STATEMENT OF

ELIZABETH GOITEIN
CO-DIRECTOR, LIBERTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HEARING ON

SECTION 702 OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT

MARCH 1, 2017
Introduction

Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law.¹ The Brennan Center is a nonpartisan law and policy institute that seeks to improve our systems of democracy and justice. I co-direct the Center’s Liberty and National Security Program, which works to advance effective counterterrorism policies that respect constitutional values and the rule of law.

Congress’s goal, when it passed the FISA Amendments Act in 2008 (thus creating Section 702 of FISA), was to give our government more powerful tools to address terrorist threats. In keeping with this goal, the authorities conferred by Section 702 have been used to monitor suspected terrorists overseas in order to trace their networks and interrupt their plots. This use of the law is widely recognized as appropriate and has caused little controversy.

In writing the law, however, Congress did not expressly limit Section 702 surveillance to such activities. Instead, Congress gave significant discretion to the executive branch and the FISA Court, trusting them to ensure that the law was implemented in a manner consistent with its objective. For instance, Congress allowed the government to target any foreigner overseas, counting on intelligence agencies to focus their efforts on those who pose a threat to our interests. Congress also did not specify what minimization should look like, leaving that to the agencies and the judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

It would be wrong to suggest that this trust has somehow been betrayed. There has been very little evidence of intentional abuse or misuse. The executive branch, however, has taken full advantage of the leeway provided in the statute. Instead of simply acquiring the communications of suspected terrorists or foreign powers overseas, the government is scanning the content of nearly all of the international communications that flow into and out of the United States via the Internet backbone, and is acquiring hundreds of millions of these communications each year. Based on the manner in which the data is collected, this surveillance inevitably pulls in massive amounts of Americans’ calls and e-mails.

We have also seen mission creep. A statute designed to protect against foreign threats to national interests has become a major source of warrantless access to Americans’ data, and a tool for ordinary domestic law enforcement. This outcome is contrary, not only to the original intent of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but to Americans’ expectations and their trust that Congress will protect their privacy and freedoms. It is now up to Congress to enact reforms that will provide such protection.

¹ This testimony is submitted on behalf of a Center affiliated with New York University School of Law but does not purport to represent the school’s institutional views on this topic. More information about the Brennan Center’s work can be found at http://www.brennancenter.org.
I. Background: How Changes in Technology and the Law Led to a Massive Expansion in Government Surveillance

Technological advances have revolutionized communications. People are communicating at a scale unimaginable just a few years ago. International phone calls, once difficult and expensive, are now as simple as flipping a light switch, and the Internet provides countless additional means of international communication. Globalization makes such exchanges as necessary as they are easy. As a result of these changes, the amount of information about Americans that the NSA intercepts, even when targeting foreigners overseas, has exploded.²

But instead of increasing safeguards for Americans’ privacy as technology advances, the law has evolved in the opposite direction since 9/11. In its zeal to bolster the government’s powers to conduct surveillance of foreign threats, Congress has amended surveillance laws in ways that increasingly leave Americans’ information outside their protective shield (the USA FREEDOM Act being the notable exception). Section 702 is a particularly striking example.

Before 2007, if the NSA, operating domestically, sought to collect a foreign target’s communications with an American inside the U.S., it had to show probable cause to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) that the target was a foreign power – such as a foreign government or terrorist group – or its agent. The Protect America Act of 2007 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (which created Section 702 of FISA) eliminated the requirement of an individualized court order. Domestic surveillance of communications between foreign targets and Americans now takes place through massive collection programs that involve no case-by-case judicial review.³

In addition, the pool of permissible targets is no longer limited to foreign powers or their agents. Under Section 702, the government may target for foreign intelligence purposes any person or group reasonably believed to be foreign and located overseas.⁴ The person or group need not pose any threat to the United States, have any information about such threats, or be suspected of any wrongdoing. This change not only renders innocent private citizens of other nations vulnerable to NSA surveillance; it also greatly increases the number of communications involving Americans that are subject to acquisition – as well as the likelihood that those Americans are ordinary, law-abiding individuals.

Further expanding the available universe of communications, the government and the FISA Court have interpreted Section 702 to allow the collection of any communications to, from, or about the target.⁵ The inclusion of “about” in this formulation is a dangerous leap that finds no basis in the statutory text and little support in the legislative history. In practice, it has been

⁴ 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b).
applied to collect communications between non-targets that include the “selectors” associated with the target (e.g., the target’s e-mail address or phone number). In theory, it could be applied even more broadly to collect any communications that even mention ISIS or a wide array of foreign leaders and public figures who are common topics of conversation. Although the NSA is prohibited from intentionally acquiring purely domestic communications, such acquisition is an inevitable result of “about” collection.

Other than the foreignness and location criteria (and certain requirements designed to reinforce them), the only limitation on collection imposed by the statute is that the government must certify that acquiring foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the collection.6 FISA’s definition of foreign intelligence, however, is not limited to information about potential threats to the U.S. or its interests. Instead, it includes information “that relates to . . . the national defense or the security of the United States; or . . . the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”7 This could encompass everyday conversations about current events. A conversation between friends or colleagues about the merits of the North American Free Trade Agreement or whether the United States should build a wall along the border with Mexico, for instance, “relates to the conduct of foreign affairs.” Moreover, while a significant purpose of the program must be the acquisition of foreign intelligence, the primary purpose may be something else altogether.8 Finally, the statute requires the FISA Court to accept the government’s certifications under Section 702 as long as they contain the required elements.9 These factors greatly weaken the force of the “foreign intelligence purpose” limitation.

