Since much of the Bush-Gore race has been discussed previously in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, we add additional analysis here regarding state-by-state numbers. One fact that jumps out from the data is the amount of party advertising in the presidential contest. When the field is limited to the major party candidates—Bush and Gore—and the parties and groups who supported them, candidate spending accounts for only 42% of the ad spending in the presidential contest, compared to 49% by the parties and 9% by groups. Thus the party coffers, loaded with soft money, played an especially potent role in the Bush-Gore battle. As stated earlier, the dollar figures included in this analysis understate actual outlays and are limited to the nation’s 75 largest media markets.
The campaign between the Texas Governor and the Vice-President was extremely close for much of the general election. For only the fourth time in history, a candidate won the Electoral College while losing the popular vote. The state which held the country’s attention for weeks, Florida, was called by many political scientists and commentators a statistical tie.1

As the race grew tight in the final two months of the campaign, many states which had been ignored by the campaigns suddenly came back onto the radar screen. As Rick Berke of the New York Times wrote less than two weeks before the November 7th election, “The roster of states that are tossups in the general election is actually expanding in the closing days of the presidential campaign, a marked departure from previous elections and one that has forced Gov. George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore to hustle around the nation even more than past nominees.”2

As well as traveling from state-to-state, Gore and Bush made their presence known by broadening their ad outlays to include states that were once thought to be uncontested. Running counter to established political precedent, the presidential campaigns searched for weaknesses in the opposition strongholds. Bush and the Republican Party made a significant effort in California in the final month of the campaign, making that state their top state (in total advertising dollars) each week for the final four weeks. Gore and the Democratic Party, meanwhile, made a serious effort to take Florida. At the same time, Gore and the Democratic Party made Pennsylvania their top state every week of the campaign with just four exceptions. Week 35 saw Ohio topping Pennsylvania, though only barely, $754,929 to $735,144. Weeks 40, 41, and 43 saw Florida as the number one state.

Groups were far more involved in supporting Gore on the airwaves than Bush. As shown in Figure A-3, pro-Bush groups, such as Americans for Job Security, did not air ads until October, and then only in small numbers. In the aggregate, groups spent more than $12 million to help Gore, and just $2 million to help Bush. Of the 19 states where both pro-Bush and pro-Gore groups aired ads, pro-Gore groups outspent Bush in 17, and Gore won in 10 of those 17 states.

In terms of aggregate spending on television ads by the presidential campaigns, it becomes evident that presidential races are fought out in only a handful of states. Political scientists, pollsters, and pundits alike recognize that most presidential outcomes are determined by fewer than 10% of the nation’s voters. Most voters reside in states that are generally viewed as securely Democratic or securely Republican. These states tend to be overlooked by the campaigns as they target their resources on tossup states. As a result, many large but uncontestable states, such as Texas, may be almost entirely ignored by the campaigns, while states with few electoral votes may find themselves awash with television campaign ads from candidates, parties, and groups.

The 2000 presidential election did not conform as neatly to conventional political wisdom as in other recent presidential elections; the fact that Florida became a tossup state reflects the uniqueness of the most recent campaign. Nonetheless, spending on television ads by the candidates, parties, and groups combined in the 2000 presidential election shows that electing the nation’s president continued to boil down to the electoral choices of just a handful of states. The air war of 2000 primarily took place in less than a dozen states.


Figure A1: Spending in States First Considered Non-Competitive, Later Considered Competitive

Figure A2: Bush and Republican Party Spending in Florida, California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania

Figure A3: Number of Group-Sponsored Ads Promoting Bush vs. Gore

Figure A4: Gore and Democratic Party Spending in Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Spending (in $)</th>
<th>Winner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$4,949</td>
<td>BUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$35,887</td>
<td>GORE</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$11,193</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$2,054,778</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$7,782</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
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<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$62,015</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$36,886</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$1,708,903</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$305,053</td>
<td>GORE</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$1,064,936</td>
<td>BUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$105,603</td>
<td>BUSH</td>
</tr>
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<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
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<td>Pro-Gore</td>
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<td>BUSH</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
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<td>$152,818</td>
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<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$2,518,762</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$818,182</td>
<td>GORE</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
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<td>BUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$234</td>
<td>GORE</td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$603,894</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$45,728</td>
<td>BUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$18,799</td>
<td>BUSH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$2,277</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Pro-Gore</td>
<td>$610,634</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Pro-Bush</td>
<td>$117,657</td>
<td>GORE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table Total**: $13,339,093

