



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

Intelligence Assessment

**(U//FOUO) Decade in
Review: Self-Selecting US
Persons Drive Post-2006
Increase in Anti-US Plotting**

7 March 2011

Prepared by

FBI

Los Angeles/JRIC

(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) Analysis of all plots^a against the United States and US interests between 2001 and 2010 by action-oriented indicted Islamic extremists^b indicated there was an 11 percent increase in the number of incidents after 2006 as compared to the earlier half of the decade. The FBI and the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) assess with high confidence,^c based on available and reliable open source reporting, that US person activity drove the post-2006 rise, as the group was five times more active than foreign nationals in the same timeframe.

(U//FOUO) The FBI and the JRIC assess with high confidence, based on available and reliable open source reporting, that several events that emerged during the decade may have triggered growing numbers of action-oriented indicted Islamic extremists to devise and sometimes execute their plans. These events included, but were not limited to, a broadening US military presence overseas and outreach by Islamist ideologues, especially those with specific appeal to English speakers. In addition to individually specific triggers, information from the dataset appeared to indicate much of the activity stemmed from a perception that the United States is at war with Islam and *jihad* is the correct and obligatory response.

(U//FOUO) Analysis of the dataset showed that as activity by US persons rose, activity by foreign nationals dropped. Although it is difficult to assess the degree to which legislative and administrative factors influenced these demographic shifts, they coincided with eased regulations on the use of national security letters, creation of the Terrorist Screening Center, and newly established criteria for the no-fly list.

(U//FOUO) The FBI and the JRIC assess with high confidence, based on available and reliable open source reporting, that the upward trend in participation by the US persons named in the dataset was due to self-selection, sometimes passively influenced by Internet provocateurs, but was not due to a formal, face-to-face recruitment plan by foreign violent extremists. The FBI and the JRIC do not rule out that a larger recruitment strategy to radicalize US citizens exists; however, based on the current dataset, it was not a factor in the overall rise in targeting by US persons against the United States and US interests.

^a (U) See Appendix A for a list of the 57 plots included in this assessment.

^b (U) For the purpose of this assessment, the definition of an "action-oriented" indicted Islamic extremist is a person with expressed interest in performing, or significantly supporting, a violent act against the United States or US interest abroad.

^c (U) **High confidence** indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information from multiple sources or from a single highly reliable source, and that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. **Medium confidence** means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible, but can be interpreted in various ways, or is not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. **Low confidence** means that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that the FBI has significant concerns or problems with the sources.

(U) Scope Note

(U//FOUO) This assessment responds to a request from law enforcement executives within the JRIC area of responsibility.^d It will attempt to provide a better understanding of the strategic threat environment as it applies to an apparent increase in activity by action-oriented indicted Islamic extremists, hereafter referred to action-oriented extremists, against the United States and US interests, particularly during the last two years. This assessment addresses the intelligence question: Why are terrorist actions against the United States and US interests increasing or decreasing?

(U//FOUO) The dataset assembled consisted of action-oriented extremists indicted between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2010, which yielded 57 entities (see Appendix A). The size of the dataset made it difficult to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. To establish a means of comparison and add perspective, analysts divided the data into two five-year periods, 2001-2005 and 2006-2010.

(U//FOUO) A key assumption is despite the limited size of the dataset, examination will yield sound conclusions and repeatable results. The FBI and the JRIC acknowledge the process of mobilization toward action-oriented extremism is highly individual; therefore, in some cases, addressing the intelligence question required dividing an already small dataset into sub-sets that might not accurately describe the broader action-oriented extremist population. As appropriate, the language used in the course of the narrative addresses these limitations.

(U//FOUO) The 57 examined plots^e included those carried out in the United States or against US interests overseas by homegrown or international extremists arrested or indicted within or by the United States, including some persons indicted on terrorism charges, but not tried yet in US courts. Analysts counted multiple arrests or indictments stemming from a single plot or attack, and the inclusion of multiple persons in the same indictment, as a single "incident." Throughout the assessment, analysts used the terms "arrest," "indictment," and "incident" interchangeably.

