## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

- - - - - - - X

GREEN PARTY OF CONNECTICUT, ET : No. 3:06CV-1030 (SRU)

AL : 915 Lafayette Boulevard

vs. : Bridgeport, Connecticut

:

: March 11, 2009

JEFFREY GARFIELD, ET AL :

- - - - - - - - - - - >

BENCH TRIAL

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, U. S. D. J.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

LEWIS, CLIFTON & NIKOLAIDIS

275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2300

New York, New York 10001-6708

BY: MARK J. LOPEZ, ESQ.

KEVIN JAMES, ESQ.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

New York, New York 10004

BY: MARK LADOV, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

55 Elm Street

P.O. Box 120

Hartford, Connecticut

BY: PERRY A. ZINN ROWTHORN, ESQ.

MAURA MURPHY-OSBORNE, ESQ.

(Continued)

BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW

161 Ave of the Americas, 12th Floor

New York, New York 10013

BY: MONICA Y. YOUN, ESQ.

ANGELA MIGALLY, ESQ.

HOGAN & HARTSON

875 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10022

BY: IRA M. FEINBERG, ESQ.

Susan E. Catucci, RMR
Official Court Reporter
915 Lafayette Boulevard
Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604
Tel: (917)703-0761

(9:30 O'CLOCK, A. M.) 1 2 THE COURT: Good morning. I don't think we had 3 a sign-in on appearances this morning so I'm going to 4 start with asking all counsel to identify themselves, 5 please, for the record. 6 MR. LOPEZ: I'm Mark Lopez, Mark Ladov and Kevin 7 James for the plaintiffs. 8 THE COURT: Thank you. 9 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Perry Zinn Rowthorn for the state defendants. 10 11 MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Maura Murphy-Osborne for the state defendants. 12 MS. YOUN: Monica Youn for the intervenor 13 14 defendants. 15 MR. FEINBERG: Ira Feinberg for the intervenor 16 defendants. And with us at counsel table are Jeff 17 Garfield and Beth Rotman from the SEEC. 18 THE COURT: Very good, thank you. 19 MS. MIGALLY: Angela Migally for intervenor 20 defendants. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. I think it might make sense to begin with the potentially tedious task of 22 23 figuring out what the record is, and I think what we ought 24 to do is determine first off what objections there might

be to the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs and take up

25

any of those objections, and then do the same thing with respect to the submissions by the defendants.

Let me, before we turn to that, let me just inquire whether the defendants have prepared a list of exhibits of any kind. I know you've got in effect exhibits attached to your declarations.

MS. YOUN: Yes, we have a supplemental trial exhibit list that we can hand up at any time or that we can give Your Honor. It's all just the declarations that have already been filed.

THE COURT: Are the exhibits specifically individually identified on that list?

MS. YOUN: They are, yes. They are not numbered but they are identified.

(Hands Court)

THE COURT: That's helpful, thank you. Did you have one more, by any chance?

(Hands Court)

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lopez, do you have an extra copy of your exhibits by any chance?

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, we don't have a list. We had, as we did in the first proceeding, we submit, we submit our exhibits with a cover and we picked up where we left off before so our supplemental trial exhibits pick up at Exhibit 69.

1 THE COURT: Right. 2 And continue through Exhibit one --MR. LOPEZ: 3 122. 4 THE COURT: All right, okay. Fair enough. 5 So -- all right, we have in effect a list in the front of 6 your exhibit book. 7 MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. All right, let me hear any objections first off to the declarations that 9 have been submitted by the plaintiffs. 10 11 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I think this is going to be a little less tedious than it was last time. 12 13 We're not going to be objecting to the admission of the declarations or the exhibits. We have obviously some 14 15 disputes with some of the weight that ought to be 16 afforded, particularly the declarations, but I think as 17 far as the submissions go we're not going to make an 18 objection. 19 THE COURT: All right. Is that true for all the 20 defendants? 21 MS. YOUN: That's true. THE COURT: All right, very good. Thank you, 22 23 that's helpful. What about going the other way? Mr. Lopez, do you have problems with the defense exhibits 24 or declarations? 25

MR. LOPEZ: Well, excuse me, as far as the declarations are concerned, we can agree that any of our concerns go to weight and not to admissibility.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOPEZ: And we, therefore, agree to the admission of the proposed declarations. I just hadn't, hadn't -- I'm trying to figure out from this list when new exhibits were tendered, besides the declarations, what new exhibits were tendered for this proceeding.

MS. MIGALLY: Your Honor, the only new exhibits are the declarations and one medium, Green Party medium that was attached to the Migally declaration.

MR. LOPEZ: Then we have no objection.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I should probably point out we did file at 7:00 o'clock last night or a little before 7:00 o'clock, a declaration, supplemental declaration of Beth Rotman. I have copies. I emailed those to counsel but — okay, so I gather there were courtesy copies submitted. I can hand up another copy.

THE COURT: I have copies, but you raise a good point in that the plaintiffs submitted an additional two exhibits recently as well, so I want to be sure that that's part of the record. Any objection to those exhibits?

```
MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: We do not, Your Honor.
 1
 2
                 THE COURT: All right.
 3
                 MR. LOPEZ: And we have no objection to the
       Proulx affidavit -- the declaration.
 4
 5
                 MS. YOUN: We submitted both the Rotman and the
       Proulx declarations last night in rebuttal so there's one
 6
 7
       from Beth Rotman and one from Zachary Proulx.
 8
                 MR. LOPEZ: Excuse me, is the one from Beth
 9
       Rotman the one that addresses deficit spending during the
       qualifying period?
10
11
                 MS. YOUN: That is correct.
                 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Yes, expenditure line.
12
13
                 MR. LOPEZ: All right. Then we have no
14
       objection to those.
15
                 THE COURT: Very good. That's very helpful.
16
       Thank you all. The written record then, I take it, is
17
       complete.
18
                 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Yes, Your Honor.
19
                 THE COURT: Doesn't that sound sweet?
20
                 (Applause)
21
                 THE COURT: And does either side intend to
      present any live testimony today?
22
                 MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, it was not our intention
23
24
       to call our Green Party officials because their testimony
25
       has been submitted in affidavit form and their depositions
```

have been taken and I see no purpose, unless you want to question them.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, we have one witness that we've disclosed, John Green from the Connecticut Working Families Party. He's not available until tomorrow morning. To be perfectly candid with the court and plaintiff's counsel, I think that's a decision that we intend to revisit at the end of today, if that's all right.

THE COURT: That's fine. He has a declaration in as well?

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: He has two declarations in. This would be for purposes — the last declaration was in September and this would be for purposes of sort of updating his experience. I think the general principles that he puts forward and opinions or views I think remain sort of valid and we would rely on those, but — so we'll revisit that and let the court and plaintiff's counsel know as soon as we look at this.

THE COURT: All right. As we've done before, I think it would be helpful to me and perhaps cathartic to all of you to point out whatever it is you want to point out about the record. Obviously today we're focused principally on the results of the recent round of elections, the November 2008 elections.

And, Mr. Lopez, I'm happy to turn to you, and in terms of format, it may, it might make sense to permit kind of as we go along direct responses so that the issues are focused rather than the defense having to keep track of all the issues it wants to raise and then somehow raising it during its term. Does that make sense to everybody?

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: It does, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So if you want to make a point, I'm going to turn to them and let them make the rebuttal point.

MR. LOPEZ: Fair enough, Your Honor. If I may, there was one pending motion that filed by the Republican Party to intervene?

THE COURT: Good point. Yes, there is. Anybody want to be heard about that?

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: We will want to be heard on that. We plan to file an objection to that motion. We think there's a jurisdictional problem with it, given that part of it, that part of the case is up on appeal, we think obviously there's a timeliness problem with that.

My understanding is Hogan & Hartson is in the process of drafting a memorandum that will become a joint memorandum in opposition.

MR. FEINBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. I

have a draft but I need to do a little more work on it, can file it in relatively short order after these hearings are completed. But, fundamentally, A, the court doesn't have jurisdiction to grant the intervention motion after notices of appeal have been filed. That's pretty clear under 2nd Circuit law.

And, secondly, even if there were jurisdiction, the application is really amazingly untimely given this case has been pending for two and-a-half years and the factual record is closed, and there's really no purpose served by the interventions. And to the extent they say they have new factual matters they want to bring to the attention of the court, it's kind of too late.

So we will be opposing that, and on grounds that I think are very substantial and I think the reality is if the Republican Party wants to participate in this case, they can seek to intervene in the Court of Appeals or simply file an amicus brief in the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'll wait then to get that opposition and perhaps we'll have a phone conference with all interested parties once I do.

MR. FEINBERG: That would be fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, our position on their application, you know, charts a middle road. I'm not sure

what point is accomplished by them intervening solely in the Court of Appeals since the record's closed, but from my conversations with the attorneys for the Republican Party, they have a compelling story to tell about how the lobbying and contract restrictions affected their associational rights.

As I understand it, they never saw this coming. It wasn't until very late in the day that they realized that this was destroying their ability — their town committees. And if that is a, if that — if those are the facts, I think that those facts should be put in the record.

Now, I haven't -- I don't know the answer to Mr. Feinberg's legal point that the matter's out of your hands. But it seems to me if, under -- if the circumstances are as dire and the facts are as compelling as, as the attorneys for the Republican Party tell me they are, then it seems to me there's some equity and there's probably some authority for the court to open up the record.

I say that having, you know, got killed on that phase of the case, so -- but I obviously think there might be some benefits to opening up the record if that's an option for the court.

MR. FEINBERG: Number one, Your Honor, I mean

number one, A, it's not an option for the court, Notice of an Appeal having been filed and jurisdiction having been transferred to the Court of Appeals.

But, number two, this is not such a late breaking development. This was happening, it happened last year up through November and they had three months from the time of the election until the time the court entered judgment and did nothing until they decided to move three weeks after the court entered judgment. So it's really too late.

THE COURT: All right. Again, I take it we're arguing this in effect without the Republican Party present.

(Laughter)

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{ZINN-ROWTHORN}:$$  As we will continue to do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Some might suggest we should give them a shot at being heard. So that's what I intend to do. I'll get the opposition, we'll have a phone conference with anybody who wants to be on and we'll go from there.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: One final logistical point in light of the, I think the intention of having a little bit of back and forth today, we do have some demonstrative exhibits that I think we will be probably referencing that

we think will be convenient to the court, parties and opposing counsel. So perhaps it would make sense to put those forward.

MS. YOUN: I don't know that we finalized them as of yet and I don't know if Your Honor wants them now but --

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Okay.

THE COURT: Whenever it's appropriate. If you want to bring them out in response to a point or you want to save them for your case or want to give them to me now, it's okay.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lopez?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, good morning, Your Honor. Good morning, Counsel. Your Honor, today we're primarily going to be walking the court through our supplemental exhibits and findings. I'll try not to revisit any of the findings that were addressed satisfactorily at the December 9th hearing.

We are primarily going to be working, Your Honor, for your convenience with Binder 1 and Binder 2 of the four binders that we filed on March 4. Binder 1 contains our declarations and data and Binder 2 is our exhibits.

THE COURT: And those two binders are much more

interesting than Binders 3 and 4.

2 MR. LOPEZ: Right.

THE COURT: It's an inside joke for anybody who's happened to look at Binders 3 and 4.

MR. LOPEZ: We submit that the plaintiffs, Your Honor, at the December 9th and 10th hearing met their burden of establishing that the CEP violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. At that hearing we took the court through our evidence which in the main was accepted into the record.

A number of important documents were excluded without prejudice and we have since supplemented the record and our findings with additional evidentiary support to fill the gap. We've also supplemented the record to focus more specifically on how this law impacted our clients in the 2008 cycle, legislative cycle, and how it will affect their fortunes in the future. And I'm going to spend my time today going through that evidence.

For the convenience of the court, we have prepared a red line version -- oh, I thought I didn't have a copy for myself -- of our findings. And --

THE COURT: That's helpful. I appreciate that.

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor. Okay, we also intend to lay out our legal arguments in summation, if the court wants to hear them. I know this case has been

briefed ad nauseum.

THE COURT: There's at least one legal issue that I think would benefit from further argument and that's the standing question.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay, and we would prefer to do that tomorrow after the conclusion of the defendant's case to the extent we don't weave in some of those arguments into our presentation, Your Honor.

And so I'm just briefly going to go over the legislative history again and I'll start there, Your Honor, because I think that's a way of teeing up the issues. The court didn't admit as proof, the court didn't admit our findings and our evidence about the legislative history as proof that the system was unconstitutional, and I don't think we asked the court to do that. It allowed this evidence for purposes of showing that the legislature was aware that there were serious constitutional problems with the act and that there were less restrictive and more narrowly tailored programs that would abate those problems.

We took the court through the legislative
history of the CEP and that history shows that the
legislature adopted a public financing program knowing
full well that major party candidates would be the primary
beneficiaries and that minor party and petitioning

candidates would have great difficulty meeting the qualifying criteria, including the seemingly neutral qualifying contribution requirement.

One important fact that we neglected to flag during the December hearing was that Governor Rell's office prepared legislation that was introduced in the '05 legislative session addressed to the public financing system, addressed to public financing. At the request of the legislature, the Office of Legislative Research prepared a summary of the Governor's bill. The report is offered now as Plaintiff's Exhibit 87.

Without going through that bill, I think it's fair to say that the proposal tracks the original House and Senate bills and provides full public funding for minor party candidates on the same terms as major party candidates.

And, moving on, at the December hearing the court excluded a number of documents allegedly linked to the intervening organizations for lack of foundation and these had to do with their opposition — their efforts to amend the CEP as it was originally adopted.

We have replaced references to those documents in our proposed findings to new exhibits that are not lacking in foundation and/or party admissions, and I understand the defendants now have consented to their

admission. This includes transcribed testimony before the legislature by the intervening parties, including testimony by Common Cause and Citizen Action Group, both of the two intervening parties here today. Both CCC, Common Cause, and Citizens Action testified in support of easing the qualifying criteria for minor parties, and closing what they refer to as the organizational expenditures loophole.

The relevant findings and the cites to the exhibits, excuse me, can be found in Findings 24 to 27. The transcript of the testimony was already placed in the record by the defendants as part of the legislative record that was compiled by the defendants and submitted with Secretary, Director, Commissioner Garfield -- Director Garfield's declaration in this case.

We've also supplemented the record to cite extensively to the March 13th, 2006, testimony of Executive Director — of Director Garfield urging the public financing statute to be amended to ease the burden on minor parties and to close the loopholes in the law.

Director Garfield's written testimony is already in the record. The transcript of his testimony — in his testimony, his live testimony, he engages in a lengthy give and take with different legislators about why he thought it was necessary to amend the law, and we would

direct the court to Findings 21 to 23 which have the appropriate cites.

For instance, when asked during his testimony to explain why he felt that the qualifying criteria were too onerous for minor party and petitioning candidates,

Garfield responded that the issue, and I quote, "The issue is one of fairness and encouraging electorial competition." He testified that the three, four percent requirements that he was urging, a grant -- okay -- would set a fair bar for minor party candidates to show support. Garfield noted that minor party candidates were also required to raise qualifying contributions and stated that that's not going to be easy for candidates to do, particularly in the Senate.

Now, moving on to some of -- to the organizational loophole and that's the language of Mr. Garfield, he stated that he thought that the loophole or organizational expenditures would undermine the effectiveness of the expenditure limits because it allows party committees, legislative caucus and leadership committees, to make unlimited expenditures and leaves the potential for many thousands of dollars of support to be provided to qualifying candidates who are already receiving very generous grants of public dollars. He told the GAE, Government Affairs and Elections Committee, in

oral testimony that the exemption for organizational expenditures is a large hole that must be closed.

Now, we've heard a lot about the organizational expenditures, about what's wrong with them, with that provision. The objection is — there are two arguments on this point. One is that organizational expenditures are basically a way of preserving the right of political parties and leadership PACs to continue to participate in the public debate, the political debate. And under federal law and under state law, unrelated to organizational, the organizational expenditure provision, political parties can engage in unlimited debate about its candidates and about its platform through, through independent expenditures. What is different about this case is that we're in effect talking about coordinated candidate and party activity.

Now, in addressing this point, Mr. Garfield was particularly concerned with the scope of the organizational expenditure provision. He drew a distinction between activities designed to promote the party — for instance, a multiple candidate listing, and get—out—the—vote efforts — and the organizational expenditure provision which allows candidates to directly coordinate their campaign with party and legislative leaders. And this is all summarized in Finding 22 of our

amended findings. The intervening organization testified to the same effect.

And we also flag for the court, something we didn't do in the December 9th hearing, that Secretary of State Bysiewicz also testified at that March 13 hearing in support of HP-4610 which would have eased the qualifying criteria for minor and petitioning parties and close the loopholes for organizational expenditures and exploratory committees. She also testified it was important to close the organizational expenditure and exploratory committee loopholes. I just said that. And that's in Findings 21-A and 23 of our exhibit, of our amended findings, Your

In fact, the transcript of the March 23rd -- the March 13th, 2006, hearings is frankly fascinating reading. The legislature heard from campaign finance reform experts, from Commissioner Garfield, from Secretary Bysiewicz and a half dozen other people all urging that the qualifying criteria of minor parties be lowered and that the organizational expenditure and exploratory committee loopholes be closed.

Now, at the time of this hearing, that's March 13th, 2006, three years ago, the legislature was also aware from its own research that other states had enacted clean election programs without discriminatory

qualifying criteria or burdensome petitioning requirements, and we have supplemented the record with an OLR research report prepared for the legislature addressed to this subject and that would be at Plaintiff's Exhibit 92.

Now, as the court may recall from the submissions of the parties, the legislature did indeed make some minor changes to the CEP in '06. What it didn't do was ease the qualifying criteria. Director Garfield and the intervening organizations specifically changed to -- well, we can delete this. They didn't change the qualifying criteria for minor and petitioning party candidates, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Lopez, let me interrupt you and ask you what is the, what's the point of the legislative history? Obviously I've read the proposed findings. I've looked through the record to a fairly significant degree and I don't think that anything that you're describing is disputed. Obviously they said what they said. But what impact does that have on your case? Why does it matter, in other words, that the legislature was presented with alternatives that would have been more favorable, in your view, than what they actually enacted?

MR. LOPEZ: Well, Your Honor, I think the legislative history in this case is evidence of two

matters. It shows that the people who are charged with administrating the state's election laws, the SEEC, had very serious reservations about the constitutionality of its program, and that's a quote. Director Garfield, I believe in his written testimony says I'm familiar, I've been in this business for 25 years, I'm familiar with the constitutional principles at stake and I believe that to avoid constitutional objections, it is imperative, it is imperative for the legislature to make the changes that the SEEC is proposing. We are the agency in charge of administrating the elections and we believe it is for the legislature to make these changes if this statute is to avoid the constitutional objections that are being raised by plaintiff in this case.

THE COURT: Right, but you're asking me to look at someone else's opinion about whether the act is constitutional. How does that bear on my decision whether it is or isn't? In other words, I'm not going to decide this by a vote of hands, who thinks it's unconstitutional and who doesn't. How does it -- I mean --

MR. LOPEZ: Well, first of all, when you say ——
I mean every person who testified, they didn't use the words unconstitutional but they did raise a red flag that this was inviting litigation.

THE COURT: And they were right.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: Here we are.

MR. LOPEZ: Right. Unless the legislature took steps to lessen the burden on minor and petitioning party candidates. And it's also relevant, Your Honor, if you're assessing the burden on minor and petitioning party candidates. It seems to me this testimony is relevant to assess that burden.

Here we have the experts -- I couldn't hire a better expert than the defendant's own witnesses to come in and say that these, these qualifying criteria are too burdensome. They are too onerous. They set the bar too high, and we don't have to set this bar too high to protect the public fisc.

I mean, to me -- excuse me. It seems to me that that is all relevant on that, those very important issues, Your Honor. And we have more testimony on this point because they -- they, the OLR, the Office of Legislative Research, is intimately involved in this process and they kept throwing one report after another at the legislature, or preparing at the request of the legislature one report after another showing how the petitioning and qualifying criteria and prior vote total criteria would affect the ability of minor party, petitioning party candidates to, to qualify.

THE COURT: Right, but here's my point.

Whenever anybody opposes a piece of legislation or a portion of it, it's an easy thing to come in and say we don't think this is constitutional. If it's then passed, the fact that someone said they didn't think it was constitutional doesn't mean that it's not constitutional. The question remains, you know, on the full record, is this constitutional or not as enacted.

MR. LOPEZ: Right.

THE COURT: And it just -- I understand the emotional or visceral impact of the fact that the people now enforcing the act are ones who initially opposed some of its terms but it doesn't, frankly it doesn't really help me a lot in figuring out whether this is constitutional or not to say that other people thought that it wasn't because that can be true of almost any law. You're always going to have people who testify against a law, and very often they are going to say, you know, this is beyond your constitutional power or this is going to be reversed or there's going to be litigation. And maybe they are right, maybe they are wrong.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, I understand your point and it's a point that I've appreciated from, before I even wrote our briefs and started collecting this data. But it is historically where people start when they bring on a

constitutional case, and --

THE COURT: But usually it's in order to understand what the legislature was doing or what it meant by a particular sentence or paragraph in a statute. Here, the statute's pretty clear. We're not looking at legislative history to figure out what did the legislature mean when it passed this act. I don't think anybody's suggested anywhere that the act is vague or ambiguous. You're suggesting instead it's unconstitutional and violates your client's First Amendment rights. And so, you know, the fact that somebody predicted that it might, you know, doesn't really necessarily help me that much.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, and we're not asking you to make that finding, you know, that Director Garfield thought the act was constitutional and, like I said, it tees it up. It's not just -- it just so happens it happened to be sitting across the room from three parties who all thought the act was constitutional, and I do think --

THE COURT: Unconstitutional.

MR. LOPEZ: -- unconstitutional, and I do think that is, you know, a legitimate consideration but of course the court isn't bound by that. But what it seems to me what the court is bound by are the, is the testimony, unless it's contradicted, but at least it's, by

our proffer, the testimony that the people charged with enforcing this regulation and the people who had a lot to do with enforcement, the people charged with the enforcement of the regulation, testified that the qualifying criteria were too onerous and that the loopholes were big and that the organizational expenditure provisions would defeat the purposes of the public financing program because it would allow candidates to continue to raise money and effectively run stealth campaigns.

Your Honor, if I didn't have the benefit of that legislative history and I had just taken the Commissioner's deposition or I had taken the Secretary of State Bysiewicz's deposition or I put them on the stand and they made these same concessions, I can't think why the court wouldn't consider that testimony on the issue of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the qualifying criteria. And that's -- I'm not sure what more I can say.

MR. FEINBERG: Your Honor, could I add one thing to make clear, I don't think anyone on this side ever conceded that the statute was unconstitutional or testified to that effect. The testimony is we'd like to avoid constitutional objections, which of course we all now are faced with, but that's a very different animal than any kind of concession Mr. Lopez is talking about

here.

MS. YOUN: Can I also be heard on the issue of organizational expenditures? The organizational expenditure loophole that Attorney Lopez cited Jeff Garfield, intervenor defendants and the Secretary of State's testimony on referred to an earlier version of the statute before it was, in fact, amended to substantially narrow that loophole.

Garfield's declaration dated March 4th, 2009, if you look to there, it will show you that, in fact, major party organizational expenditures went down from almost \$1.5 million in 2006 to less than \$500,000 in the 2008 cycle. So, the suggestion that the organizational expenditure loophole was broadened up is, I think, misplaced.

THE COURT: You're citing now to actual experience of the '08 election?

MS. YOUN: Yes, 2006 versus 2008.

THE COURT: Right, but --

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$  YOUN: But as to the changes in the law that pertain to the testimony that Mr. Lopez was citing.

THE COURT: Well, okay, but the actual experience in '08 doesn't refute the argument that the loophole is a potential problem. It just says in '08 people didn't use the loophole as much as they might have

in some other situation.

MS. YOUN: Sure. And in our presentation, we're prepared to talk about the ways in which the organizational expenditure loophole was, in fact, narrowed to, to mean that various kinds of contributions are no longer allowed, which is exactly why this result happened, which is why the expenditures went down.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FEINBERG: Can I add one thought to that,
Your Honor? The 2008 numbers don't necessarily show that
people didn't take advantage of the loophole. They may
show that the so-called loophole is not really as much of
a loophole and really not much as much of a problem as the
plaintiffs are contending.

