L. HOLLIDAY,
DIANA L. KETOLA, JON “JACK” G.
LASALLE, RICHARD “DICK” W. LONG,
LORENZO RIVERA and RASHIDA H.
TLAIB,

Case No. 17-cv-14148

Hon. Eric L. Clay
Hon. Denise Page Hood
Hon. Gordon J. Quist

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUTH JOHNSON, in her official capacity as
Michigan Secretary of State,

Defendant.

Dickinson Wright PLLC
Peter H. Ellsworth (P23657)
Ryan M. Shannon (P74535)
Special Assistant Attorneys General
215 S. Washington Sq., Suite 200
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 371-1700
PEllsworth@dickinsonwright.com
RShannon@dickinsonwright.com
Attorneys for Defendant, Ruth Johnson

Jones Day
Michael A. Carvin
Special Assistant Attorney General
51 Louisiana Ave., NW
Washington D.C. 20001
(202) 879-3939
macarvin@jonesday.com
Attorney for Defendant, Ruth Johnson

**SECRETARY OF STATE RUTH JOHNSON’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CONCERNING NEW AUTHORITY AND THE 2018 ELECTION RESULTS**

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THE 2018 ELECTION RESULTS

A. Introduction

As the Secretary has consistently noted, and Plaintiffs have never disputed, Plaintiffs have failed to establish “actual or imminent” future injury because they have nowhere alleged or shown that the “unfair” or “gerrymandered” results they cite for the 2012-2016 elections would occur in the 2020 elections—the only relevant elections in this *prospective* challenge. (See ECF No. 119, PageID.2438-2440; see also ECF No. 132, PageID.5043 (citing *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).) The 2018 general election results make any such allegation impossible because those results dramatically differ from the prior elections in this redistricting cycle and achieve precisely the level of Democratic representation that Plaintiffs themselves allege should have resulted from a fairly-drawn redistricting plan.

More generally, because the challenged plan has produced the Democratic representation that Plaintiffs seek to achieve in this lawsuit, and which significantly differs from the alleged underrepresentation they previously challenged, there is no coherent, much less principled, basis for finding liability or entering a remedy for the 2020 elections. Specifically, if Plaintiffs prove conclusively at trial that a 9 Republican / 5 Democratic congressional delegation, and 63 Republican / 47 Democratic State House delegation is an unconstitutional gerrymander (the

representation levels that *all* of Plaintiffs' evidence is directed at) this will do nothing to establish liability or justify a remedy. That is so because those challenged levels of representation *do not exist* in the real world. The real world ratios are 7 Republican / 7 Democratic in Congress and 58 Republican / 52 Democratic in the State House. These real world numbers track precisely what Plaintiffs concede are the *desired* results of a fair plan and the numbers they projected would result from the various neutral unbiased plans *they* have produced and purport to offer as alternatives.

Accordingly, it would be utterly meaningless and exceed the judicial power to adjudicate whether the representation ratios that *used to* exist in 2012 - 2016 are unconstitutional; the Plaintiffs seek only prospective relief for the 2020 elections and federal courts do not issue advisory opinions on counter-factual hypotheticals. And the February trial cannot rationally adjudicate the only extant case or controversy because Plaintiffs have offered *no* evidence suggesting that a 7 Republican / 7 Democratic or 58 Republican / 52 Democratic plan is unfair. Enjoining such a plan to substitute in Plaintiffs' proposed plan with *materially identical* representation would be a wholly gratuitous intrusion into the State's sovereignty.

Accordingly, the 2018 election results conclusively foreclose both the Plaintiffs' standing and the possibility of invalidating the extant redistricting law

under a coherent, much less manageable or well-accepted, standard for assessing whether a gerrymander's effect is unconstitutionally discriminatory.

Argument

Under the challenged Current Apportionment Plan, in 2018, Democrats gained two Congressional seats, five State House seats, and five State Senate seats:

- The Michigan Congressional delegation now reflects a 7-7, proportional balance and reflects what Plaintiffs' own experts claim should be the result under a neutrally drawn plan;
- The seat share obtained by Democrats in the Michigan State House (52 of 110) is roughly proportional and reflects what Plaintiffs' own experts claim should be the result under a "neutrally" drawn plan; and
- After the adoption of Proposal 2 by the voters, which established in the Michigan Constitution a redistricting commission for the next apportionment cycle, the Current Apportionment Plan will not be used again either to elect the Senate or to draw the lines of future Senate districts.

