INTRODUCTION

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The modern jurisprudence of money and politics has long resembled a labyrinth. The U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions in this area have erected seemingly unbreachable walls that block any straightforward path between acknowledged problems and proposed reforms. From the elevated vantage point of courts and scholars, these doctrinal walls might present some discernible pattern, but from the perspective of those who find themselves traversing this maze—lawmakers, reformers, candidates, fund-raisers, interest groups, and voters—these constitutional obstacles must seem at best arbitrary and at worst self-defeating. Well-intentioned policymakers who attempt to thread a constitutionally permissible route through this labyrinth may find themselves tracing a tortuous path and encountering unanticipated complications. The labyrinth’s sheer complexity can exact a heavy toll: campaign finance policymaking

* I would like to recognize the work of my colleagues at the Brennan Center—this volume, as well as the symposium that generated it, can truly be considered a team effort. Burt Neuborne, Michael Waldman, and Susan Liss were instrumental in conceptualizing this symposium, recruiting participants, and ensuring that jurisprudential development is at the forefront of the Brennan Center’s mission. Mimi Marziani and Mark Ladov played an invaluable role in editing this volume, while Ciara Torres-Spelliscy and Angela Migally contributed their deep expertise on campaign finance issues. Jeanine Plant-Chirlin arranged for the publication of this volume and shepherded us through the production process. Ali Hassan and Jafreen Uddin organized the symposium and ensured its success. NYU’s Review of Law and Social Change co-sponsored the symposium with us and published many of the essays included in this volume.
may result in rules that are difficult to understand and implement, vulnerable to loopholes, and subject to perverse consequences.

Most notorious, perhaps, is the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*.

There, the Court drew a First Amendment bright line between contributions given directly to a campaign and expenditures made independently from the campaign: limits on the former were deemed constitutionally permissible, while limits on the latter were assumed to be unconstitutional. In the real world, this distinction has encouraged campaign money to flow to relatively unregulated outside groups, while candidates and political parties face restrictions on the contributions they can raise. The groups wielding monetary power cannot be voted in or out, and candidates can deny any responsibility for such outside spending. Thus, *Buckley’s* legacy is a system in which money—and, consequently, power—is pushed to the political fringes, special interests wield disproportionate power over candidates and elected officials, and voters can hold no one accountable. For generations, legal thinkers have asked: is this really the result the First Amendment dictates? Despite these constant doubts, however, the contributions/expenditures distinction has become ever more deeply entrenched in the law.

In this convoluted doctrinal landscape, last year’s decision in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* arrived like a long-anticipated earthquake, leveling precedents and generating ongoing aftershocks. Even before the decision, the conservative majority of the Roberts Court had signaled its dissatisfaction with current campaign finance laws—“Enough is enough,” pronounced Chief Justice John Roberts in the 2007 decision, *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life*, rejecting an argument that federal restrictions should apply to campaign advertisements that did not advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate.

Three times prior to *Citizens United*, the Roberts Court considered campaign finance laws, and on all three occasions, the majority struck the regulation down. Thus, even before *Citizens United*, campaign finance law was suffering what election law expert Richard Hasen called “the death of a thousand cuts.”

*Citizens United* started as a little-noticed lawsuit regarding a ninety-minute video, *Hillary: The Movie*. The so-called documentary
was harshly critical of Hillary Clinton, who was then a presidential primary candidate, arguing that she was unfit to be the commander-in-chief, unqualified for the presidency, and that “a vote for Hillary is a vote to continue 20 years of a Bush or a Clinton in the White House.”

Citizens United—a nonprofit corporation that received some part of its funding from business corporations—wished to distribute the documentary on cable television as a “video-on-demand” in the period before the 2008 primary elections.

While *Hillary: The Movie* appeared to be simply just another salvo in the presidential campaign season, its production, timing, and planned release, in fact, were part of a coordinated and longstanding legal strategy to test the constitutional boundaries of federal campaign finance law, in particular the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), popularly known as “McCain-Feingold.”

Federal law barred corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to pay for “electioneering communications”—that is, broadcast campaign advertisements—or for federal communications that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a candidate. Instead, corporations could engage in such election-related expenditures only by establishing and administering a “separate segregated fund” or political action committee (PAC). Such a PAC could be funded only through contributions of the corporation’s stockholders, employees, and their families, and were subject to generally applicable federal contribution limits. But, under the so-called MCFL exemption (named after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life*), federal electioneering communications restrictions did not apply to nonprofit ideological advocacy corporations that had no shareholders and that did not accept contributions from for-profit corporations or unions.