The government uses Section 702 to engage in two types of surveillance. The first is “upstream collection,” whereby the content of communications flowing into and out of the United States on the Internet backbone is scanned for selectors associated with designated foreigners. As noted above, the acquired communications include not only communications to or from the designated foreigners, but communications about them. Although the data are first filtered in an attempt to weed out purely domestic communications, the process is imperfect and domestic communications are inevitably acquired.10 The second type of Section 702 surveillance is “PRISM collection,” under which the government provides selectors, such as e-mail addresses, to U.S.-based electronic communications service providers, who must turn over any communications to or from the selector.11 Using both approaches, the government collected more than 250 million Internet transactions a year as of 2011.12

Due to these changes wrought by Section 702, it can no longer be said that FISA is targeted at foreign threats. To describe surveillance that acquires 250 million Internet communications a year as “targeted” is to elevate form over substance. And on its face, the statute does not require that the targets of surveillance pose any threat, or that the purpose of the program be the collection of threat information.

---

7 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2).
8 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
10 PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 5, at 36-41.
11 Id. at 33-34.
Congress no doubt trusted that the executive branch would exercise these broad powers judiciously, and would not conduct surveillance of innocent private citizens abroad simply because the statute, on its face, allows it. And it is certainly possible that the government has chosen to focus its surveillance more narrowly than Section 702 requires. The certifications that the government provides to the FISA Court – which include the foreign intelligence categories at which surveillance is aimed, and could therefore shed some light on this question – have not been publicly disclosed by the government.

Even assuming that actual practices stop short of what the law allows, however, the available statistics suggest a scope of surveillance that is difficult to reconcile with claims of narrow targeting. A leaked copy of one of the certifications, listing the foreign nations and factions about which foreign intelligence may be sought, lends support to the conclusion that surveillance is in practice quite broad: it includes most of the countries in the world, ranging from U.S. allies to small countries that play little role on the world stage.

More important, Americans’ privacy should never depend on any given administration’s voluntary self-restraint, or on the hope that the FISA Court will impose additional requirements beyond those laid out in the statute. Section 702 establishes the boundaries of permissible surveillance, and it clearly allows collection of communications between Americans and foreigners who pose no threat to the U.S. or its interests. That creates an enormous opening for unjustified surveillance.

II. Constitutional Concerns

The warrantless acquisition of millions of Americans’ communications presents deep Fourth Amendment concerns. The communications obtained under Section 702, like any e-mails or phone calls, include not only mundane conversations, but the most private and personal confidences, as well as confidential business information and other kinds of privileged exchanges. Since the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States in 1967, the government has been required to obtain a warrant to wiretap Americans’ communications.13 Moreover, in a subsequent case, the Court made clear that this requirement applied in domestic national security cases as well as criminal cases.14

A. “Incidental” Collection

The government nonetheless justifies the warrantless collection of international communications under Section 702 on the ground that the targets themselves are foreigners overseas, and the Supreme Court has held (in a different context) that the government does not need a warrant to search the property of a non-U.S. person abroad.15 Although the communications obtained under Section 702 sometimes involve both foreigners and Americans,

the FISA Court, along with federal courts in two circuits,\(^\text{16}\) have held that the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of the foreign target entails the authority to “incidentally” collect the communications of those in contact with the target.

Outside of Section 702, however, the case law does not support the existence of a right to warrantless “incidental” collection. The courts reviewing Section 702 have relied on a line of cases dating back to the 1970s, sometimes called the “incidental overhear” cases, in which defendants challenged Title III wiretap orders on the ground that they did not name everyone whose communications might be recorded. The courts held that a warrant meets the Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement as long it specifies the phone line to be tapped and the conversations to be acquired, and if the government takes reasonable steps to avoid recording “innocent” conversations.\(^\text{17}\) It is hard to see how these rulings on the criteria for a valid warrant could justify warrantless collection of Americans’ communications.\(^\text{18}\)

If, on the other hand, the courts reviewing Section 702 have correctly interpreted the rule emerging from the “incidental overhear” cases, then applying that rule in the Section 702 context would be a classic case of the law failing to keep up with technology. A blanket rule that no warrant is needed for Americans who are in contact with a lawfully surveilled target might have made sense in the 1970s, when there was almost certainly a warrant for the target himself (given the infrequency of international communication) and when government agents monitored the wiretap in real time so that they could turn off the recording equipment if “innocent conversations” were taking place. That rule does not sufficiently protect Americans’ reasonable expectation of privacy in an era where millions of Americans communicate with foreigners overseas on a routine basis, those communications can easily be intercepted in massive amounts without any warrant, and there is no mechanism for “turning off” the collection of “innocent communications.” Equating the incidental surveillance that takes place in these materially different contexts is like equating “a ride on horseback” with “a flight to the moon.”\(^\text{19}\)

**B. The Foreign Intelligence Exception**

Alternatively, the FISA Court (and, more recently, a district court following its lead\(^\text{20}\)) has relied on the “foreign intelligence exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The Supreme Court has never recognized this exception, and there is significant controversy over its scope. The FISA Court has construed the exception extremely broadly,

---

\(^{16}\) See United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-CR-623 (JG), 2016 WL 1029500 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).


\(^{18}\) See Elizabeth Goitein, The Ninth Circuit’s Constitutional Detour in Mohamud, JUST SEC. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35411/ninth-circuits-constitutional-detour-mohamud/. The rulings are particularly inapt because Section 702 minimization procedures present little or no barrier to collection, and the back-end protections on retention and use are significantly weaker than those that apply in the Title III context. See Brief for Appellant at Argument I, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001) (noting that “FISA’s minimization standards are more generous than those in Title III”).

\(^{19}\) Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).

stating that it applies even if the target is an American and even if the primary purpose of collection has no relation to foreign intelligence.  

