

**The Constituent-Engagement Effect of Small Donor Public Financing:  
A Statistical Comparison of City Council (2017) and State Assembly (2018) Fundraising in New York City**

**APPENDIX<sup>1</sup>**

**OVERVIEW: CANDIDATES AND DISTRICTS ANALYZED**

Table A. City Council and Assembly Districts by NYC Borough

NYC Borough	Assembly Districts	City Council Districts
Manhattan	65, 70, 72, 76	1, 5, 9, 10
Brooklyn	46, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 59, 60	33, 34, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46
Bronx	78, 82, 83, 87	12, 13, 15, 18
Queens	23, 26, 36	19, 22, 32, 34
Staten Island	61, 63	49, 50

Table B. Publicly-financed City Council Candidates (2017) by District and NYC Borough<sup>2</sup>

Publicly-financed City Council candidate	City Council District	Overlapping Assembly District	NYC Borough
Aaron Foldenauer	1	65	Manhattan
Christopher Marte	1	65	Manhattan
Margaret Chin	1	65	Manhattan
Benjamin Kallos	5	76	Manhattan
Bill Perkins	9	70	Manhattan
Jack Royster, Jr.	9	70	Manhattan
Tyson-Lord Gray	9	70	Manhattan
Ydanis Rodriguez	10	72	Manhattan
John Cerini	13	82	Bronx
John Doyle	13	82	Bronx
Marjorie Velazquez	13	82	Bronx
Ritchie Torres	15	78	Bronx
Jayson Cancel	15	78	Bronx
Michael Beltzer	18	87	Bronx
William Moore	18	87	Bronx
Paul Graziano	19	26	Queens
Paul Vallone	19	26	Queens
Costa Constantinides	22	36	Queens

<sup>1</sup> The online Appendix contains background data pertinent to the study, [The Constituent-Engagement Effect of Small Donor Public Financing: A Statistical Comparison of City Council \(2017\) and State Assembly \(2018\) Fundraising in New York City](#). Additional data are on file with the Brennan Center for Justice.

<sup>2</sup> Nine candidates on this list ran in contests with open seats due to term limits (districts 13, 18, 41, 43).

Eric Ulrich	32	23	Queens
Michael Scala	32	23	Queens
Stephen Levin	33	50	Brooklyn
Antonio Reynoso	34	53	Brooklyn, Queens
Alicka Ampry-Samuel	41	55	Brooklyn
Inez Barron	42	60	Brooklyn
Mawuli Hormeku	42	60	Brooklyn
John Quaglione	43	46	Brooklyn
Justin Brannan	43	46	Brooklyn
Robert Capano	43	46	Brooklyn
Kalman Yeger	44	48	Brooklyn
Alan Maisel	46	59	Brooklyn
Deborah Rose	49	61	Staten Island
Kamillah Payne-Hanks	49	61	Staten Island
Michael Penrose	49	61	Staten Island
Richard Florentino	50	63	Staten Island
Steven Matteo	50	63	Staten Island

Table C. Privately-financed City Council Candidates (2017) by District and NYC Borough

Privately-financed City Council candidate	City Council District	Overlapping Assembly District	NYC Borough
Bryan Jung	1	65	Manhattan
Frank Spotorno	5	76	Manhattan
Andrew King	12	83	Bronx
Mark Gjonaj	13	82	Bronx
Ruben Diaz, Sr.	18	87	Bronx
Rafael Espinal, Jr.	37	54	Brooklyn

Table D. Privately-financed State Assembly Candidates (2018) by District and NYC Borough

Privately-financed State Assembly Candidate	Assembly District	Overlapping City Council District	NYC Borough
Stacey Pheffer Amato	23	32	Queens
Edward Braunstein	26	19	Queens
Aravella Simotas	36	22	Queens
Ethan Lustig-Elgrably	46	43	Brooklyn
Mathylde Frontus	46	43	Brooklyn
Steven Saperstein	46	43	Brooklyn
Simcha Eichenstein	48	44	Brooklyn
Joseph Lentol	50	33	Brooklyn
Maritza Davila	53	34	Brooklyn
Erik Dilan	54	37	Brooklyn
Latrice Walker	55	41	Brooklyn
Jaime Williams	59	46	Brooklyn
Charles Barron	60	42	Brooklyn

Charles Fall	61	49	Staten Island
Patricia Kane	61	49	Staten Island
Michael Cusick	63	50	Staten Island
Yuh-Line Niou	65	1	Manhattan
Inez Dickens	70	9	Manhattan
Carmen De La Rosa	72	10	Manhattan
Rebecca Seawright	76	5	Manhattan
Jose Rivera	78	15	Bronx
Michael Benedetto	82	13	Bronx
Carl Heastie	83	12	Bronx
Karines Reyes	87	18	Bronx

**SUMMARY STATISTICS: FUNDRAISING AND DONOR ENGAGEMENT**

Tables E-H show the median fundraising and donor engagement levels of the 65 publicly-financed and privately-financed candidates analyzed in 21 overlapping districts. The numbers of candidates studied in each category appear in parentheses.