(U//FOUO) To reduce subjectivity and to create consistency, analysts counted incidents in the year the subject or subjects were arrested, or, if they were still at large, indicted; in the event of multiple arrests or indictments resulting from the same incident, analysts added the episode to the year in which the first arrest or indictment occurred. Ideally, an incident would be counted in the year that an internal or external "triggering" event occurred, a specific instance that a person might identify moved him or her from passivity to action. One limitation of this standard is the information is not available in every case. Another is the progression toward action-oriented extremism likely consists of a series of incremental steps. It might be difficult, even to the individual, to name a specific event.

(U//FOUO) Based on the parameters of the dataset, incidents in which federal prosecutors did not file terrorism charges against the subjects, or did not file charges as of the date of this

^d (U) The JRIC area of responsibility mirrors that of the FBI Los Angeles Field Office, comprising Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo counties.

^e (U) For the purpose of this assessment "plot" or "plotting" refers to plans or planning, as well as successful or unsuccessful attacks.

assessment, such as the 2009 shootings at Fort Hood and an Arkansas military recruitment center, are not included.

(U//FOUO) In most cases, triggering events that preceded action came from statements subjects made in court and during interviews; some persons might have intended their statements to influence and might not accurately reflect their motivations. Other constraints included the lack of a single, formal questionnaire to guide interviews; and responses might have depended on how an interviewer framed a question.

(U//FOUO) A number of assessments have addressed the rise in terrorist actions against the United States or US interests. This is the first product to analyze together this set of five specific factors—US military action overseas, Internet radicalization, organized recruitment by foreign fighters, demographic commonalities, and administrative factors—against this specific dataset.

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(U) Source Summary Statement

(U) The data for this study came primarily from court records, sometimes augmented by media coverage that provided details of the subjects' backgrounds that went beyond the scope of prosecutorial needs. In these cases, multiple sources were used to corroborate facts. The FBI and JRIC believe these sources provide an accurate assessment of the reasons for the rise in anti-US plotting.


(U) Introduction

(U//FOUO) Analysis of 57 terrorist plots against the United States and US interests that occurred between 2001 and 2010 indicated an 11 percent increase in activity from 2006 onward as compared to the first five years under examination. Two central themes galvanized actors: anti-US sentiment based on a perception that the United States was at war with Islam, and the belief that violent *jihad* was the righteous, and in fact, requisite response. Thirty-two percent^f of those who provided a justification for their actions described it as their religious duty to “defend Islam” against perceived threats. This motivation was expressed consistently,^g whether the extremist was a US person or foreign national. Regardless of the consistent motivation, US persons drove the post-2006 increase in anti-US activity.

(U//FOUO) US Persons Drove Post-2006 Rise in Anti-US Activity

(U//FOUO) The FBI and the JRIC assess with high confidence, based on available and reliable open source reporting, that US persons were responsible for the rise in anti-US activity that characterized the post-2006 years. As seen in Graphs 1 and 2, foreign nationals led anti-US targeting prior to 2006, 52 percent to 44 percent^h among foreign nationals and US persons, respectively. However, at 70 percent, activity by US persons and groups dominated post-2006 numbers.

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(U//FOUO) Between the first and second halves of the decade, incidents involving US person action-oriented extremists rose 75 percent (Graph 1, left); during the same period, incidents involving foreign nationals fell 71 percent (Graph 2, right). [Source: original work by author]

^f (U//FOUO) Categories included “Duty/revenge,” “Afghanistan/Iraq,” “Hate United States/replace US government,” “Other (local struggle),” and “Unknown.” Fifteen of the 57 entities, or 26 percent, fell into the latter category. In some cases, the motives overlapped. In these cases, analysts judged the category that appeared to most closely fit the motivation.

^g (U//FOUO) US persons cited “duty” or “revenge” in 11 of 33 cases, or 33 percent; foreign nationals cited it in five of 18 cases, or 28 percent; and mixed groups cited it in two of six cases, or 33 percent.

^h (U//FOUO) Percentages are based on 57 total incidents; 27 prior to 2006; 30 after 2006. A graph of activity by groups in which US persons and foreign nationals collaborated—“mixed” groups—was not included because of the small numbers. Between 2001 and 2010, six plots involved mixed groups.