In the era before FISA, however, several federal courts of appeal had the opportunity to review foreign intelligence surveillance, and they articulated a much narrower version of the exception. They held that it applies only if the target is a foreign power or agent thereof, and only if the acquisition of foreign intelligence is the primary purpose of the surveillance. They also emphasized the importance of close judicial scrutiny (albeit after-the-fact) in cases where the target challenges the surveillance. While these cases addressed surveillance activities that differed in many respects from Section 702, it is clear that Section 702 surveillance would not pass constitutional muster under the standards they articulated.

A detailed analysis of the case law is beyond the scope of this testimony, but the Brennan Center’s report, *What Went Wrong With the FISA Court*, engages in such an analysis and explains why the foreign intelligence exception does not justify Section 702 surveillance in its current form.

C. The Reasonableness Test

Even if a foreign intelligence exception applied, the surveillance would still have to be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The “reasonableness” inquiry entails weighing the government’s interests against the intrusion on privacy.

In undertaking this analysis, courts generally accept that the government’s interest in protecting national security is of the highest order – as it certainly is. But to determine the reasonableness of a surveillance scheme, one must also ask whether it goes further than necessary to accomplish the desired end. For instance, how does it further national security to allow the targeting of foreigners who have no known or suspected affiliation with foreign governments, factions, or terrorist groups? How does it further national security to permit the FBI to search for Americans’ communications to use in prosecutions having nothing to do with national security?

Moreover, in assessing the impact on privacy rights, the FISA Court has focused on the protections offered to Americans by minimization procedures. As discussed below, however, these protections fall short in a number of significant respects. On their face, they allow Americans’ communications to be retained, disseminated, and used in a wide range of circumstances.

---

21 See, e.g., *In re Directives*, 551 F.3d 1004; *In re DNI/AG Certification [REDACTED]*, No. 702(i)-08-01 (FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2008).

22 See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604-05 (3rd Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977).

23 GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 2, at 11-12, 35-43.


25 See infra Part V.

26 *In re Directives*, 551 F.3d at 1015.
III. Risks and Harms of Mass Data Collection

Constitutional concerns aside, the mass collection and storage of communications that include sensitive information about Americans carries with it significant risks and harms, which must be considered in evaluating what the appropriate scope of surveillance should be.

A. Risk of Abuse or Mishandling of Data

The substantive legal restrictions on collecting information about Americans are looser than they have been since before 1978. At the same time, the amount of data available to the government and the capacity to store and analyze that data are orders of magnitude greater than they were during the period of J. Edgar Hoover’s worst excesses. History teaches us that this combination is an extraordinarily dangerous one.

To date, there is only limited evidence of intentional abuse of Section 702 authorities.27 There have, however, been multiple significant instances of non-compliance by the NSA with FISA Court orders. Notably, these include cases in which the NSA did not detect the non-compliance for years, and the agency’s overseers had no way to uncover the incidents in the meantime. Given that these incidents went unreported for years even when the agency was not trying to conceal them, it is not clear how overseers would learn about intentional abuses that agency officials were making every effort to hide. In other words, regardless of whether intentional abuse is happening today, the potential for abuse to take place – and to go undiscovered for long periods of time – is clearly present.

Inadvertent failures to adhere to privacy protections are a concern in their own right. On multiple occasions in the past decade, the FISA Court has had occasion to rebuke the NSA for repeated, significant, and sometimes systemic failures to comply with court orders. These failures took place under multiple foreign intelligence collection authorities (including Section 702) and at all points of the programs: collection, dissemination, and retention. It is instructive to review some of the Court’s comments in these cases. The following statements are excerpted from four opinions:

- “In summary, since January 15, 2009, it has finally come to light that the FISC’s authorizations of this vast [Section 215 telephony metadata] collection program have been premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses [the] metadata. This misperception by the FISC existed from the inception its authorized collection in May 2006, buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the government’s submissions, and despite a government-devised and Court-mandated oversight regime. The minimization procedures proposed by the government in each successive application and approved and adopted as binding by the orders of the FISC have been so frequently

and systemically violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall [bulk collection] regime has never functioned effectively.”

- “The government has compounded its non-compliance with the Court’s orders by repeatedly submitting inaccurate descriptions . . . to the FISC.”

- “[T]he NSA continues to uncover examples of systematic noncompliance.”

- “Under these circumstances, no one inside or outside of the NSA can represent with adequate certainty whether the NSA is complying with those procedures.”

- “[U]ntil this end-to-end review is completed, the Court sees little reason to believe that the most recent discovery of a systemic, ongoing violation . . . will be the last.”

- “The Court is troubled that the government’s revelations regarding NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions mark the third instance in less than three years in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the scope of a major collection program.”

- “The current application [for pen register/trap and trace data] . . . raises issues that are closely related to serious compliance problems that have characterized the government’s implementation of prior FISA orders.”

- “As far as can be ascertained, the requirement was simply ignored.”

- “Notwithstanding this and many similar prior representations, there in fact had been systematic overcollection since [redacted] . . . . This overcollection . . . had occurred continuously since the initial authorization . . . .”

- “The government has provided no comprehensive explanation of how so substantial an overcollection occurred.”

- “[G]iven the duration of this problem, the oversight measures ostensibly taken since [redacted] to detect overcollection, and the extraordinary fact that the NSA’s end-to-end review overlooked unauthorized acquisitions that were documented in virtually every record of what was acquired, it must be added that those responsible for conducting oversight at NSA failed to do so effectively.”

- “The history of material misstatements in prior applications and non-compliance with prior orders gives the Court pause before approving such an expanded collection. The government’s poor track record with bulk PR/TT acquisition…presents threshold concerns about whether implementation will conform with, or exceed, what the government represents and the Court may approve.”

