

Countering Violent Extremism LAPD Initiative to Develop Training

Background: The LAPD has been asked by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop the nation's first Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) curriculum for state and local law enforcement. DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano has made this a priority initiative and determined that state and local law enforcement will play a critical role nationwide because of their experience working closely with communities and the likelihood that they will be the first to recognize signs of violent extremism at the community level.

Objectives: The following bullet points provide insight into the strategic objectives of this program and how this training will serve the law enforcement community.

The underlying philosophy is that through proper training and the development of CVE-oriented outreach programs, law enforcement have the opportunity to partner with communities to enhance resilience and isolate violent, extremist groups and individuals. Through traditional community policing strategies, law enforcement can help communities to create environments that are inhospitable to violent extremists and, from a preventive standpoint, potentially disrupt radicalization processes.

Objective 1: To provide state and local law enforcement with a clear understanding of the issue of violent extremism in all of its manifestations and the process of radicalization.

Objective 2: To provide case studies and examples of how law enforcement have successfully applied community-policing principles to this issue.

Objective 3: To provide information, based on real-world experience, about the guiding principles of CVE-oriented community engagement.

Objective 4: To provide information about resources at the federal, state and local level that can support law enforcement CVE efforts. This information would also include resources for communities that support their engagement in civic life.

Objective 5: To provide information about how to protect civil rights and civil liberties and the separation between intelligence and outreach in the context of CVE.

Objective 6: To provide information about lessons learned working with communities that are culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse.

Take-Away

After taking this course, state and local law enforcement will be able to develop a new CVE-oriented engagement program or tailor existing outreach efforts. Law enforcement will also understand how their work ties into the nation's broader CVE strategies.

Countering Violent Extremism

Potential Curriculum Components (Working Document)

Submitted to DHS on September 29, 2010

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Summary: The following 12 potential topic areas of a curriculum to counter violent extremism were developed specifically for a target audience of front-line state and local police officers and key law enforcement outreach personnel. These would include officers, detectives, analysts, sergeants and lieutenants. These 12 topic areas would change depending on whether the curriculum was for executive-level law enforcement or the community, including community-based organizations, schools and parent and youth groups. The 12 topic areas are followed by the rationale for their potential inclusion. At this stage, not much detail is given about exactly what would be included as subtopics. This is so that the entities submitting proposals have the ability to apply their own creative approach to the curriculum development process.

*Topic Area One: **Fanaticism through the ages***

Rationale: In order to fully understand violent extremism, it is critical that students gain an understanding of fanaticism, its presence throughout history and its relationship to violent extremism. From the local law enforcement perspective, this information can help to place the overall training into historical context, emphasize that it is an issue that will continue into the future and help officers understand some of the factors that propel some groups and individuals along the continuum from idealism to fanaticism to violence. Most importantly, it can help officers start to make distinctions between behaviors along that continuum – some of which are constitutionally protected expressions of belief; others of which lead to criminal acts.

*Topic Area Two: **Violent Extremism in America***

Rationale: In order to be able to identify and, ultimately, counter a threat, police must have a clear understanding of the socio- and geopolitical factors and ideologies that serve as its fuel. The objective of this portion of the curriculum is to define violent extremism¹ and, through lectures and case studies, enable police to identify and articulate what it is, how this problem pertains to their work, how they can identify it, and, most importantly, what is being done around the country and the world to counter it (case studies). One of the key elements of this portion of the training can be demonstrating that community knowledge and the policing of everyday crimes – in other words, leveraging the things police already know how to do well – are essential ingredients of any plan to counter violent extremism. It is suggested that the case studies highlight violent extremism along a broad spectrum (terrorists, gangs, white supremacists, animal rights activists, etc.) rather than in the context of one particular issue. This will ensure that the curriculum is applicable to jurisdictions and communities across the country and will lay the inclusive philosophical groundwork for the outreach programs to follow. This broad-spectrum approach will also support the reality that

¹ This definition and the accompanying lexicon will come from DHS so that all training is in line with DHS' policy and philosophy in this area.

police officers across the country are experiencing: threats such as gangs and terrorism are increasingly converging and overlapping. To reflect that reality in the training will better equip the officers to face 21st Century policing issues, which are undeniably altered by globalization and other complex, transnational factors.

*Topic Area Three: **Philosophy and Approaches of Community-Oriented Policing***

Rationale: Community Policing is rooted in relationships of trust, honesty and open communication with communities, problem solving, the aligning of resources with the mission and applying tried-and-true methods such as SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) to address crime, social disorder and fear of crime. This topic area would include case studies and lectures that demonstrate the pros and cons of various outreach models (Faith-Based Initiatives, Values-Based Initiatives, Youth, etc.) and Community Policing approaches, with emphasis placed on those models with the most potential to counter violent extremism.

*Topic Area Four: **Community-Oriented Policing and CVE***

Rationale: Armed with a comprehensive overview of the Community Policing toolbox, this section would focus on exactly how to incorporate and tailor best practices to violent extremism. (Examples: What are the essential components of an outreach plan that lead to relationships of trust? How can problem-solving approaches such as SARA be applied? How do you create a strategic approach in which enforcement and outreach efforts complement each other rather than undermine each other?)

*Topic Area Five: **Developing Socio-Cultural Awareness at the State and Local Levels***

Rationale: This section would provide officers with training on sociological factors such as cultural, religious, socioeconomic or linguistic isolation that can lead to an environment in which violent extremism is likely to flourish. What are the universal risk factors at the community, group and individual levels? Ideally, this portion of the training will also use case studies and lectures to address cultural and religious issues specific to the jurisdiction in which the training is being held.

*Topic Area Six: **Incorporating Socio-Cultural Awareness into a CVE Strategy***

Rationale: Police methods to learn about the communities they serve can be complemented and made stronger through a multi-disciplinary approach that includes academia, the media and community-based organizations. This section will focus on how police can become better “listeners,” embrace a “whole-of-government” approach and clearly identify community needs (part of the problem-solving equation). This section can also focus on how to blend the tactical and strategic and create guidelines for officers. What do they look for when it comes to behaviors and crimes linked to violent extremism? What questions should they ask? With whom should they engage?

What should they do with the information? How can partnerships with communities increase the cultural and linguistic acumen of police, leading to more productive and informed crime prevention strategies? How can police leverage social networks and create more peer-to-peer messaging opportunities (i.e. officer with same cultural/linguistic/religious background to community member; community member to community member)?

*Topic Area Seven: **Protecting Civil Rights and Civil Liberties***

Rationale: This section would put the material developed by DHS' Civil Rights Civil Liberties and other relevant Federal units into context for police officers. This section would also include training on hate crimes. The training would touch on why these issues matter in the context of countering violent extremism and policing and how these issues are operationalized at the state and local levels.

*Topic Area Eight: **Creating Open Dialogue with Communities***

Rationale: This section would address ways to improve police interaction – at the interpersonal and departmental levels – with communities through meetings, Citizens Police Academies, Neighborhood Watch groups, Advisory Boards and the media. Potential topics could include: messaging, strategic communications, the importance of niche media, how to identify community leaders and opinion formers, how to build trust and community confidence, how to incorporate socio-cultural considerations into outreach events, how to create a collaborative problem-solving process with the community, how to successfully navigate complicated group dynamics (conflict resolution) and how to set goals and identify measurements of success. This section could also include examples of how familiarizing populations with police practices and U.S. law can create understanding that leads to more civic involvement and less illegal activity.

*Topic Area Nine: **Blending Tactics and CVE Outreach Strategies***

Rationale: Police tactics and enforcement actions can, in certain circumstances, undermine the accomplishments of a CVE strategy and create conditions in which violence is more likely. Drawing lessons from recent protests, demonstrations and police enforcement actions, this section would examine how police can blend tactics and enforcement actions with outreach strategies to prevent violence. In one example, this section would examine how proactive engagement with the community in advance of a protest or demonstration, coupled with tactics that minimize injury and property damage, can help minimize the chance that constitutionally protected activities will turn violent. This section would be as much about facilitating the non-violent struggle through protecting free speech (demonstrations and protests) as it would be about CVE-related strategies.

Topic Area Ten: Including the Community in CVE

Rationale: Carefully selected community members could be brought in to talk with the students about some essential components of a CVE plan, from their perspective. These community members would be briefed in advance on the issues/challenges facing law enforcement and asked to provide suggestions on approaches and community-based resources. This section would serve the following purposes:

- 1) It would include the community in the development of a CVE plan at the earliest stage thereby ensuring that such a plan was not developed by the government but by the community itself. This creates instant “buy-in” to the solutions, demonstrates respect for the community members’ opinions and helps tailor the CVE strategy.
- 2) This group/panel discussion would start a dialogue with the police where none existed previously or continue one – both essential steps in building trust. Ultimately, the discussion would evolve into how to isolate the violent extremists and how to capitalize on the moderate messaging.

Topic Area Eleven: Resources at the Federal, State and Local Levels

Rationale: This section would provide students with numerous resources, including, but not limited to grant guidance, information sharing platforms, professional reading lists and CVE-related research.

Topic Area Twelve: Creating a CVE Plan (Class Exercise)

Rationale: Asking the students to devise a CVE plan would accomplish several objectives. It would: 1) Assess the level of knowledge attained by the students and provide DHS with a measurement tool; 2) Generate action items that could be used as tools for follow-up; 3) Create a general road map for future interactions with the community; 4) Pull the training elements together in an actionable way; and 5) Allow DHS to identify emerging trends in this area.

In one scenario, students could be asked to develop a plan for an area/community in their respective jurisdictions that they think would be susceptible to violent extremism, based on what they had learned in the course. They would be asked to:

- 1) Articulate exactly what those risk factors were;
- 2) Determine how to leverage existing resources to address the problem;
- 3) Determine whether any of the resources/approaches identified during the course could supplement the usual way of doing business;
- 4) Identify at least one new pathway of communication that could be formed with the community; and
- 5) Identify action items and how to measure success.

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would draw less attention. Boyd was convicted in 2009 as one of a group of U.S. citizens supporting the violent jihad movement overseas.

Debrief:

1. Table #1 will present Case Study #1 back to the class by:
 - a. Summarizing the Key Components of the Case Study from the information provided (case summary and support articles)
 - b. Identifying Key Factors – what is known and what information is still needed
 - 1) Person Factors
 - 2) Group Factors
 - 3) Community Factors
 - 4) Context Factors
 - c. Given this analysis, what are the recommended Outreach and Mobilization Strategies?
 - d. Where would trust borders with law-enforcement have made a difference for possible prevention or intervention?
 - e. What strategies would help to move your community forward?
2. Facilitator will debrief the responses and facilitate discussion.
3. Subject Overview – Increase/Decrease Drivers **(40 min)**
 - a. There are other terms that you might hear in the discussion of “Increase Drivers and Decrease Drivers” but they essentially reflect the same idea.
 - 1) Other terms are:
 - a) “Push and Pull Factors”
 - b) “Catalysts and Inhibitors”
 - c) “Resilience Factors and Vulnerability Factors”
 - 2) Basically, some things will push people into more extreme views and actions and some will pull them back from extreme views or actions.
 - a) As we are more informed about those factors, we can probably target our responses in a more productive way to get the results we are looking for.
 - b) At minimum, we do NOT want law enforcement to be a factor in pushing people toward more violent positions if that is possible.
 - b. The information for this subject overview is derived from an assessment published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), entitled “A Model for Understanding the Motivations of Homegrown Violent Extremists” (Nov. 2011).
 - 1) This assessment examined the radicalization process and shared characteristics of 62 Known or Suspected Terrorists (KSTs).
 - a) Of this group, 52 were convicted of terrorism-related offenses
 - b) The remaining subjects are indicted, wanted for terrorist activities, or deceased.
 - 2) DEFINITION - DHS defines Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) as:

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- a) A person of any citizenship who have lived and/or operated primarily in the US or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.
- b) HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.
- c. The Cluster Model
 - 1) Illustrates pathways to violent extremism identified by studying individuals who turned toward violence or supported terrorism.
 - 2) Most HVEs tend to "cluster" into five groups, whose members share some motivating factors and characteristics and display similar life experiences during their radicalization to violence. It should be noted that:
 - a) Individuals might exhibit similar characteristics without ever turning toward violence or supporting terrorism.
 - b) Individuals may engage in violence for a variety of reasons, and may belong to multiple clusters simultaneously or, over time; they may also follow unique pathways to violence not found in these clusters.
 - c) Some of these traits/characteristics are constitutionally protected, and NONE should be viewed as definitive.
 - d) Members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities should apply this model cautiously, using common sense and within the existing framework of regulations and operating procedures. As discussed in Day One, the responsibility of protecting the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is inherent in every aspect of policing.
- d. It is highly likely that you already have a good idea of what characteristics, traits, and motivations are connected to these people just based on your years of law enforcement experience.
 - 1) Turn to your worksheet on page
 - 2) Under the name of each Cluster, write down a brief description of what you think categorizes or motivates the people in that cluster to become involved in violent extremist actions.
 - a) Give students time to look it over and write down the answers.
 - b) Have 1-2 students give a response for each cluster and then reveal the official definition.
 - c) **Lost or Damaged Cluster:** Subjects who felt a strong need to belong to a social group but had trouble finding

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and fitting into a social context and/or may have suffered from one or more diagnosable psychiatric disorders:

- (1) Driven by a strong need to belong
 - (2) Psychiatric disorder was common (1+)
 - (3) HISTORY – of involvement in multiple and/or diverse groups unrelated to violent extremism (prior to the transition to an HVE ideology)
- d) History of Violence Cluster:** Individuals with a pattern of violent behavior that used ideology to justify violent acts.
- (1) Willing participants in violence and had a prior history, gang or criminal prior to radicalization
 - (2) Sometimes American-born convert to Islam with little prior grounding in non-violent Islamic theology or interpretations inconsistent with al-Qa'ida ideology
 - (3) Used violent extremist ideology to justify violence, either consciously or as an unconsciously
- e) Foreign Policy-Driven Cluster:** Individuals whose outrage over US or Western foreign policies prompted them to adopt and justify a violent extremist ideology.
- (1) Mere disagreements over foreign policy are not a cause of violent extremism and are views that are constitutionally protected.
 - (2) Individuals in this cluster internalized a personal sense of grievance toward the US based on vehement opposition to specific policies.
 - (3) Grievances moved them to socialize with new social groups that shared their outrage, helped reshape their personal worldview, and drove the radicalization process forward to violence.
 - (4) Often no previous exposure to criminals or violent extremists
- f) Terrorist Wannabe Cluster:** Individuals who were more attracted to the perceived glory of fighting for a cause than to the specific dictates or ideas of any particular ideology.
- (1) Motivated by adventure and interest in action more than a desire to adhere to religious rules and ideology
 - (2) Seemed to be well-adjusted individuals who later rejected the religious views/traditions of their families
 - (3) Tend to be young, male, and of average or better socio-economic status
 - (4) Felt guilty over an inability to follow strict religious guidelines while living in a American

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society; guilt was sometimes exploited by al-Qa'ida recruiters

g) Violent Nationalist Cluster: Individuals whose radicalization and travel abroad or material support for a Foreign Terrorist Organization or insurgency was originally prompted primarily by nationalist rather than other ideological reasons.

h) Important Note: The clusters themselves do not represent the only pathways to violence, nor do indications that a subject shares characteristics of particular clusters necessarily mean that radicalization to violence will ensue. 42 of the 62 individuals studied met the criteria of one or sometimes several clusters.

e. Lost or Damaged

1) Possible Drivers of Increase:

- a)** Successful terrorist operations or propaganda efforts by Al Qai'da increases its visibility and attractiveness to this cluster.
- b)** Violent extremist community produces new charismatic English-speaking recruiters and radicalizers locally or online.
- c)** Creation of local grassroots groups actively advocating violent extremist ideology.
- d)** Use of new social media tools gives rise to tightly knit online community actively advocating violent extremist ideology.
- e)** Increase in anti-Muslim violence in the United States or other Western countries

2) Possible Drivers of Decrease:

- a)** Al-Qa'ida and similar groups lose prominence in the national media and /or international policy debates.
- b)** Violent extremist community is unable to produce English language radicalizers that resonate with U.S. residents.

f. History of Violence

1) Possible Drivers of Increase:

- a)** Decreased focus by federal, state and local correctional facilities on countering prison radicalization
- b)** Emergence of new charismatic radicalizers in prison or neighborhoods with heavy gang activity

2) Possible Drivers of Decrease:

- a)** Increased prison resources and oversight devoted to countering radicalization and recruiting activities toward violence
- b)** Emergence of rehabilitated former violent extremist (or group/ organization of such individuals) speaking out against ideology-driven violence
- c)** Increased outreach & disengagement efforts to at-risk youth/gang members/prisoners

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g. Foreign Policy Driven

1) Possible Drivers of Increase:

- a)** Increased public coverage of controversial counterterrorism (CT) actions, such as those that kill civilians or are perceived as Anti-Islam
- b)** Increased spread and resonance of violent extremist propaganda alleging Western efforts to exploit or undermine Middle Eastern countries for economic or geopolitical gain
- c)** Arab Spring (or similar event) results in conflicts that involve U.S./Western troops or new military and intelligence commitments overseas, especially those perceived as supporting Israel at the expense of the Muslim world

2) Possible Drivers of Decrease:

- a)** Less negative commentary about U.S. CT actions on violent extremist-linked websites
- b)** Successful military drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan that are followed by relatively stable government
- c)** Arab Spring succeeds in creating successful representative governments in several countries in the Middle East, offering a non-violent model for political change

h. Terrorist Wannabe

1) Possible Drivers of Increase:

- a)** Decrease in FBI/law enforcement domestic CT pressure
- b)** Decreased CT efforts by DHS and FBI combating HVE attempts to travel abroad for terrorist training
- c)** Violent extremist community produces new charismatic English-speaking recruiters and radicalizers locally or online
- d)** Use of new social media tools gives rise to tightly knit online communities actively advocating violent extremist ideology
- e)** Increase in anti-Muslim violence in the United States or other Western Countries

2) Possible Drivers of Decrease:

- a)** US successfully interdicts attempts by HVEs (Homegrown Violent Extremist) to travel abroad for training and continues high pace of successful CT operations at home and abroad
- b)** Fewer successful al-Qa'ida operations, more CT disruptions
- c)** More civilian Muslim deaths from al-Qa'ida affiliated groups

i. Violent Nationalist

1) Possible Drivers of increase:

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- a) Arab Spring leads to more internal conflicts in countries like Yemen where Al Qa'ida sympathetic groups are involved
- b) Expansion of conflict in Somalia/full scale invasion and occupation by foreign power leading to increased interest in defending Somalia
- 2) Possible Drivers of Decrease:
 - a) Leaders fail to cope with ongoing famine, halt internal corruption, and reverse military setbacks
 - b) Propaganda focuses on pro Al-Qa'ida messages rather than on national or clan pride
 - c) Increase in outreach programs that reach relevant communities
 - d) Arab Spring succeeds in creating successful representative governments in several countries in the Middle East, offering a non-violent model for political change

4. Outreach and Mobilization Potential (5 min.)
- a. As a team, brainstorm about what kind of outreach and mobilization efforts would make a difference for your communities
 - b. Consider the outcomes we are trying to avoid related to INCREASE/DECREASE DRIVERS.

D. PERSON FACTORS (60 min)

Case Study #3 – Shirwa Ahmed - Somali Immigrant; immigrated to U.S. in 1994 (Minneapolis); felt rejected by African Americans; could never find anyone to relate too; family encouraged him to stick to his clan; 2006 war in Somalia and Al'Qaida found a shelter there Ahmed could identify with; 2007 went to Somalia persuaded by Arab Terrorist group; 2008 drove a car bomb into a government compound in Northern Somalia killing 20.

Debrief:

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 - e. What strategies would help to move your community forward?
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- 3. Subject Overview – Person Factors (40 min)

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- a. In Day 1 there was a discussion of the "whole person" and how any person has to incorporate all elements, the cognitive, the psychomotor, and the affective to "stay balanced."
 - 1) Ideally, we all have the potential to be our best, a balance of all three sides.
 - 2) This next block will give a framework for understanding the factors that set individuals up for increasingly more extreme views and behavior.
 - a) What happens when one side gets overemphasized? When someone gets stuck in their thinking and their emotion?
 - (1) Cognitive
 - (2) Psychomotor
 - (3) Affective
 - b) Radicalization is the shift in views and values to support extremist and even violent ideology.
 - (1) Not all individuals who become radicalized have unmet personal needs but
 - (2) Those who do are more vulnerable to radicalization.
 - c) Violent Extremism is the move toward acting out those extreme views and values in a violent manner.
 - d) Demographic Characteristics will influence how he or she will experience and interpret events and increase vulnerability to life changes:
 - (1) Age
 - (2) Level of education
 - (3) Social class
 - (4) Ability to manage anxiety and frustration
 - (5) Developmental and life history events
 - (6) Traumatic experiences
 - (7) Triggering personal events – losing a job, discrimination
- b. Contributing Vulnerabilities (p. 11 – Radicalization Dynamics)
 - 1) Sense of Power and Potency – ability to exercise control over life circumstances and other people contributes to a sense of confidence and self-esteem.
 - 2) Achievement and Productivity – accomplishment, skill mastery, creative expression, and productivity.
 - 3) Affiliation, Intimacy, Sense of Belonging – interpersonal attachment and connection are critical to survival and emotional well-being.
 - 4) Sense of Personal Significance and Self-esteem – a positive opinion of oneself as competent and worthy of respect leads to a positive sense of self.
 - 5) Sense of Purpose and Meaning – the search for meaning is often met through religion and ideology, offering a conviction that one's activities have a higher purpose, providing a sense of importance and immortality.

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- 6) Moral Integrity – the sense of being “right”, of being a moral, spiritually acceptable person.
- c. Person to Group Interaction - What happens when this individual goes to find a group to connect with?
- d. Given the Case Study of Shirwa Ahmed, it may be helpful to look at the preliminary research results that have come out of the DHS study on Outreach Efforts with the Somali Community.
 - 1) Possible Risks for Terrorist Recruitment
 - a) Individual Level
 - (1) being passionate about Somalia
 - (2) needing to belong
 - (3) being “brainwashed”
 - (4) not having Somali icons
 - b) Family Level
 - (1) not talking about the war
 - (2) having absolute trust in the mosque
 - (3) lacking awareness
 - (4) lacking communication
 - (5) overemphasizing government power
 - c) Community Level
 - (1) having multiple vulnerabilities
 - (2) lacking resources
 - (3) feeling fear and mistrust
 - (4) having a divided community
 - (5) having a large community with powerful mosques
 - 2) Possible protective resources
 - a) Family Level
 - (1) having awareness and information
 - (2) having skills and good communication
 - (3) having support and access to resources
 - b) Community Level
 - 3) Whether the recruitment is for terrorism, or criminal activity, or gang activity, there are some very similar qualities. This is not unlike what you already know from policing.
 - a) Communities that have resources and support children and parents with good after-school programs are more resilient.
 - b) Parents/families generally serve as a protective factor for minimizing high risk behavior when:
 - (1) involved in the lives of their family members
 - (2) have the skills to be able to talk with their children about a range of difficult topics
 - (3) know their children’s/relatives’ friends, leaders who coach their teams
 - (4) know what their children are doing after school.
 - c) Individuals are less likely to be vulnerable to the enticement of those seeking new recruits for criminal, gang, narcotic, or terrorist efforts when:

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- (1) connected to their families,
- (2) they feel like they belong or have a voice in their family, community, school, place of worship

- 4. Outreach and Mobilization Potential (5 min.)
 - a. As a team, brainstorm about what kind of outreach and mobilization efforts would make a difference for your communities
 - b. Consider the outcomes we are trying to avoid related to PERSON FACTORS.

E. GROUP FACTORS

(60 min)

Case Study #3 – Hutaree Militia - Michigan based anti-government militia, founded by David Brian Stone, Sr. in 2008, followed his interpretation of the Bible focused on violent end of times prophecy. Created the name "Hutaree" which supposedly meant "Christian Warrior," nine members including wife and sons. Believed NATO Secretary General was the "Anti-Christ." Initially trained with other violent militia, but their cult-like nature and secretiveness later caused other militias to reject them. Had a Myspace page with 350 friends, lived in rural Michigan town. He hated "anyone with a badge."

Debrief:

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 - c. Given this analysis, what are the recommended Outreach and Mobilization Strategies?
 - d. Where would trust borders with law-enforcement have made a difference for possible prevention or intervention?
 - e. What strategies would help to move your community forward?
- 2. Facilitator will debrief the responses and facilitate discussion.
- 3. Subject Overview- Group Factors (40 min)
 - a. Preliminary Data - Precursor Behavior Among Perpetrators of Violence
 - 1) Overview of 204 cases of defendants in federal terrorism cases
 - 2) Examined where defendants lived, planned, and conducted their attacks.
 - a) 35% of defendants lived within 30 miles of their target
 - b) Most common preparation activities included:
 - (1) Meetings and Communications (37%)
 - (2) Fraud (11%)
 - (3) Travel (10%)

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- (4) Purchase of weapons-related materials (6%)
 - (5) Surveillance and reconnaissance (6%)
 - c) Of the preparation activities that took place, 35% took place within 30 miles of their target.
- b. Returning to the study we examined earlier on "A Model for Understanding the Motivations of Homegrown Violent Extremists" (Nov. 2011), it was interesting to discover that "although the HVE cases studied did not share any single set of characteristics, **FOUR** characteristics were present in 31 of 62 Homegrown Violent Extremists, they:
 - 1) Were supported by a **NON-FAMILY SOCIAL NETWORK** that was planning or supporting terrorism.
 - 2) **ABANDONED** groups integrated into the community and/or non-violent social groups to align with new groups advocating the use of violence.
 - 3) **INITATED** contact with a charismatic or prominent figure or group associated with violent extremist ideologies.
 - 4) Strongly identified with the perception that their religious, cultural, or national group required violent defense from an external threat.
- c. Given this information, it is evident that people try to connect, sometimes multiple times with different groups, trying to find the right fit for their thoughts and beliefs.
 - 1) They are making attempts to join groups
 - 2) That unless those groups trust law-enforcement, they will not be asking for help, information or assistance.
- d. Groups prone to radicalization often have (Radicalization Dynamics, p.12)
 - 1) Affiliations evolve from pre-existing relationships
 - 2) Emphasis on a collective identity - "we" and "our" cause
 - 3) Intentionally isolated members
 - 4) Language that dehumanizes opponents
 - 5) Individuals may stay dangerous after leaving
 - a) Being "kicked out" of a group can be perceived as rejection.
 - b) Choosing to abandon a group, may empower an individual to respond on their own terms, or for the attention of the group as a "Lone Wolf" actor.
- e. When it comes to youth, the first known group to a child is their **FAMILY**.
 - 1) The family is probably the smallest group, but operates with many of the dynamics of a larger group.
 - 2) The family is also one of the most powerful **PROTECTIVE RESOURCES** to a child.
 - a) Protective resources are factors that can stop, delay, or diminish negative outcomes, including violent radicalization and/or mobilization (Weine et al, under review).
 - b) **Protective resources** encompass:

Countering Violent Extremism and Building a Resilient Community

The Los Angeles Police Department has developed curriculum to introduce State, Local and Tribal law enforcement agencies to strategies to counter violent extremism at a local level. The curriculum aims to emphasize the importance of community outreach, collaboration and working with non-governmental organizations and private sector partners to develop a comprehensive outreach and mobilization strategy that agencies can use to counter violent extremism.

As a component of this curriculum, Deputy Chief Michael Downing, Counter Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, would like to present an overview identifying and defining the challenge that violent extremism presents in local communities, and strategies to identify and counter violent extremism while developing a resilient community.

The presenters will explain what violent extremism is in the larger context of terrorism and identify the challenges posed to local law enforcement and the community in identifying and countering individuals or small groups of ideological extremists. In addition, the presenters will discuss how extremists recruit and the radicalization process. Further, the presenters will identify gaps and groups for outreach and emphasize the importance of a whole community approach in building a culture of resilience, moving beyond stereotypes and assumptions and building enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities. Finally, the presenters will identify priority goals moving forward to identify and counter violent extremists.

The presentation will be followed by an opportunity for question from the audience.

"We need to show that our democratic principles built on the values, practices, and lives of American citizens are sacred and worthy of embracing. We need to show our belief in human dignity, the family and the value of the individual. We need to show how we honor the meaning of our lives by what we contribute to others' lives. We need to show that behind the badges of American law enforcement are caring Americans "doing" law enforcement. To do this we need to go into the community and get to know peoples' names. We need to walk into homes, neighborhoods, mosques, and businesses. We need to know how Islam expresses itself in Los Angeles if we expect to forge bonds of community support."

Deputy Chief Michael Downing
Committee on Homeland Security's and
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate,
October 30, 2007

CVE

Outreach Strategies

Instructional Goal: Students will develop the skill necessary to understand the strategies necessary for Outreach Officers to contribute to a CVE Strategy for their Department.

Performance Objectives: Using learning activities, research, and practical application scenarios, the student will:

- ☐ Demonstrate an ability to work as a team
- ☐ Demonstrate an understanding and grasp of the Mission of Community Outreach as a critical component in the CVE Strategy for their Department
- ☐ Demonstrate the understanding of Community Policing and Partnership
- ☐ Demonstrate an ability to apply a comprehensive policing model and design Outreach and Mobilization Strategies for their Department
- ☐ Complete a presentation to Executive Staff on a Community Outreach Project

Day 1

I. INTRODUCTION TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM FOR STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

A. Introduction

(5 min)

1. Instructor
 - a. Name, Assignment
 - b. Experience
 - c. Emphasize collaboration with the Hosting Agency
2. Show slide of Quote (pp slide 1)
*"In the final analysis, our most effective defense against terrorism will come not from surveillance, concrete barriers, metal detectors, or new laws. It will come from our own virtue, our courage, our continued dedication to the ideals of a free society. It will come from our realism in the acceptance of risk, our stoicism in the face of society. It will come from our realism in the acceptance of risk, our stoicism in the face of threats, our self-reliance, our humanity, our sense of community, too fleetingly expressed in times of disaster. It will come from our fierce determination, despite the risk, to defend our liberties and protect our values, for which we have fought many wars. These are the kinds of defenses- the ones that come from deep within that will make our nation unconquerable."*¹
3. Convey Gratitude to Host Agency and request Chief to address the class
4. Chief of Police (Hosting Agency) Introductions **(20 min)**
 - a. Establishing the tone of the training
 - 1) You have been selected as a member of a specialized team.