(U//FOUO) US Persons: Disparate “Triggers”; Disparate Demographics

(U//FOUO) The FBI and the JRIC assess with high confidence, based on available and reliable open source reporting, the post-2006 rise resulted from several factors that prompted responses from action-oriented extremists. “Triggers,” such as US military action overseas and the influence of Islamist ideologues with an Internet presence, contributed to the post-2006 rise, but demonstrated minimal impact when considered individually. A further breakdown among the US person group into sub-categories, including their backgrounds, choice of targets, and self-described motivating factors, found few unifying features. They did appear to have a greater tendency to target military persons or facilities, as compared to foreign national or mixed groups; among US persons, 58 percent of plans involved military targets or personnel.ⁱ Beyond this tendency, analysis found no common experiences or qualities among group members that might explain why they acted when they did.

(U//FOUO) US Person Violent Jihadists: No Demographic Patterns

(U//FOUO) Examination of 33 US person entities among the 57-unit dataset found few identifiable unifying qualities. Subjects were mainly first- and second-generation immigrants to the United States, but had varying ancestral ties to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe. Some were converts, others raised as Muslims, and some had no identifiable religious affiliation. Of the converts, some adopted Islam in prison while others found it in their local communities. Some groups consisted exclusively of converts; others, exclusively of those raised as Muslims; still others, mixtures of the two. There was an age range of more than 50 years between the youngest, born in 1988, and the oldest, born in 1937. Some acted singly, others with associates, and in one instance, as a family unit. Triggers included US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, hatred of the United States, and the belief that *jihad* was a religious duty.

(U//FOUO) US Military Action Overseas: Cited Less Frequently Post-2006

(U//FOUO) Based on their own statements, US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq^j factored into the decision-making process of action-oriented extremists in approximately 25 percent of cases between 2001 and 2010. Within each of three categories—US person, foreign national, and mixed groups—Afghanistan and Iraq described as a triggering event decreased after 2006.^k

(U//FOUO) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, action-oriented extremists named a variety of alleged provocations, including the 2006 clash between Hizballah and the Israelis, and the publication of

ⁱ (U//FOUO) Among foreign nationals, military targets factored into four of 18 plans, or 22 percent; among “mixed” groups, military targets factored into two of six plans, or 33 percent.

^j (U//FOUO) Subjects categorized as motivated by Afghanistan and/or Iraq specified US military involvement in those countries. In some cases, subjects stated more generally their duty to fight invaders into Muslims lands. These cases were categorized “Duty/revenge.”

^k (U//FOUO) Between 2001 and 2006, US persons cited Afghanistan and/or Iraq in four of 12 incidents or 33 percent, but only three of 21, or 14 percent post-2006. During the same period, foreign national actors cited it in four of 14 cases, or 29 percent, prior to 2006, and in one of four cases, or 25 percent, after. “Mixed” group actors cited US military action overseas in one of one case prior to 2006, or 100 percent, and in one of five cases, or 20 percent, thereafter.

cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by a Danish newspaper.^{1,2} Two subjects, Ronald Allen Grecula (US Person) and Michael Curtis Reynolds (US Person), both indicted in 2006, agreed to work with Islamist extremists due to personal issues, not religious or political conviction.³

(U//FOUO) Unquantifiable: Extent to Which Anwar al-Aulaqi (US Person) and Others Contributed to Post-2005 Rise in US Person Arrests and Indictments

(U//FOUO) Islamist propaganda became increasingly available via the Internet, especially during the second half of the decade. It is difficult to quantify the degree to which Islamist materials and ideologues—such as Anwar al-Aulaqi (US Person), Abdullah el-Faisal, and Feiz Muhammad, all of whom appeal to English-speaking audiences—played a part in the radicalization of the persons included in this assessment, specifically as these figures might have contributed to the rise in terrorist activity. Generally, court documents and open source reporting did not indicate interest by action-oriented extremists in the sermons and the lectures of al-Aulaqi and others until after mid-decade.¹ While Internet personalities are often cited as a source of radicalization, factors outside the scope of this assessment—such as social environment and personal psychology (how a person processes both external and internal messaging)—were also influential.

