



Homeland
Security

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT



(U//FOUO) Empowering Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Key for Countering Youth Radicalization and Their Travel Abroad for Terrorism

16 June 2015

(b)(3) per 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(11)

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(U//FOUO) **Empowering Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Key for Countering Youth Radicalization and Their Travel Abroad for Terrorism**

(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Assessment intends to help federal, state, local, and private partners prioritize efforts countering violent extremism (CVE) and invest in the most promising CVE strategies. Although there are dozens of CVE programs around the world, including ones that actively involve (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) of violent extremists, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

For this study, we highlight how Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) figures can be key CVE advocates in their communities, based on their (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) s.* This analysis is intended for partners whose positions afford them interaction with Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).

(U//FOUO) This Assessment takes a broad look at ethnic Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) groups in the United States and elsewhere in the West (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

Europe is home to a significant number of ethnic Somali youth who traveled—or attempted travel—to join violent extremists in Syria, and aspects of radicalization involving ethnic Somalis to violence appears to be fairly similar on both continents, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) g.²⁻¹³ (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) suggests that the United States should take a closer look at CVE programs in Europe, where there is a longer history of battling violent extremism.¹⁴ This Assessment identifies possible pitfalls, opportunities, and best practices already present throughout the West that could minimize challenges and maximize opportunities to support Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) as primary advocates of efforts to prevent radicalization to violence and travel to join foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The information cut-off date for this Assessment is 19 May 2015.

* (U) For this study, we define “western Somali” as someone with citizenship or long-term residence in Western Europe or North America who has ethnic background in Somalia.

(U) Key Judgments

(U//FOUO) The significant number of Somali-Americans joining terrorist groups in Syria demonstrates that these individuals remain vulnerable to entreaties from violent extremists and underscores the importance (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) in CVE efforts.

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) can make it difficult for Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to cooperate with and fully understand Western security agencies and legal systems. These (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) also might not be fully aware of negative influences facing (b) (3), (b) (7)(E). These challenges can make it difficult for well-meaning (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to recognize (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) radicalizing and mobilizing to violence and to handle such activities appropriately.

(U//FOUO) In the face of these challenges, Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) have demonstrated the capability and willingness to help (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) become more resistant to the appeal of violent extremists in foreign conflict zones, and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Many Somali immigrant (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) already are positioned to prevent (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) from radicalizing to violence, and the vulnerability of some young Somalis—like other American youth—to recruitment by violent or other (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) members to establish communicative relationships and to exert a positive influence over them. There are valuable lessons we have learned from their responses to the presence or absence of government and private engagement efforts.

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], can effectively
augment the efforts of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to dissuade
(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) from turning to violent extremism.

(U) Landscape

(U//FOUO) The Syrian conflict has re-energized some Somali-American youth to join violent extremist groups fighting in Syria. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. To date, CVE

programs to dissuade Somali-Americans have proven insufficient in stemming the flow of fighters to Syria, so I&A assesses (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].¹⁵

- » (U) Since the end of 2013, more than eight Somali-Americans are known publicly to have left for Syria; at least as many young Somalis in the United States have tried—but failed—to reach the Syrian conflict; and likely others unknown to authorities have reached Syria. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁶⁻²³
- » (U) Of those not publicly identified, there are approximately forty youths from the Twin Cities area—most of whom presumably are Somali-Americans—who have planned to join Syria-based terrorists, that were arrested trying to reach the Syrian conflict, or have succeeded in reaching Syria, according to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].²⁴ A (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] asserted that more than 20 Somali-Americans from Minnesota had joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the last two years.²⁵
- » (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] suggest that a significant proportion of Somalia-linked Westerners arriving in Syria are teenagers, which suggests that CVE efforts (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- » (U//FOUO) I&A assesses that Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advocates of broader efforts

that discourage foreign fighter travel. For example, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]³²

(U) Barriers Undercutting (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Cooperation

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] barriers can make it difficult for Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] to cooperate with and fully understand Western security agencies and legal systems. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] also might not be fully aware of negative influences facing (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) Misunderstanding of Law Enforcement Can Undercut (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Cooperation

(U//FOUO) To be effective, some efforts to engage (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] figures in ethnic Somali communities in Western countries (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]s.

