CHAPTER FOUR
THE FINANCING OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Some jurisdictions, including the federal government, have placed limits not only on contributions to candidates’ campaign committees, but also on contributions to other types of political organizations involved in electioneering. This chapter discusses some of the issues that arise when monetary limits are imposed on contributions to political action committees ("PACs"), independent expenditure committees, and political parties.¹

I. PACs

PACs are committees that collect money and then contribute it to candidates for elective office or spend it in coordination with the candidates. PACs also may spend some of their money on “independent expenditures” — expenditures that are made independently of candidates in an effort to influence elections. Committees that collect money exclusively for independent expenditures are treated separately from PACs in Section II of this chapter.

An organization’s principal purpose can play a role in determining whether the group qualifies as a PAC subject to campaign finance restrictions, with a primary distinction being whether the entity engages in independent expenditures. For example, an organization financed by membership dues rather than contributions can still be a PAC if its primary purpose is to influence elections and that purpose is known to its members — such as traditional 527 organizations.² Conversely, an organization may not qualify as a PAC

¹ All of these entities are engaged in “electioneering” activities. Organizations that do not engage in electioneering benefit from greater First Amendment protection. For more about the distinction between electioneering and protected “issue advocacy,” see Chapter Seven. As that chapter explains, some courts formerly (and erroneously) believed that only so-called “express advocacy” could be regulated. The Supreme Court repudiated that view in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). Before McConnell, some courts ruled that the definition of a “political committee” in campaign finance laws could not encompass organizations that did not engage in express advocacy. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating definition of “political committee” that covered groups not engaging in express advocacy); Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. 1999) (holding that Indiana’s PAC definition should be narrowly construed to encompass only organizations that “in express terms” advocate an electoral outcome). The Citizens United case decided in 2010 made clear that express advocacy conducted independently of a candidate committee may not be regulated with respect to limits, but may be subject to disclosure and other requirements.

² A Washington Court of Appeals found that dues collected by unions do not count as contributions if collected from members who are unaware, and should not reasonably be expected to be aware, of their political use. State ex. rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 49 P.3d 894, 904 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that labor union was not a political committee subject to disclosure laws because its membership dues did not constitute contributions). Moreover, unions are not required affirmatively to obtain permission from members to use their dues for political purposes. Sanger v. Dennis, 148 P.3d 404, 414-19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming a preliminary injunction against a regulation requiring unions to obtain written permission before using a member’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns, reasoning that plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of success on their claim that an “opt in” requirement violated the members’ First Amendment freedom of association). However, the Supreme Court has held that such “opt in” requirements are constitutional when applied to agency-shop fees levied on public employees who are not union members. In such cases, those making payments are not union members; rather, they are government employees whose employment is conditioned upon contribution to the union. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 187 (2007).
if electioneering is not its major purpose. See Colo. Right to Life Comm. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1152-55 (10th Cir. 2007); Alliance for Colo.’s Families v. Gilbert, 172 P.3d 964, 973 (Colo. App. 2007) (remanding case for determination whether electioneering was plaintiff’s major purpose).

**Tips**

**Tip:** Do not starve the PACs. If constitutional limits are in place on individual contributions to candidates, limits on contributions to PACs should be upheld as an anti-evasion measure. With that said, limitations on contributions to independent expenditure committees are presumptively invalid following the Citizens United and SpeechNow cases. Nevertheless, courts in some jurisdictions may separately assess whether limits on contributions to PACs are so low that they make it difficult for PACs to raise money and participate in the political process. It is therefore advisable to set limits high enough to withstand such scrutiny – at least at the level of individual contribution limits, and usually somewhat higher, to reflect the PAC’s role as a proxy for contributors who have pooled their funds.