THE COURT: Right, or it may show that people don't need the loophole if they are getting lots of free money. You can debate, and I'm sure the parties will debate what the numbers mean. I'm just, what I'm trying to focus on now is what is the significance of the legislative history.

Fair enough, it's testimony about the potential impact of the act. It's a prediction. It's a prediction about what the act might permit or what effects it might have and I think that's fair enough, but you're not, in other words, trying to suggest that because the

legislature was told this, the legislature acted with -in bad faith or there's some sort of attempt to focus on
minor parties. In other words, you're not getting at the
state of mind, if you can do that, of the legislature.
You're just -- nor are you trying to say you're clarifying
ambiguity in the statute. You're just simply trying to
say this testimony was given and it's there and the court
should consider it for what it's worth. Is that -- I mean
am I missing something?

MR. LOPEZ: As to the constitutionality, as to the legal issue, Your Honor, we're not even asking you to make that finding based on the testimony but we -- and I think you are missing something. I mean, Your Honor, we didn't, I didn't even take Director Garfield's deposition. I didn't call him as a witness today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: But he made these -- he has given his, in effect, his professional, his considered opinion that these qualifying criteria are unreasonable. And that's a factual finding the court has to make and there's no reason for the court to make that finding divorced from his testimony. I mean what more reliable testimony is there than his sworn testimony before the legislature that was considering this law?

THE COURT: Fair enough.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: That's I think what I'm saying. You want me to consider it for what it's worth on the merits, not indirectly to show what the legislature was thinking when it enacted the law. You're saying here's his testimony about Commissioner Garfield's view of the act.

MR. LOPEZ: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Fair enough. I got it.

MR. LOPEZ: At the December 9th hearing, you had made the comment, the off-hand comment that -- maybe it wasn't so off-hand but you made the comment that the legislature, based on the record it considered, could not have devised a more exclusionary system, and that's a paraphrase, Your Honor -- couldn't have devised a system that more effectively drew the line in a way that would exclude minor parties in the main and the legislative history actually supports that, that sort of -- that expression -- well, those comments, Your Honor, because the legislative history had the benefit of OLR reports that show that minor parties would almost never qualify under the petitioning and prior vote total requirements and, even if they did somehow, were able to benefit from that, they would not be able to qualify under the qualifying contribution requirements because they had the benefit of data that show that minor parties, except for

Governor Weicker, never raise the amounts of money that are — for instance, if the legislature had set the bar for raising qualifying contributions to the House race at \$1,000 instead of \$5,000, we'd have a lot more minor party participants, but they set it at five and when they set it at five they knew because the OLR, the OLR gave them a report that showed that minor parties never raise that kind of money in the House races, the Senate races and in statewide races, and there are aspects of the legislative history that are relevant to this proceeding.

THE COURT: I agree, but you're not proffering them in the way that one would normally proffer legislative history. Legislative history generally is used to help understand the legislation. What does it mean in Subparagraph A where it says "significant"? "Reasonable"? You know, words that need some interpretation. You're not using legislative history in that way to say this is what they intended when they passed this act, I don't think. I think what you're saying is this is evidence that you, the district court, can consider, be it a legislative report, be it testimony before the legislature, this is evidence, in effect, that ought to be considered in deciding whether the act is constitutional as opposed to understanding what it means or what the legislature intended when it passed it, so

that the whole concept of legislative history seems funny to me. You're offering it, as I understand it, as substantive evidence in this case.

MR. LOPEZ: I am, Your Honor, substantive evidence about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of qualifying criteria.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOPEZ: And the danger of the loopholes and of the, the -- yes, and that's what I'm offering it for, and it's as if I had put Director Garfield on the stand or any of the -- or if I called the CCC people or the Connecticut Common Cause for evidence and I'm offering it for a that limited purpose and I thought we had established that frankly at the December 9th hearing.

THE COURT: I just want to be clear that that's what you're doing. Thanks.

Mr. Zinn Rowthorn, you were halfway up a couple times. Did you want to say something?

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOPEZ: Now, Your Honor, we have a point that I expect is going to be contentious but I might as well bring it in here because it makes some sense. And it's a point we didn't make at the December 9th hearing partly because we didn't know how to present it, and we

since sort of massaged it and I think we can present it in a way that makes sense now.

The CEP as it was originally enacted, Your
Honor, did not allow minor parties who did not meet the
prior vote total to proceed as petitioning candidates.
Under Connecticut law, petitioning candidates are a
discrete subgroup of candidates. They don't have minor
party status. Minor party candidates are candidates who
are validly able to qualify under the valid party line who
met a 1 percent threshold and they held the line.

Now, under the laws, as it was originally passed, and this is our contention, and as it is written I think the law is very party intensive, very clear, minor party candidates who didn't meet the ten percent prior vote total requirement couldn't receive the benefit. They were left out in the cold.

THE COURT: One percent, one percent.

MR. LOPEZ: No. Minor party candidates who did not meet the prior vote total requirement --

THE COURT: For the ten percent.

MR. LOPEZ: -- for the ten percent.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Could not under any circumstances participate in the public financing system because the CEP could not provide for that. Now --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: -- we, our original complaint, the complaint in this case, alleges that and that minor party candidates who don't meet the prior vote total requirements are out in the cold. Our summary judgment papers which were submitted on July 10 pursue that argument, and that was an additional reason why this law was not unconstitutional, constitutional -- why this law was objectionable.

Now, what we have learned since the December 9th hearing is that Commissioner -- Director Garfield actually sought to amend the law to allow minor party candidates who didn't meet the prior vote total requirement to proceed as petitioning candidates. And that is -- his proposed legislation is already in the record. The OLR subsequently did an analysis of his proposed legislation and validated what the SEEC was trying to accomplish, was hoping to accomplish in the '06 legislative session, was to amend the law so that minor party candidates who didn't meet the prior vote total could proceed as petitioning candidates.

Just looking for a cite here, Your Honor, in the record where this OLR report is. There it is, Your Honor. We would refer you to our Exhibit Number 94 which summarizes -- excuse me. Right, Exhibit 94 which

summarizes HB-5610 which is the legislation that was being offered by the SEEC for amending the statute.

I could direct you to a specific page, Your Honor. It would be page two of six and it would be the first full paragraph on page two. Ours is 94.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, if I may, the OLR report with respect to the, to the parties' performance in various races I think are between our exhibits to the Garfield declaration, number one in our OLR report.

I'm sorry, Your Honor, I have the wrong cite.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, the point of our raising this is that the legislation as it was originally written did allow minor party candidates who didn't satisfy the prior vote total to qualify as petitioning candidates.

That was reserved just for petitioning candidates and if you read the statute, that's what it says and to this day because the amendment was not adopted by the legislature.

Now, for two years we proceeded under the assumption that my candidate's going to qualify for public financing. You're going to hear today, or you have heard in the submissions of the defendants, that my, my clients somehow sat on their hands and didn't make any effort to qualify for public financing. Well, let me tell you how it played out, Your Honor.

We actually thought this was an anomaly of the

1 law all along and we actually sought clarification from 2 opposing counsel. Mr. DeRosa actually went to some 3 trainings, raised his hand and said can I participate in 4 the CEP, and they said no because you're a minor party 5 candidate who, who didn't meet the prior vote total 6 requirements and --7 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I just have to break in. If we're going to have substantive testimony 8 about Mr. DeRosa with respect to this --9 It's in his declaration. 10 MR. LOPEZ: 11 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: But the important point is 12 the dates here, you know, when he was told that he 13 couldn't participate. Because as of July 17th, 2008, it 14 was announced to the world that individuals who had gotten 15 one who had ballot access between one and ten percent 16 could petition as minor party candidates to qualify and, 17 in fact, candidates did do that. 18 That's through the SEEC. THE COURT: 19 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: That's through the SEEC 20 declaratory ruling. 21 The petition. THE COURT: MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: And that's in the 22 23 Declaration Ruling 2008-1. I think I understand Mr. Lopez's point is although we made the system easier 24

for his clients and others like his clients to

25

participate, that is somehow inconsistent with the theme in this case. He's unhappy with it and I think he's going to make a procedural argument in the context in which -- that that determination is somehow unlawful. We would obviously tell the court our position would be the SEEC is entitled to construe the statutes. The question was presented by candidates who wanted to participate this way. The Secretary of State and the SEEC both issued decisions that were consistent on this point that concluded in fact giving the benefit of the doubt to participation, construing the statute to permit participation under those circumstances.

You know, if there is a -- you know, this claim that there's a procedural claim that's it's obviously late in the day, we would think that it is one that ought to proceed, if at all, in state court, whether there was some sort of administrative problem with how this was developed, but this was very clear. Counsel knew that this was an option, other candidates knew this was an option, so --

THE COURT: "This" being seeking a ruling?

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Participation through

nominating petitions as a minor party candidate where your party didn't get ten percent last time but that you have ballot access. So, it would be between one and ten and

this opened up a -- clarified to do this avenue to participate.

THE COURT: As of July of '08.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: As of July of '08, that was when it was clarified. We would say that was, you know, that that was the state of the law, it was perhaps ambiguous and the question was posed and we answered it.

MR. FEINBERG: It was also proposed before July, that's the date it was adopted. It was proposed a month before and it was proposed before Mr. Lopez filed his summary judgment papers. And he knew about it because we specifically brought to his attention and he nevertheless went ahead and in his summary judgment argument made an argument that completely disregarded what the SEEC's declaration ruling that was then proposed and was shortly to become final, just ignored it. He pretended his interpretation of the law was correct and the SEEC's was wrong.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me understand from Mr. Lopez what point you're trying to make.

MR. LOPEZ: Right, right. Your Honor, I didn't ignore anything. We had to make a tactical decision what to put in our briefs. Our briefs were due July 10th. The SEEC had not made, had not adopted the ruling. I knew they might or they might not.

THE COURT: Right, right, but procedurally, you know, I'm not bothered -- you know, I really don't care frankly when these things happened unless there's some substantive impact.

MR. LOPEZ: Right, and there is.

THE COURT: All right, let me hear that.

MR. LOPEZ: The substantive point, the defendants have, in their submissions have made the case that my client somehow sat on their rights and did nothing to participate in the CEP, and the substantive point we make from this is that our clients didn't know until July 17th that they could participate in the CEP. Then our client — and this is in Mr. DeRosa's affidavit — went and sought, went to, went to Hartford and they asked for the petitioning papers, and he did that after August 6th. He was notified that the petitioning period closes on August 6th, so he had a very narrow window between the 17th and the 6th to meet the petitioning requirement, even assuming that he knew that he had to meet that requirement by August 6th.

Your Honor, major party candidates or anyone who proceeds on the prior vote total, they have until October 10th to submit their application. Petitioning party candidates, in effect, have to qualify by August 6th because that's when they have to submit their petitioning

requirements. And then, it could take weeks before their petitions are approved and they don't get their grant until several weeks before the election, and that's exactly what happened to all the major party candidates in this case. Cicero Booker and Deb Nobel didn't get their grants until October 15, even though they submitted their petitioning signatures on August 6th, Your Honor, and that's three weeks before the election. All of the major party candidates had their money well in advance and that's sort of the box we find ourselves in.

So that's our substantive claim about this, Your Honor. We didn't sit on our rights. We pursued our rights vigorously.

Now, there is also a legal matter here, Your Honor, because I don't know how — the defendant, the Attorney General says the declaratory ruling and they cite this in the footnote in every declaratory ruling, has the effect of law, Your Honor, but I'm not sure what effect that has on this court's ability to interpret the statute. The statute very clearly, from our point of view, does not allow minor party candidates who don't satisfy the prior vote total requirements to proceed as petitioning candidates.

Secretary Garfield understood the statute that way and sought to amend the statute that way. The OLR

understood the statute that way and sought -- and made, and put that in their report to the legislature. Then Secretary Garfield turns around and issues this declaratory ruling that comes to a different conclusion than the position he had held two years ago.

And I'm not sure what the court can do with that. Are you bound by the declaratory ruling? Are you bound by a declaratory ruling that is flat-out inconsistent with the plain text of the statute and in light of the evidence of the position taken by Secretary Garfield when he sought to amend the statute? Can a later administration rescind, perhaps after this hearing, rescind that declaratory ruling? What is the binding effect on this court in the face of what we submit is the plain language of the statute? And now --

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me, it seems to me you've either got to -- you've either got a mootness problem or you've got a ripeness problem, the way you're arguing. As things now stand the act is, has been interpreted and apparently is being enforced in a way consistent with the SEEC declaratory ruling, so the argument that the statute should be read differently seems to be mooted. It may be, as you say, some day. I mean anything is possible. The ruling may be, you know, voided. It may be superseded.

MR. LOPEZ: Right.

THE COURT: In which case at that point someone in minor party who's disadvantaged by that would have standing presumably to challenge that statute, but as things now stand it doesn't look to me like you can argue unconstitutionality based upon either the act without the interpretation of the act or argue, well, the law may be different some day in the future.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, you know, there's some force to that argument, but our point, Your Honor, is that voluntary sensation doesn't moot a case. And I think there's clear, like what they call litigation driven decisions don't -- are not binding on the court because they are not binding on the defendants and they can be changed at any time. And because of that, the courts are not bound by that and you don't moot out the cases and it doesn't present a mootness argument.

We're going to hear later today, I don't want to get into it, about another change in policy or another interpretation of the statute that came in two days ago that completely, you know, distorts our understanding of how this statute works, and this court's not bound by that because they can withdraw, and as long as they can withdraw it, Your Honor, we submit that those — those litigation, that those interpretations are not binding on

the court and we're prepared to brief it because I think the law is generally, generally favorable to our point of view.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Well, that's an exception to mootness if someone can return to their old ways. I think that's the general rule. And I understand the point.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. Fair enough, Your Honor.

I'll move on.

I'm going to fast forward. There were other minor changes to the law in the '06 legislative session. We've addressed them pretty thoroughly before, but basically minor party, partially funded candidates can continue to raise contributions up to the limits, up to the expenditure limits. They can only do it in \$100 increments and that's our objection. A more sensible approach and probably one that's more in line with Buckley and one that's probably Constitutionally required when you consider this act as a whole is that the minor party candidates who are partially funded should be able to close the gap by availing themselves of the generally applicable contribution limits because to do it in \$100 increments is just isn't going to work, particularly for statewide office. And we put in uncontradicted evidence on that from our witnesses.

The other way the legislature tweaked the law

also had to do with partially funded minor party candidates, and it allowed partially funded minor candidates to qualify for post election grant if, say, they were funded at a third and say they actually exceeded and they got 20 percent in the general? In those circumstances, the minor party candidate would be paid -would get a supplemental grant but the grant was limited to certain deficits but, and maybe the defendants can explain this better than I, but for some reason they define deficit in a way that is really a -- I think it's more fiction than reality. You can't lend the money to your campaign, you can't borrow the money from a bank or from anyone else and you can't incur the obligation based on a promise that you will pay it if you get a supplemental grant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So it seems to me you're limited to, you know, a few unpaid bills, you know, if a bill comes in and you delay paying it until after the election. And we put in, I think, uncontradicted testimony that that's not how business is done. That, you know, you pay upfront, particularly in the broadcast advertising, you talk about statewide elections, but even for things like printing services and catering services and the like. And we put that into the record, Your Honor.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, just for the

record, that testimony is, our position is tht it's not uncontradicted. In our last reply brief we addressed that, and Commissioner Garfield's last declaration addresses that.

THE COURT: Addresses, just to be clear, the question of what is a deficit or --

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Well, no. Primarily how -the allegation is that's just not how business is done,
there are no way anyone can reasonably take advantage of
this opportunity. The testimony is that, in fact, one
could, and we think frequently do, contract for services.
The contract can't be provisional upon getting the grant
but payment wouldn't necessarily be due until after, after
the grant is issued, as long as it's going to get paid
either way, and that that -- we don't dispute the point as
to broadcast services but as far as other printing
expenses, last minute mailers, et cetera, that is
something that clearly can be done under the system.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. LOPEZ: But you see the Catch 22 that my colleague just inadvertently placed my client in? Say my client's a one-third, qualifies for a third grant and he engages in deficit spending that is in excess of the grant. What if he only, what if he gets less than ten percent of the vote? He's not eligible for a supplemental

grant. Now, how does he pay for that? Under the program rules, he can't pay for it with his own money.

Something's broken about this. He can't pay for it. What he would have to do was shut down his committee, file his termination report at the end of the cycle and if he, if that is unpaid at the end of his termination report? You have to close accounts, so what you do is you forgive it to yourself and then you'd be liable personally.

But under the program rules, under the state's definition of a contribution, forgiving a deficit on your termination report is treated as a contribution to your campaign. So our guy — so you see the, it seems to me unless I'm not being clear, sort of the difficult road that my clients have to navigate in this if they want to try to take advantage of the deficit rule.

And we don't, Your Honor, take the position that there aren't some reasonable amount of small deficits that you might run up, like an unpaid bill. Sometimes it's a delay, like an electricity bill may come in a month later to your campaign office but we're talking about a pretty small universe of unpaid bills and that's the thrust of our evidence on this.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: I think -- I don't want to dwell too much on this because I think up to this point we've been going over sort of the arguments we made at the

facial constitutional stage and we haven't gotten the as applied challenges yet, as far as I can tell, but what we anticipate what is permissible is that a candidate who gets a partial grant is always permitted to fund-raise up to the expenditure limit, and there's nothing that would prevent that candidate from hold — keeping his committee open, holding a fundraiser, doing some additional fundraising within the expenditure limits within the qualifying contribution threshold to pay off those source of debts.

THE COURT: Right, but the problem then is you have a defeated candidate trying to raise money for, to retire a campaign debt.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Right, but it happens, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Oh, I know --

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: -- quite commonly.

THE COURT: I know it happens.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, I think I'll just fast forward. I think what happened in the '07, '08 legislative history is in the record, has already been discussed in the brief, so let me fast forward to '09. Because in '09, here we are, there are even more surprises in our findings about this law.

The SEEC, I don't know if they've introduced the

legislation yet and I'm not sure how they introduce the legislation. I assume they get a sponsor and proceed that way, and I'm not sure if it's been introduced yet but I know the SEEC has proposed legislation that they intend to have introduced. And it would actually expand the trigger provision, the matching — the excess expenditure provisions? So right now under the excess expenditure provisions, supplemental grants are triggered by — let me withdraw all that, Your Honor, because I went into the wrong phase. I'm talking about the independent expenditure provision.

Right now the independent expenditure provision supplemental grants are triggered by negative ads that target participating candidates. What the SEEC has proposed, and if you're a true believer in these kinds of systems, it makes some sense, but what they propose is that supplemental grants be triggered by any advertising or any communications that target — that benefit one candidate or another. So if a, if NARAL were to take out an ad urging the election of a nonparticipating candidate, or that would, that would trigger a matching grant for the participating candidate. Right now it's limited to what NARAL took out an ad —

THE COURT: Criticizing.

MR. LOPEZ: Right, right, right. So I don't

know, we may know by the time you write your opinion, how this legislation is going to turn out. But --

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I don't know if it needs to pointed out but there are an obviously ripeness problem with that issue, but also, just to point out the sort of Catch 22 that good faith election administrators find themselves in. The bitter complaints they were confronted with during this election cycle is that the independent expenditure provision which required an express, an expression that a particular candidate should be defeated was too marrow. People were saying these are obvious ads that we think relate to us, make our life more difficult, and they said that's not how we read it, we read it narrowly. Which is, for purposes of plaintiffs, obviously a favorable ruling.

Now we have a proposal that may expand that to address one problem, it's not even worked its way through the legislative process yet and we're already receiving complaints about it. This is, well, it's just, a clear ripeness problem, Your Honor.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. Anyway, Your Honor, that proposal by the SEEC can be found at Exhibit 73.

The other development in the '07 -- in the '09 legislative session arose in the context of the budgetary crisis that Connecticut is currently in. And Director

Garfield went to the legislature and, while the Director -- apparently there's a huge surplus of money at the CEP. They have more than \$52 million if I understand the situation correctly, and Governor Rell asked the SEEC to turn some money over to the, to the state common funds to help address the budget crisis that we're in the middle of. And Commissioner Garfield prepared two documents, one with the, one with -- one for the legislature and one in connection, one for some Office of Policy Research and they can both be found in our exhibits, Your Honor, 71 and 72.

(Pause)

THE COURT: What does the deficit mitigation plan have to do with this case?

MR. LOPEZ: Well, Your Honor, just — the

Commissioner Garfield — part of the defendants' defense

in this case, Your Honor, is that the CEP is not going to

result in increased spending, candidate spending, and it's

not going to result in increased competition. That

contention is, if not flat out contradicted by this

testimony, at least called into question. And these

documents bear on that issue.

Commissioner Garfield anticipates that in 2010 he's going to need \$13 million to fund legislative elections. And he caveats his comments that he's making a

lot of conservative assumptions, including the nonparticipation of minor party candidates. And this cycle they budget a 10, I think they came in a little below that. But the point is he, as the expert, as the person in charge of enforcing this law, believes that there's going to be more money spent under the CEP in the next cycle, and that there's going — which implies there's going to be more competition.

Now, on the statewide elections — unless he made a mistake, but there's two documents here that confirm each other — in '06, the last statewide election was approximately \$14 million spent, he comes into the legislature and testifies that we need \$39 million to fund the statewide elections, which, fair enough, but all it does is confirm, confirm our claim that the CEP is going to fund candidates at levels that they could never have achieved privately. It's going to completely distort the market and that's why we offer that, Your Honor, and if you're satisfied with that explanation, I'm going to move on.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: At this point I would ask you to turn to Binder 1.

Now, at the December hearing we offered a series of tables that look very much like the tables here,

collecting expenditure and receipt data for candidates. The defendants objected to the introduction of this data on the grounds that the final expenditure data was not final and wouldn't be available until candidate termination reports are filed in January and February of '09.

We've now updated the tables to correspond to final information on candidate receipts attributable to participation in the CEP. We have double-checked this against the defendant's own data which they've submitted in connection with these proceedings. Our data, our total candidate receipts attributable to participation in the CEP is, in fact, confirmed by the defendants' data, candidate receipts in the sum of qualifying contributions in CEP grants.

Now, both sides may disagree about the conclusions to draw from this data but there are no disagreements about the underlying facts that have been brought to my attention thus far. And I would direct the court to Narain Table 1 and 2 which can be found at Tab 13 following his declaration.

THE COURT: I have it, yes.

MR. LOPEZ: Thank you, sir. These tables compare only receipts attributable to participation in the CEP with '06 receipts by that candidate or the candidate

who ran in his place in '06. A comparison of the grants paid in '08 with prior candidate receipts shows how dramatically the CEP has increased funding available to major party candidates.

There are two distinct measures of overall increased spending, of overall increased spending attributable to the CEP grants. The first measure is to simply compare '08 candidate receipts with actual '06 receipts by candidates in the same districts and that's what Tables 1 and 2 do.

In legislative districts where the party did not run a candidate in '06, receipts are listed as zero. The increase is most significant in those House and Senate districts where major party candidates are now competing in previously abandoned districts and for those candidates competing in districts in which the weaker major party candidate raised very little money.

If you just scroll down here you can see quite plainly how it will dramatically increase candidate receipts for the great majority of candidates. And in fairness, we have set out the -- we have listed the candidates who would actually not benefit under the CEP.

Now, at the December hearing, the defendants objected to the introduction of these tables on the grounds that the reported average increase and the average

decrease in '08 permissible expenditure limits were distorted because plaintiff did not back out candidates who ran in '06 but not in '08. So what we've done is remove the average and then we've created a separate set of tables that show the spending of candidates who vacated seats that they ran in '06.

Now, these tables are -- continuing to Tables 2-A and 2-B. I'm sorry, Judge, 1-A and 1-B. If you just follow the Table 1, right up after Table 1 is Table 1-A.

THE COURT: I think they are in 1-A and 2-A, is that right?

MR. LOPEZ: Right. It is Table 1-A and 2-A but if you want to look at one, just have a look at Table 1-A and this is -- we prepared this to address their concern that, to address the defendants' concern that our conclusion that overall expenditures are increasing is flawed because we didn't factor in or we didn't control for candidates who are not running in this cycle but ran in '06. And if you look at, just on the Senate side, if you look at Table 1-A, you can see that -- excuse me, that there are five such candidates and one of the candidates only raised \$5,000 so that wouldn't have any effect on our claim that spending benefits major party candidates, that the CEP benefits major party candidates, and that's true about the candidate who spent -- I'm sorry, the candidate

who spent \$25,000 and the candidate who spent \$65,000.