- » (U) Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] who reported their Syria-based (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] as missing were quoted in a (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] as feeling “betrayed by the FBI’s action,” and probably because of not fully understanding the US legal system, were reportedly reluctant to testify at a grand jury hearing because others who did not report (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] missing were not required to appear.³³
- » (U) Some Minneapolis and St. Paul-based Somali-American (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] sought more trust and stronger relationships with police officers who better understood their culture, language, and social structures. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].³⁴
- » (U) Members of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Somali community expressed significant anger, and distrust

for government at all levels due to their perception of undue scrutiny at airports and invasive police contact. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Abuses by Authorities in East Africa Undermine Trust of Some in Western Officials

(U) Some (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) immigrant Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) figures were abused by authorities in East Africa and remain wary of security services after arriving in the West, including the United States, which might deter these individuals from seeking help from government officials. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

^{36,37} A number of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Somali-Americans suffered from dangerous and corrupt government authorities in East Africa, and consequently are fearful of Western security officials, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).^{38,39}

(U//FOUO) Possibly lacking a complete understanding of Western systems of justice, some ethnic Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) have publicly expressed frustration that authorities, including those in the United States, could not do more to protect (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) from terrorist activities.

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that some Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) in the West, including the United States, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

learned that at least one young Somali-American had joined violent extremists in Syria, but was not reported to the police by anybody in the community.

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) security authorities may be unaware of an unspecified number of Somali-American females who joined violent extremists in Syria, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)⁴⁵

» (U) A US official in February 2015 identified (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) as reasons why the (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) would not report their suspicions to authorities, even in cases where (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) might had been concerned about (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) behavior for months.⁴⁶ Many Somali immigrants fear that responding to any government initiative could put their legal status and personal wellbeing in jeopardy, which is a consequence of misunderstanding of how the US government system works and the civil rights and liberties guaranteed to every citizen and resident of the United States, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Immigration Stresses Can Undercut Control

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

50

» (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

■

56

» (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

■

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

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» (U) Of the six young Somali-American males arrested in April 2015 for their alleged attempts to join violent extremists in Syria, two were brothers and another in the group had a brother who is

- 69

- (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

	70.71
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(U) A range of opportunities exists for government and private entities to inform Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) about the potential violent extremist influences (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) and to make public and private programs more approachable to Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) need to be proactive in contacting (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to explain typical assistance, investigative, and legal actions taken in such situations. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) ⁷⁵ In Sweden, a Swedish-Somali psychologist acts as a liaison to help Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) become comfortable in contacting law enforcement for assistance. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[illegible]

Commission in Minnesota said that he “expects to contribute an East African perspective to the commission,” [REDACTED] ⁸⁰

- » (U) The Portland Police Bureau in late May 2015 sworn in its first Somali-American officer. The agency put forth significant effort to build relationships with local Somalis. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. Likewise, one goal of local Somalis after a Somali was arrested for (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

- » (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

- » (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] planned to educate (b) (3), [REDACTED] individuals vulnerable to being drawn to overseas conflicts on the role of law enforcement in detecting and discouraging foreign fighter travel, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] ⁸³

(U//FOUO) Minnesota Leading the Way in Sensitizing Somalis to the US Criminal Justice System

(U//FOUO) To increase trust and collaboration with the largest US-based Somali community, officials in the Twin Cities have implemented some outreach efforts that we consider to be some of the best practices to build stronger partnerships with local Somali-Americans. These engagement efforts are improving perceptions of law enforcement in Minnesota (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

- » (U) The introduction of local Somalis in community liaison and police officer roles improved the frequency and quality of encounters between local law enforcement and members of the Somali-American community in Minneapolis. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. ⁸⁴ Similarly, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] relations between the Somali-American community and local law enforcement in Minneapolis had improved dramatically in recent years, largely because of the focused effort to hire Somali-Americans as sworn law enforcement officers and community liaisons. ⁸⁵