- “As noted above, NSA’s record of compliance with these rules has been poor. Most notably, NSA generally disregarded the special rules for disseminating United States

---

28 In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at 10-11 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
29 Id. at 6.
30 Id. at 10.
31 Id. at 15.
32 Id. at 16.
35 Id. at 19.
36 Id. at 20.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Id. at 22.
39 Id. at 77.
person information outside of NSA until it was ordered to report such disseminations and
certify to the FISC that the required approval had been obtained... The government has
provided no meaningful explanation why these violations occurred, but it seems likely
that widespread ignorance of the rules was a contributing factor.\textsuperscript{40}

- “Given NSA’s longstanding and pervasive violations of the prior orders in this matter, the
  Court believes that it would be acting well within its discretion in precluding the
government from accessing or using such information.”\textsuperscript{41}
- “[The] cases in which the FBI had not established the required review teams seemed to
  represent a potentially significant rate of non-compliance.”\textsuperscript{42}
- “The Court was extremely concerned about these additional instances of non-
  compliance.”\textsuperscript{43}
- “Perhaps more disturbing and disappointingly than the NSA’s failure to purge this
  information for more than four years, was the government’s failure to convey to the
  Court explicitly during that time that the NSA was continuing to retain this
  information . . . .”\textsuperscript{44}

It is unclear whether these failures occurred because the NSA was not putting sufficient
effort into compliance, because the NSA lacked the technical capability to ensure consistent
compliance, or for some other reason. Whatever the explanation, the fact that the agency’s many
failures to honor privacy protections were inadvertent is of limited comfort when the NSA is
asking Congress and the American public to entrust it with extensive amounts of private data.

Moreover, the fact that little evidence of intentional abuse has emerged to date is not a
cause for complacency. Government insiders have made reference to a “culture of compliance”
and professionalism that emerged in the decades following the Church Committee’s
investigation.\textsuperscript{45} But organizational cultures change, and are highly influenced by leadership.
There is simply no guarantee that the degree of institutional self-restraint exercised in the past
will continue indefinitely.

In this vein, it is significant that some intelligence experts who until recently defended
the wide discretion permitted by Section 702 have seemingly revisited their conclusions in light
of today’s tumultuous and uncertain political landscape. Matthew Olsen, who served as NSA
General Counsel and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, was a strong
supporter of the FISA Amendments Act when it was being debated in 2008 and has often
testified on its behalf.\textsuperscript{46} At a recent public conference, however, he stated: “I fought hard ... for

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 95.
\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 115.
\textsuperscript{42} [Redacted], at 48-49 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 2015), available at www.dni.gov%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2F20151106-
702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf&t=MDM3MGZmYjY1ZWQ5YiUvMjQ5ZjQ1ZTA0DExNiY
2NWU0ZTE1ZWJINsxarRxYaRQg%3D%3D.
\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 50.
\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 58.
\textsuperscript{45} See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1326
n.135 (2004).
\textsuperscript{46} See, e.g., Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The Balance between National Security,
Privacy, and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of
Matthew G. Olsen, Former Director, National Counterterrorism Center) [hereinafter Olsen Statement].

increasing information sharing… [and] for the modernization of FISA. . . . As I fought for these changes, I did not bargain on [the current political environment]. That was beyond my ability to imagine . . . [T]his is a time of . . . soul-searching for me.”

B. Chilling Effect

When Americans are aware that intelligence agencies are collecting large amounts of their data (and not just the data of suspected criminals and terrorists), it creates a measurable chilling effect on free expression and communication. After Edward Snowden’s revelations in June 2013, an analysis of Google Trends data showed a significant five percent drop in U.S.-based searches for government-sensitive terms (e.g., “dirty bomb” or “CIA”). A control list of popular search terms or other types of sensitive terms (such as “abortion”) did not show the same change. In 2013, PEN America surveyed 528 American writers to learn how the disclosures affected their behavior. Twenty-eight percent reported curtailing social media activities; 24 percent avoided certain topics by phone or email; 16 percent chose not to write or speak on a certain topic; and 16 percent avoided Internet searches or website visits on controversial or suspicious topics. These kinds of self-censorship are inimical to the robust exchange of ideas necessary for a healthy democracy.

The impact of overbroad surveillance has been particularly acute in Muslim American communities. According to one study, after the Associated Press reported on the New York City Police Department’s surveillance activities, Muslims reported a decline in mosque attendance and Muslim Student Association participation, as well as a marked reticence to speak about political matters in public places or to welcome newcomers into the community. Fear of surveillance, and the possibility that religious or political discussions could be misconstrued or misunderstood, has measurably impeded these communities’ ability to freely practice their faith or even to participate fully in civic life.

C. Risk of Data Theft

Any massive government database containing sensitive information about Americans also raises concerns about data theft. The disastrous 2015 attack on the Office of Personnel Management’s database, in which personal data concerning more than 21 million current and former federal employees was stolen (ostensibly by the Chinese government), illustrated how vulnerable government databases are. A few months later, hackers published contact

information for 20,000 FBI employees and 10,000 Department of Homeland Security employees that they may have obtained by hacking into a Department of Justice database. The broad scope of Section 702 data, and the possibility that it could include a wealth of valuable foreign intelligence information, makes it an attractive target for hacking. Its inclusion of large amounts of information about presumptively innocent Americans significantly increases the harm that would be caused by such an event.

D. Economic Consequences

Another important concern is the negative impact of Section 702 collection on the U.S. technology industry. After Snowden’s disclosures revealed the extent of NSA collection, American technology companies reported declining sales overseas and lost business opportunities. In a survey of 300 British and Canadian businesses, 25 percent of respondents indicated they were moving their data outside of the U.S. An August 2013 study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation estimated that the revelations could cost the American cloud computing industry $22 to $35 billion over the coming years, representing a 10-20% loss of the foreign market share to European or Asian competitors. Another analyst found this estimate to be low, and predicted a loss to U.S. companies as high as $180 billion.

