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June 9, 2015

Arjun Sethi  
American Civil Liberties Union  
4301 Connecticut Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20008

Dear Mr. Sethi:

Thank you for your December 18, 2014 letter to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa Monaco. I have been asked to respond on her behalf.

I personally engaged with communities across the country to address the Department and Administration’s approach to preventing violent extremism. From these dialogues, I learned how we can better improve collaborative efforts between the American people and their government.

While in New York City, I took the opportunity to discuss many of the issues you raised directly with the Brennan Center for Justice and your colleagues at the American Civil Liberties Union. My Coordinator for Countering Violent Extremism has also participated in open discussions on these topics, most recently with over 200 attorneys at an event sponsored by the American Bar Association. I write to clarify the Administration’s efforts and to dispel any ambiguity that may exist.

Violent extremism prevention and intervention activities must consider the potential impact on civil rights and civil liberties. Efforts to prevent violent extremism are undertaken in full compliance with the protection and preservation of civil rights and civil liberties. The Department’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is spearheading these efforts.

Countering violent extremism addresses potential root causes by empowering local partners to intervene while ideally avoiding the need for law enforcement action. To be clear, in instances where an imminent threat to the community exists, law enforcement action, investigation, or prosecution is a correct response. This is one of the many reasons why the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are part of the Administration’s whole-of-government effort. The overall objective of violent
extremism prevention and intervention is to increase awareness and empower communities who may be in the best position to develop their own innovative approaches. This can only be accomplished by developing trust. Therefore, the objective of these efforts is to work with communities, not to collect intelligence under the auspices of collaboration.

The Administration’s approach involves commitment to engagement and amplification of credible voices against violent extremism. These engagement efforts are further supported by research, analysis, and training. Additionally, the Administration plans to work with communities across the country to facilitate the development of locally owned and driven prevention and intervention programs. For example, local government and community members in Boston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and other communities across the country have developed grassroots prevention programs that address the issues facing their local communities. Efforts will focus on increasing law enforcement’s understanding of violent extremism and improve collaboration with stakeholders—communities, social services, mental health officials, educators, the private sector, academia, and faith-based leaders.

This approach emphasizes the strength of local communities and civil society and acknowledges that well-informed and well-equipped families, communities, and local institutions represent the best defense against violent extremism. Local communities are the front lines of defense and response and are essential in addressing this issue.

Public outreach and community engagement initiatives are central to the Administration’s strategy. The purpose of such outreach is to foster positive, productive relationships with the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal government agencies. Community engagement can undermine key recruiting narratives used by violent extremist groups, such as al-Qa’ida, al-Shabaab, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and related terrorist affiliates, as well as domestic violent extremists such as violent Sovereign Citizens.

The Department’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Faith-Based Security and Communications Advisory Committee—among others—builds on community-based activities to strengthen communities targeted by violent extremist threats. Similarly, the Department of Justice is also committed to protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, and regularly stresses this commitment through training and other engagement with law enforcement officials. Also, to be clear, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducts outreach efforts separate from traditional investigative activities to open lines of communication and forge or deepen two-way relationships with vital partner communities, therefore enhancing the Bureau’s ability to understand and protect the communities it serves.
Regarding your concerns of community involvement in violent extremism prevention and intervention efforts, the Administration and I believe that every American has a role to play in the safety and security of our Nation. Repeatedly, we have seen the advantage of public awareness and cooperation through information-sharing, community oriented policing, and citizen awareness. The diversity of our communities is a source of strength, not weakness, in the fight against violent extremism.

I appreciate the concerns raised, and believe we share the same goals of ensuring a safe and secure Nation that preserves the civil rights and civil liberties of the American people. Please share this response with the organizations that co-signed your letter.

Thank you again for your letter and your interest in this important issue. Should you wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Jeh Charles Johnson
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

Talking Points:
• We remain concerned about the heightened level of homegrown violent extremism (HVE) activity in the United States, as well as the potential for conflict areas such as Syria to continue to inspire and mobilize individuals to participate in or support acts of violence.
• The threat posed by violent extremism is neither limited by international borders nor to any single ideology. Groups and individuals inspired by a range of religious, political, or other ideological beliefs have promoted and used violence in the United States or against U.S. interests to try and force political, economic, or social change. Increasingly sophisticated use of the internet and social media by violent extremists provide an additional layer of complexity.
• Violent extremist plots in the Homeland tend to involve individuals or small groups who participate in self-initiated acts of ideologically motivated violence, often without warning or easily-identifiable indicators. The varied set of grievances and factors that can motivate these subjects provides further challenges, as violent acts are often predicated on a combination of personally held opinions and perceptions of marginalization that are highly individualized and may not be observable to law enforcement or other officials.
• Our approach to countering violent extremism emphasizes the strength of local communities. Well-informed and well-equipped families, communities, and local institutions represent the best defense against violent extremists. While our primary purpose is to prevent a terrorist or violent extremist attack by an individual or group recruited by a violent extremist organization—or inspired by a violent extremist ideology—we also support strong and resilient communities as important ends themselves.

DHS CVE Coordination
The Department’s CVE efforts have continued to adapt as the threat has evolved. Efforts have been undertaken to catalogue, coordinate, and institutionalize CVE efforts and resources across DHS. In furtherance of this, a CVE Working Group (reflecting the missions of components and equities across DHS) led by a CVE Coordinator has been formalized to oversee and coordinate all CVE activities. The Department’s CVE efforts are comprehensive and can be categorized into four function areas:

• Policy Formation and Coordination Activities
• Strategic CVE Activities (those explicitly conducted for the purpose of CVE)
• CVE Support Activities (those that aid the department and its partners in conducting their CVE missions)
• CVE-Relevant Activities (the regular activities of DHS components shaped to improve CVE or lessen the negative impact on CVE).

DHS successfully deployed a regionally based full-time CVE subject matter expert in October 2011 to work with Southern California federal, state, local, and municipal officials and communities to facilitate the development of local countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts—this model is expanding to the Boston area this Spring.

Interagency Coordination on CVE
• As opposed to designating a “lead agency,” we have identified the need for a multi-disciplinary whole-of-government approach to best support federal and local efforts to counter violent extremism, where each agency has a shared responsibility for the overall CVE mission.

• Our comprehensive approach is embodied in the strong and coordinated efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). This partnership has proved effective and provides the flexibility to support local efforts. We will continue to seek improvement in our coordination with other departments and agencies.

DHS Recent Efforts:
• The White House hosted a CVE Summit on February 18, 2015; it focused on both domestic and international CVE efforts. Prior to the Summit, DHS hosted a roundtable discussion with Vice President Biden and domestic stakeholders on February 17th at the White House.
• The Summit included the rolling out of piloted prevention and intervention programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul; DHS plans to assess these efforts and facilitate expansion to other municipalities.
• DHS and the interagency encouraged local partners to develop mechanisms for engaging the resources and expertise available from a range of new partners, including the private sector as well as social service providers including education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders.
• As next steps, DHS is working with the interagency to further support prevention and intervention efforts in Boston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul and efforts elsewhere around the country while seeking to expand support efforts to other cities.
• Over the course of 2014, Secretary Johnson has participated in community engagement events in Chicago, Columbus, Minneapolis, Los Angeles and Boston, meeting with community leaders to discuss their struggles and their partnership with DHS.
• Community Resilience Exercises (CREX) have been conducted by DHS and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in Washington, DC, Northern Virginia, Chicago, Raleigh, Seattle, Houston, and New York (to date) to develop trust between communities and law enforcement in order to prevent violent extremism.
• Community Awareness Briefings (CAB), informing communities about ISIL recruitment narratives and tactics have been successfully conducted in 15 U.S. cities thus far.
• On November 20, 2014, DHS participated in a US-UK Bilateral Strategic Discussion with the UK Home Office; as a result, both sides agreed to establish a program of cooperation on CVE research.
• DHS is leveraging its public/private partnership model to engage the private sector, especially high-tech and social media executives, in innovative solutions to address the terrorist use of social media issue.
• FEMA is currently sponsoring CVE training focused on community oriented policing practices and community partnerships with law enforcement.
• DHS has published classified and unclassified assessments—related to U.S.-based homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) and U.S. persons who have fought in Syria. DHS analysis on foreign terrorist fighters has examined these individuals’ motivations, role of the internet in their radicalization to violence, and the threat to the United States upon their
return. Many of these papers have been shared with our trusted state and local partners to improve their awareness of their threat.

Countering Violent Extremism Q&A

DHS was formed as a result of the attacks on 9/11. Therefore, why isn’t your strategy to counter violent extremism solely focused on Al Qa’ida inspired terrorism, since that is clearly the preeminent threat?

- The Department’s efforts to counter U.S.-based violent extremism are largely, but not exclusively, based on threat assessments that indicate that foreign terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qa’ida or ISIL, as well as these groups’ online supporters are actively seeking to recruit or inspire Westerners to carry out attacks against Western and U.S. targets.
- However, the Department’s efforts also illuminate the risk posed by violent extremist groups and individuals within the Homeland inspired by various other religious, political, or other ideological beliefs.
- Accordingly, although DHS has and will continue to prioritize CVE efforts to address the threat from violent extremists inspired by ISIL, Al-Qa’ida, and their affiliates, DHS has designed a CVE approach that applies to all forms of violent extremism, regardless of ideology, and focuses not on radical thought or speech but instead on preventing violent attacks.
- In addition, as countering violent extremism begins with local communities, who are the front lines of defense and response, DHS does not limit its CVE approach to any one society, culture, religion, or ideology.

What is DHS doing to ensure training for state and local partners on CVE is consistent with the USG approach to CVE?

- CRCL and NCTC created an interagency working group on CVE training, to ensure the interagency stays connected on developing and implementing the most current and consistent training on CVE.
- DHS created CVE grant guidance and coordinated with the interagency to expand grant guidance to include funding for training and local CVE efforts, including participating in CVE training workshops, developing CVE training curricula, and incorporating CVE training resources into existing training programs.
- In addition, DHS works closely with law enforcement partners, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), to emphasize that efforts to provide information and training regarding countering violent extremism should focus on the strength of local communities, as outlined by the USG and DHS strategies.
- Finally, CRCL, in conjunction with other DHS components, informs federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel nationwide on the evolving threat of violent extremism, and methods to engage with communities to raise awareness of violent extremism and build partnerships with communities such as best practices in community oriented policing.

What does the Department do different in CVE that FBI & NCTC don’t do?
A key mission for the Department is to build capacity for State and Local authorities to counter violent extremism within their communities. This is done through a variety of mechanisms, including working with State and Local authorities and local communities and Non-Government Organization to bolster pre-existing local partnerships; supporting State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement and communities by providing training, community policing best practices, and grants; and leveraging the Department’s analytic, research, and information capabilities.

In addition, DHS works closely to coordinate and collaborate on these efforts with NCTC, DOJ, FBI, and other interagency and community partners. The CVE work of the Department focuses on all forms of violent extremism ranging from individuals inspired by international terrorists to violent extremists inspired by domestic ideologies such as sovereign citizen extremists and militia extremists.

This differs from NCTC because statutorily NCTC can only focus on violent extremists with an international nexus such as Al-Qa’ida, its adherents and its affiliates. Regarding the FBI, DHS has additional authorities to conduct CVE work such as grant support.

How much money is spent by DHS on CVE?

In regards to DHS resources that are directly supporting CVE efforts, the Secretary recently established the DHS CVE Coordinator position (who was appointed in August 2014), funded by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL). Further, three dedicated full-time and one part-time CVE Coordinator support staff are funded by the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), the Office for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and Office of Policy (P L CY).

One full-time CVE field staff position in Los Angeles and a pending field staff position in Boston are funded by the National Protection Programs Directorate (NPPD).

DHS components and offices such as CRCL, I&A, NPPD, PLCY, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) currently leverage existing allocated funding to support CVE related efforts such as engagement efforts, research and analysis development, training and workshop development, and grant funding opportunities.

The FEMA Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) is also an important source of funding for CVE state, local, territorial, and tribal partners and law enforcement. FEMA National Training and Education Directorate’s (NTED) Continuing Training Grant (CTG) Program has also been successful in awarding the International Association of Chiefs of Police $700K in FY13 to develop online CVE training for frontline law enforcement and the University of Maryland Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Center of Excellence $800K in FY14 also develop CVE training. NTED is in the process of reviewing applications for another CVE CTG to a state and local grantee for FY15.

Further, DHS has allocated approximately $1.6 million in FY13 and $1.1 million in FY14 for CVE related research. Also, DHS provides funding to START—$3.5 million in both FY13-14. DHS is working to bolster these vehicles and is currently exploring how they can be expanded to better support community efforts.

What metrics exist to measure success?
DHS is working closely with its centers of excellence such as the Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses of Terrorism at the University of Maryland, other academic institutions and research institutes, interagency partners such as the DOJ National Institute of Justice, and international partners and bodies such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum to assess CVE efforts and initiatives to determine areas of impact—DHS in partnership with DOJ, NCTC, and FBI are currently assessing the recently developed prevention and intervention strategies in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul.
Community Policing and Countering Violent Extremism

Draft of Curriculum Components

January 2011
DHS CVE Curriculum Working Group

The CVE Curriculum Working Group was assembled after the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) CVE Working Group’s recommendations on ways DHS can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism in the United States were released. The CVE Curriculum Working Group was comprised of individual subject matter experts who, while using the HSAC recommendations as a basis, lent their expertise in the creation of this guidance.

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Deputy Chief, Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau,
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[Logos of various agencies]
SUMMARY
This document serves as the outline of a Community Policing curriculum geared toward frontline state and local police officers, key law enforcement outreach personnel and their supervisors. This document also addresses ways to tailor current Community policing curricula to the issue of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).

Section One: Community Policing - Relevance to CVE

History
A brief overview of the different eras of American policing will set the stage for this class because many aspects of modern-day community policing strategies are grounded in the lessons learned by policing during the decades before – lessons that are instructive in the context of CVE. This historical overview will place special emphasis on how various policing approaches have impacted the police-community relationship and how this relationship has impacted levels of crime and disorder, public perception of police and the level of fear among the citizens. These eras will include:

- **The Political Era,** which emphasized community-police interaction, the provision of social services and a decentralized organizational structure, but was marked by the directing of police resources and activities by ward politicians, inadequate supervision of line-level officers and police corruption;
- **The Reform Era,** which was marked by a centralized organizational model, the deliberate removal of political influences from police business, the professionalization of police and a move away from community-police interaction via foot patrol and toward crime control; and
- **The Community Problem-solving Era,** which is relevant today and emphasizes a decentralized organizational model, problem solving and decision-making at the line-level, the collection of information in crime-fighting and police-community interaction.

During the 19th Century, Sir Robert Peel established the first model for modern policing at Scotland Yard in London. To this date, Peel’s Nine Principles continue to serve as a framework for CVE in a blending of the old and the new.

- **Principle 1:** “The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.”
- **Principle 2:** “The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.”
- **Principle 3:** “Police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.”
• **Principle 4:** "The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force."

• **Principle 5:** "Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to the public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law."

• **Principle 6:** "Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of *persuasion*, advice and warning is found to be insufficient."

• **Principle 7:** "Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police: the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence."

• **Principle 8:** "Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary."

• **Principle 9:** "The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it."

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**Philosophy**

A review of the philosophy, tenets and specific approaches of Community Policing will follow. The goal is to provide the audience with a clear understanding of Community Policing and its operational definitions that they will use as they begin to shape CVE programs in their own organizations.

This section will also include an overview of certain other models of policing and their associated theories that have potential applicability to CVE (e.g., Problem-Oriented Policing, etc.). This approach lends itself to a facilitated class discussion about the relative merits and disadvantages of each. It enables the instructor to emphasize why the Community Policing philosophy is best suited to serve as the foundation for CVE programs. However, Community Policing in the traditional sense will not adequately address the dynamics of Violent Extremism and the associated convergent threats, particularly those that emanate from Diaspora communities. If police intend to practice community policing in an increasingly complex, ambiguous law enforcement environment, they must align community and government resources with the goal of creating environments in which violent extremism is less likely to flourish.
Section Two: Community Policing Models

This section will explore the different models of community engagement that are potentially relevant in the context of CVE. While Section One outlines the underlying philosophical foundation for a CVE program, this section is designed to present the audience with an operational framework based on descriptions of the models themselves, the steps they require and a range of case studies to illustrate how each model has been employed.

Case Study Presentations

Case study presentations will include discussions of topics such as: how police built (or inadvertently undermined) trust, the most central element of community engagement; how police achieved legitimacy in the eyes of the community; the importance of the separation between the outreach and intelligence-gathering functions; how police navigated cultural, religious and linguistic differences; and how police developed measures of accountability and outcomes (in terms of fear reduction, perception of police, lower crime rates, etc.). This section will also include discussion of approaches and lessons learned in other countries with rich histories of community engagement (e.g., the United Kingdom’s PREVENT strategy), approaches employed by the U.S. military (the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain Project) and novel approaches in the United States (Dr. Gary Slutkin’s CeaseFire program in Chicago).

The discussions during case studies will also address topics that will be explored in more detail in Section Three: How are results measured in Community Policing? What metrics can be used to measure success? What analytical methods should be used in the pre-engagement phase of a CVE program to identify problems in the community and/or to determine with whom to engage? What resources will be leveraged in and out of the police department? What problem-solving framework will be employed? How do police mobilize communities that don’t have adequate resources, infrastructure or organization to give voice to their issues and engage with police? How do police engage with communities that have a deep-seated distrust in and dislike of police? What sort of internal reporting and decision-making structure is needed to support these approaches (flattened, hierarchical, etc.)? What qualities are needed in the personnel selected for outreach (emotional intelligence, ability to navigate conflict, etc.)? What internal organizational changes need to be made to support CVE work?
The distinction between what police have to do today verses what they did in years past is focused on how they engage with communities that are not actively engaged in civic life in general or with their police departments in particular. In order for policing to evolve in the 21st Century, there must be a deeper understanding of community dynamics, their "local/global" history, narratives and culture.

This involves learning more about:

- Demographics, social structures, and languages;
- Expectations, objectives, desires, and cultural nuance;
- Current and historical relations with other population groups; and
- Common (shared) attributes, conditions, and resulting areas of mutual advantage.

Police must seek to create opportunities to harness differences as they build on similarities and create coalitions with shared interests. Beyond merely seeking the "buy-in" of communities, police should seek to promote active enrollment and participation. "Big picture" questions that will be addressed include: How do we inspire civic engagement and participation by our youth in police-sponsored activities?

The models for inclusion in this section include, but are not limited to:

- Value-Based Initiative, to include programs that aim to build trust between police and faith-based communities by partnering with them in a collaborative problem-solving process (e.g., Operation Cease Fire and Operation Homefront in Boston)

- Youth Programs, which often focus on providing children with alternatives to gang and other illegal activity by providing them with life skills, education about law enforcement, sports activities (e.g., cricket matches, Explorer Program, Police Athletic League) and opportunities to talk about their challenges. While there is a range of programs that could be included as case studies in this section, many of them are anti-gang initiatives. This curriculum will focus on developing youth programs that are specifically tailored to CVE efforts.

- Weed and Seed Strategies, which involve two major stages. In the first, violent criminals and drug abusers are "weeded" out of a community through arrest and other measures. In the second stage, community-based organizations and public agencies collaboratively "seed" the area with social services such as neighborhood restoration programs that improve the overall quality of life of residents.
The case studies presented will also address outreach initiatives geared toward specific populations. The topics in this section will largely be determined by the scope of the CVE training as defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

**Diaspora/Immigrant Communities**

**Muslim Communities Examples**

What are the concerns of the Muslim communities throughout the United States and in the areas in which the trainings are being held? How do these communities differ?

What cultural dynamics should police be aware of when creating programs to engage with Diaspora communities? What roles does fear play in engagement with police, particularly since 9/11? As the most visible representatives of government in civil society, what issues do police need to understand as they engage with these communities? What cultural and linguistic tools should police identify before they engage and where can they find it (e.g., personnel who have language skills or cultural knowledge and the personal/attitudinal disposition to conduct outreach)? How can they learn about the needs and issues of importance to the community (niche media, etc.)?

Case Studies: There are excellent examples of how police at both large and small departments have engaged with Muslim populations (Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, New York Police Department, Dearborn Police Department, etc.).

**Immigrant Communities Examples**

A lack of cultural awareness is often not specific to the police by any means. Many immigrant populations have very little knowledge of U.S. police practices and laws. As police consider this issue in the context of CVE and community policing, what measures can be taken to partner with communities in a way that educates them and lowers the chance that they will encounter police in undesirable ways? Those issues, if left unchecked, can be akin to a powder keg when there is a negative event such as a police shooting that serves as a tipping point for that community. While civil unrest is not necessarily ideologically motivated crime, it could be stated that addressing conditions that could fuel violence and anti-government sentiments are in the best interest of police in the context of CVE.

Case Studies: UNIDOS program developed by the Garland Police Department and the Delray Beach Police Department’s programs with the Haitian community.

This section should also include the topic of radicalization in the United States with discussion of the “push” and “pull” factors that can impact individuals and groups perceived to be vulnerable.
to radicalization. The "push" factors are those that contribute to feelings of discontent (thought, emotion). Examples of these factors are experiences of racism and discrimination and/or perceived oppression or injustice due to Western policies. The "pull" factors are those that can contribute to the choice of an individual or group to move along the continuum to violent action. Examples of those factors include violent ideology, in many cases espoused or facilitated by charismatic figures, and Internet-based networks of like-minded individuals.

These "push" and "pull" factors are illustrated in three recent cases that: took place in the United States but had transnational components; demonstrated the radicalization process and the traveling of individuals along the continuum to violent action; and demonstrated the failure by law enforcement to find the "tripwires" - the suspicious behaviors and/or criminal acts that, when observed by community members or police, can lead to early detection. These cases are the David Headley case, the Najibullah Zazi case and the Faisal Shahzad case. These were all United States citizens with transnational ties who experienced the "push" factors of discontent and the "pull" factors that led them to choose to mobilize and back their radical thought with violent action. All three could have been discovered earlier if local police and communities had been more sensitized and attuned to the behavioral changes that have a nexus to violent radicalization. These three case studies – and others such as the Fort Hood shooting, which demonstrates that this radicalization process can take place in unlikely settings such as the military – are rich with lessons learned. They also introduce an emerging thought in the counter-terrorism community – that of the eleventh Al-Qaeda affiliate: Al-Qaeda in the United States.¹

In addition to case studies, facilitated discussions and scenario-driven exercises, this section will also explore real world events and potential crises, which provide both danger and opportunity. These include protests, demonstrations, local reactions to U.S. military actions and public policy, elections, community problems and corruption. Since 9/11, local police officers have learned that what happens overseas has an effect on their own backyards, much the way a pebble causes ripples in a pond. Members of Diaspora communities throughout the United States who maintain strong transnational ties can be heavily impacted or galvanized by events in their native countries. Conversely, police-community interactions that are both positive and negative can be broadcast within hours to the far reaches of the globe. Instead of experiencing anxiety over such events, police should welcome these dynamics as engagement opportunities to build trust, educate the populace, and put credits in the bank. As part of a CVE curriculum, students will build separate event action plans with the required background, purpose, objective, goals and strategies.

¹ These examples exemplify the importance of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) and the role that officers play in the identification and reporting of suspicious behaviors.
Section Three: Community Policing and CVE - Creating a Program

Before a Community Policing (CP)-based CVE program can be accepted by communities it must first be accepted by the police executives and line officers who will be designing and implementing it. Section 3 will walk participants through the many organizational considerations involved in creating a CVE program. The discussions will include Community Policing “best practices” that participants can apply to their own programs.

Below is a partial list of the steps involved in developing a CP-based CVE program:

- Identification and analysis of issues/problems relevant to communities in question
  - Open-source research on topics including, but not limited to, demographics, religious, educational and socio-cultural issues, generational issues and issues of concern to the community
  - Discussions with people familiar with the communities, both in the department and with community groups/providers of social services
  - Development of tools to educate the communities about suspicious activities and other behavioral indicators that have traditionally been linked to violent extremism

- Development of strategic plan
  - Determination of departmental structure and how it will support the initiative
  - Structure of the program and determination of goals, objectives and measures of success (i.e., metrics) within the department, with the community and at the level of the individual officers doing the outreach
  - Methods of outreach (e.g., advisory boards, Citizens Police Academy, programs geared to specific populations such as youth or women, etc.)
  - Outreach to other arms of government, particularly at the local level, so that all government leaders understand the objectives of and need for outreach programs and support them (i.e., whole-of-government approach)
    - Units within the police department
    - City/State/Federal offices (e.g., Mayor’s Office)
    - Local, State and Federal law enforcement partners
  - Decision-making (Line-level officers? Supervisors? Commanding officers?)
  - Flow of communication/information within the department and with the community

- Training
  - Professional reading lists
  - Vetted classes and training programs (i.e., proven to be useful)
  - Helpful Websites, including any that bring police practitioners of this sort together to exchange ideas
  - Information on conflict resolution strategies
Personnel selection, including Officers and Reserves with special skills
Resources the police department will offer the communities (e.g., crime prevention seminars, attendance of community events, tailored and timely response to public safety concerns, etc.)
Resources the communities will offer the police departments
Outreach practices (Issues of trust, accountability, authenticity, conflict resolution, humanization of police and community members, strategic versus tactical, boundaries between outreach and intelligence, etc.)

- Selection of community/communities to engage with
  ✓ Selection of community leaders
  ✓ Identification of up-and-coming leaders
- Selection of community-based, academic and government resources and partners
- Messaging/Narrative of the program (internally and externally)
  ✓ To be developed with community
  ✓ To be communicated multiple ways ranging from meetings to niche media
- Identification of metrics used to assess outcomes
  ✓ Within the police department, how outreach personnel will be evaluated (i.e., strength of social relationships, ability to become part of a community network, ability to identify and respond to issues of concern in communities, etc.)
  ✓ With community, how progress will be measured (i.e., a specific issue is resolved, social services are brought to bear on an issue, etc.)
  ✓ Incorporation of lessons learned from the Building Communities of Trust Initiative and best practices from DHS HSAC regional meetings with communities and state and local law enforcement

The following is a list of some of the essential law enforcement capabilities and methodologies that departments and officers will need to develop to effectively carry out a CVE program:

- Cultural immersion and knowledge;
- Language capabilities;
- Specialized training for line personnel;
- Open source and neighborhood research;
- Decentralized neighborhood patrols, emphasizing recurrent presence and personal interactions;
- Youth activities, community events, and outreach forums; and
- Recruitment and organizational demographics.
Collectively, these lists, once expanded, will serve as a road map for the trainees and provide them with something tangible to bring back to their departments. Again, including executives at this stage will begin to create the buy-in necessary to implement any new initiative.

Finally, instead of dancing around the issue of who and where the adversary is, part of this curriculum should address how to facilitate discussions with community groups relative to isolating violent extremists. Solicit ideas from community groups. This is a good exercise for community engagement, community problem-solving and transferring responsibility to communities. Issues to consider as part of this discussion include: What does this conversation look like? Who participates? Who moderates? Who develops the ideas? How does this speak to trust versus whistle blowing?

While police may be the catalyst and stand on the front line initially, the ultimate goal is for the police to take on a more supportive role while allowing the community to engage the issues directly and in collaboration with police—overall smart and good governance.
Workshop at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)

On February 8-10, 2011, the following officials traveled to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia to attend a "proof-of-concept" session and to discuss CVE best practices. There, these guidelines were reviewed and validated. As a compliment to the curriculum development efforts underway at the local law enforcement level, FLETC is now working to develop a CVE curriculum that will be integrated into Federal law enforcement officer training programs.

FLETC CVE "Proof-of-Concept" Session Participants

- Sergeant, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California
- Officer, Los Angeles Police Department, California
- Nationwide SAR Initiative, BJA, Washington, DC
- Officer, Minneapolis Police Department, Minnesota
- Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism and Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department, California
- CEO, Freedom and Justice Foundation, Texas
- Sergeant, Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, Minnesota
- Sheriff, Camden County Sheriff's Department, Georgia
- Lieutenant, Minneapolis Police Department, Minnesota
- Detective, Chicago Police Department, Illinois
- Inspector, New York Police Department, New York
- Assistant Director (Nat’l Center for Biomedical Research), LSU-NCBRT, Louisiana
- Officer NYPD, LSU-NCBRT Subject Matter Expert, Louisiana
- Gary Schenkel - Office of State and Local Law Enforcement, DHS, Washington, DC
- Assistant Director (Nat’l Center for Biomedical Research), LSU-NCBRT, Louisiana
- Nathaniel Snyder - Office of State and Local Law Enforcement, DHS, Washington, DC
- Daily Chief, St. Paul Police Department, Minnesota
- Commander, Dearborn Police Department, Michigan
- Program Manager, NCAP, Los Angeles, California
- Officer, Los Angeles Police Department, California
- Commander, Dearborn Police Department, Michigan
- Assistant Chief, St. Paul Police Department, Minnesota
- Chief, Oneida Police Department, Wisconsin
- Director, State and Provincial Police Directorate, IACP, Virginia
- Detective III, Los Angeles Police Department, California
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State and Local Agencies
Brunswick Police Department
Camden County Sheriff's Department
Chicago Police Department
Dearborn Police Department
Freedom and Justice Foundation
Hennepin County Sheriff's Office
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Louisiana State University
Major Cities Chiefs Association
Minneapolis Police Department
National Consortium for Advanced Policing
New York City Police Department
Oneida Police Department, Wisconsin
St. Paul Police Department

Federal Agencies
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Information Sharing Environment
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Naval Postgraduate School
PREDECISIONAL-DRAFT

TO:

CC:

FROM:

SUBJECT: CVE CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT AND PROOF OF CONCEPT SESSION AT FLETC.

DATE: MARCH 10, 2011
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
PREDECISIONAL-DRAFT

Participants (Students and Observers):

[Redacted]

2015-CRCL-00011-000046
DHS CVE INVENTORY AUGUST 1, 2014

POLICY FORMATION AND COORDINATION

I. CVE COORDINATOR

The CVE Coordinator serves as the Department’s main point of contact concerning all CVE-related activities, which includes leading the CVE Working Group and effectively coordinating all of the Department’s CVE efforts. This person also coordinates all of the Department’s engagement with international, federal, state, and local officials, and community partners to increase efforts on the preventive front. In addition, this person also serves as the Department’s primary liaison with interagency partners and the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) concerning CVE coordination and efforts.

II. OFFICE OF POLICY (PLCY)

The Office of Policy is the Department lead for the development and coordination of DHS CVE Policy. As such the Office is the lead for the development of materials in preparation for the National Security Council meetings at the IPC, CSG, DC and PC levels. In addition, the Deputies of DOJ, FBI and DHS host a breakfast on CVE with the Director of the NCTC on a monthly basis that Policy also provides materials to support. Policy was the lead for the DHS Approach to CVE.

Policy is the lead DHS component for development of strategies and policies with the interagency on issues of counterterrorism. In support of these efforts Policy also ensures that CVE components of these plans are consistent with DHS CVE Policy and efforts. Policy led coordination of Department inputs into the National Security Strategy, National Counterterrorism Strategy, National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and associated classified strategies on counterterrorism that have CVE elements.

III. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL (HSAC)

In February 2010, the HSAC was tasked by then-Secretary Napolitano to work with state and local law enforcement, as well as relevant community groups, to develop and provide recommendations regarding how the Department can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically – focusing in particular on the issues of training, information sharing, and the adoption of community-oriented law enforcement approaches to this issue. As a result of this HSAC tasking the Countering Violent Extremism Working Group was formed.

- The group continues to meet on a bi-annual basis to discuss CVE recommendations and policy related issues.
STRATEGIC CVE ACTIVITIES

OUTREACH/ENGAGEMENT:

I. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (CRCL)

Community Engagement

CRCL leads the Department’s community engagement efforts. CRCL conducts quarterly roundtables in 16 cities across the United States, as well as dozens of other engagement events including town halls, youth roundtables, and issue-based meetings. These roundtables and engagement events bring together leaders from diverse communities such as American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, Jewish, Sikh, Southeast Asian, East African, Latino, and others.

- CRCL’s engagement efforts are designed to capture the issues, concerns and ideas of the communities most affected by DHS programs and policies. Mutual trust is essential to the success of the Department’s engagement efforts – CRCL trusts community leaders to bring questions and concerns, candidly express their ideas, and voice their opinions. Community leaders trust and understand that CRCL’s engagement events are not for the purpose of gathering intelligence, sharing personal information, or engaging in profiling.

Community Awareness Briefing (CAB)

- CRCL, with the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) developed and implemented the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), designed to share unclassified information with communities regarding the threat of violent extremism. The CAB has been conducted in 12 U.S. cities over the past few years. It is designed to help communities and law enforcement develop the necessary understanding of al-Qa’ida recruitment tactics and explore ways to collectively and holistically address these threats before they become a challenge at the local level. Due to the increased number of Western-based fighters traveling to foreign war conflicts, such as Syria and Somalia, the Community Awareness Briefing now includes information relating to the foreign fighter recruitment narrative and the myths versus realities of the situation in Syria and Somalia.

Community Resiliency Exercise (CREX)

- The Community Resilience Exercise (CREX) is a half-day table-top exercise designed to improve communication between law enforcement and communities and to share ideas on how best to build community resilience against violent extremism. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate for Strategic and Operational Planning (DSOP) have worked with local partners to implement this exercise in cities across the United States. To date, the exercise has been held in Washington, DC; Chicago, Illinois; Seattle, Washington; Durham, North Carolina, and Houston, Texas. CREXs focus on building trust and
empowering communities against violent extremism domestically, a theme that directly supports the domestic CVE Strategy and Strategic Implementation Plan.

• The CREX is based on a program that has been conducted over 50 times in the United Kingdom with great success. The CREX uses an unfolding scenario of possible violent extremist activity with two threads: one thread disclosing what the police have learned and the other thread what the community experiences. The scenario is revealed in several stages, with participants breaking into small groups after each stage to discuss potential responses and how they should work together. The scenario is hypothetical, but based on the behaviors exhibited by past violent extremists prior to their arrest. The exercise is facilitated by an individual with credibility in both the community and government. At the end of the exercise, the facilitators help the participants create a local action plan focused on prevention and intervention.