- » (U) The Somali-American Police Association (SAPA)—national organization with origins in Minnesota where there are approximately two dozen police officers of Somali descent—has been considered a model resource for police departments seeking to forge deeper ties with local Somalis since its founding in 2012. SAPA has been credited with diverting a number of Somali-American teens from potentially radicalizing activities. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

- » (U) The Hennepin County Sheriff's Office—unlike many of its counterparts with jurisdiction in Somali communities throughout the United States—has partnered with a community advisory board to field calls from individuals without immediately involving law enforcement. ⁸⁸ The Sheriff's Office also released a Somali language video in mid-February 2015 aimed at strengthening its relationship with the community by describing its public safety responsibilities, law enforcement roles, security issues affecting local Somalis, and ways residents can partner with its Community Engagement Team to reduce crime. ⁸⁹

- » (U) In comparison to efforts in Belgium, cities like Minneapolis and St. Paul employ more sophisticated CVE policies, which include recruiting Somalis for law enforcement roles and teaching the police about Somali culture and language. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] ⁹⁰ After visiting Minnesota, the head of crime prevention at the Helsinki Police Department (HPD) concluded that HPD needed to adopt best practices from the MPD by recruiting Somali officers establishing associations for Somali youth, and organizing meetings with the community (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. ⁹¹

(U//FOUO) Fear for (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to authorities in an effort to reverse the trajectory of radicalization and avoid severe criminal punishment for their activities. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]n; however, moderate punishments already have stirred some controversy.

- » (U) In a relatively unprecedented decision, a federal judge in February 2015 sentenced an 18-year-old Somali-American who was convicted of seeking to join terrorists in Syria—a charge with potential penalties of more than a decade of imprisonment—to a halfway house and entry into a mandatory community reintegration program.⁹² Approximately three months later, a judge announced that he would consider moving five young Somali-Americans accused of attempting travel to Syria from prison to a halfway house while they awaited trial.⁹³ Lenient treatment of potential foreign fighters, however, has drawn criticism, including from Somali-Americans, and the 18-year-old violated the terms of his release to the half-way house, sending him back to prison, [REDACTED].⁹⁴
- » (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) intelligence officials work with other government and private entities to tailor administrative actions outside the penal system—including referrals to social service agencies, curfews, and travel document confiscations—to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) discourage aspiring foreign fighters before their activities escalate to serious crimes, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].⁹⁶
- » (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) authorities emphasize non-criminal measures, such as confiscating or not issuing passports to minors (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], to help steer (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) away from breaking serious counterterrorism laws, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].⁹⁷ According to the same source, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) cities deploy Muslim community leaders and social service administrators to help (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) stop violent extremist-related activities before they become serious crimes.⁹⁸

- » (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) officials as of March 2015 sought to engage (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] who may be targeted by violent extremists in the “pre-criminal space” to help these youths before they cross the line into significant terrorism-related activities.⁹⁹

(U) Independent, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can provide non-punitive support to Somali immigrant (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to help (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) pivot away from foreign conflict zones. NGOs in Europe—including in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden—have established successful support groups for (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) drawn to violent extremist activities abroad, according (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁰⁰

- » (U//FOUO) The (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) inspired by a (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) call-center, funded a support hotline in April 2014, which includes Somali language counseling services, to provide (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) an alternative to informing the (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), which most (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) are reluctant to do, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁰¹ There are hotlines in (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to field calls from (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) seeking advice, counseling, referrals, and other services to address potentially radicalizing (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].^{102,103}
- » (U//FOUO) A (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)-based private support network offers counseling services, educational materials, and intervention assistance to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) interested in dissuading young adults from joining FTOs, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁰⁴ The organization works with law enforcement counterparts to avoid potentially provocative actions, such as raids and arrests, unless they become absolutely necessary.¹⁰⁵
- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) of foreign fighters in (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) organized private (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) support groups to help members increase their awareness of how violent extremist recruiters target adolescents and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁰⁶ (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) also has taken steps to create centralized referral processes to help (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) report (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) who have been radicalized to violence and arrange access to social workers, psychologists, and other assistance.¹⁰⁷
- » (U) A (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)-based group of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) that met weekly to discuss worrisome changes by their (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) helped inspire programs in the United States that help Somali-American families deal with