Group Spending on the Presidential Race – States where both Pro-Bush and Pro-Gore groups spent $$
As shown in the accompanying map (see Figure A-6), several states received grossly disproportionate attention in terms of ad buys compared to their electoral college votes. In this map, designed to express how the players viewed the electoral landscape, size of state is determined by cumulative campaign spending in that state by Bush, Gore, the DNC, the RNC, and interest groups. Color of state indicates the winner. The intensity of the color in that state corresponds to the amount of money spent per eligible voter. In this graph, the amount of eligible voters includes some citizens actually barred from voting due to felony conviction.

States that received less than $1,000 in presidential ad spending are omitted.
Cumulative spending per state:

- $1,600,000
- $100,000

States with no spending:

- That Bush won
  - ALASKA (3)
  - ARIZONA (8)
  - COLORADO (8)
  - IDAHO (4)
  - INDIANA (12)
  - MISSISSIPPI (7)
  - MONTANA (3)
  - NEW HAMPSHIRE (4)
  - NORTH DAKOTA (3)
  - OKLAHOMA (8)
  - SOUTH CAROLINA (8)
  - SOUTH DAKOTA (3)
  - TEXAS (32)
  - UTAH (5)
  - VIRGINIA (13)
  - WYOMING (3)

- That Gore won
  - DELAWARE (3)
  - HAWAII (4)
  - MARYLAND (10)
  - NEW JERSEY (15)
  - NEW YORK (33)
  - RHODE ISLAND (4)
  - VERMONT (3)

Winner:

- Bush
- Gore

Price paid per eligible voter:

- $0.00 - .99
- $1.00 - 1.99
- $2.00 - 2.49
- $2.50 - 3.49

Electoral Votes:

- State Name (#)
- # = Electoral Votes

Vote Margin:

- #% = Vote margin of winning candidate

APPENDIX A.
Senate and House Profiles

With the Republican Party controlling the House and Senate by small margins, the 2000 elections were the focus of both parties’ ambitions to improve their position in each legislative body. Because control of the House and Senate depended largely on the outcome of a handful of competitive races, an analysis of several key races is included in this report. Information on the timing, location, and magnitude of ad buys provides a clearer picture of the air war being waged for the control of Congress. Each profile provides the amount spent on TV ads by candidates, parties, and groups, as well as final vote percentages in these races. Also included are final figures reported to the FEC on all campaign spending along with graphs highlighting important features of each particular race, such as tone and selected market locations.
I
cumbent Senator Chuck Robb was challenged by out-
going Governor George Allen in a closely contested race
that ultimately saw Robb lose the Senate seat he had held
since 1989. Robb, the Democratic Party, and pro-Robb
groups spent $9.77 million on his campaign, while Allen,
the GOP, and pro-Allen groups spent $9.35 million.
Robb’s candidate committee spent only $3.7 million
on ads versus Allen’s $5.25 million, but Robb was helped
significantly by his party and sympathetic groups, as the
Democratic Party outspent the Republican Party by over
$1 million and pro-Robb groups spent nearly $1 million
more than pro-Allen groups. These two edges contributed
to the overall lead Robb enjoyed in terms of ad volume for
the last seven weeks of the campaign. In those remaining
weeks, pro-Robb ads outnumbered pro-Allen ads every
single day.

One clue to Allen’s victory may lie in the tone of ads each
candidate chose to run. Ads by Allen were 45% positive,
40% contrasting, and 15% attack ads. But Robb’s cam-
paign aired no ads that were outright negative. About
39% of Robb’s ads were positive, while 61% were con-
trasting ads. Overall, however, 40% of all Robb ads run by
the party, the candidate, and pro-Robb groups combined
were negative in tone, compared to just 20% for all pro-
Allen ads combined. This was because party and group ads
accounted for more than 60% of the pro-Robb spending,
and, taken together, party and group ads were 65% nega-
tive and 35% contrasting. The Democratic Party and pro-
Robb groups did not air a single positive ad. Thus while
Robb’s campaign eschewed ads that were solely negative,
Robb’s allies aired thousands of negative ads on his behalf.