International CVE Efforts

• DHS CRCL works with foreign governments, international organizations, and various US Embassies across the world to develop and implement CVE programs. CRCL has developed and implemented Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, such as the CVE Exchange Program. This program, in its third year, pairs two cities in the US with two in a European nation with exchange delegations representing civil society and local government exchanging operational community engagement best practices that may support CVE but also promote integration, youth empowerment, resolution of grievances, and protection of rights and liberties.

II. NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD)

NPPD has worked to leverage existing capabilities to pilot a full-time CVE expert in Los Angeles focused on building an infrastructure among Federal, state, local, law enforcement, private sector, and non-traditional partners to help counter and prevent the violent extremism threat.

• The program focuses on gaining a better understanding – and subsequently developing, reviewing, and delivering training – on the behaviors, tactics, and indicators that could point to potential radicalization and extremism, on prevention and intervention initiatives, and engagement programs and methodologies that enable the strengthening and building of resilient communities.

Efforts also include leading the development of local CVE Taskforce that includes local and federal law enforcement, mental health clinicians, social workers, members of clergy and a wide array of other public officials and private sector.

• A taskforce can be activated by the CVE community in response to an immediate or ongoing incident as a means of conducting intervention and prevention of additional radicalization and violence. Evidence of this community needs has been expressed following the Boston Bombing and local incidents in California.
III. OFFICE OF POLICY (PLCY)

Policy is the lead for international engagement on CVE and coordination of component efforts with international partners on CVE. Led by the DHS Office of Policy, we collaborate with international governments, law enforcement, and non-governmental organizations to gain greater insights and to understand violent extremism from a global perspective and techniques used abroad to counter it. DHS has formal bi-lateral meetings with the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Australia and Belgium on issues of CVE. We also work closely with the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Denmark. DHS also participates in multi-lateral meetings on CVE through the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Five Country Ministerial and the G-5. In addition DHS has work with Europol, Interpol and the International Association of Chiefs of Policy on CVE.

ANALYSIS:

I. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A)

I&A assessments regularly seek to inform CVE practitioners about trends in radicalization and mobilization to violence; most notably including an in-depth assessment of patterns in radicalization by 62 al-Qa'ida-aligned Homegrown violent extremists; an in-depth assessment of commonalities in pathways to radicalization by 88 Domestic terrorists mobilized towards violence by ideologies ranging from violent Anarchism, violent Racism, violent Sovereign Citizen Extremism, violent Animal Rights Extremisms, and violent anti-abortion extremism; and numerous studies of the effects of foreign conflicts and terrorist messaging on radicalizing US Persons to become foreign fighters overseas or attempt attacks in the Homeland. (Homegrown Violent Extremist Branch (HVEB) Branch, appx. 6 personnel. N/A for cost)

I&A launched a new indexing label, “BEESTOP”, for use in raw intelligence reporting focused on government encounters with known or suspected terrorists in the Homeland. (Analysis, N/A for personnel and cost)

I&A has since 2010 published dozens of unclassified and classified assessments for homeland security stakeholders that sought to inform domestic CVE efforts. (Homegrown Violent Extremist Branch (HVEB) Branch, appx. 6 personnel. N/A for cost)

- I&A published companion studies that looked at the common behaviors associated with 88 domestic terrorists and 62 al-Qa’ida-inspired violent extremists.
- I&A since 2010 has produced more than 10 case studies of arrested al-Qa’ida-inspired and domestic violent extremists to increase awareness of behavioral indicators of mobilization to violence.
• I&A has published assessments related to US persons who have fought in Syria that have analyzed their motivations, role of the Internet in their radicalization to violence, and the threat to the Homeland upon their return.
• I&A has published assessments analyzing the content and resonance of messaging disseminated by al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and allied groups.
• I&A has published geospatial assessments of terrorism activity in the Homeland.

INFORMATION SHARING:

I. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A)

I&A’s State and Local Program Office (SLPO) maintains and updates the joint DHS and FBI Countering Violent Extremism and Active Shooter (CVE-AS) Web Portal on HSIN, which allows DHS to conduct outreach efforts and share CVE and AS information with our Federal, State, Tribal, Territorial, Private Sector, Academia, and International partners as appropriate. (SLPO, 2 personnel)

I&A regularly briefs federal, state, local, private sector, and DC-based international partners in-person and via SVTC and teleconference on threat developments. (SLPO and Analysis, N/A for personnel and cost)

I&A regularly liaises with foreign government agencies and intelligence services in partner countries that share our concerns about countering terrorist threats in our respective nations. These exchanges have led to joint production including publishing with EUROPOL a profile of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik and publishing with Canada a comparative assessment of disrupted terrorist cells in our countries. (Foreign Liaison and Disclosure Branch (FLDB), appx. 4 personnel and Homegrown Violent Extremist Branch (HVEB), appx. 6 personnel. N/A for cost)

I&A worked with CRCL to develop content for a Community Awareness Briefing focused on Syria foreign fighters that CRCL and NCTC DSOP are delivering to US communities. (Analysis, N/A for personnel and cost)

CVE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

GRANTS:

I. THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Training and Education Division (NTED) through its training provider the Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium (RDPC), developed a curriculum for Planning and Intervention for Gangs, Hate and Terrorist
Groups in Rural Jails and Prisons, which is available to Local Law Enforcement. Course development cost is $362,107 and Training Delivery cost is $92,786.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is another FEMA training provider and is developing Web-Based courses for Law Enforcement that includes building cultural awareness through community engagement and helping students to identify threats:

- Threat specific sub-modules follow below include:
  - Al-Qa ‘ida and Affiliates
  - Foreign Fighters
  - Homegrown Violent Extremist
  - Lone Wolves
  - Sovereign Citizens
  - Online Radicalization to Violence
- Course development cost is $125,569.07

II. NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE (NPPD)

NPPD supports CVE efforts through grant funding assistance, vulnerability assessments, information sharing on protective measures, developing and delivering training to counter evolving threats, and coordinating tabletop exercises, bringing together community leaders, law enforcement and government officials.

- NPPD has active efforts to extend community-level, public-private partnerships to academia, community leaders, faith-based organizations, and other non-traditional partners to share CVE evolving risk information, deliver risk management capabilities, and build trusted relationships to assist in ensuring the security and resilience of communities against violent extremism.

TRAINING:

I. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC)

The FLETC provides lecture based CVE training and/or laboratory exercises within numerous basic and advanced law enforcement programs. These programs are attended by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel.

- The programs that currently incorporate CVE training are the Uniformed Police Training Program, Criminal Investigator Training Program, Land Management Police Training Program, Physical Security Training Program, Land Transportation Antiterrorism Training Program, Federal Air Marshal Training Program, United States Mint Police In-Service Training Program, Immigration Customs and Enforcement - Basic Immigration Enforcement Training Program, Antiterrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program, Rural Police Officer Training Program, Fish and Wildlife Service - Law Enforcement for
Supervisors Basic, National Nuclear Security Agency – Basic Training, and the United States Department of Agriculture – Investigator Advanced Training Program. FLETC’s estimated costs associated with the CVE related content of these programs in FY 2014 is $53,000.

- The FLETC is currently planning the National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism working in partnership with the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism. The purpose of the summit is to advance interdisciplinary efforts to implement effective community-based CVE intervention models, and create a community of interest that will continually improve upon those efforts. The summit will reflect the federal government’s role in supporting locally-led efforts to create and implement sustainable, local, multi-disciplinary, whole-of-government, and information-driven grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent violent attacks. The summit will take place August 13th and 14th and will be funded via a reimbursable agreement with the COPS Office in the amount of $60,000.00.

RESEARCH:

I. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE (S&T)

Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) / Resilient Systems Division’s (RSD) CVE Efforts:

- DHS S&T is sponsoring the development of a comprehensive open source database on Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) that incorporates incident, perpetrator, and geospatial information. To date, this effort has produced 15 reports and research briefs, and the completed database will be accessible through a web interface that includes graphing, mapping, and analysis functions.

- DHS S&T is sponsoring a longitudinal survey that examines the U.S. public’s attitudes toward extremist violence and government efforts to counter it, including questions that will help DHS to understand circumstances in which the public may or may not report suspicious activity. To date, this effort has produced five reports and research briefs with more to be completed in the future.

- In collaboration with the UK Home Office, DHS S&T is supporting the Arc of Terrorism Involvement Program of Research (Arc Program), which aims to further our understanding of the motivations and behaviors associated with each stage of the terrorist lifecycle. As part of this effort, DHS S&T has sponsored two projects:
  - An ongoing study that has produced more than 10 reports and research briefs focused on how and why people disengage from terrorism; whether there are differences based on type of terrorist group or an individual’s role within the group; and how disengagement can be encouraged; and
A completed effort on lone-actor terrorism that produced four reports and research briefs that identified the characteristics and recurring pre-attack behaviors of lone-actor terrorists who have been convicted of terrorism offenses in Europe and North America.

- This year, the DHS S&T Resilient Systems Division’s program on countering violent extremism was awarded an Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Award by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for facilitating terrorism information sharing. The award specifically cited the efforts of the program to distribute high quality social science research to members of the intelligence community.
- The cost of current activities is approximately $1.1 million and 2 FTEs. The cost of next year’s activities should be roughly the same.

II. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE (USSS)

The Critical Protective Analysis Group (CPAG), which is part of the Counterterrorism Section of the Foreign Assessment and Counterterrorism Branch (FAB), Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) analyzes terrorist/extremist tactics and attacks to gain insight about what happened, including what weapons were used, how many attackers were involved, how the attack was executed, surveillance techniques employed, and operational planning. CPAG briefings to local, state, and federal stakeholders provide a high-level overview of the methods and means used by the extremists but do not make recommendations on how to counter violent extremists or suggest countermeasures for potential attacks that violent extremists may conduct.

OUTREACH/ENGAGEMENT:

I. OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS (IGA)

IGA supports CVE efforts with state and local stakeholders as needed, and is willing to assist with coordination and outreach to stakeholders as necessary.

- IGA has passed along CVE training grant information to state, local and tribal stakeholders
- IGA has worked with DHS/CRCL in many of their roundtables, attending the roundtables and encouraging state and local offices to attend.

II. DHS CENTER FOR FAITH-BASED & NEIGHBORHOOD PARTNERSHIPS (FEMA)

The DHS Center bolsters efforts to catalyze and support non-governmental, community-based programs, and strengthen relationships with communities that may be targeted for recruitment by violent extremists. This is done by:

- Supporting interagency efforts to broaden engagement with state, local, and tribal law enforcement, philanthropic organizations, religious organizations, community groups, and national advocacy groups, and others to discuss violent extremism, best practices, and approaches.
• Helping to build strong and resilient communities by promoting immigration integration and civic participation.
• DHS Center supports engagement activities in high-priority cities by providing a non-securitized approach to engagement for diverse populations. Works closely with DHS CRCL, USCIS, ICE, CBP and NPPD strategic engagement advisors in select cities
• DHS Center promotes a model of building resilience with diverse religious and ethnic communities by conducting whole community engagement efforts between local police, fire and emergency management around emergency preparedness, response and recovery. As a result of these outreach and engagement efforts, DHS Center has established lines of communications and ability to engage diverse leaders as appropriate with other DHS components with a direct CVE mandate.
• DHS Center serves alongside FEMA NPD-NTED staff in discussions, review and recommendations regarding FEMA national training grants focusing on CVE
• Budget and Personnel Info:
  o 20% of deputy director’s time: $25,000
  o Travel Costs (25% of total annual): $15,000

III. FAITH-BASED SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (FBAC)

In August 2011, the HSAC was tasked by then-Secretary Napolitano to explore information sharing opportunities and methods between the Department and Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs). The subcommittee was also asked to address how the Department can better support local security officers and organization’s efforts to keep FBOs communities safe, secure, and resilient.

As a result, the HSAC’s Faith-based Security and Communications Advisory Subcommittee was formed. Members have advised the Department on domestic policies which have global and tactical relationships. This was particularly evident in dialogues with faith-based communities following recent incidents in Dearborn, Michigan; the Sikh Temple shooting in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; the Joplin, Missouri Mosque burning; the shooting at the Family Research Council in Washington, D.C.; the Boston Marathon bombing; and most recently the Overland Park, Kansas Jewish Community Center shooting. During the Boston Marathon bombings HSAC and FBAC members were briefed by senior DHS leaders on snap preparatory calls. FBAC members in their individual capacity worked together to issue several press releases jointly, which many credit with de-escalating the crisis.

Benefits of the Department of Homeland Security and the HSAC/FBAC relationship as outlined by the FBAC in their June 5, 2014 report:

• Information Sharing: Provides timely, actionable, bi-directional information sharing from trusted reliable partners.
• Training: Four Table Top/Active Shooter exercises held in past year.¹

¹ In the past year there were four Table Top/Active Shooter Training Exercises which were held jointly with FBOs and supported by the Department of Homeland Security. The tabletops (Dearborn, Michigan; Bridgewater, New
• Individual Feedback: Faith-based Organizations (FBOs) advise on domestic policies which have global and tactical relationships.

• Constituent relations: Working with many FBOs.

IV. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

USCIS promotes the civic integration of immigrants through education on the rights, responsibilities, and importance of citizenship. Citizenship is critical to civic integration because naturalization allows immigrants to have essentially the same rights as native-born Americans and fosters a sense of belonging, inclusion, and equality. Civic participation and a sense of belonging are key to maintaining strong and welcoming communities, and countering the narratives of violent extremists.

Using various points in the immigration system, USCIS provides immigrants with information and resources to encourage civic learning and civic integration, with the naturalization test serving as a primary tool to promote this process. Naturalization requirements, such as knowledge of basic English and of U.S. history and civics, encourage civic learning and build a strong foundation upon which immigrants can exercise their rights and responsibilities. The agency’s initiatives benefit not only immigrants themselves, but also all of society as we work to build a stronger civic identity based upon our shared civic ideals, an appreciation of our history, and the English language. USCIS strives to provide immigrants with respectful interactions that can foster trust in government institutions and encourages activities that reflect the longstanding strength and spirit of vested citizenship.

USCIS offers multiple resources to immigrants, such as Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants. This comprehensive guide contains practical information to help immigrants settle into everyday life in the United States. It also contains basic civics information that introduces immigrants to the U.S. system of government. This resource is available in 14 languages and can be downloaded free of charge. USCIS engages directly with immigrants and communities through listening sessions, in-person meetings, and informational engagements. In the past two years, USCIS has conducted more than:

• 1,800 naturalization information sessions for 74,000 attendees;
• 5,500 local engagements for 860,000 attendees;
• 400 national engagements on a range of topics for 75,000 attendees; and
• 20 multilingual engagements in Spanish, Creole, Arabic, Vietnamese, Korean, Mandarin and Cantonese for 12,000 attendees.

Through citizenship outreach partnerships, USCIS provides information and resources to state and local governments to help facilitate outreach and engagement, training and technical assistance, and citizenship education to communities. USCIS’s current partners include the City of Los Angeles, the City of Chicago and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County in Tennessee. USCIS also collaborates with the Institute of Museum and Jersey; Dallas, Texas; and Salt Lake City, Utah) focused on information sharing improvement, partnership development, risk mitigation, sector-wide enhancement, and lessons learned.
Library Services to provide information, educational materials, and training resources on immigration and citizenship to libraries. These mutually beneficial partnerships allow USCIS to more effectively reach immigrants in their local communities and help cities deliver much needed information and services to their residents. Additionally, USCIS offers grants, tools and educational resources to immigrant-serving organizations. Since 2009, USCIS has awarded approximately $43 million to 222 immigrant-serving organizations through its Citizenship and Integration Grant Program. To date, the program has helped more than 93,000 permanent residents prepare for citizenship.

**CVE-Relevant Activities**

**Outreach/Engagement:**

I. **National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)**

NPPD sponsors the Private Sector Clearance Program for partners, enabling DHS/NPPD to effectively communicate information across affected partners and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to share threat and security information. In addition:

- Engages local law enforcement and the private sector to recognize and report suspicious purchasing behavior of improvised explosive device (IED) components, and conduct counter-IED planning activities to prepare for terrorist explosive threats and incidents
- Supports the President’s plan to reduce gun violence and promote school safety, to include working with the U.S. Secret Service to build in behavioral anomalies into the training and exercise program to strengthen prevention and intervention methods of risk mitigation.

II. **DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement**

The DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) serves as the primary liaison between DHS and non-Federal law enforcement agencies across the country. The office also leads the coordination of DHS-wide policies related to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement’s role in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disaster within the United States. As the primary liaison with state and local law enforcement agencies, OSLLE leverages its community relationships to support the CVE mission.

**Operational Activities:**

I. **U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)**

CBP conducts limited CVE engagement through the disruption of travel for individuals believed to attempt to participate in armed conflicts overseas, and through the interception of similar
individuals attempting to return to the U.S. after overseas participation either in armed conflicts or in training designed to inflict harm on the Homeland. The budgetary cost of this engagement is difficult to quantify as the work is performed alongside other border security priority work performed by officers and intelligence analysts at ports of entry, at overseas airports, and at CBP HQ.

II. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

TSA Office of Security Operations (OSO) - Field Operations Division

The TSA Office of Security Operations (OSO), Field Operations Division is engaged in educating and training our Transportation Security Officers (TSO) on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) activities. This is accomplished through multiple methods, including the National Shift Briefs produced by TSA Headquarters, Daily Shift Briefs conducted by the TSA leadership at airports, Job Aids such as Threat in the Spotlight, and training via the Online Learning Center.

Classified threat information is communicated to Federal Security Directors via the TRACE-Movi system. Threat analysis, activities, and indicators are briefed up to the SECRET security level. TSA has also partnered with many local law enforcement agencies and stakeholders to increase information flow and cooperation. Additionally, TSA personnel such as TSOs and Behavior Detection Officers all benefit from knowledge and insight regarding CVE activities and indicators.

TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)

Transportation Security Sector Risk Assessment (TSSRA) 3.0, currently awaiting Secretary Johnson’s signature, contains an appendix that scores the HVE risks of 20 attack scenarios across all modes of transportation. TSSRA 4.0, currently under development, is in the process of assigning risk scores to the same 20, HVE-based attack scenarios."
Community Policing and Countering Violent Extremism
Advisory Board Meeting

IACP Headquarters
Alexandria, Virginia
May 3-4, 2012

THURSDAY, MAY 3RD
Report on the National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism

August 13-14, 2014
Introductory Letter from partner organizations (COPS, FLETC, UMD/START)
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The principal authors of this report: Stevan Weine, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago, and Bill Braniff, M.A., The START Consortium, University of Maryland.
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National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism 3
Executive Summary

The United States national security policy on countering violent extremism (CVE) recognizes that "our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions." To further strengthen these defenses the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) partnered with the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) to coordinate a National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism.

The three partners collaborated to plan and coordinate the national Summit, which took place at FLETC's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, August 13-14, 2014. The Summit's overall goal was to advance multidisciplinary efforts to implement effective community-based CVE intervention models, and to create a community of interest that will continually improve upon those efforts. The Summit convened more than 50 Summit participants from multiple disciplines engaged in CVE efforts from federal, non-federal, international, and non-governmental entities.

Over the course of the two-day Summit, these participants described the CVE work they are conducting in their localities with a focus on lessons learned, best practices, and challenges. Summit participants discussed and debated these matters.

Addressing the problem of violent extremism in the pre-criminal space through engagement, prevention, and intervention programs is a departure for traditional law enforcement and a responsibility that the public has recently articulated for communities and other government organizations. In order for government, law enforcement, and communities to succeed in countering violent extremism, each must undergo paradigm shifts to a new framework that emphasizes using collaborative and multidisciplinary strategies to build community-based multilevel prevention and intervention programs. The delegations that presented at the Summit have already begun to experience these paradigm shifts.

The first paradigm shift is the recognition by law enforcement organizations that CVE approaches are pragmatic and proactive when dealing with the issue of violent extremism, as they build trust and open lines of communication with the communities that police departments protect and serve, enlisting the help of communities to identify and assist at risk individuals and discredit violent ideologies in ways that the law enforcement community is not well-positioned to do on its own.

The second paradigm shift is recognizing that while the law enforcement community has an important role to play, it should ultimately play a supporting role to communities and other governmental organizations that are more well-suited to operate in the pre-criminal space.

A third paradigm shift is that countering violent extremism requires a broad array of capabilities and participants dedicated to building resilience at many levels of society simultaneously. By building more partnerships involving individuals, families, communities, institutions and various government agencies,
communities ultimately become more resilient to all hazards, including but not limited to violent extremism.

**Summary of Summit Recommendations**

Subsequent to the Summit, the COPS Office, FLETC, and START developed a framework to organize the Summit participants' recommendations for future actions.

The recommendations included in this report reflect the major themes that emerged, focusing on those that the majority of participants appeared to support. To be clear, these recommendations are not prescriptive; they are experience-based recommendations that the participants felt others "should" follow if they are seeking to obtain the best CVE-related outcomes.

The Summit partners organized recommendations into a framework that addresses what law enforcement, other government agencies, and communities can do to improve community engagement, trust building, prevention, and intervention programming regarding those individuals at risk for engaging in violent extremism. The recommendations ultimately seek to help strengthen family, community, and institutional defenses that will mitigate the risks for violent extremism.

**Law Enforcement-Focused**

1. Law enforcement organizations should prioritize building and strengthening mutual trust between themselves and the communities they serve.

2. To engage with communities, law enforcement organizations should be engaged with and responsive to community organizations and advocates consistently and over time.

3. Communication with a wide range of community partners on a broad range of topics should be part of the routine operations of law enforcement.

4. Law enforcement organizations should focus prevention and intervention activities on behaviors, and not on racial, religious or ethnic identity.

5. Law enforcement organizations should collaboratively develop and evaluate multilevel prevention and intervention programs.

**Other Government Agencies-Focused**

6. Government agencies should aim to increase the civic engagement among marginalized communities and to build the capacity of community-based organizations.

7. Government agencies' approaches to CVE should be based on sustained, collaborative partnerships with communities.
8. Government agencies should better leverage the contributions that other sectors, such as mental health and education, can make to CVE.

9. Government agencies' CVE programs and policies should be based upon both best practices and scientific evidence.

**Community-Focused**

10. Communities should advocate for a multicultural approach to working with law enforcement and other government agencies which includes not just one ethnic or religious group, and which aims to build capacities and increase civic engagement.

11. Community leaders and organizations should advocate for partnerships with law enforcement that address a range of public safety issues including but not limited to CVE, such as domestic violence, child abuse, human trafficking, and gang violence.

12. Communities should advocate for the use of community policing approaches for law enforcement to engage with communities on matters of CVE and other pertinent issues.

13. Community leaders and organizations should work with law enforcement to develop procedures for non-punitive ways of helping people who are in the pre-criminal space of radicalization and recruitment.

14. Community organizations should build community-led CVE efforts either independently or in partnership with law enforcement, government, and/or private institutions.
Background on Countering Violent Extremism

The Summit focused on countering the problem of violent extremism, a concept which has been defined by the White House as "ideologically motivated violence to further political goals." This definition is centered on the use of violence and not just extremist beliefs, which in and of themselves are not criminal in nature.

However, extremist beliefs were also of concern to the Summit participants because researchers and practitioners widely believe that some forms of extremist beliefs are more likely to lend themselves to violence, and also because the goal of CVE programming is to intervene in a preventive manner so as to stop individuals from ever crossing the line to engage in ideologically motivated criminal behavior.

Yet the ways in which CVE practitioners and community advocates use and understand the term violent extremism are often unclear and can be controversial. Practitioners and advocates question why some acts of criminal violence are regarded as violent extremism while others are not. Practitioners and advocates also question why the U.S. media associates violent extremism primarily with Muslims and much less so with far right or environmental terrorism.

Communities sometimes perceive the public's use of the term violent extremism as a derisive label against entire communities. Some community advocates argue that the media is exaggerating the actual risk of extremism. For CVE practitioners these concerns have come to mean that in their discourse with community partners they tend to avoid using the terms "violent extremism" and "CVE", so as not to put off community members and potential partners.

The Summit convened persons who looked at these issues from different positions and perspectives. Therefore, its aim was less to resolve these issues, and more to facilitate a dialogue that could help to propel the national discourse to strengthen the family, community, and institutional defenses that will mitigate the risks of violent extremism.

The overall goal of CVE is, "to stop those most at risk of radicalization from becoming terrorists." Generally speaking, CVE is "a realm of policy, programs, and interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups."

CVE in the U.S. is rooted in the 2011 White House Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violence Extremism in the United States (SIP) and its antecedent, the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism. These policy documents outline a community-based approach and the Federal Government's role in empowering local stakeholders to

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build resilience against violent extremism. They provide law enforcement and government officials with guidance in leveraging existing partnerships with community stakeholders and other activities designed to help prevent violent extremism. The SIP underlined that partnerships with community-based organizations are necessary in order to respond to community concerns and to support community-based solutions.

The U.S. CVE National Strategy has the following priorities: 1) Building safe, secure, resilient, crime-resistant communities; 2) Training, information sharing, and adopting community-oriented policing approaches; 3) Applying community-oriented policing practices that focus on building partnerships between law enforcement and communities; 4) Fostering community-led preventative programming to build resilience against violent extremist radicalization (such as those which attempt to counter extremist ideology through education, dialogue, and counseling).

Given that CVE strategies are still emerging in the U.S. and globally, the Summit aimed to explore how key U.S. localities and several other countries are approaching CVE, including lessons learned, best practices, and challenges.

The Federal Government's approach to CVE assumes that communities are a key component to preventing and intervening to stop violent extremism. Within communities reside traditions, relations, values, norms, awareness, groups, and institutions that already mitigate violent extremism. Stated in other terms, the community has resilient properties, or protective resources, that help to protect the community and its members against various kinds of adversities and threats. This implies that building resilience for the purpose of CVE is in part about enhancing or strengthening those existing properties and resources, and about jumpstarting weak or non-existent ones. All of this is part of what scholars mean when they write about empowering communities, and these concepts are critical to successful CVE engagement and partnership activities.

Empowerment refers to the process of increasing the capacities of individuals or groups to make choices and transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes. Empowerment centers on how the community looks at community development and mobilization in terms of its key needs, strengths, and meanings. Empowerment activities may include providing training or aligning resources to increase capacities, especially for community-based organizations that lack them. Empowerment can also include bringing new people to the table where decisions are made. The Summit included discussion about how law enforcement, government, and communities are approaching the issue of empowerment with respect to CVE.

Background on the National Summit

Goal

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The goal of the National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism was to advance multidisciplinary efforts to implement effective community-based CVE intervention models, and create a community of interest that will continually improve upon those efforts. The Summit reflected the Federal Government’s role in supporting locally led efforts to create and implement sustainable, multidisciplinary, whole-of-community, and information-driven grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent violent attacks.

**Objectives**

The objectives of the National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism were to:

1. Showcase existing law enforcement and local government best practices, specifically demonstrating how authorities are engaging nontraditional disciplines, such as mental health, social work, and clergy, and identifying promising community-led efforts to counter violent extremism.
2. Identify elements of intervention models that local communities, such as faith-based, school-based, and business communities, can replicate to prevent violence on the part of homegrown, radicalized extremists.
3. Contribute to FLETC’s ongoing review and validation of its CVE training curriculum and identify potential training in need of development.

**Scope**

To facilitate manageable discussion and clear outcomes, the Summit planning team focused the scope of this Summit on violent extremism that could occur within the United States. This enabled Summit participants to focus on the institutions, roles, and processes in place in the United States that can contribute to prevention. In addition, the Summit was not limited to any particular ideological motivations or groups.

**Anticipated Outcomes**

The anticipated outcomes of the Summit were as follows:

1. Local communities will gain access to best practices for implementing prevention and intervention strategies to prevent violent extremism, which build upon effective community policing practices.
2. FLETC’s CVE training curriculum will be validated and potentially modified to ensure consistency with national goals and existing best practices in CVE.

**Summit Participants**
Summit participants included federal, non-federal, international, and non-governmental entities engaged in CVE efforts. See Appendix A: Attendees and Support Personnel, for a comprehensive list of participants.

The Federal Government's approach to CVE focuses on empowering local communities to prevent violent extremism by recognizing warning signs, assessing risk, and using existing tools to mitigate threats. Several communities in the United States are already engaged in extensive CVE efforts. Thus, the Summit brought together delegations from five of these communities, including Dearborn, Michigan; Boston, Massachusetts; Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Los Angeles, California; and Montgomery County, Maryland. While law enforcement organizations are well positioned to participate in these activities because of their frequent interactions with communities, professionals from other disciplines such as mental health, social work, faith-based, and education are ideal candidates for participation in CVE efforts. Thus, the delegations comprised not only law enforcement representatives, but also community-level stakeholders from a cross-section of sectors and disciplines. In addition, the delegations included proactive community activists and youth leaders who have become role models and ombudsmen for their respective communities and constructive partners for the practitioners engaging in CVE efforts.

In addition, the Summit aimed to showcase best practices from several other democratic countries engaged in CVE efforts. Representatives from Australia, Germany, and Canada participated in the Summit.

Key stakeholders from DHS and DOJ, including CVE Working Group members, and representatives from public policy offices engaged in CVE efforts also participated in the Summit, primarily to listen to the testimonials and concerns voiced by the delegations, and also for the purpose of addressing how current efforts throughout the United States align with the National Strategy. These stakeholders help to establish funding priorities for CVE-related research and grants, disseminate lessons-learned to other cities, ensure CVE efforts strengthen civil rights and civil liberties in the United States, and engage in interagency and international dialogue on CVE-related matters. Therefore, their presence at the Summit helped to ensure that the experiential knowledge of the delegations could inform CVE policy and practice more broadly.

Format

To accomplish its goals, objectives, and anticipated outcomes, the Summit included a combination of presentations and plenary sessions during which participants engaged in cross-disciplinary dialogue. The facilitators and attendees sought to focus as much on challenges as successes.

On Day 1, the focus was on CVE in the United States. Representatives from five American jurisdictions (Dearborn, MI; Boston, MA; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN; Los Angeles, CA; Montgomery County, MD) provided overviews of their CVE efforts, describing not only what they were doing, but their thought process for how and why they arrived at those sets of initiatives. Following these, the Summit planners facilitated a discussion on core elements of CVE prevention and intervention models.
On Day 2, the focus began with CVE in other countries. Representatives from three international sites (Australia, Canada, and Germany) provided overviews of their CVE efforts. Following these, the Summit planners facilitated a discussion of key themes, best practices, challenges, and next steps related to CVE. Each location further elaborated on a specific CVE effort (e.g. scenario training, social media, etc...) in their jurisdictions.
Reporting on the Summit

The recommendations included in this report reflect the major themes that emerged, focusing on those that the majority of participants appeared to support. The discussion points in this report reflect the participants' debate and dialogue throughout the two-day event.

Addressing the problem of violent extremism in the pre-criminal space through engagement, prevention, and intervention programs is a departure for traditional law enforcement and a responsibility the public has recently articulated for communities and other government organizations. In order for government, law enforcement, and communities to succeed in countering violent extremism, each must undergo paradigm shifts to a new framework that emphasizes using collaborative and multidisciplinary strategies to build community-based, multilevel prevention and intervention programs. The delegations that presented at the summit have already begun to make these shifts.

The first paradigm shift is the recognition by law enforcement organizations that CVE approaches are pragmatic when dealing with the issue of violent extremism, as law enforcement cannot "arrest their way out of the problem," and both resource constraints and Constitutional protections of civil rights make it problematic for police officers to monitor the pre-criminal space of radicalization. On the other hand, CVE approaches help to build trust and open lines of communication with the communities that police departments protect and serve, enlisting their help to identify and assist at risk individuals. Summit participants observed that law enforcement organizations should not only build relationships with communities specifically related to CVE efforts, but rather, intervention on other issues may create the kind of trusting relationship necessary for effective police-community relations on CVE efforts.

"If it wasn't for law enforcement, nobody would have reached out to this community. Zero. So we were the ones...At the beginning I thought it was not going to work because I would go into our housing complexes where Somali youth and elders were residing and nobody wanted to talk to us, didn't want to come to our meetings...my officers do as much social work today - I never thought when I signed up for this I would be doing social work, intervention and prevention initiatives. I think that's where the dollars should be going, not toward enforcement. That's what we've had to do. We stopped a sexual trafficking case. It was a terrible case. The reason I bring that up is that a woman in a Somali community told us that because of a partnership. We didn't realize this was happening because nobody would come forward because they didn't know if they could trust us. That led to 30 indictments."

Minneapolis-St. Paul Delegation

The second paradigm shift is recognizing that while the law enforcement community has an important role to play,
it should ultimately play a supportive role to communities and other governmental organizations. Summit participants noted that while it may be necessary for law enforcement to initiate CVE efforts, other community entities may be best suited to fully implement cross-disciplinary approaches, as much of CVE-programming occurs in the pre-criminal space and will utilize capabilities that are not organic to most law enforcement organizations.

"In the beginning we had to always be out front, as we were the most symbolic form of government - in uniform 24 hours a day. Today it has evolved to where police can still be there in a support role and let these other things take hold."

Los Angeles Delegation

A third paradigm shift is recognizing that countering violent extremism requires a broad array of capabilities and participants dedicated to building resilience at many levels of society simultaneously. By building more partnerships involving individuals, families, communities, and various government agencies, communities ultimately become more resilient to all hazards, including but not limited to violent extremism.

"For Boston, we want (to build) relationships because they will reduce issues of crime and violence. It has to be about strengthening local communities. I don’t think you abandon the CVE title, but put it in context as one of the threats you face."

Boston Delegation

**Summit Recommendations**

The Summit planners organized the participants’ recommendations according to the kinds of organizations responsible for implementing them. To be specific, the Summit planners identified three major categories of organizations positioned to implement these recommendations - law enforcement organizations, other government organizations, and community-based organizations. The recommendations center on strengthening family, community, and institutional defenses that will mitigate the risks for violent extremism.
To be clear, these recommendations are not prescriptive; they are experience-based recommendations that the participants felt others “should” follow if they are seeking to obtain the best CVE-related outcomes.

**Law Enforcement-Focused**

1. **Law enforcement organizations should prioritize building and strengthening mutual trust between themselves and the communities they serve.**

Summit participants discussed building and strengthening mutual trust between law enforcement and community organizations more than any other single issue. There was consensus that law enforcement and communities should establish a high degree of mutual trust before they can have productive conversations about issues like radicalization and violent extremism. Participants drew from their own experiences to share some helpful strategies.