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

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(U//FOUO) Community Resiliency Programs a Proactive, but Contentious, Development for 2015

(U) A delegation from Minnesota, including the US Attorney representing that district, attended a late-February 2015 counterterrorism summit at the White House to advocate pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis intended to stem the causes of radicalization, including within Somali communities. These pilots—administered by local US Attorneys in coordination with the Department of Justice, NCTC, and DHS—plan to infuse communities with resources to increase their resilience to violent extremism as well as establish outlets for sensitive communications on potentially concerning activities. A significant number of Somali-Americans, however, are skeptical of these programs,

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U) These pilots envisage the creation of community-led “intervention teams” in which (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) would have the confidence, privacy, and means to enlist help from mental health counselors, religious leaders, teachers, and other community advocates if they suspect (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) are being recruited by violent extremists, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).^{112,113} Based on conversations with friends and relatives of youth who entered foreign conflicts, the delegation wanted to employ resources, such as the intervention teams, to emphasize the early detection of youth at risk for radicalization before their activities become criminal in nature.^{114,115} The community intervention team will only contact police if it cannot dissuade a person from joining a terrorist group, but the goal is to handle these cases outside law enforcement channels.¹¹⁶

» (U) Elements of the pilot program also are intended to counteract the very sophisticated and persuasive violent extremist messaging directed at youth, including young Somali-Americans, by encouraging after-school programs, job training, law enforcement occupations, and elimination of perceived profiling at airports.¹¹⁷

» (U//FOUO) The pilots have drawn concerns and skepticism from many participants, including Somali-Americans, that these efforts will blur the lines between law enforcement, community outreach, and intelligence gathering. Much of this unease comes from reports that past unrelated community outreach programs created by the FBI and St. Paul police were designed, in part, to gather intelligence, although both agencies publically maintain they never used outreach efforts to spy on community members with whom they engaged.^{118,119,120} In early May 2015, nearly 50 Muslims organizations, including the local chapter of the Council on American–Islamic Relations, jointly criticized the pilot program for unfairly targeting local Somalis and subsequently developed a task force separate from the federal program.^{121,122,123,124}

(U) Support Is Available to Assist Somali

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Despite the challenges of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) have access to broad support networks in the West beyond their immediate families (b) (3), (b) (7)(E). Efforts to discourage radicalization and mobilization to violence are particularly successful when they take advantage of the typically (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U) When facing negative circumstances, individuals in the Somali diaspora commonly rely on extended family members for support. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).¹²⁷ There have been cases of Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) in the West enlisting (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to monitor their (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) and help detect violent and anti-social behavior. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).¹²⁸

» (U) The communal aspect of Somali culture often results in the responsibility of monitoring young children being entrusted to the whole community, with any adult having the right to speak to a child about his or her behavior. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).¹²⁹ Adults in Somali culture commonly act as a (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) if they see something potentially wrong involving unsupervised youth. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).

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(U//FOUO) Many Somali immigrant (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) have welcomed education about risks (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) face, including radicalization to violent extremism and recruitment to overseas conflicts. Such guidance has proven effective in integrating (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) advocacy into broader efforts (b) (3), (b) (7)(E). As of February 2015, stakeholders for radicalization concerns in Europe—(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)—

—were developing training modules to enable practitioners to help (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) potential foreign fighters detect early warning signs of radicalization.^{131,132}

- » (U) Many Somali-Americans, particularly those in Minneapolis-St. Paul, believe that promises of outside support are hollow and self-serving based on years of researchers, journalists, government offices, and other organizations studying radicalization and recruitment in their communities only to abandon the community when the research funding is exhausted, according to [REDACTED] 144 (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] found that Somalis in Minneapolis-St. Paul were more willing to discuss the primary research interest—terrorist recruitment and methods for countering it—when (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) demonstrated genuine interest in the community's challenges and accomplishments.