**Tip:** To enhance the voice of small contributors, consider creating a form of PAC that may accept only small contributions but is allowed to make larger contributions to candidates than ordinary PACs. PACs can be a tool for grassroots organizing.³

**Legal Analysis**

The Supreme Court has upheld federal limits on contributions to PACs as a constitutionally permissible means of preventing individuals from circumventing the limits on contributions to candidates. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 199 (1981) (“Cal. Med.”) (plurality opinion); id. at 203-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).⁴ The Cal. Med. Court noted that, without a limit on contributions to PACs, individuals could evade the $1,000 limit on contributions to federal candidates “by channeling funds” through PACs that could each give $5,000 to each candidate. Id. at 198. In addition, individuals could easily circumvent the $25,000 aggregate limit on contributions to candidates, because PACs were not limited in the overall amount they could contribute to candidates. Id. The limit on contributions to PACs thus functioned as “no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation[s].” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38; N.C. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Leake, 108 F. Supp. 2d 498, 515-16 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (recognizing anti-evasion rationale in denying preliminary injunction against $4,000 limit on contributions to PACs); Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Moreham, No. 6:98-770-CV. ORL-19A, 2000 WL 33733256, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2000) (“[T]his Court’s determination that Florida’s limit on

³ For a discussion of the legal issues raised by the creation of small donor PACs, see Chapter Three, Section II(B) (LEGAL ANALYSIS).

⁴ Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (upholding the aggregate limit on contributions on the grounds that “this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate”).
contributions to candidates is permissible also resolves Plaintiffs’ challenge to Florida’s [$500] limit on contributions to political committees.”).5

If PAC contribution limits are justified only as a means of preventing circumvention of limits on direct contributions to candidates, the absence of valid direct contribution limits in a particular jurisdiction could undermine the validity of PAC contribution limits. During the 1990s, the Eighth Circuit voiced skepticism about the possibility that contributions to PACs, by themselves, could be corrupting. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding little risk of corruption from contributions to a “PAC that does not itself wield legislative power”); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). But Cal. Med. noted that the limit on contributions to PACs prevented an individual or group from dominating the PAC’s operations and dictating the use of PAC funds. 453 U.S. at 198 n.19. The limits thus addressed not only circumvention of other regulations, but also the risk that PACs would represent only one wealthy supporter and thus “influence the electoral process to an extent disproportionate to their public support and far greater than the individual or group that finances the committee’s operations would be able to do acting alone.” Id. This reasoning is more persuasive, of course, when PACs are entitled to make larger contributions to candidates than individuals are, as is the case under federal law.

The Cal. Med. Court also considered an equal protection challenge to the federal limit on contributions to PACs. 453 U.S. at 200-01. The plaintiffs alleged that federal law discriminated in favor of corporations and unions, because the statute permitted those entities to spend unlimited amounts for the establishment, administration, and solicitation expenses of the separate segregated funds used for political purposes, whereas unincorporated associations were limited in the contributions they could make to multi-candidate PACs. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, stating:

The differing restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated associations, on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.

Id. at 201. The Court’s hands-off approach is typical of the deference generally accorded to Congress where contribution limits are at issue.

II. Independent Expenditure Committees

A distinction has clearly been drawn between (i) PACs that make contributions to, or coordinate expenditures with, candidates (addressed in section I, supra) and (ii) “independent expenditure committees,” which collect funds to be spent only on independent advertising and other activities designed to affect candidate elections (the subject of this section).6


**Tips**

**Tip:** The legal landscape created by Citizens United establishes uncertainty as to whether laws limiting contributions to PACs that engage in coordinated communications or hard dollar expenditures, but permitting unlimited funding inflows and outflows for “independent expenditure” PACs, are permitted. It is clear, however, that limits on independent expenditure committees as such are invalid.

**Legal Analysis**

When a committee is entitled to make both contributions and independent expenditures, a cap on contributions to the committee may be justified as a means of preventing the evasion of other contribution ceilings. *Cal. Med.*, 453 U.S. at 197-98 (plurality opinion) (noting that $5,000 limit on contribution to federal multi-candidate political committee prevented circumvention of $1,000 individual limit on contributions to candidates); *Ark. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Butler*, 983 F. Supp. 1209, 1223 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (noting the possibility of evasion where a single entity registers as both a PAC and an independent expenditure committee), aff’d, 146 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998). *SpeechNow* made clear the premise that committees making independent expenditures without engaging in coordinated activities or hard dollar contributions cannot legally be subject to contribution or expenditure limits. Reporting requirements in connection with those independent expenditures, however, are permissible. See *id.* at 696-98.