The corporate electioneering restriction had been an explicit feature of federal campaign finance law since at least 1947, and had been upheld against a facial constitutional challenge by the Supreme Court in its 2003 decision *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*. In that case, the Court reasoned that the existence of the PAC alternative gave corporations and unions a “constitutionally sufficient” alternative to participate in federal electoral politics. The Court
had also upheld a state law analogous to the federal electioneering communications restriction in its 1990 decision *Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce*.  

In multiple ways, *Hillary: The Movie* was at the very margins of the coverage of the corporate electioneering communications restrictions. Whether or not the proposed video-on-demand release was, indeed, a “broadcast” advertisement, whether the *de minimis* amount of business corporation contributions disqualified Citizens United from being covered by the MCFL exemption, and whether a ninety-minute documentary could be considered an advertisement were all questions that could have been resolved narrowly, avoiding the constitutional issue. Rather than resolving the case on narrow grounds, on the last day of the 2009 term, the Supreme Court vastly expanded the scope and consequences of the case by requesting expedited reargument on whether the Court’s precedents in *Austin* and *McConnell* should be overturned, and whether the restrictions on corporate electioneering should be held facially unconstitutional.

Suddenly, this sleepy little case had the potential to transform federal politics as we know it. The political community sat up and took notice: forty-one *amicus* briefs were filed in the few short weeks of the Court’s rushed briefing schedule. The end result was, of course, a sweeping decision, clearing the way for unlimited corporate spending in federal elections for the first time in the modern era.

This volume of essays is an attempt to map out the complex labyrinth that led to *Citizens United* and to explore where this decision may lead. The chapters in it arose from a symposium sponsored by the Brennan Center just nine weeks after the *Citizens United* decision was announced. The timing was somewhat fortuitous—although we knew the *Citizens United* decision was pending when we organized the convening, we had no way of knowing that the Supreme Court was on the verge of upending decades of settled constitutional doctrine. We were painfully aware, however, that the increasingly byzantine contours of campaign finance law had driven many of our greatest constitutional scholars out of the field, leaving the topic of money and politics to be largely the province of specialists. A fundamental reassessment was long overdue. Our goal, then, was to bring together the most incisive, innovative, and
profound constitutional scholars of our time to take a fresh look at the age-old conundrum of money and politics.

Now, *Citizens United* has created an inflection point in constitutional law. Fundamental questions of money and politics have been brought to the forefront of constitutional debate: Should the First Amendment favor individual speech rights at the expense of other democratic values, or is the First Amendment itself premised on an ideal of deliberative democracy? Are elections a marketplace that the economically powerful can rightfully dominate, or should they instead be viewed as an institution designed to facilitate informed decision-making by voters? Should money be treated as speech, and, if so, when and to what extent? How do the First Amendment rights of corporations and other organizations compare to the rights of individuals? Does the insulation of judges from politics make them the ideal arbiters of the competing claims of campaigners, or does their inexperience lead them to constitutionalize a misguided view of the political process?

In responding to these and other basic questions, the contributors to this volume have outlined unexpected and productive avenues to pursue in examining the constitutional law of money and politics. The volume is divided into four parts. The first part explores the concept of “electoral exceptionalism,” in which elections may be deemed to be exceptional realms of First Amendment activity—comparable to town hall meetings or public debates—in which ordinary rules regarding government regulation of speech may apply differently than in other spheres of public discourse. In Chapter 2, Robert Post points out that First Amendment coverage is not omnipresent—whether particular circumstances trigger First Amendment analysis at all depends, crucially, on an underlying account of the purposes and values advanced by the First Amendment. He argues that First Amendment coverage should be triggered whenever state regulations threaten communication that is essential to public discourse, but also that First Amendment doctrine should be formulated to safeguard essential processes of democratic legitimation. The question of First Amendment protection should turn on assessing the justification for campaign finance regulation in light of its impact on public discourse. He suggests that reconciling campaign finance regulation with existing
First Amendment doctrine will require a reorientation, so that such regulations are conceptualized as efforts to preserve the institutional purposes of elections.