- 2) You have been identified for your skills and ability to work with the Community.
- 3) This is a critical and important work for the National Strategy for protecting America.
- b. Purpose of Community Outreach as a Critical CVE Strategy
 - 1) Framing the vision personalized to the Department
 - 2) Where do you expect the Department to be in 5 to 10 years?
- c. Expectation of the team
 - 1) Ability to tie outreach strategy goals with the Departments
 - 2) Ability to make decisions, manage and direct efforts
 - 3) Ability to communicate information through the chain of command
 - 4) See beyond stereotypes, assumptions, motives or beliefs
 - 5) Ability to embrace other cultures
- 5. Facilitator Wrap Up - Housekeeping Items (5 min)
 - a. Restroom location
 - b. Breaks

B. Countering Violent Extremism – Mission and Vision Overview (40 min)

- 1. The core principles guiding the National Strategy for Counterterrorism
 - a. Adhering to United States Core Values
 - b. Building Security Partnerships
 - c. Applying Counterterrorism Tools and Capabilities Appropriately
 - d. Building a Culture of Resilience
- 2. With the core principles as the foundation of our efforts, the National Strategy needs the assistance of State and Local Law Enforcement to be successful in eight Counterterrorism goals
 - a. Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests
 - b. Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle and Defeat al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents
 - c. Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
 - d. Eliminate Safe havens
 - e. Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities
 - f. Degrade Links between al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents
 - g. Counter al-Qa'ida Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al-Qa'ida Exploits
 - h. Deprive Terrorists of Their Enabling Means
- 3. Training Philosophy for the Course
 - a. Mission Vision Values
 - 1) Re-emphasized throughout the course
 - 2) Different Mission Statements across departments but all agree on the foundations of police as protectors of civil rights and Civil Liberties

- b. In a Team, by a Team, to be a Team
 - 1) Observe the set-up of the room; team work is foundational to this workshop.
 - 2) All agencies have Community Policing efforts, by working in teams during this workshop; solutions should be directly applicable to your work environment.
 - 3) All team members must know that they have the power to influence the success or failure of their team.
 - 4) Rank is important for leadership and understanding responsibilities, but all supervisors in the team are considered full participants.
- c. Not TO an Event but THROUGH an Event
 - 1) Continual push to think through an event to consider what the implications are to internal and external partners.
 - 2) Think larger than just one critical event.
- 4. Ground rules
 - a. Be open minded.
 - b. Students agree to take turns speaking and not interrupt each other.
 - c. Students agree not to blame, attack, or put down others.
 - d. Ask questions of each other only for the purpose of gaining clarity and understanding.
 - e. Students agree to stay away from establishing hard positions and express themselves in terms of their personal needs and interest and the outcomes that they wish to realize.
 - f. Students agree to listen respectfully and listen to others, sincerely trying to understand the other person's needs and interest.
 - g. Stay focused on objectives.
 - h. Respect others' opinions and observations.
 - i. One of the goals for the day is to come up with some strategies that have not been tried before. All ideas need to be presented, some will be used, some discarded but all need to be respected.

C. Overview for Day 1

(5 min)

- 1. Model for Community Outreach
- 2. Application to Actual Cases (use Practical Application?)
- 3. Civil Rights and Civil Liabilities
- 4. Setting and Outreach Strategy
- 5. Panel Discussion
- 6. Debrief

II. TRAINING TEAM IDENTITY

(50 min)

A. LEARNING ACTIVITY (PART I): Meet the Team

PURPOSE: This activity provides the student the opportunity to get to know each other and the other team members.

PROCEDURES: Small Group Activity

1. Using flip charts or table top easels
2. At each table, identify one person to scribe and log team introductions
3. Team Member Introductions
 - a. Each person will give their own introduction to the table
 - 1) Name, assignment
 - 2) Experience
 - b. Focus on who you are, not what you do
 - 1) **Ask** the student to share with the table the most significant event to you as an officer, where you felt like you made an impact in the community that really made a difference.
 - 2) **Explain** this event does not need to be one that was formally recognized, it only needs to be significant to the officer.
 - 3) **Ask** why this event mattered to the community
4. The scribe will create a Chart on paper and identify
 - a. The name of the team member
 - b. Key phrases that summarizes the significant event
 - c. Why it mattered
 - d. Chart Example

Team Member	Summarize Event Key	Why it Mattered-To Whom
1.		
2. (etc.)		

5. Large Group: Debrief the exercise
 - a. Have the team scribe introduce each team member to the larger group
 - b. What do the significant events have in common?
 - c. What matters to the community?
 - d. Key Learning Points
 - 1) Connection with People on "Human Level" matters most
 - 2) Connection back to Original purpose when you took the job- MVV
 - 3) Getting the Department to "recognize" what matters most to the community

B. LEARNING ACTIVITY (PART II): Expectations and Concerns

Purpose: To develop a list of expectations and concerns that are generated by the students and that can be addressed throughout the training by the facilitators.

Procedures: Small Group Exercise

1. Using flip charts or table top easels
2. At each table, identify one person to scribe
3. The team will discuss their expectations and concerns related to this training
4. The scribe will list the responses in two separate columns, one for expectations and one for concerns

5. Debrief: Large Group
 - a. Discuss the expectations and concerns of the class
 - b. Post the findings and ensure they are addressed throughout the training

III. MODEL OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION (1.5 hrs)

- A. Foundational Elements of Incorporating Community Police as a Critical Element of Countering Violent Extremism
 1. Use of Select COIN Principles (refer to student Workbook)
 - a. Gain, retain, and actively involve the civilian populace - "The Nation's most important natural resource"
 - b. Perceived government legitimacy is directly proportional to the government's ability to fulfill society expectations
 - c. In the big picture, it will be more critical to positively influence the population than to eliminate enemy forces and infrastructure
 - d. Complementary interest promotes the collective pursuit of mutually beneficial objectives and resource sharing
 - e. Build partnerships on Common Characteristics while harnessing and integrating differences
 - f. Physical capabilities, strong organizations, and unwavering desire are critical to governments and insurgencies
 - g. Reconciliation and re-assimilation are more important than revenge and retribution; former enemies can be strong allies
 2. The COIN environment necessitates a WHOLE of government approach that employs all elements of national power – What does that mean?

B. Learning Activity: Table Top Activity

PURPOSE: To familiarize the student with the principles of COIN

PROCEDURE: Small group activity

1. Allow 3 minutes for table discussion
2. Assign each table;
 - a. Table 1- Discuss items **a** and **b** from the previous discussion
 - b. Table 2- Discuss items **c** and **d** from the previous discussion
 - c. Table 3- Discuss items **e** and **f** from the previous discussion
 - d. Table 4- Discuss item **g** from the previous discussion
 - e. Table 5- Discuss item **h** from the previous discussion
3. Key Learning Point
 - a. It is important to recognize that the CVE Outreach Strategy is not "just one more thing tacked on to the role of policing."
 - b. CVE Outreach Strategy is the pooling of the best of what law enforcement does every day.

- c. CVE Outreach Strategy is collectively learning from each other, assessing and reassessing what works to benefit a national public safety strategy.
- d. We cannot afford for those who have criminal or terrorist intentions to be more networked and formulate better partnerships than we do.

C. Model Overview -Power Point Visual Presentation (Complex Slide)

1. Preface

- a. This may look complicated, but at our best, this is what we do every day in policing. Once this is explained, this is very common-sense and will easily become a structure for assessing your successes and failures and how to move forward.
- b. For the next 25 minutes, we are going to walk through each individual element of this model; however, it is critical that you recognize that none of these elements are individually sustained. As we apply it to various scenarios throughout training you will recognize it as a guide for influencing the application of your outreach efforts.
- c. As you work with the model, it becomes evident that it is critical to continually move in and out of each of the elements.
- d. Community-based policing is not a location that can be "arrived" at; it is a process of assessing, moving, and growing in partnership with the community.

2. The Context (pp slide 1)

- a. For the purpose of needing a place to start, look first to the outside circle this part of the model represents the context that is continually evolving.
- b. The **RED** area represents when law enforcement is responding to a critical incident: when lives and property may be at stake.
 - 1) This is often where law enforcement shines, because this is where we often have the best alignment between the community and the officers who serve that community.
 - 2) It is what the police are trained to do, and this is where the community wants and expects a police officer to respond.
 - 3) We know what to do during a critical incident, and we generally, like to train to these scenarios.
 - 4) As good as our critical incident responses may have been independently, we quickly realized after 9/11 that we needed a common language for complex incidents where we could expect a response from multiple agencies.
 - 5) This system had to expand from law enforcement to all first responder and the national training for the Incident Command System was put in place.

- 6) In terms of time, we actually spend much less of our time in the **RED**, but we spend the bulk of our training time anticipating and preparing for the **RED** critical incident.
- 7) A critical component of critical incident (**the RED**) is the clear sense of mission.
 - a) We do not spend time in the discussion of details; we are united in the sense of urgency to act and to resolve the crisis.
 - b) There is a heightened physical, mental, and emotional response, but it is all channeled into resolving the incident.
- c. The **BLUE** represents what happens in between critical events.
 - 1) In the world of policing we know and have confidence that another critical (red) event will occur, but what we do in-between events is actually just as important as what we do during the critical event itself.
 - 2) It is in the blue when we need to be thinking forward and identifying what kind of training needs to be done and reinforced.
 - 3) In the blue is when we should be serious about self-assessment.
 - 4) We should be asking ourselves these self-assessing questions
 - a) What are we doing well?
 - b) What do we need to improve on?
 - c) How do we need to market our message?
 - d) What do communities need to know?
 - 5) Ironically, for many of our departments (agencies), many of our complaints both internally (from each other, hostile workplace, discrimination) and externally (from the community) don't come from when we are operating in the critical event (the red), but when we come out of those times when we are in-between, when we are in the blue.
- d. The leadership challenge is to know and understand how to manage our teams and our communities when we are in the blue - when the critical incident is passed.
 - 1) Since there is such a high regard in law enforcement for managing incidents "in the red", leadership practice is that everything is "in the red".
 - 2) The blue area is actually very complex because instead of one single mission, we have always been a challenge...
 - 3) While all law enforcement agencies are involved in community-based efforts, there is little agreement on what we are all doing collectively; making the benefits from our collective efforts hard to identify.
 - 4) Just like ICS became the official language for how we respond during a crisis, there is a need for an agreed

upon language for how to determine what our protective efforts will be in-between the critical events.

- 5) In the aftermath of every critical event, it can be seen that what was done "in the blue" will either mitigate or exacerbate the depth and magnitude of the critical event.
- 6) What happens "in the blue" becomes just as important, as what is done "in the red."
- 7) Law enforcement leadership must think through an event (to the blue) not just to an event. As mentioned earlier, part of the leadership role is to get law enforcement functioning in partnership with the community during neutral times, such that we are collectively prepared for how to respond in a crisis.
 - a) The best and most recent example of this was Japan's response to the tsunami that hit in 2011. The crisis was enormous and devastating, but the people of Japan were prepared for their response and were collaborators with the recovery instead of instigators.
 - b) An excellent law enforcement example of this was the collaborative efforts of the Police Chief in Dearborn, MI, prior to Terry Jones' arrival to burn the Koran.
 - (1) The Police Chief had pre-established relationships across the inter-faith community that allowed the community to manage a potentially volatile situation.
 - (2) This case will be discussed in more detail tomorrow, but it bears referencing today to demonstrate how what you do "in the blue" will determine what resources are available when you are "in the red".
- e. The **YELLOW** is actually a small area, but for law enforcement leadership, what you do and say directly before and after an incident where the lives of your team may depend on you, is just as critical as the management of the situation itself.
 - 1) In the yellow there is a small window of opportunity immediately before and after when people are motivated to listen and respond differently than when they are in periods of calm (in the blue).
 - 2) Once the urgency has passed, people quickly acclimate to the situation and will fall back on old habits.
 - a) Additionally, all our experience- physical, emotional, mental- are all keenly focused for a short period of time.

- b) What leaders say and do in these "windows" will be remembered much more significantly by the community and by the officers.
 - f. It wouldn't take much for you to remember a significant incident in your organization where a leader's response directly afterward helped people to move on or made it the situation worse.
 - g. As a nation, we share a collective memory after significant events that become symbolically imprinted in our minds and hearts and they affect how we choose to respond afterward.
 - h. Setting aside political dynamics consider President Bush with a Firefighter's hat and a megaphone after 9/11
 - 1) Whatever else he did or did not do while in office, that image is forever imprinted on his presidency and the collective memory of the nation.
 - i. Likewise, with every law enforcement leader managing critical "red" situations, what you do in the "yellow" will likely have a lasting imprint on the three elements of the model that we will discuss next
 - 1) The Person
 - 2) The Group
 - 3) The Community
- 3. The **Person** - The triangle represents the most basic elements of every person, it is intentionally made into an equilateral triangle, because at our best, we strive to be "balanced" in all domains. The discussion of "finding balance" or "being balanced" is frequently bantered about because we all have had the experience of being "out of balance." So let's look more closely at the ideal of what we all strive for – a balanced, whole person. (pp slide 2)
 - a. The **Cognitive**- this reflects your mental process;
 - 1) What you think about. It is what you know about a situation that enables you to respond.
 - a) In law enforcement, much of our classroom training is focused on the cognitive such as our policies and procedures, the law.
 - b) This is the WHAT
 - (1) It is a critical component of any police response, but as you can see, it is not complete because it is only one sided of the triangle.
 - (2) This is also the problem solving aspect of policing, the incorporation of the strategic.
 - (a) This element also incorporates our statistics.
 - (b) We count and identify as important how we prioritize and choose our responses to any given situation.
 - 2) Finally, this is a critical element because after every situation is over, it is how we articulate our response,

either verbally or in a written report, that is judged by the community and our leaders.

3) This becomes even more relevant in the interconnected world of the internet

4) What is written down becomes our history

b. The **Psychomotor**- what you do with your body, your physical response to any situation; what you do.

1) In law enforcement, this area is a primary training focus and reflects all things tactical. Tactical training is often emphasized over other components of training because we do not want people to hesitate when we need them to respond.

a) Frequently, in tactical debrief we will hear people identify that they were able to respond so quickly because they instantly referred back to their training.

2) It is a critical component of any police response, but as you can see, it is not complete because it is only one side of the triangle.

a) Every response has a physical component to it whether you are in the field or in an administrative assignment. Consider that you always take your body with you; it is the vehicle that enables your response to any situation.

3) Your physical response also includes your body language or gestures.

a) Consider the new probationer in the field, they may not have uttered a word, but you have a sense very quickly about whether or not they can "handle" a situation just by the way they carry themselves.

b) You could be wrong, but years of experience have taught you to observe and pick up on small aspects of their demeanor that convey confidence or uncertainty.

c) Consider a new leader, who says all the right things but you don't quite trust them yet. Why?

4) Recognize that many of our responses to physical cues are culturally-based. Keep open the possibility that you may be wrong. For example:

a) Crying and victimization – do victims cry?

b) You expect a victim to respond in a certain way and when they don't it raises questions.

However, it should not be the final determination of whether or not they have been victimized.

c) Eye Contact – if a suspect avoids eye contact are they guilty?

d) Might depend on the culture where they were raised or they might have autism or they might be guilty

c. The **Affective**- what you feel, your emotional response, small or large, that informs how much significance you give to something. How something impacts you is generally the motivation behind anything you do.

- 1) In law enforcement, this area is indirectly addressed in the discussion of our Mission, Vision and Values.
- 2) This is a critical emphasis in all our drill and ceremony.
- 3) It is the heart and the foundation of everything you do.
- 4) Consider, you really don't do anything unless you want to.
- 5) This is why you joined law enforcement; the passion, the desire to make a difference, the hope to do something purposeful and meaningful. This is all represented by the affective domain.
- 6) **Disclaimer**- realize that while we just referred to emotion, there is a wide range of emotion for every individual here, it's just that in law enforcement, we tend not to talk about it. Unfortunately, what are the messages promoted very early in law enforcement training about emotion?
 - a) Leave it at home
 - b) Don't show emotion
 - c) Emotion is weakness; etc.
- 7) How many of you instantly thought of "emotional" as crying in the corner? Unfortunately, law enforcement training through the years has really limited officers from acknowledging a possible area of strength.
- 8) No one is disputing that there is a time and place for expressing your emotion, but saying you can't have any emotion is not only impossible, but in law enforcement is actually undesirable.
 - a) Every situation that requires a police response is laden with emotion and officers are at a disadvantage when they are not accurate in their assessment of the emotion in the room.
- 9) Consider that every top athlete or performer has to learn to manage their emotions to be a peak performer.
 - a) List any major athlete who is a significant player in their sport, and they have had to learn to harness and manage their emotions in order to perform, return from injury, face an opponent, face their own fear of failure, etc.
 - b) Think of the officers/leaders you would choose to model if you could...most often those are the people who somehow were able to remain balanced, who stayed committed to the job but didn't seem to lose the connection to what made them seem human.
- 10) Those are the people that everyone wants to work with. They are good with the officers, the command staff, and the community.