Crucially, there is nothing in any of Plaintiffs' expert reports that suggests that the Congressional and House results in 2018 will not be largely replicated in 2020. Even when Plaintiffs claimed that the Current Apportionment Plan was designed to, and did, result in a 9 Republican / 5 Democrat Congressional delegation in 2012 through 2016, there was nothing in any of their reports (or even their allegations) to support a conclusion that the 2020 election would result in a 9-5 delegation as well. The same is true of the projected State House results. Moreover, all of their (alleged) evidence of statewide unfairness ("efficiency gap," etc.) was based on a 9-5

congressional delegation and an (approximately) 63-47 House delegation. Now that the Current Apportionment Plan has resulted in 7-7 and 58-52 delegations in 2018, there is literally no evidence that these plans are unfair or that support even the potential of injury or redressable harm in 2020.

B. The lack of reliable predictions as to outcome makes standards and remedies impossible in partisan gerrymandering litigation.

It is not atypical that, at the end of a 10-year cycle, the political outcome of a redistricting plan differs materially from the outcome the plan had when first implemented. Voters move, demographics change, and voter preferences change as well. This makes predictions as to outcomes difficult or impossible.

The Supreme Court plurality in *Vieth* highlighted this issue when deciding such claims were nonjusticiable, noting that these very facts “made it impossible to assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally to craft a remedy.” *Vieth v. Jubelirer*, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004) (plurality op.). The plurality gave the “delicious illustration” of the litigation in *Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt*, 1996 WL 60439 (4th Cir. 1996), in which, five days after the court concluded that a system of statewide elections “had resulted in Republican candidates experiencing a consistent and pervasive lack of success,” “every Republican candidate standing for the office ... was victorious at the state level.” *See Vieth*, 541 U.S. at 287 n. 8.

The election outcome following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Vieth* also illustrates this point. The Democrat plaintiffs in *Vieth* challenged the Congressional delegation plan for Pennsylvania’s 19 U.S. House districts on the basis that it constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. In 2002, the challenged plan resulted in the election of 12 Republicans and 7 Democrats. By 2006, Democrats had flipped 4 previously Republican seats to their favor (winning 11 out of 19), and by 2008, Democrats had turned the 2002 result on its head, winning fully 12 of the 19 seats—the corollary to the very proportion the *Vieth* plaintiffs had claimed demonstrated a partisan gerrymander in favor of the Republicans.¹

This same phenomena occurred in Michigan itself in the last redistricting. As Plaintiffs themselves note, the redistricting plans that allegedly “heavily favored” Republicans showed a decrease from 60% Republican congressional seat share in 2002 to 46.7% in 2008, and a decrease from a 56.4% Republican State House seat share in 2002 to 39% in 2008. (ECF No. 129, PageID.3335-3336.)

C. The 2018 General Election Results

1. Congress

In the center column, the following table shows the percentage of the statewide two-party Congressional vote share obtained by Democrats in each

¹ See Pennsylvania Secretary of State, Official Results, Congressional Representatives, General Elections 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008, available here: <https://www.electionreturns.pa.gov/> (last accessed 11/20/2018).

election under the Current Apportionment Plan. In the column on the far right, it shows Democrats’ resulting Congressional seat share, including, now, the 2018 Michigan general election result:

Election year	Dem Vote Share	Dem Seats Won
2012	52.7%	5 of 14
2014	50.8%	5 of 14
2016	49.4%	5 of 14
2018	55.8%	7 of 14

As can be seen above, while the 2018 election was undoubtedly a “good one” for Democrats, it was not, in Michigan, an anomalous “blue wave” election. Certainly, nothing in Plaintiffs’ expert reports predicts that the 2018 result will not occur again in 2020. (*See* ECF No. 129-50, -51, -52.)

The 2018 congressional result of 7-7 is, moreover, roughly proportional. That is, Democrats obtained 50% of the seats with 55.8% of the vote. (Had Democrats won 8 seats, that number would comprise 57.1% of the delegation, which is higher than their 2018 vote share.)