As a member of the Montgomery County delegation stated, “The communities that need us the most often trust us the least.”

- The Minneapolis-St. Paul, Boston and Los Angeles delegations highlighted the importance of communicating success stories from within the community via trainings and in-services to help make law enforcement officers aware of the positive achievements and contributions occurring in the community. As law enforcement officers are regularly exposed to examples of criminality, this helps provide a more balanced view of the communities in which they work, enhancing trust.
- The Los Angeles and Montgomery County delegations highlighted the importance of transparent policies and practices for redress when law enforcement organizations make mistakes.
- The Dearborn delegation stressed the importance of ensuring that use-of-force and surveillance policies are up to date to avoid the potential erosion of trust that can occur between law enforcement and communities due to perceived abuses of power.
- The Montgomery County delegation discussed how their faith communities collaborate to develop law enforcement training regarding CVE. Similarly, the Boston delegation cited how the police department brings community representatives who work with law enforcement on CVE issues into training academies to deliver and receive trainings to increase mutual familiarity and trust.
- The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation highlighted the use of citizen academies and youth academies focusing on the roles and responsibilities of the police force, as well as youth summits focused on relevant issues, to enhance transparency and dialogue.
- The Los Angeles and Boston delegations stressed the importance of separating their community outreach efforts from their intelligence gathering efforts entirely, recognizing that using engagement activities to advance specific investigations could erode trust quickly.
• Every delegation discussed the need to build trust prior to an incident occurring, typically through consistent engagement over time, because trust is difficult to establish after a violent extremist incident/arrest has occurred.
• Several of the delegations highlighted the importance of hiring police officers who reflect the diversity of the communities that they serve.
• The Australian delegation stated that based on their experience, increased trust leads to greater input from the community regarding prevention, intervention, and disruption efforts.

2. To engage with communities, law enforcement organizations should be engaged with and responsive to community organizations and advocated consistently and over time.

Summit participants gave many examples that testified to the importance of ongoing commitments to build relationships with community leaders and groups. Engagement is certainly not a one-off event. Summit participants observed that in many cases law enforcement interacted with communities more than any other government agency.

- While each of the delegations stressed that key leaders must be visible participants and champions of community engagement, the Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul delegations also stressed the importance of community policing models in which senior officers are present, familiar with, and responsive to their assigned communities on a routine basis. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, Community Engagement Teams play this role, while Captains lead such efforts in Boston.
- The Montgomery County delegation stressed the importance of following up on routine matters, such as complaints or tips from the community, as a way to build performance legitimacy.
- The Minneapolis-St. Paul and Montgomery County delegations stated that it is important to try to answer questions from the community on the first phone call, without giving the person the 'run-around.'

3. Communication with a wide range of community partners on a broad range of topics should be part of the routine operations of law enforcement.

Summit participants emphasized the importance of information sharing and open dialogue for advancing CVE efforts. Through proactive communication practices, law enforcement and other government agencies can enhance their transparency, which would help build trust.

- Each of the delegations' law enforcement representatives discussed using social media to increase the reach and frequency of their interactions with communities and to communicate positive messages about their organization and its role in the community. There was also a discussion about how social media platforms can provide a forum for communities to voice their concerns.
  - The Boston Police Department representative emphasized the pragmatic value of social media platforms, which allowed them to quickly address rumors and incorrect information in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing.
  - The Minneapolis Police Department produces a community engagement newsletter, which it sends by email to a large number of recipients.

"We take the criticism also. I think it's a good conduit for people to express their opinions on what the police department is doing."

Minneapolis-St. Paul Delegation
Several of the delegations' law enforcement representatives stated that they hired individuals with communications or media backgrounds to lead their social media efforts.

- The Los Angeles delegation discussed its Youth Advisory Council, which meets with police monthly to discuss programming geared specifically for 18-30 year olds.
- The Dearborn delegation discussed various occasions in which the police asked a broad cross-section of the community for help on urgent security issues, and the community responded positively.

"When we have crime trends, we send out bulletins in two or three languages to homes and schools. We've had great results - whatever crime we have - we inform the community. There was a K2 (bath salts) epidemic in our county a few years ago. Several people died in the county from using it. I called the superintendent; he said, "I support you." We convinced the entire community to take that stuff off the shelves in gas stations and convenience stores – no push back. I had no expectation of what success would look like. We passed a city ordinance that equally outlawed it and made it a seven year felony. It worked and became a state law; in 14 days it was on the Governor's desk. We got all that stuff off the shelves in Dearborn before the rest of the state. I must have sent out 400 letters - every church, school principal, chamber, etc. You have to keep citizens engaged on every front...you can do tremendous things if people are allowed the opportunity."

Dearborn Delegation

4. Law enforcement organizations should focus prevention and intervention activities on behaviors, not on racial, religious, or ethnic identity.

Summit participants agreed that the focus of CVE activities should be on violent extremist beliefs and behaviors, and not identity itself. The participants felt that focusing on one ethnic or religious community can stigmatize that community and generate pushback on CVE efforts.

- The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation used an Urban Area Security Initiative Grant to develop a Community Awareness Program that focuses on recognizing suspicious behavior. They trained approximately 3,000 community volunteers on eight suspicious behaviors associated with terrorist attacks to help secure the Major League Baseball All Star Game.
- The delegations also emphasized being as inclusive as possible of different communities as another way to avoid stigmatizing any particular community. Dearborn maintains a local CVE working group with members from the law enforcement community, the media, faith-based groups, and schools. "If we have a meeting, we invite everyone. Whatever programming we put on in the east end, we do the same for the rest of the city."
5. Law enforcement organizations should collaboratively develop and evaluate multilevel prevention and intervention programs.

Summit participants agreed that engagement and partnership between law enforcement and communities are necessary but not sufficient to build individual, family, community, and institutional defenses that mitigate the multilevel risks for violent extremism. Thus, efforts to mitigate risks must consider multiple levels where risks can exist, including individual, interpersonal, family, community, and organizational levels. Therefore, communities and law enforcement organizations must eventually develop multi-level prevention and intervention programs. Summit participants endorsed program evaluation efforts that are also multilevel (focused on indicators in two or more realms such as community, organizational, socio-cultural, family, mental health) and that incorporate both qualitative and quantitative methods. Summit participants discussed several examples of existing evaluation efforts, but emphasized that more resources are needed to support evaluation.

- The Montgomery County program uses pre- and post- measures to assess program impact and is also undergoing a National Institute of Justice-- sponsored evaluation of its CVE program.
- The Canadian delegation gives surveys to participants after certain engagement events, and then uses the results to devise new action plans with the community.
- The Australian government has funded a university-based research panel to host workshops and generate objective research relevant to CVE efforts. This effort has resulted in a website, Resilient Communities, http://www.resilientcommunities.gov.au/pages/home.aspx, which serves as a clearing house for this content.
6. Government agencies’ CVE efforts should aim to increase the civic engagement among impacted communities and to build the capacity of community-based organizations.

Summit participants acknowledged that many, though not all, communities where CVE is a focus are communities that face significant social and economic adversities. They did not argue that underlying conditions like poverty or poor governance cause violent extremism, but they did agree that CVE efforts could not be most effective without addressing these needs as well, for two reasons. In addition to the fact that extremist recruiters and ideologues exploit local grievances and conditions, it is difficult for communities to develop capacities when they have limited resources or are focused on more immediate needs. Communities will focus their finite capacity on more pressing issues. While Summit participants recognized that ameliorating broader social, economic, and structural problems is beyond the scope of current CVE programs, they did stress the importance of working with underserved communities, and especially immigrant and refugee communities which frequently face these and other challenges, so as to promote their civic engagement and to build the capacities of their community based organizations. They offered several compelling examples of this:

- The Montgomery County delegation and the Boston delegation stressed the importance of servicing newer immigrant communities that may not benefit from existing programming geared towards more established racial and ethnic communities with different needs, such as Hispanic or African-American communities. In Montgomery County, the International Cultural Center’s Crossroad programs, funded by the Office of the County Executive, provide a model that other counties can adopt. It was established in order to provide social services and counseling to populations dramatically underserved by other county programs, primarily because existing service organizations did not have the cultural competencies to serve those communities.

- In Montgomery County, the Department of Health and Human Services maintains a network of over 500 nonprofit community-led organizations. When a new need is identified, the county executive identifies a community-led organization to take the lead, because this is typically less expensive and more responsive to the need than developing the capacity inside the government. The county executive allocates a significant portion of the county’s budget for this purpose.

- Germany has embraced the idea of using competitions to highlight local projects that demonstrate potential for success. These contests help spread good ideas, connect local actors, support promising efforts financially, and empower local leaders. The German delegation cited one example of an inter-faith non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Berlin that has worked to improve the condition of an underprivileged community.

7 “Other Government Agency” refers to any non-law enforcement agency from federal, state, local, or tribal government participating in a CVE-related activity. Common examples include local Departments of Health and Human Services, Departments of Education, and offices of the county executive. While law enforcement organizations have often taken a leading role in CVE efforts, several of the participating delegations stressed the importance of having law enforcement play a supporting role to that of other government agencies and communities.
7. Government agencies’ approaches to CVE should be based on sustained, collaborative partnerships with communities.

"The community member will bring the government representative out and have that representative confirm that there’s no recording going on, that this is a safe space where people can feel comfortable saying what they’re saying. We’ll make them say this in front of everyone to give a sense of confidence to attendees that you can be honest here. There are no negative repercussions."

Canadian Delegation

Summit participants agreed that the government approach to CVE should be based on sustained, collaborative partnerships with communities. They expressed the ineffectiveness of developing CVE programs in isolation and then handing them off to communities with no further support or participation. Instead, Summit participants believe that when government agencies engage in CVE programming, they should co-develop programs in partnership with communities or provide support to community organizations developing them on their own. Government should aim to empower communities on a broad front, rather than treat communities as merely an audience for their programs, especially narrowly focused national security programs that run the risk of creating a perception that the government is de-emphasizing the concerns of the community.

- The Montgomery County model is not law enforcement-centric. Instead, the Office of the County Executive is leading the effort, and does much of its work through its Office of Community Partnerships as well as a network of community-led NGOs.
- The Canadian delegation described an innovative community engagement and awareness program, called Storytelling, which uses first-person radicalization narratives (stories) to highlight moments when friends, family, and community members could have intervened. The community selects which stories will be read from a menu of narratives, selects a location for the event, and invites the attendees. The government representatives and a community member facilitate a conversation focused on how the community members can be empowered to conduct an intervention. Based on this discussion, the government then follows up to help the community develop prevention and intervention tools. The delegation stressed the importance of a strong relationship between the government and community before engaging in a program like Storytelling, as the emotional nature of the narratives can provoke heated discussion.
Most of the delegations mentioned the value of community advisory boards that convene regularly to engage with local government, and stressed how important it is for those boards to include representatives from a cross-section of the community.

8. **Government agencies should better leverage the contributions that other sectors, such as mental health and education, can make to CVE.**

Summit participants perceived violent extremism and the efforts to counter it as a multidimensional problem that requires multidisciplinary solutions. Summit participants noted that government is in a position to bring other individuals and organizations from various disciplines together to identify assets that could contribute to CVE. Additionally, they noted that government should be responsive to the needs of its communities and ensure access for persons who require government services, such as health and mental health, even if those services do not appear to be directly related to CVE.

- The Boston delegation described the importance of mental health and educational services for at-risk individuals, such as immigrant youth who experienced trauma prior to or during their emigration from their country of origin.
- The delegations noted that it was important to enable other civilian and government agencies to step forward and take the lead in areas where they have specific capabilities, such as those involving recreation, education, housing, or jobs.
  - The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation mentioned that they "made CNN last year" by working with the local YMCA to provide a culturally specific swimming program accessible to young Somali-American women.
  - The Boston delegation discussed the need to partner with hospitals and the Boston Public Health Commission to provide families with "wrap-around services" that the police department cannot provide.
- Dearborn is rolling out a Law Enforcement Mental Health Intervention model, which rather than prosecuting violence, focuses on curbing violence by leveraging mental health professionals within a framework that respects their capabilities and limitations.

**Discussion Points:**

Summit participants discussed the potential or perceived limitations of the mental health and educational communities in sharing health-related and education-related information with the law enforcement community. The Summit illuminated the need for increased understanding on the part of law enforcement, educational, and other practitioners regarding when it is permissible or mandatory to divulge information. The Summit planners support increased training and awareness of these laws, specifically the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.
• In Dearborn, the school superintendent is a co-leader of CVE efforts, and schools are a major partner to law enforcement. The school system involves parents, students, and law enforcement in tabletop exercises around school security issues to build trust and familiarity prior to an incident occurring, and to minimize the negative impacts if a crisis does occur.

"Some may be surprised to see schools here, but Chief and I can tell you incident upon incident we've been able to head off by building trust with our students. Police don't just build trust with adults, but build trust with kids in high schools and elementary schools and have headed off incidents because of those relationships."

Dearborn Delegation

9. Government agencies’ CVE programs and policies should be based upon both best practices and scientific evidence.

Summit participants’ current activities were more focused on program development and implementation than on evaluation or measurement. Summit participants stated that there is little to no formal evaluation of CVE programs in their communities, explaining that they do not have the expertise or resources to do so. Some described limited partnerships with university-based academics around the issues of evaluation and measurement. However, participants described the importance of building not only best practices but also scientific evidence of program impacts. START leadership discussed how having evaluation metrics on CVE programs is important for deriving best practices and for allocating resources within organizations and at the county, state, and federal levels of government. Summit delegates discussed a strategy whereby law enforcement, government, and community CVE programs might partner with university-based academics to collaborate on evaluation projects. Participants observed that demonstrating evidence of the effectiveness of CVE programs is a key to long-term sustainability and should therefore be a priority from the onset. Summit participants discussed how they have begun to do this:

• The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation is working with the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Police Executive Research Forum to conduct a study of community perceptions that aims to better understand and increase community trust in law enforcement officers.
• Montgomery County uses a set of pre- and post-quantitative and qualitative evaluative tools to measure the effectiveness of their preventative interventions. Some of the scales are validated from other studies measuring stress or anger management behavior. Others tools are experimental but based on studies conducted in concert with the University of Maryland. Montgomery County is also undergoing an NIJ sponsored evaluation of its CVE program.
• Montgomery County bases much of its CVE-related training on science-based research, including training on the risk factors of radicalization and "what violent extremism looks like," and other CVE-relevant training on topics like mental illness and mental fitness. The delegation described how they examine prior case studies of radicalization to better understand potential opportunities for intervention.
• FLETC leadership stated that continued research is vital in revising and validating curriculums used to train law enforcement on their role in CVE.
Community-Focused

10. Communities should advocate for a multicultural approach to working with law enforcement and other government agencies that includes not just one ethnic or religious group, and that aims to build capacities and increase civic engagement.

Summit participants acknowledged that it was best not to focus CVE efforts on any one ethnic, racial, or religious group. Rather it was best to be inclusive of multiple such groups in order to avoid the potential for stigmatization. Summit participants also emphasized that adopting a multicultural approach would help to ensure that CVE efforts were focused on individual behaviors rather than group identity, which is potentially discriminatory and unconstitutional. Summit participants also stated that a multicultural approach also helps to build community capacity and increase integration and civic engagement.

- The delegations noted that multicultural dialogue can facilitate learning, citing how newer immigrant and refugee communities can learn lessons from the experiences of prior immigrant and refugee communities in terms of cooperation with law enforcement and government. The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation stated that their experience engaging with the Hmong community helped to inform and enrich more recent experience regarding the Somali community.
- Dearborn has an interfaith community that meets regularly and which also engages in an interfaith table-top exercise. These exercises help the community institutions and individual community members build the lines of communication that allows them to "head-off" crises before they occur.
- When the Los Angeles team conducted a news conference, they brought representatives from multiple ethnic and religious groups so the focus wasn't only on one group and to emphasize multi-ethnic and interfaith solidarity.
- The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation discussed how the Somali community works with other minority communities on issues of mutual concern, such as health care, community service, and immigration.

11. Communities should advocate for partnerships with law enforcement that encompass a range of public safety issues that include CVE, but also other issues such as domestic violence, child abuse, human trafficking, and gang violence.

Summit participants debated whether or not it was best to focus exclusively on CVE, or whether it was better to integrate CVE with addressing other public safety concerns. Summit participants widely agreed that there are advantages to integrating CVE with other public safety concerns. They observed that this type of broader approach is less likely to lead communities to feel targeted in a potentially discriminatory way. Additionally, this kind of approach is more likely to engage the interests of a broader range of community partners.

- The Los Angeles delegation stated that engagement should be purposeful and address what the community perceives as its needs in order to be effective. They learned that the communities' priorities were integration, bullying, bias, and hate crime. This led to the formation of an anti-bullying/bias coalition, which demonstrated the responsiveness of the law enforcement community and helped to engender trust.

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For purposes of the Summit, the planners used the term "communities" to refer to any individual or group acting outside of formal employment by federal, state, local, or tribal government. For example, it may refer to student groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interfaith groups, sports clubs, or individual community members active in civil society.

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The Office of Community Partnerships in Montgomery County maintains three working
groups, including the Faith Community Working Group. This interfaith working group does
not focus exclusively on violent extremism, but instead on working with their broader
communities to mitigate all-hazards. This approach helps to depoliticize CVE-related issues,
while increasing the community’s capacity to deal with those issues through habitual
collaboration and dialogue.

12. Communities should advocate for community policing approaches to engaging with their
community on matters of CVE and other pertinent issues.

Summit participants strongly endorsed the significance of community policing approaches to building
CVE programs. They observed that communities embrace community policing; however, Summit
participants perceived a need to clarify and update what exactly community policing means in the
context of CVE. Traditionally, community policing combines traditional aspects of law enforcement with
prevention, problem-solving, community engagement and partnerships. Community policing in the
context of CVE draws upon that tradition, but makes modification and additions that address CVE issues.
Modifications may include creating special units with different expertise than typical community liaison
units, such as expertise on radicalization and violent extremism, greater or more specific cultural
competency, greater familiarity with mental health concerns such as post-traumatic stress disorder, or
specific knowledge regarding grants or other government resources available to support community-led
intervention or prevention programming. Several delegations emphasized the importance of community
policing to their CVE efforts:
- The Los Angeles delegation stated that it was important for CVE never to lose its roots in
community policing, suggesting that communities should know that their voices will be heard
without having to speak directly to the highest ranking officers in the police department.
- The Boston delegation stated that community policing is in their DNA and that it was fundamental
to their approach to CVE.

13. Community leaders and organizations should work with law enforcement to develop
procedures for non-punitive ways of helping people who are in the pre-criminal space of
radicalization and recruitment.
Summit participants shared information on how local, state, and federal law enforcement and communities are finding ways to help steer persons away from violent extremism that do not involve criminal arrest and prosecution. However, they expressed that more work needs to be done in this area.

- The Minneapolis-St. Paul delegation explained that when a law enforcement officer is told, "I'm worried about this person," police officers who are well trusted in the community, such as community liaison officers, will speak with the parents before taking any other action.
- The Los Angeles delegation and the Montgomery County delegation stated that standardized and transparent protocols are important to help establish clear lanes of responsibility between community organizations and law enforcement organizations regarding interventions. However, at present these protocols are often lacking.
- In 2012, the German government established the "Radicalization Advisory Center," which provides professional advice free of charge to those who call or email the hotline with concerns that someone they know may be radicalizing. Each case is handled on a case-by-case basis; the goal is to develop strategies with the person seeking help. If there is the need for more extensive counseling, the Advisory Center refers those callers to a network of NGOs and state and local resources.
- The Montgomery County delegation communicated that their Faith Community Working Group plays a valuable role contesting militant ideologies when an intervention team determines that ideological factors are playing a significant role in an individual's radicalization process.
- Many delegations discussed the importance of multidisciplinary intervention teams.

Discussion Point:
Participants debated whether, or in what circumstances, communities leading these efforts should involve law enforcement. They recognized that there were both advantages and disadvantages of having law enforcement involved. Advantages include protecting the community from legal risks or assuming liability when dealing with an at-risk individual. Disadvantages include creating a "chilling effect" on communities' willingness to conduct an intervention in the first place, or fear it may result in an unnecessary investigation or arrest.

14. Community organizations should build community-led CVE initiatives either independently or in partnership with law enforcement, government, and/or private institutions.

Summit participants shared several community-led CVE activities they are implementing and strongly endorsed developing more of these activities. Summit participants recommended that communities themselves take the lead on multiple elements of CVE. For example, they observed that community-based organizations should take a leading role in counter narrative campaigns, making more extensive use of social media to communicate with the public. Additionally, they noted that community-based organizations should seek partnerships with law enforcement and government organizations that address underserved needs and increase human services, especially regarding youth and families, to help foster trust in government and the resilience of communities. Summit participants also contended that communities are in the best position to build programs and campaigns that give parents better knowledge, skills, and awareness of violent extremism risk and protection. Lastly, communities may be
able to help law enforcement to understand how to better connect with difficult to reach sub-groups. Summit participants expressed that communities must have meaningful and ongoing input into CVE programs and policies and that community strengthening should be fundamental to CVE.

- The Los Angeles delegation stated that a division of labor between community and law enforcement was helpful, because when community members talk with fellow community members about certain CVE issues, it has much more credibility than if it was presented by a government representative.
- The Montgomery County delegation discussed both developing programs internally within a relevant NGO, but also having that NGO work to coordinate and work in partnership with the various governmental organizations that provide CVE-relevant services to communities.
- Several youth organizations from Minneapolis-St. Paul take a leading role in prevention programming, involving youth in skill-building programming, and using the creative arts to help young people express themselves in positive ways. Some of these groups have then partnered with law enforcement and government organizations to create internship programs.
- Participants from the Los Angeles delegation described an intervention model created by a Muslim-American NGO involving crisis-intervention teams comprising community members. These community-led intervention teams decide if they are comfortable including a member of the law enforcement community in their team. The program calls for the use of table-top exercises to prepare the intervention teams to engage with individuals who are engaging with extremist ideas but who have not yet engaged in extremist criminal behavior. This training is similar to training exercises used by offices within the Department of Homeland Security to train communities on how to respond to other hazards, and provides an opportunity for collaboration in the future.
The Summit’s Anticipated Outcomes and Next Steps

**Anticipated Outcome 1:** Local communities will gain access to best practices for implementing prevention and intervention strategies to prevent violent extremism, which build upon effective community policing practices.

To help disseminate the lessons learned during this Summit, the COPS Office and FLETC enlisted the help of the START Consortium, a DHS Center of Excellence based at the University of Maryland and comprising a network of scholars from around the world. START engages in research, education, and training pertaining to CVE among other topics related to terrorism, counterterrorism and resilience. START will post this Summit report on its website and will disseminate it in the START newsletter. The content of this report will directly inform START’s undergraduate course on *Innovation and CVE* and the coursework in its graduate certificate program. Finally, the Summit report will contribute to START’s development of a CVE training curriculum, funded by a Federal Emergency Management Agency Continuing Education and Training Grant, which will reach a national audience of CVE professionals inside and outside of government. Additionally, FLETC will post the Summit report on its public website, and will disseminate it to key stakeholders and partners in the law enforcement training community.

**Anticipated Outcome 2:** FLETC’s CVE training curriculum will be validated and potentially modified to ensure consistency with national goals and existing best practices in CVE.

The FLETC curriculum on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is designed to provide new federal officers and agents with a basic understanding of the concept of ideological extremism, along with an awareness of the various methods employed by foreign and domestic terrorist organizations to recruit potential operatives. The current curriculum focuses heavily on the myriad of factors that lead individuals to radicalize, mobilize and/or take action in support of these groups in order to highlight the various opportunities to identify at risk persons and take the necessary steps to intervene in the radicalization process. The discussions amongst the summit participants confirmed that communities and local law enforcement agencies continue to face the factors and methodologies currently presented by in the FLETC curriculum; however, it also provided numerous examples of intervention methods being employed throughout the nation, and internationally, to provide a counter-narrative to these groups. As a result, the FLETC will incorporate examples of these best-practice models to demonstrate the strategic approach currently underway in support of the CVE mission.

**Next Steps:**

The 14 recommendations that emerged during this national Summit centered on the need to strengthen family, community, and institutional defenses that mitigate the risks for violent extremism. This occurs when law enforcement organizations, other government agencies, and communities build trust-based, collaborative and multilevel programs tailored for local communities that address prevention and intervention in the pre-criminal space. It is the hope of the Summit organizers that other communities looking to build resilience to the threat of violent extremism can take the lessons learned and recommendations from this Summit to build successful and sustainable initiatives in their locales.
Future areas of emphasis include educating the multiple stakeholders and the broader public about empowerment strategies for countering violent extremism and helping them recognize how they can contribute to those efforts. This should include helping them to make the aforementioned paradigm shifts: recognizing the pragmatic value of CVE programming; leveraging the capabilities of federal, state, and local government and non-governmental entities in addition to law enforcement capabilities to help enhance community resilience; and adopting an all-hazards approach that strengthens community resilience to violent extremism among many other hazards.

There is also a pressing need to build scientific evidence regarding best practices for prevention and intervention programs that mitigate risks for violent extremism. Finally, while not discussed extensively during the Summit, some observers of CVE policy and practice have articulated a need to allocate greater attention to the development and evaluation of rehabilitation and reintegration programming.
Appendix A: Attendees and Support Personnel

State and Local Participants

Boston Representatives
- Deputy Superintendent Kelly Nee (Boston Police Department)
- Brandy Donini-Melanson, Law Enforcement Coordinator (US Attorney's Office - MA)
- Deeqo Jlbril, Founder and Executive Director (Somali Community and Cultural Association)
- Marianna McCormick, Communications and Policy Coordinator (Somali Community and Cultural Association)

Dearborn, Michigan Representatives
- Imam Radwan Mardini (American Muslim Center)
- Superintendent Brian Whiston (Dearborn Public Schools)
- Chief Ronald Haddad (Dearborn Police Department)

Los Angeles, California Representatives
- Deputy Chief Michael Downing (Counterterrorism Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department)
- Sergeant Michael Abdeen (Homeland Security Division, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department)
- Police Officer II Guy Golan (Liaison Section, Counter Terrorism & Special Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department)
- Salam Al-Maryati, President (Muslim Public Affairs Council)
- Joumana Silya-Saba, Senior Policy Analyst (City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission)
- Tiffany Cohn, Special Agent (North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation)

Minnesota Representatives
- Lt. Dean Christiansen (Minneapolis Police Department)
- Chief Thomas Smith (Saint Paul Police Department)
- Hashi Shafi, Executive Director (Somali Action Alliance)
- Kassim Busuri, Education Director (Minnesota Da'wah Institute)
- Abdi S. Mohamed, Community Outreach Liaison (Hennepin County Sheriff's Office)
- Mohamed Farah, Executive Director (Kajoog)

Montgomery County, Maryland Representatives
- Assistant Chief Luther Reynolds (Montgomery County Police Department)
- Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, Founder and President (World Organization for Resource Development and Education)
- Rev. Mansfield "Kasey" Kaseman, Interfaith Community Liaison (Montgomery County Executive's Office, Office of Community Partnerships)
- Rev. Dr. Carol Flett, Ecumenical and Inter-religious Officer (Episcopal Diocese of Washington), and Chair of the Board (Interfaith Conference of Metropolitan Washington)
- John Kenney, Coordinator (Emergency Preparedness Coalition, Department of Health and Human Services, Montgomery County)

International Participants

Canadian Representatives
- Anna Gray-Henschel, Senior Director of National Security Policy, Public Safety Canada
- Sergeant Derek McDonald (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
- Hussein Hamdani, Member (Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security), and Vice-Chair (North American Spiritual Revival)

Australian Representatives
• Inspector Brian Curley (Victoria Police, Australia)
  German Representatives
• Michael Vogel, German Liaison Officer (U.S. Department of Homeland Security)

Federal Participants
• Billie Yrlas Coleman, Policy Analyst, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice
• Timothy Curry, Deputy Director of Counterterrorism Policy, Office of Policy, US Department of Homeland Security
• Ronald L. Davis, Director, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice
• Brandi Donini-Melason, Law Enforcement Coordinator, US Attorney’s Office (MA)
• Gregory Ehrie, Section Chief - Domestic Terrorism Operations Section, Federal Bureau of Investigations/US Department of Justice
• Willie Johnson, Program Manager/Training Specialist, National Training and Education Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency
• David Gersten, Countering Violent Extremism Coordinator, US Department of Homeland Security
• Agatha Glowacki, Interagency Coordination Officer - Homeland Group, Countering Violent Extremism Branch, National Counterterrorism Center
• Charles Kelso, Attorney Advisor, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, US Department of Homeland Security
• Jennifer Kim, Federal Bureau of Investigations/US Department of Justice
• John Markovic, Senior Social Science Analyst, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, US Department of Justice
• Carl Milazzo, Deputy Assistant Director, Glynco Training Directorate, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Department of Homeland Security
• Lee Newman, Chief, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Artesia)
• Connie Patrick, Director, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
• John Picarello, PhD. Director of the Crime, Violence and Victimization, Research Division, National Institutes of Justice, US Department of Justice
• Jennifer C. Ranger, Branch Chief, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Department of Homeland Security
• Martin J. Roddini, Division Chief, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Department of Homeland Security
• Mark Royer, Senior Instructor, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Department of Homeland Security
• Irfan Saeed, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, US Department of Homeland Security
• Theresa Singleton, Senior Instructor, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Department of Homeland Security
• Brette Steele, Senior Advisor on Forensic Science and Senior Counsel, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, US Department of Justice
• Jennifer E. Tocco, Management & Program Analyst, Director’s Office, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers, Department of Homeland Security
Non-Federal Participants

- William Braniff, Executive Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland
- Stevan Weine, Professor of Psychiatry, START Affiliate, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago,
Appendix B: About the Summit Organizers

About the COPS Office

For 20 years, the COPS Office has strengthened law enforcement agencies’ capacity to address public safety through its core principles of community partnerships, problem solving, and organizational transformation. The same community principles that have been used for decades to enhance civic engagement and partnership around traditional crime, disorder, and public service issues are increasingly applicable to homeland security concerns. The COPS Office is committed to advancing public safety and homeland security through the implementation of community policing strategies. To facilitate this, the COPS Office broadly distributes information on addressing CVE though collaborative partnerships and problem solving. COPS strives to develop innovative programs that respond directly to the emerging CVE needs of state, local, and tribal law enforcement, emphasizing preventing, rather than reacting to, violent extremism. COPS-sponsored strategies include developing state-of-the-art training and technical assistance to enhance law enforcement officers’ problem-solving capacities, conducting community outreach, and building communication skills. Through this summit, the COPS Office gained a greater understanding of the emerging CVE needs of local law enforcement and the communities they serve. The findings from the summit will inform the development of future CVE-related initiatives funded by the COPS Office.

About the FLETC

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) is the Nation’s largest provider of law enforcement training. In Fiscal Year 2014, FLETC provided training to 58,666 law enforcement officers and agents. This includes providing basic and advanced training to 96 federal partner agencies and thousands of state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies at FLETC’s four domestic training sites and at export locations throughout the United States. In addition, FLETC serves DHS’s international mission through participation and leadership at the International Law Enforcement Academies, training and capacity-building activities overseas, hosting international law enforcement personnel at FLETC’s domestic training sites, and engaging with international partners in research and the exchange of best practices and subject matter expertise. FLETC pursues ongoing training review, development, and research in coordination with stakeholders at all levels of law enforcement to ensure its training continues to meet its partners’ needs. Since 1970, FLETC has trained over one million students.

For more than 40 years, FLETC has engaged in research to ensure its training remains relevant and meets the needs of the federal, state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement communities. One objective of the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violence Extremism in the United States is “to improve the development and use of standardized training with rigorous curricula based on the latest research which conveys information about violent extremism, improves cultural competency, and imparts best practices and lessons learned for effective community engagement and partnerships.” To this end, the Summit assisted FLETC in ensuring its counterterrorism curriculum meets the Nation’s CVE objectives as they relate to training.
About START

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism—better known as START—is a university-based research and education center comprised of an international network of scholars committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism, and to serve as a leading resource for homeland security policymakers and practitioners. Headquartered at the University of Maryland, START is a part of the collection of Centers of Excellence supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate and also receives funding and support from a variety of Federal agencies, private foundations, and universities.

In addition to maintain a broad research agenda specific to CVE, START is actively creating educational and training opportunities on the topic. START currently offers one of the only undergraduate course in the country on CVE, an undergraduate fellowship dedicated to the topic, and is currently developing training for CVE practitioners, supported by a grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Appendix C: Glossary

Community - a space of belonging, consisting of shared meanings, comprised of one or more of a combination of geographical, imaginative, emotional, political, and other ties.¹

Community based organization- an organization driven by community residents in all aspects of its existence, meaning the majority of the governing body and staff consists of local residents, priority issue areas are identified and defined by residents, solutions to address priority issues are developed with residents, and program design, implementation, and evaluation components have residents intimately involved, in leadership positions.²

Community empowerment - the process of enabling communities to increase control over their lives.³

Community-focused approach – community consent and participation in the governance of various strategies and approaches that are applied.⁴

Community mobilization- a capacity building process through which community individuals, groups, or organizations plan, carry out and evaluate activities on a participatory and sustained basis to improve health and other needs on their own initiative or stimulated by others.⁵

Community Policing- a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues, such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.⁶

Community resilience- measure of the sustained ability of a community to utilize available resources to respond to, withstand, and recover from adverse situations.⁷

Counter-narrative- actions to directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messages.⁸

Crime prevention- the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it.⁹

Cultural intelligence – being skilled and flexible in understanding a culture, learning more about it from your ongoing interactions with it, and gradually reshaping your thinking to be more sympathetic.¹⁰

Ejection - removing the individual from the community space, and contacting law enforcement.¹¹

Engagement- a planned process with the specific purpose of working with identified groups of people, whether they are connected by geographic location, special interest, or affiliation or identify to address issues affecting their well-being.¹²
Grassroots - people or society at a local level rather than at the center of major political activity.

Governance - all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language.

Human rights - rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.

Ideological extremism - the result of a process where individuals or groups come to intellectually approve of the illegal use of violence against civilians for political or social aims. Ideological extremists engage in lawful, constitutionally-protected free speech and other non-violent and legal activities, but hold extremist beliefs.