(U//FOUO) Expanded Use of National Security Letters, Creation of the Terrorism Screening Center, and Implementation of the No-Fly List Coincided with Rise in Arrests of US Persons, Drop in Arrests of Foreign Nationals

(U//FOUO) Although there is no mechanism to measure the effect of legislative and administrative factors, the higher number of national security letters (NSLs) issued mid-decade, adjusted for investigative lag time, appeared to coincide with the higher number of US persons arrested and indicted in the latter half of the decade. The USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005 (passed into law in February 2006) eased restrictions on NSLs, allowing investigators to obtain information about an individual prior to confirming that individual's relationship to a foreign power.⁴ While statistics were missing from 2001 to 2002,^m figures for the rest of the decade show NSL numbers peaked between 2003 and 2006.⁵ Around this same time, statistics revealed an increasing number of requests related to investigations of US persons.⁶

(U//FOUO) During the same period that arrests and indictments of US persons rose, those of foreign nationals fell. Activity by foreign nationals dropped 71 percent after 2006. The fall coincided with the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center in 2003, newly established criteria for the no-fly list in 2004, and a period between 2005 and 2007 when selectees to the no-fly list were at an all-time high. As of 2008, 95 percent of names on the consolidated terrorist watch list, of which the no-fly and automatic selectee lists are a part, were not US persons.⁷

¹ (U//FOUO) Part of this is due to a change in tone by al-Aulaqi. Prior to 2004, his tone was moderate. After moving to the United Kingdom in 2004, and then on to Yemen, he increasingly called for obligatory *jihad*.

^m (U//FOUO) Problems identified by the FBI with its internal NSL tracking system precluded the Bureau from tracking statistics from these years.

(U//FOUO) Self-Selection: Within the Dataset, US Persons Volunteered for Action

(U//FOUO) While some US persons, notably Bryant Neal Vinas (US Person), David Coleman Headley (US Person), and Najibullah Zazi (US Person), worked on operations with foreign contacts, a review of court testimony and open source accounts suggested the subjects themselves initiated the communication.^{8,9,10,11,12,13} This finding does not negate the possibility that foreign nationals have an organized, formal recruitment strategyⁿ focused on US persons; however, the current dataset does not support this proposition.

(U//FOUO) The dataset also revealed terrorist groups sometimes rejected US persons who offered their services. In 2003, Tarek Mehanna (US Person) and Ahmad Abousamra (US Person) traveled across Yemen trying to enlist in terrorist training without success.¹⁴ Abousamra additionally traveled to Pakistan and Iraq in an effort to join the *mujahideen*, but foreign operatives told Abousamra he was either “not needed” or would not be allowed to participate because he was an American.¹⁵ Although Abousamra and Mehanna hoped to attend camps operated by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or the Taliban, they were willing to fight anywhere groups engaging in *jihād* would accept them.¹⁶

(U//FOUO) Extrapolating from anecdotal evidence within the dataset that subjects reached out to terrorist organizations, and not the reverse, the FBI and the JRIC assess the post-2006 rise in plotting was not due to an organized, formal campaign to enlist US persons for operations. Recently, some groups, notably al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), appear to have launched informal or passive efforts^o of encouraging action. Higher numbers in 2010 did not appear to be a result of these efforts.

(U) Alternative Analysis

(U//FOUO) The preceding analysis showed targeting by US persons was on the increase. As seen in Graph 3 (page 9, left), an alternative methodology, a three-period moving average, confirmed the upward trend in targeting by US persons. The trend began in 2004 and continued until 2010, which was the end of the period studied.

(U//FOUO) However, as seen in Graph 4 (page 9, right), activity by foreign nationals, which demonstrated a 71 percent decline based on the previous analysis, exhibited some volatility toward the end of the decade. Foreign nationals were involved in three^p incidents between 2009 and 2010. None were prompted to act based on US military action in Afghanistan or Iraq; none chose military targets; demographics varied; and all self-selected. The data did not indicate a common event sparked the small resurgence of activity by foreign nationals. It coincided with


ⁿ (U//FOUO) For the purpose of this assessment, “recruitment strategy” refers to a calculated, systematic decision from a group’s command structure to increase the participation of US persons; “recruitment” refers to a specific effort to enroll, or seek to enroll, persons who otherwise might not have sought a violent path.