- » (U) Mosques, community leaders, and organizations performing CVE-related work (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], because some (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) do not know where to go when they have concerns (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁴⁵
- » (U) Some (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) have discovered that government sponsorship can undermine the legitimacy of a program intended to counter violent extremist messaging.¹⁴⁶ The Somali community in Minneapolis widely believe

some local CVE programs are pawns of federal counterterrorism efforts, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].¹⁴⁷ This (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) found that some organizations unaffiliated with government-driven initiatives can more effectively message Minneapolis-St. Paul Somali youth because they do not raise as much community suspicion regarding motives.

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) The large and varied body of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) reporting provides us (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) confidence in our judgment that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. We have (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) confidence in our ability to account for most major government and private programs in the West—and areas where these efforts are lacking—(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. Limited substantive information—where noted—prevented us from making definitive judgments on certain trends, although we have (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) confidence in the anecdotal information cited.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx>.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.5.2, HSEC-8.8

11/11/2019

(b) (5) (A), (b) (7)(E) [Redacted text block containing multiple paragraphs of information, all of which have been fully redacted with black bars.]



Homeland Security

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Customer Feedback Form

Product Title: (U//FOUO) Empowering Somali (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Key for Countering Youth Radicalization and Their Travel Abroad

 1. Please select partner type: and function:

 2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive?

 3. Please complete the following sentence: "I focus most of my time on:"

4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's relevance to your mission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Drive planning and preparedness efforts, training, and/or emergency response operations | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate a law enforcement investigation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Observe, identify, and/or disrupt threats | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own regional-specific analysis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Share with partners | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own topic-specific analysis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Allocate resources (e.g. equipment and personnel) | <input type="checkbox"/> Develop long-term homeland security strategies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Reprioritize organizational focus | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not plan to use |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Author or adjust policies and guidelines | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <input type="text"/> |

6. To further understand your response to question #5, please provide specific details about situations in which you might use this product.

 7. What did this product not address that you anticipated it would?

8. To what extent do you agree with the following two statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

 9. How did you obtain this product?

 10. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up conversation about your feedback?

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name: <input type="text"/>	Position: <input type="text"/>
Organization: <input type="text"/>	State: <input type="text"/>
Contact Number: <input type="text"/>	Email: <input type="text"/>

Submit Request


[Privacy Act Statement](#)



Homeland
Security

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D)

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT



(U//FOUO) Syria-Based US and UK Persons' Public Social Media Activity Effective but Provides Terrorism Prevention Opportunities

20 May 2015

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IA-0196-15

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D)

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*(U) This product contains US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It has been highlighted in this document with the label **USPER** and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at (b) (6).*

IA_00572



Homeland Security
Office of Intelligence and Analysis

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D)

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

20 May 2015

(U//FOUO) Syria-Based US and UK Persons' Public Social Media Activity Effective but Provides Terrorism Prevention Opportunities

(U//FOUO) Prepared by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(D)

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Assessment examines public, English-language, social media activity by US and UK persons participating in the conflict in Syria or Iraq. (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E). DHS and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) reviewed (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) released between September 2013 and November 2014 that documented 255 messages posted by 20 confirmed or self-proclaimed US persons who attempted to or engaged in violence or material support in Syria or Iraq. (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) s. Many of the examined US and UK persons possibly engaged in social media activity that was (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E). This Assessment is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and cleared private sector security partners in better understanding the threat posed by Syria-based foreign fighters and US-based violent extremists.

(U) Key Judgments

(U//FOUO) DHS and (b) (3), (b) (7)(D) assess that the examined social media postings of 20 US and 20 UK persons in Syria were (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E). These individuals (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) We judge that the US and UK persons examined (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) We assess that these persons are (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) DHS assesses that trying to directly engage such Syria-based English-speakers on social media would (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E). Counter-narratives will likely be most effective (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

* (U//FOUO) DHS defines a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.