### Virginia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Total FEC Spending</th>
<th>Vote Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat: Charles Robb</td>
<td>$6,537,158</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican: George Allen</td>
<td>$9,980,930</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total Ad Spending for Robb:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>$3,717,342</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$5,022,088</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$1,033,783</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$9,773,213</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total Ad Spending for Allen:

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>$5,256,525</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$3,999,348</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$94,549</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$9,350,422</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tone of Pro-Robb and Pro-Allen Ads**

- **Attack**
- **Contrast**
- **Promote**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Robb</td>
<td>$3,717,342</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Allen</td>
<td>$5,022,088</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$1,033,783</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$9,773,213</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Robb</td>
<td>$5,256,525</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Allen</td>
<td>$3,999,348</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$94,549</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$9,350,422</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In one of the most highly publicized races in the nation, millionaire Jon Corzine faced Congress Member Bob Franks in the New Jersey Senate race. Corzine’s immense wealth and his willingness to use it made him a national figure in the 2000 campaigns. Eventually spending more than $60 million, Corzine spent heavily on television ads to defeat former Governor Jim Florio in the primary and Franks in the general election.

Corzine spent more money on television ads than any other Senate candidate. Aside from attempting to build his name recognition, unique geopolitical features of New Jersey forced Corzine to spend heavily in order to get his message out. As New Jersey lacks its own major media market, the candidates had to air ads in Philadelphia and New York in order to reach the electorate. Given that it was a presidential election year, with Senate candidates also running in tight races in New York and Pennsylvania, the cost of ad buys dramatically increased.

Franks received no help from the Republican Party in the form of party ads. If the party was aiding Franks with television ads, it did so without directly placing ads in the major markets.

Franks was never able to mount a significant air presence compared to Corzine, but Corzine ultimately won by less than four percentage points. According to Campaigns and Elections, “Corzine’s extraordinary campaign, with its record breaking spending, probably could have been stopped—by money, and relatively little of it, at the right time.”¹ The analysis here indicates that Corzine’s lopsided advantage in TV spending did not produce a similar lopsided advantage at the polls.

---

**New Jersey**

**SENATE RACE: CORZINE-FRANKS**

**Democrat: Jon Corzine**
Total FEC Spending: $63,209,506
Vote Percentage: 50.1%

**Total Spending for Corzine:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$32,885,265</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Republican: Bob Franks**
Total FEC Spending: $6,609,425
Vote Percentage: 47.1%

**Total Spending for Franks:**

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<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$644,109</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$5,627,095</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

In an extremely close race between an incumbent Republican senator and a wealthy Democratic challenger, Washington voters may not have noticed the unique nature of the ad war taking place on their TV screens. While Maria Cantwell paid for more than $6 million worth of ads, compared to $160,000 by the Democratic Party and $543,352 by sympathetic groups, Slade Gorton’s campaign spent just $1.55 million, the Republican Party $1.2 million, and pro-Gorton groups $1.5 million. Whereas the national Republican party committees spent heavily to promote Senate candidates in other states, in the state of Washington the Republican Party was outspent by both the candidates and outside groups.

The Cantwell-Gorton race saw an unusually large amount of independent group spending, and almost half of all group ads were negative in tone. Cantwell’s candidate campaign maintained a predominantly positive message, as over 63% of her ads promoted her own candidacy and just 10% were negative. Ads by the Gorton campaign were 55% positive and 14% negative.

Most noticeable on the Republican side was how dramatically pro-Gorton group spending increased in the final weeks of the election. Group spending accelerated past party spending and was even more voluminous than Gorton’s own spending until just two weeks before election day.
New York

The race to succeed retiring New York Senator Patrick Moynihan was one of the most closely watched in 2000. As the first First Lady ever to run for Senate, Hillary Clinton brought national attention to New York’s Senate race. Initially running against New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, Clinton eventually faced Congress Member Rick Lazio in the general election after Giuliani withdrew from the race for health reasons.

More than 40,000 ads were aired as Lazio and Clinton battled across New York State. Voters in New York City, Albany, Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse saw heavy amounts of advertising by the candidates, parties, and groups. The tone of the race overall was mixed, with positive ads accounting for 48% of the airings and contrasting and attack ads amounting to 21% and 30%, respectively.