The point is more vividly made, Your Honor, in Table 2-A where if you scroll down that table, you'll see that almost none of these candidates raise the \$30,000 that they would, they would receive if they participated in the Citizens Election Program.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, we have responded to many of these points in the Proulx declaration but we also prepared demonstratives of our own averages of expenditures. We didn't exactly refute those tables because I wasn't quite sure what these tables were being put in for. But we did our own analysis of what happened in the 2008 elections with regard to expenditures which is in the Proulx declaration that was — that's dated March 10, 2009. I don't know if it would be more helpful for us to confine that to our, you know, our part of the presentation or whether you would like it to be addressed now.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, Your Honor, the major difference between their data and our data is they back out and return money. And our position, unless I'm wrong, and our position is it's a completely irrelevancy. Let me draw an analogy, Your Honor — you know, at least for constitutional purposes, it's completely irrelevant.

Let me draw an analogy. If you gave a Democrat

a half hour of televised debate time on public television and you gave his Republican opponent a full hour under the statute, under a statutory scheme, the fact that the Republican opponent didn't use the whole hour or only used a half an hour wouldn't defeat the Democrat's challenge to that statutory system, either on its face or as applied. And that's how we, and that's -- I'm not sure what else to say about that.

MS. YOUN: Yes, I don't want to interrupt

Attorney Lopez at length. You know, we have prepared our own presentation, I guess, of what happened with regard to major party expenditures in the 2008 as opposed to the 2006 election, and I think that maybe Attorney Lopez would prefer just to continue on, rather than --

THE COURT: I think that makes sense. I mean you're not, you're not disputing the accuracy of the information contained in these tables.

MS. YOUN: No, I don't believe so.

THE COURT: So we'll take up your spin on the data during your case. Thanks.

Mr. Lopez, we're going to be taking a morning break at some point, so when you reach an appropriate point in your case, why don't you let me know.

MR. LOPEZ: Fair enough, Your Honor. Thank you.

Now, Your Honor, we've been making the point

throughout that the base grant's more in the nature of a subsidy and actually corresponds to running in a race and we think is unconstitutional, and we'll address that when we address our legal claims.

The defendant's data on returned grants in our view confirms this. The legislature knew all along that the grant amounts were inflated, and I would direct you to the Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 listing average and median candidate expenditures, and we went over that in December. They are inflated, Your Honor, because they don't take into account three very important factors.

One, they don't take into account candidates who filed exemptions. Almost all minor party candidates file exemptions, and petitioning party candidates. Major party candidates also file exemptions. This cycle alone, 14 major party candidates filed exemptions. Excuse me.

Second, the data contained in the OLR reports that the legislature based its decision to set the grant amounts don't take into consideration privately financed candidates, and that would also include minor party candidates and weak major party candidates who don't want to bother with the reporting requirements because they, they are going to donate, they are going to finance their own campaign.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I just think

it's important to qualify, when we're talking about exemptions we're talking about somebody who doesn't plan to raise or spend more than \$1,000. So if you had a privately financed candidate who's going to spend a lot of money, he'd still have to engage a report.

MR. LOPEZ: Then I stand corrected. But privately financed candidates who don't spend more than \$1,000, the OLR reports don't take into account.

Now, and the third factor that the OLR reports don't take into account, Your Honor, are -- occur in elections where there was no second major party candidate, so vacated seats. And this is very significant, Your Honor, because the failure to account for vacant seats inflates the reported average cost of running an election because the total amount of candidate expenditures is being averaged out over fewer candidates.

For instance, in a noncontested Senate district, a Democrat who spent 50 against no opponent would have an average of \$50,000 if you don't account for the absent opponent; whereas the arrival of a low spending Republican who spent 10K would, as opposed to his, the other candidate who would have spent \$50,000, for instance, would yield an average of \$30,000.

So our contention is that -- and this is important to our argument about that taxes are in the

nature of a subsidy as opposed to inflated over-replacing private dollars with public dollars. Our contention is that the grant amount is significantly greater than even the average spending that is reported in the OLR reports.

Now, the grant amounts that the legislature settled on also failed to take into account the fact that major party, safe major party candidates historically raised more money than they'd need, so that they can have a surplus to distribute at the end of the election. This is exactly what happened in this cycle. The people who returned money or reported surpluses are strong incumbents, and at the last hearing I had made this claim and I drew the objection that I didn't have any evidence for this. I knew there was some evidence for it but I couldn't pull it up. And as it turns out, there is an OLR report that was considered by the legislature, and it's Plaintiff's Exhibit 84, that shows, that indeed shows that candidates do -- many candidates do have significant surpluses.

For example, in that report, Andrew McDonnell who is a safe incumbent, raised \$154,000 in '04 and he returned \$78,000 of it. And we've seen in their data that a number of safe incumbents have returned large amounts of grant money as well.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. He returned money in

'04?

MR. LOPEZ: Right. I have made the claim, Your Honor, I had made the claim at the December hearing that the subsidies are inflated because they don't take into account the actual cost of running an election because safe incumbents usually run a surplus. I had no evidence for that — or I did have evidence for that, I couldn't pull it up. I now tender that evidence in Document 84, and in that document it shows as an example or has drawn as an example that Andrew McDonnell is one of those safe incumbents who returned more than half the money that he raised.

THE COURT: Well, he distributed it. He didn't return it.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, he distributed it to --

THE COURT: He distributed it to PACs and party committees and so forth, as opposed to returning it to the CEP.

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, sir, yes.

THE COURT: Right. Got you.

MR. LOPEZ: And that basic trend continues under the CEP. Safe incumbents didn't spend all the money they received under the CEP grants and that point frankly is not terribly controversial from our point of view.

Now, then I'm going to talk for about five more

minutes and then I'm going to take a break and I would just like to direct the court to updated Nikolaidis Tables 3 and 4 which can be found --

THE COURT: I have it.

MR. LOPEZ: -- at the end of the Narain declaration. And we have prepared these tables -- if I can just ask the court to look at Table 3 -- we've prepared these tables just to show how district-wide spending is going to dramatically change under the CEP based on actual receipts. Earlier reports were based on projections, these are based on actual receipts. As it turns out, nothing changed.

But, so these reports, Tables 3 and 4 are just another measure of how the CEP is going to change the playing field, how it is going to make elections more expensive in certain districts. And these tables just set out, set out how it will be expensive, dramatically more expensive and how it was dramatically more expensive in '08 in the majority of legislative districts.

Now, Your Honor, the other helpful thing about this table, it seems to me, is we've created a column, it would be the second column from the right, called Nonmajor Party Participated in '08.

THE COURT: In '06.

MR. LOPEZ: In '06, yes, sir.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOPEZ: And it shows -- you can see that nonmajor parties participated in, in many of the districts that, in many of the districts that are going to show the greatest district-wide spending increase as a result of the CEP.

And the trends, it's hard to draw -- the trend is much more pronounced in the House races, Your Honor. If you turn to updated 4 and you turn to the column Nonmajor Parties participated in '06, you'll see that there are many more in the House. Okay.

(Pause)

Nikolaidis Table 4, suggests that minor parties

participated most in the districts that had the greatest
increase in funding or spending, and also those that had
the greatest decrease in funding, which I take it your
point is the minor parties participated most in formerly
noncompetitive districts which either had now become
significantly more competitive or which remained
uncompetitive, even after the CEP was introduced.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, it's not strictly -it's competitive by two measures. It's -- a lot of the
increase in spending is attributable to the edge of two
major party candidates, but also due to the fact these

used to be very cheap races, so even if there was only one major party candidate, he was only spending three grand, or six grand or eight grand, and now he's spending 30 grand, or she is.

THE COURT: Okay. So the point is the minor party candidates are running principally in districts that were formally not competitive districts.

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. YOUN: I think, I think that this -- I don't think that this table purports to be a comprehensive list of all non-major party participation in 2006. I think this is just a subset of candidacies that, of major party candidates who were participants and then whatever minor party candidate happened to participate in that subset of districts.

MR. LOPEZ: That's right. That's fair enough.

MS. YOUN: All right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Now, Your Honor, if I could ask you to back up and if I could ask you to flip backwards to Narain Table 5 which doesn't follow updated 3 and 4.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: In order to understand how the district by district spending impacts minor party candidates, we've created a second snapshot. It sets

forth actual '08 candidate receipts attributable to participation in the CEP in single party districts targeted by non-major parties in '06.

So this lists all the single party districts that were targeted by minor parties in '06. And it lists, column three lists '06 expenditures in those districts, column four lists the net increase in expenditures in districts attributable to participation in the CEP, and then the final column denotes those districts that are newly contested -- excuse me -- by major parties in '08.

And the relevance of this is that, which should come as no surprise, is that minor parties are indeed competing in more expensive districts and in districts that are drawing a second major party candidate who is participating in the CEP. That's why the expenses have risen so dramatically.

Now, I would ask you -- and I'm only going to note another paragraph before I'm happy to take a break, Your Honor. If I could ask you to turn to Narain Table 3 and 4.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Just start with Narain Table 3. It deals with Secretary of State election results and Table 4 contains Secretary of State election results of the House, Table 3 is the Senate. And we offer these tables to

show -- to confirm that Connecticut remains a party-dominant state. Even though under the CEP, most districts are dominated by one of the major parties. The only difference under the CEP is the state is subsidizing a lot of weak major party candidates.

And in your motion to dismiss, order on the motion to dismiss, Your Honor, I don't know, you know, if we provided you this number or you came to this conclusion yourself. We said 43 percent of the legislative districts, in 43 percent of the legislative districts, 43 percent, major parties won't even meet their own qualifying criteria, and that actually remains true today through the analysis of the '08 election results. It might even be kept to 44. There continue to be scores — would that be the right word? Scores of uncontested districts, scores of vacated districts, and there continue to be major party candidates who are posting less than 20 percent vote returns.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, just a clarification with regard to Table 5. Once again, Table 5 represents not all districts in which -- or, I guess, Table 5 omits, as it indicates in footnote five, District 15 and District 146 so, once again, it's not attempting to be a comprehensive picture. It is instead a subset of, that just includes districts where CEP participants competed and additionally

my researcher says, he informed me there was a district that was inadvertently omitted off this chart which we'll be able to explain in my presentation.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, if I could just talk about Narain 3 and 4 which is the election results, there's some interesting data that comes out of that.

There were eight Senate districts and 33 House districts where a CEP funded major party candidate lost by at least 20 percent of the vote.

There are four Senate districts and 15 House districts where the CEP funded a major party candidate who challenged an incumbent in a party dominant district.

We make this point to show that the CEP is funding very weak major party candidates.

There are three Senate and ten House districts where a major party candidate received less than 20 percent of the vote, but would nevertheless be entitled to a full CEP grant in 2010 if they can meet the qualifying criteria; if they can meet, if they can raise the qualifying contribution.

The list also shows the number of districts where major parties didn't run a candidate, nine in the Senate and 62 in the House. And if you, if you take that data, the nine in the Senate and 62 in the House, and add

that to the three Senate and ten House districts for major party candidates that pull less than 20 percent of the vote, we get back to our 43 or 44 percent of major party candidates who wouldn't even meet their own — the CEP's qualifying criteria if it was applied to them equally.

And on that note, I'm happy to take a break, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't we take a break then until about 11:30. We'll stand in recess.

(Whereupon a recess was taken from 11:12 o'clock, a. m. to 11:30 o'clock, a. m.)

THE COURT: Can somebody check in the hall for Mr. Feinberg, please?

(Pause)

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Lopez?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. Now, we submit that there's no serious factual dispute in the record that the CEP is going to incentivize major party candidates to run in districts that they previously had neglected. The defendants' expert makes this — that would be Don Green, who we heard from in December — acknowledges as much in his initial report and he acknowledges in his examination in response to my questions and the questions of the court, plaintiff's experts has also testified through his

affidavit that the CEP is going to increase competition by drawing new major party candidates into the race.

And I would direct the court to Findings 94-A and 94-B, and in those findings we provide appropriate transcript cites to Don Green's testimony and to our expert reports.

Now, the available data supports this conclusion as well, although I don't think that what we learned in '08 is necessarily dispositive because part of our claim is that over time, this was — the CEP will solidify the position of the two major parties and that it will diminish the position of minor party candidates. But even what we know from '08, Your Honor, I think the trend — there is a trend and I'm about to address that.

MR. FEINBERG: I don't mean to interrupt and Mr. Lopez should, of course, make his argument, but to say there's no serious dispute about this, Your Honor, I just want the court to understand this is one of the most disputed issues in the case. So I don't understand what Mr. Lopez is referring to when he says this is not seriously disputed.

Just the question of whether this law will lead major party candidates to run in districts that weren't previously — that previously weren't contested is, we say it will not have that effect. Mr. Lopez argues it will,

fine, but it's a very much disputed issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, Your Honor, it's disputed by Mr. Feinberg but it wasn't disputed by the defendant's experts and we provided the appropriate — by the defendant's own expert, and it seems to me that that — that's evidence the court should consider. I think the court had a back—and—forth with the expert, I had a back—and—forth with the expert on this exact subject, and he wrote a report addressed to it. Because at the time when he wrote his report, the point of his report was that this, the CEP was a good thing because it would increase competition and that's good for democracies. Okay.

So, anyway, if I could return to my presentation about how the CEP did, in fact, affect competition in the '08 cycle, I think there is some data that supports that.

If Mr. Feinberg had given me another split second, I would have conceded that defendants, of course, contest that the playing field hasn't changed significantly. They argue that the level of competition nets out because the number of newly, of new major party challenges are offset by the districts that are being vacated by major party candidates. And he's right, as far as that goes, but it's a gross over-simplification.

Although the evidence shows that the CEP is

encouraging major party competition in newly entered districts, there is no evidence that the CEP is related to the decision by major party candidates to vacate or abandon the districts that they did vacate in 2008.

There were, there were five -- excuse me. We can agree with the defendants that the number of elections in which a second major party candidate entered the race is roughly equal to the number of districts that were vacated by one of the major parties in -- there were five in the Senate and approximately 30 in the House but that is where the comparison ends. We have isolated these districts and looked at the electorial and campaign finance history of the candidates who ran in those districts.

Here is where I would direct the court first to the Narain Tables 1-A and 2-A. Table 1-A is a newly vacated district by Senate candidates in '08. The court can look at these tables and satisfy itself that there is no basis to conclude that the availability of funding under the CEP was a factor in the decision to vacate these districts. Almost uniformly, each of the candidates in these prior races raise sufficient funds in '06 to meet the qualifying criteria. And that's Table 1-A and Table 2-A.

The opposite, Your Honor --

(Pause)

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, the data in Table 2 raise slightly more equivocal than the data in Table 1-A but the trend is there. Those, the candidates in those vacated districts by and large raise more than the \$5,000 that they would have to raise to qualify for public financing. So it's hard to -- so I don't see how the defendants can maintain that candidates aren't running because they can't qualify for CEP funding. They are not running for different reasons but it's not lack of ability to qualify for CEP financing.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I think it's very important to qualify that hasn't been our position. Our position through our major party witnesses, George Griffin and George Jepsen, it's a very complicated calculus, much different than a minor party might undertake in order for the major party candidate to contest a district that it hasn't contested before. The availability of public funding is one but not a dispositive factor. That's been our consistent position.

So I think it's -- you know, we haven't heard,

Mr. Lopez hasn't come forward with one major party

candidate who is prepared to testify that the only reason

I contested this district, which we hadn't contested

before, is the existence of, potential existence of public

campaign financing. I think it's very dangerous for anybody to ask the court to make any assumptions about the motives of any person not before the court about why they chose to run or not run in a particular district.

What we have done instead, Your Honor, is to simply put forward the data and say there has been no net increase, in fact, a slight net decrease in the contestedness in races.

Beyond that, Your Honor, there is simply no basis for them to suggest and for you to conclude that the reason particular districts aren't contested or are contested comes down to the potential existence of public finance campaigning.

THE COURT: But the defense also hasn't suggested that the reason for the decrease in competitive districts set forth on 1-A, 2-A is caused by any aspect of the CEP.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, I think what we submit is we're a little bit confused by Mr. Lopez's argument on this point because Mr. Lopez argued in his last set of briefs that where candidates, where candidates came into preexisting noncompetitive districts, it was because of the CEP but when candidates didn't come into previously noncompetitive districts and in fact abandoned previously competitive districts, it wasn't because of the CEP.

All we are saying, as Attorney Zinn Rowthorn has pointed out, is that there has been no net increase in contestedness. The idea that the CEP is going to cause, is enough of an incentive to cause major party candidates to change their strategic behavior is simply not borne out by the factual record.

MR. LOPEZ: Nothing, except for that last statement by Ms. Youn, the conclusion, is inconsistent with the point I'm making. There are a lot of factors that might lead a candidate not to seek office. The CEP doesn't appear to be one of those factors because, consistent with our claim, the CEP qualifying criteria are set at levels that can generally be satisfied by major party candidates, and that's what Tables 2-A and 1-A show.

Now, to address opposing counsel's second point -- I was about to. We believe that there is a causative relationship between the availability of public funding and the decision of a candidate to enter a previously uncontested race. And we think this is a common sense conclusion but we have collected some data on this, Your Honor, and I apologize because I said I was going to restrict my presentation to Binders One and Two but I would have to -- I'm going to ask the court to, to turn to the -- it's, this is a binder that was submitted in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. It

contains Declaration A-8 and the declaration of Alexander Nikolaidis and accompanying data. If it's helpful, I can come up and show it to the court.

THE COURT: You might want to pass that up. I didn't bring with me the binders from the summary judgment briefing.

MS. YOUN: Just to clarify, are we talking about 257-4 on the docket?

THE COURT: Table --

MS. YOUN: What table are you on?

THE COURT: Table 5.

MS. YOUN: Thank you.

(Pause)

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. Your Honor, Table 5 has previously been admitted into evidence and we offered this, this table, Table 5 shows the newly contested elections this cycle. And Table 6 shows the newly contested House elections this cycle. In the five -- and this would be the, on Table 5, this would be the first of the two tables.

In the five newly contested Senate elections this cycle, for instance, candidates, A, routinely lose by landslide margins going back to 2000. And, B, uniformly have raised a de minimus amount of money going back to the year 2000.

1 Only one candidate in these five districts going 2 back to 2000 raised more than the 15,000 needed to qualify 3 for CEP funding. 4 If I could ask the court to flip to Table 6, we can make similar observations on the House side. 5 THE COURT: Wait, wait, let me go back to the 6 7 In newly contested 2008 Senate districts, you're 8 saying only one candidate ever raised 15,000? 9 MR. LOPEZ: Unless I missed something. I see that in District 35 in 2002. 10 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Senate District One? 13 THE COURT: Senate District 35. 14 MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Senate District 35. That's the 15 losing candidate. The losing candidate. Okay? 16 MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Oh. 17 MS. YOUN: Your Honor, just before we get too far in this, the Rotman Declaration which was filed on 18 19 October 3rd, 2008, Document 274 in the record, in 20 paragraph 16 of that, she states that the underlying data 21 in these tables is substantially inaccurate. She says that there are, you know, for example, plaintiff's Table 5 22 23 says that there are three newly uncontested Senate districts when there are five. You'll see on the bottom 24

of this half of this chart, et cetera.

25

1 MR. LOPEZ: We're not offering this document for 2 newly uncontested elections, Your Honor. That's what 3 Narain Tables 1-A and -- 1-B do and that's based on the final election results. 4 THE COURT: I understand. 5 6 MS. YOUN: And also in the five newly contested 7 Senate districts we were discussing, the districts are 8 misidentified, so this data does not, I think, apply. 9 newly contested Senate districts instead should be Districts 1, 6, 24, 28 and 32, so I guess -- two out of 10 11 five are wrong. 12 THE COURT: Well, there's one -- 35 should be, 13 whatever, should be six is what you're saying. MS. YOUN: It should be -- there should be six. 14 15 MR. FEINBERG: Six should be in there. 16 MS. YOUN: And 35 should not be in there. 17 THE COURT: Right, so the question is is the information shown for District 6 -- excuse me, information 18 19 shown for District 35 accurate with respect to District 20 6. 21 MS. YOUN: I believe so. I don't have any reason to believe that it's not. 22 23 THE COURT: So we just need to change the district numbers, are the only inaccuracy. 24 25 MR. FEINBERG: No, no.

MS. YOUN: No, no, that's not right. They reported the wrong --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out what's going on.

MS. YOUN: I misunderstood your question. I thought that you meant with respect to the districts that are included here correctly, is the data with respect to those districts correct. No, we do not know that -- we do not believe that what is put in here as District 35 should actually be District 6 or that those numbers correspond in any way to what happened in District 6.

THE COURT: All right. Are Districts 1, 24, 28, and 32 accurate?

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Your Honor, in preparing the Rotman declaration, what was reviewed wasn't the accuracy of the receipt information but just whether or not they had even been put in the correct districts in their analysis. And throughout the plaintiff's opposition and these tables that were submitted in our opposition on September 5th, there was just a series of errors that called into question the overall credibility of their conclusions because the tables contained so many errors on various points. And so as to whether or not the receipts information that's contained in that chart is accurate, that was not examined.

MR. FEINBERG: At the time, Your Honor, it really was being submitted for a different purpose than for trying to establish the relationship, the causation relationship Mr. Lopez is now trying to establish, so no, apparently we did not look at the accuracy of the receipt information listed there.

THE COURT: Okay, well, why don't do you that. Why don't you send me a letter that tells me to what extent this is accurate or inaccurate and your view of what the accurate information should show.

MR. FEINBERG: We'll do that, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LOPEZ: And if I may, Your Honor, the reason that there might be a discrepancy is that this, after this table is reported, vacancies occurred in, in some of the legislative districts or, or a new candidate entered the race very late. And this data was prepared for the, for a submission in the first week of September.

We can, if there are problems, we're not aware of them. We just learned there's one mistake they identified and we'll fix that and actually we've omitted a district so we'll fix that.

MS. YOUN: You included one district erroneously and omitted another district.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. I'll have a look at that, and -- fair enough.

MS. YOUN: And the graphic at the bottom is missing two districts.

THE COURT: Why don't we do this. The letter

Mr. Feinberg is going to send in, why don't you confer and

see whether you can get it done by stipulation so there's

no need for further factual development. The two of you

can stipulate, as I'm assuming you can, because those are

all public records. Let's just get it stipulated as to

what the accurate information for Table 5 ought to be.

MR. FEINBERG: We'll do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Fine. Thanks.

MR. LOPEZ: And, Your Honor, if I could ask you to turn to Exhibit 6 -- I mean Table 6.

THE COURT: I have it.

MS. YOUN: What we have in the Foster declaration with respect to plaintiff's Table -- with respect to Rotman, what we have in the Rotman declaration with respect to plaintiff's Table 6 is that it lists 25 newly uncontested House districts when, in fact, there are 28, and Table 6 lists 32 newly contested House districts when, in fact, there are only 29. And it also includes, I guess, four -- it indicates that Districts 29, 73, 108 and 127 are newly contested when, in fact, they are not.

THE COURT: Why don't we do the same thing with respect to Table 6 and let's get a stipulation so I know what the accurate facts are, okay?

MR. LOPEZ: That's fine. Anyway, if I could continue with my presentation -- and I don't think that any updates are going to change this, Your Honor.

On the House side many of the districts that have newly entered this cycle have been vacant cycle after cycle going back to 2000. And many of the candidates consistently lost by landslide margins and many of them, or a majority of them raised de minimus amounts of money, although some did raise enough that that would qualify them for public financing. And with that, I'm going to move on.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just return to you this appendix.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay.

(Hands Counsel)

MR. LOPEZ: Now, most of the Narain data that we've been talking about all morning, Your Honor, measures the impact -- most of the Narain, Nikolaidis data, measures the impact of the CEP on the electorial playing field from the macro playing field as a whole. It was organized that way to support our facial challenge that the playing field is at least going to change.

The impact of the CEP, however, is also apparent when you look at the specific districts where minor parties competed. There are two relevant measures, it seems to us, and we have have looked — first, we looked at the districts where minor party candidates participated in 2006 and compare the cost and competitiveness of running in those same districts in 2008.