Plaintiffs concede in their Response that the Supreme Court has approved of “proportionality line drawing.” (ECF No. 129, PageID.3389 (citing *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).) Given that the Current Apportionment Plan for Michigan’s Congressional delegation just elected candidates from the two major

political parties proportional to their statewide vote share, there is no hope for Plaintiffs of establishing either liability or redressable harm justifying the re-shaping of any particular district in the plan. Dismissal is thus warranted.

2. Michigan House

The same chart is produced below, this time for the Michigan House:

Election year	Dem Vote Share	Dem Seats Won
2012	54.0%	51 of 110
2014	51.1%	47 of 110
2016	50.0%	47 of 110
2018	52.6%	52 of 110

As shown above, Democrats actually obtained a lower statewide portion of the two-party House vote share in the 2018 election than in the 2012 election, which again confirms that 2018 was not an anomalous “blue wave” election in Michigan. But further, despite taking a *lower* statewide vote share percentage in 2018 than in 2012, Democrats won a *greater* number of seats in 2018. This confirms that shifts in populations and voter preferences have significantly changed the impact of the Current Apportionment Plan since it was enacted in 2011.

While the 2018 State House result is not precisely proportional, it is roughly proportional and, as shown below, *reflects precisely what Plaintiffs’ own experts*

assert that Democrats should be able to obtain under a purportedly “neutral” plan drawn without partisan considerations.

D. Plaintiffs’ Expert Reports

Plaintiffs filed the expert reports of Drs. Jowei Chen and Kenneth Mayer as attachments to their Response. (*See* ECF No. 129-50, -51.). (A third filed report—that of Dr. Warshaw (ECF No. 129-52)—did not include a comparison of outcomes between the Current Apportionment Plan and any hypothetical plan.)

1. Under the Current Apportionment Plan, the same number of Democrats were just elected as Dr. Chen says should be elected under a “neutrally drawn” plan.

Dr. Jowei Chen claims to have drafted 1,000 simulated Congressional plans and 1,000 simulated House Plans by adhering to a strict set of nonpartisan criteria. His report is based on his identification of differences between the Current Apportionment Plan and his purportedly “neutral” simulation sets.

At page 15 of his report (ECF No. 129-51, PageID.4722), Dr. Chen includes a table comparing the Current Apportionment Plan to every single one of his 1,000 Congressional simulations. Using historical election data, this table says that, while the Current Apportionment Plan elects 9 Republicans, 87.5% of his simulated plans would elect 7 Republicans (under the relevant 2012-2016 election data) – precisely the number of Republicans elected under the challenged plan in 2018. Thus, the

challenged plan produced precisely the result Dr. Chen asserts *should* result if no partisan considerations entered into the drawing of districts.

Similarly, at page 40 of his report (ECF No. 129-51, PageID.4747), Dr. Chen includes another table for the Michigan House. Using historical election results for 2012 through 2016, 91.8% of Dr. Chen’s allegedly neutral simulations produce 58 *or more* Republican seats. The 2018 election result—in which Republicans obtained 58 seats—again reflects what a neutral plan purportedly should produce.²

2. Under the Current Apportionment Plan the same number of Democrats were just elected as Dr. Mayer says should be elected under his “Demonstration” Plan.

Dr. Mayer similarly claims that he compared the Congressional districts and House districts under the enacted Plan against a purported “neutral” Demonstration Plan.

² In the Senate, Democrats flipped 5 seats in their favor in 2018, resulting in a final composition of 16 Democrats and 22 Republicans. While this outcome is within the ranges of Dr. Chen’s “neutral” simulations, the Senate is not further discussed because the Michigan Senate will not be elected again under the Current Apportionment Plan in 2020. The Current Apportionment Plan further will not be used as the basis for the drawing of districts for use in 2022, as the recently voter-approved Proposal 2 omits preserving prior districts as a permissible criterion for consideration by Michigan’s new redistricting commission. Since the Current Apportionment Plan will not form the basis of future redistricting, there is no basis even for *declaratory relief*. Compare *Sanders v. Dooly County, GA*, 245 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that while laches barred injunctive relief for gerrymander, declaratory relief was still available since invalid plan could be used as baseline in the future).