Despite the holdings in *Citizens United* and *SpeechNow*, it remains unclear whether the government may limit contributions to committees that are entitled to make contributions to candidates (or coordinated expenditures) but actually fund only independent expenditures. *SpeechNow* held that the “anti-circumvention rationale” simply does not apply to individuals’ contributions to committees that in turn make only independent expenditures. See *id.* at 694-95. This argument draws on Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in *Cal. Med.*, in which he agreed with the plurality that caps could be placed on contributions to PACs that in turn contributed to candidates but added that “a different result would follow if [the cap] were applied to contributions to a political committee established for the purpose of making independent expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates.” *Cal. Med.*, 453 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

Reformers in the states should be aware that the regulation of independent expenditure committees remains a very hot topic at the federal level even after these two decisions.10

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8 Similar logic is employed in cases addressing ballot initiative committees, where courts allowed unlimited fundraising and expenditures because the government did not “provide evidence demonstrating a sufficiently important governmental interest, such as the risk of corruption” for limiting those contributions. *Citizens for Clean Gov’t v. City of San Diego*, 474 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2007).

9 See Chapter Eight for further discussion of reporting requirements.

III. Political Parties

As the Supreme Court’s decision in *McConnell v. FEC*, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), clarified, the government may regulate all contributions to political parties. For a variety of reasons, however, existing regulations may vary depending on whether the party is raising money to use in support of specific candidates — either for contributions to the candidates or for direct expenditures by the parties — or for party-building and similar efforts. For example, until the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA,” also known as the McCain-Feingold bill), Congress limited contributions for campaigning but permitted unregulated contributions for other political party activities. Federal law now regulates all contributions to national parties irrespective of the use to which the party intends to put the money, as well as contributions to state and local parties engaged in federal election activities, and *McConnell* upheld the new approach. Some states continue to regulate only contributions made to parties for certain purposes, such as for subsequent transfer to candidate’s campaign committees; in the wake of BCRA, however, states may limit all contributions to parties in order to close so-called “soft money” loopholes.

**Tips**

*Tip:* The evidence of corruption and the appearance of corruption that supports limits on contributions to candidates may also support limits on contributions to parties. Without such limits, parties and party committees may be used to evade individual contribution limits or to conceal contribution patterns.

*Tip:* Evidence may sometimes be found of political party activity that contributes to the appearance of corruption. For example, some political parties have published fundraising materials promising special access to elected officials in exchange for large donations to the party. The Supreme Court’s opinion in *McConnell*, upholding BCRA’s soft money ban, discusses at length evidence of parties’ selling access in this manner.

*Tip:* Limits on contributions to political parties should take into account the complex organization of political parties, specifying clearly whether the law limits aggregate contributions to certain party committees or treats each committee separately. Some states treat certain party committees as PACs for the purpose of campaign regulation. It may also be desirable to treat all committees of each particular party (i.e., the state committee and all county committees) as one entity for purposes of contribution limits. Otherwise, contribution limits could be circumvented by giving the maximum amount to the party’s committee in each county and having county committees put their contributions at the state party’s disposal. Before BCRA, donors avoided federal contribution limits by giving to state and local party committees, which then used the money (in coordination with the national party) to support federal candidates.

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11 Indeed, the rationale of *McConnell* survived an even more recent challenge when the Court summarily upheld the “soft money” bans established in BCRA and upheld in *McConnell*. See *Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC*, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
**Tip:** Do not starve the parties. Parties need money to operate. They use money to recruit candidates and may support candidates with limited financial means of their own, thereby helping to expand and diversify the candidate pool. Parties also use the money to mobilize voters and to convey substantive messages to the electorate distinguishing their agenda from that of other parties. Because some courts reviewing limits on contributions to political parties may consider the following types of evidence relevant to their decision, you may wish to collect data on:

- how much money political parties have raised in the past;
- what percentage of funds raised in previous years would be affected by the new limits;
- what methods political parties have used to raise money in the past;
- what additional fundraising methods are available;
- the percentage of registered voters who contribute to the parties and the average amounts of their contributions;
- income and wealth of registered voters in the jurisdiction; and
- how parties have allocated funds among their various activities in the past.

**Tip:** Consider public funding for limited purposes, such as party-building activities that encourage citizen participation. A handful of jurisdictions provide limited public funding to parties. See Chapter Nine for a discussion of public funding. Party-building activities must be defined carefully to avoid misuse of the funds.

**Tip:** Consider whether limits or other regulations hinder the development of third parties.

**Tip:** Consider whether you should include contributions to parties in an aggregate limit on individual political contributions.