^o (U) In 2010, *Inspire*, an online magazine attributed to AQAP and aimed at an English-speaking audience, began publication.

^p (U) The three were Hosam Smadi, a Jordanian national who unknowingly collaborated with federal agents to attack a skyscraper in downtown Dallas, Texas; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national who allegedly collaborated with AQAP to bomb a Northwest Airlines flight into Detroit, Michigan; and Sami Samir Hassoun, a Lebanese citizen who allegedly planned to bomb targets in Chicago, Illinois.

relatively high activity by US persons during the same period, and confirmed the disparate nature of the threat.

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(U//FOUO) Graphs 3 (left) and 4 (right) illustrate the value of the moving average method. Moving averages smooth fluctuations in data that vary widely, which can lead to a clearer trend line.⁹ [Source: Original work by author]

(U) Intelligence Gaps

- (U//FOUO) How might a potential lack of Muslim historical and cultural context among those new to Islam, whether born Muslim or not, have affected the actions of members of the dataset?

(U) The FBI Intelligence Requirements addressed in this assessment are WW-TERR-CTD-SR-0149-10.I.B.1; and AM-TERR-CTD-SR-0029-09.I.A.1.

(U) This assessment was prepared by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center/Los Angeles Division of the FBI. Comments and queries may be addressed to the Joint Regional Intelligence Center at (562) 345-1100.

⁹ (U//FOUO) These charts do not include targeting by mixed groups.

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(U) Appendix A

(U) Dataset of 57 action-oriented indicted Islamic extremists

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Year ^r	NAME
2001	US v. John Phillip Walker Lindh AKA Suleyman al-Faris, Abdul Hamid
2001	US v. Zacarias Moussaoui AKA Shaqil, Abu Khalid al Sabrawi
2001	US v Richard Colvin Reid AKA Abdul-Raheem, Abdul Raheem, Abu Ibrahim
2002	US v. Omar Ahmed Khadr AKA Akhbar Farhad, Ahmed Muhammed Khali
2002	US v. Jeffrey Leon Battle AKA Ahmad Ali, Abu Isa; Patrice Lumumba Ford AKA Lumumba; Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal; Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal; Habis Abdulla al-Saoub AKA Abu Tarek; October Martinique Lewis AKA Khadijah
2002	US v. Karim Koubriti; Ahmed Hannan; Youssef Hmimssa AKA Patrick J. Vuillaume, Michael Saisa, Jalali; Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi AKA Abdella LNU, Jean Pierre Tardelli, George Labibe, Hussein Mohsen Safiddine, Nabil Hayamm; Farouk Ali-Haimoud AKA Khalid
2002	US v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah AKA Abu Hafs al Kuwaiti, Sammy
2002	US v. Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani AKA Khaddafy Abubakar Janjalani, Abu Muktar; Isnilon Totoni Hapilon AKA Abu Musab, the Deputy; Aldam Tilao AKA Abu Sabaya, Abu Catada, Abu Ahmad Salayuddin; Jainal Antel Sali, Jr. AKA Abu Solaiman, the Engineer; Hamsiraji Marusi Sali AKA Jose Ramirez, Tiberkis
2002	US v. Imran Mandhai; Shueyb Mossa Jokhan
2003	US v. Randall Todd Royer; Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi; Masoud Ahmad Khan; Yong Ki Kwon; Mohammed Aatique; Seifullah Chapman; Hammad Abdur-Raheem; Donald Thomas Surratt; Caliph Basha ibn Abdur-Raheem; Khwaja Mahmood Hasan; Sabri Benkhala
2003	US v. Iyman Faris AKA Mohammad Rauf
2003	US v. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali
2003	US v. Nuradin Abdi
2003	US v. Adnan Gulshair el-Shukrijumah
2003	US v. Majid Khan
2004	US v. Abdullah Ahmed Khadr AKA Abu Bakr
2004	Ahmed Hassan al-Uqaily
2004	US v. Ryan Anderson
2004	Shahawar Matin Siraj
2004	US v. Dbiren Barot AKA esa al-Britani, Abu Esa al-Britani, Esa al-Hindi, Issa al-Hindi; Nadeem Tarmohamed; Qaisar Shaffi
2005	US v. Wesam al-Delaema AKA Wesam Khalaf Chayed Delaeme
2005	US v. Kevin James; Levar Washington; Gregory Patterson; Hammad Riaz Samana
2005	US v. Michael Curtis Reynolds

^r (U) The information is arranged in chronological order by year arrested or indicted.