- a) It doesn't mean they aren't good at tactics or problem-solving; it's just that they really seem to be really good with people.
- 4. **Balanced Triangle-** there is a reason it's an equilateral triangle, the most stability comes when all three sides are balanced.
 - a. The ideal officer is the one who responds to any given call using all three sides of the triangle, and their actions are deliberately chosen by weighing and identifying the best course of action from using their skills and abilities in all three domains.
 - b. The skilled officer is the one who is able to tailor their response to what is demanded in their environment.
- 5. **Review:** So we just went over the "whole person" concept, looking at the three main domains through the lens of what you have all experienced in your law enforcement training. For those of you with military background, they correspond to "be", "know", "do." In other literature you'll see it as "emotional, mental, and physical."
- 6. How does this relate to community outreach?
 - a. Every person out in the community, the family and friends you go home to, the coach for your son's soccer team, your Captain, every person you are trying to work with- they all operate from those three universal areas- the affective, the psychomotor, and the cognitive.
 - b. When you are making connections in the community, you will need to identify and tailor your interactions by assessing which side of the triangle is most dominant for them in their conversation with you.
 - c. Let's try out different individuals and see if you could generalize how they are looking at a problem (which is their dominant point of view, how they give and receive information). Give one scenario per table:
 - 1) The community member who had a teenager shot near their backyard and the shooter is still at large.
 - 2) The officers working the night shift in the same community.
 - 3) The Captain who needs statistics for all open cases including the one above for COMPSTAT.
 - 4) The Public Information Officer from City Hall who is about to do a press release.
 - 5) Your 16-year old daughter who wants the car tonight to go to a party in the community next to this one.
 - d. We could continue, but you will quickly realize that your communications, both on the job and off, become much more effective once you recognize where the other person is coming from, which side of the triangle do they see the problem from?
 - 1) Your results will become even more pronounced when you recognize your own "default" domain. Where are you the most comfortable?
 - a) There is a reason you are the "only one in the office who can do the Excel spreadsheet." Your strength might be in the cognitive domain.

- b) Do people seem to just offer up information to your partner after 5 minutes of chit-chat?" Your partner probably has strength in the affective domain.
 - c) Do you know people who absolutely cannot tolerate working inside even to improve their career? It is likely they are dominant in the psychomotor domain.
- 7. The best officers are "trilingual"- they understand their own point of view, but they quickly identify how the other person views the problem and they can tailor their language and response to meet and resolve that situation.
 - a. Often, the problems within the community are dispelled once the community member believes someone has heard their concern and will be responding.
- 8. The **Group** - Once you understand what motivates the individual; it is not hard to understand the group that he/she would gravitate to. (pp slide 3)
 - a. Almost every individual will seek out a group to connect to – it's a human drive, we all seek a place to belong.
 - b. Why is it that every high school, every college and university has different student groups (the chess club, the band, the wrestlers, the debate club, fraternities, etc.)?
 - c. We grow up and we find groups to belong to, and groups within groups:
 - 1) What about the workplace?
 - 2) What about the PTA?
 - 3) If you think of your own life you all have a few different groups you belong to.
- 9. If you were pulled out of your city today and transported to another state where you didn't know anyone, how long would it take before you found yourself around people in law enforcement? We all do it, we look for like-minded people. It might start out as sharing a similar interest but ultimately, to stay in a group you will need to support or adopt the values of the group. So when you are doing outreach to a group, before you try to make any inroads, you need to at least respect the foundation of what makes them a group: (pp slide 4)
 - a. Values
 - b. What kinds of people gravitate to this group?
 - c. Think of your experience in law-enforcement – we actually look for people with different skill sets (psychomotor side of the triangle), we encourage people to get extra education and to become Subject Matter Experts (cognitive side of the triangle), but if you are not like-minded on our Mission, Vision, and Values, those are generally the people who cannot stay in law-enforcement. Either that or they are the ones who bring about civil liabilities.
 - d. Likewise with other groups. Differences in skill set, or knowledge can be okay, but differences in values lead to unavoidable tension. Eventually, the tension will increase until either the individual leaves, or the group kicks them out. This

becomes true of human groups whether the group is religion-based, the local PTA, or the Quilters Club of America. Actually, if you think even smaller, even families are like that.

10. The group is a critical asset in public safety. The key members have an ownership in monitoring who comes in and out and maintaining the values of the group, it happens every day in America. If leaders are connected with law-enforcement, and feel respected by that partnership, they are more likely to convey their concerns when exposed to those who threaten their values approach or leave their group due to extreme views.

- a. As we begin to examine specific case studies, you will notice that those with extreme views and potential for violence are also looking for places to belong.
- b. They come in contact with several different groups where gradually their ideology and intentions start to surface.
- c. If those groups or people have a trust relationship with law-enforcement there is the potential for early intervention or prevention.
- d. Worst-case scenario – people in the group become aware of those who pose a threat and simply push them out of the group without passing on their observations or concerns.
 - 1) Consider the shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona. Jared Lee Loughner withdrew from college when school officials were about to expel him due to ramblings reported on his Myspace page.
 - 2) What is the threshold for law-enforcement involvement? With the people who were concerned about his escalating attitudes and behaviors, where could a threat-assessment and law-enforcement involvement have come into play preventatively instead of reactively?

11. The Community

- a. Public safety is an enormous job. Law-enforcement cannot do it alone, which is why we have learned that Community Policing practices often multiply our efforts exponentially.
- b. Community and police partnerships need to be continually fostered because the trust-distrust continuum is vulnerable with every situation that arises.
 - 1) Once community and police partnerships are formed, the progress made can be significant.
 - 2) Regrettably, the same (the opposite?) occurs when there is no trust between the community and the police. To change the collective distrust of a community with the police is a very difficult process.
 - 3) Additionally, the benefits of positive and negative community-police relationships are instantaneously sent across the internet to similar communities across the Nation. The recent Occupy movement is a good example.
- c. Those who are close, the ones that share our borders are frequently ones who share similar values or goals.

- 1) These groups become our "go-to" networks, the ones we turn to first to get things accomplished.
 - 2) This is not good or bad, it is just a reality that once trust is established, we tend to use and sometimes overuse the connections we know the most.
 - 3) The downside of those shared borders is that sometimes, we are entirely unaware of those who are further out.
 - 4) Those further out may not be dissimilar, they may have shared goals, but they may simply be unknown.
- d. The goal of this training and the reason we are teaching this model is to get law enforcement to connect with the people, the groups, the untapped resources we could have with communities that are not currently well connected with law enforcement.
- 1) Every department has regular community meetings, but frequently we see the same people at those meetings.
 - 2) Why are there communities that are not represented?
 - a) Do we know who they are?
 - b) Where are their leaders? Do they have any?
 - c) Why they are not connected?
 - d) Could these communities be our most vulnerable?
 - 3) What would it take to reach those communities?
12. Ideally, by increasing our connections across the country, we can increase the effectiveness of our public-safety efforts across the United States. (pp slide 7)
13. It is important to note, that the model is purposefully designed to be in a constant state of assessment because people and their leaders, groups, communities, and the context they live in constantly change.
14. Model Application – To practice this model, let's take a current situation that will affect the demographics of every major city, the resettlement of refugees.
- a. **Refugee Facts**
- 1) The United States is the largest of the 10 resettlement countries.
 - 2) The Ten resettlement countries are:
 - a) Australia
 - b) Canada
 - c) Denmark
 - d) Finland
 - e) The Netherlands
 - f) New Zealand
 - g) Norway
 - h) Sweden
 - i) Switzerland, froze its resettlement program entirely in 2002
 - j) United States

- (1) The United States has accepted more refugees for resettlement than all other countries combined.
- (2) In fiscal year 2010 the United States accepted 73,311 refugees for resettlement.
- (3) The State Department determines location for refugee resettlement within the United States.
- (4) In fiscal year 2010 refugees resettled in all states except Montana.
- (5) Top 8 states where refugees resettled in Fiscal Year 2010:
 - (a) California-8,577
 - (b) Texas-7,920
 - (c) New York- 4,559
 - (d) Florida-4,216
 - (e) Arizona-3,400
 - (f) Georgia-3,224
 - (g) Michigan-3,192
 - (h) Washington-3,004

- k) Top 8 countries of origin for Fiscal Year 2010:
 - (1) Iraq- 18,134
 - (2) Burma- 16,665
 - (3) Bhutan-12,309
 - (4) Somalia-4,873
 - (5) Cuba-4,818
 - (6) Iran-3,541
 - (7) Democratic Republic of the Congo- 3,048
 - (8) Eritrea-2,497

b. Ask: What are the differences between refugees and immigrants?

1) Refugee:

- a) One who flees for safety especially to a foreign country.
- b) They do not get to choose the country of resettlement.

2) Immigrant:

- a) A person who migrates to a foreign country and takes up residence.
- b) Generally chooses country of resettlement
- c) Researches new country and/or has knowledge of new country
- d) May seek to become a citizen even prior to arriving

3) We will add to these terms, the definition of Diaspora. Frequently, you will hear reference to diaspora communities in the discussion of vulnerable communities and Countering Violent Extremism.

4) Diaspora:

- a) the movement, migration, or scattering of people away from an established or ancestral homeland;
 - b) people settled far from their homeland or dispersed by whatever cause to another location;
 - c) discussions of assimilation into the new country and how national origins are discussed, hidden, or devalued will need to be understood when trying to do outreach with these communities.
- c. **Ask:** What are some concerns refugees may have when arriving in a new location?
 - 1) Urban area versus rural area
 - 2) Many refugees go from rural undeveloped countries to life in urban centers where public transportation, education, health care systems, job applications, and grocery shopping can be difficult to navigate.
 - a) Employment opportunities
 - b) Housing prices
 - c) Quality schools for the children
 - d) Access to services
 - e) Crime rate
 - f) Cultural transitions
 - g) Issues of identifying and belonging
 - h) Discrimination
 - i) Language barriers
 - 3) Refugee resettlement is distributed to different resettlement agencies that have grant contracts through the government. These resettlement agencies do not provide services, only referrals to programs such as English as a Second Language, how to look for a job, and enroll children in school.
 - 4) Resettlement agencies have 90 days to connect people and families in their new community. Once the 90 days are up, the agencies do not have any other contact with the new families.
- d. **Ask:** What are some concerns the community members of the city where refugees are being resettled may have?

Expected Responses:

 - 1) Refugees generally flee en masse, how many refugees are being relocated into the city?
 - 2) What are the cultural differences?
 - 3) Will the refugees take jobs from the established residents?
 - 4) Will the refugees be a financial burden on the city?
 - 5) Increased welfare costs
 - 6) Increased property tax
- e. **Ask:** Why is refugee resettlement of concern to law enforcement?

Expected Responses:

- 1) Law enforcement will be involved in addressing the unique social dynamics.
- 2) Transnational communities are at increased vulnerability to becoming victims of crime, and possibly anti-social pressures.
- 3) Refugees' existing value systems may not be compatible with their new social dynamics.

15. SHOW VIDEO- Somali Refugees in Lewiston, Maine

a. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Case Study

PURPOSE: The students will apply the Model to a refugee situation.

Case Study: During the next year, 200 Iraqi refugees will be resettling in your city.

PROCEDURE: Small group Activity

- 1) At your tables, work through the following situation using the model.
- 2) Complete the worksheet in your Class Workbook, page XX.
- 3) Be prepared to present your work to the class.
- 4) Large Group Debrief of the four key areas
 - a) Person Factors
 - b) Group Factors
 - c) Community Factors
 - d) Context Factors

IV. CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES

(60 min)

A. Introductions

1. Name and Assignment
2. Experience
3. Brief overview of learning objectives
 - a. Greater understanding of the civil rights laws
 - b. Liability concepts and principles related to suspicious activity contacts

B. Adhering To Our Core Values – At the start of the day we briefly went over the Core Principles that must guide all CT efforts including CVE Outreach and Mobilization efforts. "We are committed to upholding our most cherished values as a nation not just because doing so is right, but also because doing so enhances our security (p.4)"

1. "The United States was founded upon the belief in a core set of values that is written into our founding documents and woven into the very fabric of our society. Where terrorists [or violent extremists] offer injustice, disorder, and destruction the United States must stand for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity (p.5)."

2. This next block of training will focus on the responsibility of law-enforcement to ensure protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, but inherent within that responsibility, is the adherence to all US Core Values:
 - a. Respect for Human Rights
 - b. Encouraging Responsive Governance
 - c. Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties and Civil Rights
 - d. Balancing Security and Transparency
 - e. Upholding the Rule of Law
 - 1) Maintaining an Effective, Durable Legal Framework for all Law-Enforcement Operations
 - 2) Bringing Criminals (or Terrorists) to Justice

C. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Civil Rights Law

1. Show Video "Police Contact on a Subway Platform" (8 min)

This video demonstrates what effect a police officer's lack of understanding of applicable laws and negative demeanor has on the public's opinion of the police department and provides discussion topics on various solutions to make a lawful contact related to suspicious activities.

2. The students will be divided into five equal groups and provided with reference material that can be used as training/resource material for suspicious activity contacts - Refer to Handouts:
 - a. Training Bulletin – Consensual Encounters²
 - b. Photographer's rights³
3. Have the groups identify and journal what are the legal problems with the contact. An appointed group spokesperson will provide responses to the class.
4. Expected responses:
 - a. Illegal Detention - The detention appeared not to have reasonable suspicion.
 - b. Investigative actions were not reasonable.
 - c. Length of detention was longer than necessary.
 - d. Pat down search was not permitted without permission or an ability to articulate a set of facts which lead to the search.

2

□ Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Legal Contacts with the Public, April, 2006

3

□ The Photographer's Rights, 2006

5. After completion of the group presentation, a class discussion summarizing the issues related to the topic and the impact on the community:
 - a. **Ask:** Who are those people who are affected?
 - b. **Ask:** Who are those people who interact at various points during service delivery or investigation (Direct Clients)?
 - c. **Ask:** Who are those people who are not directly involved in an incident or its investigation because of the way it was handled or because of the association of the incident to similar incidents (Indirect Clients)?
6. **Reiterate:** United States Patriot Act
 - a. Federal Law that, generally, does not apply directly to local jurisdictions.
 - b. Existing State law should be followed in most cases.

D. Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies

1. Federal guidelines governing the operation of federally funded criminal intelligence systems National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC)
2. Understand why collection of information about individuals/groups cannot be part of engagement. In order to maintain the trust and confidence of the community, it is critical that the Intelligence Gathering Operation be separated from the Community Outreach and Mobilization Operations.

E.

LEARNING ACTIVITY: Respectful Contact

PROCEDURE: Large Group Activity

1. Show Video "Respectful Contact" (1 min)

This video demonstrates what effect a police officer's respectful demeanor and understanding of applicable laws has on the public's opinion of the police department and provides discussion topics on various solutions to make a lawful contact related to suspicious activities.

2. Have a short discussion about the video and how a positive demeanor and understanding of the laws can have an unparalleled impact on public opinion of the police

F.

Key Learning Points

1. The importance of understanding and following the applicable laws
2. Identify the value of pre-incident planning strategies in the area of suspicious activity contacts
3. Understand the nature and scope of the problems associated with suspicious activity contacts

===== LUNCH =====

V. IDENTIFYING YOUR NETWORK

(60 min)

A. Introduction to Team Project

1. **Ask:** Why does law enforcement training fail?
 - a. We train in rank
 - b. We train the wrong people
2. We return people back to their workplaces with new information and mixed support from their organization
3. Even if you want to implement improvements, it is hard to gain the momentum needed to result in organizational change because there has to be agreement and synergy all the way up the Chain-of Command

B. This training is designed differently to move toward coordinating Organizational and National change.

1. We all fail if we do not gain better collaboration with our communities.
2. We all fail if our communities are not connected civically to public safety efforts.
3. In this training, individual agencies need to have the freedom to identify:
 - a. Which communities they need to reach
 - b. What resources they have to use
 - c. What interventions make the most sense given the law enforcement role and history with that community
4. You are the ones who are closest to the work and know where your own strengths and weaknesses are.
5. This training is designed to guide each Outreach Team through a process for the design and development of the strategic plan for your department.
6. You are in teams at your table for the purpose of reflecting the teams that need to return to your department to do the work.
 - a. The activities of this training will assist your team in identification of:
 - 1) The community and partnerships around you
 - 2) The groups you want to connect with
 - 3) The key people you may need to connect with
 - 4) The context you are working in for community outreach
 - 5) The recommendations to be made by your team for your department
7. The recommendations will be for a Strategic Outreach and a Mobilization plan for the next 3 months, 6 months, and a year.
8. As mentioned earlier in the training, you are intentionally training in the teams you work with because the key players and the people who need to design the work should be at the table.
9. Finally, the Strategic Outreach and Mobilization Plan designed by your team will be presented back to the class on the final day of training.