At page 90 of his report (ECF No. 129-52, PageID.4890), Dr. Mayer provides a table showing the democratic two-party vote share for Michigan's Congressional districts in his "neutrally drawn" Demonstration Plan. At Exhibit 1, the Secretary has added red numbering to each district in Dr. Mayer's Demonstration Plan in which Democrats, using historical election data, would have been in the majority. As shown in the attachment, Dr. Mayer asserts that his purportedly neutral Demonstration Plan results in 6 Republican seats under the relevant 2012-2016 data (and 8 under the stale, worst-case 2006-2010 data). The 2018 result of 7 Democrat districts is right in the middle.

At pages 91-93 of his report (ECF No. 129-52, PageID.4891-4893), Dr. Mayer provides the same table for the Michigan House. His Demonstration plan produces 58.5 to 62.5 Republican districts depending on the historical election data used; the actual Plan, again, just elected 58 Republicans. (*See* Exhibit 1.)

3. Plaintiffs' proposed expert reports support the Secretary.³

For both the Congressional Plan and House Plan, both Dr. Chen's and Dr. Mayer's reports dramatically support the Secretary's position rather than Plaintiffs'. Since the 2018 election resulted in the same number of Democrats being elected as

³ The Secretary does not intend to imply that she adopts Plaintiffs' expert reports. To the contrary, the Secretary reserves the right to raise all objections and file motions *in limine* with respect to such reports.

these experts assert *should* be elected under a neutrally drawn plan, these reports show that the Current Apportionment Plan is indistinguishable from a plan purportedly free of any political considerations and therefore cannot be deemed a marginally unfair plan, much less an extreme gerrymander. No case anywhere has ever hinted that a plan which produces rough proportionality and the same results as Plaintiffs' proposed neutral alternatives could possibly be unconstitutional.

Nor have Plaintiffs made such an absurd argument or produced any evidence to support it. All of their evidence and arguments concerning wasted votes and statewide efficiency gaps was based on an analysis concluding that the enacted plan would produce cognizably disproportionate results and many more Republican seats than that resulting from a neutral plan. Even if the trial were to completely vindicate such testimony and arguments, this would not establish liability for the proportional results mimicking Plaintiffs' neutral plans *that actually occurred in 2018*. (Again, Plaintiffs have not and cannot project that 2020 will be materially worse for Democrats than 2018, particularly since the newly-elected Democrats will have an incumbency *advantage* in 2020.)

Needless to say, a judicial determination that the 9 Republican / 5 Democrat results projected by Plaintiffs' experts is unconstitutionally unfair will not suggest that a 7 Republican / 7 Democrat plan is also unconstitutional. So there will be no basis for declaring the real-world results of the enacted plan unconstitutional or for

replacing that real world 7 Republican to 7 Democratic plan with another *projected* 7 Republican to 7 Democratic plan to achieve constitutional fairness. Accordingly, since Plaintiffs have not even *alleged* any unconstitutional unfairness for either a 7 Republican / 7 Democratic plan or a 58 Republican / 52 Democratic House plan, they have not created a material factual dispute about the actual results of the challenged Current Apportionment Plan or produced any basis for concluding that the Plan will be dilutive in 2020. Dismissal of their claims is thus warranted.

E. Conclusion as to 2018 election results

The 2018 election results confirm that this Court should not enter into the political thicket to provide the extraordinary remedy of invalidating a legislative redistricting plan. As was already true, but is now made especially plain following the 2018 election, nothing in Plaintiffs' evidence supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer *any* harm if elections are held under the Current Apportionment Plan in 2020. Such harm is, however, an indispensable element to this Court's intervention.

This Court should grant summary judgment to the Secretary, and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.

SUPPLEMENTAL DISCUSSION OF *BENISEK*

On November 20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a notice of supplemental authority regarding the District Court of Maryland's recent decision in

Benisek v. Lamone, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2018 WL 5816831 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2018), which decision issued after dispositive briefing in this matter closed.

In the *Benisek* decision, the court granted summary judgment on First Amendment associational claims to the plaintiff Republican voters on the basis that their district—the Maryland Sixth—was unconstitutionally gerrymandered in 2011. Plaintiffs here assert in their proposed notice that this decision is “a valuable illustration [of] the framework for resolving partisan gerrymander claims suggested by Justice Kagan in *Gill*” and “presents a compelling demonstration of the First Amendment implications of partisan gerrymandering....” (ECF No. 141-1, PageID.5234.)