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	NAME
2005	US v. Anthonius Wamang
2005	US v. Hamid Hayat; Umer Hayat
2005	US v. Ronald Allen Grecula
2005	US v. Tarik Ibn Osman Shah AKA Tarik Shah, Tarik Jenking, Abu Musab; Rafiq Sabir AKA the Doctor; Mahmud Faruq Brent AKA Mahmud al-Mutazzim
2006	US v. Syed Hashmi AKA Fahad
2006	US v. Kobie Diallo Williams AKA Abdul Kabeer, Abdul Kabir; Adnan Babar Mirza
2006	US v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi; Marwan Othman el-Hindi; Wassim I. Mazloun; Zubair A. Ahmed; Khaleel Ahmed
2006	US v. Syed Haris Ahmed; Ehsanul Islam Sadequee
2006	US v. Derrick Shareef
2006	US v. Narseal Batiste AKA Brother Naz, Prince Manna; Patrick Abraham AKA Brother Pat; Stanley Grant Phanor AKA Brother Sunni; Naudimar Herrera AKA Brother Naudy; Burson Augustin AKA Brother B; Lyglenson-Lemorin AKA Brother Levi, Brother Levi-El and Rotschild Augustine AKA Brother Rot
2007	US v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed and Youssef Samir Megahed
2007	US v. Mohamed Ibrahim Shnewer; Dritan Duka AKA Distan Duka, Anthony Duka, Tony Duka; Eljvir Duka AKA Elvis Duka, Sulayman; Shain Duka; Serdar Tatar; Agron Abdullahu
2007	US v. Russell Defreitas AKA Mohammed; Kareem Ibrahim AKA Amir Kareem; Abdul Kadir; Abdel Nur
2007	US v. Christopher Paul AKA Abdul, Abdul Malek, Abdul Malik, Abdul Melik, Abdulmaled, Abdel Malek, Abdul Malek Kenyatta, Paul Kenyatta Laws, Paul Laws
2008	US v. Bryant Neal Vinas AKA Ibrahim, Bashir al-Ameriki, Ben Yameen al-Kanadee
2009	US v. Najibullah Zazi (Adis Nedunjanin; Zarein Ahnedzay)
2009	US v. Betim Kaziu
2009	US v. Michael Finton AKA Talib Islam
2009	US v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra
2009	US v. Daniel Patrick Boyd; Hysen Sherifi; Anes Subasic; Zakariya Boyd; Dylan Boyd; Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan; Ziyad Yaghi
2009	US v. James Cromitie AKA Abdul Rahman, Abdul Rehman; David Williams AKA Daoud, DL; Onta Williams AKA Hamza; Laguerre Payen AKA Amin, Almondol
2009	US v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi
2009	US v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
2009	US v. Ilyas Kashmiri; Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed AKA Major Abdur Rehman, Pasha; David Coleman Headley AKA Daood Gilani; Tahawwur Hussain Rana
2009	US v. Colleen LaRose; Jamie Paulin Ramirez
2010	US v. Faisal Shahzad
2010	US v. Raja Lahrasib Khan

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Year	NAME
2010	US v. Barry Walter Bujol
2010	US v. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh
2010	US v. Paul Gene Rockwood
2010	US v. Sami Samir Hassoun
2010	US v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud
2010	US v. Antonio Martinez AKA Muhammad Hussain
2010	US v. Farooque Ahmed