10. To get the best results out of the work created by each team, it is critical to have "buy-in" and awareness at the Executive-level of each organization.

- a. To ensure Executive-level participation at the earliest possible stage, the Executives from each department will be attending on the third day of this training.
- b. In the morning, while teams are working on the presentations, Executive staff members will receive an overview of the training and topics that have been examined over the first two days of training.
- c. Executives will be aware of the content of the training but also what is needed on an organizational level for Officers to be supported in the work.
- d. Additionally, Executive staff will receive direction on how the efforts of each department will collectively influence the national commitment for a Strategic Outreach and Mobilization Plan from every major city.

11. In the afternoon, Executive Staff will come to hear the presentations prepared by each team.

- a. They will be informed that your presentations are the culmination of two days of training and interaction with this material.
- b. It is very likely that the research over the next two days will uncover what still needs to be learned, developed or promoted over the next year-quite possibly more questions than answers.

12. **Presentation Project-** Strategic Outreach and Mobilization Plan

- a. **Explain:** Before this begins to look too ominous, let's look at exactly what the presentations are about and what you will be doing.
- b. Insert Instruction from student Handbook
- c. Presentations will also address the following:
 - 1) What was learned from their experience
 - 2) How the assignment changed their prior perception of the culture, group, organization or historical location
 - 3) How the assignment will affect their performance in the field
 - 4) List possible outreach strategies or milestones to be accomplished over the next year
 - 5) Identify measures of success and progress should also be considered

13. Debrief

- a. At the conclusion of each presentation the facilitator shall lead a facilitated discussion on each presentation asking:
 - 1) How well did the group incorporate their Mission and Vision when stating their accomplishments for the next year?
 - 2) How well did the group identify their networks/ community partners in their presentation?
 - 3) Are the recommendations possible?

4) Would any of you like to refrain from or explore further?

b. Highlights of the presentation

14. Project – Q & A

C. Leveraging Partnerships – This next section will provide the foundation for the project presentation.

1. Part I - Using the worksheet that looks like a honeycomb, label your group in the black hexagon.

a. Start with the groups that are most closely connected to yours that you have frequent contact with and possibly use most often.

b. Work with your team to continue to fill out the groups that you work with on a less frequent basis. Consider a variety of different groups:

1) The inter-agency effort (law enforcement and non-law enforcement)

a) Federal

b) State

c) Local

2) Non-Governmental Organizations

a) Community-based organizations

b) Non-profit organizations

c) Private sector

(1) Business

(2) Marketing

(3) Media Production

c. Consider – when your Department has a community meeting, who are the groups/entities who have little or no involvement?

1) Be sure to identify groups that have a distant or even hostile relationship with your department.

d. Recognize the groups that may be sources for introduction or connection with groups that are disconnected with your department or law-enforcement.

e. Is it possible that there are groups within your own department that will need more information or understanding for you to be successful in your Outreach efforts?

2. Part II – Selection of groups for Outreach and Mobilization

a. As a team, select three groups and provide a justification or priority as to why you think these groups would be the ones for your Department to begin an outreach strategy.

b. Share results in the large group.

c. Any surprising results from doing this exercise?

VI. IDENTIFYING GAPS AND GROUPS FOR OUTREACH

(60 min)

A. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Identifying and analyzing the connection gaps before doing community outreach.

PURPOSE: To closely identify and analyze what is known or unknown about a specific community.

PROCEDURE: Small Group Activity, Research and Presentation

1. Discussion Point – Much of the time, the pace of law enforcement does not allow us to do very much preparation when we go to meet with the community.
 - a. Think of how many times you didn't know you were going to an event or a meeting until that day, or right before it happened.
 - b. Slowly it becomes one of our strengths to simply adapt and be able to handle public presentations across multiple formats.
 - c. This is about creating trust borders. If we understand what a group values, what is important to them, it will be easier to cultivate mutual respect and trust borders.
2. This next activity is going to provide the luxury that we usually don't get, the ability to work as a team and dive into **preparation**.
 - a. Every major strategy in policing is improved by the preparation put in beforehand - from managing a mobile field force, a search warrant, two partners discussing their response to a call before they arrive on scene, to the extensive training we give to our SWAT teams.
 - b. In the past, almost any officer could be tasked with managing a community meeting, with very little understanding and very little background on the problems/concerns they were walking into.
 - c. When moving to engage communities that may have negative experiences with law-enforcement, preparation is critical.
 - d. Often our community failures have occurred because we did not understand the groups we were addressing, their needs, concerns, and values.
 - e. Consider how you evaluate a speaker coming to talk to law-enforcement when it seems like they have not prepared for their audience or they do not have law-enforcement experience. What makes a difference to you? It's the same with the community, it is evident and most of the time they know when we have not prepared. How does a lack of preparation interfere with creating trust borders?
3. Each table of six will break into three groups of two to do the research on a community that they are responsible for as a public service agency, but may have a non-existent, or even hostile relationship with.
4. This worksheet is intentionally detailed and there will be some information you know immediately, some information you can gain from the internet, and some information you won't be able to know until you talk to someone in that group.
 - a. Answer as many questions as you can using the internet as a resource.
 - b. If there is information you don't know, write that it is not known and identify a possible source for gaining the information later.

B. Debrief the exercise:

1. What were the key things you learned from doing this exercise?
2. Why would you be required to know such specific and detailed questions?
3. Of the information that you learned about this group – what do you think would be the most meaningful to those in the group?
 - a. Emphasize, to move or motivate someone, you need to identify what is meaningful to them on the **AFFECTIVE** side of the triangle.
4. When our Outreach Strategies include things that are symbolically meaningful to people, it conveys trust, understanding, and respect. These are the essential foundations for building healthy public safety collaboration.

VII. COMMUNITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT PANEL DISCUSSION

(60 min)

A. Introduction of Panel

1. Name
2. Agency, or Assignment, Background
3. Community leaders (approx.2)
4. Law Enforcement Outreach Officers and /or Supervisors (approx.2)
5. Executive Member (either 1 law enforcement or city human relations)

B. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Discussion Community/Law Enforcement

PURPOSE: To provide the student the opportunity to engage and gain insight from local law enforcement, community members and local fusion center personnel.

PROCEDURE: Large group Activity

1. Panelist Questions:
 - a. Introduce yourself and your background/interest for being here today
 - b. If you have not already stated it, what started you in community-law enforcement outreach?
 - c. What would you identify as one of your top successes in the development of community and law enforcement partnership?
 - d. Any obstacles
 - e. What been the most challenging
 - f. What has been the surprising
 - g. What do you think that the community (or law enforcement) does not know or understand about law enforcement (or the community)? (alter this question depending on who is the panelist)
 - h. What has been the most meaningful to you?
 - i. Where do you think we need to grow/develop in the next 5 years?
 - j. Any other lessons learned?
 - k. Things to stop doing
 - l. Things to start doing
 - m. Closing statement
2. Listen to the discussion among panel participants

- a. Have the groups formulate questions based on the open discussion
3. Open up to questions and answers
4. Thank the panelists for their participation, time and efforts
5. Debrief And Revision Discussion
 - a. Discuss any new information obtained from the lessons learned panel.
 - b. Once the group reconvenes, follow-up on any questions or responses to the lessons learned panel
 - c. What did you hear about how to move from Law Enforcement Outreach to Community Mobilization?
 - d. In Teams, identify what you learned about Trust Borders from the Panel and possible areas to generate or improve Trust Borders with the community.
 - e. The students will also consider making revisions to their Strategy based on the new information from the Panel Discussion.



VIII. ASSESSMENT AND MISSION STATEMENT

(60 min)

A. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Create a Mission Statement for CVE Outreach and Mobilization Efforts

PURPOSE: To allow teams time to assess and adjust their Outreach Strategy in response to the Panel Discussion

PROCEDURE: Small Group Activity:

1. Distribute 1 flip chart paper to each table
2. Each team will write down the 3 outreach groups at the table, and identify the group they will focus on for the final presentation
3. The group may or may not be the one that has the most information; it should be the one with the highest Department priority and the potential for early win-win (Community and Department) gains.
 - a. Understand that in some areas, it may be appropriate to respond that within the first 3 months, more research is needed, or meeting with leaders need to occur such that the milestones in the next 6 months will reflect the needs of the community
4. Utilizing the Department Mission Statement, Vision, and Core Values, direct each Outreach Team to develop a Mission Statement to guide their efforts. 
5. Have each group read their Mission Statement aloud, then post it on the back wall of the room. 
6. Debrief
 - a. Share 1-2 Highlights of the DAY

- b. Q&A for Overview of CVE Community Presentations to Executives
- c. Overview of Day 2
- d. Point out that the Mission Statement is how they will stay focused on their goals.
- e. Tomorrow there will be detailed discussions on specific terrorist cases, groups, and events. It will be critical to remember your Mission Statement to keep the focus on Outreach and Mobilization Strategies.
- f. The exploration of these incidents must always be evaluated for the purpose being able to notice preventative outreach methods which may have made a difference in identifying of this person(s) sooner rather than later as a threat to the community

IX. END OF DAY 1 CLOSING

A. Review Key Learning Points:

1. The key to a safe America is Community Involvement and Mobilization
2. Law-enforcement efforts must be based within the Context of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to maintain public confidence.
3. Community policing requires new models that combine community and police resources to create environments when violent extremism cannot thrive.
4. An agreed upon Mission is critical to guide these efforts.

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DAY 2

I. DAY 1 REVIEW AND EXPECTATIONS FOR DAY 2

(10 min)

A. Greet the students

1. **Explain:** Yesterday you were introduced to a model for guiding your Community Outreach and Mobilization Efforts and came up with a Mission Statement to guide those efforts.
2. By the end of the day, your team should have identified a group that your department would prioritize for Community Outreach and Mobilization efforts. This is the group that you will be focused on for the presentation that will happen tomorrow.
3. To maximize your efforts today, it would be good to keep the presentation in mind and apply the upcoming blocks of instruction to the group you are researching.
4. As we investigate and explore what happened in past events of terrorism, or people who became involved in terrorist-related efforts, you must continually adjust to assessing the upcoming case studies from two perspectives:
 - a. As teams, you will come to know and understand more about what creates situations where extremist views and acts of violence can occur.
 - b. Ideally, this will aid you all in having better assessment skills in knowing the person, group, community, and context you are working with.
 - c. Once we understand what creates those situations, we must proactively incorporate into all our CVE Outreach Strategies, efforts that will deter those situations from being able to flourish.
 - d. For the purposes of this course, as concerns are raised, you are going to be challenged to consider:
 - 1) What trust border or prevention effort would have made a difference?
 - 2) What do we need to be doing today, to create a resilient America?

B. Overview for Day 2

1. Hate Groups, Crimes, and Social Media
2. Case Study Analysis
3. Context Factors
4. Increase and Decrease Drivers
5. Lunch
6. Person Factors
7. Group Factors
8. Community Factors
9. Assessment and Debrief

II. HATE GROUPS, CRIMES AND SOCIAL MEDIA

(55 min)

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A. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Facilitated Discussion, Identifying the connection of social media and hate crimes

PURPOSE: To increase the awareness and understanding about problematic hate groups, hate-based crimes and the utilization of social media for good or bad intentions. Session will end with a discussion about creating a Counter-narrative message in the community about working with law-enforcement.

PROCEDURE: large and small group activity

1. Facilitated Discussion

a. Review from Day One - Legal Aspects of CVE

- 1) American Constitutional Values
- 2) Religious Freedom

b. The great diversity of the American Landscape

- 1) Threats to any part of our community are a threat against our diverse life.
- 2) Acts or threats of violence motivated by hate or prejudice are serious acts that tear at the fabric of our community.
- 3) Changes in the population may affect the targeting of victims and the frequency of these crimes.

c. The reporting of Hate Crimes

- 1) **ASK:** How can we use the Hate Crime Laws and the reporting standards for hate crimes to inform law enforcement about inter-group conflict occurring in the community?

a) Expected Responses:

- (1) Highlight conflict to patrol officers for identifying perpetrators
- (2) Depending on the group targeted, increase heightened awareness on days of significance (i.e., High Holy Days, protests, parades, anniversary dates)
- (3) Connecting Outreach Officers to Community Leaders
- (4) Increased patrol at different times
- (5) Outreach to target groups, i.e., youth, schools, aftercare

- b)** If communities don't trust law enforcement, it is likely we won't ever know these crimes exist, let alone that they are hate-based.

d. ASK: How the victim, their families and the community are affected?

- 1) Victims and their families (direct client)
- 2) The community (indirect client)

e. ASK: How could a victim of today's hate crime become a violent perpetrator tomorrow?

- 1) If victimization increases so do the likelihood of violent responses, consider also:
 - a) Bullying
 - b) Cyber-bullying

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- c) Sexual-assault
 - d) Domestic Violence
 - e) Exposure to Community Violence
- 2. It is NOT illegal to have strong or even extreme views:
 - a. Part of what we VALUE about America is that you can express your point of view even if others disagree with it – people cannot be arrested for having views that appear to be extreme.
 - b. It is where extreme views interact with criminal activity that law-enforcement becomes involved.
- 3. DHS Research – The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States: Comparing Violent to Non-Violent Organizations.
 - a. The findings presented provide a preliminary understanding of how different organizational characteristics are related to the likelihood of violence among far-right hate groups.
 - b. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), there were at least 6,000 hate groups in the United States between 1990 and 2008.
 - 1) The vast majority of these groups actually did not survive more than a year.
 - 2) Most of the groups that do demonstrate some longevity are not linked to violent crimes and even fewer commit multiple acts of violence.
- 4. Why examine far-right hate groups?
 - a. They pose a deadly threat to the United States. The United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) has documented (1990-2010):
 - 1) over 335 homicide events, claiming over 560 lives
 - 2) committed by domestic far-right extremist groups
 - 3) More than 100 formal organizations were connected to these incidents
 - 4) More than half of these fatal events were committed by white supremacists
 - 5) Far-right extremists have also been linked to sixty planned and/or attempted terrorist plots between 1995 and 2005
- 5. An important question then is: In what ways are groups that turn to violence different from groups that do not?
 - a. Group (Organizational) Capacity Variables:
 - 1) Age of the Group
 - a) As groups increased in the number of years in existence or in the number of their members, the likelihood of them being involved in violence increased.
 - b) This result makes sense as groups have an opportunity to learn and adapt over time.
 - 2) Size of the Group
 - a) Having more members increases the odds at least one individual will be linked to a violent act.
 - b) Larger organizations also have a more diverse body of members who bring different skills and expertise.
 - c) This diversity may allow them to evade capture for a period of time and thus provide the opportunity to commit more violent crimes.

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- b. Group Constituency Variables:
 - 1) The variables studied in this category were not related to increased violence
 - 2) One variable was related to decreased likelihood for violence:
 - a) Groups that Published Ideological Literature
 - (1) Groups that generated newsletters or pamphlets were significantly less likely to be involved in violence.
 - (2) Such literature is used to attract potential members to the organization.
 - (3) Perhaps these groups calculate that publishing their rhetoric will also garner them increased attention and thus decreases the likelihood of these organizations being involved in violence.
- c. Inter-Group Collaboration or Conflict:
 - 1) Groups that were linked to other groups in various ways did not increase the propensity for violence or extreme violence.
 - 2) Groups that had a specific conflict with another far-right hate group were significantly more likely to be involved in extreme violence.
- d. Structural (Leadership) Factors: WHO is leading and HOW they lead will result in increased violence.
 - 1) Charismatic Leaders – having a charismatic leader generally results in an increase in violence by the group.
 - 2) Groups that Advocated for/or used leaderless resistance tactics are significantly more likely to be violent.
 - a) We defined leaderless resistance as a “lone wolf operation in which an individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engages in acts of anti-state violence independent of any movement, leader, or network of support” (Kaplan, 1997: p. 80).
 - b) Use of these tactics increases the likelihood of a completed plan and fewer links back to the main group.
 - c) The use of leaderless resistance tactics by white supremacist organizations appears to have become more common since far-right extremist leaders began publicly calling for the adoption of these tactics.