Intervention - the act or method of interfering with the outcome, especially a condition or process. Here it is dealing with a particular identified individual going down a path of violent radicalization or moving dangerously close to it. Intervention measures are both proactive and reactive.

Outreach - an activity of providing services to populations who might not otherwise have access to those services.

Partnership - an arrangement in which parties agree to cooperate to advance their mutual interests, involving equality, transparency, and legitimate cooperation.

Prevention - the action of stopping something from happening or arising. Here it is dealing with the problem by “nipping it in the bud” through efforts that focus on developing communities or important parts of communities.

Preventive Interventions - interventions aimed to enhance protective resources at population, community, and family levels so as to stop, lessen, or delay possible negative individual mental health and behavioral outcomes. Preventive interventions often use multilevel strategies that simultaneously address family, social, and structural issues.

Protective resources - social and psychosocial factors that can stop, delay, or diminish negative outcomes. Protective resources encompass not only resilience (e.g., bouncing back) but also resistance (e.g., preventing). Protective resources can reside in families, communities, and institutions.

Public Safety - the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters (natural or man-made).
Rehabilitation – the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement of and engagement in violent activity.25

Resilience - the capacity of a material or system to return to equilibrium after a displacement.26 Community psychologists use resilience to refer to a process shaped by resources – such as economic development, social capital, information and communication, and community competence – that may lead to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity.27

Securitization – reacting to a security threat in such a way as to erode civil liberties, increase executive powers, and decrease due process.28

Stigmatization- to describe and regard (something, such as a characteristic or group of people) in a way that shows strong disapproval.29

Terrorism – politically motivated violence designed to instill fear and anxiety.30

Trust- belief that someone or something is reliable, good, honest, and effective.31

Victimization- the process of making someone a victim; unwarranted singly out of one person from a group and subjected to unfair treatment and other wrongs.32

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1 Spalek, Basia. "Community-Based Approaches to Counter-Terrorism." Counter-Terrorism: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime (2012): 60.
4 Spalek, "Community-Based Approaches," 69.


"Safe Spaces," 64.


"Safe Spaces," 44.


"The ideological effects of framing threat on immigration and civil liberties." Political Behavior 34, no. 3 (2012): 477-505.


Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Toolkit

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DHS-Europol/EU Partners CVE Work Plan

Overall Purpose
Share information to improve the quality and effectiveness of law enforcement activities to prevent violent extremism in Europe and the United States. This will be achieved by sharing of best practice between DHS and Europol in concert with European partners. This best practice can then be shared with other European partners less active in this area and be implemented to improve overall best practice in the United States and Europe.

Main Objectives
1. Improve knowledge of indicators and behaviors of violent extremism among DHS and European law enforcement.
2. Identify best practices for training of law enforcement to prevent and detect violent extremism in the United States and Europe.

Deliverables
1. Exchange case studies and behaviors and indicators of violent extremism;
2. Exchange best practices of national and local law enforcement coordination and community oriented policing to prevent and detect violent extremism;
3. Exchange information on current and future CVE training curricula and identify CVE training best practice;
4. Learn about threats involving travel patterns of violent extremists between Europe and the U.S.; and
5. Exchange case studies on internet usage by potential violent extremists.

Case Studies: DHS, Europol and European partners will share case studies of violent extremism to demonstrate patterns of behaviors and indicators. Analyses of the Norway attacks will be prepared in coordination with the FBI, NCTC and DOJ and shared with state and local law enforcement (SLLE) officials in the United States and Europe via briefings.

1) DHS I&A will deliver a briefing of all existing case study behaviors and indicators to European law enforcement officials
   a. DHS/I&A provided a briefing to European law enforcement partners on behaviors and indicators of violent extremism at the White House CVE Conference and the two-day Europol workshop.
2) DHS and Europol officials will complete open-source research on the July 2011 Norway attack.
3) Europol will compile all existing information held by European law enforcement officials that is approved for sharing and will brief DHS on available information on the Norway attacks.
4) DHS and Europol will conduct interviews with 2-3 key law enforcement officials affiliated with the Norway attacks.
a. DHS is working with Europol to set up a 4 way video conference with Norwegian officials, Europol, European partners, DHS, and U.S. State and Local LE.

**Goal: Product to be completed by Feb 20.**

**Training:** An analysis will be conducted of training curricula being used by U.S. and European law enforcement for CVE to identify best practice. The product will be disseminated to U.S. and European partners. U.S. and European partners will identify effective elements of CVE curricula.

1) LAPD Deputy Chief Michael Downing will provide a briefing on the State and Local CVE curriculum on the next video conference with Europol
2) DHS and Europol will compile CVE SLLE training curricula among U.S. and EU partners and any other examples.
3) DHS and the EU will identify open-source resources on training materials in other countries, e.g. India.
4) DHS will be briefed by key EU Member State officials will brief on CVE training curricula that has shown promise
   1) Europol is working to set this up for a future video conference.
5) Europol and DHS staff will combine info from the U.S. briefings, European briefings and open-source research to identify best practice, including necessary elements for effective CVE curricula. After these analyses are presented to the working group, they will decide on further recommendations for improvements.

**Goal: Product to be completed by March 19.**

**Internet Usage** – DHS will work with Europol to exchange general information on behaviors, indicators, and trends of the use of the internet by violent extremists. Relevant information will also be shared with state and local law enforcement (SLLE) officials in the U.S. and Europe via briefings. DHS will work with Europol and European law enforcement partners to address the following questions:

1) What are examples of violent extremist convictions in which internet usage had a prominent role and what type of content was a contributing factor?
2) Are there trends of activity on the internet by violent extremists that could be useful in informing longer term countermeasures?
3) How could the internet and social media be used for counter-messaging?

**Goal: Product to be completed by April 2.**

**Multi-level and Multi-Agency Coordination to Prevent Violent Extremism:** Share best practices for coordination of national, federal, state, and local authorities (e.g. fusion centers) to enhance information sharing to prevent violent extremism.

1) European law enforcement officials will attend a DHS briefing on fusion centers and other initiatives like Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR), including a tour of DHS facilities.
   a. European officials received a tour and briefing of the Harrisburg Fusion Center on January 20, 2012.
2) DHS officials will tour select fusion center operations in Europe, e.g. Belgium.
   a. DHS officials will tour a fusion center in Europe in March.
3) DHS and Europol in concert with European partners will conduct interviews and identify existing successes and challenges in standing up and maintaining multi-level communication (e.g. fusion centers) to prevent violent extremism in the United States and Europe.

4) From tour briefing materials, interviews, and training, DHS and Europol in concert with European partners will compile best practices, including lists of successes and challenges, in order to brief DHS, Europol, and European partners.

**Goal:** *Product to be completed by April 30.*

**Deliverables**

1. Compendium of shared case studies and behaviors and indicators of violent extremism.
2. Collection of EU and USG training with gap analysis on similarities, differences, and future opportunities for collaboration.
3. Exchange information on Internet material used for violent extremist recruitment and increase awareness on potential violent extremist threats.
4. Summarize and exchange guidance on best practices for multi-level and multi-agency law enforcement and intelligence coordination to prevent violent extremism (e.g. fusion centers).
ISSUE PAPER: CVE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AND PROGRESS WITH THE EU AND EU MEMBER STATES

Talking Points:

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
National Capital Region CVE Workshop Summary

Overview
A two day workshop was held on July 11 & 12, 2012 over Countering Violent Extremism in the National Capital Region. The workshop was hosted by the CIA Threat Management Unit in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It was attended by approximately 160 state and local law enforcement officials from the National Capital Region. Panelists represented the hosting departments and local law enforcement. The first day’s focus was on Al Qa’ida and non-Al Qa’ida inspired terrorism and were discussed both generally and through some specific case studies provided by DHS, NCTC, and FBI representatives. The second day focused on community-oriented policing, building communities of trust, and other ways for law enforcement officials to become active in their communities in order to prevent homegrown violent extremism.

Panel Summaries

Al Qa’ida Inspired Homegrown Violent Extremism
The panel focused on how the agencies see the threat, what they perceive as targets, and what local law enforcement can do to help combat the Al Qa’ida inspired threat.
- Threats from Al Qa’ida inspired homegrown violent extremism are evolving away from complex attacks to lone actor and small arms attacks, and Al Qa’ida is openly supporting the evolution.
- Al Qa’ida inspired violent extremists have been targeting military buildings and personnel through small arms attacks.
- Takeaways include: preforming reporting from the local level, increasing dialogue with the community, and continuing suspicious activity reporting.

Non-Al Qa’ida Inspired Violent Extremism
The panel provided insight into domestic violent extremist groups ranging from White Supremacists to militia groups, as well as Lebanese Hezbollah.
- Many domestic groups are nonviolent, however each contain small sections that have and continue to pose a violent threat.
- Hezbollah’s presence in the US is based solely on fundraising and is not operational; however there is a continued threat to US interests abroad.
- Takeaway: Domestic extremist groups continue to pose a violent threat.

In-Depth Case Studies on Violent Extremism
The case studies provide insight into homegrown violent extremist threats. The cases presented were on Anders Breivik, sovereign citizens, and Hosam Smadi.
- Breivik’s manifesto is unlikely to inspire others ideologically, however it can be used as a guide for future attacks in terms of operations.
- Sovereign citizens are posing a greater violent threat to law enforcement and thus officials need to be informed and alert.
- Takeaways: case studies are easy for local law enforcement to take back and share; case studies provide first hand examples for law enforcement to learn from.
The Role of the Internet in Radicalization to Violence
- Terrorist groups have been increasing their presence on the internet, especially on social media sites.
- Radicalization is not a linear process, but social media can serve as a catalyst in the process.
- Domestic extremist groups use the internet for targeting, recruitment, and propaganda.

Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: Somali-American Case
Dr. Stevan Wiene presented his research on CVE among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis and St. Paul.
- The major risks to radicalization include a lack of communication to educate kids on the realities of Somalia and a lack of resources to keep kids out of trouble.
- Building resilience in the community requires active partnerships between family, community, and government.
- Takeaway: some of this study may be generalizable, however the best way to build resilience is to go and engage with the community.

Incorporating Research and Analysis on the Behaviors and Indicators of Violent Extremism into Suspicious Activity Reporting
- SAR training is critical in helping to understand what to report, why the reporting is important, how to report, and what happens to a report.
- Incorporating SAR into daily patrolling is an essential step in combating violent extremism.

The Importance of Community Oriented Policing
This panel brought together chiefs from two local county law enforcement departments and a retired FBI representative to talk about community policing and how to better integrate it into local law enforcement departments.
- Identifying a common thread that resonates with everyone in the community is a good way to initiate building trust.
- Community policing is not soft on crime, mutual trust leads to partnerships and information sharing.
- He stressed that community policing is a philosophy and still requires a treating people with dignity and respect it is an investment for community based problem solving for the future.
- Takeaway: the best way engage a community and avoid securitizing the relationship is to start by discussing issues that affect everyone and to show the main goal is public safety.
- Takeaway: spreading success stories is the best way to inform others about community policing, whether they are in the same department or in a different community; executive involvement is also needed.
- Takeaway: recruitment of diverse staff can help build in-roads; encourage youth to think about a career in law enforcement.

Building Communities of Trust: Partnership between the ADAMS Center and Law Enforcement
In this panel, a local Imam from ADAMS, a local law enforcement officer, a representative from NCTC, and community NGO shared a local success story regarding partnerships to increase public safety.
• The Imam invited NCTC alongside with a local Sheriff’s Deputy’s presentation on internet safety and in-roads were made into the community regarding internet safety awareness.
• The community had already developed trust with the Deputy Sheriff, and the Imam, but was unfamiliar with federal government; because presentations were given the community responded very well.
• Takeaway: the Deputy spoke about his use of “common thread” issues to build trust with the community and to work with parents to build a foundation for a community trust.
• Takeaway: it is important for communities to know that the federal government is an ally in CVE and public safety.
• Takeaway: the best way is to communicate success is by sharing positive feedback with staff and communities.

Cultural Demystification Training: Understanding Protected Religious & Societal Practices
Nawar Shora from TSA gave a presentation on demystifying Islam and Arab-American culture. Understanding communities will make community policing, developing partnerships, and identifying legitimate criminal behavior easier.

Informing Frontline Officers through Enhanced Training and Better Analysis
• Fusion centers help serve local law enforcement and they are continuing to reach out to the law enforcement community to build a better understanding of informational needs.
• The goal is for local law enforcement to become more involved in reporting SAR’s and working with fusion centers to help them better tailor their products and leverage their grassroots analytic capability more effectively.
• The Major City Chiefs is working with DHS to develop a CVE curriculum for law enforcement that should be finished by the end of this year.

Closing: Chief Lanier, MPD
Chief Lanier from the Washington Metro Police Department provided closing remarks for the workshop. She identified three main themes: identifying the threat and preventing it, community policing, and reducing the violent extremist threat.
• Local police are no longer demanding information from the intelligence community to do their jobs, the IC is now asking for information from the local police to do their job.
• Community policing is about creating bonds to encourage information sharing and develop public safety partnerships.
• Education on community policing is key to making sure that threats get reported effectively.
Discussion Paper: 2013 Proposal on Coordinated International CVE Efforts
Page 116 of 131

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DHS Office of the CVE Coordinator

MEDIA REPORT

White House Countering Violent Extremism Summit

Coverage: Events on February 17-18, 2015

Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015
TEXT: Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism | Feb 19.
VIDEO: President Obama Speaks at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.
TWITTER: @WhiteHouse: "When people are oppressed and human rights are denied...when dissent is silenced, it feeds violent extremism" — President Obama #CVESummit

TEXT: Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism | Feb 18.
VIDEO: President Obama Speaks at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.
BLOG: President Obama on the Causes and Antidotes to Violent Extremism.
FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.

Los Angeles Times
President Obama: Our fight against violent extremism
February 17, 2015, 11:03 p.m.
“In the face of this challenge, we must stand united internationally and here at home. We know that military force alone cannot solve this problem. Nor can we simply take out terrorists who kill innocent civilians. We also have to confront the violent extremists — the propagandists, recruiters and enablers — who may not directly engage in terrorist acts themselves, but who radicalize, recruit and incite others to do so.”

C-SPAN
February 18, 2015
VIDEO: Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, Secretary Jeh Johnson Remarks

Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015
U.S. Muslims Take On ISIS' Recruiting Machine
February 19, 2015

"Imam Magid, speaking upstairs at his Muslim center while a team of Muslim girls pounded out a basketball game below, said that real prevention meant programs that give young people as much purpose and inspiration as extremists promise. Once young Muslims buy into the ideology, he said, it is very hard to pry them loose. "You have to reach them before it happens," he said."

Obama proclaims: 'We are not at war with Islam'
February 19, 2015

"We are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam," Obama said during his remarks, adding later that Muslim leaders "need to do more to discredit the notion that our nations are determined to suppress Islam."

LA's Counter-Extremism Efforts Highlighted at CVE Summit
February 19, 2015

"In Los Angeles, groups like the Muslim Public Affairs Counsel have already implemented programs namely, the Safe Spaces Initiative - aimed at reaching at-risk young people. The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI have also been working with LAPD to deter radicalization since the Fall of 2014."

Twin Cities Delegation Attends Washington Summit to Discuss Terror Recruiting
February 19, 2015

"Richard Thornton, head of the Minnesota FBI, spoke at the summit and put it plainly: Minnesota has a problem. Young Somali men and women are leaving the state to join two specific terrorist groups: al-Shabaab or the Islamic State. He said he's not trying to scare anyone but that this is a fact."
"Muslim leaders need to do more to discredit the notion that our nations are determined to suppress Islam," Obama said, referring to the narrative from Islamic militants that Western nations are in a war against Islam."

"While putting the blame on IS and similar groups — Obama said the militants masquerade as religious leaders but are really terrorists — the president also appealed directly to prominent Muslims to do more to distance themselves from brutal ideologies. He said all have a duty to "speak up very clearly" in opposition to violence against innocent people."

"But Mr. Obama said that "we must never accept the premise that they put forward, because it is a lie." The operatives of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, "are not religious leaders — they’re terrorists," he said."
Groups like al Qaeda and ISIL promote a twisted interpretation of religion that is rejected by the overwhelming majority of the world's Muslims. The world must continue to lift up the voices of Muslim clerics and scholars who teach the true peaceful nature of Islam," he wrote. "We can echo the testimonies of former extremists who know how terrorists betray Islam. We can help Muslim entrepreneurs and youths work with the private sector to develop social media tools to counter extremist narratives on the Internet.''

"Minnesota law enforcement, politicians and Muslim leaders gathered Wednesday at the White House to tout a nascent, community-backed program as a model for attempts to prevent youths from being swept away to fight with jihadist groups abroad. Sharing a stage with authorities from Paris, Boston and Los Angeles at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, the Minnesota leaders stressed the early successes of the new pilot project.''

"What my community, the Somali-American community, needs today is no less than a Marshall Plan tailor-made to the community's employment challenges," Minneapolis City Council Member Abdi Warsame said as he described the poverty and lack of upward mobility that help drive radicalization.''

"Obama also painted the campaign against radicalization and extremism as "ultimately a battle for hearts and minds" in an opinion piece published Wednesday in the Los Angeles Times. He added that the focus of the summit would be on ways to empower local communities."
VIDEO: Obama Counters 'Violent Extremism' in Speech
February 18, 2015
"Speaking at his summit on countering violent extremism Wednesday, Obama sought to strike a balance between appealing for more acceptance of Muslim-Americans while emphasizing the need to remain vigilant against radicals who could turn violent."

VIDEO: White House has Summit to Stop Violent Extremism
February 18, 2015
"CNN’s Wolf Blitzer talks with Nabil Elaraby, Arab League Secretary-General about the White House summit to stop violent extremism."

Obama: Countering Violent Extremism Depends on Muslim Support
February 18, 2015
"President Barack Obama on Wednesday called on American Muslim communities to do more to counter what he called "violent extremism," speaking at a three-day White House summit on the issue."

Boston Civic Leaders In Washington To Discuss Violent Extremism
February 18, 2015
"It’s a summit drawing people from around the country, including Boston, to look at ways to counter violent extremism: to ask, what compels young people to join violent causes? And how can we prevent them from attacking the U.S. or going overseas to fight?"
Obama: US at War With Those Who Have Perverted Islam

February 18, 2015

"Yet the argument over terminology has increasingly become a distraction, including this week as Obama gathered law enforcement officials, Muslim leaders and lawmakers for a three-day summit on violent extremism. In his remarks Wednesday, Obama acknowledged it was a touchy subject but insisted it was critical to tackle the issue "head-on.""

Obama Announces Initiatives to Curb Recruitment of Terrorist Groups

February 18, 2015

"Even as the country wages this fight, Obama concluded that Americans should not lose sight of the fact that Muslims are an integral part of U.S. society. He recalled how he recently received a Valentine’s Day card from an 11-year-old named Sabrina who wrote to him, “I am worried about people hating Muslims. If some Muslims do bad things, that doesn’t mean all of them do.”"

CBSNEWS

Obama: Don’t Grant Terrorists Legitimacy by Labeling Them Islamic

February 18, 2015

"'Of course the terrorists do not speak for a billion Muslims who reject their hateful ideology,’ he said. ‘They no more represent Islam than any madman who kills innocents in the name of God represents Christianity or Judaism or Buddhism or Hinduism. No religion is responsible for terrorism. People are responsible for violence and terrorism.’"

Los Angeles Times

Obama Calls for Global Effort Against Spread of Extremist Ideas

February 18, 2015

"In his remarks, Obama also talked up programs in Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston as models for reaching what officials describe as “vulnerable communities” in the U.S. “These are partnerships that bring people together in the spirit of mutual respect,” he said.”
Barack Obama says US 'at War With Those Perverting Islam'
February 18, 2015

“Prevention is the focus of the conference. It's mobilised people from the trenches in the battle for hearts and minds to share best practices: everyone from teachers to entrepreneurs to Silicon Valley executives have been talking about community outreach to marginalised youth and counter-messaging Islamists on social media.”

Obama: We Must Confront 'Twisted Ideologies' That Spawn Violence
February 18, 2015

“Obama said that parents, teachers and faith leaders play a key role in preventing terrorist groups from penetrating into local communities. They are usually the first to notice signs that someone is beginning to adopt radical religious beliefs.”

By The Numbers: White House Takes On Violent Extremism
February 18, 2015

“Wednesday's schedule features a presidential keynote speech and sessions focused largely on domestic issues, highlighting programs in three American cities designed to combat recruiting by radical groups.”

U.S. Communities Called On To Prevent Homegrown Terrorism
February 18, 2015

“Participants in the summit will hear about pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis, where local officials have tried to combat radicalization. Those efforts have included law enforcement, but also the business community, teachers, families, churches and mosques.”
VIDEO: White House Convenes Summit on Violent Extremism
February 18, 2015

“...today the White House brought together community leaders law enforcement officials religious leaders and politicians, to share the ways they've approached the threat of violent extremism so other communities can learn.”

The Note: Countering Extremism
February 18, 2015

“Officials say the focus is on bolstering domestic efforts to address extremists' propaganda machine and engage young, minority (predominantly Muslim) immigrant communities with alternative opportunities and a sense of inclusion. The administration is highlighting three cities: Los Angeles, Boston and Minneapolis.”

Obama: No Religion Responsible for Terrorism
February 18, 2015

“'No religion is responsible for terrorism — people are responsible for violence and terrorism,' Obama told delegates at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.”

Obama: Extremism Fight is 'Battle for Hearts and Minds'
February 18, 2015

“'Our campaign to prevent people around the world from being radicalized to violence is ultimately a battle for hearts and minds,' Obama writes.”
Obama to Call for Joint Efforts Against Violent Extremism at Summit
February 18, 2015

"With that threat in mind, Obama is hoping to concentrate the world’s focus on the need to combat the underlying ideologies that entice otherwise modern individuals — including many disaffected youth — to behead a non-believer, kidnap a schoolgirl or shoot up a synagogue. During the three-day conference, Obama is working to highlight local models for preventing radicalization that could be replicated in other communities."

A Beaming White House Summit on Extremism
February 17, 2015

"Most of the summit’s work is focused on positive alternatives for potential IS recruits while also exposing the emptiness of the group’s vision and the likelihood of it collapsing from within."

Biden Kicks off White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism
February 17, 2015

"We have to ... engage our communities and engage those who might be susceptible to being radicalized because they are marginalized," Biden said.

Biden: Including Immigrants Key to Stopping Extremism in US
February 17, 2015

"Biden, in his remarks, held up Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis as examples of communities moving ahead with programs to counter extremism locally. He said the goal was to bring together broad coalitions of community leaders so that all Americans — and particularly Muslims — would feel like "we see them.""
Biden Opens White House Summit on Violent Extremism
February 17, 2015
“Biden took part in a round-table discussion with local leaders from Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis. The three cities have programs to counter extremism that the White House wants to promote as examples.”

Muslim NGOs Could Help Counter Violent Extremism
February 17, 2015
“The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism is an excellent moment for stakeholders to rise to the challenge and develop a sustainable, long-term solution to violent extremism by engaging and empowering Muslim NGOs as strategic partners in a shared fight.”

Biden: Including Immigrants Key to Stopping Extremism in US
February 17, 2015
“Joining local elected officials, community leaders and religious figures, Biden portrayed the U.S. as far better positioned than Europe, thanks to what he called America’s successful record at cultural integration. He said societies must offer immigrants an “affirmative alternative” to extremism, cautioning that military force alone could not address the threat.”

Joe Biden: Societies Must Offer “Affirmative Alternative” to Extremism
February 17, 2015
“He praised the efforts of cities like Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St Paul that have been working to develop prevention programs. He reserved particular praise for Boston, saying the city “did not turn its venom, its anger, its frustration against any community” in the wake of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three and injured hundreds.”
“Violent extremism is a local threat, so local law enforcement agencies should be on the front lines helping educate and strengthen our communities to prevent or disrupt these threats. The key is to overcome barriers by building trusting and lasting relationships; this creates resiliency,” Stanek said.”

“Sheriff Rich Stanek of Hennepin County said he’s already built something akin to the “community intervention team” Luger envisions. The department has a community advisory board of religious and business leaders, both from within the Somali community and outside it, who people can call about their concerns without immediately involving law enforcement. “They get calls, day and night, every day,” Stanek said. “That’s building those long-term communities of trust.””
VIDEO: Los Angeles ICG Prevention, Intervention, Interdiction Framework Presentation

Michael Downing
Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Countering Violent Extremism in Los Angeles

39 views
Hi Jeff,

Please find the two read aheads (Interview Questions and Strategy 1-pager) attached. Please attach these to the calendar invite for tomorrow's interviews.

Best,
Marisa Meyers
Analyst
Office of Strategy, Plans, Analysis & Risk
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
### DHS CVE Strategy Outline

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In the final analysis, our most effective defense against terrorism will come not from surveillance, concrete barriers, metal detectors, or new laws.

It will come from our own virtue, our courage, our continued dedication to the ideals of a free society. It will come from our realism in the acceptance of risk, our stoicism in the face of threats, our self-reliance, our humanity, our sense of community, too fleetingly expressed in times of disaster. It will come from our fierce determination, despite the risks, to defend our liberties and protect our values, for which we have fought many wars.

These are the kinds of defenses - the ones that come from deep within - that will make our nation unconquerable.

- Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation (Rand Corporation, 2006), 177.
### DAY ONE

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# WORKBOOK
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CASE STUDIES
(Listed Alphabetically)
INTRODUCTION
CVE OUTREACH STRATEGY

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is a strategic priority for the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and American law enforcement agencies. Over the course of the last year, DHS has sponsored a series of efforts intended to comprise a national CVE strategy and law enforcement training has emerged as a key component of the planned approach.

The goal of the CVE training project is to provide state and local law enforcement personnel the skills and knowledge to create, effectively execute and manage community engagement initiatives that have the potential to counter violent extremism in the United States at the strategic and operational levels.

Using the examination of case studies and lessons learned, an interactive model will be used and reinforced to cultivate better assessment and strategies for working with diverse communities.

This training involves facilitated discussion of actual CVE case studies and what the actions/strategies of community policing could accomplish in each of these cases. Traditional community policing will not adequately address the dynamics of violent extremism and the associated convergent threats. In this increasingly complex and ambiguous law enforcement environment, community policing requires new models that combine community and police resources to create environments where violent extremism cannot flourish. This outreach strategy will equip families, communities, and local institutions to be well-informed and therefore, our best defense against terrorist ideologies.
The Core Principles guiding the National Strategy for Counterterrorism include:

- Adhering to the United States Core Values
- Building Security Partnerships
- Applying Counterterrorism Tools and Capabilities Appropriately
- Building a Culture of Resilience

Goals

1. Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests
2. Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents
3. Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
4. Eliminate Safe Havens
5. Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities
6. Degrade Links between al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents
7. Counter al-Qa'ida Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al-Qa'ida Exploits
8. Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means
### MODEL OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION

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<th>Communities:</th>
<th>![Community Diagram]</th>
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<th>Context:</th>
<th>![Context Diagram]</th>
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2015-CRCL-00011-000145
### Refugee Case Study

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Do You Know?</th>
<th>What Do You Need To Know?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Context:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Person:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Outreach Strategy for this community:</strong></td>
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The United States was founded upon a belief in a core set of values that are written into our founding documents and woven into the very fabric of our society. Where terrorists offer injustice, disorder, and destruction the United States must stand for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity. The power and appeal of our values enables the United States to build a broad coalition to act collectively against the common threat posed by terrorists, further delegitimizing, isolating, and weakening our adversaries.1

- **Respect for Human Rights.** Our respect for universal rights stands in stark contrast with the actions of al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents, and other terrorist organizations. Contrasting a positive U.S. agenda that supports the rights of free speech, assembly, and democracy with the death and destruction offered by our terrorist adversaries helps undermine and undercut their appeal, isolating them from the very population they rely on for support. Our respect for universal rights must include living them through our own actions.

- **Encouraging Responsive Governance.** Promoting representative, responsive governance is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy and directly contributes to our CT goals. Governments that place the will of their people first and encourage peaceful change directly contradict the al-Qa’ida ideology. Governments that are responsive to the needs of their citizens diminish the discontent of their people and the associated drivers and grievances that al-Qa’ida actively attempt to exploit. Effective governance reduces the friction and space for al-Qa’ida, reducing its resonance and contributing to what it fears most—irrelevance.

- **Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights.** Respect for privacy rights, civil liberties, and civil rights are a critical component of our Strategy. Indeed, preservation of those rights and liberties is essential to maintain the support of the American people for our CT efforts. By ensuring that CT policies and tools are narrowly tailored and applied to achieve specific, concrete security gains, the United States will optimize its security and protect the liberties of its citizens.

- **Balancing Security and Transparency.** Democratic institutions function best in an environment of transparency and open discussion of national issues. Wherever and whenever possible, the United States will make information available to the American people about the threats we face and the steps being taken to mitigate those threats. A well-informed American public is a source of our strength. Information enables the public to make informed judgments about its own security, act responsibly and with resilience in the face of adversity or attack, and contribute its vigilance to the country’s collective security. Yet at times, some information must be protected from disclosure—to protect personnel and our sources and methods of gathering information and to preserve our ability to counter the attack plans of terrorists.

- **Upholding the Rule of Law.** Our commitment to the rule of law is fundamental to supporting the development of an international, regional, and local order that is capable of identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks, bringing terrorists to justice for their acts, and creating an environment in every country around the world that is inhospitable to terrorists and terrorist organizations.

  - **Maintaining an Effective, Durable Legal Framework for CT Operations.** In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States Government was confronted with countering the terrorist threat in an environment of legal uncertainty in which long-established legal rules were applied to circumstances not seen before in this country. Since then we have refined and applied a legal framework that ensures all CT activities and operations are placed on a solid legal footing. Moving forward, we must ensure that this legal framework remains both effective and durable.

  - **Bringing Terrorists to Justice.** The successful prosecution of terrorists will continue to play a critical role in U.S. CT efforts, enabling the United States to disrupt and deter terrorist activity; gather intelligence from those lawfully held in U.S. custody; dismantle organizations by incarcerating key members and operatives; and gain a measure of justice by prosecuting those who have plotted or participated in attacks.

1 National Strategy for Counterrorism – June 2011
LEGAL CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC

The Fourth Amendment

The first part of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution deals with the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A Fourth Amendment "seizure" i.e., detention, does not occur merely because an officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions, or asks for identification, as in a consensual encounter. However, a detention may result from physical restraint, unequivocal verbal commands, or words or conduct by the officer, which clearly relate to the investigation of specific criminal acts.

Consensual Encounter

A consensual encounter is an encounter between a police officer and an individual in which the individual voluntarily agrees to stop and speak with the officer. These encounters can take place on streets and sidewalks, in cars, on buses, in airports, homes, or businesses. A consensual encounter allows an officer who has a hunch or minimal information that a person may be violating the law, to engage the person in a brief conversation for the purpose of confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. What makes these encounters unique is that officers, because they have neither reasonable suspicion to detain nor probable cause to arrest, cannot legally prevent the individual from just walking away. The individual has a right to refuse to cooperate, in which case officers must leave the individual alone. Refusal to cooperate, by itself, is not reason enough to detain. Nor would a refusal to cooperate constitute a violation of Penal Code §148, which makes it unlawful for a person to willfully resist, delay, or obstruct an officer in the performance of his or her duties. So, officers must seek the individual's cooperation, which mean force, threats, and intimidation are out of the question. To be successful in a consensual encounter, officers must rely on a combination of their persuasive ability, personal restraint, common sense, and a good working knowledge of the law.

During a consensual encounter officers can gather information, interview witnesses at the scene of a crime or accident, have a casual conversation, and disseminate information. Officers may also approach an individual and request the individual to show identification, remove hands from pockets, or step to the side and answer questions.

Elevating Consensual Encounters

The exact words officer's use, and even their tone of voice, are extremely important to a court that is trying to decide if the contact was voluntary or not. If an officer starts to give orders, demand answers, display a weapon, use a harsh tone, tell the person...
to stop what he or she is doing, or to move to some other location, the encounter will be viewed as a detention, and it will be illegal unless supported by "reasonable suspicion." The courts have ruled the following commands to a suspect rendered the encounter a detention:
- Come over here. I want to talk to you.
- Stop.
- Stay there.
- Hold it.
- Police.
- Step away from your car.
- Sit on the curb.
- Put your hands on the dashboard.
- Get off your bicycle, lay it down, and step away from it.
- Put your hands up and get out of the car.

Reasonable Suspicion

An officer may need to detain a person in order to investigate that person's involvement in possible criminal activity. To be lawful, a detention must be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has taken place or is about to take place, and that the person detained is connected to that activity. This "suspicion" must be supported by articulable facts rather than hunch or instinct. These facts can be drawn from the officer's observations, personal training and experience, or information from eyewitnesses, victims, or other officers.

In some cases, the decision to detain is based on a single circumstance; e.g., the individual matched the description of a wanted person or a person who had just committed a crime in the area. But often the decision to detain is based on a variety of circumstances which, when considered as a whole, are sufficiently suspicious to justify a detention.

Contributing Factors

The following are some of the factors that contribute to establishing reasonable suspicion. Although none of these circumstances standing alone will usually justify a detention, various combinations of them will.
- Appearance of suspect (intoxicated, resemblance to wanted person),
- Actions (hiding objects, looking furtively, flight from officers or crime scene)
- Driving behaviors,
- Prior knowledge of the person (criminal record or conduct),
- Demeanor (nonresponsive, nervous, lying),
- Time of day (unusualness),
- Area of the detention (near crime scene, known criminal activity in area), and
- Officer training and experience (modus operandi, expertise in certain area such as narcotics or gang activity).
Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to make an arrest. Probable cause to arrest is a set of facts that would cause a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime. Definite information, or enough to convict the individual is not needed, only the fair probability that the individual committed the crime.

No matter what the context is, “probable cause” always boils down to the same question: Does an officer possess enough factual knowledge or other reliable information so that it is reasonable for him/her, in light of his/her training and experience, to believe “X.”

In addition to the facts, knowledge, training, expertise, experience, observations, etc., that the officer personally has, probable cause can consist of information conveyed to the officer by others (such as victims, citizens, other officers, and “official channels,” informants, tipsters, etc.), as long as it is reasonable to rely on this information under the totality of the circumstances.