(U//FOUO) DHS assesses that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

DHS judges that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) US and UK Persons Promoted Similar Themes

(U//FOUO) A study of the identified, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) social media postings of 20 US and 20 UK persons participating in or supporting violence in Syria revealed that (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

although the UK subjects (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

Their messages frequently (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) The individuals studied likely emphasized these themes (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) Roughly 30 percent of the examined messages posted by these persons comprised statements (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

. We assess that persons (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

. Such messaging also likely attempted to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

* (U//FOUO) For more information on the examined persons' social media activity see attached *Reference Aid*, "(U//FOUO) Research Findings: Use of Social Media by UK and US Foreign Persons in Syria."

» (U//FOUO) Nearly 20 percent of messages included (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) Approximately 20 percent of the (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) Less than 10 percent of the messages (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)
These messages (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Calls for external attacks in the West by lone offenders, criticism of the US-led Coalition bombing campaign against ISIL, and commentary on ISIL's execution of US and UK hostages (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

. Given that the examined individuals elected to travel to support violence, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

Additionally, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) According to (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of the examined US persons publicly called for attacks in the United States on their social media accounts during the timeframe we examined.

» (U//FOUO) US and UK persons also rarely posted about (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] US persons provided general (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) When confronted by other social media users about the execution of US and UK hostages, UK persons frequently (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Although US and UK persons posted about many themes at a consistent rate throughout the time period we examined, UK persons posted (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) while US persons (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Following the start of Coalition airstrikes targeting ISIL in August 2014, both sets of persons (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) Following ISIL's proclamation of a Caliphate, UK persons (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) By contrast, following ISIL's declaration of a Caliphate, US persons (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

The frequency of commentary by US persons about life inside Syria was (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) After the declaration of the Caliphate, we saw (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] On (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) 2014, prominent ISIL supporters began to promote the (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) to encourage the group's followers (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) is likely one factor contributing to the (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) In the months following the (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) in (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) 2014, some UK users (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Their reluctance to provide (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) with (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

- » (U//FOUO) Several of the examined US persons most prominent on social media (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

DHS assesses that some of these persons may have (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

- (U//FOUO) Male and female UK users generally (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) except for (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) Messages by Syria-based females in the study (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) and we assess they were (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) The one US woman included in this study also emphasized (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) US and UK Persons May Show Differences in Platforms, Similarities in (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) Thirteen of the 20 US persons had publicly viewable (b) (3), accounts in which they posted content relevant to this study, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

However, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D),

- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

We assess that they (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

18

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) **Messaging Reaches Small Numbers,**
(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) As expected, the size of the examined US and UK persons' identified online social networks was

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

The examined US and UK persons' (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), as well the challenge of individual foreign fighters (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

—many of whom also maintain public social media presences—(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

» (U) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(C)

» (U) In May 2014, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) about (b) (3), (b) (7)(C), a prominent UK social media user who traveled to Syria in August 2013. (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) radicalization to violence, examples of his online messaging, and provided his (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) handle.* Highlighting his story and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) name (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

* (U//FOUO) DHS defines radicalization as the process through which an individual changes from a non-violent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use unlawful violence as a method to effect societal or political change.

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) **Assessing Resonance of Messaging**

(U//FOUO) Understanding the effects, if any, on an individual's behaviors and beliefs after consuming a terrorist message online (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

Additionally, messages posted by a Syria-based fighter to a single social media platform (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) DHS (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) judge that the best direct measure of the resonance of the examined messages is (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

Although the English-speaking audiences mostly had (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

The examined individuals also often received questions about (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) These persons are (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) We often saw violent extremists in the West use (b) (6) to seek (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) **Opportunities to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)**
Messaging by Syria-based
Persons

(U//FOUO) DHS assesses that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) In July 2014, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) In contrast (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

Religious leaders, NGOs, community leaders, and family and friends are typically (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) We assess that (b) (3),
(b) (7)(E)

Nevertheless, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) We judge, based on our analysis of numerous recent cases of radicalization to violence in the West, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

As a result, we assess that counter-narratives that

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

are likely to be (b) (3), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(D)

» (U//FOUO) We assess that personal associates, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) DHS assesses that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