Instructor Note: It might be that the open discussion of such tactics was merely rhetoric an empty threat, that groups endorsed this tactic to appear stronger and more threatening than they actually were in practice. The reality, however, was that groups that organized as a leaderless resistance cell or encouraged those under their umbrella to organize in this manner were significantly more likely to be involved in violence.

- e. Geographic Region: Groups in these regions were significantly more likely to be involved in violence.
 - 1) Groups in the West
 - 2) Groups in the Northeast

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- f. Awareness of the Far-Right Hate Groups – both violent and non-violent is important because far-right terrorists were usually involved in the larger movement before becoming terrorists. The literature supports that often the decision to turn to violence is the culmination of an “extremist career.”
- g. White supremacists and other far-right hate groups are seen as representing a significant threat.
 - 1) In 2005, when law-enforcement agencies were surveyed about terrorist group presence within their state:
 - a) 85% of state law enforcement agencies indicated right-wing extremist group presence
 - b) 82% indicated the presence of race/ethnicity/hate-related groups (Riley, Treverton, Wilson & Davis, 2005)
 - 2) A more recent survey of state police agencies (74% response rate) found the following representation:
 - a) Neo-Nazis – 92%
 - b) Racist Skinheads – 89%
 - c) Klu Klux Klan – 72%
 - d) Far-Right Christian Identity Groups – 70% (Freilich, Chermak & Simone, 2009; see also Carlson, 1995)

Instructor Note: This research used the SPLC's annual Intelligence Report and Klan Watch publications to produce a list of hate groups in the United States. DHS Researchers identified over 6,000 hate groups, and, focused analysis on groups that existed for at least three consecutive years. Then, over 50% (N = 275) of these organizations were sampled and studied in-depth. Each organization was systematically researched to uncover all publically available information on it. The information was then further categorized to identify each group as violent or non-violent: Groups whose members had committed at least one ideologically motivated violent crime were categorized as violent, and groups whose members had not were coded as non-violent. This research revealed that 21% of the 275 far-right hate groups included in the study had members who had committed at least one violent criminal act. In addition, if a group's members had committed six or more violent crimes, we categorized the group as having committed extreme violence. We categorized these organizations as violent groups.

- 6. **ASK:** How has social media become a key factor in the perpetuation and coordination of hate groups and hate crime?
 - a. **Consider:** On April 19, 1995, the day of the Oklahoma City Bombing, there was a single known hate site on the World Wide Web.
 - b. Since then, the growth of the web has been dramatic allowing for the explosive growth of hate-based sites
 - 1) in 2001 over 3,000
 - 2) in 2008, over 6,000
 - 3) in 2011...?
 - c. Show DVD from Museum of Tolerance, if possible
 - d. How effective is law-enforcement in addressing these concerns for targeted people, groups, and communities?

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- e. Ensure the student understands the negative effects a hate crime can have for future community contacts for law enforcement.
 - 7. Use of social media by the community
 - a. Anyone can become a reporter and instantly stream and post video and audio of events as they occur and get instant feedback from their audience (You stream).
 - b. Responses may not always be positive for law enforcement and may continue to influence after the incident.
 - 1) Civil rights
 - 2) The speed at which news travels in the community because of social media
 - 3) Influence of public perception of law enforcement
 - 4) Depends on what has happened prior to the critical event
 - 8. **ASK:** How can we use the virtual world of social media to assist law enforcement?
 - a. **AS A TABLE:** Complete the Social Media Worksheet
 - b. Any surprises on how much are available for Social Networking?
 - c. Do you REALLY know what your Department is hooked into?
 - d. Do your officers have policies / guidelines?
- B. Large Group Debrief**
- 1. Discussion – Use of CD provided by the Museum of Tolerance
 - a. Resources for knowing the scope of the problem
 - b. Recognize who is being targeted by the games/blogs/music
 - c. At minimum – use of Google Alerts as a free service for what is happening in a community, good or bad
 - 2. Basic Overview
 - a. Scope of the Resource
 - b. Scope of the Problem
 - c. Recommendations for a Counter-Narrative

III. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

(45 min)

- A. PURPOSE:** To engage participants in critically thinking about real-life case studies and applying the model learned in Day 1. Students will understand and identify how Increase/Decrease Drivers influence violent extremists. The students will identify the influences of social media and contributions it makes to violent extremism.

PROCEDURES: Small group activity

- 1. Case Study Assignment – Assign Tables #1-5 to Case Studies #1-5 in the back of the Resource Book.
- 2. Each table will use the resources provided to critically review and analyze the case study assigned to their table using the two-page worksheet in the Student Workbook (Case Study Analysis Worksheet).
- 3. Working as a team, each table should be prepared to present back to the class by:
 - a. Summarizing the Key Components of the Case Study from the information provided (case summary and support articles).

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- b. Identifying Key Factors – what is known and what information is still needed:
 - 1) Context Factors
 - 2) Increase Drivers/Decrease Drivers
 - 3) Person Factors
 - 4) Group Factors
 - 5) Community Factors
- 4. Using this analysis and their collective experience in law-enforcement, identify possible gaps where outreach could have made a difference and follow-up with recommendations for Community Outreach and Mobilization.
 - a. Where would trust borders with law-enforcement have made a difference for possible prevention or intervention?
 - b. What strategies would help to move your community forward?
- 5. At the end of this block, each table should be prepared to present their case study back to the class.
 - a. For the remaining blocks of instruction, each hour will start with one of the case study presentations from the class.
 - b. The presentations and the class debrief will be limited to 20 minutes per case study. Please be attentive to the timeframe so that each table has time to present but that the class is not put behind.
 - c. Here's what to expect for the rest of the training today:
 - 1) At the top of each hour, the class will start with a case presentation from one of the tables. Depending on the time remaining, there will be a class debrief over the key factors to reinforce the model.
 - 2) The remaining 30 minutes will be used to cover material under each factor.
 - 3) The last 5 minutes will be used to brainstorm as a team about what possible outreach and mobilization strategies might be used to address the concerns presented in that hour.
 - 4) There will then be a 5 minute break and then a return to class.
 - 5) At the end of the day, there will be some time for review and assessment, and the possible incorporation of your outreach and mobilization strategies into your plan for your presentation tomorrow.

B. Case Study #1 - Context Factors

(60 min.)

Case Study #1 - Samir Khan: Arab born, Pakistani, immigrated to US at the age of seven to New York. He was well-versed in English colloquialism and culture and was attracted to militant online propaganda. He was primarily known as the editor and primary contributor of the Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) online Jihad Magazine, aimed at western audience. Family saw radicalization and tried to stop it.

Debrief:

- 1. Table #1 will present Case Study #1 back to the class by:
 - a. Summarizing the Key Components of the Case Study from the information provided (case summary and support articles)

-

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(5) 4,501 to 5,500

(6) 5,501 to 6,500

Answer: 2,594 attacks in the US in past 30 years

- b) **ASK:** Estimate the number or percentage of those attacks that occurred in the last 10 years, 2000-2010

Answer: 213 (roughly 12%)

2,382 occurred in the previous 20 years between 1970-2000 (roughly 78%)

- c) **ASK:** List the top 5 cities that have experienced the most attacks? (Show Map)

Answer:

New York (494)

San Juan (117)

Los Angeles (107)

San Francisco (98)

Miami (86)

- d) **ASK:** What were the top three targets? (Show Slide)

Answer:

Businesses (27%)

Governments (12%)

Private Citizens and Property (11%)

- e) **ASK:** Of the 2,594 Attacks – what percentage killed at least one person?

Answer: 9% of attacks killed at least one person (233)

2% killed more than one person (approx. 50)

- f) Discussion questions:

(1) **Ask:** What surprises you about these findings?

(2) **Ask:** Why were our estimations off?

(3) **Ask:** Why does it seem like most of the attacks are after 2000?

- g) **Power Point Presentation**-Pew Research Center, Muslim American Survey, 2011 - Start the slide with the question, allow students to respond anonymously before providing the answer.

(1) Concern about Islamic extremism

(2) How important is religion in your life

(3) Views of al-Qa'ida

(4) Views on suicide bombings

(5) Support for Extremism

(6) Most Muslim immigrants want to assimilate

(7) Positive views of their communities

(8) Reports about profiling, harassment

(9) Most important problems facing Muslim Americans

(a) Negative views about Muslims 29%

(b) Discrimination/Prejudice 20%

(c) Ignorance about Islam 15%

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- 4) Use informants carefully and sparingly, especially in prosecutions.
- 5) Encourage and enable Muslim-American groups to push back against extremists.
- 6) Improve counterterrorism education guidelines and standards.
- f. Every agency here is going to have different communities, needs, resources, expectations, and demands.
 - 1) It is not the intent of this training to tell you WHO your communities are, what their needs are, or how to connect with them.
 - 2) We are, however, intentional about bringing to the foreground, the conversation about the role of law enforcement in creating healthy and thriving communities where violent extremism cannot flourish.
 - 3) It is our goal to quickly identify for you what is seen as Best Practices in employing community policing strategies in this National effort.
 - a) You have a resource book with multiple documents (the ones above included) and they consistently repeat the mandate that law-enforcement across America needs to work more closely with Muslim-American communities and key partners and stakeholders in the security of America.
 - b) Given the current reality of the American Context, misperceptions about Muslim-Americans, it is evident that law-enforcement still has a long way to go to benefit from the creating more durable TRUST BORDERS with Muslim-American.
 - c) For the departments who do not have Outreach to the Muslim-American Community, this might be one of the groups that you consider for your presentation tomorrow.

4. Outreach and Mobilization Potential (5 min.)

- a. As a team, brainstorm about what kind of outreach and mobilization efforts would make a difference for your communities
- b. Consider the outcomes we are trying to avoid related to CONTEXT FACTORS.

C. INCREASE DRIVERS/ DECREASE DRIVERS (60 min.)

CASE STUDY#2 - Daniel Patrick Boyd: Born American to an Episcopalian Family and his father was a U.S. Marine. He traveled to Israel in 2006 and tried to contact radical jihadist in Palestinian territories, lied to U.S. customs and FBI. In 2009, he stopped attending his mosque because of ideological differences, and he started believing that killing Americans was the duty of all Muslims. He attempted to radicalize and recruit young men in the Raleigh-Durham area, and even held demonstrations on weapon-use in his home. Boyd lived in a rural area, he was an asset to terrorist organizations because he was a white male, and his appearance

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- (1) Resilience – the ability to bounce back
- (2) Resistance – preventing altogether
- (3) Protective resources can reside in families, communities, and institutions.
- (4) We place a great emphasis on the family as the most proximal environment of the youth.
- c) In a community, we think of community protective resources that work either by building family protective resources or by working directly upon the youth to promote psychosocial adjustment.
- d) Supporting the family base is so critical that we also think of a range of different kinds of actors in a community who can provide protective resources, such as teachers, clergy, coaches, and elders.
- e) In an ongoing study of refugee adolescents from Burundi and Liberia, we have identified the following family protective resources as being linked with positive psychosocial adjustment of adolescents:
 - (1) financial security
 - (2) English proficiency
 - (3) sociocultural adaptation
 - (4) social networking
 - (5) active flexible parenting
 - (6) educational support
- f) **Protective mechanisms** are the processes by which family and community protective resources make change occur.
 - (1) In the same study of refugee adolescents from Burundi and Liberia, we have identified the following protective mechanisms:
 - (a) Supporting: providing social, emotional, and material support
 - (b) Defending: protecting from harm or danger
 - (c) Connecting: bringing them into contact with others
 - (d) Preparing: getting them ready for things to come
 - (e) Promoting: furthering their progress
 - (f) Opening: making them more responsive
 - (2) These are areas where parents often face great difficulties, and often a lack of support from services from outside the families to help them. In that sense, the focus on families is necessarily connected with the focus on communities, because families need the support of communities in order to be strong and protective (Ungar, 2008).

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- (3) Building on these family and community capacities, preventive intervention programs have been deployed in many different areas including:
- (a) Depression
 - (b) substance abuse
 - (c) conduct disorder
 - (d) HIV/AIDS risk behaviors
 - (e) chronic medical illness
 - (f) mental, emotional, and behavioral health
 - (g) children exposed to serious adversities
 - (h) violence prevention (O'Connell et al, 2009)
- Can this be done for preventing terrorist recruitment?

4. Outreach and Mobilization Potential (5 min.)
- a. As a team, brainstorm about what kind of outreach and mobilization efforts would make a difference for your communities
 - b. Consider the outcomes we are trying to avoid related to GROUP FACTORS.

F. COMMUNITY FACTORS (60 min)

Case # 4 – Terry Jones: A pastor of the Florida-based Dove World Outreach Center, a small evangelical Christian congregation. Strong anti-Muslim and anti-gay beliefs. Considered an extreme hate organization. Gained notoriety through his purported "International Burn a Koran Day" in 2009. On the anniversary of 9/11, 2011 Jones held "International Burn a Koran Day", these videos and images appeared online; actions resulted in mob protesters in Afghanistan, attacking a UN compound killing 12, violent rioting for days. Group called "Order of the Dragon" planned to protest in front of the ICA in Dearborn, Michigan on April, 2011. For weeks leading up to the protest the community planned a response. The Mayor and Chief of Police met with religious leaders. The Dearborn community of all faiths stood together to show support for the Islamic center.

Debrief:

1. Table #1 will present Case Study #1 back to the class by:
 - a. Summarizing the Key Components of the Case Study from the information provided (case summary and support articles)
 - b. Identifying Key Factors – what is known and what information is still needed
 - 1) Person Factors
 - 2) Group Factors
 - 3) Community Factors
 - 4) Context Factors
 - c. Given this analysis, what are the recommended Outreach and Mobilization Strategies?
 - d. Where would trust borders with law-enforcement have made a difference for possible prevention or intervention?