We have also looked at the districts where minor party candidates actually ran in 2008 and compared the cost and competitiveness of running in those same districts prior to the implementation of the CEP. And we've reached some conclusions. They are rather lengthy, Your Honor. They can be found in our findings at 270(a), 270, paren, small A, paren, through 270 -- sub H.

And now I'm loathe to read all that material into the record.

THE COURT: You don't need to. I've read it.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. Well, so a conclusion from all the data, and these charts were prepared by counsel and have been submitted into the record. They are attached to the declaration of Kevin James, an associate in my office. The basic conclusion is that, is that it targets — excuse me. The basic conclusion is that in districts that were targeted by major parties in 2008, there are actually targeted by minor parties — excuse me.

The basic exclusion is that in districts that were targeted by minor parties in 2008, it was much more expensive in — those districts were much more expensive and much more crowded than they were in 2006 in both the House and the Senate.

You flip it and you look at the districts they ran in in 2006, you can also see that it was much more expensive and much more crowded in 2008 to run in those districts. And predictably what we saw, for instance, is that minor parties abandoned, I believe, 18 of the 35 districts, or 20 of the 35 districts that they ran in 2006.

And if you look at that subset, you'll see how dramatically spending increased in those districts and we would suggest that that was a causal factor for them abandoning those districts.

When I talk about districts becoming more expensive, I'm talking about the spending by every measure just about doubled. If there was -- I might as well give you an example.

In the 28 House districts in which minor parties ran in '08, total receipts increased by \$400,000.

Receipts increased from 900,000 in '06 to 1.3, for instance, in '08. And this, this is a trend you see back and forth.

And what we've done with this data is just compare, as I said. We've looked at the district's minor party who ran in '08, I mean ran in '06 and provided for the court data about how much more it would be, how much more expensive it would be to run in those same districts in '08 and it would be about twice as expensive, twice as expensive and significantly more crowded. And, in addition, we know that minor parties abandoned 18 of those districts.

We also know that there are a number of identical districts that they ran in. I believe there were 17 and the spending went through the roof in those districts and none of it was attributable spending by minor parties. It was attributable to the CEP, participation in the CEP by major party candidates. So it became a much more difficult environment for minor party candidates to participate. And overall there were more major party candidates running in '08 than in '06, and there were fewer minor party candidates running. And this, this is all set out in our affidavits and in our charts.

The defendants have submitted declarations last night that present the data in a different way but they put it in terms of percentages. The percentages didn't change but the real number of candidates did change. And

we bring this to your attention because you did ask at the last hearing are there fewer minor party candidates participating, are there more major party candidates participating. And we make this point not only to make a point about competitiveness to Your Honor but it's about money. There's more money being driven to the pockets of the major party candidates, and that is as much -- that is, from a constitutional point of view that is as objectionable as the fact that there is more major party competentation. Because what a major party -- major party candidates, win or loss, major party candidates have this money to spend getting out their message, solidifying their position and laying the foundation for future elections, whether it's a future election in that particular district or whether it's running for city council. They've got their name out there. That benefit, that communication benefit is denied to my candidates, Your Honor -- my clients, Your Honor.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. YOUN: Yes, Your Honor, Attorney Lopez has just stated and repeated several times a factual misstatement which is that there were more major party candidates in 2008 than there were in 2006. In fact, there were one fewer. There were, there were the same number of Senate candidates and there was one fewer House candidate.

THE COURT: You know, let me just throw out to both of you a question that I'm a little hesitant to ask but, of the many factors that that may be affecting decisions to run in '08, is this litigation one of them? Can I factor out the concern by minor party candidates, you know what, if you have any doubt about running, don't run because it will make the numbers look better. And for major party candidates, if you have any doubt, you know, don't contest because — or drop out because, don't use the CEP because this case is pending and we want the numbers to look as good as we can so we can keep this cash cow going. I just don't know, frankly —

(Several counsel stand)

THE COURT: I'm glad there's a response.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, I think the simple fact is none of us know. There's no evidence whatsoever in the record for any of that.

THE COURT: Right, of course. That's the point. But I mean I'll just tell you I'm taking the 2008 numbers with a grain of salt because, you know, there's every incentive for somebody who's on the fence to make a long term decision rather than a short term decision.

MR. FEINBERG: I think that presupposes that candidates have, you know, of one of the major parties could be particularly concerned by -- would, A, think they

would have an influence on the outcome of this litigation or be particularly concerned about that.

THE COURT: No, it's really easy, Mr. Feinberg. The Democratic party comes to you and says, I know you're thinking about running in District 3, but you know what? You've never won in District 3 and we want to keep this money coming. And so, by the way, the party's not going to support you at all if you run in District 3. You're going to be on your own. Don't expect anything from us because you're going to mess up this litigation. That's what I'm talking about. It's not that Tom Smith says, oh gee, I'm concerned about the litigation, that there's party pressure, be it the major party or be it the minor party, to gain in the system by affecting the numbers for 2008.

MR. FEINBERG: But, A, there's no evidence of that, and, B, I really think that overstates the centrality of this litigation in the calculations of the major parties and their candidates.

THE COURT: I hope you're right. Of course there's no evidence. You know, no one's going to have — no one's going to have an admission that there's an arm twist here to keep somebody out of a race in order to affect the litigation. It's not the kind of evidence you're ever going to get, but I'm just expressing some

skepticism about 2008 numbers because --

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, I think 2008, I think at least for the Democratic party was an historic election, one in which Connecticut, they managed to, you know, unseat longstanding Chris Shays. I don't think that a Democratic party state legislative candidate would be deterred from running because of some attenuated impact on this litigation. But in any event —

THE COURT: Well, if you're running in

Ridgefield and it's 80 percent Republican registration —

I'm just guessing. I have no idea what the numbers are

and I don't know if Ridgefield is a Republican town. I'm

just throwing this out as an example. And the Democratic

party, you want the Democratic party support. They are

going to say, look, do it in two years. Do it in two

years.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, but I mean honestly, to the extent that you want to take the 2008 election data with a grain of salt, it is plaintiff's burden here to establish injury and to establish causation, and to the extent that you're taking the 2008 election data with a grain of salt makes it impossible for them to do so. It would be their burden to prove some sort of interfering variable of the kind that you've just hypothesized.

THE COURT: Okay. This is just a side comment,

by the way. You know --

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, first of all, Ms. Youn said I had my numbers wrong about the number of major party candidates, the net number of major party candidates participating in this cycle. I was referring to the subset of the 46 House and Senate elections that minor party candidates participated in either '06 or '08, and within that subset. That's our only point of Findings 280(h) that within that subset it's a heck of a -- it's prohibitively more expensive. It's much more crowded, and as a result, the minor party candidates have run away from any of those issues. None of that data is in dispute, I think, and wasn't contradicted by Ms. Youn's statements, and the court can satisfy itself by looking at our findings.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Just -- and I don't want to back up too much but it does relate also to that point. I think another area in which it's dangerous to try to make assumptions about people's motives for running or not running, particularly with respect to whether a minor party or a petitioning candidate would be influenced by a major party candidate's participation in the program, what we haven't been provided is any reason -- a timeline that would suggest that a petitioning candidate who may be committed to participating as early as January, is somehow

influenced by a decision or a qualification for public funds on a potential major party opponent, a decision that may not be made until after October 10th, or that a minor party who nominates its candidates sometime over the summer, maybe before, maybe after the major party candidacies in primaries are resolved, and certainly before a decision on grants would be issued, that those can be sort of causally connected. I think really in an overly simplistic fashion, that's been suggested.

This is why we continue to say, you know, you may have some concerns about what you can infer or not infer from participation in 2008 but the numbers themselves are the best evidence since we don't have the evidence that minor party candidates, petitioning candidates are making those decisions based on major party qualification.

In fact, you know, the best conceivable evidence here is Mr. DeRosa and the Green Party who appears not to have abandoned districts, ran more candidates than previously. You know, so I just, I really think, you know, it's — this is very, very dangerous for us to be relying on or inferring these sort of motivational factors, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, okay. To what extent is motivation of any particular candidate an issue in this

case? It certainly is not an issue on the facial challenge, and it isn't obvious to me that there needs to be proof one way or the other about individual candidates' motivations on the as applied challenge.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Well, that appears to be a primary theme of plaintiff's case that a prospect of facing better funded major party candidates is causing, I guess it's a chill argument, we're not going to contest races. We just don't think that's at all the case.

And then there's another theme running through the case that the prospect for major party candidates of getting additional campaign funding from the public is incentivizing them to contest districts where they previously haven't. We don't think that's the case. So, I do think --

THE COURT: But that's the argument.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Yes.

THE COURT: The argument is not the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the reason Tom Smith ran in 2006 and didn't run in 2008 is because he individually was motivated not to run by X Y and Z factors.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Sure.

THE COURT: They don't have to prove that.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: No, they don't, but they made a prediction to Your Honor of certain effects and I

think those predictions are particularly suspect now that we have a record that suggests those effects have not occurred.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: And I think the whole focus on expenditures is a red herring. Because I think if -- you know, I think the point is, you know, it's become more expensive to run, it hasn't been more expensive to Mike DeRosa or a Green Party candidate or someone who says to themselves I'm not going to raise more than \$1,000 no matter what. It hasn't become more expensive for them to run. And --

THE COURT: No, but it's the competition for the -- the \$1,000 doesn't go as far as it used to go, if they stop at \$1,000.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: I disagree, Your Honor. I don't think the evidence is there, because the evidence is the Green Party -- all minor party candidates did on average better. The Green Party did on average better.

So I think, I do -- listen, I can't suggest to you that expenditures shouldn't be part of this case as a predictor of evidence of what may occur, perhaps with respect to the as applied. But I'm saying expenditures themselves aren't proof of harm. What do they result in? And I think that's why I think the as applied figures are

particularly important. We haven't seen the objective criteria of political success and opportunities discussed as they played out in 2008. We do have a general agreement that a little bit more money was spent across the spectrum, but where we significantly disagree, Your Honor, is on the so what. What has that done to the minor party. And that's where, that's where we part ways significantly. That's why we look at the 2008 numbers. We haven't seen the effect.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, might I be heard just on the chill point? My timing seems to be a little off here. And I think it's true that courts commonly take into account factual evidence of whether or not an alleged chilling effect has actually occurred by comparing data such as statistics before and after, is there any evidence of a decline. And to the extent that there is not, we would submit that there's no evidence, either testimonially or in the data, of any — that any chilling effect has, in fact, occurred.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, I think we're talking past each other. I just -- I try to spare everyone the trouble of going through the receipt and competition data that is contained in findings 278 through H. But they just, they should -- I don't know what part of this

conversation is not being appreciated.

The candidate receipts in those expenditures that are directly attributable — the candidate receipts in those districts targeted by minor parties in '06 or in '08 have gone through the roof and it's all attributable to the CEP. Minor parties are competing in a very, a much more expensive environment. Their thousand dollars doesn't go as far. They say so what. They actually, and they also say sometimes minor parties do better. I say so what to that.

This is a subsidy case, Your Honor. Election results are not the only measure of how my clients are hurt. My clients are hurt by the fact that a Republican party candidate who didn't poll, who lost by 20 or 30 points and who might not have run in that race but for the CEP, now has \$85,000 to brand his or her candidacy and the Republican Party and to in effect bank that good will which was purchased by that government money. That same subsidy is denied to my candidate and that's how my candidates are hurt, Your Honor.

It doesn't matter whether they are competing in more or fewer districts. They are competing in fewer districts but it doesn't matter. The injury is the fact that they are competing in a more expensive field. It's the same injury that I gave the court an analogy to about

the big time. If a Democrat has half an hour by statute and a Republican has an hour by statute to address the public on public T.V., the injury flows from the increased resources that the state has provided to the Republican candidate, and that's how my candidates are hurt. And my clients discuss this in their testimony and I'm going to walk the court through it.

Now, we have looked at, Your Honor, we have looked at all the data from a macule point of view to see how much more money is flowing into, into political campaigns in Connecticut. And we have shown how it affects scores and scores of candidates across the board. It will increase their expenditures. We have shown how it will affect districts, I have tried to show how it will affect districts in which minor party candidates have participated, and I've heard nothing here that is a contradiction to any of my data, the data we presented showing how expenditures, spending will in fact decrease in minor party districts.

Now, I've broken it down further for the court and for the defendants, and I'm wondering if they are reading our data, I mean our findings. But I think, I think there were four or five Green Party candidates — five Green Party candidates who ran for legislative office in 2008 and one Libertarian Party candidate — and one

Libertarian candidate who ran in '08 and there was one who ran in '06 and didn't run in '08. The playing field has changed dramatically in these districts. It's become very — in four of those six districts it's become prohibitively expensive to continue to be heard in those districts because of the effect of the CEP grants.

Now, I understand their argument that one of our candidates actually did great this cycle. I think he polled 19 percent, but -- against a publicly funded candidate, there was no Republican in the race or no Democrat in the race, but that's almost irrelevant. The key here is that the publicly funded candidate has been given this windfall, if you will, to spend to get his message out, and the Republican candidate who chose not to run in this particular election can nevertheless enter that race the next cycle and be given, and also be given this windfall. And that's the injury to my client, since my clients have to plan for this contingency. They have to deal in that environment.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Your Honor, just to clarify factually, two of the Green Party candidates ran in districts where none of the major party candidates participated in the CEP. I think it was Kenric Hanson in 39th and Zack Chaves. So that statement that you made that they were impacted by the CEP in their races isn't

right. I just wanted to clarify that for the court.

MR. LOPEZ: I didn't mean to mislead the court.

I think I said four out of six ran in races with CEP funded candidates. The other two candidates ran in districts that there's no indication that the major party candidate couldn't have participated in the CEP. They chose to opt-out. In one of the districts the major party candidate spent -- it's a safe Democratic district in New London and the Democratic candidate decided to opt-out. There's no indication he couldn't have participated. And our clients have to plan for that contingency, that maybe next cycle -- is there something wrong with the court's -- yes, maybe the next cycle they could be facing a CEP funded candidate whose receipts are significantly more than \$3,000 as they said in this cycle.

And also I would say in the Zak Chaves district, which is the Greenwich Senate district, both the Democrat and Republican opted out. I don't know why they opted out, but the money they raise would be less than what they would have gotten if both participated. There's no indication they couldn't have participated and they may participate in the next cycle. And if they do, my clients, you know, will have to make a decision at that point do we target that district in 2010? This is — all of a sudden this district got very difficult for us.

That's the type of injury we're talking about.

The injury isn't a limited -- isn't limited to election results or what they did or didn't do this cycle. It's about their plan in going forward and I'm ready to address that, Your Honor.

The primary challenge based by the Green Party under the CEP is the recognition that its candidates are competing in a more competitive and, more importantly, more expensive political environment. In three of the five legislative districts that the Green Party targeted in '08, the resources available to the CEP funded major party candidate were significantly greater than expenditures in '06.

In the first Senate district, for instance, Mike DeRosa, who's sitting here today, was opposed by John Fonfara. Fonfara is considered a safe incumbent who, nevertheless, received \$160,000 in combined primary and general election grants, in addition to the \$15,000 he raised in qualifying contributions. In '06, Fonfara raised only \$36,000. In addition, a second Democrat received a \$75,000 grant to run in the primary against Fonfara.

A Republican, Barbara Rhue, also entered the general election after abandoning the district in '06.

Although she failed to qualify for public financing after

signing up for it, or didn't pursue it after signing up for it, her entry into the race drew votes from, from my candidate whose vote total took him below the ten percent that he had polled in previous elections when he was only competing against John Fonfara.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I would just like to there, I have to object. What is the foundation for the statement that a Republican candidate's entry into the first senatorial district race drew votes from Mr. DeRosa?

MR. LOPEZ: I can give it to you.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Well, we know what the numbers are between then and now. He did appear a little worse. But, you know, there's a little bit of logical leap here in a court of law to suggest that we can make that conclusion.

MR. LOPEZ: Perry --

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Was the message the same? Were they going after the same sort of demographics, the same issues?

THE COURT: You know, it's not apparent to me frankly that vote totals, 2006 versus 2008, are especially helpful. I'll be very frank. Because every election is different. You know, in some cases, if the, if the minor party candidate is running against only a weakened

Republican, that is weakened in 2008, the minor party candidate may have done better in other cases. If they are running against only a Democrat, they may have done worse. There's just too many factors to try to sort out any particular race or why overall what the vote totals mean in terms of this act. I'll just be very frank.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Well, I don't disagree with that, Your Honor, except we have to look at something I think the test requires us to evaluate relative to something before and after. Ideally we're looking at objective factors, none of which is perfect. But, you know, we have to make some sort of evaluation. Vote totals is about as good as we can get as far as determining a candidate's strength in a particular district.

There are other objective factors that I think we can look to. Party enrollment numbers, for example.

But, you know, what I sort of -- what we sort of object to generally is the notion that we should not, the State is not entitled to the benefit of the doubt when it comes to the question of whether the intangibles, you know, operate to the detriment of the plaintiffs, whether the expenditures will result in a detriment to the defendants, whether there are motivational factors now that exist that result in a detriment to the plaintiffs. We object to the

fact that we're not entitled to the benefit of the doubt in that. We think in this particular kind of case, at the facial challenge particularly, we are entitled to every benefit of the doubt on those sorts of disputed issues.

But then, to compound that with the fact that we're not entitled to the benefit of the doubt on the objective factors like vote totals? You know, that to me seems like a double-bind that the State finds itself in, Your Honor.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, it's not a question of benefit of the doubt. Vote totals are really not at issue in this case. I agree with this court. This is a subsidy case. It's about whether or not the money that's being paid to major party candidates increases their electorial opportunities and increases their competitive, their electorial opportunities and their communication, their ability to communicate.

And, frankly, the more and more I get my arms wrapped around this case, Your Honor, I've come to the conclusion, at least in my mind, that this case is about money. And the fact that, that a major party candidate's vote, average overall vote total, a major party candidate's average vote total this cycle may not have increased or decreased is really neither here nor there.

The only point where it's relevant, Your Honor,

is a point that was conceded by the defendants' experts, I believe under your cross examination. We came to a consensus that the entry of a second major party candidate could affect, will certainly, almost certainly affect the vote total of a third party candidate in a district that was previous, in a previously single party district. And that had consequences for minor party candidates, just as it did this cycle for Mike DeRosa because it could bring him below the ten percent threshold for qualifying for public financing. And I think it happened to two other minor party candidates this cycle who were both recipients of public financing this cycle and because the second major party candidate entered the race, their vote total would make -- they decreased and would make them eligible for less money next time around if they could raise the qualifying contribution.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So, in that sense vote totals are important and we have the testimony of the defense expert acknowledging that. But beyond that, I'm not sure the relevance.

MR. FEINBERG: Your Honor, if I might, there's one other huge logical flaw in the argument that Mr. Lopez is making right now. The claim that Mr. DeRosa was disadvantaged by the entry of a second major party candidate in his race, I mean that is the argument, it dropped him below 10 percent, and that candidate was

Barbara Rhue, a Republican, as I understand it, who didn't participate in the CEP, so that has no causative effect whatsoever. You can't attribute the fact that Mr. DeRosa did less well this year to anything that's in the CEP if Ms. Rhue didn't participate in it. And there's no evidence that she was motivated to join the race because of that, or that she — and she in fact did not take advantage of it, so what — there's no, there's no beef there, if you will.

MR. LOPEZ: If I may just answer, this might be helpful. She did sign up to participate in the CEP.

She's one of the -- she either didn't make it or she opted out.

MR. FEINBERG: And then she didn't follow up on it. So how much of an incentive is that supposed to be?

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: And, by the way --

THE COURT: The point I think is this. The argument, as I understand it, is not that in any particular race a candidate who accepted CEP funding affected the political opportunity of a minor party. I think the argument is simply this.

The CEP encourages major party candidates to participate where they otherwise would not. In any situation in which two major party candidates are opposing each other, the political opportunity of a minor party

candidate is reduced. Therefore, the CEP reduces the political opportunity of minor party candidates by encouraging participation of major party candidates where they wouldn't otherwise.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  FEINBERG: On the facial side, I think that is the argument.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FEINBERG: And I think we disagree with it because we don't think the CEP will have that effect on major party candidates.

On the as applied side, Mr. DeRosa is specifically saying I was adversely affected in my Senate race by this statute. And the point is that is not true and they haven't sustained any burden of proof to establish that.

MR. LOPEZ: I think he has met that burden, if that's the burden. His testimony establishes that he — the entry of a second major party candidate in the first district drew votes for him. He believes it drew votes for him, drew votes for him and took him below the ten percent.

He also has testimony that whereas his \$1,000 competed only against \$36,000 in 2006, it's now competing against 3- or \$400,000, and he's complaining -- that's an injury he's complaining about, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But Mr. DeRosa doesn't have a right to any particular level of electorial support. What he has a right to, if anything, is an argument about the political opportunity he has, and how the funding program of the CEP affects that. So I mean --

MR. LOPEZ: That -- I couldn't have said it better, Your Honor.

Your Honor, look, this is just too, too dry to go through — so I would just ask the court if the court wants to satisfy itself how these six minor party candidates who ran, my clients, Libertarian and Green Party candidates, how they were affected by the implementation of the CEP this cycle, this is set forth in findings 306(g) through 306(k). It's also supported by affidavit and testimony and, summarized, just makes the point they are competing, as a whole competing in a more expensive and in some cases crowded environment.

But I just want to urge -- but in these findings, in our client's affidavits, they make the even more important point that going forward in 2010 and 2012, they have to factor in the fact that they are going to be competing in this very expensive or very different environment and they are going to have to plan for that and they are in the process of doing that now, Your Honor.

And later in my presentation I'll, I'll go into

some detail about what they are doing now to try to adapt.

All right? I am at --

THE COURT: This would be a good stopping point for lunch if you're --

MR. LOPEZ: All right.

THE COURT: If you're at a good break, we'll have lunch but let me throw this question out. Is there anybody who would object to my taking judicial notice of any facts that are available to me from public, that is government websites concerning electorial results, campaign financing and expenditures? In other words, let me just give you an example. If I wanted to figure out where did -- was it Barbara Rhue, was that the candidate we're talking about?

MR. FEINBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. If I want to see, for example, where Barbara Rhue got her money to run, I assume I can find that on the public, that is, the government website that shows who contributed to her campaign, including whether she got party contributions or individual contributions or funded her own campaign or whatever.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Your Honor, you could. I think one thing we've learned over the past couple of months is that extracting data, even from objective, you

know, sort of filings is not a science -- it's more of an art than a science. So I think we would probably kind of want the opportunity to know what the court's questions were, because we've been, even on matters as simple as contestedness we've been in disagreement on some things, so I think it might be helpful to us to know sort of more specifically what the court is trying to determine.

THE COURT: Okay, I'll give you the question that popped in my head. Argument is made there's no causation between the CEP and Mr. DeRosa's election results because Ms. Rhue did not take CEP funds. I'd be curious to know what has been the pattern of party contributions to candidates not accepting CEP funds 2006 versus 2008. In other words, if most of the parties' candidates are fully funded because they are taking CEP funds, those who decide not to potentially are more heavily subsidized by a party that now has more money to focus on particular races where it used to have to spread this money around. And that may be a less direct effect but it seems to me it could provide the causation that Mr. Feinberg is arguing is missing.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: My understanding is she wasn't a significant recipient of those funds, but that is the kind of question I think we could answer for Your Honor by looking at termination reports, committee

reports. Some of that may already be in the record in raw form and maybe we just have to extract a particular data point here.

MR. FEINBERG: Your Honor, I always hesitate to tell a judge that what you're thinking of doing is not an appropriate course, but I really don't think that it is proper for the court to be kind of engaging in its own research trying to sort out factual issues like that, even from publicly available data, because there may be, for example, other considerations that really ought to be brought to bear in terms of how to evaluate that data the court may not be aware of when you're just looking at public websites.

go. One is to ask us some questions and let us try to provide you with the information; another is to at some point now or down the road, advise the parties that you're thinking of using this data and these are the conclusions that you're thinking of drawing, do we have any objection to it at that point, so we have an opportunity to weigh in on any specific factual conclusion that the court's trying to draw from the evidence.