_____. Instead, DHS judges that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) _____

» (U//FOUO) In October 2014, (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) Online users, especially ISIL supporters, employ a range of tactics to circumvent the effects of account shutdowns, such as (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), in the summer of 2014 repeatedly suspended ISIL's official group accounts, which forced the group to migrate to significantly less popular sites—(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)—until these second tier sites also suspended the group's official accounts, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) DHS notes that (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] may provide (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] Many individuals in the early process of potentially radicalizing to violence may be engaging in protected speech and have not committed or expressed an intent to commit any illegal activities, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U) The US-based Muslim Public Affairs Council^{USPER} (MPAC) in 2014 released a toolkit called the "Safe Spaces Initiative," which was designed to provide Muslim American communities with practical advice on countering radicalization to violence among their members using the MPAC-designed Prevention, Intervention, Ejection (PIE) model. The prevention element of PIE recommends that, when a respected authority figure—such as a religious leader, teacher, or parent—learns that an impressionable community member has been exposed to violent extremist content online, the authority should view the material with the vulnerable individual and debunk its misleading narratives.⁴¹

» (U) Montgomery County, Maryland's municipal officials and police have partnered with the US-based NGO World Organization for Resource Development and Education^{USPER} to develop an intervention program for individuals radicalizing to violence. Part of the program—which is informing separate locally led countering violent extremism pilot initiatives in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis—seeks to educate communities about the risks of individuals being exposed to violent extremist materials, especially on social media.⁴²



(U//FOUO) Research Findings: Use of Social Media by UK and US Persons in Syria

Overview

I&A and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) analyzed the public social media activity of identified UK and US persons in Syria to inform efforts to counter online recruitment and radicalization to violence. Our study's findings are derived from a review of 20 UK persons and 20 US persons (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E). This infographic highlights the most common themes they promoted, as well as key similarities and differences between UK and US persons, men and women, and the social media platforms they used.

Intelligence cut-off date: 30 November 2014

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Calls for External Attacks

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

Travel Guidance and Advice

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

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Key Findings

- UK and US persons in Syria typically promoted themes (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) with (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).
- Messages primarily were designed to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) and most of the remainder were designed to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).
- (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Only a handful of messages referenced (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).
- Fighters from both countries regularly (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).
- Examined travelers increasingly provided (b) (3), (b) (7)(E).

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

Differences and Similarities of UK and US Persons

- UK and US persons published messages in approximately the same proportion about life in Syria, combat operations in Syria, tributes to martyrs, and terrorist messaging.
- UK persons were more likely to (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E).
- US persons were more likely to (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), and provide commentary (b) (3).

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Promoting a Foreign Terrorist Organization

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

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Life in Syria

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

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Application Preferences*

(b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E)

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*Size reflects prevalence of public use by examined persons

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) DHS and (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) reviewed (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) released between September 2013 and November 2014 that documented (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) 20 confirmed or self-proclaimed US persons who attempted to or engaged in violence or material support in Syria or Iraq, as (b) (3), (b) (7)(D), (b) (7)(E) by 20 UK persons. (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E). We have (b) (3), confidence (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) We also have (b) confidence in (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx>.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.8.3

([REDACTED]
b [REDACTED]
) [REDACTED]



Homeland Security

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Customer Feedback Form

Product Title: (U//FOUO) Syria-Based US and UK Persons' Public Social Media Activity Effective but Provides Terrorism

1. Please select partner type: and function:

2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive?

3. Please complete the following sentence: "I focus most of my time on:"

4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's relevance to your mission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Drive planning and preparedness efforts, training, and/or emergency response operations | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate a law enforcement investigation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Observe, identify, and/or disrupt threats | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own regional-specific analysis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Share with partners | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own topic-specific analysis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Allocate resources (e.g. equipment and personnel) | <input type="checkbox"/> Develop long-term homeland security strategies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Reprioritize organizational focus | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not plan to use |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Author or adjust policies and guidelines | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <input type="text"/> |

6. To further understand your response to question #5, please provide specific details about situations in which you might use this product.

7. What did this product not address that you anticipated it would?

8. To what extent do you agree with the following two statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. How did you obtain this product?

10. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up conversation about your feedback?

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name:

Organization:

Contact Number:

Position:

State:

Email:

[Privacy Act Statement](#)