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- e. What strategies would help to move your community forward?
- 2. Facilitator will debrief the responses and facilitate discussion.
- 3. Subject overview- Community Factors (40 min)
 - a. Socio-cultural factors are powerful influences because they give people places to belong
 - 1) Family and extended family
 - 2) Friends
 - 3) School
 - 4) Student/University Groups
 - 5) Faith-based (church, mosque, temple, synagogue, etc.)
 - 6) Internet-based networks
 - b. The influence of community factors can be positive and/or negative depending on the exposure.
 - 1) The goal of law enforcement is to contribute to healthy and thriving communities such that there is no place for violent extremism to take hold.
 - 2) To focus our Outreach and Mobilization Strategies, we need to learn from current research and different professions on what makes a community healthy.
 - c. Community Factors that encourage radicalization include: (Radicalization Dynamics)
 - 1) Religious discrimination
 - 2) Tensions with law enforcement
 - 3) Weak civil society, mistrust of government
 - 4) Insularity and isolation
 - 5) Unresponsive mosques – lack of effective youth engagement (youth can feel that moderate religious institutions and leaders are unresponsive to their concerns or are unwilling to communicate with them/address their needs)
 - d. RESILIENCE is a term borrowed from engineering, where it refers to, "the capacity of a material or system to return to equilibrium after a displacement" (Bodin & Wiman, 2004). References are from the DHS study, Violent Radicalization and Terrorist Recruitment in Somali Americans
 - 1) Community psychologists use resilience to refer to a process of adaptive capacities – such as:
 - a) Economic development
 - b) Social capital
 - c) Information and communication
 - d) Community competence
 - e) Being able to maximize these capacities are what lead to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, R.L., 2008).
 - 2) Family therapists use resilience to refer to three domains of family life that may contribute to family adaptation after adversity:
 - a) shared family belief systems that make meaning out of a crisis, positive outlook, transcendence and spirituality

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- b) a family organization of flexibility, connectedness, and social and economic resources
 - c) communication processes of clarity, open emotional expression, collaborative problem solving (Walsh, 2003)
 - d) Resilience has also become a key term in the disaster preparedness field, where it has been described in terms of multiple subsystems and encompasses such elements as infrastructure and communication systems.
 - (1) Ecological
 - (2) Economic
 - (3) physical infrastructure
 - (4) civil society
 - (5) governance (Longstaff et al, 2010)
- 3) Resilience has not yet been applied to the prevention of terrorist recruitment in the U.S.
- a) Over the past ten years, there has been an explosion of interest in resilience in the clinical, community, and family sciences concerning a broad range of adversities.
 - b) What does this new knowledge of resilience tell us about deterring terrorism?
 - (1) It tells us that you can be resilient to some risks but not to others (Luthar and Zigler, 1991).
 - (a) This fits with the fact that many of those recruited are high achievers, not mentally ill or criminals.
 - (b) How can we help their parents, teachers, and imams to protect them?
 - (2) It tells us that resilience is neither entirely individual nor entirely social but an interactive combination (Luthar and Zigler, 1991).
 - (a) To understand resilience to terrorist recruitment, we need to look past individual characteristics
 - (b) Include family, community, media, and institutional factors.
 - (3) It tells us that when youth face risks from socio-economic and sociocultural adversities, their family is often the strongest buffer against the associated risks (Weine and Siddiqui, 2009).
 - (a) The role of the family in prevention is seen in cases where parents either informed law enforcement or helped to get their kids off a path of radicalization.
 - (b) How can we better help families to do so when they are already struggling to

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meet many basic challenges of daily life?

- (4) It tells us that in diaspora communities, resilience is shaped as much by their home country and refugee camp internment as by American values and institutions (Weine et al, in press).
 - (a) In diaspora communities, higher resilience doesn't necessarily mean greater alignment with American society and its values.
 - (b) If we want it to be more aligned, we may need to help the diaspora, such as making opportunities for peaceful ways to give back to the homeland or local community.
- (5) It tells us that preventive interventions have been able to lessen youth's negative actions through effectively enhancing protective resources at multiple levels (O'Connell, Boat, & Warner, 2009).
 - (a) This is certainly good news, but challenging because it calls for a paradigm shift from traditional ways of countering and studying terrorism.
 - (b) This shift requires:
 - moving away from a heavy focus on risk factors to an equal focus on protective factors
 - integrating knowledge and practice concerning psychosocial factors with that of security
 - working collaboratively with families and communities to design programs and policies that work in real-world settings
- (6) It tells us that preventative interventions' true aim is to reduce the vulnerability of a population (Luthar and Zigler, 1991; O'Connell et al, 2009).
 - (a) These interventions should not only aim to increase family and community cooperation with law enforcement, but also try to change basic family and community processes that will reduce young men's entry into violent extremism.
 - (b) Interventions with families might aim to increase parents' awareness of recruitment, provide them with up-to-

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date information and strategies for speaking with youth, and discuss preventative measures like guarding their children's passports.

- (7) It tells us that effective preventive strategies are locally tailored, multi-pronged, sustainable, and involve far more than information sharing (O'Connell et al, 2009).

- (a) Thus enhancing resilience to terrorist recruitment will take more than a town hall meeting or an informative briefing, as important as those are.
- (b) Will require extensive outreach and involvement.

4. Outreach and Mobilization Potential (5 min.)
- a. As a team, brainstorm about what kind of outreach and mobilization efforts would make a difference for your communities
 - b. Consider the outcomes we are trying to avoid related to COMMUNITY FACTORS.

IV. TEAM WORK AND STRATEGY ADJUSTMENT

- A. Executive Summary on Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism – This study is an explorative review on the CVE programs being conducted by 5 countries.
- 1. The QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project was a descriptive, exploratory study, not just of “de-radicalization” or “terrorist rehabilitation” programs, but also of strategic counter-terrorism approaches in France, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Singapore, and Great Britain.
 - 2. The diversity among the objectives and approaches in these countries was striking.
 - a. Reducing the risk of engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism was the key and the singularly common feature across the array of programs.
 - b. None of programs visited had systematic “outcome” data that could be used to evaluate them, but each had some useful elements.
 - 1) Singapore - has a fully developed, multi-faceted, resource-intensive risk reduction program for militant detainees.
 - a) The government uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) primarily to neutralize terrorist plots rather than charge suspects in court.
 - b) ISA detainees may be placed in physical detention or restrictive release.
 - c) The program has three core components:
 - (1) Psychological
 - (2) Social
 - (3) Religious

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- d) As of 2010, 60 participants were in the program with individualized programs extended to the detainee's and their families in perpetuity.
- 2) Indonesia - Detachment 88 (Indonesia's police counterterrorism unit)
 - a) Operates a highly focused intelligence source development program that matches unit members with known violent extremists to develop individual, personal relationships.
 - b) A local NGO operated by a former radical uses a similar approach but only for rehabilitation, not to elicit security-related information.
- 3) Northern Ireland - CVE efforts are embedded in a multi-layered national peace process based on a philosophy of "engaged grievance management."
 - a) The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) leads an engaged, community policing initiative that aims to:
 - (1) challenge the ideology of violent extremists,
 - (2) empower individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment
 - (3) Enhance community resilience.
- 4) Great Britain -- There is an elaborate, multi-pronged national CVE effort that is focused on persons "at-risk" rather than those who are convicted or detained.
 - a) The strategic cornerstone, known as PREVENT, involves countering ideological support for:
 - (1) violent extremism
 - (2) disrupting those who promote the ideology
 - (3) supporting persons vulnerable to recruitment
 - (4) enhancing community resilience
 - (5) Addressing extremist related grievances.
- 5) France -- France believes rehabilitation or de-radicalization programs for violent extremists generally have no value.
 - a) They view terrorism principally as a strategic threat, and have crafted an intelligence-driven approach to prevention.
 - b) They seek only to counter violence and terrorism, not the underlying ideologies.
 - c) Using the leverage of their laws and justice system, they assertively collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity.
- c. Research Results - The nature of this sample and the methodology employed do not permit a distillation of "best practices" as that term is commonly used.
 - 1) "Best practice" typically refers to an approach or technique that is far superior to any other approach.
 - 2) It is one that has been successfully implemented and is transferable elsewhere.

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- 3) Those conditions do not exist here.
- 4) There are, however, some practical and overarching observations that emerged from the project, including:
 - a) In countering violent extremism, one size does not fit all (or even most).
 - b) There may be no single "right" answer in trying to explain violent extremism.
 - (1) Two suggestions seem evident:
 - (a) local knowledge is often a good place to start
 - (b) People's motivational pathways in and through terrorism are often complicated.
 - (c) Extremism is not always driven by the explicit ideology or the "cause"
 - c) Among the countries studied, most have a goal in mind, but few have a clearly defined strategy for how to get there.
 - d) Different programs have very different objectives and expectations for both community and individual level outcomes. It helps to be
 - (1) explicit and clear up front about those objective
 - (2) Show they will be measured, and which ones to pursue.
 - e) Nearly everyone thinks systematic program evaluations are important, but no one does them.
 - (1) This is a critical deficiency in this global effort. Knowledge of whether a program is "working" cannot be established without objective and systematic evaluation.
 - (2) Unknowingly sustaining and growing a program that is not working is costly, inefficient, and, at times, even counterproductive.
 - f) Systems and interagency relationships are critical. Partnerships among agencies and systems are a centerpiece of the approaches in every country where there is any degree of satisfaction or success.
 - g) Violent extremism is not evenly distributed throughout the world, and typically not even within a given country.
 - (1) Countries seeking to address the problem of violent extremism at a strategic level should carefully examine "hot spot" areas and conditions that might exist locally.
 - (2) They should also examine how the [state's] own actions, inactions, or reactions might be fueling rather than mitigating militant sentiments.

B. Large Group Discussion -
1. Given

1000

1000

1000

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V. END OF DAY 2 CLOSING

a. Review Key Learning Points:

- i. Understanding Hate Groups and Hate Crimes is key to identifying where conflict in communities can arise and where preventative law-enforcement action may need to occur.
- ii. Knowing increase and decrease drivers can influence where to invest law-enforcement Outreach efforts.
- iii. All factors (person, group, community, context) must be assessed to create effective outreach and mobilization strategies.
- iv. Law-enforcement efforts must be based within the Context of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to maintain public confidence.
- v. An agreed upon Mission is critical to guide these efforts.

Day 3

I. COMMUNITY OUTREACH PREPARATION

(30 min)

A. Overview for the CVE Outreach Strategy Community Project

1. Within every community policed by law enforcement, there are many cultures, sub-cultures, organizations, and historical locations that influence a group identity.
2. Some examples of group identity include age, disability, ethnicity, language, religion, sexual orientation, citizenship, gender, and there are many more.
3. Often each group has a unique perspective of law enforcement and may have expectations and needs both either formally known or informally implied.
4. Research for this project should include;
 - a. Identification of the cultures, groups, and organizations that co-exist around a specific group
 - b. How the cultures, groups or organizations perceive law enforcement and resolutions used by law enforcement
 - c. Examples of any previous conflicts with law enforcement resolution
 - d. Examples of positive police-community relations
 - e. Law enforcement milestones within the community
 - f. Identify the community leadership (both formal and informal) and how this impacts (or does not impact) a law enforcement response
 - g. Current issues facing the culture, group organization or location
 - h. Recommendations on forming partnerships between law enforcement and community groups
 - i. Identify if any officers have been injured or killed in the line of duty that may be connected to this group/community and how this may impact law enforcement's relationship with this group/community
 - j. Sample Questions to consider when completing the project:
 - 1) Recent policy decisions that have affected the area, such as;
 - a) airport expansion
 - b) gentrification
 - c) secession
 - d) Gang injunctions, etc.

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- 2) Demographic shifts or trends that have affected the area, such as;
 - a) increase in people who rent
 - b) decrease in homeownership
 - c) influx of new residents who speak a language other than English

B. LEARNING ACTIVITY: Learning Lab-Research

(3 hrs. 30 min)

1. **PURPOSE:** To develop the presentation skills that are necessary to form strong community bonds and trust borders.

PROCEDURE: Small Group Activity

- a. Each team will create a group presentation to be presented back to the class, and department Command Staff at the end of training.
- b. Each team will prepare a formal 15 minute presentation about their strategic plan and communities they will be focusing on for outreach.
- c. Research presentations will include but may not be limited to:
 - 1) Culture, sub-cultures
 - 2) Groups, organizations
 - 3) Historical locations surrounding communities
 - 4) Police Department milestones with the community
 - 5) Formal and informal leaders
 - 6) Current issues facing the community
 - 7) How to form and build partnerships

II. COMMUNITY PROJECT PRESENTATIONS

(2.5 hrs.)

A. Presentations

1. Each student along with his/her group will complete a 15-minute presentation on a group identified in Day One of training.
2. Timeframe: ten minutes for discussion with the audience.
3. Visual aids are recommended and a power-point template is prepared on the individual thumb-drive received by each student.
4. Include a summary of any relevant research.
5. Presentations should also address the following:
 - a. What was learned from their experience
 - b. How the assignment changed their prior perception of the culture, group, organization or historical location
 - c. How the assignment will affect their performance in the field
 - d. List possible outreach strategies or milestones to be accomplished over the next year
 - e. Method to identify measures of success and progress should also be considered

B. Debrief: At the conclusion of each presentation the facilitator will lead a facilitated discussion on each presentation asking:

1. How well did the group incorporate their Mission and Vision when stating their accomplishments for the next year?

**Los Angeles Police Department
Countering Violent Extremism Outreach Strategies;
For State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement**

2. How well did the group identify their networks/community partners in their presentation?
3. Are the recommendations possible? Any you would like to refrain from or explore further?
4. Highlights of the presentation.

III. OUTREACH TEAM AND EXECUTIVE COLLABORATION (60 min)

A. Outreach Teams meet with Executive Staff (45 min)

1. Discuss Outreach and Mobilization Strategies for the upcoming year.
 - a. What are the priorities or additional goals?
 - b. What are obstacles to be removed?
 - c. What are additional social, political, economic, marketing considerations on a Department level?
 - d. Any timeframe adjustments?
2. Identify possible modifications to the plan.
 - a. Discuss implementation needs
 - b. Identify any Executive partners
 - c. Identify feedback and communication loop
3. Set the Vision -
 - a. What will be different in a year?
 - b. What does success look like for your Department?

B. Closing and Certificate Presentation (15 min)

1. Evaluations
2. Debrief by Table
 - a. What will be different in a year?
3. Presentation of Certificates

C. Convey Gratitude for participation of Outreach Teams, support of Executives and host agency collaboration.

1. Acknowledge key staff and "go-to" people who do the work.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
Countering Violent Extremism
Expanded Course Outline

Pre-requisite: None

Instructional Goal: To provide the student with the knowledge and skills, to apply policy, procedure and legal issues pertaining to countering violent extremism (CVE).

Performance Objectives: Using videos, learning activities, open discussion and scenario exercises the students will:

- ☐ Understand what violent extremism is and how it manifests itself in the United States
- ☐ Understand what the role of state and local law enforcement is in countering violent extremism and how that role fits into CVE efforts at the national level
- ☐ Understand the important role of communities and other non-law enforcement resources and how these all fit together in a policing strategy
- ☐ Understanding of CVE-related strategies from around the country and world that have been effective; also an understanding of why certain CVE strategies have failed
- ☐ Develop confidence in their ability to create a CVE-related community engagement program tailored to respective jurisdictions

I. INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTATION

(50 min)

A. Introduction

1. Instructor (s)
 - a. Name, Assignment
 - b. Experience
2. Conduct administrative duties (i.e., POST roster; notification cards)
3. DISTRIBUTE: Resource Guide (prior to training at each table)
 - a. The resource guide should contain all of the documents that are cited in this lesson plan and
 - 1) A Common Lexicon (International Association of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism CVE Working Group)
 - 2) Radicalization Dynamics (national Counterterrorism Center)
 - 3) Countering Domestic Radicalization (New America Foundation – National Security Studies Program Policy Paper)
 - 4) Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing (Law and Society Review, Volume 44, Number 2 2010)
 - 5) American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat (Congressional Research Service, September 20, 2010)
 - 6) Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism (Center for New American Security, 2009)
 - 7) Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together (RAND study, 2009)
 - 8) Homegrown Radicalization
 - 9) National Security Strategy: Empowering Local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States
 - 10) In addition any other case law or material that would assist the students with resolving the scenarios effectively
 - b. Ensure there are enough Resource Guides available for each student to take one when the course is over

B. CVE Challenges (open discussion)

1. Origins of CVE initiative
2. Show Video Clips (News & Documentary footage)
3. What is the overall objective of CVE-related law enforcement efforts?