The *Benisek* decision, of course, is not binding on this Court—nor is Justice Kagan’s concurrence in *Gill*. The Supreme Court in *Gill* emphasized that partisan gerrymandering cases “concern[] an unsettled kind of claim,” “the contours and justiciability of which are unresolved.” *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018). It expressly “left for another day consideration of other possible theories of harm” and, in the face of Justice Kagan’s concurrence, emphasized that “the reasoning of this Court with respect to the disposition of this case is set forth in *this* opinion and *none other*.” *Id* (emphasis added).

The *Benisek* decision moreover conflicts with a decision issued by a panel in this Court in 2002, holding, unequivocally, that “[p]artisan gerrymandering ... does

not support either a freedom of speech or a freedom of association claim.” *O’Lear v. Miller*, 222 F. Supp.2d 850, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The idiosyncratic facts of *Benisek* show why this Court should not depart from this precedent in recognizing a new type of constitutional claim here.

The Court in *Benisek* considered stipulated facts as related to the challenged Maryland Sixth congressional district:

- Before the 2011 redistricting in Maryland, the Maryland Sixth had contained the same five counties going back to 1966; one of the counties—Frederick County—had not been divided in any congressional redistricting plan *since 1840*;
- The 2010 census showed that only about 10,000 residents of the Maryland Sixth had to be re-apportioned to other districts to bring the Sixth into equal population;
- The Democrat-majority legislature accomplished this 10,000 resident transfer by moving 360,000 largely Republican voting residents *out* of the Sixth (including portions of two counties and splitting Frederick County), and shifting 350,000 residents *into* the Sixth from Democratic-leaning Montgomery County.
- This was the largest shift of voters in any single district in the Country in the 2011 apportionment process, and had the largest impact on the existing district’s Partisan Voting Index (“PVI”) in the Country as well; the Maryland Sixth went from having a Cook Political Report PVI of R+13 to D+2. [*Benisek*, 2018 WL 5816381, *2-3, *8, *26.]

The 2011 Democrat redistricting of the Maryland Sixth was thus unique.

There is nothing like it in the Current Apportionment Plan.

Further, the Republican voter plaintiffs in *Benisek* had solid and *specific* evidence that the 2011 change had impacted their abilities to organize: (i)

Republican voter participation in the Sixth significantly declined in primary elections after 2011; (ii) the *Benisek* plaintiffs provided testimony of Republican voter confusion over where the lines of their new districts were; (iii) and the Republican Central Committees in the three counties that remained in the Maryland Sixth all had significant declines in fundraising after the 2011 change. *Id.*, *9.

Plaintiffs *here* have presented *none* of this kind of evidence: (i) they have no evidence showing that fewer Democrats turned out as a result of the enactment of the Current Apportionment Plan; (ii) no evidence that any person who would have donated to a campaign did not; and (iii) no evidence that there was otherwise any difficulty in organizing or recruiting Democrat candidates to run for office in the challenged districts.

Further, even if Plaintiffs had provided *historical* evidence of these things occurring in 2012 through 2016 (and Plaintiffs have not), they have provided no evidence that such organizational hindrances are likely to recur in the 2020 election. The decision in *Benisek* provides no basis for this Court to rescue Plaintiffs claims or allow them to go to trial on the threadbare factual record they have provided.

Dismissal remains warranted.

Respectfully submitted,

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

JONES DAY

/s/ Peter H. Ellsworth
Peter H. Ellsworth (P23657)
Ryan M. Shannon (P74535)
Attorneys for Defendant