THE COURT: Well, you know, I don't need to focus on the one race, but in general I'd be interested to see what effect the CEP has had on party or party

oriented, party controlled -- party affiliated is probably the best word, funding sources for candidates who are not engaged in accepting CEP funds. In other words, did the Republicans funnel money to Republican candidates who are not taking CEP funds? Did the Democrats do that? I just would be curious.

MR. FEINBERG: Then we will try to answer that question for you in some reasonable period of time after this hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: We will caucus and I think we'll be able to, we'll do our best to provide that. It's not many immediately apparent where we would have to -- all the sources we would have to look at but we will address that question.

THE COURT: That would be helpful. Thank you.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, you had -- you're going to address that specific point? Okay. Your Honor, I just didn't want to leave the court with the misimpression that we said Barbara Rhue and Fonfara's and DeRosa's senate district run received a CEP grant.

THE COURT: No, I understand.

MR. LOPEZ: She signed up for it, and that means she's bound by certain rules, but the fact that she didn't qualify --

THE COURT: No, it's precisely because she didn't accept CEP funds that I was wondering, well, did she receive a benefit indirectly.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: In that case she would be bound by the contribution restrictions that anyone who did accept CEP funds, so she was in the sort of circumstance where she couldn't do what another candidate might do but also didn't get the CEP funding.

THE COURT: Okay, and I'm not focusing on her except that her name came up.

MR. ZINN-ROWTHORN: Understood.

THE COURT: Yes, okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, and, Your Honor, we've gone back and forth about what the difference between facial and as applied challenge is. I just think the example I keep giving about the debate is helpful as to, I think, both facially and as applied. Remember what I said earlier, in a situation where the two speakers get different debate time, you can challenge that facially because on its face it draws a distinction that has no constitutional conflict to political speech, but the fact that the Republican didn't use his advantage under the scheme I was referring, it doesn't defeat Mike's facial challenge this time because the statutory scheme is still in place and he will have to face that disadvantage next

time.

THE COURT: I understand the difference between facial and applied.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay, all right. And, you know, I really don't like getting caught up on this issue of causation. I really think we've complicated the record here, everyone, because, you know, look, it's just common sense. In all the prop — or all the — I don't want to use the word propaganda, but in all the excitement about this public financing program, there's consensus that the point is to increase competition and to increase, and to increase the number of challenges that challenge incumbents. That's the whole point of this public financing program and that footprint is all over legislative history and all over their documents that come from the CEP.

We also have our experts and their experts who confirm that, of course, it's going to provide an incentive for major party candidates and it may not happen this cycle but over time it's going to happen. And that's what our clients are testifying to, Your Honor. This cycle it may not have, the effect may not have been so pronounced that it catches the court's attention. I think it was. I think they are competing in a very -- a much, much more difficult environment. But over time it is

going to affect the playing field or alter the playing field that they are competing on, and they are right now engaged in the process of trying to figure out how to deal with that, Your Honor.

For instance, do they get in the cross endorsement business? There's a lot of advantages to be engaged in the cross endorsement business. That's not what they do. Do they withdraw from electorial politics in the State of Connecticut? Do they — because they don't feel they can compete in this enforcement? Do they focus all their attention on federal states races or maybe the statewide slate? Do they get out of legislative elections, Your Honor?

They are having this conversation now, Your

Honor, and there's no rule that says they have to come to

final conclusions now. This is a conversation or a debate

that's going to be had in their executive committee over

the next, over the next several months and years as they

continue to evolve their policy.

The point is from their point of view, the game has changed and they have to now come up with a new game plan and they are doing that. And that's the injury.

That's what's sufficient for purposes of Article III, Your Honor, and it's what's sufficient for purposes of the merits.

```
1
                 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lopez, let me just
 2
       quickly inquire where are you in terms of your
 3
      presentation? How much longer do you anticipate going
 4
       after lunch?
 5
                 (Pause)
 6
                 MR. LOPEZ: I think I need the afternoon, Your
 7
       Honor. I think I need --
8
                 THE COURT: Okay.
                 MR. LOPEZ: -- three hours? What did we take
 9
10
       this morning? We took three hours and I got more than
11
      halfway through my presentation.
12
                 THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. Let's take
13
       just over an hour. Come back at 1:45. Stand in recess.
14
                (Whereupon the luncheon recess was taken at
15
       12:40 o'clock, p. m.)
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

AFTERNOON SESSION

2 (1:45 O'CLOCK, P. M.)

THE COURT: Mr. Lopez?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, sir. Your Honor, I just wanted to point out that I am here with my clients today, Mike DeRosa who ran in the First Senate District; Rich Duffy who is the Party's candidate for the Congressional District, and; Mr. Steven Fournier who is the co-chair of the Party, also the Congressional District; David Bedell who is also here today, was the party's candidate for the Stamford Registrar of Voters, and; Ben Wojan who has previously run as a candidate.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, this morning I tried to present half a dozen different ways, I tried to measure the impact of the CEP on the political opportunities and competitiveness and the resources of my candidates. I think there is another measure and it has to do with cross endorsements.

Connecticut's new fusion voting rules work in tandem with the CEP to benefit the major parties, primarily the Democratic Party, by providing minor parties like the Working Families Party with a powerful incentive, cross endorsement of the major parties, and this is what has happened. The number of minor party cross

endorsements of major party candidates in the State legislature increased from 57 in '06 to 79 in '08. In '08 the Working Families Party largely stopped running its own candidates and instead embraced a strategy of cross endorsing Democratic candidates.

This is all -- in 2002, for instance, the WFP ran 25 legislative candidates of their own. In '04 they ran 54 and crossed endorsed 16 major party candidates. In '08 the WFP only ran four candidates. They cross endorsed a Democrat in over 70 other districts. This is all set out in -- it can be deduced from the Secretary of State's website but it's also set out in Mr. James' declaration and the accompanying tables.

Now, this -- we may or may not hear from the chair of the WFP tomorrow, and so reserving on this issue, but the Chairperson has submitted two affidavits, and in those affidavits -- and they are both part of the defendant's record -- they argue that they benefit from the CEP, and presumably that's why Mr. Zinn Rowthorn was going to put Mr. Green on the stand. We can agree, Your Honor, that they indirectly benefit to the extent that the major party candidate that they support receives public financing. But to the extent the WFP maintains that it benefits directly under the CEP, the court must accept two -- three propositions.

First, that the WFP will get ten percent or more on the WFP line when they cross endorse a major party candidate. Second, that the WFP in the next election will break from the major party candidate and run their own candidate against the very same candidate they supported in the previous election. And, thirdly, that they will actually qualify for public financing in those circumstances.

This series of hypotheticals, Your Honor, it is in our view a slim reed to credit the testimony of Mr. Green in his affidavits and his position that the WFP is benefiting from public financing.

There is, of course the scenario where they could run their own candidates, as they did this time — they ran two of their four candidates under the public financing program — but that, what they did in '08 is completely inconsistent and contrary to the trend of what they have done in the past, which is move in the direction of cross endorsing Democratic candidates.

In contrast, the Green Party, like the
Libertarian party, has for now decided not to engage in
cross endorsements as a matter of party policy in order to
maintain its independent voice as a minor party. The
decision not to cross endorse has allowed the Green Party
to maintain its political independence. But it has made

it more difficult for the party to take advantage of the CEP because Green Party endorsed candidates are unable to benefit from the CEP's major party preference. The CEP is currently — the Green Party, Your Honor, is currently rethinking its policies on cross endorsement.

The course of the increased difficulty of competing in a post-CEP environment — and this is all set out in the declaration of Steven Fournier, who's here today. I would add that there was a Green Party candidate who submitted a declaration in this case named Kenric Hanson, who ran in the 39th House District and he received 9.9 percent of the vote. And the Republican Party approached him and offered to cross endorse him and if that had occurred, it's very likely that Mr. Hanson would have polled more than 10 percent of the vote and possibly as much as 20 percent of the vote, but because he didn't agree with the position of the Republican Party, he decided not to do that.

But the point I make here, Your Honor, is that while the WFP may feel that benefit from the CEP, that's a much more difficult -- it's very unlikely that the Green Party candidates will benefit from adopting a policy of cross endorsing major party candidates.

Now, if I can move on then, Your Honor. The injury to minor party candidates that flow from competing

in what we believe we've shown is a more expensive and crowded environment, might be offset if the benefits to minor parties were limited to base grants. The benefits of the CEP to minor party candidates, as we know, are not limited to the general base grants amount. In at least a dozen different ways, the base grants can be doubled under the excess expenditure provisions.

Director Garfield testified before the legislature at this session that he expects this position to come into play with the 2010 elections and has budgeted for the likelihood that grants will be doubled, will in fact be doubled under this provision of statewide elections.

The base grant can also be doubled under the independent expenditure provisions and Director Garfield's 2010 -- or testimony before the legislature anticipated that the independent expenditure provisions will also come into play, in fact, even greater than the excess expenditure provisions. He believed that in the statewide elections it's very likely those provisions are going to come into play.

He also testifies that he thinks there's going to be increased primaries in the 2010 elections, that there will be a contested Republican and a contested Democratic primary for the office of Governor, and I think

also for Office of Attorney General and perhaps for Secretary of State. Depends which seats are open. And that's all playing out currently.

The other benefits that flow to major parties outside of the grants is that the party can funnel unlimited amounts of money into its statewide candidates. There's no restriction on which party committees can funnel to its statewide candidates to fund the organizational expenditure loophole. And I'm not talking direct infusion but the coordinated political activity including something as basic as running ads that urge the election or reelection of Governor Rell. A party — the party can, you know, the party can always do that independently but under the organizational expenditure they can actually coordinate that have strategy with, with Governor Rell and do it, and engage in that advocacy. Governor Rell can also raise money for the, for the party for this very purpose.

So it's sort of, there's -- this confirms, I think, what Director Garfield testified to before the state legislature. This has the potential to really undermine the purposes of the public financial system which was to remove the influence of private money from the system. And -- excuse me.

Now, we had prepared organizational expenditure

data from -- and it's submitted as part of, as part of the James declaration but it's sort of moot because we came up with a number of 250-odd thousand dollars that was raised just by the leadership tax on the Democratic side. The Democratic House and Republican House and Senate leadership actually raised about \$250,000.

The State actually looked at all the organizational expenditure committees for all the committees that are covered and they came up with a much larger number. I think it was approached a half million dollars, and I understand their point is this half million dollars is a lot less that was, than was raised in the past by party committees and leadership committees. But, nevertheless, a half million dollars in the first year that this program has been in place we submit is a significant amount of money that was driven into the campaigns of State, House and State senate candidates.

So for that proposition, as it turns out we need to look no further than the Commissioner Garfield's own declaration.

Now, there's also another benefit that major parties have under the system that really distinguish it from other systems, is that they can engage, they can organize exploratory committees and they can raise and spend significant amounts of money before they receive the

party's nomination, and this has already happened.

At the last hearing, an objection was raised that there's no evidence that this is happening. Actually Governor Rell and Jim Amann -- Amil? Speaker Amann have both organized exploratory committees as of last August, and that's in the record. We placed that in the record as well, Your Honor.

And we would direct the court to Plaintiff's 82 and Plaintiff's 96 and Plaintiff's 97. These are the exploratory committee reports of the two gubernatorial candidates and the exploratory committees, and Plaintiffs' 82 is a list of candidates who have formed exploratory committees in which we pointed out --

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I think just for the record, Speaker Amann is now out of an exploratory committee into a candidate committee, just for the record.

MR. LOPEZ: And just one more anecdote because the -- I'll withdraw that.

You know, the final aspect of this, of how the CEP is designed to lock in the benefits of major party candidates is how the grants to minor and petitioning party candidates who qualify for partial grants are made. As described, as I'll describe in a minute, minor parties have to meet a much more difficult standard to qualify. This fact alone distinguishes this system from other state

financing systems, which at this point are a matter of record, how the public financing system works.

What distinguishes Connecticut even more from those systems is that minor party candidates who satisfy the qualifying contribution requirement do not receive an equal return on their money.

First, they must invest a significant portion of the potential grant in qualifying expenses. Mr. Ladov is going to address that for Your Honor but I will give you a preview, that the cost can be prohibited and significantly exceed the amount of money a candidate is allowed to raise during the qualifying period, and I think that was confirmed by the testimony of Donald Green and their appropriate citations to his testimony in our findings.

The second factor is that a candidate who qualifies and raises the qualifying contributions may only receive a partial grant. And so a candidate for state senate makes a full grant if he raises \$15,000. A minor party candidate who qualifies based on prior vote totals, ten percent of the prior vote total, has to raise the same \$15,000 and he only gets \$28,000 or a third of the grant.

And I'm -- that candidate finds himself in an awkward position. If he wants to, if that candidate qualifies for a partial grant and wants to seek a full grant, our reading of the statute is that he would have to

revert, he'd have to give up his eligibility for that grant and revert to being a petitioning candidate and try to qualify for a full grant through the petitioning process.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, that may benefit from a little clarification. Just it wasn't clear to me that he was talking about someone in an election cycle who's qualified, has a grant, as opposed to making a decision at the outset early in the year. So there's no circumstance under which someone would get a grant, say I'm happy with this amount of money for my current expenditures, I'm giving it back, and then start the process again.

But it is true that, you know, that there isn't an opportunity for someone who is qualified for a one-third grant to circulate petitions to increase the size of that grant. That fact is true. I don't know if I added anything to that.

THE COURT: And what are the opportunities after the election for proceeding with a full grant? In other words, if the election turned out you get the 20 percent vote, what do you get looking backward for that last --

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Looking backward you can get some supplemental post-election funds to cover existing debts.

THE COURT: To cover deficits. 1 2 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Deficits. 3 THE COURT: But you can't get --4 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: You wouldn't get a windfall 5 that would exceed your debts carrying the amount 6 forwarding. 7 MR. LOPEZ: There's still some confusion in my mind about how the system works. Do you mind if I --8 9 Perry, if a minor party candidate qualifies for a one-third grant or is eligible for a one third grant --10 11 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Based on the previous two 12 years? 13 MR. LOPEZ: Right, based on prior proposal, can 14 they -- do they even have the option of seeking to qualify 15 for petition prices? 16 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I don't want to 17 go too far out on this. I think this is a question that 18 has -- there's been -- I don't think it's ever been 19 squarely before the SEEC and I think I'd like to give them 20 the opportunity to probably consider that and perhaps do a 21 declaratory ruling, if appropriate. But -- am I right this hasn't been an issue that you've issued any guidance 22 23 on? MS. ROTMAN: Yes, declaratory ruling --24 25 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: This is outside of the scope

of the 2008-1 declaratory ruling. That was folks who weren't eligible last time but had ballot access from having received one percent, between one percent and ten percent. But this, this scenario is not one that the SEEC has issued guidance on.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just note that the comment wasn't picked up on the record. I don't know if you want your statement to be on the record or not. We'll be happy just to have Mr. Zinn Rowthorn's statements, so I don't -- I leave it up to you. I don't care but I just don't want anybody to be surprised that the comment wasn't picked up.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: What was conveyed just was the scenario was outside the scope of the 2008-1 declaratory ruling.

MR. LOPEZ: And just to summarize then, if I understood Mr. Rowthorn, our reading of the statute is correct that a partially funded major party candidate, partially funded minor party candidate who qualifies for a one-third grant cannot, cannot receive full funding by engaging in additional petitioning, and I understand from Mr. Rowthorn's comments that if a minor party candidate is eligible based on prior vote total, he could — he may or may not be able to, to jettison his eligibility, if you will, and seek full funding for the petitioning process.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: I think that's right, Your
Honor. I don't know the answer to the latter scenario.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ LOPEZ}$  : Our position is the statute does not allow you to do that.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. LOPEZ: Now, Your Honor, our whole discussion of how the CEP sort of elevates the position of major parties really begs the question and ultimately, the ultimate issue in this case is whether the benefits to minor parties under the CEP offset the benefits that are being given to major parties. Another way of saying that — and we can all degree that the answer to that question depends on the reasonableness of the qualifying criteria, and if the qualifying criteria are, in fact, reasonable by constitutional measure, then I think we can all agree that we don't win. Our position, of course, is that they are unreasonable.

Our view is that the 20 percent vote total line is an arbitrary line whose only purpose is to protect major parties and exclude minor parties. It is, the line is completely unrelated to the likelihood of a major party candidate's ability to run an effective and competitive campaign and that's because of the political landscape in Connecticut.

Major party candidates consistently don't

compete and they consistently lose by landslide margins, as defined by the defendant's own testimony. Setting the line at 20 percent is low enough to capture all major parties but it's high enough to exclude minor and petitioning parties in the main.

Now, we submit that the line is arbitrary for two reasons. First, it provides full funding for major party candidates who have no chance at winning the election, and this is clear from not only past elections but it's also set out in the Narain Tables 3 and 4, showing the number of CEP funded candidates who lost by 20 percent or more of the vote and who competed in party nominations.

Second, it is -- in many cases the line is unrelated to the government's goal of removing suspect private money from the system. These uncompetitive candidates weren't raising any money in the first place. In many cases they weren't even running. The funding will also have the ancillary effect of driving up expenditures in districts that were previously low spending in comparison because of the absence of any meaningful competition.

Our view is that if the legislature wants to fund candidates who aren't viable, that is a legitimate policy decision, but they have to fund our candidates,

too, since in many races minor parties have comparable support to the lesser of the two major parties.

The 20 percent threshold, Your Honor, in our view is not only arbitrary but there are other rules, there are other funding rules that add to the arbitrariness of the system. First, there is no post election funding except for the small amount that you may be able to qualify for in supplemental payments that Mr. Rowthorn spoke to.

In addition, a minor or petitioning party candidate who didn't qualify on the front end because he didn't collect the required number of signatures or because she didn't qualify with prior vote totals is disqualified from receiving public funds, no matter how well they do in the election. And that's an important distinguishing fact from, from how presidental systems are funded and discussion about it.

In addition, minor party candidates are denied primary funding, and I know I've seen some testimony from, I believe from Director Garfield, that nothing in the statute prohibits minor parties from getting primary funding when they are in primaries. But the statute is actually very clear that the primary funding is only available to two major party candidates. And the court can satisfy itself of that by looking at the statute.

Your Honor, the second discriminatory aspect of the qualifying criteria is the qualifying contribution requirement. It is set at a level that roughly corresponds, if you will, to the ability of major party candidates to raise those amounts of money.

According to the defendant's witnesses, "It is within the basic competence," and that's a quote, "and ability of all major party candidates to raise the necessary qualifying contributions because of their party apparatus." This is at George Jepsen's deposition, Plaintiff's Exhibit 20, at 90 to 93.

He goes on to testify that "Major party candidates for statewide office can easily satisfy this requirement by tapping into the party infrastructure."

And this appears at pages 80, 85 of his deposition.

"The State Central Committee for both the Democratic and Republican Party maintains a list of contributors and can provide other fundraising assistance to the candidate." And that's at page 29 to 31 of his deposition.

There is no correlation, however, between the ability of the major party candidates to raise this money and, A, to run a competitive campaign, and, B, to raise anywhere near the amount of money that is provided by the CEP. The only purpose served by this requirement is to

weed out minor party candidates who don't have the demonstrated fundraising ability to satisfy the qualifying contribution requirement.

And the legislature was aware of this. The legislature adopted a qualifying contribution requirement with the knowledge that minor party candidates almost never raise the amount of money required to qualify under the CEP. That's Plaintiff's Exhibit 18.

In contrast to other states, Your Honor, that had adopted public financing systems, the amount of money that a candidate must raise in Connecticut is substantial. In Maine, for instance, a candidate only has to raise \$12,500 in the race for Governor. In Arizona, the candidate only has to raise \$20,000.

Under the -- if the court's looking for guidance from <u>Buckley</u>, under the federal system for financing presidental campaigns, there is no requirement that a candidate first raise qualifying contributions.

Candidates who win their party's nomination automatically qualify for public financing provided, in the case of minor party candidates, that they are otherwise eligible.

The system for financing presidental primaries is different. Under that system, a system for financing primaries as opposed to general, under that system, candidates must raise a relatively de minimus amount of

money. Candidates are eligible for matching funds if they first raise \$5,000 in each of 20 states, counting only the first \$250 towards that requirement. That was the requirement in 1976 when <u>Buckley</u> was decided and remains the standard today.

Adjusted for inflation, the \$250,000 requirement in Connecticut is much more significant and much more difficult to achieve since it is limited to Connecticut residents. Adjusted for inflation, the \$100,000 requirement under the federal system from 1976 is the equivalent of a \$20,000, \$23,000 requirement today.

If I wasn't clear, what I'm just trying to say is \$250,000 is a sight more than the \$100,000 you have to do to qualify for presidental matching funds during the primary period when you adjust it for inflation.

THE COURT: What you're saying is Ralph Nader had an easier time running for president as an Independent Party candidate than running for Governor as a Green Party candidate.

MR. LOPEZ: Absolutely. And Ralph Nader actually qualified for primary funding because under the presidential system, to qualify for funding — all you have to do to qualify for primary funding, all you have to do is meet the same requirement as a major party candidate. There's no need for you to have a formal state

endorsed, state sanctioned primary, the way do you in Connecticut, or the way you do in most states. The party can hold its own primary and it can a very informal. You just to have to be seeking the new party's nomination and we introduced that into the record and replaced evidence that was excluded. There was an advisory opinion granting Ralph Nader —

(Pause)

MR. LOPEZ: We site to an FDC advisory opinion granting him, granting him primary funds and I don't think the defendants have contested it, frankly, that if the minor party candidates are eligible for primary funding under the presidential primary system, even though they don't have state sanction primaries the way we do in Connecticut.

And the other point I would emphasize about the presidentials is, once again, I think this is important to emphasize, is that there is no requirement that you raise qualifying contributions to be funded for the general.

The other important point about the financing system under the presidential system is even though — is that although only the first \$1,250 of the contribution are, count toward meeting the qualifying contribution requirement, the candidate can, can raise the contributions up to the applicable federal limit which is

\$2,300 and that enables the candidate to finance the process of qualifying for the ballot and collecting the contribution and that's not true in Connecticut. You are limited to raising the money in \$100 amounts -- and -- okay.

Now, Your Honor, that, for now -- Your Honor, just to summarize, there are three aspects of qualifying process apply to major, nonmajor party candidates that impose a real burden on nonmajor party candidates and have the effect of effectively excluding them from participation in a CEP, but at least excluding them on a discriminatory, what we allege are discriminatory terms.

The primary vote total, we submit, is an arbitrary requirement. We submit that the seemingly neutral qualifying contribution requirements is, in fact, an arbitrary requirement. And then there is, of course, the reasonableness of the petitioning process itself, and I've asked my co-counsel to address that subject.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Ladov?

MR. LADOV: Thank you. So, Your Honor, I'm

going to walk through the burden of petitioning for a bit.

Now, the burden of petitioning has been set out at length

in our proposed findings. You can find the sections sort

of beginning at paragraph 181 and going all the way up to

241. We think that our findings have been validated by

the testimony of defense witnesses Donald Green and Harold Hubschman. So we've offered our evidence and we've also been relying on the evidence submitted by the defendants.

Now, at the December hearing, the defendants' expert acknowledged that the amount of money needed to qualify could easily exceed the amount of money that a candidate is allowed to raise during the qualifying period. His testimony about the reasonableness of the qualifying criteria was based on his belief that candidates could incur a deficit to defray the cost of qualifying and repay the money once they receive CEP funds.

Now, we think that that opinion, that you would spend half your CEP grant on qualifying is confirmed by the evidence that we put into the record regarding the enormous costs incurred by two Working Families Party candidates.

Now, obviously I think there's a legal dispute between the parties and whether that's permitted by the act. We believe that it's not permitted by the plain language of the statute, that it's not permitted by the regulations and, frankly, that it's not permitted by anything that we heard from the SEEC until yesterday. I think that the other side will argue otherwise.

THE COURT: And what is it you're saying is not

permitted is to reimburse the campaign for expenses that have been previously incurred in order to obtain signatures?

MR. LADOV: Right. We believe that and we also -- I think that the law is very clear that a candidate cannot incur expenditures over the qualifying period limit, which is limited to the amount of qualifying contributions plus \$1- or \$2,000 in your personal funds. We think simply that the law states that you cannot spend more than that amount of money and you can't incur expenditures that you're going to later pay back to. Qualify. We've always seen the regulations as a way of enforcing that, but we think it's a plain part of the statute.

I guess just to start with though, I just want to get into the factual evidence that's presented by the Working Families Party candidate. Now, the Working Families Party has been presented as the type of organized and successful minor party that can benefit from the CEP. Their executive director, John Green, may or may not offer testimony tomorrow. He's already offered his testimony through the written affidavits into the record.

He says he believes the qualifying criteria are reasonable. We simply ask that that assertion be evaluated in the light of the evidence, which shows that

the WFP have spent enormous amounts of money and enormous amounts of time in order to qualify for these grants. And that fact stands, whether or not it's permissible or impermissible, it's still an absolutely enormous amount of time and money that's being spent.

Now, in our findings, paragraph 230(a), we quoted at some length from John Green's September 4th, 2008 declaration, and I'm just going to walk through those numbers for a moment just to reiterate the amount of money we can expect.

And, according to John Green, in order to obtain

signatures and raise qualifying contributions, Mr.

Booker's campaign hired a canvassing service.

Approximately 20 canvassers collected signatures for Mr.

Booker's candidacy. Mr. Booker's public filings reflect an expenditure of \$9,210 for this canvassing service, and then he goes on to break it down for how much per shift.

As Mr. Green explains, Deb Noble's campaign did the same thing. They hired approximately 22 canvassers collecting signatures. Her public financier says, he says or indicates an expenditure of \$4,020 and he breaks that down. In addition to the Working Families Party's central committee reported an organizational expenditure in the amount of \$1,105 for services provided to the campaign. And he breaks that down to 12 signature gathering shifts

at \$70 per shift.

So for Green -- according to Green, Noble spent \$4,020 on canvassing service on her own and the WFP spent another \$840, if you do the math, in organizational expenditure that was solely devoted to her petitioning services.

Now, that raises another huge red flag as far as we're concerned. If you look at the statute Section 9-601 (25), defines organizational expenditures, and we actually put the full definition in our findings at paragraph 137. But, Your Honor, there's simply nothing in that definition of what the organizational expenditure is that possibly permits the WFP to spend \$840 to allow Deb Noble to gather petitions and qualifying contributions.

Organizational expenditures we think are a huge broad, loophole. Even we don't think the loophole is that broad, and I think that's supported as well by SEEC. If you, if you refer to their guidebook for participating candidates, it's been submitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 61, on page 56 they discuss organizational expenditures.

So, Your Honor, I guess -- so you have the statute in front of you. If you go the SEEC's guidebook, on page 56 they discuss what is permissible and what is impermissible as an organizational expenditure, and they say organizational expenditures do not include fundraising

for a candidate's committee.

And it seems like that's exactly what the WFP is doing here. They are giving \$840 in organizational expenditures which they say is, you know, for these services which are collecting signatures and, you know, that are also collecting qualifying contributions.

So, that's a little bit of sidebar but I think it just points -- it's further evidence that the organizational expenditure loophole is in fact a huge loophole and it's having an impact in a variety of races.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I don't know where to jump in. There's a couple points where we have a legal disagreement. One has to do with the characterization about the qualifying period contribution limit or expenditure limit. They don't exist under the law. That's -- we put in Beth Rotman's declaration in last night on that. We talk about that in some more detail.

You know, it's a little troubling that the defense -- or the prosecution in this case is founded on asserting that the Working Families Party violated the law in order to try to participate in the program. You know, obviously there are going to be post election audits on every candidate's committee's expenditures, but we ought to at least have the law right before we cast those kinds

of aspersions.

Now, the Working Families Party consulted with the State Election Enforcement Commission on this specific issue about whether it's okay to make an organizational expenditure to assist in gathering petition signatures and the answer was yes. Because organization expenditure is permissible organization expenditure under 9-600(25), includes --

THE COURT: 601, 601(25).

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: 601(25), that's right.

Includes the retention of services of an advisor to provide assistance relating to campaign organization, financing and accounting, strategy, law and meeting.

Their view on that -- what's that?

Yes, their view on that was, as stated to Mr. Green, that assisting a candidate in gathering petition signatures constitutes, the way it was done constituted the use of an advisor services as proven.

MR. LADOV: I guess, I mean -- to respond, Your Honor, I mean I think, first of all, I guess we would have a hard time understanding how a petitioning service which is the hiring of individuals who go out to door-to-door collecting signatures and contributions, we don't see how that can be advisory.

I think to respond to the -- something else that

Mr. Zinn Rowthorn said, obviously we didn't get into this piece of evidence in an effort to disparage the Working Families Party or the SEEC. We looked into this evidence because part of, part of the heart of our claim has been the CEP sets qualifying criteria so high that it is effectively impossible for minor parties to reach these criteria.

One of the reasons that we've been arguing that is, you know, is both because it is an enormous amount of money that we think sets this way out of reach of minor party candidates and, in addition, because we felt that that amount of money simply violates the terms of the act. And as I said before, we had never had any reason to believe that the SEEC thought otherwise until yesterday.

Honestly, the fact that in many ways if you look at some of the evidence we've been putting in, the SEEC is sort of bending over backwards to make this program, which we think is deeply and unsolvabley flawed, better for minor parties. Mr. Lopez already talked about the fact that the SEEC went in after the law was passed and said this program excludes minor parties, we should fix this program. The legislature didn't listen. When, you know, when the SEEC saw that the law appeared to exclude minor parties from any ability to get public funding, the SEEC first asked for an amendment to the act and then went back

and used its authority to say we're going to interpret the law and say that the spirit of this is not to deny the minor party and to let them petition. Arguably that's what's going on here as well.

They are trying to figure out how to get minor parties into the system because, frankly, if you don't let minor party candidates violate this qualifying expenditure limit, there's simply no way to do it. But, Your Honor, we simply think that, first of all, that's a point at which you, the law does not go. That there's simply no way that the statute can get you to that interpretation.

We also think that it's an interpretation that's effectively precluded by how the SEEC has interpreted the act and the guidance it has given to all candidates previously. And then, finally, I think, you know, in a related vein, maybe that's the SEEC's interpretation now but we need to be able to tell our plaintiffs and their candidates what they can and can't do. And what they can and can't do has been, we think, crystal clear from the statute, from the regs, from the guidance.

All that the other side has submitted to contradict that is a declaration submitted yesterday that is, you know, a document prepared for litigation. That at the very least, we think, you know, we could not go back to our client and say in good faith you should rely on

this and you can do that kind of fundraising the next time around because we just don't think it's a reliable legal position to take.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, the consistent position appears to be, and it continues to puzzle me, is every time the State Election Enforcement Commission interprets the law to the benefit of minor parties, that it's somehow disappointing to the plaintiffs in this case.

We haven't submitted a declaration from Beth Rotman somehow suggesting a novel interpretation of the expenditure limit. What we have done is submitted a declaration of Beth Rotman explaining the statutory provisions from which we reached the conclusion that they have badly misstated the expenditure limit during, during they say the qualifying period. The fundamental misunderstanding on this side of the room is that there is no qualifying period expenditure limit. The expenditure limit depends, by the clear language of the statute, it differs on whether it is a -- whether the candidate is in a primary period or general election period, and those periods themselves are defined by statute.

A general election period commences for a candidate who is nominated without a primary, i.e. a minor party candidate, the day after that nomination and the expenditure limit in that general election period is the

full grant plus qualifying contributions.

So, to look at, you know, the filings of Cicero Booker and say, oh, he spent \$40,000 before he got a grant, misses the point. A, it's wrong on the law because we have no idea — you know, they haven't suggested to you how much of those expenditures were during the primary period and how much were during the general election period. We know at a certain point, we put the dates in the declaration, we know at a certain point in Mr.

Booker's case he was in the general election period as of August 18th, 2008, going forward for purposes of the expenditure limit.

So, again, Your Honor, that's the clear language of the statute. There's nothing novel about this. What I haven't heard from Mr. Ladov or anybody else in support of impugning Mr. Booker and impugning the SEEC is where in the statute that we're wrong about that.

But, again, Your Honor, you know, I think, I think we -- I invite Your Honor to review the affidavit. I think we ought to have our law right before we start making accusations.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, what the defendants have done they have read out the qualifying period in this statute. As soon as -- we're all in agreement that during the qualifying period, and we have 15 SEEC documents and

we're going to show you some of them, Your Honor, that say during the qualifying period their State Senate candidate can only raise \$15,000 in qualifying contributions and you can donate \$2,000 to your campaign, \$2,000 to your campaign. And you can only spend, the expenditure limit during the qualifying period is \$17,000. There's no dispute about that.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: But I'd like to know from where we are reading that out. Where does --

I will tell you. Now, what they are MR. LOPEZ: doing is saying if you delay your qualifying effort until you get your party's nomination, we're going to read out the qualifying period and during that period you can spend unlimited -- well, you can spend up to the full expenditure limit, 85 -- or \$100,000 to qualify. You can only raise, Your Honor -- there's no dispute, it's in their affidavit, Rotman's declaration, you can only raise \$15,000. You're absolutely barred from that because when you submit your grant application, you have to certify that I only raised \$15,000 for your state -- if you're a State Senate candidate. But they are saying you're allowed to engage in the very type of deficit spending that is prohibited during the qualifying period because they say once you get your nomination, you're rolled into a new period.

Now, there are plenty of implementing regulations that contradict that. The statute is, in our view is vague on it but there are implementing regulations that make very clear that the, the point of the qualifying period is to prove you're bona fide so you can go out and raise this modest, so-called modest amount of seed money, qualifying contributions from different people within your district. And that's why there's an expenditure limit that corresponds to the, to the amount of money you're allowed to raise in qualifying contributions.

What they are doing is reading that out and saying once you're into the general election -- I mean most candidates don't start qualifying until they have their party's nomination. They don't even know -- right? So once you're into the general election, they are saying you can spend -- you can't raise whatever you want, you still have to, before you get your grant, you can still only raise \$5,000 in the House and 15,000 in the Senate. But you can spend whatever you want if you can get someone to float it.

Now, apparently in the case of Working Families

Party, they are able to get someone to float it. Mr.

Ladov can address that. But most people, most major party

candidates can't get --

THE COURT: Minor.

1 MR. LOPEZ: -- people to float \$40,000 in 2 canvassing services. 3 THE COURT: Most minor party. 4 MR. LOPEZ: Most minor parties can't get people 5 to float that kind of money and, and there was a reason 6 the Working Families Party can and Mr. Ladov can -- he's 7 prepared, he can try to address that. 8 So that's -- look, and we cast no aspersions. 9 You've read the statute. We didn't know they read it that way. This all came as a surprise to us. We put it into 10 11 our findings. You know, you made your counterpoint. It's a point well taken and I apologize for any offense. 12 There's no offense taken. 13 14 But doesn't -- isn't it almost irrelevant, 15 Judge? Isn't the real point here that Cicero Booker spent 16 \$40,000 collecting in -- collecting signatures and 17 qualifying contributions? And thank God, he qualified for a full grant because it could have been a completely 18 19 fruitless exercise if he had fallen short. Excuse me. 20 MR. LADOV: I guess to -- I was going to address 21 this question of --THE COURT: All right, just a moment. Let me 22 hear if -- there's apparently a dispute factually about 23 whether Mr. Booker spent \$40,000 on petitions. 24 25 MS. YOUN: Sure. I think Mr. Ladov actually had the figure correct when he said, as stated on Mr. Booker's disclosures forms, the figure was somewhere around 8 or 900 or \$9,000. \$40,000 that was paid included a range of candidate services which included, you know, as far as I understand it, a direct mail, get out the vote, media buy. The idea that Cicero Booker spent \$40,000 on petitioning has no support in this record.

MR. LADOV: Well, Your Honor, it's certainly correct that he reported about \$8,000 before October 10th when he submitted his application. On October 28th, after he had been awarded a grant, and this is Plaintiff's Exhibit 109, his findings showed that he incurred an expenditure of about \$40,000 to CSI.

Actually, Your Honor, if this is helpful, I actually -- I know you complained about how boring Volumes 3 and 4 are. I actually did the cliff notes and made for everybody -- I just printed out the pages that we cite to, if I may approach. It's -- one is for Booker and one is for Noble.

So this isn't anything new. This is just, I just tried to isolate the pages because I know it's a lot of pages to go through. I just thought it might make it easier for everybody.

So, first of all, we know that in his October 28th report, again this is Plaintiff's Exhibit

109, on page 15, Booker's filings show that he incurred -(Pause)

So this is where we first see that Mr. Booker states that he incurred on October 11th an expenditure of \$40,845 to CSI. So it was incurred before he got his grant, although submitted, this information was submitted — to the best of our knowledge, it wasn't submitted to the SEEC until after the grant had been awarded on October 16th.

Now, if you look at Plaintiff's Exhibits 106 and -- so Plaintiff's Exhibit 106 was the filing from January. And on page 14 of Exhibit 106, all right, it's the second page of what I gave you. It's page 14 of the full exhibit. And at the bottom of the page you can see three checks that were made out to CSI, October 22nd, October 23rd and November 3rd, and the total reported amount was \$35,145.

Now, this, the purpose of those checks was for door-to-door donations. For a candidate like Cicero Booker who receives a full grant, there's no purpose of door-to-door donations other than qualifying expenses. You know, unlike someone who gets a partial grant he's not permitted to raise additional contributions after he's received his grant. So all of the evidence in the record shows that he, his campaign characterized the money paid

to CSI, the \$35,000 paid to CSI as door-to-door donations. We don't see any way that this could be understood as being anything other than qualifying expenses.

I also would note, and we haven't done any research into CSI but I want to note it's located in the same offices as the Working Families Party, as ACORN. So, as Mr. Lopez mentioned, part of the problem that we see is that the candidates who have access to people who are willing to float these kinds of services on spec are able to potentially qualify by just sort of paying enough to get a CEP grant. The candidates for minor parties who don't have those sorts of institutional connections can't.

And apparently that's permitted by the defendants but, again, we think that it speaks to both the the burden of qualifying and the fact that it is discriminatory against minor party candidates in general.

In terms of this question of is there a qualifying period, I mean again, Your Honor, we are not making this up. If you look at the statute and I think we can concede certainly that the statute doesn't use the word "qualifying period;" it's in fact the SEEC that coined the term "qualifying period." You know, the statute, on the other hand, if you look at 9-702(c), and this is where the legislature set forth, you know, what the SEEC has characterized as the qualifying period, the

primary period and the general election period. And this is, I believe it's the first couple of sentences of the, of that section.

(Pause)

THE COURT: This being the limitation on qualifying contributions during that period, it's a limit on the expenditures while qualifying for contributions?

MR. LADOV: Right, that is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LADOV: And, you know, again, we can certainly agree that this, the legislature doesn't say, use the word qualifying period. That's the language the SEEC used in its guidance to candidates, but we certainly think that, you know, the legislature intended to create three distinct periods at three distinct expenditure limits, and the current interpretation that's just been offered by defendants effectively writes that first period out of the statute.

I mean as a basic canon of statutory interpretation, we have to assume that the legislature meant something when they put this language in. And by the defendant's interpretation, they've effectively meant nothing because every period is pre-primary and pre-general election. The legislature, you know, said there's three distinct periods and I think the SEEC got it

right before. The first period is the qualifying period.

It's the period during which, in the SEEC's language, it's the period before a primary general election that allows candidates to raise all qualifying contributions and demonstrate they have the threshold of support necessary to qualify for participation in the program.

And actually, Your Honor, if I can take a couple minutes to walk Your Honor through the guidebook that they put out, what we submitted into the record as Plaintiff's Exhibit 61. If you don't that have, I can -- I have a copy I can give you.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Mark, if I can just clarify one item on that Exhibit 109, confer to the SEEC, that Form 30 that is the Plaintiff's Exhibit 109 is a form that all candidates have to submit to the SEEC on periodic reporting, including nonparticipating candidates, and disclosure that are contained on page two of that document, for example, on line 29, those are — that information is part of what the SEC would consider in determining whether an excess expenditure grant was required. So, in other words, candidates are obligated to list expenditures in that section for services that are yet to have been provided, so that the SEEC has the prior notice, prior to Election Day, that a candidate, participating and nonparticipating, is going to exceed the

expenditure limit for under the CEP for that election.

So, just to clarify that this line 29 that contains the \$41,000 figure isn't necessarily a retrospective payment, but it — the candidate would be under an obligation to list that even if it was a prospective obligation under a contract.

MR. LADOV: Right. Although, Your Honor, there's one thing I would want to add to that. I think counsel's absolutely correct that one of the reasons that the legislature requires candidates to itemize expenditures incurred but not yet paid is for the excess expenditure provision. In fact, Section 9-711, the excess expenditure provision, says that a candidate can be penalized for expenditures that are made or incurred. But relevant to the section that we're discussing now, if you look at the law -- where is it. It's 9-706(c).

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LADOV: And in 9-76(c), the legislature set forth what a candidate must do when they apply for a grant. And I just would note -- just want to be sure I have the right one. Right, that the application shall be accompanied by a cumulative accounting of all funds received, expenditures made, and expenditures incurred but not yet paid by the candidate. So I think, we actually believe that this supports our interpretation, that this

is showing that just as a candidate has to make reporting that will show whether they exceed the general election expenditure limit by incurring expenditures above that, that the same thing is happening for the qualifying period, that the candidate, when they apply for the grant need to certify that they are submitting an accurate list of all of their contributions, their expenditures made, and expenditures that were incurred but not yet paid, for the very reason that we've been discussing.

And I think --

THE COURT: There may be a response. Let me see.

MS. YOUN: Sure. This was actually a response to the previous question as to what was the purpose of the expenditures from Cicero Booker? I'm looking now to document 260-4 which is the declaration of John Green which was filed on September 5th, 2008, in this matter. And in paragraph, in paragraph eight, it says that, you know, as of this point, as of early September, Mr. Booker has already gathered between 300 petition signatures. He hasn't gathered more than that amount of petition signatures. It also states the price that was paid for those petition signatures was \$9,210.

You know, I don't see -- I see what plaintiffs are pointing to in saying that there's a line on here that

1 says A dash other door-to-door donations, but I think to 2 infer from that that Mr. Green has perjured himself, that he has, in fact, said it was only 9,000 when it was, in 3 fact, 40,000 is a real -- is really quite a stretch. 4 5 THE COURT: I don't think anybody's talking 6 perjury here. 7 MS. YOUN: But I'm saying in the record as to what those petition signatures cost, and I don't think 8 9 this \$40,000 that is being thrown around is accurate. THE COURT: What are these checks for then? 10 11 What's another theory for what they could be for? MS. YOUN: My understanding of what Citizen 12 13 Services Incorporated is, it is a branch of the Working 14 Families Party. John Green testified in his deposition 15 that the Working Families Party contracts with a number of 16 candidates, Green Party -- I'm sorry, Working Families 17 Party candidates as well as other candidates to provide a range of candidate services that include media buys, that 18 19 include get-out-the-vote services, that include direct 20 mailing services, that include all of the expenses that 21 one would usually incur in conducting a campaign. THE COURT: So then you're saying this form 22 23 is --24 MS. YOUN: I'm saying this is an 25 all-encompassing -- this is what you pay for that range of