The economic news went from bad to worse in late 2015, when the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the “Safe Harbor” agreement – a 2000 decision of the European Commission allowing the transfer of personal data from the European Union (EU) to the United States, based on the premise that the U.S. met certain EU-law requirements about the handling of that information. The court held that EU law requires U.S. companies to give the data a level of protection that is essentially equivalent to the protections under EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU – akin to an EU bill of rights. Under this standard, the court found that the European Commission had failed to ensure that EU citizens’ data was sufficiently protected within the U.S. While the court did not make express findings about Section 702, the law unquestionably loomed large in the court’s analysis, as the authority it confers is inconsistent with many of the essential rights and principles the court described. For instance, upstream surveillance is clearly implicated by the CJEU’s conclusion that “generalized” access to the content of electronic communications compromises the essence of the right to privacy.

52 Mary Kay Mallonnee, Hackers Publish Contact Info of 20,000 FBI Employees, CNN (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/08/politics/hackers-fbi-employee-info/.
Although the U.S. and the European Commission have devised a new arrangement, known as the “Privacy Shield,” legal challenges to that agreement are underway⁵⁷ – and recent developments have given a boost to these challenges. In particular, some of the protections U.S. officials had cited to assuage concerns about the breadth of Section 702 and other U.S. surveillance programs have been, or may soon be, eroded. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board has lost its chairman and three other members, and is effectively dormant. A recent executive order issued by President Trump removes Privacy Act protections for foreigners. The current CIA director previously proposed revoking a directive issued by President Obama that extended some protections to foreigners’ data obtained under foreign intelligence programs.⁵⁸

In the absence of reforms to Section 702 and other surveillance authorities, it appears likely that the Privacy Shield will ultimately be invalidated by the CJEU or potentially even by the European Commission itself (which can suspend the arrangement unilaterally). Experts believe this would deal a massive economic blow to U.S. companies and could undermine the very structure of the Internet, which requires free data flow across borders. In the meantime, the legal limbo in which U.S. companies find themselves constrains their ability to pursue business opportunities in Europe.

E. Potential National Security Harms

Last but clearly not least, there is a risk to national security in acquiring too much data. While computers can glean relationships and flag anomalies, they cannot replace human analysis, and human beings have limited capacity. When they are presented with an excess of data, real threats can get lost in the noise. This is not merely a theoretical concern. After the intelligence community failed to intercept the so-called “underwear bomber” (the suicide bomber who nearly brought down a plane headed to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009), an official White House review observed that a significant amount of critical information was available to the intelligence agencies but was “embedded in a large volume of other data.”⁵⁹ Similarly, the independent investigation of the FBI’s role in the shootings by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood concluded that the “crushing volume” of information was one of the factors that hampered accurate analysis prior to the attack.⁶⁰

---


Whatever threat information may exist amidst the 250 million Internet communications acquired yearly under Section 702, there is surely a large amount of chaff. Because this may make it more difficult to find the threats, it is important for lawmakers to examine whether the current scope of Section 702 collection may be too broad from a security standpoint as well as a privacy one.

IV. Minimization and Its Loopholes

Legal and policy defenses of Section 702 surveillance rely heavily on the existence of minimization procedures to mitigate the effects of “incidental” collection. The concept behind minimization is fairly simple: The interception of Americans’ communications when targeting foreigners is inevitable, but because such interception ordinarily would require a warrant or individual FISA order, incidentally collected U.S. person information generally should not be kept, shared, or used, subject to narrow exceptions.

The statutory language, however, is much more complex. It requires the government to adopt minimization procedures, which it defines as procedures “that are reasonably designed . . . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.”61 The statute also prohibits disseminating non-foreign intelligence information in a way that identifies U.S. persons unless their identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance. The one caveat is that the procedures must “allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes.”62

The lack of specificity in this definition, and the tension between its general rule and its caveat, has allowed the government to craft rules that are permissive and contain multiple exceptions. To begin with, the NSA may share raw data with the FBI and CIA.63 All three agencies generally may keep unreviewed raw data – including data about U.S. persons – for five years after the certification expires;64 they also can seek extensions from a high-level official,65

---

and the 5-year limit does not apply to encrypted communications (which are becoming increasingly common among ordinary users of mobile devices) or communications “reasonably believed to contain secret meaning.” The agencies may keep indefinitely any U.S. person information that has foreign intelligence value or is evidence of a crime.

If the NSA discovers U.S. person data that has no foreign intelligence value and contains no evidence of a crime, the agency is supposed to purge the data. The NSA, however, interprets this requirement to apply only if the NSA analyst determines “not only that a communication is not currently of foreign intelligence value to him or her, but also would not be of foreign intelligence value to any other present or future foreign intelligence need.” This is an impossibly high bar, and so, “in practice, this requirement rarely results in actual purging of data.”

The FBI and the CIA have no affirmative requirement to purge irrelevant U.S. person data on detection, relying instead on age-off requirements. Moreover, if the FBI reviews information containing U.S. person information and makes no determination regarding whether it is foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime, the 5-year limit evaporates, and the FBI may keep the data for a longer period of time that remains classified.

If any of the three agencies – all of which have access to raw data – disseminate information to other agencies, they must first obscure the identity of the U.S. person; but once again, there are several exceptions to this rule. For instance, the agencies need not obscure the U.S. person’s identity if it is necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or if the communication contains evidence of a crime.