Conclusion

It will be to the officer’s advantage to have a thorough understanding of consensual encounters, reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Proper application directly impacts the officer’s ability to enforce the law in a fair and impartial manner. Becoming confident in expressing the corresponding facts in reports and testimony will ensure that prosecutors file charges and cases are not dismissed in court.
The Photographer's Right
Your Rights and Remedies When Stopped or Confronted for Photography (Updated Nov. 2006).

About this Guide
Confrontations that impair the constitutional right to make images are becoming more common. To fight the abuse of your right to free expression, you need to know your rights to take photographs and the remedies available if your rights are infringed.

The General Rule
The general rule in the United States is that anyone may take photographs of whatever they want when they are in a public place or places where they have permission to take photographs. Absent a specific legal prohibition such as a statute or ordinance, you are legally entitled to take photographs. Examples of places that are traditionally considered public are streets, sidewalks, and public parks.

Property owners may legally prohibit photography on their premises but have no right to prohibit others from photographing their property from other locations. Whether you need permission from property owners to take photographs while on their premises depends on the circumstances. In most places, you may reasonably assume that taking photographs is allowed and that you do not need explicit permission. However, this is a judgment call and you should request permission when the circumstances suggest that the owner is likely to object. In any case, when a property owner tells you not to take photographs while on the premises, you are legally obligated to honor the request.

Some Exceptions to the Rule
There are some exceptions to the general rule. A significant one is that commanders of military installations can prohibit photographs of specific areas when they deem it necessary to protect national security. The U.S. Department of Energy can also prohibit photography of designated nuclear facilities although the publicly visible areas of nuclear facilities are usually not designated as such.

Members of the public have a very limited scope of privacy rights when they are in public places. Basically, anyone can be photographed without their consent except when they have secluded themselves in places where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy such as dressing rooms, restrooms, medical facilities, and inside their homes.

Permissible Subjects
Despite misconceptions to the contrary, the following subjects can almost always be photographed lawfully from public places:

- Accident and fire scenes
- Children
- Celebrities
- Bridges and other infrastructure
- Residential and commercial buildings
- Industrial facilities and public utilities
- Transportation facilities (e.g. airports)
- Superfund sites
- Criminal activities
- Law enforcement officers
The Photographer’s Right

Who Is Likely to Violate Your Rights
Most confrontations are started by security guards and employees of organizations who fear photography. The most common reason given is security but often such persons have no articulated reason. Security is rarely a legitimate reason for restricting photography. Taking a photograph is not a terrorist act nor can a business legitimately assert that taking a photograph of a subject in public view infringes on its trade secrets.

On occasion, law enforcement officers may object to photography but most understand that people have the right to take photographs and do not interfere with photographers. They do have the right to keep you away from areas where you may impede their activities or endanger safety. However, they do not have the legal right to prohibit you from taking photographs from other locations.

They Have Limited Rights to Bother, Question, or Detain You
Although anyone has the right to approach a person in a public place and ask questions, persistent and unwanted conduct done without a legitimate purpose is a crime in many states if it causes serious annoyance. You are under no obligation to explain the purpose of your photography nor do you have to disclose your identity except in states that require it upon request by a law enforcement officer.

If the conduct goes beyond mere questioning, all states have laws that make coercion and harassment criminal offenses. The specific elements vary among the states but in general it is unlawful for anyone to instill a fear that they may injure you, damage or take your property, or falsely accuse you of a crime just because you are taking photographs.

Private parties have very limited rights to detain you against your will and may be subject to criminal and civil charges should they attempt to do so. Although the laws in most states authorize citizen’s arrests, such authority is very narrow. In general, citizen’s arrests can be made only for felonies or crimes committed in the person’s presence. Failure to abide by these requirements usually means that the person is liable for a tort such as false imprisonment.

They Have No Right to Confiscate Your Film
Sometimes agents acting for entities such as owners of industrial plants and shopping malls may ask you to hand over your film. Absent a court order, private parties have no right to confiscate your film. Taking your film directly or indirectly by threatening to use force or call a law enforcement agency can constitute criminal offenses such as theft and coercion. It can likewise constitute a civil tort such a conversion. Law enforcement officers may have the authority to seize film when making an arrest but otherwise must obtain a court order.

Your Legal Remedies If Harassed
If someone has threatened, intimidated, or detained you because you were taking photographs, they may be liable for crimes such as kidnapping, coercion, and theft. In such cases, you should report them to the police.

You may also have civil remedies against such persons and their employers. The torts for which you may be entitled to compensation include assault, conversion, false imprisonment, and violation of your constitutional rights.
Other Remedies If Harassed
If you are disinclined to take legal action, there are still things you can do that contribute to protecting the right to take photographs.

(1) Call the local newspaper and see if they are interested in running a story. Many newspapers feel that civil liberties are worthy of serious coverage.
(2) Write to or call the supervisor of the person involved, or the legal or public relations department of the entity, and complain about the event.
(3) Make the event publicly known on an Internet forum that deals with photography or civil rights issues.

How to Handle Confrontations
Most confrontations can be defused by being courteous and respectful. If the party becomes pushy, combative, or unreasonably hostile, consider calling the police. Above all, use good judgment and don’t allow an event to escalate into violence.

In the event you are threatened with detention or asked to surrender your film, asking the following questions can help ensure that you will have the evidence to enforce your legal rights:

(1) What is the person’s name?
(2) Who is their employer?
(3) Are you free to leave? If not, how do they intend to stop you if you decide to leave? What legal basis do they assert for the detention?
(4) Likewise, if they demand your film, what legal basis do they assert for the confiscation?

Disclaimer
This is a general education guide about the right to take photographs and is necessarily limited in scope. For more information about the laws that affect photography, I refer you to the second edition of my book, Legal Handbook for Photographers (Amherst Media, 2006).

This guide is not intended to be legal advice nor does it create an attorney client relationship. Readers should seek the advice of a competent attorney when they need legal advice regarding a specific situation.

Published by: Bert. P. Krages II, Attorney at Law
6665 S. W. Hampton Street, Suite 200, Portland, Oregon 927223
WWW.KRAGES.COM
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PRESENTATION OVERVIEW

Formal Group Presentations:

Each officer, along with his/her group/table will complete a Formal Presentation on a Group identified in Day One of training. Your Community Outreach Project shall include researching cultures, sub-cultures, groups, organizations or historical locations that are related to that specific group.

Mandatory research for this project includes:

1. Identification of the cultures, groups, and organizations that co-exist around this specific group.
2. How the cultures, groups or organizations perceive law enforcement and identify what their expectations and needs are from law enforcement;
3. Examples of any previous conflicts with law enforcement and resolution;
4. Examples of positive police-community relations;
5. Law enforcement milestones within the community;
6. Identify the community leadership (both formal and informal) and how this does or does not impact a law enforcement response;
7. Current issues facing the culture, group, organization or location;
8. Recommendations on forming partnerships between law enforcement and community groups;
9. Identify any officers killed in the line of duty connected to this group and how this may impact law enforcement's relationship with this group/community.
10. Identify the person or key people, primary domain / perspectives
11. What was learned from your experience?
12. How the assignment changed their prior perception of the culture, group, organization or historical location
13. How the assignment will affect their performance in the field
14. List possible outreach strategies or milestones to be accomplished over the next year
15. Identify measures of success and progress should also be considered

Timeframe: Fifteen minutes and ten minutes for discussion with the audience

- Visual aids are recommended
- Must include a summary of the research

Sample Questions To Consider When Completing Your Project

What recent policy decisions have affected the area? Examples: airport expansion, gentrification, secession, gang injunctions, etc.

What demographic shifts or trends have affected the area? Examples: more renters than homeowners, influx of new residents who speak a language other than English

Results of the 2010 Census: http://2010.census.gov/2010census/
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<tr>
<th>Suggested Resources*</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
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<td><strong>Adult Protective Services (APS)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Advocacy Organizations:</strong> ACLU, MADD, SADD</td>
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<td><strong>African American Organizations:</strong> NAACP</td>
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<td><strong>Asian/Pacific Islander Organizations:</strong> APADRC, APALC, Center for the Pacific Asian Family, KYCC,</td>
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<td><strong>Blind &amp; Visually Impaired Organizations:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Chamber of Commerce</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Children's Advocacy Groups:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>City Departments:</strong> Commission on the Status of Women, Department on Aging, Department on Disability, Ethics Commission, Human Relations Commission</td>
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<td><strong>Colleges:</strong> Community, 4-Year</td>
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<td><strong>CPAB</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Deaf and Hard of Hearing Organizations:</strong> GLAD,</td>
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<td><strong>Ethnic/Cultural Areas:</strong> Chinatown, Filipinotown, Little Tokyo, Thai Town</td>
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<td><strong>Ethnic/Cultural Museums:</strong> Afro-American Museum, Chinese American Museum, El Pueblo, Japanese-American National Museum, Korean Cultural Center, Simon Wiesenthal Center</td>
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<td><strong>Family Violence Centers/Shelters:</strong> About Face, Family Violence Project, Jenessa Center, Sojourn, 1736 Family Crisis Center</td>
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<td><strong>Goodwill Organizations:</strong> Goodwill, Red Cross, Salvation Army</td>
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<td><strong>Homeless Advocacy Groups</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Houses of Worship</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Housing Developments</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Landmarks</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Latino/Hispanic Organizations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>LGBT organizations:</strong> GLAAD</td>
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<td><strong>Neighborhood Councils</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Persons with Disabilities Organizations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Rape Treatment Centers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Recovery Programs:</strong> Alcoholics Anonymous, Cocaine Anonymous, Gamblers Anonymous, Gangsters Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous</td>
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<td><strong>Religious Organizations:</strong> ADL, NOI, SCLC</td>
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<td><strong>Senior Centers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Service Dogs Organizations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Schools:</strong> Elementary, Middle, High, Continuation</td>
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<td><strong>Social Justice Organizations:</strong> Amnesty International, CHIRLA, El Rescate, Janitors for Justice, NCCJ, United Farmworkers</td>
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<td><strong>Tenant/Housing Organizations:</strong> Housing Rights Center, Inquilinos Unidos,</td>
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<td><strong>Veterans Organizations:</strong> American Legion, VFW, Veterans Hospital,</td>
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<td><strong>Youth Centers:</strong> Boys &amp; Girls Clubs, Bresee, YMCA, YWCA</td>
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A Community we do not know anything about

Trust Border
Instructions:

1. Using the network analysis on the previous page, identify three groups where outreach is needed.

2. Include justification why each of these groups would be a priority for your Department.

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The following questions are to prevent you from jumping immediately to a resolution without considering the needs and expectations of the outreach group.

**1. WHO - Identify the group:**

**Preferred Term(s):**
- Current Demographics (age, gender, ethnicity)
- History of Immigration/Migration
- History of Relationship with Police
  - Recent PD events
  - Significant PD events
- Diversity
- Political Views
- Spiritual / Religious Orientation
- Economic
- Literacy Assessment
- Language(s)
- Words for*:
  - Hello
  - Thank you
  - Good bye
  - Help

*Translation Sites:
  - www.babelfish.yahoo.com
  - www.translate.google.com
  - www.webtranslation.paralink.com
  - www.translation.babylon.com

2010 Census:

**2. WHAT - Do they value?**

**Family Roles / Relationships**
- Birth Rituals
- Expectations of Children
- Gender Roles
- Elders
- Death Ritual
- Privacy

**Communication**
- Modesty
- Personal Space
- Eye Contact
- Tone of Voice
- Touch

**Time Orientation**
### Special Clothing / Amulets

Health Views on:
- Getting Medical Help
- Birth Control
- Getting Psychological Help
- Domestic Violence
- Pain Management
- Words for Pain

Expectations on Education

Significant Holidays
- Duration
- Meaning

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<th>3. Connections – What are current issues / problems / concerns for this group?</th>
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<th>4. Perspective – Using the issues / problem / concerns identified above, what is the perspective of this group on the problem / issues / concerns? Is this perception shared or divided in the group? Also, are these key people?</th>
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<th>5. What additional information is required?</th>
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<th>6. What / Who is the source for that information?</th>
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<th>7. Do you know any key leaders / people?</th>
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<tr>
<td>4 Major Response Types</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Service:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assisting the public and referring them to appropriate partners</td>
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<td><strong>Enforcement and Alternative:</strong></td>
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<td>Enforcement will always be an important part of policing, some situations are in the public's best interest, in the pursuit of justice, to enforce the law by arresting and prosecuting the offender to hold them accountable</td>
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</table>

8. Using the 4 Major Response Types, what would be your primary response and out of the 4, what type does your response represent?

9. Who are your potential partners in defining the problem and acquiring the information?

10. Referring to the problems / issues / concerns identified above, what alternative strategies are available to address the problem?

11. Identify two additional responses from the 4 Major Types (Be sure that one of your responses include prevention)

12. What criteria would you use to determine whether your response was successful?
   - 
   - 

13. Where will you need assistance from partners to achieve these goals?

14. To improve outcomes, are there any political or organizational obstacles that need to be addressed? Who can help address those obstacles? Do you need to redefine the problems / issues / concerns to address these obstacles?
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<th>Person:</th>
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Hate Groups and Hate Crimes:

List how victims, families, and communities are affected by Hate Groups and Hate Crimes:

________________________________________
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How could a victim of today’s hate crime become tomorrow’s violent perpetrator?

________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________

Notes:

________________________________________
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Social Media¹:

Social media has become the tool du jour for thieves, frauds, combatants, terrorists, looters, and rioters. These groups are highly motivated, very skilled, flexible and resourceful in the application of a simple web-based service or software. Moreover, they are unhampered by governmental rules of engagement.

"Forms of electronic communication (as Websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)²."

What is the current social media message about community and police interaction/relations in your community?

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What is a possible counter-narrative message that peace officers may need to communicate?

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Why should law enforcement participate in the creation of that counter-narrative message?

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¹FYSA – For Your Situational Awareness: An Essay on Social Media's Impact on Law Enforcement Operations by LAPD Detective I Jeffery Duggan and Detective III Mark Tharp
Do you know if your agency uses any of the social media forms below? If so, which ones? (Check all that apply)

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<td>Constant Contact</td>
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<td>BlackPlanet</td>
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Identify pros and cons to maximizing social media in your Department:

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What are some ideas for a counter narrative?

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HATE GROUPS, CRIMES AND SOCIAL MEDIA

DIGITAL TERRORISM AND HATE 2011 – THE POWER OF SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE DIGITAL AGE¹

SITEMAP

2.0 STRATEGIES
Internet 2.0
Blogs – North America
Blogs – International
Networking
Video on Demand
Virtual / Games / Mobile
Miscellaneous
Targeting the Enemy
Social Networking
Religion
Re-Writing History
Conspiracy
Images
Miscellaneous
Recruitment
Blogs / Publications
U.S./Foreign
Gender / Education
Networking
Discussion Forums

Marketing
Music / For Sale

Boycott
Topsites
Games
U.S.
Foreign

TERRORISM
Strategies
Recruiting
Propaganda / Threats
Broadcast / Video
Networking
Images
Instructional
Explosives
Guerilla Tactics
Manuals / Other
Cyberwars
Support
Social Networking
Fatwas
Blogs
Recruiting
Women / Children
Media / Publications
Video
Fundraising

Who’s Who
United States
International
Icons – Global
Icons – Iraq
Forums

GEOGRAPHIC
U.S. / Canada
Social Networking
Internet 2.0
Nazi / Supremacy
Klan / Skinhead
Other U.S. Groups
Miscellaneous
Canada
Europe
Social Networking
Western Europe
Northern Europe
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
Latin / S. America
Youth / Music
Aryan
Other
Social Networking
Asia / Africa /
Australia
Asia
Australia / New Zealand
Africa / Middle East
Social Networking
Transnational

¹ Simon Wiesenthal Center Snider Social Action Institute
**CASE STUDY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET - 1**

**CASE STUDY:**

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Recommendations for Outreach and Mobilization

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Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) Definition:

A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently or direction by a foreign terrorist organization.¹

It has been identified that most HVEs tend to "cluster" into five groups, whose members share some motivating factors and characteristics, as well as, display similar life experiences during their radicalization to violence.

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<td>Terrorist Wannabe:</td>
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<td>Violent Nationalist:</td>
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¹ A Model for Understanding the Motivations of Homegrown Violent Extremists, Nov. 2011 - DHS
### Person Factors

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## GROUP FACTORS

### CASE STUDY:

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## COMMUNITY FACTORS

### Person:
- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

**Increase / Decrease Drivers**

### Group:
- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
  - Clergy
  - Ambassadors
  - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
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### Communities:
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- Local Businesses
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Resilience is just starting to be examined for understanding how individual's, families, and communities can become resilient to the influence and recruitment of violent extremists. These capacities might include:

- Economic development;
- Social capital;
- Information and communication; and
- Community competence

Resilience has also become a key term in the disaster preparedness field, where it has been described in terms of multiple subsystems (ecological, economic, physical infrastructure, civil society, and governance) and encompasses such elements as infrastructure and communication systems.

Resilience is just starting to be explored in regards to the potential recruitment of terrorists in the U.S. or violent extremists. Over the past ten years there has been a significant increase of interest in resilience in the clinical, community, and family sciences concerning a broad range of adversities. What does this new knowledge of resilience tell us about deterring terrorism or violent extremism?

- It tells us that you can be resilient to some risks but not to others;
- It tells us that resilience is neither entirely individual nor entirely social but an interactive combination;
- It tells us that when youth face risks from socio-economic and sociocultural adversities, their family is often the strongest buffer against the associated risks. How can we better help families to do so when they are already struggling to meet many basic challenges of daily life?
- It tells us that in diaspora communities, resilience is shaped as much by their home country and refugee camp internment as by American values and institutions;
- It tells us that preventive interventions have been able to lessen youth’s negative actions through effectively enhancing protective resources at multiple levels. This shift requires moving away from a heavy focus on risk factors to an equal focus on protective factors; integrating knowledge and practice concerning psychosocial factors with that of security; working collaboratively with families and communities to design programs and policies that work in real-world settings.
- It tells us that preventative interventions’ true aim is to reduce the vulnerability of a population. These interventions should not only aim to increase family and community cooperation with law enforcement, but also try to change basic family and community processes that will reduce young men’s entry into violent extremism.
- It tells us that effective preventive strategies are locally tailored, multi-pronged, sustainable, and involve far more than information sharing. Thus enhancing resilience to violent extremism recruitment will take more than a town hall meeting or an informative briefing, as important as those are.

1 Research on Violent Radicalization and Terrorist Recruitment in Somali Americans, September 2011 - DHS
The Executive Summary on Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism study is an explorative review on the CVE programs being conducted by 5 countries. The diversity among the objectives and approaches in these countries was striking. Reducing the risk of engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism was the key and the singularly common feature across the array of programs. None of the programs visited had systematic “outcome” data that could be used to evaluate them, but each had some useful elements.

1. **Singapore** - has a fully developed, multi-faceted, resource-intensive risk reduction program for militant detainees. The Government uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) primarily to neutralize terrorist plots rather than charge suspects in court. ISA detainees may be placed in physical detention or restrictive release. The program has three core components: Psychological, Social and Religious. As of 2010, 60 participants were in the program with individualized programs extended to the detainee’s and their families in perpetuity.

2. **Indonesia** - Detachment 88 (Indonesia’s police counterterrorism unit) operates a highly focused intelligence source development program that matches unit members with known violent extremists to develop individual, personal relationships. A local NGO operated by a former radical uses a similar approach but only for rehabilitation, not to elicit security-related information.

3. **Northern Ireland** - CVE efforts are embedded in a multi-layered national peace process based on a philosophy of “engaged grievance management.” The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) leads an engaged, community policing initiative that aims to challenge the ideology of violent extremists, empower individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and enhance community resilience.

4. **Great Britain** - There is an elaborate, multi-pronged national CVE effort that is focused on persons “at-risk” rather than those who are convicted or detained. The strategic cornerstone, known as PREVENT, involves countering ideological support for violent extremism, disrupting those who promote the ideology, supporting persons vulnerable to recruitment, enhancing community resilience, and addressing extremist-related grievances.

5. **France** - France believes rehabilitation or de-radicalization programs for violent extremists generally have no value. They view terrorism principally as a strategic threat, and have crafted an intelligence-driven approach to prevention. They seek only to counter violence and terrorism, not the underlying ideologies. Using the leverage of their laws and justice system, they assertively collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity.

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1 Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project - 2010
Research Results - The nature of this sample and the methodology employed do not permit a distillation of "best practices" as that term is commonly used. "Best practice" typically refers to an approach or technique that is far superior to any other approach. It is one that has been successfully implemented and is transferable elsewhere. Those conditions do not exist here. There are, however, some practical and overarching observations that emerged from the project, including:

a. In countering violent extremism, one size does not fit all (or even most). There may be no single "right" answer in trying to explain violent extremism.

Two suggestions seem evident:

1. Local knowledge is often a good place to start and;
2. People's motivational pathways in and through terrorism are often complicated. Extremism is not always driven by the explicit ideology or the "cause."

b. Among the countries studied, most have a goal in mind, but few have a clearly defined strategy for how to get there.

c. Different programs have very different objectives and expectations for both community-- and individual-- level outcomes. It helps to be explicit and clear up front about those objectives, how they will be measured, and which ones to pursue.

d. Nearly everyone thinks systematic program evaluations are important, but no one does them. This is a critical deficiency in this global effort. Knowledge of whether a program is "working" cannot be established without objective and systematic evaluation. Unknowingly sustaining and growing a program that is not working is costly, inefficient, and, at times, even counterproductive.

e. Systems and interagency relationships are critical. Partnerships among agencies and systems are a centerpiece of the approaches in every country where there is any degree of satisfaction or success.

f. Violent extremism is not evenly distributed throughout the world, and typically not even within a given country. Countries seeking to address the problem of violent extremism at a strategic level should carefully examine "hot spot" areas and conditions that might exist locally. They should also examine how the [state's] own actions, inactions, or reactions might be fueling rather than mitigating militant sentiments.
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CASE STUDIES

SHIRWA AHMED
Case Study: Shirwa Ahmed

Shirwa Ahmed was born in Somalia in 1981 and immigrated to the United States in 1994. His single mother raised him, along with his three brothers and a sister. Ahmed went on to graduate from a Minneapolis high school and become a naturalized US citizen.

The FBI also believes Shirwa Ahmed to be the first known American suicide bomber.

Many of the Somali teenagers who immigrated at the same time as Ahmed were unaccustomed to Western conveniences and luxuries, and some suffered emotional trauma from years spent amidst a bloody civil war. As a first-generation immigrant, he attempted to assimilate with the local Minneapolis culture but still retain his Somali family identity.

Ahmed learned to play pickup basketball, memorized rap lyrics, and emulated the clothing style and vocabulary of his American-born neighbors. When they rejected him, he was genuinely surprised, as he believed African-Americans and Somali-Americans shared a common ancestry. To compound the matter, his relatives disapproved of his associations with “ghetto people,” preferring that he honor the relationships of his family’s clan.

After graduating from high school in 2000, Ahmed took community college classes and worked odd jobs. He avoided the criminal activity that appealed to some of his peers. By 2004, Ahmed began associating with a group of fundamentalist Muslims and changed his dress and mannerisms, actively preaching his mosque’s form of Islam to people on the street.

In 2006, Ethiopian troops, with American intelligence support, invaded war-torn Somalia and overthrew the fundamentalist Islamist government that at the time was believed to be sheltering al-Qa’ida elements and threatening its neighbors. The invasion of Muslim-majority Somalia by a Christian-majority Ethiopia united Somalis around the world, who ordinarily display loyalties to their respective clans, instead of towards Somali nationalism.

In this environment, the al-Shabaab (“the youth” in Arabic) terrorist organization flourished, presenting itself as a group fighting to restore Islamic sovereignty in Somalia and exaggerating the degree of US involvement in the country. Al-Shabaab recruiters with combat experience in Somalia persuaded the first group of Minneapolis Somali-Americans—which included Ahmed—to travel to become “freedom fighters” in Somalia in 2007.

On October 29, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed drove a car bomb into a government compound in northern Somalia, killing more than 20 people, one of five coordinated al-Shabaab operations that day.

http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=6331697&page=1#.TsavUHMbUpw
A Call to Jihad, Answered in America

MinnieAPOLIS — The Carlson School of Management rises from the asphalt like a monument to capitalist ambition. Stock prices race across an electronic ticker near a sleek entrance and the atrium soars skyward, as if lifting the aspirations of its students. The school's plucky motto is "Nowhere but here."

For a group of students who often met at the school, on the University of Minnesota campus, those words seemed especially fitting. They had fled Somalia as small boys, escaping a catastrophic civil war. They came of age as refugees in Minneapolis, embracing basketball and the prom, hip-hop and the Mall of America. By the time they reached college, their dreams seemed within grasp: one planned to become a...
Shabaab’s Latest Propaganda Video

Related
Essay by Mohamoud Hassan (July 12, 2009)
Radio Interview with Zakaria Maruf (July 12, 2009)
Times Topics: Al-Shabab

From the Midwest to Mogadishu
While “homegrown” jihadism has caused alarm in Britain and other European countries, does the United States face challenges of its own?

Join a Discussion »

But last year, in a study room on the first floor of Carlson, the men turned their energies to a different enterprise.

“Why are we sitting around in America, doing nothing for our people?” one of the men, Mohamoud Hassan, a skinny 23-year-old engineering major, pressed his friends.

In November, Mr. Hassan and two other students dropped out of college and left for Somalia, the homeland they barely knew. Word soon spread that they had joined the Shabab, a militant Islamist group aligned with Al Qaeda that is fighting to overthrow the fragile Somali government.

The students are among more than 20 young Americans who are the focus of what may be the most significant domestic terrorism investigation since Sept. 11. One of the men, Shirwa Ahmed, blew himself up in Somalia in October, becoming the first known American suicide bomber. The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert M. Mueller, has said Mr. Ahmed was “radicalized in his hometown in Minnesota.”

An examination by The New York Times, based on interviews with close friends and relatives of the men, law enforcement officials and lawyers, as well as access to live phone calls and Facebook messages between the men and their friends in the United States, reveals how a far-flung jihadist movement found a foothold in America’s heartland.

The men appear to have been motivated by a complex mix of politics and faith, and their communications show how some are trying to recruit other young Americans to their cause.

The case represents the largest group of American citizens suspected of joining an extremist movement affiliated with Al Qaeda. Although friends say the men have never thought of carrying out attacks in the United States, F.B.I. officials worry that with their training, ideology and American passports, there is a real danger that they could.
A naturalized U.S. citizen who reportedly blew himself up in a suicide bomb attempt in Somalia last month might have recruited others to join a terror network, U.S. law enforcement officials tell ABC News.


ABC News has learned that agents from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security are investigating whether Ahmed had developed a recruiting network in the Minneapolis area where he had been residing before departing for Somalia.

More than a dozen young men of Somali descent, mostly in their 20s, from the Minneapolis area have recently disappeared, U.S. law enforcement officials tell ABC News. All are thought to be associates of Ahmed.

U.S. officials suspect that most of the young men have departed for Somalia to fight in ongoing violence there or to train in terrorist camps. Family members of the young men are said to be distraught, trying to figure out what happened to them, sources tell ABC News.

The Justice Department declined to comment on the matter.
The investigation has not uncovered credible evidence of a plot targeting the U.S. homeland, but U.S. officials want to track down all these young men before they can say for certain what this is or is not. Sources say the situation is being closely monitored by senior law enforcement and intelligence officials in Washington.

CIA director Michael Hayden recently voiced his concern about increased fighting in Somalia and the Horn of Africa and the desire of al Qaeda to strengthen its ties in Somalia.

"In East Africa, al Qaeda’s engaging Somali extremists to revitalize operations,” said Hayden. "And while there clearly has not yet been an official merger, the leader of the al-Shabaab terrorist group is closely tied to al Qaeda. And the recent bombings in Somalia may have meant, at least in part, may have been meant to strengthen the bona fides of this group with al Qaeda’s senior leaders."

"A merger between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda could give Somali extremists much-needed funding while al Qaeda could then claim to be re-establishing its operations based in East Africa,” Hayden said. "That's a base that was severely disrupted about two years ago when Ethiopia moved into Somalia."

Arrests of Extremists

Two weeks ago, officials in Boston arrested a U.S. citizen traveling to Somalia who was reportedly in communication with Daniel Maldonado, a Muslim convert who moved from the Houston area in 2005 and eventually ended up in an al Qaeda training camp near Mogadishu.

Maldonado was initially detained by Kenyan security forces in 2007. He pleaded guilty to federal charges of training at an al Qaeda camp in Somalia.

In the recent Boston case, Tarek Mehanna was charged with making false statements for allegedly lying to the FBI about his communications with Maldonado while he was in Egypt and Somalia.

According to the charges against Mehanna, Maldonado told him in 2006 he was in Somalia, "I'm here fighting," according to the court papers. The FBI arrested Mehanna as he was leaving the United States to take employment in Saudi Arabia.
Testimony of W. Anders Folk
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland
July 27, 2011

I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") for the District of Minnesota from October 2005 through December 2011. Prior to my work as an AUSA, I was a judge advocate in the Marine Corps, prosecuting and defending Marines and Sailors charged with criminal offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I am also a Minnesota native, who attended the University of Minnesota as an undergraduate and law student. Among other duties as an AUSA, I served as the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council prosecutor for the District of Minnesota ("ATAC"). In that capacity, I was responsible for working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") Joint Terrorism Task Force ("JTTF") in Minnesota to investigate individuals who were involved with terrorist groups or terrorist-related activity. In some circumstances, this led to criminal charges directly related to terrorism (e.g., providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization), and other times, charges with no direct relation to terrorism (e.g., immigration-related marriage fraud).

During the course of my duties as ATAC, I worked collaboratively with the FBI and numerous other federal agencies involved in national security to investigate al-Shabaab's activities in the District of Minnesota. This assignment ultimately led to work across the United States and the world. To date, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Minnesota and the FBI's JTTF in Minnesota have unsealed indictments against twenty (20) individuals – nineteen of whom were Minnesota residents – involved either directly with al-Shabaab or who supported others connected to al-Shabaab.

In addition to my work targeting individuals in Minnesota who were supporting al-Shabaab, I was also involved in and aware of, though less so, investigations into individuals providing material support to al-Shabaab in other federal districts within the United States.

By way of background to the investigation of al-Shabaab, between September 2007 and October 2009, over twenty mostly ethnic Somali men left the Minneapolis, Minnesota area and traveled to Somalia, where they trained with al-Shabaab. Many of them ultimately fought with al-Shabaab against Ethiopian forces, African Union troops, and the internationally-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Since their departure from Minnesota, these men have been involved in all aspects of al-Shabaab's terrorist activities, including military training, combat, suicide bombings, and recruitment.

The unique and extraordinary threats to national security that foreign terrorist organizations present to the United States are abundantly clear. Al-Shabaab's successful recruitment of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and the existence of a base of ideological and actual support for al-Shabaab in the United States raise a number of issues that require study in order to ensure that the United States maintains its safety in the face of the threat posed by the group. The lessons learned in Minnesota and across the United States from investigating and prosecuting members of al-Shabaab provide an opportunity for such study.
General Concerns Raised by Al-Shabaab’s Recruitment, Training and Operational Deployment of U.S. Citizens and Residents in Combat

The departure of men from Minnesota to fight in Somalia on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist group raises numerous concerns for federal and state law enforcement, the national security agencies and U.S. military, and for any community which experiences recruiting, fundraising or advocacy on behalf of designated foreign terrorist groups. First, the idea that it is possible that men (or women) may leave the United States, receive military training, combat experience and religious indoctrination justifying violence against innocent people, and then return to the United States to either put those experiences to use or to recruit others to do the same, poses a significant threat. Second, the strong social and family networks that individuals leaving the United States maintain when they travel to foreign countries to join foreign terrorist organizations enhances the reach-back capability of those organizations to conduct recruiting and fund-raising in the U.S., thus enhancing the organization’s ability to continue to function. Third, the recruiting of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents allows foreign terrorist organizations access to identification and travel documents that permit travel and access to and within the United States. Fourth, recruiting U.S. persons provides international terrorist organizations with inside knowledge about the United States that makes it easier to operate within the United States and to teach others to do the same.

There are a number of distinct challenges to protecting U.S. communities from foreign terrorist activities. First, the organizations are international, thus, often their members and resources are located outside the reach of a domestic law enforcement agency. Second, the organizations are often motivated by ideology - political, religious, or otherwise. As a result, the forces driving the groups’ desire for violence or other operational activities often cannot be controlled by law enforcement in a meaningful way. Third, because the groups are international, their modus operandi may not be easily discernable to domestic law enforcement agencies. Fourth, their members often will not be known to law enforcement agents.

Background on Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Recruitment Efforts

Al-Shabaab’s efforts to recruit foreign fighters are no secret. Its former leader, Aden Hashi Ayrow, called for foreign fighters to join al-Shabaab in a “holy war” against the Ethiopian and African Union forces in Somalia. This call was echoed by al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since Minnesotans began leaving the U.S. for Somalia, al-Shabaab has made significant and repeated efforts to advertise its cause, to recruit individuals from outside Somalia to join its organization, and to raise money in support of its operations in Somalia. Such efforts are disclosed in press releases, videos released on the Internet, and documents contained in publicly available court proceedings. Additionally, these efforts include the glorification of jihad, espousal of rhetoric critical of the United States, and justifying violence. Illustrative of such conduct by al-Shabaab’s are the widely distributed and viewed videos on the internet, one of which features an individual who left Minnesota and traveled to Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab and to recruit other men to travel to Somalia.

The Minnesotans ultimately charged as part of the investigation into al-Shabaab generally fell into two groups: individuals who have traveled to Somalia to fight, and individuals who have provided support from the United States to al-Shabaab members in Somalia or to
individuals in the United States preparing to travel to Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. Among the men who traveled to fight in Somalia, the individuals can be further categorized based upon the year of their departure for Somalia: the classes of 2007, 2008, and 2009.