```
1
       services. I'm saying that we only have it clear that
 2
       $9,000 of that $40,000 went to petitioning, per se, as
 3
       opposed to the other normal costs of conducting a
 4
       campaign.
                 THE COURT: But what I'm saying is Exhibit 106,
 5
 6
       which is apparently a form submitted by Mr. Booker, is
 7
       that right?
 8
                 MR. LADOV: Yes, his candidacy.
                 THE COURT: Shows 35,000-plus in three checks
 9
       that are for the purpose of door-to-door donations.
10
11
                 MS. YOUN: Yes.
12
                 THE COURT: Which isn't media buys, which isn't
13
       all of those other things.
14
                 MS. YOUN: I think that -- I mean my inference
15
       from that is if you look at the various categories on
16
       this, and it appears that there were a number of
17
       catch-alls that -- there's one that's postage. There's
18
       one that's purpose A dash other door-to-door donations.
19
       My suggestion is that is a catch-all category.
20
                 THE COURT: I'm sorry, what are you looking at
21
       for --
                 MS. YOUN: Sure. The line you were pointing to
22
23
       where it says -- right before it says door-to-door
24
       donations, it says expenditure purpose?
25
                 THE COURT:
                             Right.
```

```
1
                 MS. YOUN: There seems to be an abbreviation of
 2
       OTH, which is, I think it's fair to infer is "Other." I'm
 3
       sorry, I'm looking at Document 340-13, Exhibit 5.
 4
                 MR. LADOV: Actually, Your Honor, I don't know
 5
       if this is helpful but if you look at the back of the Form
 6
       30. I mean, for example, just looking at the back of
 7
       Exhibit 109, the last page of one of our binders, there's
       a list of quoted purposes for expenditures.
 8
 9
                 THE COURT: That's what I'm looking for. Where
10
       is that?
                 MR. LADOV: Right, it's the last page of the
11
             If you have Binder 3 in front of you --
12
       form.
13
                 MS. YOUN: Do you have the docket number?
                 MR. LADOV: I'm sorry, I don't. It's in the
14
15
       back in any of the forms. I don't think there's a change
16
       from form to form.
17
                 (Pause)
18
                 MS. YOUN: It's says any other expenditure for
19
       other advertising, including posters, stickers, streamers.
20
       I'm not sure whether that is the same category or not.
21
                 MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: If you were to look at
       Docket 340-13, page 109, it has an example of the codes.
22
23
                 THE COURT: I still haven't found the list.
24
                 MR. LADOV: I'm sorry, Your Honor. If I can
25
       approach, I can just bring one up.
```

1 THE COURT: I got it.

2 (Pause)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. LADOV: Well, I mean I guess -- I don't see anything that was just said that really contradicts how we've been interpreting the evidence at this point.

I mean the other code -- what matters here is that what Cicero Booker's campaign said was that these were door-to-door donations.

Now, I just want to respond, we're certainly not claiming that John Green perjured himself. John Green's declaration, as I recall, was based on his reading of public filings. At the time that he submitted his declaration in September, Cicero Booker had submitted all of the signature requirements which were due back in August.

Now, maybe this was confusing. We can -- you know, perhaps it's right that Booker only spent \$10,000 or the \$9,000 on collecting signatures and that's the number that John Green saw. It doesn't change the fact that it certainly looks, from Booker's own filing, that he then spent upwards of \$30,000 on what he called door-to-door donations.

And, in fact, that sort of fits perfectly with our understanding that the burden's on candidates, because

a huge amount of the burden is these, is collecting all these small donations, all up to \$15,000. If you look at Booker's filings, you'll see he's collecting a lot of five-dollar, ten-dollar donations.

So, collecting that many small donations obviously is a huge expense, apparently perhaps is more of an expense than collecting the signatures for his petitions but I don't see how — it seems to us that it's pretty clear from the evidence that those expenditures were on top of his earlier expenditures.

And there were, I mention this in our filings, earlier payments also to CSI which I guess we're discovering was a vendor that is part Working Families

Party and, you know, we sort of assumed that those CSI expenditures were for similar petitioning services, and maybe that's, you know, for the signatures, the donations.

Another point that this raises in terms of the problems of the law for minor parties is that you have this situation where Booker has spent, you know, upwards of \$9,000 collecting signatures which, you know, is a burden that his major party candidate opponents don't have to meet which is, we think, on its own both unnecessary and sufficient to show that he has met the threshold for qualifying, and then he sort of is forced to spend the next couple months raising donations, spending all this

additional tens of thousands of dollars on collecting donations rather than running his campaign.

And he's in this limbo, this legal limbo until October 16th when he finally gets a grant. So even though he's effectively submitted half his application on August 6th, by asking the Secretary of State to certify his petition signatures, he is in this limbo where he's really, you know, we believe, by the statute and what the SEEC has said in the past, he's really not permitted to spend additional money until two months later when he finally gets the grant. So I understand why it is that what seems to us to be this loophole has come into effect in this situation but, again, it just seems like it contradicts the guidance that the state has been giving to other candidates.

What I wanted to do at the risk of sort of belaboring this but I think it's important, is to go through their guidebook and give a few examples of how they have made this clear to candidates. I think — this is our Exhibit 61. I can bring this up to the court if you don't have a copy.

THE COURT: That would be helpful, thank you.
(Hands Court)

MR. LADOV: It's the guidebook. I know it shows up in the record a couple times. I think it may be --

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, could I make one final point with regard to the Cicero Booker example and its relevance? It's pretty clear from the record that around \$9,000 was spent on petitioning.

Petitioning is the particular burden that is placed on minor party candidates. We don't know how much of this additional amount was spent on qualifying contributions or on anything else. But recall that qualifying contributions are not a burden you give to minor party candidates. Everyone has to hit the ground and get those five-dollar or ten-dollar donations.

MR. LOPEZ: Under that logic, Your Honor, the 20 percent prior vote total is a burden that is given to minor party candidates too, because in some sense that's a party neutral law, too, that minor parties have and major parties have.

MR. LADOV: So, Your Honor, this is the guidance that the SEEC gave to candidates at the beginning of this election cycle that we think contradicts their current interpretation. If you look at page eight and nine, this is the section on spending limits.

- MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: What's the docket number?
- MR. LADOV: I don't know the docket number.
- MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Is it in your book?
- MR. LADOV: It's Exhibit 61. It's in -- I'm