In short, the NSA routinely shares raw Section 702 data with the FBI and CIA; and the agencies’ minimization procedures suggest that U.S. person information is almost always kept for at least five years and, in many circumstances, much longer. The sharing and retention of U.S. person information are not unrestricted, but it is a stretch to say that they are “minimized” under any common sense understanding of the term.

65 PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 5, at 60.
66 NSA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at § 6(a)(1)(a); CIA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at § 3.c.
67 NSA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at § 6(a); FBI 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at § III.G; CIA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at §§ 3.a, 7.d.
68 NSA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at §§ 3(b)(1), 3(c).
69 PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 5, at 62.
70 Id.
71 FBI 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at § III.G.1.b.
72 Id. at § V.A-B; NSA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at § 6(b); CIA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at §§ 5, 7.d.
V. Back Door Searches

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the minimization procedures is that they allow all three agencies to query Section 702 data using U.S. person identifiers, with the express goal of retrieving and analyzing Americans’ communications.73

If the government wishes to obtain an American’s communications for foreign intelligence purposes, it must secure an individual court order from the FISA Court after demonstrating that the target is an agent of a foreign power. If the government wishes to obtain an American’s communications for law enforcement purposes, it must get a warrant from a neutral magistrate. To ensure that Section 702 is not used to avoid these requirements, the statute contains a prohibition on “reverse targeting” – i.e., targeting a foreigner overseas when the government’s intent is to target “a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States.” Before conducting Section 702 surveillance, the government must certify that it does not intend to target particular, known Americans.

And yet, immediately upon obtaining the data, all three agencies may sort through it looking for the communications of particular, known Americans – the very people in whom the government just disclaimed any interest. Worse, even though the FBI would be required to obtain a warrant in order to access Americans’ communications absent a significant foreign intelligence purpose, the FBI may search the Section 702 data for Americans’ communications to use in criminal proceedings having no foreign intelligence dimensions whatsoever.74 This is a bait and switch that is utterly inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the prohibition on reverse targeting. It also creates a massive end run around the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Some have defended these “back door searches,” claiming that as long as information is lawfully acquired, agencies may use the information for any legitimate government purpose. This argument ignores Congress’s command to agencies to “minimize” information about U.S. persons. The very meaning of “minimization” is that agencies may not use the information for any purpose they wish. Minimization is a constitutional requirement as well as a statutory one: as Judge Bates of the FISA Court has observed, “[T]he procedures governing retention, use, and dissemination bear on the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of a program for collecting foreign intelligence information.”75

73 NSA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at § 3(b)(5); FBI 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at § III.D; CIA 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 64, at § 4.
75 [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *27 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011). In cases involving the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, the reasonableness of a surveillance scheme turns on weighing the government’s national security interest against the privacy intrusion. While the surveillance scheme should be evaluated as a whole, it is difficult to see how any scheme could pass the reasonableness test if a significant component of the scheme were not justified by any national security interest. This is one of several errors, in my view, in the FISA Court’s 2015 decision upholding the constitutionality of back door searches. See Elizabeth Goitein, The FBI’s Warrantless Surveillance Back Door Just Opened a Little Wider, JUST SEC. (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/30699/fbis-warrantless-surveillance-door-opened-wider/.
Indeed, restrictions on searches of lawfully obtained data are the constitutional norm, not the exception. In executing warrants to search computers, the government routinely seizes and/or copies entire hard drives. However, agents may only conduct searches reasonably designed to retrieve those documents or files containing the evidence specified in the warrant.\(^76\) The fact that the government lawfully obtained and is in possession of the computer’s contents does not give it license to conduct any search it wishes; that would violate the terms on which the government obtained the computer’s contents in the first place.

The same principle holds true in the analog world. When the police obtain a warrant to search a house for a murder weapon, they may enter the house and, in appropriate cases, search every room. But after they find (or fail to find) the murder weapon, they are not allowed to continue searching for other items they may have some interest in, simply because they are now in the house. Their entrance into the house was legal, but that does not entitle them to search for anything inside it. That would be exceeding the terms accompanying their initial access to the house.

Under Section 702, the terms on which the government is authorized to collect data \textit{without} a warrant include a limitation on whom the government may target – i.e., the government may only target foreigners overseas. To obtain access to the data on those terms and then search for Americans’ data is the equivalent of seizing a computer to search for child pornography and then searching for evidence of tax fraud, or obtaining access to a house to search for a murder weapon and then conducting a search for drugs.

Compounding the constitutional harm, the government has not fully and consistently complied with its statutory and constitutional obligation to notify criminal defendants when it uses evidence “obtained or derived from” Section 702 surveillance. Before 2013, the government interpreted “obtained or derived from” so narrowly that it notified no one. In the three and a half years since the government’s approach reportedly changed,\(^77\) the government has provided notification in only eight known cases, even though the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) reports that the FBI searches Section 702 every time it conducts a national security investigation\(^78\) and there have been several hundred terrorism and national security convictions during this time.\(^79\) There is reason for concern that the government is avoiding its notification requirements by engaging in “parallel construction” – i.e., recreating the Section 702 evidence using less controversial means.\(^80\) Attorneys have asked the Department of Justice to

\(^{76}\) See, e.g., United States v. Gancias, 755 F.3d 125 (2nd Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 824 F.3d 199 (2nd Cir. 2016).


\(^{78}\) PCLOB 702 REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.

\(^{79}\) DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2015 at 14; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014 at 12; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013 at 60.

share its policies for determining when information is considered to be “derived from” Section 702, but the Department refuses to provide them.