Separate from these travelers is the additional category of individuals who were investigated and charged for supporting the travelers who joined *al-Shabaab* or who independently supported *al-Shabaab* financially. This category includes an individual charged and convicted of committing perjury before a grand jury as a result of false statements related to his knowledge of individuals planning to leave the United States for Somalia; an individual charged and convicted of obstruction of justice regarding his knowledge of individuals traveling from Minnesota to California, ultimately to leave the United States and join *al-Shabaab*; and individuals raising money from supporters in the United States and sending that money to *al-Shabaab* in Somalia via the *hawala* money transfer system.

### 2007

The class of 2007 fighters left Minnesota in December 2007, traveling from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Somalia via the Netherlands and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. At the time these men left Minnesota, *al-Shabaab* was not yet designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State. Upon their departure from Minnesota, members of the class of 2007 stayed at an *al-Shabaab* operated safe house outside of Mogadishu, Somalia, attended an *al-Shabaab* training camp, and in some cases, participated in combat actions on behalf of *al-Shabaab*. Of the men who left Minnesota in 2007, three ultimately returned to Minnesota. These three men were Salah Osman Ahmed, Kamal Said Hassan and Abdifatah Yusuf Isse. Isse and Ahmed both pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, for providing material support to terrorists. Hassan pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B and 1001, for providing material support to terrorists, providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, and making false statements in an offense involving international terrorism.

Other individuals who traveled to Somalia as part of the class of 2007, but who have not returned to the United States, include Khalid Abshir and Ahmed Ali Omar. These men have been charged with a number of federal criminal offenses related to providing material support to *al-Shabaab* but remain at large.

In addition to the individuals who returned to the United States and were charged with criminal offenses, the class of 2007 included Shirwa Ahmed. On October 29, 2008, Ahmed took part in one of five simultaneous suicide attacks on targets in northern Somalia that appeared to have been coordinated. These attacks resulted in a significant number of deaths, including his own, and represented *al-Shabaab*’s ability and willingness to use suicide bombers to carry out attacks.

Finally, the class of 2007 included two individuals who remained in Minnesota but were involved in criminal activity supporting the travel of men to fight in Somalia. Adarus Ali was charged with and pled guilty to committing perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, based on false statements he made to a grand jury that was investigating the travel of Minnesotans to Somalia to fight. Omer Abdi Mohamed was charged with and pled guilty to providing material...
support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, based on his role in the conspiracy to assist the class of 2007 to travel to Somalia.

2008

In January 2008, Mahamud Said Omar was the first of the class of 2008 to travel to Somalia from Minnesota. While in Somalia he stayed at an *al-Shabaab* safe house with other Minnesotans. While at the safe house, he provided money to purchase AK-47 assault rifles and to operate the safe house. Mahamud Said Omar returned to Minnesota in April 2008, during which time he remained in contact with members of the conspiracy and members of *al-Shabaab*. Upon his return, he assisted other Minnesotans in their departure from Minnesota to Somalia. Mahamud Said Omar left the United States for a second time later in 2008, and was ultimately arrested in the Netherlands pursuant to charges filed in the District of Minnesota, alleging Mahamud Said Omar's activities in support of *al-Shabaab*.

In February 2008, Zakaria Maruf traveled from Minnesota to Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. Maruf was charged with a variety of terrorism-related offenses following his departure to Somalia. Maruf's later death in Somalia was widely-reported. The reports surrounding Maruf's death included descriptions of Maruf's efforts to recruit additional fighters from Minnesota, in a manner consistent with the recruiting language and themes found in *al-Shabaab*'s videos available on the internet.

In August 2008, Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan and Mustafa Ali Salat left Minnesota for Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. Each has been charged with a variety of criminal offenses related to providing material support to *al-Shabaab*.

In November 2008, Abdisalan Hussein Ali, Abdikadir Ali Abdi and others, left Minnesota for Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. This departure took place less than one week after Shirwa Ahmed conducted his suicide bombing attack on behalf of *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. Abdisalan Hussein Ali and Abdikadir Ali Abdi have been charged with a number of criminal offenses related to providing material support to *al-Shabaab*. They remain at large.

Among the men in the class of 2008, the following have been reported killed in Somalia: Zakaria Maruf, Troy Kastigar, and Burhan Hassan.

2009

In October 2009, three additional Somali men left Minnesota and traveled to Somalia to fight. Amongst them was Farah Mohamed Beledi, recently identified publicly by the FBI and his family as being killed in Somalia in an attempt to detonate a suicide bomb. Another man who traveled to Somalia to fight on behalf of *al-Shabaab* was Cabduullahi Farax. Farax was charged not only with terrorism-related offenses, but also with lying to the FBI on multiple occasions about his knowledge of terrorist-related activities in and around Minneapolis, Minnesota.

As part of the class of October 2009 travelers, Abdow M. Abdow was also charged with and pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of others who traveled with him from Minnesota to California.
Financing

The criminal cases against Minnesotans and others throughout the United States financially supporting al-Shabaab highlight the central role that money plays in sustaining terrorist organizations. As illustrated by the cases of Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan in Minnesota, Nima Ali Yusuf, Basaaaloy Saeed Moalin, Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud and Issa Doreh in San Diego, California, and Mohamud Abdi Yusuf in St. Louis, Missouri, fundraising has occurred across the United States to support al-Shabaab. As set forth in the charging documents in these cases, al-Shabaab supporters sought financial support from others that they would then pool and send to members of al-Shabaab located abroad. Cutting off the ability for those in the United States to provide financial support to al-Shabaab is crucial to diminish al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out terrorist operations.

Recruiting

Al-Shabaab has made no secret of its desire to recruit individuals from abroad to join its cause. Al-Shabaab’s efforts to recruit include edited videos posted on the internet. These videos depict al-Shabaab training camps, combat footage involving al-Shabaab, and religious messages in an effort to glamorize and justify their actions. The videos include statements by individuals such as Omar Hammami, a U.S. citizen, encouraging others to join al-Shabaab and justifying the terrorist activities of al-Shabaab. At least one video put out by al-Shabaab includes rap or hip-hop style music and a message that appears clearly to focus on recruits in Western Europe or the United States. Additionally, videos celebrating the death of al-Shabaab fighters and extolling their virtues as “martyrs,” to include individuals from Minnesota, have also circulated on the internet.

In addition to the formal attempts to recruit through the internet and media, al-Shabaab has used its recruits to conduct further recruiting. As set forth in charging documents and a variety of interviews of individuals in Minnesota by the media, those men who left Minnesota to fight in Somalia have maintained contact and communication through phone calls, the internet and email with friends and family in Minnesota. In part, such contact has included the recruiting of others to join al-Shabaab. One of the more disturbing elements of al-Shabaab’s recruiting efforts in the United States has been the number of recruits leaving the United States who are teenagers. The fact that al-Shabaab has managed to convince very young men that a better life exists for them in Somalia, despite its abject poverty, lack of a functioning government and violence, is a testament to the persuasiveness and allure of its message.

In addition to recruiting by al-Shabaab as an organization and by individuals on behalf of al-Shabaab, religious figures such as Anwar al-Awlaki have provided potential recruits with ideological underpinnings for individuals to fight in Somalia on behalf of al-Shabaab. As has been publicly reported, al-Awlaki’s “Constants on the Path to jihad” has provided recruits and potential recruits with an ideological framework, however distorted and incorrect it may be, to fight on behalf of al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Threat Posed by Al-Shabaab

It is impossible to predict with certainty what, if anything, and who, if anyone, will come to the United States after training and indoctrination by al-Shabaab. It is obvious, however, that individuals who are trained, indoctrinated and deployed in combat by al-Shabaab have learned how to carry-out acts of lethal violence. Additionally, it is clear that the ideology espoused by al-Shabaab echoes that of al-Qaeda. This combination of ability and ideology illustrates the threat that is posed by even one al-Shabaab veteran residing in the United States. The ability to prevent or detect such a person from entering the United States or carrying-out any terrorist acts in the United States requires continued vigilance of the group’s activities in Somalia, but also to ensure that supporters or sympathizers within the United States are targeted for investigation.

Deterrence of Al-Shabaab Recruitment, Fundraising and Violence in the United States

To fight al-Shabaab and its supporters, the United States must engage in a multi-faceted approach that utilizes all of the United States’ abilities, including military, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic options. Further, this effort must be carried out in Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the United States.

Consistent with U.S. legal authorities, a focus must remain on Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and importantly include Yemen, to ensure that the U.S. targets al-Shabaab in the same manner as it does other foreign terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This targeting should focus on the application of military power and intelligence-gathering techniques to make certain that if there are threats or potential threats to the United States in foreign countries, those threats are extinguished in that foreign country and the information regarding those threats is provided as quickly as possible to the FBI and other relevant agencies. This will increase the likelihood that any connections to the threat that come from or link to the United States are identified and either eliminated or mitigated.

Second, the FBI must continue to investigate and prosecute those within the homeland who provide, attempt, or conspire to provide, support to al-Shabaab. This investigation and prosecution requires the continued use of all techniques within the FBI’s lawful authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), Title-III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and the Attorney General’s guidelines, to target groups and individuals supporting al-Shabaab within the United States. Additionally, as is illustrated by the Minnesotans who have left to fight in Somalia, the FBI’s relationships with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies are imperative to allow the United States to track suspects and if possible, affect their arrests in foreign countries where appropriate.

Third, military, intelligence and law enforcement techniques must be complimented through local outreach within the United States to the communities with members who have supported al-Shabaab. For example, the Somali community in Minnesota has experienced firsthand the negative effects that al-Shabaab recruiters have had in their communities. One way to work to gain cooperation and assistance from the Somali community is to provide education regarding how the Department of Justice’s investigative processes, the legal system generally, and civil rights operate, as well as ways they can help to strengthen their communities against the
message of *al-Shabaab* recruiters. Younger Somalis have in many cases invested in the United States through their education and employment, as well as through their athletic and social networks. It is important to ensure that they understand the government’s interest in them is not limited to putting their name on an indictment. Additionally, law enforcement will be more effective in its ability to detect and prevent extremist behavior if the Somali community trusts the FBI enough to make contact with the FBI or other law enforcement if the community has concerns.
CASE STUDY

DANIEL PATRICK BOYD
Daniel Patrick Boyd is the senior member of a group of seven North Carolina men charged in July 2009 with supporting violent jihad movements overseas. The defendants included two of his sons. All but one of the group were US citizens, and one was a legal permanent resident. A superseding indictment followed soon afterwards, accusing Boyd of plotting to attack the US Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia.

Daniel Boyd was born in the United States to an Episcopalian family. His father was a Marine. He converted to Islam shortly after high school. In 1989, he reportedly traveled abroad to train with mujahedin rebels fighting against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

In 2006, Boyd went to Israel for what prosecutors believe was an attempt to contact radical jihadists in the Palestinian territories.

Following a 2007 trip to Israel, Boyd allegedly lied to US Customs officials and FBI agents about his intentions to meet with two co-defendants in Israel.

In 2009, Boyd stopped attending mosques in his home town due to ideological differences and began hosting Friday prayer services at his own home. Authorities believe he attempted to radicalize and recruit young men in the Raleigh-Durham area to engage in violence against perceived enemies of Islam. His activities included demonstrations of the use of AK-47-style weapons in his living room, to develop familiarity and skills with the weapons used by mujahedin in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In an audio recording, Boyd described how he had once robbed a bank in Pakistan and intended to fund upcoming jihad by robbing Wells Fargo banks and trucks.

Daniel Boyd was a valuable asset to terrorist organizations. As a US-born white male, he was fluent in Western culture and language. His appearance could potentially draw less suspicion from other Americans than a foreign-born terrorist operative. He trained in paramilitary combat tactics, networked with international extremists, and deeply believed that killing Americans was a religious duty. Perhaps most unusual is the fact that Boyd offered a unique street credibility among local extremists due to his Soviet Afghan war experience.

 Authorities believed Boyd had participated in paramilitary exercises with other Islamic radicals in the North Carolina countryside.

When investigators searched the Boyd home, they discovered a cache of firearms; 27,000 rounds of ammunition; $13,000 in cash; gas masks; a book titled Emergency Response
Case Study: Daniel Patrick Boyd

to Terrorism, described by a federal agent as the FBI’s “playbook”; and a fatwa declaring war against America, and the killing of Americans a duty for all Muslims.

Boyd’s rural neighbors knew that family members were devout Muslims, but they were unaware of his alleged terrorist activities or of Boyd’s Afghan fighting experience.

In February 2011, Boyd pleaded guilty to conspiring to assist violent jihadists and participate in attacks in foreign countries. When sentenced, he could face life in prison.

North Carolina Man Admits to Aiding a Jihadist Plot

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON
Published: February 9, 2011

Daniel Patrick Boyd, a North Carolina man whose arrest on terrorism-related charges surprised the residents of his bucolic town, pleaded guilty in Federal District Court in New Bern, N.C., on Wednesday to conspiring to assist violent jihadists and to participate in attacks in foreign countries, Justice Department officials said.

Mr. Boyd, 40, an American citizen who worked for a company that installed drywall, and six other men, including two of his sons, were first charged in July 2009 with participating and supporting violent jihad overseas.

A superseding indictment two months later contained more charges, including one accusing Mr. Boyd and another man of plotting an attack on the Marine Corps base in Quantico, Va. He did not enter a plea on that charge on Wednesday.

Mr. Boyd is scheduled to be sentenced in May. He faces up to 15 years in prison on one count of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and a life sentence for conspiring to "murder, kidnap, maim and injure persons in a foreign country."
The cases involving the other defendants, including Mr. Boyd's sons, are working their way to trial, said Robin G. Zier, a spokeswoman for the United States attorney's office for the Eastern District of North Carolina.

At the time of his arrest, Mr. Boyd's neighbors in Willow Spring, N.C., about 15 miles south of Raleigh, were in disbelief.

Although they knew he was a devout Muslim, many were hearing for the first time that Mr. Boyd was known by an alias, Saifullah, and that he had been in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1992, training with and supporting fighters who were trying to overthrow the government in Kabul, Afghanistan.

The charges also said that he had taken his sons to Gaza to introduce them to jihadists and that Mr. Boyd had been stockpiling assault weapons and had participated in paramilitary exercises with other Islamic radicals in the North Carolina countryside.

The indictments described a period from 2006 to 2009 during which Mr. Boyd plotted with other radical Muslims to recruit jihadists and send material support to fighters overseas.

"This case proves how our world is changing," the United States attorney, George E. B. Holding, said in a statement on Wednesday. "Terrorists are no longer only from foreign countries, but also citizens who live within our own borders."

A version of this article appeared in print on February 10, 2011, on page A14 of the New York edition.
Arrests in Terror Case Bewilder Associates

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON
Published: July 28, 2009

WILLOW SPRING, N.C. — Daniel Boyd was a man of rare conviction for these parts.

Rare because he and his family were Muslims in this quiet rural subdivision where the denominations generally run from Baptist to Presbyterian. But also rare for his intensity.

“How many Christians you see standing in the yard praying five times a day?” asked Jeremy Kuhn, 20, who lives across the street. “They just believed more than anyone else.”
But to the disbelief of Mr. Kuhn, the federal authorities say Mr. Boyd and two of his sons took their convictions beyond religious faith and into terrorism. They were among seven men charged on Monday with supporting violent jihad movements in countries including Israel, Jordan, Kosovo and Pakistan. An eighth man was still being sought, said a spokeswoman for federal prosecutors in Raleigh, about 20 miles north of here.

The men are charged with stockpiling automatic weapons and traveling abroad numerous times to participate in jihadist movements. There is no indication in the indictment that they were planning attacks in the United States, though prosecutors said they had practiced military tactics this summer in a rural county close to Virginia.

Their plans apparently involved a suicide attack, according to an e-mail message Mr. Boyd sent in 2008 to another defendant, Hysen Sherifi, about dying as a martyr.

Besides Mr. Boyd, who is 39, the indictment names his sons Zakariya, 20, and Dylan, 22; Anes Subasic, 33; Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, 22; Ziyad Yaghi, 21; and Mr. Sherifi, 24. All are American citizens except Mr. Sherifi, who is from Kosovo and has legal residence in the United States. Detention hearings for the men are set for Thursday.

Mr. Boyd, the son of a Marine, is a convert to Islam, and received training from Islamic radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the indictment said.

Prosecutors said much of the activity took place over the last three years, citing coded conversations, exchanges of cash, numerous gun purchases and a Kalashnikov demonstration in Mr. Boyd's living room.

Mr. Boyd, the central figure in the indictment, is also charged with lying to federal agents in 2007 about his reasons for a trip to Israel. According to the indictment, he and several other defendants had intended to join violent jihadists in the Palestinian
territories, though the trip was ultimately unsuccessful.

It was the second trip to Israel mentioned in the indictment. Mr. Boyd is said to have taken his son Dylan to Gaza meet jihadists in March 2006, though that, too, was apparently unsuccessful.

Highlighted in the indictment, but not part of the charges, was a period the authorities say Mr. Boyd spent with his brother in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1992, training with and supporting fighters who were trying to overthrow the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. They were in the news at the time, when the Pakistani government charged them with bank robbery and sentenced them to lose their right hands and left feet. (The convictions were overturned by the Pakistani Supreme Court at the urging of the State Department.)

Federal officials in Washington said that the men charged on Monday were not seen as serious terrorist threats to the United States or American interests abroad, and that there were no indications of ties to Al Qaeda or other militant groups. But the officials said there was concern that they were amassing a sizable number of automatic weapons, given Mr. Boyd’s record as a foreign fighter.

“What essentially this is about is a guy with foreign fighter experience,” said one law enforcement official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the pending prosecution, “who comes back to the U.S. from the conflict zone with street cred and a network of contacts overseas, intending to recruit others who were on the fence.”

Mr. Boyd’s wife, Sabrina, cited that same period in defense of her husband. “He was there fighting against the Soviets in a war that had the full backing of the U.S. government,” Ms. Boyd said through a spokeswoman, Khalilah Sabra of the American Muslim Society Freedom Foundation, an advocacy group.

Ms. Boyd is also an American, and, according to a 1991 Washington Post report, the couple were high school sweethearts in Northern Virginia. A neighbor said the Boyds looked for other churches before settling on Islam. The Post profile said Mr. Boyd’s stepfather was a Muslim.

“The charges have not been substantiated,” Ms. Boyd said. “We are an ordinary family,
and we have the right to justice, and we believe justice will prevail. We are decent people who care about other human beings."

Neighbors were startled, even angered by the arrests, which they learned about when federal agents, some carrying assault weapons, swarmed over the lawn of the Boyds' house.

The house, with a Ford Bronco in the driveway and a swimming pool in the back, looks like any other in the quiet subdivision, and neighbors said the Boyds were generally no different than anyone else, other than being nicer than average. Mr. Boyd ran a company installing drywall, for which his two older sons often worked. The Boyds had two younger sons, one of whom was killed in a car accident two years ago, and a daughter.

Prosecutors said Mr. Boyd had stopped attending mosques this year because of "ideological differences" and had begun having Friday prayer services at home.

The Boyds had the usual interactions with the neighbors — tool swapping, rides to school — and other than a day when the house was egged, which neighbors attributed to their religion, their faith did not seem to be an issue.

"We never really had a problem with it," said Anthony Perfetto, 15, who used to have after-school snacks at the Boyd home. "All they'd say about it was like they had to go pray, and that's about it."

All of which has left neighbors shaking their heads and repeating that there must have been some kind of mistake.

"I don't believe any of this," Mr. Kuhn said. "And it's going to take a whole lot of evidence to convince me otherwise."

*Liz Robbins contributed reporting from New York, and Eric Schmitt from Washington.*
Daniel Patrick Boyd is among seven men charged by a federal grand jury with supporting violent jihad movements in countries including Israel, Jordan, Kosovo and Pakistan.

The men are charged with stockpiling automatic weapons and traveling abroad numerous times to participate in jihadist movements. There is no indication in the indictment that they were planning attacks in the United States, though prosecutors said they had practiced military tactics this summer in a rural county close to Virginia.

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>> Read the Indictment

**Highlights From the Archives**

**7 Charged With Plotting ‘Violent Jihad’ Abroad**
**By ROBERT MACKEY**
Federal agents arrested seven men in North Carolina and charged them with plotting attacks outside the U.S.

*July 28, 2009* | *BLOGS | WEB LOG*

**North Carolina: Second Guilty Plea in Terror Case**
**By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON**
The 22-year-old son of a North Carolina man who pleaded guilty in February to supporting Islamist terrorism pleaded guilty himself on Tuesday, Justice Department officials said.
June 8, 2011
MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: NORTH CAROLINA, BOYD, ZAKARIYA

Daniel Boyd Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges in N. Carolina
By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON
Daniel Patrick Boyd, who worked for a drywall installation company, was charged with conspiring to assist Islamic militants and to participate in attacks overseas.

February 10, 2011
MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: MILITARY BASES AND INSTALLATIONS, ISLAM, TERRORISM, DECISIONS AND VERDICTS, NEW BERN (NC), NORTH CAROLINA, QUANTICO (VA)

The Allure of Terrorism
By OLIVIER ROY
Radicalization takes place in the virtual ummah, not in Yemen, or Afghanistan.

January 11, 2010
MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: MOSQUES, TERRORISM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AL QAEDA

Court in North Carolina Hears Tapes in Terror Case
By VICTORIA CHERIE
Federal prosecutors played recordings in which the man accused of being the ringleader of a group of radical Muslims advocated violent jihad against the West.

August 5, 2009
MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: ISLAM, RECORDINGS AND DOWNLOADS (AUDIO), TERRORISM, NORTH CAROLINA

Arrests in Terror Case Bewilder Associates
By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON; LZ ROBBINS CONTRIBUTED REPORTING FROM NEW YORK, and ERIC SCHMITT FROM
American Arrested for Plotting 'Violent Jihad' Abroad

By ROBERT MACKEY

Associated Press

Undated

Images of four of the men arrested on Monday in North Carolina on terrorism charges. From left, Daniel Boyd, Hysen Sherifi, Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan and Ziyad Yaghi.

Updated | 4:29 p.m. Federal agents arrested seven men in North Carolina on Monday and charged them with plotting to wage "violent jihad" outside the United States, according to an indictment unsealed in federal court in Raleigh, N.C. The full text of the indictment is embedded below.

The government charged Daniel Boyd, a 39-year-old American who traveled to Afghanistan two decades ago to fight the Soviet-backed government, with recruiting six young men, including two of his sons, to take part in a conspiracy "to advance violent jihad, including supporting and participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping or maiming persons abroad."

According to the indictment, members of the group practiced military tactics and the use of weapons in rural North Carolina, and traveled to Gaza, Israel, Jordan and Kosovo hoping "to engage in violent jihad." The indictment also claims that an eighth member of the group, who is still at large, traveled to Pakistan for the same purpose.

A North Carolina newspaper, The News & Observer, reported on Monday night: "The charges are related to allegations that they helped raise money and provide training for terrorism operations in Tel Aviv, Israel." The newspaper added "Federal officials will not say where the men are being held."

The Justice Department identified two of the suspects as Mr. Boyd's sons Zakariya Boyd, 20 and Dylan Boyd, 22. The others are Anes Subasic, 33; Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, 22; Ziyad Yaghi, 21 and Hysen Sherifi, 24. All are American citizens except Mr. Sherifi, who is a native of Kosovo but a permanent legal resident of the United States. The Associated Press reports that "no attorneys for the men were listed in court records." Mr. Boyd's mother told The A.P. that she knew nothing about the case but that it "certainly sounds weird." The father of Mr. Hassan declined to comment and family members of the other me were unable to be reached on Tuesday.

The Justice Department's summary of the charges lays out several apparently unsuccessful efforts by members of the group to take part in attacks in other countries:

Among other acts, the indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd traveled to Gaza in March 2006 and attempted to enter Palestine in order to introduce his son to individuals who also believed that violent jihad was a personal religious obligation. Later, in
October 2006, defendant Ziyad Yaghi allegedly departed the United States for Jordan to engage in violent jihad.

In June 2007, Daniel Boyd and several other defendants departed the United States for Israel in an effort to engage in violent jihad, but ultimately returned to the United States after failing in their efforts. According to the indictment, after his return to the United States, Daniel Boyd made false statements twice to federal officials about who he had planned to meet on his trip to Israel.

In February 2008, Daniel Boyd allegedly solicited money to fund the travel of additional individuals overseas to engage in violent jihad and in March 2008, discussed with Anes Subasic preparations to send two individuals abroad for this purpose. He allegedly accepted $500 in cash from defendant Hysen Sherifi to be used to help fund jihad overseas and later showed Sherifi how to operate an AK-47 assault weapon.

According to The News & Observer, one of Mr. Boyd’s neighbors, Charles Casale, said he was shocked by the arrest: “If he’s a terrorist, he’s the nicest terrorist I’ve ever met in my life.” The newspaper also reported:

To neighbors and friends, Daniel Boyd was a father who stopped his work at noon each day for prayer. Dylan Boyd, Daniel’s son, was a college student at N.C. State University who until last year worked as a clinical services technician at WakeMed Raleigh Campus. Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan was a newlywed; his father owns a Raleigh car dealership. [...] 

A spokesman at the Islamic Center in Raleigh said he did not know the suspects; an estimated 1,200 people attend Friday services at the center. Hassan and Yaghi both attended Al-Iman School, which shares space with the Raleigh mosque, according to former teacher Samar Hindi. Most recently, Daniel Boyd had been attending Jamaat Ibad Ar-Rahman, a mosque in Durham.

David Kris, an assistant Attorney General, described Daniel Boyd as “a veteran of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan who, over the past three years, has conspired with others in this country to recruit and help young men travel overseas in order to kill.”

Mr. Boyd’s history, as sketched out in the indictment, illustrates how complicated the American government’s relationship has been with Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan over time. Two decades ago, Mr. Boyd was reportedly a member of an Afghan-led faction that was then allied with the United States in the struggle against the Soviet-backed government.

According to The Associated Press:

In 1991, Boyd and his brother were convicted of bank robbery in Pakistan — accused of carrying identification showing they belonged to the radical Afghan guerrilla group, Hezb-e-Islami, or Party of Islam. They were each sentenced to have a foot and a hand cut off for the robbery, but the sentenced was later overturned.
The wives of the men told The Associated Press in an interview at the time they were glad the truth about their husbands had finally become known. The wives said the couples had U.S. roots but the United States was a country of “kafirs” — Arabic for heathens.

Hezb-e-Islami, or the Islamic Party, led by the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was one of a number of groups that the United States supplied with weapons during the time Mr. Boyd was in the region. The group still exists and is still led by Mr. Hekmatyar, but it is now allied with the Taliban against American-led forces in Afghanistan. Last month, my colleague Adam Ellick reported that Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan “is largely controlled by the Islamic Party.”

In an interview with The New York Times in 1988, Mr. Hekmatyar, described then as a “major recipient of covert American military assistance, whose aim is a ‘pure’ Islamic state,” complained, in English, that “there are people in America who are against our jihad.” In what might now be seen as a sign that the American alliance with Afghan holy warriors was inherently problematic, Mr. Hekmatyar told The Times in 1988 that he knew there were “people who support our struggle because they are against the Russians, not as an Islamic struggle.” He also explained that he had refused to accompany other leaders of the Islamic resistance who traveled to Washington to meet President Ronald Reagan in 1986, because “I was afraid America would compromise with Gorbachev over Afghanistan.”

While the shifting alliances in Afghanistan seem to have no relationship to the recent plots that Mr. Boyd was charged with facilitating, there was an interesting coincidence of timing. On Monday, the same day he was charged, The Guardian reported that Mr. Hekmatyar “has reportedly been approached with a deal by western intelligence agencies,” hoping to draw the Islamic Party back into a de facto alliance with the United States.

The A.P. reports that during Mr. Boyd’s trial in 1991, he accused the court of being insufficiently Islamic:

In 1991 in Pakistan, Daniel Boyd and his older brother denied they were guilty of stealing $3,200 from the bank. When the sentence was imposed, Boyd shouted: “This isn’t an Islamic court. It’s a court of infidels!”

When the brothers were arrested, they were accused of carrying identification showing they belonged to the radical Afghan guerrilla group, Hezb-e-Islami, or Party of Islam. They had become the first foreigners to be convicted and sentenced by special Islamic courts set up by the conservative federal government to impose speedy trials for so-called “heinous” crimes.

About a month later, when the brothers’ convictions were overturned, Daniel Boyd said, “The truth has finally come out.”

During Mr. Boyd’s trial in Pakistan, his wife, Sabrina, who is also American, was present, as were the two sons who were arrested with their father on Monday. At the time Zakariya was three and his brother Dylan, also known as Mohammed, was five.
Update | 1:27 p.m. As a reader points out, a North Carolina news site, the Cary Citizen, has published more photographs of two of the men who were arrested on Monday, which seem to have been posted on one man’s Facebook page.

Update | 1:31 p.m. Readers from or familiar with the Balkans, or really any region that has suffered through ethnic-nationalist conflict, will not be surprised to hear that news Web sites concerned with the former Yugoslavia have focused on the fact that two of the arrested men reportedly have roots there. The Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje reports that Anes Subasic is from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that Hysen Sherifi is from Kosovo is given great prominence in the lead story on the Web site Serbianna, which is headlined: “Kosovo Albanian Islamic Terrorist Charged.”

Update | 1:58 p.m. A fellow news blogger, Catherine Pritchard of The Fayetteville Observer, writes to tell us that she has just written a blog post based on a Washington Post article from 1991 on Mr. Boyd and his trial in Pakistan. You need to pay to read the full text of the Post article — which was written by Steve Coll, the author of “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001” — but this excerpt is available for free on Washingtonpost.com:

[Daniel Boyd] married his high school girlfriend, [Sabrina Boyd], the daughter of a medical doctor who works for the U.S. government, at a mosque at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She decided to convert to Islam just hours before the wedding and said she has never regretted it. “As much as I was raised as an American, I try to follow Islam strictly,” she said. Both Daniel and [Charles Boyd] worked in construction. Just under two years ago, Daniel and Sabrina decided to move to Peshawar to work with a Muslim relief agency aiding some of the estimated 3 million Afghan refugees who have fled to Pakistan because of Afghanistan’s 12-year-old civil war.

In Pakistan the Boyds shifted from house to house in Hyatabad, a suburb in the foothills of the Hindu Kush mountains beneath the Khyber Pass, which leads to Afghanistan. After a year, Charles Boyd and his second wife, [Debra], joined them. With two young sons initially and a third born in Pakistan, there were many adjustments. Money was short, hospitals were inadequate, baby supplies were difficult to find, and all their drinking water had to be boiled. Still, as they became increasingly involved in their new religion, said Sabrina Boyd, the hardships were more than worth it.

Through their lawyers, the Boyds maintain that they did not rob the bank. Their lawyers also say they did not receive a fair trial in the special Islamic courts recently established by Pakistan’s government to provide swift justice in cases of “heinous crimes.” Among other things, the Boyds’ lawyers have contended that police invented evidence against the brothers, obtained a confession from them at gunpoint and arranged witness identifications improperly.

Update | 2:37 p.m. Steve Coll, who wrote that article about Daniel Boyd’s trial in Pakistan in
1991 for The Washington Post, now writes, and blogs, for The New Yorker. He just published a new post on his blog, Think Tank, on The New Yorker's Web site, which includes another excerpt from the article:

[T]his morning Daniel Boyd and his wife, Sabrina, also known as Saifullah Abu Laith and Umm Mohammed, are a long way from football games and homecoming dances. They are sitting in the dusty office of the superintendent of the Peshawar Central Jail in this swirling, violent city near the Afghan border. Here Daniel and his brother Charles await the appeal of their conviction on bank robbery charges by a Pakistani Islamic court, which has handed down a stunning sentence—amputation of their right hands and left feet.

"I guess we're just living in a nightmare come true," said Sabrina Boyd, who appears in public covered from head to toe in strict Islamic dress, her wide brown eyes peering through a slit in her veil. "It's just unfortunate because it's really breaking up my family. I hope this thing is over with very soon, God willing. We were very private people before all this."

I won't spoil the surprise (or Washingtonpost.com's business model) if readers want to purchase and read the full text of that article, but I will mention that Mr. Boyd's story, of a young American convert to Islam heading for Afghanistan to engage in holy war, seems to have been similar to that of John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," who traveled the same route about a decade later. In 2003, Jane Mayer wrote this article for The New Yorker on Mr. Lindh's case.

Update | 3:03 p.m. The Washington Post's Web site has just made the full text of Mr. Coll's article on Daniel Boyd from 1991 available for free. It makes interesting reading both in light of today's arrests, and in light of the current struggle inside Pakistan over the implementation of Shariah law. In October 1991, Mr. Coll wrote that the Islamic court that had ruled that Mr. Boyd and his brother should be punished with amputations had been set up by the government of then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who may return to power in Pakistan soon. Mr. Coll reported:

The special courts in which the Boyd brothers were convicted were created earlier this year under a controversial constitutional amendment pushed through by Sharif's government. The amendment was denounced by opposition leaders as a mechanism for political authoritarianism. Other commentators saw it as partly an effort to appease Pakistan's small but vocal minority of radical Islamic religious leaders.

Update | 3:54 p.m. The News & Observer reports that "An unnamed eighth member of a suspected North Carolina-based terrorism group is at large and wanted by federal authorities, U.S. Attorney George Holding said early this afternoon. The individual, whose name was redacted from an indictment made public yesterday, doesn't appear to pose a danger to the larger public, said Holding, the head of the Raleigh-based federal prosecutor's office for the Eastern District of North Carolina."
According to the News & Observer:

FBI agents are actively looking to take the person into custody. Holding would not name the person, nor describe his or her involvement beyond the indictment. That individual is described as a U.S. citizen and North Carolina resident who traveled to Pakistan in October 2008 to participate in violent jihad.

Update | 4:03 p.m. The Associated Press reports: “Authorities think the eighth suspect is in Pakistan, according to a law enforcement official who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the investigation.” According to the indictment, the suspect went to Pakistan in October to “engage in violent jihad.”

Update | 4:29 p.m. My colleague Liz Robbins reports:

On Tuesday in Raleigh, Khalilah Sabra of the Muslim American Society gave a news conference to urge due process for the arrested men, and she read a statement from Mr. Boyd’s wife, Sabrina, with whom she is friendly.

“The charges have not been substantiated,” Ms. Boyd said in her statement. “We are an ordinary family and we have the right to justice and we believe justice will prevail. We are decent people who care about other human beings.” The statement, which Ms. Sabra read to The New York Times in a telephone interview, continued: “Indictments always seem factual, but a rush to judgment is not part of the process.”