Michael Carvin
Attorneys for Defendant

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EXHIBIT 1

Table A4 – Demonstration Plan, U.S. House

Table A4 - Demonstration Plan, United States House Districts					
US House District	Baseline Democratic Vote Share		Total Population	Voting Age Population	Black VAP Percent
	2006-2010	2012-2016			
1	46.0%	42.9%	705,974	559,852	1.4%
2	41.4%	42.4%	705,975	522,870	8.3%
3	41.9%	40.1%	705,974	537,780	4.5%
4	45.6%	44.5%	705,975	535,476	7.7%
5	1 51.9%	1 52.0%	705,974	546,395	7.8%
6	2 54.2%	2 52.8%	705,974	529,219	11.7%
7	3 55.0%	3 55.4%	705,974	549,266	8.2%
8	4 55.7%	4 55.6%	705,974	531,154	6.0%
9	40.8%	41.0%	705,975	534,356	3.8%
10	48.3%	48.7%	705,974	547,952	5.3%
11	5 51.1%	49.7%	705,974	542,006	6.5%
12	6 50.1%	47.2%	705,975	549,341	5.4%
13	7 84.0%	5 84.8%	705,974	525,825	55.7%
14	8 78.9%	6 80.2%	705,974	528,080	57.0%

*2018 election result under Current Apportionment Plan: 7

Table A5 – Demonstration Plan, Michigan Lower House

Table A5 – Demonstration Plan MI Lower House Districts							
MI House District	Baseline Democratic Vote Share		Total Population	Voting Age Population	Black VAP Percent		
	2006-2010	2012-2016					
1	1	57.3%	1	59.1%	92,236	72,533	10.7%
2		49.9%		44.1%	88,126	71,371	0.2%
3		43.2%		39.0%	93,120	71,513	6.8%
4	2	60.8%	2	60.3%	92,412	71,032	8.3%
5	3	69.6%	3	71.2%	85,436	65,362	24.0%
6	4	59.8%	4	59.7%	88,304	68,498	10.3%
7		47.4%		44.5%	86,326	64,484	3.8%
8		36.3%		33.6%	89,194	66,448	1.7%
9		43.5%		44.7%	91,563	70,852	4.1%
10	5	71.3%	5	75.1%	86,095	68,953	5.5%
11		43.3%		38.0%	86,569	65,801	1.9%
12		49.1%		44.6%	93,024	70,989	1.1%
13		49.2%		47.7%	92,192	72,267	3.6%
14	6	50.7%	6	54.1%	90,173	65,602	9.6%
15		36.3%		37.5%	92,442	67,584	5.4%
16	7	50.9%		49.4%	93,900	71,983	12.8%
17	8	52.2%		49.8%	93,998	70,952	12.0%
18		45.0%		39.4%	88,847	68,914	0.7%
19		34.7%		33.2%	90,845	66,710	0.9%
20	9	64.4%	7	66.3%	94,325	80,372	7.7%
21		43.8%		42.2%	93,628	67,179	3.7%
22	10	55.4%	8	56.9%	86,930	71,320	4.5%
23		46.7%		44.5%	93,861	72,110	2.8%
24	11	73.4%	9	74.2%	90,251	68,761	32.0%
25		49.5%	10	50.0%	85,404	66,568	7.8%
26	12	62.7%	11	60.5%	86,129	65,102	16.3%
27		41.4%		43.2%	91,476	68,209	5.4%
28	13	52.7%	12	55.1%	93,892	72,659	10.4%
29		42.3%		40.2%	93,907	71,373	1.1%
30	14	70.7%	13	73.3%	86,944	73,074	10.0%
31	15	65.8%	14	67.9%	89,735	70,871	16.2%
32	16	63.0%	15	64.7%	92,348	69,534	27.0%
33		43.9%		45.3%	93,787	72,359	7.3%
34		45.3%		44.7%	93,869	72,345	4.6%
35	17	75.1%	16	75.7%	85,907	64,433	38.9%
36		44.2%		42.8%	85,647	65,556	3.6%