Importantly, opposition to warrantless searches for U.S. person information is not a call to re-build the barriers to cooperation among agencies often attributed to “the wall.” Threat information, including threat information that focuses on U.S. persons, can and should be shared among agencies when identified, and the agencies should work together as necessary in addressing the threat. What the Fourth Amendment cannot tolerate is the government collecting information without a warrant with the intent of mining it for use in ordinary criminal cases against Americans. That is why President Obama’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies – a five-person panel including a former acting director of the CIA (Michael J. Morell) and chief counterterrorism advisor to President George W. Bush (Richard A. Clarke) – unanimously recommended closing the “back door search” loophole by prohibiting searches for Americans’ communications without a warrant.81

VI. Foreign Nationals and Human Rights Risks

Section 702 surveillance also raises concerns about the privacy and human rights of foreign nationals who are not foreign powers, agents of foreign powers, or affiliated with terrorism. While the Fourth Amendment might not apply to these individuals, the right to privacy is a fundamental human right recognized under international law – including treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the U.S. has signed. In Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28), President Obama acknowledged that “all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and . . . all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.”82

PPD-28 requires agencies to extend certain privacy protections to foreign nationals when conducting electronic surveillance. Most notably, personal information of non-U.S. persons may be retained or disseminated only if retention and sharing would be permitted for “comparable information concerning U.S. persons.”83 This is a significant change, but several factors limit its actual and potential impact.

Most notably, the future viability of PPD-28 is uncertain, given that President Trump already has rescinded several of President Obama’s orders and CIA Director Mike Pompeo, when he served in Congress, argued that PPD-28 should be revoked.84 Additionally, even if PPD-28 remains in place, the directive does not prevent the acquisition of information about foreign nationals who pose no threat to the United States. Finally, the limits on retention and sharing of U.S. person information are not particularly strict to begin with, and it remains to be

83 Id. at § 4(a)(i).
seen whether and how the agencies incorporated PPD-28’s requirement of “comparability” in their 2015 minimization procedures (which have not been declassified).

A particular concern relates to the sharing of Section 702 information with foreign governments. Agencies have significant leeway to share foreign intelligence information, as long as the sharing is consistent with U.S. law, clearly in the national interest, and “intended for a specific purpose and generally limited in duration.”

Although the agency should have “confidence” that the information “is not likely to be used by the recipient in an unlawful manner or in a manner harmful to U.S. interests,” there is no express requirement or mechanism to ensure that governments with poor or spotty human rights records will not use the information to facilitate human rights violations – for instance, to harass or persecute journalists, political dissidents, human rights activists, and other vulnerable groups whose communications may have been caught up in the Section 702 collection.

VII. Must We Leave Section 702 in Its Current Form?

Having discussed the concerns surrounding Section 702 surveillance, it is important to address the arguments that have been put forward for its necessity. These arguments have varying degrees of merit, but none of them forecloses the possibility of reforms.

A. Restoring FISA’s Original Intent?

Executive branch officials have argued that Section 702 was necessary to restore the original intent behind FISA, which was being subverted by changes in communications technology. These officials note that FISA in 1978 required the government to obtain an individual court order when collecting any communications involving Americans that traveled by wire, but required an individual court order to obtain satellite communications only when all of the communicants were inside the U.S. Asserting that “‘wire’ technology was the norm for domestic calls,” while “almost all transoceanic communications into and out of the United States were carried by satellite, which qualified as ‘radio’ (vs. ‘wire’) communications,” they infer that Congress intended to require the government to obtain an order when acquiring purely domestic communications, but not when obtaining communications between foreign targets and Americans. This intent was undermined when fiber-optic cables later became the standard method of transmission for international calls.

89 Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence at 4 (Sept. 6, 2007).
The problem with this theory is two-fold. First, it would have been quite simple for Congress to state that FISA orders were required for purely domestic communications and not for international ones. Instead, Congress produced an elaborate, multi-part definition of “electronic surveillance” that relied on particular technologies rather than the domestic versus international nature of the communication. Second, it is not correct that “almost all” international communications were carried by satellite; the available evidence indicates that one third to one half of international communications were carried by wire.\textsuperscript{90}

A more plausible explanation for the original FISA’s complex scheme – one with much stronger support in the legislative history – was put forward by David Kris, a former head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. Mr. Kris concluded that Congress intended to require a court order for international wire communications obtained in the U.S., and that the purpose behind its definitional acrobatics was to leave legislation covering surveillance conducted outside the U.S. and NSA satellite surveillance for another day.\textsuperscript{91} Although Congress never followed up, the legislative history of FISA made clear that the gaps in the statute’s coverage of NSA’s operations “should not be viewed as congressional authorization for such activities as they affect the privacy interests of Americans.”\textsuperscript{92}

A related argument in support of Section 702’s necessity is that certain purely foreign-to-foreign communications, which Congress never intended to regulate, now travel through the United States in ways that bring them within FISA’s scope. In practice, this appears to be a fairly discrete (albeit thorny) problem that applies to one category of communication: e-mails between foreigners that are stored on U.S. servers.\textsuperscript{93} Section 702, however, goes far beyond what would be necessary to solve that problem, as it eliminates the requirement of an individualized court order for the acquisition of any communication between a foreign target and an American.

Moreover, there is a flip side to this issue: changes in technology have also caused certain purely domestic communications to travel outside the U.S. in ways that remove them from FISA’s scope. Purely domestic communications once traveled on copper wires inside the U.S., and FISA thus required a court order to obtain them for foreign intelligence purposes. Today, digital data may be routed anywhere in the world – and U.S. Internet Service Providers may store domestic communications on overseas servers – rendering these communications vulnerable to surveillance under Executive Order 12333, which has far fewer safeguards.\textsuperscript{94} Any legislation

\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 13-23.
\textsuperscript{93} FISA regulates three basic types of surveillance: wiretapping, the interception of radio communications, and the “monitoring” of information through other electronic means — which, in 1978, referred primarily to bugging. Although e-mails may be captured in transit by wiretapping or (for e-mails sent wirelessly) interception of radio signals, once they are stored on a server, their acquisition is considered “monitoring.” Because FISA regulates “monitoring” within the U.S. regardless of the nationality of the target, stored foreign-to-foreign e-mails come within its ambit. DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS 2d §§ 7.27, 16.6 (2012).
\textsuperscript{94} GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 2, at 19-20; TOH ET AL., supra note 87, at 8-10.
that attempts to address the unanticipated inclusion of purely foreign communications should address the unanticipated exclusion of purely domestic communications, as well.