Ms. Sabra said that she first met the family in Afghanistan two decades ago, when she was working for the Red Crescent Society, a relief organization akin to the Red Cross. She said Mr. Boyd was in the region to train with the mujahedeen, rebel groups who were then fighting the pro-Soviet government. [..]

In her statement, Ms. Boyd acknowledged reports of her husband’s activities in Afghanistan. “He was there fighting against the Soviets in a war that had the full backing of the U.S. government,” she said.

Below is the full text of the federal indictment unsealed on Monday. (Click on the box at the upper right to enter full screen mode.)

Boyd Indictment
CASE STUDIES

ANDERS BEHRING BREIVIK
Outreach Strategy

Case Study: Anders Breivik

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian citizen, detonated a truck bomb adjacent to government offices in the Norwegian capital of Oslo, killing eight. While first responders swarmed to the area, Breivik traveled to the island of Utoya 19 miles away and, dressed as a police officer, shot and killed 69 people, most of them teenagers attending a political camp. He surrendered to responding police officers without resistance.

Breivik was unknown to law enforcement prior to the attacks. He enjoyed a middle-class upbringing. He was fond of hip hop and graffiti and had a Muslim best friend, but as he entered his 20s, his views hardened as he convinced himself of the need to protect Western civilization. Just hours before the bombing, Breivik released a 1,500-page manifesto online which provided a timeline detailing his evolving ideology, the tradecraft he used to avoid detection, and his final attack planning.

2002: Breivik perceives the effects of multiculturalism, particularly the “Islamization” of Europe resulting from large-scale immigration, to be a problem for which a political solution is insufficient. He and several others form a group called the “Knights Templar Europe.” No evidence points specifically to the 2011 plot at this time.

2002–2008: Breivik begins with the equivalent of $360,000 in assets, allowing him to avoid seeking outside funding or engaging in any activity that might have triggered suspicious financial activity warnings. He does not hold a formal job from this point on and will have exhausted his funds by the time of the 2011 attacks. While conducting research for his manifesto, he concludes that other extremist movements attracted the attention of authorities because they lacked “subtlety and discretion” due to outdated, “amateurish” tradecraft.

2009–2010: The first evidence of attack planning begins. Breivik creates business proposals for a mining company and a small farm operation, providing him a cover story to purchase explosives and components. He creates websites and business cards for his fake businesses, but he lacks real-world experience in those industries. He believes his clean criminal history will protect him from terrorism charges if arrested at this time. Breivik maintains an online presence, communicating with right-wing “primary nationalists” and sharing extremist views, but taking care to omit details about his planned attack. He is concerned that his networking may have landed him on terrorism watch lists.

2010–2011: Breivik acquires equipment for his attack, beginning with relatively innocuous materials less likely to trigger suspicious activity reporting, and leaving
Case Study: Anders Breivik

firearms and explosive precursor fertilizer for later. Along the way, he purchases police insignia items, a police riot suit, a shield, and liquid pure nicotine (a poison). He rents a small, remote farm and attempts to educate himself on farming methods and terminology, but some locals detect Breivik's inexperience with the agriculture industry. With more space and privacy at the farm, Breivik is able to assemble his explosives. Police are not alerted before the attacks.

Throughout his planning period, Breivik is not known to have maintained close or romantic personal relationships. His social interactions appeared to be mostly online, sometimes through the video game community. He had a habit of having Sunday dinners with his mother; he was estranged from his father, and his sister had moved to the United States. He maintained his physical fitness and reportedly underwent steroid treatments.

Soon after his arrest, he reportedly confessed to the bombing and shootings, but called them necessary to force a change in society and spark a revolution. Although he claimed to have collaborated with associates, police believe he most likely planned and committed the attacks on his own.

(U) JRIC Special Bulletin: Oslo Suspect's "Compendium" Details How to Avoid Detection in the Planning Stages of an Operation, 25 July 2011
Norway — Breivik Attacks, July 2011

Updated: Nov. 29, 2011

Oslo Bombings and Utoya Attack

On July 22, 2011, at least 77 people were killed in the bombing of a government building in central Oslo and a shooting rampage at a youth camp at an island near the capital.

A man described as a right-wing fundamentalist Christian, Anders Behring Breivik, was seized by the police at the island and later admitted to the killings in both incidents. Authorities said he was a religious, gun-loving Norwegian obsessed with what he saw as the threat of multiculturalism and Muslim immigration to the cultural and patriotic values of his country.

In November, Mr. Breivik was judged to be insane after undergoing a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. The report will be reviewed by a panel from the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine before the court makes a ruling on whether Mr. Breivik is legally insane.

The killings pointed to a meticulous and well-organized attack on Norway's current and future political elite. Police assume that Mr. Breivik, having drawn security services to central Oslo when he exploded a car bomb outside government offices, then traveled to Utoya Island, the location of the camp sponsored by the Liberal party, dressed as a police officer. Once there, he said he had come to check on the security of the young political campers, gathered them together and proceeded, coldly, to shoot them and then hunt down those who fled. He killed 69 and injured many more.
Utoya is a wooded retreat accessible only by boat about 19 miles northwest of Oslo. The police said that difficulty reaching the island delayed their response. For more on the killings, [click here](#).

**Right-Wing Groups Shrinking**

Norwegian analysts said that the country's right-wing groups were very small, having shrunk considerably since the 1990s, and had been quiet. Even the Progress Party, which began as an anti-tax protest and has been stridently anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim in the past, has moved more to the center, to the point that it is seen as a potential coalition partner for the Conservative Party in the 2013 general election.

Mr. Breivik had been a member of the Progress Party but quit in 2006, disappointed by its move toward moderation; his Internet postings also indicate contempt for the Conservative Party. He said it had given up a serious battle against multiculturalism, which he said was diluting the nation's character. He also criticized the government for spending too little of Norway's oil wealth at home.

**Norway Overview**

Norway is Europe's largest exporter of oil and gas. The country's carefully managed oil riches has let this fjord-fringed nation of 4.8 million people develop one of the world's most advanced social welfare models and weather the current global financial crisis with nary a wobble.

But the role of fossil fuels in the economy has been a major subject of debate, especially in the run-up to the country's parliamentary election in September 2009, when the country's left-leaning prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, was re-elected.

Norway is the world's fifth-biggest crude exporter. However the powerful oil and gas lobby has said the future of the country hinges on gaining access to new Arctic areas to replenish dwindling North Sea resources.

Oil and gas pumped from North Sea platforms have made Norway one of the world's most affluent nations. But that wealth has also presented a challenge for sitting governments, who must balance the risk of overheating the domestic economy with Norwegians' high demands on the cradle-to-grave welfare system.
Before the September election, the country’s prime minister struggled in a closely fought race despite the relative buoyancy of Norway’s economy, with its stock market rising and its unemployment rate hovering at 3 percent, among the lowest in Europe.

Immigration has skyrocketed by a factor of five since the early 1970s — more than 10 percent of Norway’s population is of foreign origin. In recent years, the biggest groups of asylum seekers have come from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Eritrea.

The top challenger to the prime minister, Siv Jensen, the leader of the right-wing populist Progress Party, channeled resentment over immigration, taxes and other contentious issues. Ms. Jenson also wanted to raise spending on hospitals and roads by tapping into the country’s robust oil proceeds.

Most of Norway’s vast riches from oil and gas are tucked away for future generations in a sovereign wealth fund currently valued at more than 2.4 trillion kroner ($400 billion.) The fund moved toward green investments in 2009, with officials announcing plans to commit about $3.5 billion dollars over a period of five years to companies it deems environmentally sound and engaged in sustainable growth in emerging markets.

As a result of its petroleum fund, Norway can pledge more ambitious reductions than other nations, and then dig deep into its plentiful public savings to buy up larger amounts of international credits to offset its carbon footprint. That frustrates some environmental groups like Greenpeace, which have warned Norway to do more at home rather than pay developing nations to reduce emissions.
In October 2009, the Norwegian government said that by the end of the next decade, it would cut emissions as much as 40 percent from 1990 levels. The offer goes significantly beyond that made by the European Union, which has agreed to cut emissions 20 percent and could go to 30 percent.

Norway would make the cut “if this can contribute to achieving an ambitious climate agreement where the major emission countries take on concrete emission obligations,” according to a statement from the governing coalition.

There has been virtually no talk about joining the European Union, which Norwegian voters rejected in referendums in 1972 and 1994, and which on average has been more severely hit by the recession.

Highlights From the Archives

At Least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting
By ELISA MALA and J. DAVID GOODMAN
A gunman stalked youths at an island summer camp for young members of the governing party after explosions in Oslo hit government buildings. The police seized a man officials described as a right-wing extremist in connection with both attacks.
July 23, 2011 | WORLD | NEWS

Thriving Norway Provides an Economics Lesson
By LANDON THOMAS Jr.
Instead of spending its oil riches, Norway saved, and it is now growing in the midst of the global recession.
May 14, 2009 | BUSINESS | NEWS
Anders Behring Breivik

Updated: Nov. 29, 2011

Anders Behring Breivik is the 32-year-old Norwegian man who killed at least 77 people in an Oslo bombing and a shooting rampage at a summer camp for young political activists on July 22, 2011.

Mr. Breivik admitted the killings in a court hearing in July. He was later judged to be insane in a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. The report will be reviewed by a panel from the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine before the court makes a ruling on whether Mr. Breivik is legally insane.

The authorities have described Mr. Breivik as a right-wing fundamentalist Christian, a gun-loving Norwegian obsessed with what he saw as the threat of multiculturalism and Muslim immigration to the cultural and patriotic values of his country.

Will the Norway Massacre Deflate Europe's Right Wing?
The killings could weaken nationalist fervor in Europe, as the Oklahoma City bombing cooled off militias in the U.S. in the late 1990s.

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More Multimedia »
Mr. Breivik’s lawyer, Geir Lippestad, has described him as a “very cold” person who lived in his own world, buttressed by drugs and the belief that he was a warrior doomed to die for a cause that others did not comprehend. He said that his client called the killings “atrocious,” but “necessary.”

One thing is certain: the killings point to a meticulous and well-organized attack on Norway’s current and future political elite. Police assume that Mr. Breivik, having drawn security services to central Oslo when he exploded a car bomb outside government offices, then traveled to Utoya Island, the location of the camp sponsored by the Liberal party, dressed as a police officer. Once there, he said he had come to check on the security of the young political campers, gathered them together and proceeded, coldly, to shoot them and then hunt down those who fled.

As soon as the shooting started, witnesses said, people panicked, running in all directions, tumbling down the island’s rocky hill in an attempt to reach the sea. Even after many made it into the water, Mr. Breivik calmly and methodically shot at those who were swimming.

He was equipped, the police said, with an automatic rifle and a handgun; when the police finally got to the island, about 40 minutes after the shooting started, Mr. Breivik surrendered when they called out to him, dropping his weapons.

Mr. Breivik appeared at court in a closed hearing on July 25 and said that two cells of extremists collaborated with him, but police say they found no evidence of collaborators. He was ordered held for eight weeks, the first four in solitary confinement. The judge said after the hearing that Mr. Breivik had acknowledged that he had carried out the attacks but had pleaded not guilty.

On Nov. 14, Mr. Breivik appeared in court in his first public hearing. He declared himself a “military commander” in the “Norwegian resistance” movement, but was quickly cut off by the judge, who extended his custody 12 weeks pending trial.

In late November, prosecutors said that Mr. Breivik was insane and should be sent to a psychiatric ward instead of prison. A psychiatric evaluation ordered by an Oslo court found that Mr. Breivik was psychotic during the July 22 attacks, which means that he is not mentally fit to be sentenced to prison.

The 243-page report was written by two psychiatrists who spent a total of 36 hours talking to Mr. Breivik. It will be reviewed by a panel from the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine before the court makes a ruling on whether Mr. Breivik is legally insane.
In Norway, an insanity defense requires that a defendant be in a state of psychosis, or out of touch with reality, while committing the crime with which he or she is charged. In July, the head of the Board of Forensic Medicine panel, Dr. Tarjei Rygnestad, said that a psychotic person typically struggles to perform even simple tasks, and that the planning and skills required for the attacks Mr. Breivik is charged with did not point to psychosis.

Breivik's Writings

In a Facebook page and a Twitter account set up under his name days before the rampage, suggesting a conscious effort to construct a public persona and leave a legacy for others, Mr. Breivik cited philosophers like Machiavelli, Kant and John Stuart Mill. Although there did not appear to be calls for violence in his Internet postings, he hinted at his will to act in his lone Twitter post, paraphrasing Mill: “One person with a belief is equal to the force of 100,000 who have only interests.”

In a 1,500-page manifesto, posted on the Web hours before the attacks, Mr. Breivik recorded a day-by-day diary of months of planning for the attacks, and claimed to be part of a small group that intended to “seize political and military control of Western European countries and implement a cultural conservative political agenda.”

He predicted a conflagration that would kill or injure more than a million people, adding, “The time for dialogue is over. We gave peace a chance. The time for armed resistance has come.”

Mr. Breivik’s manifesto spells out plans for using anthrax as part of his war to defend Europe against what he called the rising threat of Muslim domination. But experts in biological weapons said the manifesto showed no evidence that he had actually obtained the lethal germ or could wield it as a weapon. They said the document — at least on the subject of germ attacks — evoked the air of an armchair theorist rather than someone poised to commit mass slaughter.

The manifesto was signed Andrew Berwick, an Anglicized version of his name. A former American government official briefed on the case said investigators believed the manifesto was Mr. Breivik’s work.


The document also describes a secret meeting in London in April 2002 to reconstitute the Knights Templar, a Crusader military order. It says the meeting was attended by nine representatives of eight European countries, evidently including Mr. Breivik, with an additional three members unable to attend, including a “European-American.”

Mourners gathered on Monday in Oslo to pay tribute to the victims of Saturday’s bombing in Oslo and shooting on Utoya Island.

Aftermath of Norway Violence
As Norwegians began to cope with the killings in Oslo and on an island to the northwest, survivors met with their families and the search for bodies continued.

Scenes of the Attacks in Norway
Diagrams of the attacks in Oslo and Utoya Island in Norway.
Horrors of the Attacks

The horror of the twin strikes on the government building and a political summer camp on Utoya Island, a remarkably meticulous attack on Norway's current and future political elite, came into focus in interviews with witnesses, who painted a picture of 90 minutes of hell that left at least 85 people dead, some as young as 16.

As soon as the shooting started, they said, people panicked, running in all directions, tumbling down the island's rocky hill in an attempt to reach the sea. Even after many made it into the water, the gunman calmly and methodically shot at those who were swimming.

The police also said that unexploded munitions were still in some downtown Oslo buildings, and they had not ruled out the possibility that Mr. Breivik had accomplices.

The police are working on the assumption that Mr. Breivik, having drawn security services to central Oslo when he exploded a car bomb outside government offices, then traveled to Utoya Island dressed as a police officer. Once there, he said he had come to check on the security of the young political campers, gathered them together and proceeded, coldly, to shoot them and then hunt down those who fled.

He was equipped, the police said, with an automatic rifle and a handgun; when the police finally got to the island, about 40 minutes after the shooting started, Mr. Breivik surrendered when they called out to him, dropping his weapons.

Utoya is a wooded retreat accessible only by boat about 19 miles northwest of Oslo. The police said that difficulty reaching the island delayed their response.

Norway's prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, had been scheduled to speak to the campers; a former leader of Labor's youth wing, he had attended the camp every summer since 1974.

Background

Norwegian analysts said that the country's right-wing groups were very small, having shrunk considerably since the 1990s, and had been quiet. Even the Progress Party, which began as an anti-tax protest and has been stridently anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim in the past, has moved more to the center, to the point that it is seen as a potential coalition partner for the Conservative Party in the 2013 general election.
When Mr. Breivik was not plotting mass murder and fine-tuning the bomb he detonated here, he was busy playing video games and blogging, listening to Euro pop and watching episodes of “True Blood” — except on Sunday nights, when he usually dined with his mother.

It was a parallel life he maintained meticulously in recent years. Former classmates and colleagues described him as unremarkable and easy to forget, qualities, perhaps inborn, that he cultivated — consciously, he would say — to mask his dedication to what he called his “martyrdom operation.”

For years, Mr. Breivik, who is 32, participated in debates in Internet forums on the dangers of Islam and immigration. It is not clear at what point he decided that violence was the solution to the ills he believed were tearing European civilization asunder. Before the attacks that he has admitted mounting on government buildings and a children’s summer camp, he was careful never to telegraph his intentions.

“He didn’t say anything you could remember,” said Stig Fjellskaalnes, who knew Mr. Breivik when he was a member of Norway’s conservative Progress Party in the early 2000s. “He’s one of the crowd, if you know what I mean. You forget him.”

Yet it was about a decade ago that Mr. Breivik started to change. Once a schoolboy who was fond of hip-hop and had a Muslim best friend, in his 20s he began to view the immigrants who flowed freely into Norway and elsewhere in Europe as enemies, and those who sought to accommodate them as traitors, worthy only of execution.

“Around year 2000 I realized that the democratic struggle against the Islamization of Europe, European multiculturalism, was lost,” he wrote in a manifesto that he published on the Web shortly before the attacks. “I decided to explore alternative forms of opposition. Protesting is saying that you disagree. Resistance is saying you will put a stop to this. I decided I wanted to join the resistance movement.”
Early in life, Mr. Breivik, far from being a radical, appeared to be on a track to join Norway's political establishment. He grew up in Skoyen, a middle-class district of western Oslo. His father, a civil servant, and mother, a nurse, divorced when he was 1. Beyond that, his childhood seems to have been uneventful; Mr. Breivik said in his manifesto that it was happy.

He attended the elite high school where the country's current king, Harald V, and his son once studied. Former classmates remembered him as quiet but intelligent, with a small rebellious streak: he was a prolific graffiti artist.

Toward the end of high school, he joined the youth wing of the Progress Party, drawn to its anti-immigrant platform and market capitalist bent. But those who knew him from those days said that he failed to leave much of a mark.

He began to struggle with life, those who knew him said. He became estranged from his father, who moved to France. Then his sister, Elisabeth, on whom he seemed to rely in his father's absence, moved to the United States and married an American.

It was a time when, according to his manifesto, his political views began to transmute. He began to perceive what he said was the hostility of Muslim youth. He latched on to reports of attacks against ethnic Norwegian men and rapes of ethnic Norwegian women by immigrant gangs.

Dagbladet, a national newspaper, quoted an unnamed fellow student from Mr. Breivik's high school days as saying that Mr. Breivik started showing an interest in far-right and neo-Nazi movements around the age of 18, in the late 1990s, and that he was rumored to have worked as a doorman or bouncer at neo-Nazi events. He would later become critical of neo-Nazi groups.

Mr. Breivik wrote that the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 was a tipping point for him, describing the operation meant to halt a genocide as a betrayal of a fellow Christian people for the sake of Muslims.

He spent the next decade slowly working out his plan, though few people, it seems, had any inkling of it.
To earn money for the attacks, he wrote that he had started a company that earned him millions. Neighbors cast doubt on this claim, however, saying that they thought he had inherited some money from relatives.

As he went about gathering six tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and turning aspirin powder into pure acetylsalicylic acid for his bomb, he led an active life online, railing against Muslims and Marxists in debate forums.

The police say he rented a farm in eastern Norway not far from the capital and holed up there for several months to prepare his bomb.

When not surfing conservative blogs, Mr. Breivik was fighting virtual demons, ogres and other fantastical creatures in online role-playing games. He was a regular in talk forums for players of “World of Warcraft,” using a busty female as his avatar and the handle Conservatism.
Oslo Suspect’s “Compendium” Details How to Avoid Detection in the Planning Stages of an Operation

On 22 July 2011, coordinated attacks involving a car bombing and an active shooter took place in Oslo, Norway. While all the facts are not yet known, documents and videos posted by the alleged perpetrator provide a detailed view into the mindset and careful planning of a violent actor. Though there is no single model/path from ideology to action, the information in these documents provides an opportunity for public safety personnel to re-examine current training with regard to indicators and warnings, and may allow for the development of new countermeasures.

Incident Overview

On 22 July 2011 at approximately 1520 hours local time, a car bomb detonated in downtown Oslo, Norway damaging several buildings, including the offices of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. Later that day, a gunman, reportedly wearing a police uniform, opened fire at a Labour Party youth camp organized on the island of Utoya, approximately 19 miles northwest of Oslo. Police arrested Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Oslo resident, at the scene.

Over the next hours, a series of documents and video messages surfaced on the Internet that meticulously detailed Breivik’s philosophy and plans for events that corresponded with the crimes that took place that day. While the entries begin in 2002, Breivik writes with increasing detail post-2009 about what appeared to be preparations for an improvised explosive device and small arms attack. (Note: Breivik’s writing might have intended to influence or to mislead.)

First Steps: “Armed struggle appears to be futile at this point but it is the only way forward.”

April/May 2002 – Developing an Ideology

Breivik concludes there is nothing to gain by working within the existing political system to counteract what he perceives to be the negative effects of multi-culturalism and the “Islamization” of

1 Breivik authored the compendium using the Angloized version of his name, “Andrew Berwick.” For clarity, this bulletin refers to him by the Norwegian spelling, Breivik.

2 Included was a 1500+ page “compendium,” titled, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, that Breivik claimed he distributed to 7,000 “primary nationalists” and possible members of parliament in Western countries [NFI] earlier. The majority of the quotes in this bulletin are taken from this compendium.

Oslo after the car bomb (above); rescue workers on Utoya island, site of the second attack (below).
Europe. He and eight associates allegedly form a group called the “Knights Templar Europe,” and Breivik begins to write/compile a compendium of beliefs/strategies that will be used to grow the organization into the “foremost conservative revolutionary movement in Western Europe.” The compendium refers to the ideology as “Crusader Nationalism,” a balance to the prevailing “cultural Marxism.”

- At this time, it does not appear Breivik has the 22 July attacks in mind, “I don’t know if I will ever proceed with a martyrdom operation at this point as it simply seems too radical.” It would have been difficult for public safety personnel to identify him here because he has not yet moved from talk to action.

2002-2006 – Financing the Ideology

Breivik has €250,000 in assets (approximately $360,000) with which to sustain himself while he writes the compendium and sets up the Templar organization. He will not hold a formal job from this point forward, and will be financially insolvent at the time of the July 2011 attacks.

- Breivik’s initial financial independence allowed him to work without the need to contact like-minded individuals for financing, or to engage in any activity that might have triggered suspicious financial activity indicators or warnings.

2006-2008 – Studying the Failures of Others, Moving toward Action

Breivik spends this time researching and writing the compendium, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence.” In addition to developing the group’s ideological underpinnings, he makes a study of the failures of other extremist movements. He believes members of an alleged Swedish neo-Nazi group might have been caught due to their “outdated, traditional and vulnerable hierarchical military cell-model.” He judges other European resistance groups “amateurish” and lacking in “subtlety and discretion.”

- It was unclear at what point Breivik made the decision to carry out the operation; however, in the course of writing, he memorialized the group’s tenets that a “Justiciar Knight” should embrace voluntary poverty and martyrdom. His activity so far may not have attracted any attention, and there would likely have been no legal basis for investigation.

Operations Begin

Autumn 2009-Winter 2009/10 – Cover Stories, Operational Security, Recruitment Efforts, and Virtual Shooter Training

Sometime in late 2008 or early 2009, Breivik appears to have made the decision to conduct some kind of attack, because he begins to create the infrastructure needed to obtain the necessary

*Quotes and excerpts from the compendium, explaining the Templars’ ideology, can be found in Appendix A.*
supplies without arousing undue suspicion. He starts the operation by developing a cover to purchase and transport explosives and explosives components. He believes that if authorities question or arrest him during this time, his cover story and clean criminal history will make it difficult to bring him up on terror charges. Regardless, he is cautious and acknowledges, “an arrest will land [me] on every imaginable watch list for the rest of my life.”

- Even at this stage, Breivik’s activities would likely not have aroused law enforcement suspicion. He creates two different, professional-looking business proposals for a mining company and a small farm operation (GeoFarm), modeled on an existing prospectus, and makes plans to create two Web sites, obtain business cards, and contact suppliers related to these industries who can act as future witnesses.

While he is setting up a clean business history, Breivik works on an e-mail campaign, hoping to identify 10,000 like-minded “primary nationalists”—and, possibly a few members of parliament in Western countries (“It is important that our enemies know ‘how we see what they are doing’”)—who will receive his compendium. He ultimately identifies 5,700 contacts via two accounts on a social networking site, and obtains 800 “high quality” e-mail addresses in the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa, “certain Eastern European countries,” Armenia, Israel, and India.

- Though he has taken care to maintain separation between his online and real-world activity to this point, Breivik is aware that his online activity may attract attention. He expresses concern that his work in compiling his e-mail list has landed him on various watch lists, and knows at least a few of the profiles he invited were fake.

During this time, Breivik also seeks out, assesses, and plays active-shooter online role-playing games, some of which he judges are excellent military simulators that closely mimic actual operations.

“Armour Acquisition Phase” – Personal Physical Security Preparations

Breivik’s study of failed resistance movements may have informed the order in which he carried out the next stages of his plan. He does not immediately attempt to acquire weapons or manufacture explosives; instead, he begins by acquiring and caching items less likely to trigger existing suspicious activity reporting programs.

Summer 2010 – Acquiring and Storing Materials, Actively Destroying Evidence of the Activity

Breivik begins to acquire and hide personal protection equipment that will likely enable him to extend the duration of his shooting spree. He takes care to keep most of these items far from

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11 The Mumbai terror attacks took place in November 2008; it is unknown what, if any, impact these events might have had on Breivik’s plans.
locations common to his daily routine. While he omits details of how he acquired the equipment, he describes his operational security considerations in minute detail. Using Internet imagery, he identified a remote forested area three to four hours by car from his home. There, he hid equipment, including “a complete set of Lokis armour—shield included, caltrops, police insignias...” inside of a Pelican™ case. However, due to size considerations, he hid large, bulky equipment, such as a Damascus FX-1 Flexforce™ riot suit and MOLLE pouch, in a box in his attic marked “airsoft equipment.”

- Breivik’s activity at this stage reveals that he has given thought to both the method of his attack and the rising possibility that his preparations will raise suspicions. In addition to taking great care with the acquisition and storage of his equipment, Breivik continues to clean up his “digital trail.” After this step, as from the beginning, Breivik covers his tracks, including purging and destroying computer hard drives.

“Weapons Acquisition Phase”

Late Summer 2010-Winter 2011 – Taking Care to Stay Under the Radar as the Risk of Discovery Rises

At this stage, Breivik moves into a pre-operational phase he acknowledges is likely to garner unwanted law enforcement attention: attempting to acquire weapons, materials to manufacture explosives, and false law enforcement identification and insignias. His planning indicates an extraordinary sensitivity to operational security – seeking to keep his movements and activities as low profile and low risk as possible by using cash, limiting his use of electronic communications, traveling through less-trafficked routes, and acquiring materials in other countries. However, he ultimately fails to acquire the weapons outside of Norway, and resorts to buying them legally within the country.

- Breivik’s attention to operational security in this phase is noteworthy. He planned his travel in a manner designed to avoid contact with authorities and minimize legal/financial traces. Knowing he would have to use identification and electronic payments for flights, ferries, or trains that might enable his movements to be tracked, he planned to drive to Prague, Czech Republic. He chose to cross back into Norway through the northern border with the weapons he hoped to obtain because he believed it had the fewest customs agents. He planned to leave his mobile phone off, except for emergencies, and to hide the weapons in a hollowed-out section of his back seat. Though he worried about his old car breaking down en route, he felt it would provide good cover because it was less likely to draw attention. He also used his stay in Prague to manufacture the sensitive items—police badges and other insignia—he believed would be reported to law enforcement in Norway. He paid cash for these services.
After failing in his plan to acquire weapons in the Czech Republic, Breivik fills out the necessary legal paperwork in Norway, and meets the training requirements to obtain guns. (See text box for a description of weapons.)

His compendium outlines Breivik's experiments to increase the lethality of his attacks. He orders 50 ml, 99 percent pure liquid nicotine from a Chinese online supplier, intending to inject three to four drops into hollow-point bullets in order to kill more effectively; however, when he tries to manufacture these "bio rounds," he finds the size of the ammunition would not accommodate a lethal dose. He weighs whether 9mm bullets might be more suitable for the task, but has to wait for a Glock license before he can access larger rounds. The text does not specify whether he tried again with new ammunition.

"Chemical Acquisition Stage"

November-December 2011 - Finalizing Cover for Explosives Acquisitions, Experiments

Breivik acknowledges this is probably his most vulnerable stage. He estimates there is a 30 percent chance of failure, a thought that fills him with such apprehension that he begins the second of three courses of steroids, which improves his mood. He methodically purchases other items he will need. (For a list of the items that Breivik purchased, along with their intended use; amount purchased; place purchased; cost; purchase/delivery details; cover story; and assessed risk, see Appendix B.)

Breivik uses one of his previously-prepared business plans (Geofarm) to rent a remote piece of farmland, ostensibly to test sugar beet production methods. He educates himself on farm practices and learns all of the appropriate terminology in order to better appear legitimate.\(^1\)

\(^{1}\) In addition to steroids, Breivik used "ECA stack," an ephedrine-caffeine-aspirin combination, to stay alert.

\(^{VI}\) Toward the end of the compendium, Breivik presents a section on small-scale farming "to prepare the Justiciar Knight for the fertilizer acquisition phase of his operation." He advises the reader must "learn to think, dress and act like a farmer and become confident through study of agricultural practices" to establish an effective cover. Additionally, he presents an introduction to small-scale surface mining for those planning to initiate a high-grade
Following media reports that Breivik was a suspect in the Oslo attacks, several agricultural supply companies notified authorities that he had purchased fertilizer and chemicals from them. They did not report him earlier because his orders fell within expected norms, and he appeared to be operating a legitimate business.

"Explosive Manufacturing Stage"

Breivik’s continued focus on operational security manifests in his choice of an improvised explosive, and his recommendation to others to work alone to avoid detection. He acknowledges the most common popular primary explosive is currently “AP” (acetone peroxide), but advises against using it because it is too dangerous. He suggests instead picric acid/DDNP (diazodinitrophenol). Although he calls himself a “chemistry amateur,” he successfully manufactures both picric acid and DDNP on his first try. In the compendium, he attempts to persuade readers to use these components unless the materials cannot be acquired.

Breivik provides meticulous details on buying materials or substitutes; manufacturing times and costs; trial and error; improved techniques; testing; and storage. Reviewing his experience, Breivik realizes he could have accomplished in 30 days what took him 80, and offers a timeline for others (see Appendix C). He also calculates what he perceives as the risk of detection and interdiction based on the number of persons involved and the time to accomplish the tasks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk vs. Labor</th>
<th>Time required to complete</th>
<th>Risk of apprehension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 person</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 people</td>
<td>20 days</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 people</td>
<td>16 days</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 people</td>
<td>13 days</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 people</td>
<td>12 days</td>
<td>90-95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

explosive acquisition phase. "Buying some new or second hand equipment relating to prospecting will strengthen your cover story."
The Compendium Ends; It Appears Online; the Attacks Take Place

The final entry in the compendium dates to 22 July 2011. On or around the 22nd, it was posted online, accompanied by a video version explaining some of the Knights Templars' fundamental tenets. That day, Oslo is attacked using weapons and tactics similar to those described in the compendium.

Learning from the Compendium

Breivik made a careful study of the failures of other violent actors and groups, and the factors that led to their interdiction, so that he could take steps to avoid the same pitfalls. Once identified, he took steps to craft plans he felt would minimize his risk of exposure, and carried them out in a methodical, patient manner. He identified the foundation of legitimate business enterprises as the most effective means to acquire materials legally, and purchased them in a manner that fell within normal patterns within the industry he used as a cover. For materials he could not obtain without arousing suspicion, he crafted a plan to gain them far from the watch programs he knew to be in effect in Norway. Ironically, when this plan failed, he resorted to legal means by which to obtain materials, leveraging his lack of criminal history to facilitate the acquisition process. Though he actively participated in online forums where he posted extremist views, he was careful to avoid mentioning operation details. He took steps to destroy physical evidence of his activities as he moved through the planning and operational stages. And at all times, he took care to maintain a low-key, "ordinary" appearance and behavior.

Re-assessment, Re-calibration of Suspicious Activity Reporting Procedures and Thresholds

While it may yet come to light that Breivik did arouse minor suspicion at various stages of activity, he appears to have successfully evaded detection programs designed to identify indicators of possible terrorist and criminal activity in relation to chemical purchases, weapons acquisition, fraudulent businesses, and so forth. This is cause to review current protocol and training with regard to similar programs in effect in the United States and the JRIC area of responsibility. Though Breivik managed to elude detection, we still believe in the need for continued awareness training and suspicious activity reporting at the local level, arising from the general public, state and local law public safety personnel, or private sector partners. Careful study of the measures Breivik took to avoid detection may help public safety personnel re-calibrate existing training and outreach efforts, and develop new countermeasures.

(U) Law enforcement can report tips and leads to the JRIC via the Web site at www.jric.org, by e-mail at leads@jric.org, or by telephone at (562) 345-1100 or (888) 705-JRIC (5742).
Appendix A – Tenets of the “Justiciar Knights”

The following excerpts are taken from the purported Breivik compendium, and explain the creation, grievances, and goals of the alleged group.

“The European Military Order and Criminal Tribunal (the PCCTS [Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici]—Knights Templar) was created by and for the free indigenous peoples of Europe. One of the primary purposes of the tribunal and order is to attempt/contribute to seize political and military control of Western European multiculturalist regimes and to try, judge and punish Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist perpetrators (category A, B and C traitors) for crimes committed against the indigenous peoples of Europe from 1955 until this day.”

The group was reportedly founded, or, as they state “re-founded,” in London in 2002 by representatives from eight European countries. Its founding members—all anonymous—are described as “English Protestant (host); English Christian atheist; French Catholic; German Christian atheist; Dutch Christian agnostic; Greek Orthodox; Russian Christian atheist; Norwegian Protestant (member and proxy for Anonymous 9); Serbian Orthodox (by proxy, location: Monrovia, Liberia).” Three additional members are listed only as “Swedish,” “Belgian,” and “European American.”