**Tip:** Consider whether you want to limit the amount PACs may contribute to political parties.

**Legal Analysis**

*McConnell* confirmed what earlier Supreme Court cases had seemed to imply but had never quite said: the federal government may limit all contributions to national political parties and state and local parties engaged in federal electioneering activities, and it can prohibit parties from accepting corporate and union money. See 540 U.S. 93, 155-56. After *McConnell*, states presumably may limit all contributions to state and local party committees, just as the federal government can limit all contributions to national committees. This rationale is bolstered even more by the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of the D.C. District Court’s ruling in *Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC*, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150. In that case, the RNC, along with state and local party committees, challenged the ban on soft money contributions to political parties in light of *Citizens United* and other cases. The court found that there was no evidence that the corrupting influence of soft money had

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12 The same purpose may be served by permitting all genuinely independent local parties to accept contributions and limiting intra-party transfers.
disappeared in the intervening five years since McConnell had been decided, and upheld the restrictions on such contributions. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 153.

Before BCRA, federal parties could take unlimited money from all sources. In theory, money that was received from corporations and unions, and money received from PACs and individuals in excess of contribution limits – so-called “soft money” – could be used only for limited purposes. Party activities designed to influence federal elections were supposed to be paid for with non-corporate, non-union money raised subject to contribution limits – “hard money.” But massive loopholes developed. What about activities that influenced both federal and state or local races, for example? The FEC permitted parties to use a mix of hard and soft money for those activities. National parties also could transfer soft money to state and local parties, which had even looser restrictions on using it for mixed-purpose activities. In addition, soft money could be used for “issue ads” that were in reality designed to influence federal elections. By the late 1990s, the national parties had become adept at raising and spending massive amounts of soft money, mostly from corporations, and spending it on federal electioneering, making a joke of federal limits on contributions to candidates and party committees. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-25, 128-32.

Congress responded by “tak[ing] national parties out of the soft money business.” Id. at 132. The core of BCRA’s soft money provisions is section 323(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act:

[N]ational committee[s] of a political party . . . may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.

2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1). In simple terms, what this means is that corporations and unions may not give any money to national party committees for any purpose, individuals may not give more than $25,000 (indexed for inflation) to a national party committee for any purpose, and PACs may not give more than $15,000 to a national party committee for any purpose.13 (Individual contributions to national parties are indexed for inflation, but PAC donations are not. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (c)(1)(B)(i)). Other provisions of BCRA are aimed at preventing circumvention of the soft money ban; for example, federal elected officials may not solicit soft money contributions to state and local parties, and the state and local parties themselves are not permitted to use soft money for most activities affecting federal elections.14 This is the regime

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13 Even before McConnell, lower courts had upheld limits on contributions to parties and bans on corporate soft money contributions. See Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a $5,000 limit on individual contributions and a ban on corporate soft money contributions, employing reasoning similar to McConnell’s, but striking down a limit of $5,000 on the value of professional services that individual professionals could donate); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 625 (Alaska 1999) (upholding a $5,000 limit under the anti-evasion rationale). After McConnell, the contrary decision of Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, 4 P.3d 808 (Wash. 2000), which held that a corporate soft money ban was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to funds used for “issue advocacy,” cannot be regarded as good law.

14 The exact meaning of “solicit” for the purpose of BCRA is in dispute. In 2005, the D.C. Circuit struck down an FEC definition of the term requiring that federal party officials “ask” directly for soft money contributions, holding that the
The rationales supporting BCRA would likely support state laws placing source and amount restrictions on contributions to state and local party committees. It is accordingly important for advocates at the state level to understand why BCRA was upheld.

First, even though § 323(a) prohibits the parties from spending soft money, the Supreme Court recognized that the provision is really a limit on contributions, not on expenditures. The parties remain free to spend as much as they want, so long as they raise the money lawfully. *McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 139. This regime is analogous to restrictions on contributions to candidates upheld in *Buckley*: even though the government cannot impose mandatory spending limits on candidates, it can limit the sources and amounts of money they can raise. Accordingly, and critically, the soft money ban was subjected to the more deferential judicial scrutiny given to contribution regulations, not the strict scrutiny reserved for expenditure limits. *Id.* at 134-41; see also Chapters Five and Six.