Table E. Total Funds Raised from Different Donor Types by the Median Publicly-Financed and Privately-Financed Candidates Running in Overlapping Districts

<b>Candidate Type</b>	<b>Total Funds</b>	<b>People</b>	<b>Entities</b>	<b>Constituents</b>	<b>Small Donors</b>	<b>Small-Donor Constituents</b>
<i>Publicly-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (35)</i>	\$228,373	\$202,058	\$16,000	\$74,530	\$97,834	\$39,795
<i>Privately-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (6)</i>	\$126,803	\$75,715	\$36,187	\$13,100	\$15,775	\$3,372
<i>Privately-financed State Assembly candidates, 2018 (24)</i>	\$112,490	\$39,364	\$54,002	\$8,850	\$6,111	\$1,580

Table F. Share of Total Funds Raised from Different Donor Types by the Median Publicly-Financed and Privately-Financed Candidates Running in Overlapping Districts

<b>Candidate Type</b>	<b>People</b>	<b>Entities</b>	<b>Constituents</b>	<b>Small Donors</b>	<b>Small-Donor Constituents</b>
<i>Publicly-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (35)</i>	95%	5%	41%	47%	25%
<i>Privately-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (6)</i>	86%	14%	13%	14%	3%
<i>Privately-financed State Assembly candidates, 2018 (24)</i>	43%	57%	11%	5%	2%

**Table G. Numbers of Different Donor Types Engaged by the Median Publicly-Financed and Privately-Financed Candidates Running in Overlapping Districts**

<b>Candidate Type</b>	<b>Total Donors</b>	<b>People</b>	<b>Entities</b>	<b>Constituents</b>	<b>Small Donors</b>	<b>Small-Donor Constituents</b>
<i>Publicly-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (35)</i>	389	384	10	131	293	107
<i>Privately-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (6)</i>	367	323	37	66	200	56
<i>Privately-financed State Assembly candidates, 2018 (24)</i>	196	136	49	29	74	19

**Table H. Share of Different Donor Types Engaged by the Median Publicly-Financed and Privately-Financed Candidates Running in Overlapping Districts**

<b>Candidate Type</b>	<b>People</b>	<b>Entities</b>	<b>Constituents</b>	<b>Small Donors</b>	<b>Small-Donor Constituents</b>
<i>Publicly-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (35)</i>	97%	3%	45%	77%	40%
<i>Privately-financed City Council candidates, 2017 (6)</i>	95%	5%	22%	60%	16%
<i>Privately-financed State Assembly candidates, 2018 (24)</i>	72%	28%	17%	34%	11%

## MULTIVARITATE QUANTILE REGRESSIONS

Dependent variables:

1. Proportion **constituent donations** of total funds raised
2. Proportion **small donations** of total funds raised
3. Proportion **small-dollar constituent donations** of total funds raised
4. Proportion **small donors** of total donor pool
5. Proportion **constituent donors** of total donor pool
6. Proportion **small-donor constituents** of total donor pool

Independent variables:

1. **Publicly-financed City Council candidate** = 1 if the candidate was a recipient of public campaign funds; 0 if otherwise.
2. **City Council** = 1 if the candidate ran for a seat in the City Council; 0 if the candidate ran for a seat in the Assembly.
3. **Incumbent** = 1 if the candidate was an incumbent in the district they campaigned in; 0 if otherwise.
4. **Contested Primary** = 1 if the candidate faced at least one challenger in a primary election; 0 if otherwise.
5. **Contested General** = 1 if the candidate faced at least one challenger in a general election; 0 if otherwise.

Results:

The quantile regression results in Table I show proportional differences in funds raised from constituents (model 1), small donors (model 2) and small-donor constituents (model 3) by publicly-financed City Council candidates vs. privately-financed City Council and State Assembly candidates.

Table I. Effects of Public Financing on Shares of Funds Raised from Constituents, Small Donors and Small-Donor Constituents

Variables	Model 1: Constituent Donations	Model 2: Small Donations	Model 3: Small-Dollar Constituent Donations
<i>(Constant)</i>	0.113 (0.106)	0.132 (0.140)	0.064 (0.065)
<i>Publicly-financed City Council candidate</i>	0.302*** (0.095)	0.266** (0.125)	0.176*** (0.058)
<i>City Council</i>	-0.054 (0.102)	0.109 (0.136)	0.038 (0.062)
<i>Incumbent</i>	-0.053 (0.061)	-0.085 (0.081)	-0.062* (0.037)
<i>Contested Primary</i>	0.047 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.076)	-0.028 (0.035)
<i>Contested General</i>	0.052 (0.093)	-0.003 (0.124)	0.002 (0.057)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Cells report quantile regression coefficients. Each model had 65 observations. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> values for Models 1, 2 and 3 are 0.3221, 0.4465 and 0.3732, respectively. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

The quantile regression results in Table J show proportional differences in shares of constituents (model 4), small donors (model 5) and small-donor constituents (model 6) engaged by publicly-financed City Council candidates vs. privately-financed City Council and State Assembly candidates.

Table J. Effects of Public Financing on Shares of Constituents, Small Donors, and Small-Donor Constituents Engaged

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Model 4: Constituents</b>	<b>Model 5: Small Donors</b>	<b>Model 6: Small-Donor Constituents</b>
<i>(Constant)</i>	0.099 (0.128)	0.475 (0.127)	0.050 (0.107)
<i>Publicly-financed City Council candidate</i>	0.233** (0.115)	0.119 (0.114)	0.136 (0.095)
<i>City Council</i>	0.039 (0.124)	0.168 (0.123)	0.102 (0.103)
<i>Incumbent</i>	0.017 (0.074)	-0.182** (0.073)	-0.420 (0.061)
<i>Contested Primary</i>	-0.000 (0.070)	0.038 (0.069)	0.018 (0.058)
<i>Contested General</i>	0.075 (0.113)	0.040 (0.112)	0.100 (0.094)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Cells report quantile regression coefficients. Each model had 65 observations. Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> values for Models 4, 5 and 6 are 0.2493, 0.3864 and 0.2827, respectively. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.