It should also address another way in which technological advances have undermined the protections of FISA. As noted above, FISA governs the acquisition of “wire” communications as long as one of the communicants is inside the United States, but it governs the acquisition of “radio” communications only if the sender and all recipients are inside the United States. In addition, even if a communication travels most of its route by wire, it is considered a “radio” communication if intercepted during a non-wire portion of transmittal. Today, as cell phones are replacing landlines, more and more “wire communications” have a wireless component—allowing the government to acquire an increasing number of international phone calls on U.S. soil outside FISA’s legal framework. This unintended exception to FISA’s coverage threatens to swallow the rule, unless Congress acts to fix it.

B. Thwarting Terrorist Plots

Executive officials have stated, and the PCLOB and the president’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies have found, that Section 702 surveillance played a role in detecting and thwarting a number of terrorist plots. That is, after all, the most important function the statute is intended to serve; if it did not accomplish this goal, it presumably should go the way of the now-discontinued Section 215 bulk collection program, which, by most reliable reports, added little counterterrorism value.

Whether Section 702 is useful is thus a question of critical importance. It is not, however, the only question that must be answered. There is also the question of whether effective surveillance could be conducted in a manner that entails less intrusion on the privacy of law-abiding Americans and foreigners. Indeed, in the few cases that have been made public—including those of Najibullah Zazi, Khalid Ouazzani, David Headley, Agron Hasbajrami, and Jamshid Muhtorov—it appears that the targets of the Section 702 surveillance were known or suspected to have terrorist affiliations. Intelligence officials have confirmed that this is the norm in cases where Section 702 surveillance has been critical—i.e., that the “typical” such case has involved “narrowly focused surveillance” targeting “a specific foreign individual overseas[,] based on the government’s reasonable belief the individual was involved with terrorist activities.” Such cases do not support the idea that the NSA needs the authority to target any foreigner overseas and collect all of his communications with Americans.

---

95 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) & (3).
96 See Kris & Wilson, supra note 93, at § 7.6.
97 Although most wireless communications today do not technically travel via radio waves, the legislative history of FISA indicates that Congress intended to cover a broader range on the electromagnetic spectrum. See id. at § 7.7.
99 See Olsen Statement, supra note 46, at 5.
We must also ask whether the costs to our liberties are too high. It is commonly said that if terrorists succeed in undermining our values, they win. But while this notion is often invoked, it is also often forgotten. The United States was founded on a set of core principles, and none of these was more important than the right of the citizens to be free from undue intrusions by the government on their privacy. 100 Our Constitution promises us that law-abiding citizens will be left alone. It is incumbent upon us as a nation to find ways of addressing the terrorist threat that do not betray this promise.

VIII. Who Decides? – The Need for Transparency

Within constitutional bounds set by our nation’s courts, it is up to the American people – speaking through their representatives in Congress – to decide how much surveillance is too much. But they cannot do this without sufficient information.

While a significant amount of information about Section 702 has been declassified in recent years, critical information remains unavailable. For instance, the certifications setting forth the categories of foreign intelligence the government seeks to collect – but not the individual targets – have not been released, even in redacted form. Unlike the NSA and the CIA, the FBI does not track or report how many times it uses U.S. person identifiers to query databases containing Section 702 data. The list of crimes for which Section 702 data may be used as evidence has not been disclosed. Nor have the policies governing when evidence used in legal proceedings is considered to be “derived from” Section 702 surveillance. The length of time that the FBI may retain data that has been reviewed but whose value has not been determined remains secret.

Perhaps most strikingly, despite multiple requests from lawmakers dating back several years, the NSA has yet to disclose an estimate of how many Americans’ communications are collected under Section 702. The NSA has previously stated that generating an estimate would itself violate Americans’ privacy, ostensibly because it might involve reviewing communications that would otherwise not be reviewed. In October of last year, a coalition of more than thirty advocacy groups – including many of the nation’s most prominent privacy organizations – sent a letter to the Director of National Intelligence urging that the NSA go forward with producing an estimate. 101 The letter noted that, as long as proper safeguards were in place, the result would be a net gain for privacy.

In April 2016, a bipartisan group of fourteen House Judiciary Committee members sent the DNI a letter making the same request. 102 Eight months later, the members wrote again to memorialize their understanding, in light of interim conversations and briefings, that the DNI would provide the requested estimate “early enough to inform the debate,” and with a target date

of January 2017.\textsuperscript{103} It is now March, and the administration has issued neither the estimate nor any public response to the members’ second letter.

This basic information is necessary for Americans to evaluate the impact of Section 702 on their privacy. It is also necessary because most Americans are not lawyers, and when they hear that a surveillance program is “targeted” only at foreigners overseas and that any acquisition of Americans’ communications is “incidental,” they may reasonably assume that there is very little collection of their own calls and e-mails. An estimate of how many communications involving Americans are collected would help to pierce the legalese and give Americans a truer sense of what the program entails.

In short, Section 702 is a public statute that is subject to the democratic process, and the democratic process cannot work when Americans and lawmakers lack critical information. More transparency is urgently needed so that the country can begin an informed public debate about the future of foreign intelligence surveillance.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.