```
1
       sorry, it's the supplemental trial exhibits that we filed
2
      back in November.
 3
                MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: November?
 4
                MR. LADOV: Yes.
                MS. YOUN: I'm sorry, could you just repeat the
 5
 6
       filing and the date of the filing? Would make this
7
      faster.
8
                             Sure, it's the November 19th
                MR. LADOV:
       supplemental trial exhibits. There would have been a
9
       series of -- I'm sorry, I'm sorry. This was filed on
10
11
       September 3rd. I apologize. It was Exhibit 61.
                MS. YOUN: Okay, great. Thank you, we have it.
12
13
                MR. LADOV: So, Your Honor, Section 8 and 9
14
       discuss the spending limits. Again, this is where the
15
      SEEC defines this period as the qualifying period. If you
16
      look sort of at the third paragraph, they say expenditures
17
      by candidate committee during the pre-primary general
18
       election period, which again they define as the qualifying
19
      period, are limited to the required amount of qualifying
20
       contributions plus any allowable personal funds the
21
       candidate provides to the candidate committee --
                MR. FEINBERG: I'm sorry, Mr. Ladov, could you
22
23
       identify where you are, please?
24
                MR. LADOV: Sure. It's page eight.
                                                      It's the
25
       section on spending limits. It would be eight, it's eight
```

according to the document's numbering, not according to the PDF.

MR. LOPEZ: It's page eight of the guide.

MR. LADOV: Okay. I don't mean to jump ahead.

Okay. So, in paragraph three, starts out
"Expenditures by a candidate committee during the
pre-primary general election period are limited to the
required amount of qualifying contributions, plus any
allowable personal funds the candidate provides to the
candidate committee.

"Participating candidates must be careful to avoid exceeding the qualifying period expenditure limit by making or obligating themselves to make an expenditure that results in their aggregate spending total exceeding the qualified period spending limit. Excess spending will result in disqualification for receiving program grants."

Now, we've always interpreted that plain language to tell candidates that while you're in this qualifying period, you know, before you have submitted the grant you need to be careful not to disqualify yourself from receiving the grant by exceeding this limit.

Now, on page nine, they discuss the primary and general election grants and, again, you know, this is all sort of relational. You need to see the qualifying period in relationship to the subsequent, primary and general key

period.

And perhaps the most critical piece here, the very top sentence, that says "The expenditure limit during the primary campaign period and the general election campaign period is calculated by adding the amount of grant received," and then goes on to talk about the additional supplemental grant and unspent contributions. But that's the key, Your Honor, is that the SEEC told the candidates that their general election period expenditure limit was calculated based on the grant they received, which obviously means that it's not an application until after the grant has been approved.

In relation to that general election period is what they describe as the qualifying period, which basically, you know, tells candidates that you can't violate this, you know, \$15,000 or \$5,000-plus personal funds unless you want to potentially disqualify yourself from getting a grant.

On page 16 of this same document, again, this is their numbering. And in the second section where it says raising qualifying contributions, the first sentence says "Major party candidates and minor party candidates who qualify for the full grant amount may only raise contributions during the qualifying period."

And, again, I don't think any of this was really

in question before this week but that has always appeared to us to be perfectly consistent with the notion that the qualifying period is defined as the period when you are raising donations and then the general election period is the period after you receive your grant.

On page 47 of this document, this is a section on expenditure limits, and what the SEEC is doing here is they are giving, they are giving guidance to candidates through sort of illustrative examples of what may or may not fun afoul of the law. If I also may go back to page 26 and just note this chart at the bottom where they set forth those expenditure limits, the 15-, \$17,000 for State Senate and 5- to \$6,000 for State Rep.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: I would just like, while you're on page 46, note above that the SEEC sets forth in that paragraph right above that chart that they are three discrete periods in of spending limits.

MR. LADOV: Right, and again, I think --

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: None of them are the qualifying period.

MR. LADOV: I guess our response, Your Honor, would be that that other sections of that document which we sort of feel the candidate needs to be able to read consistently as a whole, they defined the qualifying period as the pre-qualifying, pre-general election period.

But I would just point to the second example, the second box on page 47. And, you know, it gives an example of a candidate who's going to fall afoul of the rule and it says a participating candidate for state senator provides no personal funds and thus has a spending limit of \$15,000 during the pre-primary, general election period. Her candidate committee has spent \$10,000 of the qualifying contributions on permissible campaign expenses.

And then I think this is the critical sentence, says "Before the candidate applies for a grant" -- again, "Before the candidate applies for a grant, the campaign treasurer signed the contract with the company that produces typical campaign paraphernalia and places an order for \$7,500 of campaign paraphernalia. Because the campaign treasurer has obligated the campaign committee to make an expenditure that results in the committee's aggregate expenditures for the pre-primary general election period," and it says this is a total of seventeen-five, "Because this exceeded the applicable expenditure limit of 15,000, the committee has impermissibly violated the program's requirements."

Now, this is -- I mean this isn't even what we saw in Booker's filing. This is a candidate who is making, is incurring expenditures for campaign paraphernalia which perhaps implicitly is typical, you

know, we can imply general election paraphernalia, and what the SEEC told candidates was you may not do this before the candidate applies for a grant. I just don't know how much clearer they can be.

MS. YOUN: Your Honor, that's not what that says at all. If you look back to the, to the expenditure limit section on the previous page that Attorney Murphy-Osborne was pointing to here, it says there are three discrete periods. There is, one, the period before a primary campaign and general election campaign, is which we're referring to in shorthand on the following page as pre-primary/general election period. Two, there is the primary campaign and, three, the general election campaign.

The pre-primary/general election period referred to in that example is the time before the candidate is nominated. Once the candidate is nominated by the party, as we said consistently, that next day that person is allowed to -- that person's expenditure limit becomes the entire grant plus the amount of qualified contributions.

You know, it's possible that there is some ambiguity in this wording. It seems relatively clear, you know, to me but we also note that this guidebook cites a multiple times to the actual language of the statute which we think should definitely control here.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. That implies, doesn't it, that there's never a period when you've been nominated but you're still trying to raise qualifying contributions.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: No, it doesn't imply that. It implies that there could be a period after your nomination in which you are considered in the general election campaign period, as that's defined by statute, and you have an expenditure limitation applicable to that period, but you are still trying to gather your qualifying contributions and you haven't yet applied for a grant.

Sort of the check on that, Your Honor, there is an outside expenditure limit and there is the regulation prohibiting conditional contracting for services. In other words, I'll only pay you if I get my grant.

I'm going to be very frank. With respect to this issue, this guidebook is not well written and I think, I don't think I'm going out on a limb to say there will be revisions for it in 2010. But the SEEC consistently gave advice to candidates with respect to this issue that is consistent with parts of this guidebook where we define three different periods, and where we say what the spending limit is for the general election campaign period.

There was also an enforcement decision, Your

Honor, that's January 16th, '09 -- I'm sorry -- yes, in which, in which the SEEC sort of defines what the expenditure limit is, you know, during the primary campaign which begins the day after the caucus or the convention where the candidate is endorsed.

Your Honor, we think, we think the guidance is unclear but it includes our position here. We think we ought to be, we ought to be governed by sort of the statutory language to the extent there's any ambiguity in there. You know, and I think this is also sort of one of the kind of general points we have here this is our first time around on this and I think before we get kind of locked in, you know, we should — the state should have worked out these kinks. We think where we are now with this issue is the correct issue, we think it's not entirely inconsistent, but clearly we would concede this is confusing.

But we would ask Your Honor to look at the, look at the statute and look at how, you know, we're not adding any gloss to this statute in Beth Rotman's declaration, but we think we explain it well in that declaration.

MR. FEINBERG: Just one further point, Your

Honor. Mr. Ladov said earlier on that they have to be

able to give guidance to their candidates, and the problem

with that argument is that the SEEC has been available, it

has been giving guidance to candidates, both major party candidates and minor party candidates, on a consistent basis throughout this whole process and the Rotman declaration that was submitted just the other day is consistent with the advice that's been given to candidates all along.

The problem that they are having is they are trying to rely on their own arguments and their own construction of the law without bothering to consult with the SEEC or what the law means or how it might be applied to their candidates.

MR. LADOV: If I could just briefly respond to that, Your Honor. I do think that we need to rely on the public statements of the SEEC, including this guidebook and again, frankly we never thought this was a controversial point until this week. This is an argument that we made repeatedly in December and were never corrected on to say, oh, that may be what you think but we're actually telling everybody informally that we are advising them otherwise. So I think, you know, we would just ask the court to sort of rely on the public documents and we think that's pretty clear.

I guess I did just want to address one other point sort of within this argument, which is this notion that the regulation 9-706-2B16 which bars the use of CEP

funds to pay for, quote, "Expenditures incurred but not paid for which candidates pay any portion of the outstanding liability paid contingent on the participating candidate's committee's receipt of a grant from the citizens election fund."

Now, the current interpretation that Ms. Rotman has put forth is essentially that this just means you can't incur expenditures by saying I will only pay you if I get a grant, rather than, you know, the contingency being that I will pay you when I get a grant. And the problem, Your Honor, is that — and this sort of creates a Catch—22 and, again, when the legislation and it's not the SEEC and it's not their efforts to implement it, but we just think there's an unavoidable Catch—22 that the statute generates that makes it impossible to read this as saying anything other than you can't incur expenditures above your qualifying limit.

Because I mean, plainly, a candidate who, you know, who spends \$40,000 to qualify can only pay back up to \$17,000 of that before he gets the grant. Now, he says I will pay you back — and we've always thought he said I'll pay you back when I get the grant but he is effectively saying I'll pay you back if I get the grant and that's a contingency and that violates the SEEC regulation.

But the problem, Your Honor, is there really aren't any other options. You know, especially, you know -- right, Ms. Rotman's interpretation would say I'm going to pay you back no matter what and if I don't get the grant, I'm going to find another way to pay you back, but there's no other way that the candidate -- and Mr. Lopez said this before -- the candidate cannot pay, you know, the remaining, the remainder of this \$40,000 back through personal funds because that violates the act.

The candidate cannot pay for this on credit because that's borrowing money from bank and that's prohibited by the act.

The candidate cannot ask the vendor to, you know, hold off in collecting funds for this expenditure because that, under Section 9-601(a)(1), means that the vendor has either loaned or advanced the candidate the services, and that makes it a contribution under the act and that violates the CEP's contribution limits.

And, finally, the vendor can't forgive the debt because when the vendor does that, it becomes an in kind contribution and that's defined in this guidebook at page 19. "If you forgive a debt of services, that's an in kind contribution," and that violates the contribution limits in the act.

And finally, as Mr. Lopez pointed out, you also

can't just sort of hold it until the end of your candidate committee determination and then sort of forgive it to yourself and make it a personal debt because, again, that's violating the personal funds. That is violating the act.

And, you know, we certainly think that creating a regulation that says you can't do something — or that you can, you can do something that is going to inevitably place you in the position of violating the statute and violating the terms of the program, we don't see how the regulation can be interpreted that way.

If you take on, if you close the campaign debt and take it on yourself, that's treated as a contribution. Any money that you give to your campaign is treated as a contribution.

I'm actually, I think, ready to move on from this discussion unless there's any other rebuttal points.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: The only point, Your Honor, we talked about this briefly, is if you don't get a grant, you then can raise the contributions up to generally applicable contribution limits. To close it, you can also keep your committee opened, we talked about that before, to try to erase debt.

The other point here is to just to say there's an expenditure limit, candidates still have to impose some

discipline, and the check is, you know, I know how I'm doing qualifying, do I want to take on a \$40,000 debt with, you know, with no guarantee that I'm going to have a fund grant to pay for that. So we think there's a significant, you know, self-imposed check that exists, and we also strongly disagree with the notion that there are no ways to pay that debt that are permissible under the law.

MR. LADOV: And I guess we would just say that's a heck of a risk to take on, and to tell minor party candidates they should take on this risk in hopes of qualifying for a grant and potentially being this far in the hole, we would argue having really no legal way to pay it back, is — if that's the guidance, then I think that —

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: But there are legal ways to pay it back. They may not think they are sufficient, we think they are. But let's not mischaracterize and say there are no legal ways to pay it back.

MS. YOUN: Also, you know, it's not just the minor parties who have to take on that risk. Anyone who's applying for a grant and needs to gather a certain number of qualifying contributions, whether that person be a major party or a minor party, has the same level of qualifying contributions. They are all taking on a

substantial risk.

MR. LADOV: The only other point I wanted to make, and I guess this sort of specifically refers to the petitioning requirement which is the requirement that minor party candidates are obligated to comply with but major party candidates are not, I think in the December hearing, Your Honor asked a question basically saying at the local level is there really any basis for treating the, say the Republican party, and I think your hypothetical was the jerrymandering district in Bridgeport, differently than the Green Party, and I would just say at this point we think we have some evidence in the record to show there's no basis.

First of all, we have the testimony of Kenric Hanson, one of the Green Party candidates. His testimony is obviously in the declaration, is discussed in our findings at paragraph 79-B to 79-I, and he goes on at some length about how the Republican Party and the Green Party are on similar footing in New London and how they are both effectively minor parties trying to fight for a piece of the vote against the Democratic party's dominance.

I think the findings sort of speak for themselves but the only thing I would add, in the Proulx declaration we got last night he sort of tries to rebut this by saying, look, the Republican Party has polled

30 percent in the last few elections and this time -- and so that shows that they are presumptively stronger than the Greens. And, first of all, we certainly concede that the Green Party is a minor party and we are not trying to pretend they are getting votes beyond what they are getting.

But if you look at it, this is the first year that the Green Party contested the State Assembly race, and Jason Catala, the Republican Party candidate, his vote dropped from about 30 percent to about 18 percent. And, meanwhile, Ken Hanson from the Green Party entered the race for first time and as a first time candidate polled almost ten percent. And I think, Your Honor, what we would say is this shows that, you know, the Greens arguably are taking away some of the votes the Republicans were getting as the opposition to the Democrats.

Now, the Republicans are getting more votes than the Greens, but I think the fundamental point is that the Greens are fighting with the Republicans to get a piece of the vote and to get a piece of the public support and to get their message out to the voting public in New London and that, you know, these results as well as the testimony actually, we believe, show very well how in a town like New London the Greens and the Republicans, or the one New London Party we discussed which has actually got people

elected to the city council, and the Republican Party are on the same terrain and that there's no legal reason for treating them differently.

The other example that we want to give is actually the Independent Party of Waterbury. They get some discussion in the Garfield declaration that was submitted this week. Mr. Garfield explains that the independent party holds five seats on the 15 seat board of Aldermen in Waterbury. We look at the website he cited and discovered for the first time that Cicero Booker is actually the minority leader on the Board of Aldermen in Waterbury as the head of the Independent Party caucus. There's nine Democrats, one Republican and five Independent Party members.

The defendants also put into the record that the Waterbury Town Committee spent a total of \$32,969.44 in 2008. And, again, I think all of this is to show that in a town like Waterbury the Independent Party is as substantial an opposition party as the Republican Party is.

If you look at the election results, and this is in our Narain Tables 3 and 4, you can see that this, you know, these independent party candidates who are really the only other candidates who are able to get funding under the CEP, you know, they are effectively the

opposition party in these districts. I believe in six of the seven districts in the House and the Senate where the Independent Party ran, and they are all in that Waterbury area, you know, they were the opposition. They were — there was only one major party candidate in the race. And if the goal of the CEP is to encourage competition, there's just fundamentally no reason why the independent party in Waterbury needs to be jumping through hoops that the Republican Party doesn't have to.

And the results actually show a couple of the anomalies that you get as a result of this. For example, Mr. Denze, who's the Independent Party candidate in District 71, got a full grant this time around because of his prior vote total. This time he ran against fully funded Democratic and Republican candidates. He only got 12 percent of the vote, so the next time he only gets the one-third grant.

You know, Mr. Denze is the same politician he always was. He's the same Adlerman in the Town of Waterbury that he always was. The only difference is that the competition has changed and as a result, you know, he is, whereas in 2008 he was entitled to a full grant, the next time around he's only entitled to one-third grant unless he goes through these burdensome petitioning requirements. While I actually, I don't remember -- I

think it was the Democrat who was kind of the lesser of the two candidates. The Republican, I think, is the incumbent in that district. You know, the major party is also the opposition party but doesn't have to go through any of those burdens.

Cicero Booker is actually another good example.

I want to beat up on him a little bit, but — you know, he holds almost 20 percent of the vote. He is certainly comparable to any number of major party candidates who are now getting about 20 percent of the vote across the State of Connecticut. He was cross endorsed by the Working Families Party and the Independent Party. As a result, he had to go through all of these burdensome requirements which, you know, we can argue about it but which we think were extraordinarily costly. The end result of all these efforts is that, as far as the CEP is concerned, the Independent Party is entitled to one—third grant next time around. The Working Families Family actually doesn't get anything because he fell just shy of the ten percent threshold on that line.

There's just no basis for the law to say because you're running on these party lines, you're not entitled to funding the next time around, whereas if you had had the exact same result, the exact same public presence, the exact same level of support as another candidate who was

cross endorsed by one of the major parties, you would be entitled to a full grant next time around. It's just arbitrary and discriminatory, as Mr. Lopez said.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And the final point I want to make about that is maybe -- the John Green affidavit discusses the benefits of the CEP and I think Mr. Hanson talks about this as The benefits of the CEP are not simply to help a candidate get elected to office, although that's obviously the primary purpose, or one of the primary purposes. Mr. Green explains -- and I don't have the paragraph but it's in his September 2008 affidavit -- getting CEP funding helps to spread the party agenda. It helps to build the party's base. It helps to increase candidate name recognition, and maybe that's not going to -- maybe the funding isn't going to effect the outcome in this or the state assembly race, and maybe, as we discussed earlier, the prior vote totals, the current vote totals aren't the measure, but it certainly is going to effect how these parties get the message out and it's going to effect how these same candidates run the next time around. It's going to affect how well Cicero Booker or Arthur Denze are able to become known to voters for when they run for the Board of Aldermen or the Board of Ed or for another local election the next time around.

And so I think, just to close, there's really no

1 basis for saying that one message and one party should be 2 subsidizing the way that the minor party should, based on 3 any number of local elections and local races around the 4 state. 5 THE COURT: All right, thank you. We need to 6 take an afternoon break, at least -- but perhaps plaintiff 7 is done. I'm not sure where you are. 8 MR. LOPEZ: No, Your Honor. I mean I'm content to have the court read the affidavits of Steve Fournier 9 10 and Mike DeRosa in which they talk about how this is 11 affecting their political strategy, how they are being hurt now and how they are modifying their conduct, how 12 13 they are scrambling, how they are trying to sort it all 14 out. And basically I was going to read or paraphrase 15 their affidavit testimony into the record.

THE COURT: Well, I've read it and it's in the record, so --

MR. LOPEZ: Okay.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: I don't want to cut you off, but on the other hand, it's been a long day, too, so --

MR. LOPEZ: Well, if we can take an afternoon break, Your Honor, and I can come back and I won't read it verbatim and I'll try to keep it to a paragraph or two. Fair enough?

THE COURT: Sure. Why don't we come back at

3:45. We'll stand in recess until then.

(Whereupon a recess was taken from 3:30 o'clock, p. m. to 3:45 o'clock, p. m.)

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, the dispute that we just spent 40 minutes having about whether you can engage in deficit spending during the qualifying period should not distract from the issue that the rule that was supposedly adopted by the SEEC was adopted in recognition of the cost of qualifying.

You'll recall that we, during the examination of Professor Green, Don Green, we had a whole discussion, he was under the impression that candidates could, in fact, engage in deficit spending to pay for their qualifying, to pay to meet their qualifying criteria. And he acknowledged that the cost of qualifing can, indeed, exceed the amount of money that you raise in qualifying contributions.

And I think the Booker case illustrates the point very well that the cost of qualifying, of meeting both the petitioning and the qualifying contribution requirements can get very expensie. And, frankly, what's most compelling about the Booker case, and the Deb Noble case, is they had to meet an August 6th deadline for submitting signatures. They didn't submit their applications for grants until October 10th. Those grants

those applications were approved on October 15th. So they didn't get their money until three or four weeks before the election and far later than most major party candidates received their grants.

And I think the court can infer from this that the, both encountered substantial difficulty in getting their application together, whether it was receiving approval from the Secretary of State's office that their signatures were valid or whether it was raising the qualifying contributions as the evidence, as the filings by Mr. Booker seems to indicate.

Now, Your Honor, so that's just -- I think that's just more evidence of the burden that is faced by petitioning party candidates. One final point before I move on, Your Honor, and it's funny, Attorney Youn made the concession and I may have misunderstood it but the concession is made in the deposition of John Green who's the Director of the Working Families Party, that they provide, they are -- they act as a vendor in addition to a political party and they provide candidate services.

And so what we have here is a situation where, and if I understood Ms. Your correctly, CSI is a subsidiary or a branch of the Working Families Party.

MS. YOUN: No.

MR. LOPEZ: But we can establish that, Your

Honor, we'll establish that. But there's a relationship between CSI, which means Candidate Services, Incorporated, and ACORN --

MS. YOUN: Citizens Services Incorporated.

MR. LOPEZ: Citizens Services Incorporated, there is a relationship, Your Honor. And what we have here very possibly is a situation where the candidate is reimbursing a political committee, if you will, with, with public money. And my understanding of the implementing of the regulations is that that is also prohibited. And I would direct the court -- this is, and I would direct the court to Plaintiff's 13 which was submitted with our previous exhibits back in December.

THE COURT: The previous truckload.

MR. LOPEZ: Right. And it talks about and what it is is the program regulations for the CEP and its permissible and non-permissible use of campaign funds.

And in fact I didn't misunderstand this regulation and candidates are actually allowed to funnel money that's given them back to their parties, well, if that's the case, then all that does is, it seems to me, is reinforce our position that the major parties have every incentive to get minor parties — I mean to get their candidates to run who can in turn purchase services from their parties, if that's the practice in Connecticut. It

seems to be the practice in WFP. I don't know if it's the practice of the Democratic and the Republican parties.

Maybe they can tell us tomorrow. But if it is, it's another reason to object to this program, Your Honor.

MS. YOUN: Just a couple of clarifying points,
Your Honor. Mr. Green testified, CSI is -- I think
Attorney Lopez is correct in saying that there is a
relationship obviously, but CSI does vending work for I
think the Working Families party, the Democratic Party and
the Republican Party. They are a general vendor.

Secondly, I think Mr. Lopez suggested that major party candidates get their grant monies much earlier than the October 10th deadline on which Cicero Booker got his grant money. I don't think that there's any basis for that in the record and, in fact, my understanding is many major party candidates as well, you know, didn't submit their materials until October and didn't get their grants until that time.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, "many" is a relative number, Your Honor. I'm sure there were some major party candidates who waited until the last minute to get their applications in but there were also many, many others and we can, you know, if the court wants that data, we can put that data into the record. It's all a matter of public record. The minutes of the SEEC meetings where they were,

where this occurs, they are all posted on the website unless it's been taken down, and it's a matter of public record, Your Honor. And I'll probably follow up on that because I think that is an important point.

And I don't know, I wish I had addressed this with Mr. DeRosa, but we got a declaration in from the Registrar of Voters or the county clerk from -- Registrar of Voters up in Hartford, and it's offered to show what a burden it is to, to verify petitions. And I don't know if he says in that, that declaration how long it takes to verify petitions once they are submitted, but I would ask that -- well, I'm going to consult with my colleagues but my understanding from earlier conversations, and I apologize it's not on the record right now, that it can take several weeks to verify petitions.

Okay, Your Honor, and I want to conclude here today by talking about how the CEP is affecting my clients different from the, in a way that's different from the statistical analysis that we've engaged in. Party officials, two co-chairs have met several times since the '08 election, they've met regularly in the months leading up to the election and they've come to the conclusion that the CEP will indeed increase the electorial opportunities of major party candidates by providing them with the resources to run more expensive and more competitive

campaigns.

While this may not happen in every district that the party has targeted in the past or in the future, it is a consideration in the party's strategy for targeting districts in the future. Moreover, the party has to plan for the fact that the CEP will provide major party candidates with the resources to get their message out, maintain or improve their branding, and solidify their position in the state. And this is all set forth in our affidavits.

And it's their view, and I think it's confirmed by the testimony of John Green, the Chair of the Working Families Party, that the availability of public funding solidifies the positions of the parties themselves, the political parties, by allowing major political parties to redirect private contributions to the party and to its party committees.

Now, party officials have come to the conclusion that if the party is to maintain its relative position, it must act quickly and must act now. Any delay could irreversibly damage the parties in Connecticut and lead to its decline and possible dissolution.

They've identified a number of strategies that could stave off the impact of the CEP on the party. The party could attempt to qualify its candidates for

statewide office. They have talked about this, they've discussed this. They don't think this is feasible. The qualifying contributions data and the petitioning requirements they believe are are out of their reach based on their historical spending and petitioning limits.

Party officials believe that if they are going to try to qualify candidates in the legislative districts, realistically it's limited to one or two assembly districts where the candidates hold more than ten percent of the vote in prior elections or the petitioning requirements are very low, and that happens in some districts. I think you've seen data on this. It usually happens in off elections.

Let me just back up for a second. When I was talking about the burden on Mr. Booker, the burden on petitioning, Mr. Booker qualified for a full grant this cycle, had to collect 2,600 valid signatures and he submitted 5,300 as a cushion. Next cycle, he would have to collect 5,600 valid signaturers or just about twice as many, and then twice as many as a cushion. And that's because the voter turn-out is so high in this cycle.

Now, if I may return to -- if I may return to the Green Party's fortunes, or misfortunes under the CEP, realistically they think may be able to qualify one or two candidates in legislative districts if they can raise the

qualifying contributions. That's a big if. They think they are going to have a hard time finding enough constituents in those districts to contribute to their campaigns. They think they can meet the petitioning requirements but raising the qualifying contributions is more difficult.

So while in the '06 election, the '06 statewide election, maybe thousands or 17,000 people voted --

MR. DeROSA: 18,000.

MR. LOPEZ: 18,000 people voted on the Green Party, they don't know who those people are. Their party in all statewide is very small. They don't know the universe of people who voted for them and it's very difficult to identify those people.

So, again, that's true even at the district level. They may only know, for instance, a dozen or two dozen or three dozen people who might contribute to their campaign. And for them to engage in a cold fundraising campaign, could you support my candidacy, is something they are not at all sure that they can realistically accomplish, even at the House level.

And I think we've learned from this Mr. Booker how difficult it is. And at the Senate level they're not very optimistic that they can meet petitioning requirements or the seed money requirements.

Now, so what's the party going to do? Well, at the very least, they are going to target single party districts. They are going to try to avoid districts where there are two major party candidates. They are also going to try to avoid districts where there's a CEP funding candidate, because it's in those districts that it's hard, the most difficult for their voices to be heard. Excuse me.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, I know Mr. Lopez is entitled to make his points but I think we ought to be clear about what the factual record is on this. The resolution suggests that there is a study that has commenced about whether they will do these things, so let's not suggest, and I think it's important to make that distinction because the claim is -- I mean I think there's, we're talking about litigation-driven decisions by the party. It seems to me that this resolution right before the as applied hearing I think is intended to bolster his part of the case, but let's be clear about what it says. They have not made decisions to alter their political strategy. They are considering whether to make decisions to alter their political strategy.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, I'm not sure exactly what resolution the Attorney General is referring to. I'm referring to our affidavits, and there is at least one,

maybe two resolutions associated with those affidavits but I'm basically referring to our affidavits in which our candidates say in emphatic terms we are in a pickle and this is, this is how we're going to proceed.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: I am talking about the resolution attached to Mr. Fourner's affidavit that lays out what the Green Party is doing to recess in light of the CEP.

THE COURT: I've seen it.

MR. LOPEZ: So, anyway his affidavit speaks for itself, Your Honor. It's there to lay out the future plans of the party.

Now, the party -- there are several alternatives available to the party. They are all under consideration. I said they could target, at the very least -- well, at the very least they might run -- at the very most they might try to field candidates in one or two legislative districts. They would want to avoid legislative districts where there's two CEP funded candidates, so that is something they are going to have to navigate.

They, in districts where they can't realistically fund a candidate, they are going to avoid two party districts and they are going to avoid -- or if it makes sense. I mean if that's what they can do, they are going to avoid, excuse me, districts where there are

CEP funded candidates.

For instance, in the 39th cycle, Kenric Hanson you know, ran a very satisfying campaign, a very successful campaign, because it was only, there was a non-serious Republican Party candidate who apparently, according to Mr. Hanson, wasn't very visible and there was a strong incumbent and Mr. Hanson was able to leverage off of those two facts and to get a fair bit of exposure and to do reasonably well in the poll. And there were a number of debates and overall he very pleased with his performance.

Now, the reality is though that none of this really reflects a long term strategy and, in effect, a long term strategy that would necessarily stave off the decline of the party in Connecticut. Over time -- party officials believe that over time that its position will decline because of the infusion of money that is flowing to major party candidates and indirectly to the political parties because of the redirection of private money into the political party system.

So, what is the party doing? They are rethinking their position on cross endorsements because there are some advantages to cross endorsements. I happen to think they are -- the cross endorsement strategy is a little cynical because what it requires you to do is to

get your ten percent by using the cross endorsement and then -- on your own line and then you have to turn around and, in my view, stab the candidate who you cross-endorsed in the back and run on your own line.

But they're not comfortable with that. They think it's cynical. They think it's — and they are not that happy about cross endorsing candidates because they represent an alternative to major parties, and it's all well and good for Working Families to embrace that strategy but that's their strategy. That's an alternative. The reason they exist is because they have points of view that are different than the major parties. For that reason, at this point they haven't decided definitively on whether or not they are going to, to proceed with, proceed with cross endorsements or not.

Now, the more realistic alternative, Your Honor, for the party, I think, is based on the view -- well, the more realistic alternative for the party may to be get out of the business of fielding candidates in statewide elections or in legislative elections. I don't think they -- right now they plan on running candidates in the 2010 statewide cycle and they will run candidates in the federal elections, but they are seriously considering, depending on how they do in their election, they are seriously considering their ability to continue to compete

in the post-CEP world, but they want to remain relevant in Connecticut. And the one way that they can remain relevant in Connecticut, the political party, is to engage in more advocacy, Your Honor, and that is an important point for our Count Two and Three claims. Yes.

The way you remain relevant if you can't compete effectively is you have your voice heard. And the party has committed itself to raising more resources so that they can engage in advocacy in support or in opposition to candidates, and that's true whether they are running in —they are running candidates themselves or whether they are just on the sidelines and not running candidates.

The CEP policy, the independent expenditure provision works that strategy right upfront because they are not interested in engaging in spending if the result is going to be to release public funds to the candidate who they oppose so that that candidate can deliver a counter message. If the legislature expands the independent advocacy rule to allow for supplemental grants for all advocacy, then you can also see how this strategy would be thwarting.

Now, we've made the point that, we've conceded that as a factual matter, the admittedly closer question in this case is whether or not minor party candidates are engaging in the kind of candidate expenditures that would

trigger an excess expenditure grant. As a factual matter we can concede that they have not raised an amount of money that would trigger excess expenditures. They never have. Excuse me. And frankly, any -- if they could raise that kind of money, they probably would try to participate in the public financing system.

The problem for them, however, is, Your Honor, is the limits on how you raise money. They think they would have more success with attracting a self-finance candidate to stay outside the system than they would with a candidate who might try to meet the qualifying contribution requirements.

So, if they wanted to get a lock on this group or if they want to, to run on their line for Governor in 2010, they believe that the excess expenditure provision thwarts that strategy, because any independent spender, you know, would come into the election or come into the decision knowing that, that there is a matching fund provision that will prevent, prevent you from leveraging your personal wealth to gain any electorial advantage.

And you know, in candor, there's no one on the radar right now, but they are out there everyday looking for that person, Your Honor. And they are looking for a candidate who can self-fund, or they are looking for any candidate who can bring resources to bear on the election

and the excess expenditure provision in line with the other provisions of the statute. Just make it more difficult to recruit candidates and in general to recruit candidates for that purpose and to generate enthusiasm about those candidates.

Now, finally, Your Honor, there are two other aspects of this statute, of the triggering excess expenditures statutes, that haven't been given a lot of, been given a lot of attention in this case, but our clients are plainly covered by it and they plainly have to comply with the provisions and they have to deal with disclosure, Your Honor.

Under the excess expenditure provision, once any nonparticipating candidate triggers it, all nonparticipating candidates have to engage in weekly disclosures. You'll recall we got into a big debate in December about whether the expenditures of all nonparticipating candidates are aggregated for purposes of the triggering provision, and I think Mr. Garfield has answered that question they are not. But the disclosure proceedings still apply so my candidates, even though they are not triggering it, are required to file — within 24 hours?

MR. DeROSA: 48.

MR. LOPEZ: 48 hours a disclosure report

detailing every expenditure so during the last two weeks of the election they have to a file, like all other candidates. But that's burden on them that's untethered from any risk that they are triggering excess expenditure provisions. They are covered by it and they certainly are objecting to it and they certainly seem to have a reason to raise that objection.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Hold on. A candidate who files a 1-B indicating they are not going to raise or spend more than \$4,000 doesn't have to make a disclosure and that's in most instances the Green Party candidate.

MR. LOPEZ: But not in all instances and not in all instances in this cycle.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. And the law applies until it's rescinded or until the legislature changes or until this court renders this unconstitutional.

And the other provision, the other aspect of the trigger provisions has to do with disclosure for independent expenditures. We would all agree that independent expenditures are aggregated and that the first dollar that my client has in independent expenditures would result in matching funds to his publicly financed opponent. But over and above that, my client is required to, even if he is engaging in — he's required to —

1 (Pause) 2 Oh, the party, even if it doesn't have a dog in 3 the fight, even if he doesn't have a candidate in the 4 race, is required to engage in expedited reporting, even 5 though it may not even have a candidate in the race. And 6 so the expedited reporting is, is his own risk in the same 7 way that the expedited reporting is for purposes of the 8 excess expenditure provisions. 9 And with those remarks, unless you have any questions, I've concluded for today. 10 11 THE COURT: Just on that last point what you're 12 saying is the independent expenditure trigger has been 13 triggered, the Green Party has to make reporting, even if it's not running a candidate? 14 15 MR. LOPEZ: I don't think it even has to be 16 triggered, Your Honor. I think that -- somehow I left 17 this out of my notes. 18 THE COURT: Make this last point again because 19 I'm not sure I follow what you're saying. 20 All right. MR. LOPEZ: 21 (Pause) MR. LOPEZ: Sorry, Your Honor. 22 Excuse us. 23 THE COURT: Take your time. 24 (Pause)

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Your Honor, while they are

25

looking for that information, we have some rebuttal points on that resolution that was just referenced and some of the Fourner and the Hanson facts. So I didn't know if you wanted us to do that now in direct rebuttal or roll it into our presentation tomorrow, which do you refer?

THE COURT: When you say "rebuttal" you mean what he said is not factually accurate or you dispute the significance of it?

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Partially that and then also if you wanted our assistance in pointing you, we've submitted their full depositions and if you wanted our assistance in pointing to you the points in the deposition that we feel contradict some of the statements in the declaration and in the resolution, we were advised that there was a possibility that there would be witnesses today and so we didn't learn until lunchtime that they weren't. So we were prepared to raise those points, but --

THE COURT: Maybe do that tomorrow.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: All right.

THE COURT: Thanks.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, our declaration was prepared to answer after the deposition intentionally and just the way it would be if our client was to testify today. I hope we've said nothing inconsistent. I concede

some very basic points, like we don't have the money right now to engage in independent expenditures. We can agree on that --

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Just a couple things about Hanson, for example. I think Attorney Ladov said that in that district there had been Republicans who had run in the past but actually -- and maybe I misheard what you said, but the actual record was that Republicans have run, I think, in almost every election since 2000 and they only had gotten approximately 29 percent. There might have been one cycle where they didn't.

MR. LADOV: I think what I said, or what I certainly intended to say, it was the first time the Green Party had jumped into that race. I don't remember saying anything about prior Republicans. If I did, it was in error, other than to refer to the Proulx declaration which said the Republicans had been running and was getting 30 percent. If there was something prior, it may have been in error that we received from the witness but I don't --

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Mr. Lopez had characterized Mr. Hanson as being really pleased with his performance in this past election, when in fact he testified that he felt his performance was actually weak and he wasn't satisfied with it. So, there were some direct contradictions.

1 MR. LOPEZ: I must have stepped out of the room 2 then because he was much more enthusiastic when I prepped 3 him. 4 (Laughter) 5 MR. LOPEZ: So, I apologize about that statement 6 if that's the case. 7 Okay. So, disclosure of the independent 8 expenditures is mandatory even if they would not trigger 9 the payment of matching funds. Independent expenditures must be disclosed within 24 hours if made within 20 days 10 11 of an election. And that would be Plaintiff's Exhibit 46 12 at page 8. 13 THE COURT: Okay, but you're saying if the Green Party makes an independent expenditure, it doesn't have a 14 15 candidate in the race but buys an ad for some other 16 purpose, you'd have to disclose that in a report. 17 MR. LOPEZ: That's right. 18 THE COURT: Okay, but that's --19 That applies to everybody. MR. LOPEZ: 20 THE COURT: That applies to everybody, that's 21 not singling out --22 That applies to all independent MR. LOPEZ: 23 speakers. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. LOPEZ: And I guess that makes some sense

for the independent expenditure provision because the state's trying to keep track of independent expenditures for purpose of payment of matching funds. But if you think the matching fund provision, the -- you can reach the disclosure requirement. My clients are covered by that and you can reach the disclosure requirement. And --

THE COURT: I thought you were saying that if somebody else made independent expenditure, that somehow minor parties were required to do something by way of reporting.

MR. LOPEZ: If I said that, I didn't mean to say that.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

MR. LOPEZ: On excess expenditures minor parties are required to engage in this expedited reporting, even if they are not a threat to trigger --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOPEZ: -- excess expenditure payments.

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Your Honor, this may be apparent to everybody, but there isn't a claim in this case based on a disclosure requirement. There are challenges to the independent expenditure and excess expenditure provisions that are sort of in the nature of a chill claim, but there isn't just a straightforward we object to the disclosure. That is not in this case.