37	38.5%	36.2%	93,595	71,642	2.2%
38	40.4%	40.8%	86,986	67,791	1.3%
39	38.5%	34.9%	88,317	67,896	0.2%
40	46.7%	42.6%	89,161	71,653	3.7%
41	18 62.9%	17 67.2%	94,148	68,876	27.1%
42	37.9%	34.6%	93,528	68,385	0.4%
43	38.2%	36.4%	88,045	66,735	1.0%
44	42.3%	38.1%	92,973	71,392	0.4%
45	19 89.6%	18 90.1%	85,510	60,978	60.3%
46	20 54.5%	19 58.2%	90,112	70,658	15.9%
47	36.9%	39.8%	86,185	63,460	10.4%
48	46.2%	46.0%	85,964	65,513	19.5%
49	21 69.6%	20 70.0%	93,587	69,966	25.4%
50	36.0%	34.2%	90,492	67,547	0.3%
51	45.9%	45.4%	92,004	68,832	6.4%
52	40.9%	37.7%	91,377	68,872	0.4%
53	43.1%	39.5%	91,422	70,161	3.3%
54	22 55.9%	21 53.0%	91,070	68,717	3.2%
55	36.3%	35.1%	90,475	67,183	0.5%
56	23 72.2%	22 74.8%	85,855	65,642	29.0%
57	24 50.7%	48.6%	90,959	74,537	2.0%
58	41.8%	38.8%	93,164	73,010	3.1%
59	25 58.4%	23 55.3%	93,474	72,351	1.5%
60	20.9%	21.3%	85,775	64,629	1.6%
61	34.1%	34.0%	90,348	66,533	2.1%
62	48.3%	49.6%	92,731	70,489	2.8%
63	26 72.1%	24 74.6%	91,794	71,168	23.4%
64	40.8%	37.8%	92,572	72,290	0.3%
65	39.9%	41.0%	85,535	65,088	4.2%
66	49.6%	46.5%	89,406	67,772	3.8%
67	40.8%	36.5%	91,317	68,570	2.9%
68	25.9%	27.5%	91,296	65,564	2.0%
69	27 55.2%	49.6%	90,076	71,827	1.2%
70	28 55.9%	25 52.4%	86,059	64,299	10.5%
71	29 52.1%	45.9%	85,815	68,517	2.1%
72	41.2%	39.2%	87,894	66,014	4.7%
73	33.5%	35.3%	88,583	63,989	1.4%
74	30 72.0%	26 75.2%	93,839	71,435	21.3%
75	37.8%	33.0%	91,936	70,009	2.1%
76	43.2%	43.7%	85,687	63,806	3.0%
77	43.5%	45.5%	90,976	69,963	3.5%

78		45.8%		46.5%	85,897	65,169	2.8%
79		49.6%		48.3%	90,011	68,650	1.3%
80		46.6%		45.2%	92,671	73,797	1.2%
81		49.4%		46.6%	87,183	66,173	0.5%
82		48.2%		45.5%	90,522	68,380	6.2%
83		36.1%		35.5%	86,132	63,016	1.9%
84		42.5%		37.9%	85,895	65,217	0.3%
85	31	55.7%	27	56.2%	92,514	73,246	7.6%
86	32	52.3%	28	50.7%	92,872	71,064	3.8%
87		36.2%		35.3%	86,730	64,871	0.5%
88	33	55.3%	29	54.9%	86,585	68,836	12.5%
89	34	51.7%	30	52.1%	87,255	65,069	6.4%
90	35	50.0%		48.4%	92,962	72,968	10.9%
91		48.2%		43.2%	88,754	71,937	0.2%
92	36	63.3%	31	61.2%	90,199	68,862	5.2%
93	37	64.1%	32	62.6%	94,074	72,963	4.2%
94		49.6%	33	50.3%	92,629	71,595	6.8%
95	38	60.1%	34	60.5%	85,466	64,845	5.8%
96	39	53.6%	35	51.0%	85,837	70,335	2.5%
97		45.2%		45.9%	92,483	73,208	3.3%
98	40	62.1%	36	64.9%	92,063	70,005	13.3%
99	41	73.3%	37	74.4%	87,768	62,294	60.7%
100	42	73.3%	38	74.2%	87,595	64,027	64.9%
101	43	96.4%	39	97.2%	87,906	63,943	90.4%
102	44	94.2%	40	94.7%	88,171	66,024	61.7%
103	45	95.3%	41	95.8%	87,356	61,356	62.1%
104	46	92.7%	42	93.4%	89,082	68,284	60.4%
105	47	96.8%	43	98.1%	88,524	66,908	95.5%
106	48	95.9%	44	97.0%	88,195	64,767	91.0%
107	49	94.6%	45	95.6%	89,598	62,867	76.0%
108	50	80.2%	46	84.4%	87,586	66,552	56.2%
109	51	60.6%	47	64.8%	89,880	63,766	4.1%
110	52	78.9%	48	82.0%	90,361	71,146	58.5%

2018 election result under Current Apportionment Plan: 52