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(U) Endnotes

- ¹ (U) Internet site; NEFA; FD-302 Interviews of Derrick Shareef"; 7 December 2006; http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v._Abujihaad_FBIInvus.pdf; accessed on 27 October 2010; NEFA is a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 attacks.
- ² (U) FBI; Press Release; "Two Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles in Foreign Terror Plot That Focused on Targets in Denmark"; 27 October 2009 <http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/cg102709.htm>; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ³ (U) Internet site; Brian Michael Jenkins; RAND Corporation; "Would-be Warriors"; 2010; http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010; RAND Corporation is an established think tank and independent, nonprofit organization.
- ⁴ (U) Internet site; Anna C. Henning, Elizabeth B. Bazan, Charles Doyle, and Edward C. Liu; Congressional Research Service; "Government Collection of Private Information: Background and Issues Related to the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization"; 23 December 2009; http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40980_20091223.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010.
- ⁵ (U) Internet site; Office of the Inspector General; "Statement of Glenn A. Fine before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties concerning the FBI's Use of National Security Letters and Section 215 Orders for Business Records"; 15 April 2008; <http://www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t0804/final.pdf>; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ⁶ (U) Internet site; Office of the Inspector General; "Statement of Glenn A. Fine before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties concerning the FBI's Use of National Security Letters and Section 215 Orders for Business Records"; 15 April 2008; <http://www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t0804/final.pdf>; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ⁷ (U) Internet site; TSA; "Myth Buster: TSA's Watch List is More Than One Million People Strong"; http://www.tsa.gov/approach/mythbusters/tsa_watch_list.shtm; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ⁸ (U) Internet site; NEFA; USDC Eastern District of NY; "US v. Vinas, Guilty Plea"; 28 January 2009; http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Vinas_guiltytranscript.pdf; accessed on 27 October 2010; NEFA is a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 attacks.
- ⁹ (U) Online newspaper article; Michael Powell; *New York Times*; "US Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners"; 23 July 2009; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24terror.html?_r=2; accessed; accessed 27 October 2010.
- ¹⁰ (U) Online newspaper article; Ginger Thompson; *New York Times*; "A Terror Suspect with Feet in East and West"; 21 November 2009; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/us/22terror.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ¹¹ (U) Internet site; NEFA; USDC Northern District of IL; "US v. Headley"; 7 December 2009; http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Headley_information.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010; NEFA is a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 attacks.
- ¹² (U) Internet site; NEFA; USDC Eastern District of NY; "US v. Najibullah Zazi-Order of Detention"; 24 September 2009; http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_NajibullahZazi_detentionmemo.pdf; accessed on 27 October 2010; NEFA is a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 attacks.
- ¹³ (U) Online newspaper article; Michael Wilson; *New York Times*; "From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect"; 25 September 2009; <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html>; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ¹⁴ (U) Internet site; NEFA; USDC District of MA; US v. Mehanna; 31 October 2009; http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Mehanna_fbi affidavit.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010; NEFA is a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 attacks.
- ¹⁵ (U) Ibid.
- ¹⁶ (U) Ibid.

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Joint Regional Intelligence Center

FBI Customer Satisfaction Survey

Please take a moment to complete this survey and help evaluate the quality, value, and relevance of our intelligence product. Your response will help us serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. Please return to:

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Production Services Unit
935 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Room 11079C
Washington, DC 20535

Customer and Product Information

Intelligence Product Title: (U) Decade in Review: Self-Selecting US Persons Drive Post-2006 Increase in Anti-US Plotting

Dated: 7 March 2011

Customer Agency: _____

Relevance to Your Intelligence Needs

1. The product increased my knowledge of an issue or topic. (Check one)
- ☐ 5. Strongly Agree
 - ☐ 4. Somewhat Agree
 - ☐ 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - ☐ 2. Somewhat Disagree
 - ☐ 1. Strongly Disagree

Actionable Value

2. The product helped me decide on a course of action. (Check one)
- ☐ 5. Strongly Agree
 - ☐ 4. Somewhat Agree
 - ☐ 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - ☐ 2. Somewhat Disagree
 - ☐ 1. Strongly Disagree

Timeliness Value

3. The product was timely to my intelligence needs. (Check one)
- ☐ 5. Strongly Agree
 - ☐ 4. Somewhat Agree
 - ☐ 3. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - ☐ 2. Somewhat Disagree
 - ☐ 1. Strongly Disagree

PSU INTERNAL USE ONLY

Product Tracking #: IA-888

Return To: _____

Comments (please use reverse or attach separate page if needed): _____