In Chapter 3, Richard H. Pildes introduces more fully the concept of “electoral exceptionalism,” arguing that elections should be constitutionally viewed as specially bounded domains warranting distinct First Amendment rules. Pildes explains that particularized treatment of election-related speech would be consistent with existing First Amendment doctrine, which recognizes a variety of context-dependent principles. Pildes outlines a jurisprudential theory that treats elections as a bounded sphere of First Amendment concern.

In Chapter 4, Geoffrey R. Stone responds with fundamental questions raised by the electoral exceptionalism approach. He sets forth the parameters that govern the recognition of First Amendment exceptionalism in other areas, such as in schools or town hall meetings. He explores the difficulty of finding an appropriate analogy between such recognized First Amendment exceptions and elections, and lists an array of questions that must be answered before suspending our general skepticism of government efforts to regulate electoral speech.

The second part of the volume offers new perspectives on a fundamental issue: whether and to what extent money spent on speech equals speech itself. In Chapter 5, Deborah Hellman posits a fresh approach to determining when the spending of money should be equated with an underlying constitutional right. She explores case law in other arenas in which such spending is, and is not, deemed to be encompassed within the penumbra of a particular right. She ultimately concludes that spending can be constitutionally regulated when the state provides an adequate, alternative means of accessing the right in question.

In Chapter 6, highlighting the constitutional primacy of consent in legitimate democratic government, Frances R. Hill faults the Citizens United Court for ignoring the underlying First Amendment rights of corporate shareholders and members. She explores the textual and doctrinal foundations of considering consent a constitutional principle. She then considers methods to ensure consent and accountability for corporate political spending in the post–Citizens United world.

In Chapter 7, I explain that the Court’s campaign finance decisions have embodied two competing conceptions of the source
of First Amendment value in campaign spending: the volitional account ties such value to the intention of the spender, while the commodity account assesses such value from the point of view of the marketplace. Through this lens, I explain how the *Citizens United* opinion’s “source-blind” approach represents a radical extension of the commodity account and question some of this approach’s destabilizing ramifications.

The third part of the volume considers how political spending may lead to a corruption of our democratic polity. In Chapter 8, Samuel Issacharoff takes a hard look at the meaning of political corruption and finds that the concept has never been satisfactorily explored. He explains that the concept of “corruption” is really a concern with ensuring public—rather than private—outputs from the policymaking process of government once in office, rather than when candidates stand for election. He suggests a reorientation of campaign finance law using an approach that guards against “clientelism” and can combat the corrosive distortion of political decision-making.

In Chapter 9, Zephyr Teachout also challenges the narrow concept of corruption adopted by the *Citizens United* Court. She shows that, in fact, American courts have long been concerned by the distorting influence of money in the political sphere, and historically relied on such concerns to refuse to enforce private contracts. With this case law as a guide, she suggests looking beyond traditional campaign finance principles to enrich and expand the judicial tools available to combat political corruption.

In Chapter 10, Mark C. Alexander argues that the Supreme Court’s money-in-politics jurisprudence has over-emphasized free speech values at the expense of key equality considerations. He urges the Court to recognize, for example, equality concerns implicated when elected officials spend more time fund-raising than legislating, or when power is concentrated in the hands of an elite group of fund-raisers.

The fourth part of the volume examines the extent to which the courts have assumed too great a role in the realm of political spending. In Chapter 11, Richard Briffault demonstrates that campaign finance jurisprudence has become overly judicialized, routinely privileging the judgment of courts over the opinion of elected officials. Given the numerous constitutional interests implicated, the normative judgments
about how to order competing concerns, and the importance of empirical considerations, Briffault maintains that questions of campaign finance regulation are best resolved by public debate, with judicial intervention justified only to prevent clear constitutional abuses.

In Chapter 12, Burt Neuborne takes a historical long view, tracing our dysfunctional law of democracy to a fundamental disagreement among Justices Felix Frankfurter, William Brennan, and John Marshall Harlan. He pinpoints the ultimate problem with the Court’s money in politics jurisprudence—its refusal to consider how particular decisions will affect democracy.

The chapters in this volume are intended to serve as a guide through the labyrinth of judicial decisions on money and politics and to mark some new paths forward. Whether *Citizens United* is the first step leading to a brave new world of deregulated campaigns or whether it is ultimately revealed as a constitutional dead end is, at this point, yet to be determined. But the scholarship presented here will be crucial to determining the ultimate legacy of this watershed decision—and of our constitutional democracy.