Clinton received significant air assistance from the party, while Lazio did not. Though Clinton’s campaign spent $17.7 million on ads compared to Lazio’s $21.9 million, the Democratic Party spent $4.7 million on ads supporting Clinton. The Republican Party stayed largely out of the ad war, spending just $67,840 on behalf of Lazio. This was far less than the $309,188 Republican groups spent to assist Lazio. The Democratic Party’s assistance kept Clinton competitive on the air and allowed her campaign to husband resources for other uses.

Before signing a unique “soft money ban” which mandated that the parties not spend soft money to promote either of their candidacies, both Clinton and Lazio attempted to extract promises that outside groups would not spend soft money as well. Suggesting that outside groups may have honored their promises, outside groups did very little TV advertising in the Senate campaign. While there were fears that outside groups would spend millions to tip the balance in the election, groups accounted for just 2% of the total ads in the race. Clinton won by a larger than expected margin of 55%-44%.

SENATE RACE: CLINTON-LAZIO

Democrat: Hillary Rodham Clinton (D)
Total FEC Spending: $29,871,577
Vote Percentage: 55.0%

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<thead>
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<th>Total Spending for Clinton:</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$22,549,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Republican: Rick Lazio
Total FEC Spending: $40,576,273
Vote Percentage: 44.0%

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<td>Candidate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$309,188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$22,281,116</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX B.

**Total Airings, by Market**

- **Albany-Schnectady**: 18.6%
- **Syracuse**: 22.0%
- **Rochester**: 21.3%
- **New York City**: 18.0%
- **Other**: 1.5%
- **Buffalo**: 18.5%

**Total Spending, by Sponsor**

- **Pro-Clinton**: $30,000,000
- **Pro-Lazio**: $20,000,000
- **Pro-Clinton Party Group**: $10,000,000
- **Pro-Lazio Party Group**: $0
The 2000 Michigan Senate race saw Democratic Congress Member Debbie Stabenow come from behind in the polls to defeat incumbent Republican Senator Spencer Abraham in a race that saw large amounts of party and group advertising. Almost 25,000 ads were aired in the race and voters in the Detroit, Flint, and Grand Rapids markets saw the vast majority of these. The tone of the race was split roughly in thirds, as positive ads accounted for 35% of the airings, contrasting ads 29%, and attack ads 36%.

Michigan’s race was unique in that groups successfully maintained their strength in the race as Election Day neared. As the overall volume of candidate and party ads increased, interest groups adjusted their outlays to keep up their share of the airings. Groups supported Abraham with 50% more ads than they did Stabenow, as Abraham’s candidacy was helped by roughly 3,100 group-sponsored ads compared to 2,100 for Stabenow. Overall, groups aired 20% of the ads in the election, and their expenditures were competitive with party expenditures, equaling over 70% of the aggregate party spending.

The two political parties appeared to have spent themselves to a draw, with each spending $2.7 million supporting their candidate. However, the Democratic Party appears to have been extremely successful in timing their ads in order to allow Stabenow to conserve resources. On more than one occasion, party airings increased just as Stabenow’s own airings decreased.

---

**Democrat: Debbie Stabenow**  
**Total FEC Spending:** $7,971,450  
**Vote Percentage:** 49.5%

**Total Spending for Stabenow:**

- **Candidate:** $3,565,324  
- **Party:** $2,760,750  
- **Group:** $1,675,836  
- **Total:** $8,001,910

**Republican: Spencer Abraham**  
**Total FEC Spending:** $13,028,636  
**Vote Percentage:** 47.9%

**Total Spending for Abraham:**

- **Candidate:** $5,130,709  
- **Party:** $2,776,958  
- **Group:** $2,309,322  
- **Total:** $10,216,989
APPENDIX B.

Tone of All Ads, by Week
New Jersey

In a race that remained too close to call weeks after the election, Congress Member Rush Holt eventually succeeded in retaining his House seat for a second term. Opposed by Dick Zimmer, a former Congress Member who represented the 12th District from 1990-1996, Holt had defeated Congress Member Mike Pappas in 1998 but was faced with a tough re-election fight in 2000.