- a. Creation of resilient communities and facilitating integration/identification with American values and ideals
 - b. Establishing relationships of trust
 - c. Isolation of extremist forces/influences
 - 4. Relevance of CVE to Policing (open discussion)
 - a. Tactical (Officers and Executives)
 - 1) Officer safety
 - 2) Building trust
 - 3) Creating and leveraging partnerships
 - 4) Safer streets/communities
 - 5) Crime reduction
 - 6) Clearing investigations
 - b. Strategic (Officers and Executive)
 - 1) Long term partnerships
 - 2) Confidence in city government
 - 3) Participation in city political process
 - a) Confidence in national government
 - 4) Crime reduction
 - 5) Crime prevention
 - 6) Acceptance of funding expenditures for associated policing initiatives
 - 7) National Counterterrorism objectives
 - c. Critical Vested Interests (Mission, Vision, Values)
 - 1) Common goals and common vision
 - 2) Safer streets/communities
 - a) Crime reduction
 - b) Safe schools
 - c) Drug free communities
- C. Brief overview of training topics
 - 1. Parasitic Amalgamation: Differentiating the Extremist from the Host
 - 2. Legal Aspects of CVE
 - 3. Adapting Community-Oriented Policy for CVE
 - 4. Leveraging Partnerships
 - 5. Intelligence Analysis for Countering Violent Extremism
 - 6. Counterterrorism and CVE
 - 7. Developing a CVE Strategic Plan

II. PARASITIC AMALGAMATION: DIFFERENTIATING THE EXTREMIST FROM THE HOST

- A. Different Forms of Violent Extremism
 - 1. History of Fanaticism/Extremism/Radicalization
 - 2. Different types of Extremism (lecture/case studies)
- B. Exploited Communities
 - 1. Islam
 - 2. Democratic Societies
- C. Path to Radicalization
 - 1. Socio-cultural factors
 - a. Social networks
 - 1) Family
 - 2) Friends
 - 3) School
 - 4) Faith based (churches or mosques)
 - b. Charismatic leader(s)
 - c. Internet

- d. Social media
 - e. News
 - f. Self-radicalization
 - 2. Political factors
 - 3. Economic factors
 - 4. Environmental factors
- D. Historical Perspective of Violent Extremism
 - 1. Case Studies
 - 2. Searching for Common Ground: Lessons Learned

III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF CVE

- A. Civil Rights/ Civil Liberties
- B. Constitutional and Unbiased Policing
- C. 28 CHF Part 23
- D. Implications of the USA PATRIOT Act
- E. Department Policies (LAPD Only)
- F. Hate Crimes
- G. Consequences of violations
 - 1. Community
 - 2. Organizational
 - 3. Political
 - 4. Economic
 - 5. Social
 - 6. Public confidence
 - 7. Public perception

IV. ADAPTING COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICY FOR CVE

- A. Cultural Awareness
 - 1. Cultural idiosyncrasies and nuances
 - 2. Linguistic differences and similarities
 - 3. Behavioral nuances
 - 4. Customs and courtesies
- B. Philosophy & Approaches of Community-Oriented Policing
- C. Community-Oriented Policing and CVE
- D. Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community-Oriented Policing
- E. Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- F. Blending Policing Tactics with Community Outreach Strategies

V. LEVERAGING PARTNERSHIPS

(50 min)

- A. The interagency effort
 - 1. Federal
 - 2. State
 - 3. Local
- B. Non-Governmental Organizations
 - 1. Private entities and initiatives

VI. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR CVE (Case Studies)

(50 min)

- A. Information versus Intelligence
- B. Differentiating active intelligence collections from passive information collection
- C. Sources of information

1. Social Networking and the World Wide Web
- D. Network Centric Strategies
 1. Understanding compartmentalization efforts
- E. 28 CFR part 23
 1. What it states -- what it is and is not
- F. Establishing procedures for SARs intake
- G. The importance of separating CVE and intelligence collections
 1. Case studies (examples)
 - a. UK
 - b. Egyptian
 - c. Irvine Ca. example -- FBI Informant in mosque
 - d. CIA/NYPD (counterproductive community engagement)

(CASE STUDIES AND VIDEO EXAMPLES)

VII. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND CVE – Complimentary Missions (50 min)

- (Case Studies)**
- A. Importance of CVE in the overall Counter-terrorism mission
 1. Host communities identifying outliers
 - a. Actively engaged with law enforcement
 - b. Preventing radicalization and extremism
 - c. Detecting/preventing extremist violence
 2. Preventive measure
 - B. National objectives and homeland security

VIII. DEVELOPING A CVE STRATEGIC PLAN (SCENARIO) (100 min)

- A. Identify appropriate liaison personnel
 1. Interpersonal skills
 2. Culturally diverse
 3. Ethnically aligned (optimal)
 - a. Linguistic capability/capacity
- B. Identify Stakeholders/Issues
 1. Department
 2. Community
- C. Consolidate Resources
- D. Construct and Organizational Template
- E. Establish Programs
 1. Community Forums
 2. Town hall meetings
 3. Individual engagement
 4. Department Open house
 5. Advisory boards
- F. Evaluate Measures of Success

(GROUP EXERCISE- DEVELOPING/DISCUSSING CVE IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY/PLAN)

II. COURSE DEBRIEF (30 min)

- A. Open discussion
- B. Determine if learning objectives have been met
- C. Hand out course evaluations

December 18, 2014

The Honorable Lisa O. Monaco
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Deputy National Security Adviser
Office of the Homeland Security Advisor
1650 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20502

Via Email, Mail and Facsimile

Re: Federal Support for Countering Violent Extremism Programs

Dear Ms. Monaco:

The undersigned human rights, civil liberties and community-based organizations write to express our concern about the targeting of American Muslim communities and communities presumed to be Muslim through activities conducted under the auspices of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).

In 2011, the White House released a strategic implementation plan with the overarching goal of “preventing violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.”¹ The plan describes federal support for “community-led efforts to build resilience to violent extremism” and “preventative programming.” It tasks the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and FBI to execute CVE programs and emphasizes the coordinating role of local US Attorneys’ Offices. However, the White House has not described the basic parameters, methods and metrics of CVE, which appear to vary at the local level.

Our organizations have diverse perspectives on the wisdom and legality of CVE and therefore do not take a final position on CVE here; however, we all agree that where the federal government encourages these efforts, it also bears responsibility for their impacts. In this letter, we describe some of these impacts, including on: religious exercise; freedom of expression; government preference for or interference in religion; stigmatization of American Muslims; and ongoing abusive surveillance and monitoring practices. We recommend necessary initial steps toward addressing our concerns.

Impact on Religious Exercise and Political Expression

One purported method of CVE is to provide a space for community discussion of alternative political opinions and religious viewpoints, without the threat of government surveillance and monitoring. Yet CVE may also task community members to expansively monitor and report to law enforcement on the beliefs and expressive or associational activities of law-abiding

¹ Office of the President, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, Dec. 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>.

Americans. That approach to American Muslim communities—or any belief community—reproduces the same harm as government surveillance and monitoring. The result of generalized monitoring—whether conducted by the government or by community “partners”—is a climate of fear and self-censorship, where people must watch what they say and with whom they speak, lest they be reported for engaging in lawful behavior vaguely defined as suspicious.

Religious exercise and political expression are among the casualties, as individuals may abandon discussions about religion and politics—or avoid mosque and community spaces altogether—to avoid being tracked into CVE programs that brand them as “at risk” or potential “terrorists.” Indeed, insofar as CVE trainings and guidance promote a theory of “radicalization” and malleable “indicators” and “predictors” of violence including patterns of lawful political activism, ideology and religious worship, they are likely to result in law enforcement targeting based on political opinion and religious exercise. These are First Amendment-protected activities—no government-sponsored programs should chill them and law enforcement cannot use them as a basis for action.

Even where the parameters of CVE and community outreach are more narrowly defined, we are concerned based on prior incidents of law enforcement overreach that law enforcement may use them as a pretext for intelligence gathering activities that treat entire communities as suspect. Indeed, in any community roundtable or event, the presence of Justice Department officials and police creates the risk that community members’ participation and statements may be recorded in intelligence databases.

Improper Characterization of American Muslims as a Suspect Community

CVE’s stated goal is to “support and help empower American communities.”² Yet CVE’s focus on American Muslim communities and communities presumed to be Muslim stigmatizes them as inherently suspect. It sets American Muslims apart from their neighbors and singles them out for monitoring based on faith, race and ethnicity.

CVE’s focus on supporting local communities links it to traditional community policing initiatives. Yet federal support for community policing should focus on crime reduction in communities overall—and not succumb to a singular focus on terrorism or American Muslims. The federal government’s support for community policing should also be delinked from “radicalization” theory and related concepts. Empirical studies show that violent threats cannot be predicted by any religious, ideological, ethnic, or racial profiling. The evidence suggests that there is no direct link among religious observance, radical ideas and violent acts.

Moreover, all agencies involved in CVE should be mindful of potential stigmatizing impacts when they publicize and promote their efforts to engage with American Muslim communities. Materials should avoid linking federal engagement with these communities to actions to counter

² *Id.*

armed groups such as ISIS, especially as many federal officials acknowledge ISIS does not pose a credible threat of attack within the United States and the number of Americans who have allegedly traveled to join ISIS—let alone returned—is miniscule.

Harmful associations with ISIS and other armed groups play into fear-mongering about American Muslim communities. They are amplified and distorted by the media and can be exploited by individuals and groups who promote anti-Muslim rhetoric. Government and law enforcement authorities have the power to significantly shape public discourse and send a strong message to the American public that fundamental rights such as equal protection and religious liberty must be defended. Singling out one community for special interventions and enhanced monitoring may have the effect of aggravating existing prejudices and reinforcing intolerance.

CVE's Relationship to Abusive Counterterrorism Practices

In assessing CVE and urging basic safeguards, we are mindful of the larger context of ongoing abuse in federal counterterrorism practices. CVE programs are certainly bound to fail unless the government ends abusive counterterrorism practices that fuel distrust in law enforcement. Specifically, the mutual trust and respect for rights that ought to form the basis for community policing of any kind have been jeopardized, if not extinguished, by the FBI's practice of pressuring law-abiding American Muslims to become informants against their own communities, often in coercive circumstances. The FBI's use of community outreach to gather intelligence has also severely undermined confidence in its assurances of openness and cooperation.

The FBI and local law enforcement have also broken community trust by deploying undercover employees and informants to infiltrate mosques and community centers in the absence of particularized suspicion of wrongdoing. Terrorism sting operations, which the FBI and US Attorneys' Offices publicly tout as thwarting would-be terrorists, too often target youth and other individuals who appear to have little or no capacity or pre-existing intent to engage in criminal activity. The involvement of the FBI and US Attorneys' Offices thus taints CVE and will reasonably lead to fears that it is a thin veil for prosecutions. Indeed, some American Muslims fear that engaging with these agencies could lead them to be targeted—either to become an informant or be prosecuted.

Furthermore, we are concerned that by encouraging law-abiding Americans to provide information on their communities to law enforcement, CVE may further these abuses. The FBI and local law enforcement could feed information they gather in CVE and community outreach settings into ongoing surveillance and monitoring practices—including the demographic mapping of American Muslim communities, pressuring individuals to become informants and placing people on the No-Fly List and other watchlists based on loose standards. Indeed, in recent weeks, many of our organizations have received reports that the FBI is approaching community members, individually and in group settings, with requests for information about any individuals who have discussed the politics of military actions in Syria and Iraq. This amounts to

a law enforcement fishing expedition on political viewpoints, which is anathema to a robust democracy. Local community members could become unwitting partners in the abusive activities that the government implies CVE is intended to replace.

In the end, the lead involvement of the FBI and US Attorneys' Offices in CVE—agencies that have been responsible for abuses that have left deeply rooted distrust of law enforcement in American Muslim communities—is inappropriate and counter-productive to the government's own stated goals. Moreover, to the extent that individuals in American Muslim communities would benefit from improved social services or community mental health resources, such efforts should be undertaken by other actors, not federal law enforcement agencies and should not be a conduit for law enforcement surveillance.

CVE Funding of Private Organizations and Individuals

Another potential CVE method is to build capacity within communities for social services, educational resources and mental health services. These are admirable goals but they are more appropriate to strategies that treat communities holistically and address a range of needs and social problems, rather than through the singular lens of national security or law enforcement.

In any event, government programs, whether administered by the government itself or by partner organizations, cannot target a particular religious community or determine participants by reference to religion—or they risk running afoul of the Constitution and statutory civil rights protections. These programs must employ neutral, secular criteria. Thus, grants cannot lawfully be made to organizations that are solely from the Muslim community or because they predominantly serve that community. These constitutional and statutory strictures contradict the premise of CVE when it is focused almost exclusively on American Muslim communities.

Perhaps even more troubling would be CVE methods that favor one ideology over another. A government program cannot, directly or indirectly, choose which views within Islam or particular imams and community leaders are worthy of support and which are not. We caution that in choosing partners, CVE programs could have the constitutionally impermissible effect of advancing a particular set of religious beliefs and suppressing others.

Recommendations

We urge that the White House and relevant agencies take the following measures as a first step to addressing the concerns outlined here:

- **White House Guidance on CVE:** The White House should immediately issue guidance to address impacts on religious exercise, freedom of expression and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The guidance should:
 - Prohibit federal employees from sponsoring, directing or participating in CVE programming that has the purpose or effect of encouraging private organizations

or individuals to collect and provide to law enforcement information about religious activities, speech, association and other First Amendment protected activity—including noncriminal behavior and associations—in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the concerned individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity.

- Prohibit federal employees from using or promoting CVE training and CVE training materials that single out expressive conduct, including through alleged indicators or predictors of violent extremism or “radicalization” that focus on patterns of religious observance, political activism or religious beliefs.
 - Prohibit federal employees from implementing any program, directly or indirectly, that has the effect of defining participants by reference to religion. This includes selecting partners and making grants.
 - Require that all CVE trainings and training materials be assessed for their impact on religious exercise, freedom of expression and First Amendment Establishment Clause concerns.
 - Be binding on all federal employees. Compliance with the guidance should also be a condition on state and local government agencies’ receipt of federal funds for CVE and counterterrorism programs.
 - Direct each agency to establish meaningful safeguards against using information gathered through CVE and community outreach as intelligence. Limit the retention and dissemination of this information to other agencies, which must themselves be subject to the same prohibition and safeguards.
 - Direct each agency to foster transparency by making all regulations, guidance, documents, policies and training materials that govern or are used in CVE be made publicly available. Direct each agency to also make publicly available documents needed to receive and maintain funding, including requests for proposals, grants, contracts and assurances; names of organizations receiving funding; and information about meetings.
- **Justice Department Civil Rights Division Investigation & Assessment:** The Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department should investigate and assess the impact of DOJ and FBI community outreach and CVE programs on religious exercise and freedom of expression in minority communities, including American Muslim communities.
 - **US Attorneys’ Offices & FBI roles:** In light of their responsibilities for criminal investigations and prosecutions, these agencies should not have lead involvement in CVE programs.
 - **Justice Department Guidance on Race:** Our concerns outlined above are heightened by recent changes to the Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. The changes do not close loopholes that have long permitted the use of profiling in the national security context. In fact, the Guidance explicitly permits practices we have long identified as abusive, discriminatory and stigmatizing.

We continue to believe that a crucial step toward ending the abusive counterterrorism practices we have described, are further, meaningful, comprehensive changes to the Guidance to establish uniform, national standard against profiling in all its forms.

DOJ should also release the full current version of the FBI Domestic Intelligence and Operations Guide (DIOG) and require the FBI to amend it to completely prohibit profiling in all contexts, require at least an articulable factual basis to open investigations and prohibit the recruitment or tasking of informants when there is no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.

Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security should revise its April 2013 memorandum to component heads regarding its commitment to non-discriminatory law enforcement and screening activities, which incorporates the Justice Department's Guidance by reference, accordingly.

As organizations that support this administration's commitment to equal protection and freedom of religion, we look forward to working with you to strengthen civil liberties and human rights safeguards for all. Thank you for your attention to these matters.

Sincerely,

American Civil Liberties Union
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
Amnesty International USA
Arab American Institute
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - Asian Law Caucus
Black and Pink
Brennan Center for Justice
Center for Constitutional Rights
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Defending Dissent Foundation
DRUM - South Asian Organizing Center
Interfaith Alliance
Islamic Circle of North America
Jewish Voice for Peace Boston
Muslim Advocates
Muslim American Society
Muslim Legal Fund of America
National Council of Churches
National Religious Campaign Against Torture
New Evangelical Partnership for the Common Good

Shoulder to Shoulder Campaign
Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund
The Sikh Coalition
T'ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights
UNITED SIKHS
United States Council of Muslim Organizations
United Voices for America

cc: The Honorable Eric Holder, Attorney General
The Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security
The Honorable James Comey, Director of the FBI