Applying the appropriate standard of review, the Court found that the soft money ban properly aimed to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption in two ways. The simplest way was in preventing circumvention of limits on contributions to candidates. Given the extensive evidence that parties used soft money in close coordination with the candidate’s campaigns, soft money contributions to the parties were an obvious way to get around contribution limits and curry favor with the candidates. *See McConnell*, 540 U.S. at 125-26, 144. The Court also noted substantial evidence that corporations and wealthy individuals “candidly admitted” making soft money contributions “for the express purpose of securing influence over federal officials.” *Id.* at 146. The corrupting potential was especially obvious when the contributions were solicited by the candidates themselves and subsequently used by the party to support the candidates’ campaigns.

Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy individual donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate’s federal election. It is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.

*Id.* at 144-46.

But even when soft money contributions do not directly benefit a particular candidate, the Court recognized a considerable potential for corruption – a potential that the record showed had been repeatedly realized. “The record in the present case is replete with similar examples of national party committees peddling access to limitation was contrary to BCRA. *Shays v. FEC*, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This and many other regulations implementing the requirements of BCRA are likely to be litigated for quite some time.
federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft money donations.” Id. at 150. Corruption does not include only outright bribery, but extends to contributors’ exercising “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); but see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10 (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”). The parties’ peddling access to officeholders “certainly gave the appearance of such influence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the close connection between federal officeholders and national party committees, Congress was entitled to ban all soft money contributions to national parties, even if the contributions were to be used strictly for state and local election activities. Id. at 154-56.

Similar reasoning led the Court to uphold bans on national party committees, and on federal candidates and officeholders, from soliciting or directing soft money contributions to other organizations. Id. at 156-57, 181-82. Regardless of the ultimate use to which the money was put, donating large sums of money at the parties’, candidates’, or officeholders’ request was likely to give the donor special influence over elected officials. Thus, even if contributions were made to an entirely separate organization, they would have to be made within hard money limits or they would become vehicles to circumvent limits on contributions to candidates and parties.

Large soft money donations at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder. Though the candidate may not ultimately control how the funds are spent, the value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder is evident from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and officeholders could easily avoid FECA’s contribution limits by soliciting funds from large donors and restricted sources to like-minded organizations engaging in federal election activities. As the record demonstrates, even before the passage of BCRA, federal candidates and officeholders had already begun soliciting donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party’s, electoral cause.

Id. at 182.

In sum, McConnell’s main lessons for regulating parties’ financing are:

• All contributions to parties may be regulated and limited;
• Corporations and unions may be prohibited from giving any money to parties (stated another way, corporations and unions may be required to set up PACs to make contributions to parties); and
• Loopholes that could enable donors to evade restrictions on giving to parties and candidates may be closed on an anti-circumvention rationale.

But just as with BCRA’s electioneering communication regulations, state-level soft money rules modeled on BCRA could be challenged on the grounds that the state has not compiled an adequate record to prove that soft money has been a corrupting influence in that particular state. See Chapter Seven (discussing analogous
IV

A Note on Candidate Contributions to Nonpolitical Organizations

It is not uncommon for candidates to make donations to organizations that are ostensibly established for religious, civic, or other charitable purposes. Some such organizations (or their affiliates) endorse candidates or otherwise promote the election of particular candidates through independent expenditures or sham issue advocacy. In an apparent attempt to forestall efforts by candidates to curry favor with such groups by means of donations from campaign funds, and to prevent evasion of campaign finance laws, Florida enacted a law

IV-10
banning candidate contributions to such organizations. In *Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar*, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the ban unconstitutional. 273 F.3d 1318, 1325-29; *see also Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley*, 427 F.3d 1106, 1116-17 (8th Cir. 2005) (striking down a Minnesota law that prohibited religious, charitable, or educational organizations from requesting donations from candidates or committees). What is important to note is that the Lamar court struck down the law as written, because it broadly banned many genuinely charitable donations, even from personal funds. The court did not reach the question whether it would be permissible to ban contributions to ostensibly nonpolitical organizations when they were made for the purpose of securing electoral support. *Lamar*, 273 F.3d at 1326 n.10. *McConnell* upheld BCRA’s limitations on the amounts federal candidates and office holders may solicit on behalf of charitable organizations. 540 U.S. at 181-83.