The Democratic Party came to Holt’s assistance with more than $2.8 million in TV advertising. The Democratic Party spent more on TV ads in Holt’s race than in any other House race in the country. Notably, Holt’s campaign itself did not air ads on his behalf that were captured by the CMAG satellite, meaning either that the campaign elected not to run ads or that the ads they ran were on cable television. Zimmer’s campaign did run ads, but not nearly as many as the Republican Party did on his behalf. While the Zimmer campaign spent more than $600,000 airing 297 ads, the party spent $1.4 million airing 471 ads. Their combined effort, however, was not enough to match the Democratic Party ad buy, which included nearly 1,000 airings promoting Holt. Holt ultimately defeated Zimmer by less than 500 votes cast out of roughly 280,000 cast.

**12TH DISTRICT HOUSE RACE: HOLT-ZIMMER**

**Democrat: Rush D. Holt**
Total FEC Spending: $2,566,080
Vote Percentage: 48.7%

**Total Spending for Holt:**
- Candidate: $0 (0%)
- Party: $2,780,509 (100%)
- Group: $0 (0%)
- Total: $2,780,509 (100%)

**Republican: Dick Zimmer**
Total FEC Spending: $2,197,628
Vote Percentage: 48.5%

**Total Spending for Zimmer:**
- Candidate: $611,869 (31.1%)
- Party: $1,352,540 (68.9%)
- Group: $0 (0%)
- Total: $1,964,409 (100%)

*Total Number of Ads Aired for Holt vs. Zimmer*
Having won the 1998 race to represent the 49th California congressional district by just three percentage points, Republican candidate Brian Bilbray was a natural target for the Democrats. State Senator Susan Davis succeeded in her challenge to Bilbray, defeating him by a margin of 50%-46%.

Bilbray depended on large amounts of group advertising in his race, as group-sponsored spending on ads accounted for 68% of pro-Bilbray ads compared to 21% aired by the candidate and 12% aired by the party. The 49th District saw more pro-Republican group spending than any other congressional district in California and in the country. By comparison, groups accounted for 38% of the pro-Davis spending, the party accounted for 30%, and the candidate 32%. Still, this group spending was the second largest of all pro-Democratic group spending in the House races.

Pro-Davis ads enjoyed a healthy lead in terms of total airings until the middle of October, when pro-Bilbray ads accelerated to more than 600 ads per week.

### 49TH DISTRICT HOUSE RACE: DAVIS-BILBRAY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrat: Susan A. Davis</strong></td>
<td>$1,259,441</td>
<td>$1,172,505</td>
<td>$1,489,387</td>
<td>$3,921,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FEC Spending:</strong></td>
<td>$1,926,497</td>
<td>$1,846,574</td>
<td>$2,213,364</td>
<td>$3,921,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vote Percentage:</strong></td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FEC Spending:</strong></td>
<td>$1,846,574</td>
<td>$2,213,364</td>
<td>$3,295,215</td>
<td>$3,295,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vote Percentage:</strong></td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Ads Aired for Davis vs. Bilbray, by Sponsor**

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APPENDIX B
Congress Member Anne Northup faced a challenge from State Senator Eleanor Jordan in a race political prognosticators had defined as leaning Republican, despite the fact that 59% of 3rd District residents are registered Democrats. Having first won in 1996, and re-election in 1998 by a 52%-48% margin, Northup held a seat targeted by the Democratic Party.

The campaign saw large amounts of candidate, party, and group spending. Pro-Jordan and pro-Northup ads by all sponsors were in close proportion throughout the race, but pro-Northup ads became significantly more frequent with three weeks remaining in the election. Pro-Northup group ads were markedly greater in volume than party ads, totaling 1,946 ads compared to 425 ads. Citizens for Better Medicare and the Chamber of Commerce were two groups that attacked Jordan with large advertising buys.

**Democrat: Eleanor Jordan**
Total FEC Spending: $1,700,171
Vote Percentage: 44.2%

**Total Spending for Jordan:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>$699,308</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$821,837</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$953,564</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,474,709</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Republican: Anne Northup**
Total FEC Spending: $2,904,751
Vote Percentage: 52.9%

**Total Spending for Northup:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>$1,531,325</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>$236,655</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>$787,214</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,555,194</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A
ttempting to fill the seat left open by Ron Klink (D), who resigned to run for Senate, candidates Melissa Hart and Terry Van Horne battled in a race many thought would be extremely close. However, Hart ultimately won by a margin of 59%-41%, becoming the first female Republican Congress Member from Pennsylvania.