```
1
                 MR. LOPEZ: We briefed it, Your Honor.
 2
                 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN:
                                     I don't mean in the
 3
       complaint. It's not in the amended complaint, it's not in
 4
       there.
                             The words disclosure aren't in there
 5
                 MR. LOPEZ:
 6
       but the --
 7
                 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: There's -- okay.
 8
                 MR. LOPEZ: We challenge the statute that
 9
       imposes a burden on our First Amendment rights.
       dozen things about this statute that aren't specified in
10
11
       the complaint because the statute as a whole, the burden
       is --
12
13
                 THE COURT: But you're talking about the Claim
14
       Number One now, right? Claims Two and Three are more the
15
       chilling of the speech. Claim One is the burden on equal
16
       opportunity.
17
                 MR. LOPEZ:
                             I don't believe -- do we use those
18
       words, Your Honor?
19
                             That was how I always thought of it.
                 THE COURT:
20
                             I thought we challenged -- well, why
                 MR. LOPEZ:
21
       don't we look.
22
                 MR. FEINBERG: What Mr. Zinn Rowthorn raised as
23
       a point, that they didn't challenge this aspect of the
24
       statute. To the best of my knowledge that's right,
25
       they've never challenged this until trying to submit it
```

1 now after two years-plus of litigation. 2 THE COURT: All right. So, the issue in terms 3 of whether they've challenged it or not is not necessarily 4 whether those words are used in the complaint. 5 argument --6 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: Even in substance, Your 7 Honor, this isn't a disclosure based claim. In other 8 words, the stand-alone we object to having to disclose, 9 that's -- I don't read that even expansively to suggest 10 that. 11 THE COURT: If the complaint says this burdens 12 our political opportunity, period, the statute burdens our 13 political opportunity, then they can raise expenditure 14 limits, they can raise petition requirements, they can 15 raise reporting requirements, why couldn't they? 16 In other words, in discovery why didn't you say 17 tell us every way in which you think that the statute 18 burdens your political opportunity and they would come 19 back. 20 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: I think we did. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: And this is literally, you 23 know --MR. LOPEZ: I have the --24 25 MS. YOUN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let's go one at time. That works really well.

MS. YOUN: The complaint specifies subsections of the CEP that it is challenging. Count One of the complaint talks about the qualifying criteria in the distribution formulas. It specifies subsections nine, two, four, five -- and five. Two is the matching fund provision. Three is the independent expenditure provision which cites to specific statutory subsections. Count Four is lobbyist ban. Count five is a contract ban.

Now, had we known that plaintiffs were going to raise just disclosure, pure disclosure, we would have taken discovery on the burdens of disclosure. We would have -- that's simply not within the complaint. The complaint's very clear as to what it covers.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, nine-dash -- we challenge 9-714 and 9-713 broadly and the disclosure requirements are -- 9-712. Oh my goodness, all right. Excuse me.

(Pause)

MR. LOPEZ: Well, okay, Your Honor. Our complaint challenges specifically 9-713 and 9-714. The disclosure requirements are contained in 9-712 --

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: 9-612.

MR. LOPEZ: In both. It's addressed in 9-712,

1 but we have challenged the CEP as a whole under Count One, 2 but even under Count Two and Three, Your Honor, we have put this issue into play in our previous submissions and 3 we briefed it, and they've had notice of this and I don't 4 5 recall them raising any objection to this. And my 6 understanding is that, absent prejudice, that, you know, 7 the complaint is deemed amended to, to --8 MS. YOUN: Your Honor, I'm reading now from 9 Document 309 which is our memorandum of law in opposition 10 to plaintiff's pretrial memorandum on counts two and 11 three. This is after the close of discovery. 12 We say in their pretrial memorandum -- I'm on 13 page 37 of our brief -- "Plaintiffs argued that the 14 Section 9-612 reporting requirement relating to the 15 independent expenditure matching funds burden minor 16 parties. This claim is not alleged in the complaint." 17 And this -- and they first mentioned it in their pretrial 18 memorandum after the close of discovery.

THE COURT: Let me just suggest that if the plaintiffs lose on the other issues, it's not likely that they are going to win --

MR. LOPEZ: On disclosure.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: -- on disclosure and reporting requirements.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, I'm trying to protect our

rights on the standing issue because we've clearly been covered by those, Your Honor. I mean I can't think of a more crystal clear -- I don't know what they would say about standing.

MS. YOUN: So you would certainly have standing in that case.

MR. LOPEZ: No, because I don't think, Your Honor — there are many different aspects of this provision, and the fact that we just specified one — in Counts Two and Three, the fact that we just specified 9-714 and -13 instead of -12 when both said, when 9-713 in fact refers to 9-712, I don't think — we briefed it, they've had the benefits of the brief. The courts have had the benefit of our briefs, and there's no reason for the court not to reach that issue, because clearly if 9-713 are unconstitutional, then so is 9-712 and any other reporting requirements that are linked to it. I don't think I can add anything to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, is plaintiff resting?

MR. LOPEZ: I did reserve, well, two things, I was hoping to put on some supplemental testimony about how long it takes to get your petitions approved, unless we can reach a stipulation that it takes several weeks or months.

MS. YOUN: It's hard, Your Honor, because it depends on the particular --

MR. LOPEZ: Well, you put on -- you have a witness. You submitted his declaration. Can we reach a stipulation or do I have to put on my own -- do you want to hear -- I don't know the answer to this. Excuse me.

(Pause)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I don't know if this would MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: be of any assistance, but we brought here today Mr. Hanson's petition, entire petition signature packet that reflects the date on which he would have submitted it to the town registrar and the date on which they, they would have certified and validated the number of signatures. So, that's for Mr. Hanson that we did have evidence that Mr. Hanson himself personally concluded his own petition signature gathering on August 2nd, because he certified that all the signatures on there were accurate to the best of his knowledge. So that would have been the last day he could have circulated that particular petition page, and he submitted the pages to the town registrar -they are dated by the town register and the town clerk on August 5th and August 7th. So the second was a Saturday, August 2nd was a Saturday, so August 4th would have been the first business day they could have been submitted to the town, and it looks like it was about a two, two to

three day turnaround.

MR. LOPEZ: I just talked to my client and, Your Honor, he advises me that by statute it has to be done within two weeks and there's penalties if it's not done. So, and he also tells me that in Hartford where apparently the burden described by the defendant's witness is so great, even there it only takes two or three days. We are willing to enter to a stipulation it takes two or three days.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: No, between --

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: We're not going to stipulate to any of those facts. I think it is so situational as to the towns, what's going on in the town, who the registrars are in the town, whether it's a town clerk or the town registrars, so I think Mr. Lopez should offer some evidence on the particular circumstances affecting his party's candidates and how long it's taken to have their petitions.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, we rest but for rebuttal.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

MR. LOPEZ: Plaintiffs rest.

THE COURT: All right, let's talk a little about tomorrow. What's the defense's intention? You're going to have witnesses?

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: We are going to have discussion about — we need to make a decision about whether to call John Green. There's been some testimony about the Working Families Party; the question for us this evening is whether we're going to, we need to put somebody on to rebut that. We're considering whether to call Beth Rotman on this issue, about whether, whether the SEEC did, in fact, as we know to be the case, provide advice that was, that we think is inconsistent with what her declaration says. So that's, so the answer is we're going to have make the decisions as to witnesses overnight.

And if we don't have witnessed, Attorney Youn is going to make a presentation consistent with sort of what she did last time and what Mr. Lopez has done, and I would ask for the opportunity to make some closing remarks.

THE COURT: Yes. In terms of closing remarks I guess I'd like to hear from both sides and principally about the standing issue but whatever issues you want to raise are fine. How much time do each of you want for your closings?

MR. ZINN ROWTHORN: I think I need 20 minutes to do a closing. I'll ask for half an hour just to be safe.

MR. LOPEZ: That's fair, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, 30 minutes. Okay. There shouldn't be any problem in getting your presentation

completed, including testimony?

MS. YOUN: No.

THE COURT: All right. A lot of your points have been made today presumably, some of them.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Your Honor, at the outset of the proceedings you had indicated you were interested in hearing from the plaintiffs on the standing issue, and at this point the defendants, in order to preserve their rights, would like to make a motion for judgment as a matter of law in light of the fact that the plaintiffs have rested in this case. And primarily the basis for our motion, while we're making it orally now, if you would like additional briefing on these issues related to standing, we're happy to do it after the close of the hearing, but we are, you know, making our motion for judgment as a matter of law at this point since it is required by the Federal Rules under Rule 52.

MR. FEINBERG: On the grounds of standing.

MS. MURPHY-OSBORNE: Primarily on the grounds of standing. On all counts, as to Count One and Count Two and Three, we're renewing essentially our standing arguments that are briefed amply in Hartford.

THE COURT: All right, well, I'll reserve on that motion and decide what we're going to do. Thanks.

All right. Anything else we can do today?

```
All right. Feel free to leave whatever you want
 1
       in the courtroom. And we'll see you tomorrow at 9:30.
 2
       Thank you. We'll stand adjourned.
 3
 4
                (Whereupon the above matter was adjourned at 4:35
 5
       o'clock, p. m.)
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

## CERTIFICATE

I, Susan E. Catucci, RMR, Official Court
Reporter for the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, do hereby certify that the
foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of
my shorthand notes taken in the aforementioned matter to
the best of my skill and ability.

## /S/ Susan E. Catucci

Susan E. Catucci, RMR
Official Court Reporter
915 Lafayette Boulevard
Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604
Tel: (917) 703-0761