Both candidates received significant ad help from parties and groups. Van Horne received particularly strong assistance from the party: 80% of all pro-Van Horne ads were paid for by the party. Just 21% of spending on ads was by the candidate's campaign and only 1.5% by sympathetic groups. At the same time Hart's campaign accounted for 44% of spending on pro-Hart ads, the party 40%, and groups 17%.

The timing of ads was notable for the apparently different strategies at work. With two weeks left, pro-Van Horne ads and pro-Hart ads were roughly even in volume. But the pro-Van Horne ads, sponsored mostly by the Democratic Party, scaled down dramatically as Election Day neared. At the same time, ads promoting Hart escalated with groups, the Republican Party, and the candidate increasing their spending. These spending efforts were maintained, though at a slightly lower level, through the final week of the campaign.

Pennsylvania

Democratic: Terry Van Horne
Total FEC Spending: $673,346
Vote Percentage: 41.0%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Spending for Van Horne:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate: $219,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party: $950,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group: $23,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: $1,193,693</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Republican: Melissa Hart
Total FEC Spending: $1,724,048
Vote Percentage: 59.0%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Spending for Hart:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate: $677,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party: $617,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group: $260,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: $1,555,654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coding the Commercials
4. Is the ad aired for a general election or a primary election?
1. Primary
2. General

5. What is the party of the favored candidate?
1. Democrat
2. Republican
3. Other

6. What is the seat’s incumbent status?
1. Open Seat
2. Republican Seat
3. Democratic Seat
4. Other (Independent Seat)

7a. Does the ad direct viewer to take any action (as opposed to merely providing information)?
0. No
1. Yes

8. (If yes to #7) What is that action?
0. Not applicable
1. Other
2. To vote for someone
3. To support someone
4. To elect or re-elect someone
5. To write, call, or tell someone to do something
6. To reject someone
7. To urge action or attention to a particular matter
8. To defeat someone
9. To send a message or call someone to express yourself
10. To vote against someone

9. (If an ad asks people to contact a public official) Does it provide a specific bill number to discuss or urge action on?
0. No
1. Yes

10. (If an ad asks people to contact a public official) Does it provide a phone number or address to help them to do so?
1. Toll number listed
2. No
3. Toll-free telephone number listed
4. Address listed

11. In your opinion, is the purpose of the ad to provide information about or urge action on a bill or issue, or is it to generate support or opposition for a particular candidate?
1. Generate support or opposition for a candidate
2. Provide information or urge action
3. Unsure/Unclear

12. Is the favored candidate...
0. Not applicable
1. Mentioned
2. Pictured in the ad
3. Not identified at all
4. Both mentioned and pictured in the ad

13. Is the favored candidate’s opponent...
0. Not applicable
1. Not identified at all
2. Both mentioned and pictured in the ad
3. Pictured in the ad
4. Mentioned by name in the text of an ad

14. In your judgement, is the primary purpose of the ad to promote a specific candidate (“In his distinguished career, Senator Jones has brought millions of dollars home. We need Senator Jones.”), to attack a candidate (“In his long years in Washington, Senator Jones has raised your taxes over and over. We can't afford 6 more years of Jones.”) or to contrast the candidates (“While Senator Jones has been raising your taxes, Representative Smith has been cutting them.”)?
0. Not applicable
1. Attack
2. Contrast
3. Promote
4. Unsure/Unclear

15a. Does the favored candidate appear on screen narrating his or her ad?
0. No
1. Yes

16. Is the office at stake mentioned in the ad?
0. Not applicable
1. Yes – referred to in text of the ad
2. No
3. Yes – written in one of the visual frames of the ad
4. Yes – referred to in both the text and visuals of the ad
17. Is an opponent’s commercial mentioned or shown on screen?
0. Not applicable
1. Yes – opponent’s commercial is shown on screen
2. Yes – opponent’s commercial is referred to in text and screen
3. No
4. Yes – opponent’s commercial is referred to in text

18. Does the ad use any of the following adjectives to characterize the favored candidate? (first mention)
0. Not applicable
1. Common sense leadership
2. Independent
3. Innovative
4. Self made
5. Caring/Compassionate
6. Bold
7. Principled
8. Tough/Fighter
9. Proven/Tested/Experienced
10. Values (shares them, has American ones…)
11. No adjectives or descriptions of candidates
12. Protector
13. Moderate/Middle of the road/Mainstream
14. Conservative
15. Fiscally conservative
16. Hardworking
17. Friend of Clinton
18. Committed
19. Visionary
20. Reformer
21. Competent/Knows how to get things done
22. Honest
23. Family man
30. Other

19. Second mention (same as #18)

20. Does the ad use any of the following adjectives to characterize the opposing candidate? (first mention)
0. Not applicable
1. Dishonest/Corrupt
2. Dangerous
3. Friend of Pat Robertson/Religious Right
4. Reckless
5. Too risky
6. Turncoat
7. Incompetent
8. Taxing (or some version of liking taxes)
9. Hypocrite
10. Extremist/Radical
11. Career Politician
12. Heartless (may be used in reference to Social Security)
13. Friend of Newt Gingrich
14. Negative
15. Liberal
16. Reactionary/Right-Wing
17. Friend of special interests
18. No adjective or description
19. Friend of Clinton
30. Other

21. Second mention (same as #20)

22. Does the ad mention the party label of the favored candidate or the opponent?
0. Not applicable
1. No
2. Yes – opposing candidate’s party
3. Yes – both candidates’ party affiliations are mentioned
4. Yes – favored candidate’s party

23a. Does the ad use technology to distort (i.e. morph) the opposing candidate’s face?
0. No
1. Yes
2. Not applicable

24a. Is the ad funny or is it intended to be humorous?
0. No
1. Yes

25. Does the ad refer to newspaper stories or editorials?
1. Yes – in both the text and the visuals of the ad
2. No
3. Yes – in the visuals of the ad
4. Yes – in the text part of the text of the ad

26. Does the ad cite supporting sources (including in footnotes) to bolster various claims?
1. Yes – in the visuals of the ad
2. No
3. Yes – in the text part of the text of the ad
27. In your judgement, is the primary focus of this ad on the personal characteristics of either candidate or on policy matters?
1. Policy matters
2. Personal characteristics
3. Both
4. Neither

28. Does the ad feature a celebrity or a politician endorsing the candidate?
1. Celebrity
2. Politician
3. Neither

29. Is the ad in Spanish?
0. No
1. Yes

30. Is the ad directly targeted to appeal to a racial minority?
0. No
1. Yes

31. Are the people in the ad racially diverse?
0. No
1. Yes

32-35. Campaign Themes
1. Background
2. Political record
3. Attendance record
4. Ideology
5. Personal Values
6. Honesty/Integrity
7. Special Interests
10. Taxes
11. Deficit/Surplus/Budget/Debt
12. Government Spending
13. Minimum Wage
14. Farming
15. Business
16. Employment/jobs
17. Poverty
18. Trade/NAFTA
19. Other economic reference
20. Abortion
21. Homosexuality
22. Moral values
23. Tobacco
24. Affirmative Action
25. Gambling
26. Assisted Suicide
27. Gun Control
28. Other reference to social issues
30. Crime
31. Drugs
32. Death Penalty
33. Other references to law and order
40. Education
41. Lottery for education
42. Child Care
43. Other child-related issues
50. Defense
51. Missile Defense/Star Wars
52. Veterans
53. Foreign Policy
54. Bosnia
55. China
59. Other defense/foreign policy issues
60. Clinton
61. Ken Starr
62. Whitewater
63. Impeachment
64. Sexual harassment/Paula Jones
70. Environment
71. Immigration
72. Health Care
73. Social Security
74. Medicare
75. Welfare
76. Civil Rights/Race Relations
77. Campaign Finance Reform
78. Government Ethics
95. Other
99. None
Sample Storyboard

The coding process was a key element of our study. A sample storyboard is presented here to demonstrate what the undergraduate students had available to them when coding the ads. Students utilized the coding protocol displayed in Appendix C to analyze the storyboards. The storyboard contains the full ad script and ad visuals captured every 4-5 seconds.
[Announcer]: There’s a nursing home crisis in America. Despite record budget surpluses Medicare has been cut by billions.

Seniors’ access to quality nursing home care threatened.

[Woman]: “Caring for the elderly: it becomes your life.”

But with Medicare cuts my job is much harder.” [Announcer]:

Call. Tell Al Gore to fight to restore the Medicare cuts.

Call Al Gore
1-888-882-2442
Keep The Promise

Keep the promise. [Woman]: “Help me help those who need it the most.”