The compendium outlines a 100-year plan to contribute to the destabilization of political power in Western European countries currently controlled by “cultural Marxist/multiculturalist nationalists” in order to seize power and “bring freedom and cultural and demographical sustainability to all Europeans.”

Tenets of “Justiciar Knights”

- Oppose all hate-ideologies; communism (anti-individualist), cultural Marxism/multiculturalism (anti-European), Islam (anti-kafr) and national socialism (anti-Jewish)
- Serve and protect the indigenous peoples of Europe and all other loyal and patriotic European individuals
- Preserve European culture, traditions and heritage
- Stop the ongoing European cultural and demographical genocide facilitated by the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists, suicidal humanists, and capitalist globalist elites
- Prevent the deconstruction of Christendom in Europe
- Prevent further Islamic demographic warfare—disallow the Muslim invasion/colonization of Europe
- Repulse Islam from Europe by the initiation of future deportation campaigns
- Effectuate punishment for Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist/globalist perpetrators for crimes committed against the indigenous peoples of Europe
- Oppose and defeat the Multiculturalist Alliance (MA 100) in Europe using any and all means necessary
- Support Israel’s fight against Jihad
- Liberation of the Middle East Christians from Islamic rule
- Virtues such as the willingness to martyr oneself for the cause, the exercise of discretion, voluntary poverty, and devoted obedience to the principles are mandatory for all Justiciar Knights
- Honour the wishes and memories of our forefathers, who secured European security and prosperity in the past
- Follow the PCCT’s mantra—“Martyrdom before Dhimmitude.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Intended use</th>
<th>Amt</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Purchase/delivery</th>
<th>Coverstory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sulphur powder</td>
<td>Component to primary charge</td>
<td>0.5 kg</td>
<td>EBay, aquarium stores, or supplier</td>
<td>20 €</td>
<td>Paypal, delivered without incident</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium nitrate</td>
<td>Primary charge</td>
<td>0.3 kg</td>
<td>Polish chemical store</td>
<td>10 €</td>
<td>Paypal, delivered without incident</td>
<td>Used as a preservative to prevent rust; certifies as a business risk used to send right signal; recommended use of inorganic sodium in response area with hunting in the vicinity and have hunting license available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium nitrate</td>
<td>Secondary charge: Pikri acid (0.5 kg)</td>
<td>0.5 kg</td>
<td>Apothecary drug store</td>
<td>50 €</td>
<td>Visa for letter to avoid suspicion of transaction, cash for others, purchased and transported.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulphuric acid (for battery acid)</td>
<td>Component to primary and secondary charge</td>
<td>11 litres of 99% to 99.99% pure</td>
<td>Drug stores</td>
<td>1140 € for the total for transfer and cash f/ky for cash transaction</td>
<td>Three packages for my company. December is the season for Christmas parties, so lots of residual (very expensive) used car story in even state.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distilled water</td>
<td>Manufacturing process of primary and secondary charge (never use normal water)</td>
<td>20L</td>
<td>Same as previous</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash, retail sale</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin)</td>
<td>Component to primary and secondary charge</td>
<td>150 packets</td>
<td>Drug stores</td>
<td>1140 € for the total for transfer and cash f/ky for cash transaction</td>
<td>Three packages for my company. December is the season for Christmas parties, so lots of residual (very expensive) used car story in even state.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum powder, flaked 40 mesh (particles size)</td>
<td>Component to tertiary charge (fertilizer solution)</td>
<td>1 - 1.5% of total fertilizer weight (two tons of fertilizer means 200-300 kg of aluminum powder)</td>
<td>Polish chemical store</td>
<td>2000 € for 30 kg (lower price got 100 kg for 1000 €, but not processed from 1300 €)</td>
<td>Aluminum powder is a component of heat sensitive epoxy paints to provide the point (UV protective properties; explained this instead of e-mail to company; claims company was producing coating solutions for the marine sector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microbeads 016 oil/very small glass spheres filled with oxygen</td>
<td>Component to tertiary charge (fertilizer solution)</td>
<td>2.5% of total fertilizer weight (two tons of fertilizer means 200-300 kg of aluminum powder)</td>
<td>A maritime shop in Norway</td>
<td>Met with authorities, evasive answers with detail about the story method of accomplishment.</td>
<td>Going to research a story when needed; believe it was a component of boat plastics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

30-Day Operation Schedule for Explosives Manufacture (1 person): ANFO-3 x 600kg; PA-3 x 0.5kg; DDNP-3 x 10g

1. Moving and getting your equipment and gear into place
2. Installing all equipment—fume hood, fan etc.
3. Finishing the metal skeletons/cylinders for the blast devices and completing other practical issues relating to gear and equipment
4. Creating an evacuation/emergency strategy, packing an evacuation kit (survival gear, etc.)
5. Grinding 2.5 kg of aspirin: 30 minutes with blender, manufacture of acetylsalicylic acid from aspirin (4 hours) + drying in oven (4 hours per batch x 3)
6. Manufacture of acetylsalicylic acid from aspirin (4 hours) + drying in oven (4 hours per batch x 3)
7. Boiling sulfuric acid using 4 cooking plates outside, from 23.00-07.00, 15-18L -> 5L of 90% +
8. Boiling sulfuric acid using 4 cooking plates outside, from 23.00-07.00, 15-18L -> 5L of 90% +
9. Creating Picric Acid (6 out of 12 batches using 3 x hot plate stirrers)
10. Creating Picric Acid (6 out of 12 batches using 3 x hot plate stirrers). Completed
11. Purification of Picric Acid
12. Purification of Picric Acid
13. Purification of Picric Acid. Completed
14. Creating DDNP
15. Creating DDNP. Completed
16. Relocation of 27-0-0 fertilizer. Break down a 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags, load in the truck, drive to the location where you are going to crush them if needed.
17. Relocation of fertilizer. Break down another 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags.
18. Relocation of fertilizer. Break down the last 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags.
19. Initiate fertilizer grinding phase using 4 stationary blenders simultaneously. It will take approx. 30-40 minutes to complete a full 50kg bag of ANFO, including the addition of diesel and sealing the inner and outer bag with pieces of duct tape. It should be done nighttime between 23.00-07.00 as it is quite noisy. The task also includes filling 20L plastic containers with diesel and then breaking each 20L container down to 4L containers (empty distilled water containers) Complete 9 x 50kg bas of ANFO
20. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
21. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
22. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
23. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO. Completed.
24. Mix in 2.5% (by weight) micro balloons and 10-15% (by weight) aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
25. Mix in 2.5% micro balloons and 10-15% aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
26. Mix in 2.5% micro balloons and 10-15% aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
27. Prepare trucks for transportation.
28. Prepare trucks for transportation
29. Prepare trucks for transportation
30. Completed.
Case Study: Terry Jones

Terry Jones is the pastor of the Florida-based Dove World Outreach Center, a small evangelical Christian congregation. Jones and his followers espouse strong anti-Muslim and anti-gay beliefs. Several human rights organizations consider Jones' group an extremist hate organization.

Jones may have gained most of his media coverage and notoriety through his proposed "International Burn a Koran Day" on the 2009 ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, in which he threatened to destroy several hundred copies of the Muslim holy text. Although the Koran-burning protest was ultimately canceled, Jones would not rule out revisiting the issue in the future.

Jones held an "International Judge the Koran Day" in March 2011. At his Gainesville church, Jones hosted a mock trial of the Koran, allowed Facebook followers to vote on the method of "execution" of the book, then convicted and burned a Koran. This received significantly less press coverage than his earlier event, but videos and images appeared online. The action resulted in actual loss of life several weeks later when a mob of protesters in Afghanistan, citing Jones' desecration of the Koran, attacked a UN compound and killed at least 12, including seven foreign employees. Violent rioting continued for days.

The saying "Islam is of the devil" is often associated with Jones and his church. Jones has authored a book with that title, and followers have worn T-shirts and carried signs with that slogan to Dove protests.

A group called the "Order of the Dragon" planned to protest in front of the Islamic Center of America (ICA) in Dearborn, Michigan, on April 22, 2011. At the time, the ICA was the largest mosque in North America. The Order invited Jones to join their protest. Following a meeting with community and interfaith leaders, the Order cancelled their protest, retracted the invitation to Jones, and called him insensitive and dangerous. Jones vowed to continue his own protest at the ICA regardless.

For the week leading up to the protest, the community planned a response. Dearborn's mayor and police chief met with religious and community leaders. The city refused to grant Jones a permit to protest in front of the mosque. The county prosecutor employed an uncommon strategy: issuing a peace bond of $100,000 payable by Jones. (This type of bond required Jones to post the amount in advance to ensure funding for the additional cost to public safety services, since there was a reasonable likelihood of a threat to public safety.) The pastor refused to pay.
The Dearborn community—of all faiths—stood together to show support for the Islamic center, demonstrate unity as Americans, and reject the hate speech of Terry Jones and his followers. Over 700 attended the mosque service on the day of the protest, and hundreds more rallied near the civic center despite cold rain. Jones first protested at city hall but was unable to walk the two miles to a nearby Arab-American festival because counter-protestors—mostly non-Muslims—blocked his path.

(U//DRAFT) DHS Summary: Dearborn, Michigan events as related to Pastor Jones Visit, 23 April 2011
http://www.freep.com/article/20110618/NEWS05/106180355/Pastor-Terry-Jones-thwarted-Dearborn
Controversial Florida Pastor Terry Jones to Protest in Dearborn

Planned for April 22 outside Islamic Center

Updated: Tuesday, 19 Apr 2011, 6:08 AM EDT
Published: Wednesday, 23 Mar 2011, 10:56 PM EDT

By AMY LANGE
WJBK | myFOXDetroit.com

SOUTHFIELD, Mich. (WJBK) - The Florida pastor who made headlines for threatening to burn a Koran on the anniversary of 9-11 is headed to metro Detroit. He says he won't burn the Muslim holy book here, but he is planning to protest outside the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn on Good Friday.

"I think you would define our message as one of welcome and warning. We welcome Muslims into the country," Pastor Terry Jones told FOX 2's Huel Perkins on Wednesday. "The only thing that we are demanding of them is that they honor and obey and submit to the Constitution of the United States."

Click on the first video to hear Jones' complete interview with FOX 2.

During the interview, Jones confirmed he actually burned a Koran last weekend, but said he will not do that when he comes to metro Detroit. The spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of America has the following advice for the pastor.

"I would invite him instead of burning the Koran to read the Koran," said Imam Saved Hassan Al-Qazwini.
"There is no need for him to question our loyalty to this country. We belong to this country as much as he belongs to this country," the imam added. "If he is a true man of religion, he must respect other religions, including Islam."

The imam met Thursday with the mayor of Dearborn and the police chief to start preparing for the pastor's visit. Jones and his supporters won't be allowed on private property, but will be allowed in free speech zones.

"We're defining what the public space is at this site. We're offering them other sites," said Dearborn Mayor John O'Reilly.

It's not clear how many supporters will be with Jones on April 22, but the police chief is strongly urging people not to counter protest.

"I would hope that there is no counter protest. I'm going to go on the record as saying that," said Dearborn Police Chief Ronald Haddad.

"The best way sometimes to deal with a fool is to ignore a fool, so we don't plan on doing any counter protest against him," said Dawud Walid with the Council on American-Islamic Relations.

"This is totally against the message that we're trying to promote," said Pastor John Tolbert with the People's Missionary Baptist Church.

"Thank you, but no thank you. Nobody's bringing you here for a revival. Nobody's bringing you here to preach, so there's no reason for you to come here," said Pastor Charles Williams II with the King Solomon Baptist Church.

"It's not just we don't need you, the message is don't come," said Rev. David Bullock with the Greater St. Matthew Baptist Church.
Pastor Terry Jones thwarted in Dearborn

After railing at Dearborn City Hall against Muslims and African Americans, Quran-burning Pastor Terry Jones and his supporters were thwarted Friday in their plans to speak out at a nearby Arab-American festival after a group of angry protesters confronted him. But a group of Christians sympathetic to Jones did rally at the festival later, hurling insults through a megaphone at people attending the festival.

"Dearborn has made it clear: Racist bigots aren't welcome here," shouted a small group of protesters who surrounded Jones as he tried to walk up Schaefer Avenue near City Hall. Earlier, Jones had led a rally against Islam, where several pastors and a rabbi -- all from out of state -- spoke about what they saw as the threat of Islam in the U.S.

Jones sported sunglasses, a bulletproof vest and a T-shirt that read: "Everything I ever needed to know about Islam I learned on
Related Links

Terry Jones back in Dearborn

Pastor Terry Jones attempts to walk through a crowd of protestors Friday on his way to the Dearborn Islamic Festival after his anti-Muslim rally at City Hall. He had to keep changing directions as protesters blocked his path. He did not speak at the Arab festival as planned. / Photos by JARRAD HENDERSON/Detroit Free Press

"Dearborn has made it clear: Racist bigots aren't welcome here," shouted a small group of protesters who surrounded Jones as he tried to walk up Schaefer Avenue near Dearborn City Hall on Friday.

9-11."

"We stand up for the Constitution," he said during his rally at City Hall.

Afterward, he tried to walk the 2 miles to the Arab festival, but had to keep changing directions as protesters -- mostly non-Muslims with the group By Any Means Necessary -- blocked his path.

After a few minutes of shouting and minor scuffling, Jones decided to not continue and canceled his plans to walk and speak at the festival. Dearborn police swarmed in to whisk Jones and his assistant pastor, Wayne Sapp, into a police car.

Police arrested six counter-protesters, ages 18-22. Three of them were men, three were women, Dearborn Police Chief Ron Haddad said. Five of the six arrested were not from Dearborn, indicating that Dearborn residents largely stayed away, Haddad said.

Mayor John O'Reilly criticized both Jones and BAMN protesters for being outsiders who were disturbing the peace in his city.

Compared with a similar rally Jones held in April at City Hall, this one attracted markedly fewer supporters and counter-demonstrators. There were about 15 Jones supporters.

Matthew Keller, 78, a Dearborn resident who supports Jones, said he has Muslim neighbors, but is concerned about Islam.

"I'm a patriot. I'm a Christian. I believe in Jesus Christ above everything," he said.

Jones announced a plan to target Muslim-heavy communities across the U.S., including neighborhoods in Chicago, where the Nation of Islam has a presence. He said he would return to Dearborn.
Jones said Friday, as he has said repeatedly before, that Muslims have to prove their loyalty to the U.S. because their religion makes them suspect.

That outraged Dearborn resident Mohamed Al-Hachami, 14, who said Jones has no right to question them.

"I love America," Al-Hachami said. "I've never even been to the Arab world my entire life."

Late Friday, a group of Christians yelled at people attending the Arab festival.

Shouting through a bullhorn, they repeatedly insulted Muslims.

One sign read: "Muhammad is a ... liar ... pervert."

Wayne County sheriff's deputies later escorted them away as Arab Americans yelled back.

Contact Niraj Warikoo: 313-223-4792 or nwarikoo@freepress.com
Terry Jones is an evangelical pastor who threatened to mark the ninth anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks by burning more than 200 copies of Koran, the sacred text of Islam, at his small church in Gainesville, Fla. Mr. Jones later canceled his demonstration, saying he had won a promise to move the proposed Islamic center near ground zero to a new location. After learning that the project's leaders in New York had said that no such deal existed, Mr. Jones backed away from his promise, saying the bonfire of sacred texts was simply "suspended."

The overall commander of forces in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus, among others, had warned at that time that such an action could provoke violence in Afghanistan, putting American lives in danger. Mr. Jones subsequently publicly promised not to burn a Koran, but in March 2011 he nonetheless presided over a mock trial and then the burning of the Koran at his church, the Dove World Outreach Center, with only 30 worshipers attending.

The provocation drew little response worldwide, but drew angry condemnation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where anti-American sentiment runs high. Stirred up by a trio of angry mullahs who urged them to avenge the burning of a Koran, thousands of protesters on April 1 overran the compound of the United Nations in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif, killing at least 12 people, Afghan and United Nations officials said. The dead included at least seven United Nations workers — five Nepalese guards and two Europeans, one of them a woman. None were Americans.

**Plans That Garnered Worldwide Attention**

In 2010, Mr. Jones's plans garnered him worldwide news media attention and set off protests in Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. His intention to burn the Koran brought condemnation from national religious leaders and from General Petraeus. President Obama also weighed in, saying that he hoped the pastor behind the event "understands that this is a destructive act that he's engaging in," and will call it off after listening to his "better angels."

Mr. Jones's scheduled event coincided with the uproar surrounding the building of an Islamic center near ground zero. With the debate in New York putting religious tensions front and center, the Florida pastor suddenly attracted thousands of fans and critics on Facebook, while around the world he was presented as a symbol of American anti-Islamic sentiment. Muslim leaders in several countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, formally condemned him and his church.

Mr. Jones, a former hotel manager, has argued that as an American Christian he has a right to burn the Koran because "it's full of lies." In 2009, he posted a sign at his church declaring "Islam is of the devil," but it caused no outcry.
He said he sincerely hoped that his planned Koran-burning would not lead to violence. He dismissed the idea that it could put American troops at greater risk, and — echoing his sermons — he said that his church was being persecuted. His bank recently demanded immediate repayment of the $140,000 balance on the church mortgage, Mr. Jones said. His property insurance had also been canceled since he announced in late July 2010 that he intended to burn copies of the Koran; and that death threats now come in regularly, he said.

**Angry Clerics’ Call to Action**

In 2010, even though Mr. Jones called off his burning of the Koran, a subsequent wave of protests at NATO facilities in Afghanistan led to at least five deaths. In several of those incidents, Taliban agitators played a role, allegedly spreading rumors that the Koran burning had taken place. However, the Taliban have had little or no presence in Mazar-i-Sharif.

On March 20, 2011, Mr. Jones burned the sacred text with little apparent reaction. President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, however, condemned the burning in an address before Parliament, and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan called on the United States to bring those responsible for the Koran burning to justice. A prominent Afghan cleric, Mullah Qyamudin Kashaf, acting head of the Ulema Council of Afghanistan (and a Karzai appointee), also called for American authorities to arrest and try Mr. Jones for the Koran burning.

The incident that resulted in the deaths of United Nations workers began in April when three mullahs, addressing worshippers at Friday prayers inside the Blue Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif, one of Afghanistan’s holiest places, urged people to take to the streets to agitate for Mr. Jones’s arrest.

The crowd — some carrying signs reading “Down With America” and “Death to Obama” — poured into the streets and swelled — the governor of Balkh Province, Atta Mohammad Noor, later put the number at 20,000. According to Lal Mohammad Ahmadzai, spokesman for General Daoud Daoud, the Afghan National Police commander for northern Afghanistan, the crowd soon overwhelmed the United Nations guards, disarming some and beating and shooting others.

Mr. Jones was unrepentant. “We must hold these countries and people accountable for what they have done as well as for any excuses they may use to promote their terrorist activities,” he said in a statement.
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty . . .”

These words, taken from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution, have rightfully served as the uncontested, timeless cornerstones of many police department mission statements for more than 200 years. The police mission has faced many challenges in meeting the demands of the evolving global perspective, changing the role of law enforcement in modern society. Police departments continually redefine their missions as dictated by the needs of the community they are empowered to serve. The changing faces and cultures that make up the United States of America are vital in defining the police mission.

The city of Dearborn, Michigan, hometown of Ford Motor Company, is a city built on industry and shaped by diversity. Dearborn has a population of approximately 100,000 residents and a 200-officer police force. Like many communities in Michigan, Dearborn is battling through difficult economic times as a result of the serious challenges faced by the American auto industry. During this period defined
by unemployment and increasing incidents of foreclosure, crime and the fear of crime have become more disconcerting to Dearborn residents and its diverse community.

The surrounding areas of southeastern Michigan and the city of Dearborn are home to the largest concentrated Arab population (estimated at 380,000) outside of the Middle East. Many in this community prefer to be referred to as American Arab, as they believe it is important to represent that they are Americans first and of Arab heritage. The city of Dearborn has been home to Arab American populations for many years. In the early 1900s, people from all over the country and world migrated to Dearborn as a result of the opening of the Ford Rouge Assembly plant, which marked the birth of the American auto industry. Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria were the main countries of origin during that time period. Throughout the 1950s, another large wave of Palestinian and Lebanese immigrants came from the Middle East to the Dearborn area. This population has grown and thrived. Arab American families are now multigenerational; have established deep cultural, political, and religious roots in the Dearborn community; and play a significant role in the Dearborn economy.
The Immigrant Communities

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Dearborn became home to a growing Yemen American population that immigrated to the area largely because of jobs in the auto industry and the established Arab American and Muslim community. The Yemen American community is primarily first- and second-generation immigrants from the country of Yemen. This community started primarily with working-class men settling in to set up a financial base before establishing roots and bringing family members to the area.

While a number of these community members have jobs as professionals, there are also currently members of the Yemen American community who do not speak or write the English language and often rely on school-aged children to translate and communicate with public safety personnel. Communication barriers can create challenges with developing trust, and, as a result, many in the Yemen American community are still relatively reluctant to make contact with police. Being members of their community’s first and second generation to live in the United States, the Yemen American community also is experiencing many of the growing pains that occur when parents are from a traditionally non-Westernized culture and the children tend to be inundated with Western culture. In addition, the country of Yemen is challenged economically and is often associated with militant Muslim ideologies, which have resulted in Yemen being of grave concern to U.S. national security. This broad-based stigma has added stress to the Yemen American community as it struggles to assimilate, grow, and contribute in the American way of life.

Adding to the Arab American mix in Dearborn and metropolitan Detroit is a well-established Chaldean (Iraqi Christian) population. Individuals in the Chaldean community have been joined over the past 18 years by many Iraqi citizens fleeing their homes during the Gulf and Iraq wars. During the past decade, many of the displaced Iraqi refugees landed in Dearborn as they chose to settle in communities with high Arab populations.

In Michigan, the Arab American population is predominately of the Christian faith. In contrast, it is estimated that approximately 80 percent of Dearborn’s Arabic population is Muslim. The Arab American community accounts for more than 30 percent of Dearborn’s residents, or 30,000 residents.
Barriers to Trust

Dearborn strives to provide upscale housing and vibrant business venues in addition to serving as a destination for dining and entertainment. Dearborn is home to several universities, colleges, and institutions for professional career development. The city is known as a regional employment center, center of commerce, and a regional health care destination. The city works hard to offer a welcoming environment that accommodates residents and visitors alike and offers a high quality of life, with well-cared for homes in attractive neighborhoods. Its residents have a sense of purpose and belonging and above all else value the atmosphere of safety and security provided in the community.

The city of Dearborn has a rich history of providing quality public services to its citizens. The Dearborn Police Department continues to follow a philosophy of service that requires it to work in partnership with members of the community to identify common issues and develop common solutions. This has not been without challenges, as the Arab American population in Dearborn is often impacted by global events that create barriers to effective communication and trust. Wars in the Middle East, the ongoing Palestinian conflict, terrorist video threats, acts of violence by terrorist organizations, and global heightened security have all had an impact on the Arab American population in Dearborn, often subjecting its members to stereotypical cultural bias created by these global events. Arab American populations, like most Americans, have resigned themselves to certain infringements on freedoms, such as added airport security screening procedures. However, the perception of cultural bias in issues such as unfair national immigration policies, reported recruitment of informants within local mosques, and racial profiling can all elicit a passionate community response. These issues add a continuous burden on the local police department in building trust with the community in areas that were not created by—or in the control of—any police department. These factors cannot be allowed to impede progress. Adhering to a community-oriented policing philosophy continues to be significant in overcoming these obstacles.
Encouraging Community Involvement

The cornerstone of the Dearborn Police Department’s philosophy is communication, education, and mutual respect. Dearborn believes that through effective communication, all segments of a population have a chance to contribute and educate each other in the hopes that they all realize they are of equal importance and with that have equal responsibility in contributing to a successful and safe community.

A defining example of community identity is a section of the city of Dearborn referred to as Altar Road. Located along Altar Road is the Islamic Center of America, the largest mosque in the United States. The Islamic Center of America hosts 350,000 visitors each year and is very involved with the community. It is led by Imam Hassan Qazwini, who has been a communicator, facilitator of education, and a true community partner. Important to note is that also located on Altar Road are Saint Sarkis Armenian Apostolic Church, Saint Clement Orthodox Church, Warrendale Community Church, and Abundant Life Arabic Lutheran Ministry. Adjoining Altar Road is Saint Thomas Aquinas Catholic Church as well. Churches of various religious beliefs seamlessly coexist as peaceful neighbors, working together and all contributing to one community. This is representative of the spirit of Dearborn and why effective communication and education promotes mutual respect.

Cooperative community-based efforts are often the result of elaborate community policing initiatives. The ideals are quite simple: Individuals should become educated about their community and show through action their legitimate concern, ensuring all members of the community have an equal voice and are respected for who they are and what they represent. These actions will result in trust. Trust results in communication. Communication allows police to better deter and solve crime and enlist community support and assistance in providing a safe and secure environment for the entire community.

Before facilitating community outreach initiatives, the Dearborn Police had to clearly define the meaning of community policing. Community policing initiatives can be costly, so they must be results oriented and have a meaningful and measurable outcome. Only through education and positive experience comes the recognition of community policing as a serious facilitator of innovative problem solving and intelligence gathering. Community policing approached this way can positively affect defined crime issues with the byproduct of building relationships and trust in the community.
Mindfulness of Cultural Differences

In Dearborn, the learning process has been extensive. Beyond acknowledgement of the stereotypical cultural bias associated with the Arab American community, it is imperative that police officers recognize that the Arab culture has many nuances. Not understanding some of these nuances can lead certain police officer actions or honest efforts to be misconstrued as being offensive or disrespectful. That can inadvertently result in conflicts and communication breakdowns.

The majority of Arab Americans residing in Dearborn practice Islam, which celebrates religious beliefs and customs that are not well understood by non-Muslim peoples and are often incorrectly correlated and linked to radical portrayals of the religion. The Muslim religion has a great influence in the local Arab American culture, and, therefore, it is very important for police officers to understand many of the core ideologies. It is also important to note that Arab American communities can vary greatly within themselves in cultural traditions, ideologies, and religious beliefs based on their country of origin or religious sect. Established long-term residency that includes jobs, voting, education, civic involvement, and inclusion in a community lends itself to greater community assimilation and assists in developing relationships and trust in any ethnic community. It is imperative to recognize that although communities share a common culture, religion, and language, they do not necessarily have the same needs and concerns, nor will they automatically and harmoniously live together. Each distinct community must have equal voice and input and be an equal contributor to solutions.
A valuable lesson learned in Dearborn is the importance of locating, recognizing, and supporting programs and initiatives already existing within the community. William K. Brehm and the Brehm Scholarship Program is one such program. Brehm, a successful businessman and previous public servant as the assistant secretary of the U.S. Army in both the Nixon and Ford administrations, was a Fordson High School (Dearborn) and University of Michigan graduate. Brehm has established scholarships to encourage accomplished Fordson students to attend the University of Michigan and recently created full-tuition scholarships at the University of Michigan Medical School. The Arab American student population at Fordson is predominant and this generous educational opportunity is highly revered in the Arab American community.

Recognizing initiatives like the Brehm Scholarships is important, but, as Chief Haddad also points out, it is equally important to recognize the efforts of individuals like William Ali, a Yemen American citizen who works as a community liaison/youth intervention counselor at Edsel Ford High School (Dearborn). It is the unofficial daily efforts of William Ali that serve as a community example. Ali resides in the community and has, for more than two decades, worked with the youth in the Yemen American community, keeping them away from gangs and crime by organizing athletic programs, promoting education and language skills, and identifying at-risk youth for mentoring. The police department has been greatly assisted by the efforts initiated by Ali in reaching out to the community, building relationships, identifying at-risk youth, and bringing resources to the area. These are only two examples at each end of the spectrum of community leaders stepping forward to benefit the greater good. There are many more individuals who are also deserving of recognition.

Police Commitment and Interest

The Dearborn Police Department believes partnerships are made one at a time and are often facilitated by the interactions and professional services provided by the patrol officer. The patrol officer sets the tone, which can be positive or negative. This
is why patrol officers are essential in the success or failure of any community-oriented police initiative and should be well educated and knowledgeable about the communities in their patrol areas. Members of the Dearborn Police Department benefit from education and training that portrays community policing as a philosophy, not a program. Officers continuously study the effective use of positive communication skills to create relationships, trust, and opportunities to facilitate change. These skills can also be vital in gaining useful information on a daily basis. Community policing philosophies adopted by the Dearborn Police Department are being incorporated in the policies and procedures manuals. These skills are also being incorporated in the field training officers mentoring program and in new-officer, supervisor, and in-service training, as well as in the officer’s goals and objectives. Dearborn police officers are expected to have a commitment and interest in the citizens they are serving. All officers are expected to show empathy and professionalism in all citizen contacts. Most officers continually cultivate relationships with citizens and gain information every day about crime, criminals, and issues that affect the community. It has proven to be beneficial to police and to the community to utilize teaching sources provided by the communities themselves. This allows a better understanding of key components. It is a continuing goal of the Dearborn Police Department to expand its efforts in facilitating relationships in all segments of the community.

Just as it is important to recognize the vital role of the patrol officer in community policing initiatives, law enforcement supervisors and administrators play an equally important role in developing relationships with the Arab American community. The police chief and command staff facilitate and have ongoing dialogue with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Anti-Defamation League, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Advocate and Leaders for Police and Community Trust, the Yemeni American Benevolent Association, and other civil rights–related groups. They actively participate on committees that stem from these interactions. It is important to communicate directly with these leaders to address common issues and develop equal participatory strategies for solving problems.
It is important and beneficial to be involved in these committees, but it is also important that the committees do not over evolve, transforming themselves into police oversight committees where outside committee members feel they are entitled to a policy-making role. The value in committee involvement is in equal sharing, not one-sided complaint receiving. Involvement is crucial so members of the community have the opportunity to become familiar with police and government functions. Trust and respect need to be mutual.

Programs to Instill Community Confidence

The Dearborn Police Department has made a commitment to the School Resource Officer program, assigning a police officer to each public high school and providing services at all the elementary and middle schools. This commitment proves itself valuable especially in the Arab American community, as it allows first- and second-generational youths to see police officers as educators and mentors rather than solely law enforcers, which serves as a foundation for the future.

The police department promotes and supports a solid Reserve Officer program, which has 33 officers, 21 percent of whom are volunteers from the Arab American community. This program allows volunteers from the community to assist and participate in certain police functions, which not only adds great value to the police department, but helps facilitate the police mission through civilian volunteers.
The Dearborn Police Department has a police Explorer program, which has 25 Explorers, 33 percent of whom are youths from the Arab American Community. The purpose of this program is to attract youths to the police department, expose them to the police profession, and facilitate relationships with them with the intent of building inroads and relationships with members of the community in the future.

Another program calls for police interns. Dearborn Mayor John B. O'Reilly Jr. strongly believes in the value of having a paid police intern program. This program currently comprises five interns, 60 percent of whom come from the Arab American community. The intern program offers these youths the opportunity to work side by side with police officers in a supporting role. The program offers college tuition reimbursement as the interns work toward a degree related to law enforcement. Gail Mee, president of Henry Ford Community College in Dearborn, has added her support by allowing the interns to earn six credit hours. The interns serve as ambassadors both in the community and within the police department.

Multidimensional and Information Sharing Policing

Community policing traditionally is thought of as facilitating relationships in one direction: between the police and community. The Dearborn Police Department looks at community policing as a multidimensional philosophy. If communication and trust work well in one direction, then, if properly implemented, they should work in all directions. The police department is perfectly positioned to serve the community, and it is also perfectly positioned to be the facilitator between the community and the government agencies more removed from daily contact.

The Dearborn Police Department believes it is extremely important to also build relationships upward with federal law enforcement partners by facilitating the sharing of information. Violent extremism that emanates out of radical groups concealed or blended into various religions, ethnic groups, special interest groups, bullied teens, and hatred from otherwise disturbed individuals is a concern of every citizen and government agency. It would be naive to believe information that the patrol beat officers recognize through training indicators, traits, and early warning signs could not be of value to the interests of federal law enforcement. It would also be naive to believe that services offered by federal law enforcement could not be of value to the community. Local police officers receive information daily from many street-level sources, but many times are unfamiliar or reluctant to share that information with a federal law enforcement agency because they lack knowledge or trust that the information they have obtained is valuable.
In 2010, both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice publicly commended, endorsed, and pledged support for community-oriented policing initiatives. The Dearborn Police Department is taking initiatives to facilitate relationships between the local police officers and the federal agents at the investigative level. The police department is making efforts to invite federal law enforcement entities to meet and train local officers in areas of interest and invite federal agents to learn and participate locally, developing relationships between agents and officers. The goal of these initiatives is for the police department to build relationships of trust and common interests with federal law enforcement partners. The goal is also to be a link in the chain that facilitates relationships between federal law enforcement entities and the members of the community.

Communication, education, and mutual respect likely already play an important part in the majority of law enforcement mission statements and philosophies across the United States. Local police departments have the opportunity to be the lead facilitators of change and can be vital in providing the necessary ingredients for safe and secure communities. Legislation will not create public order. Rather, the goodwill of individuals must be relied upon to ensure that the common good of any community will be served. Citizens' voices must be heard and their treatment must be viewed as equitable. Dialogue on the critical issues of this time can be perplexing. It can also be painful. However, mutual recognition of each other's perspectives, not intimidation, will go a long way in building respect and trust. There are times when the right decision is clear and it cannot be impacted by political correctness, budgetary constraints, or popular demand. It relies upon the individual courage of the police executive to do what is right to ensure all people enjoy the safeguards and freedoms that are designed and guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

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Case Study: Samir Khan

Samir Khan was perhaps most notoriously known as the editor and primary contributor of the al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) online jihad magazine, *Inspire*. Written in colloquial English, with a keen understanding of American youth culture, and illustrated with sophisticated graphics and photos uncommon in the jihadi world, *Inspire* aimed directly at a Western audience and sought to recruit terrorist operatives to strike their own homelands or abroad. Khan was 25 years old when he was killed by a September 2011 US drone strike targeting AQAP's operational leader, Anwar al-Aulaqi.

Born in Saudi Arabia of Pakistani ancestry, Khan moved to the New York area with his middle-class family at the age of 7. Neighbors knew him as a teenager who played basketball in the street with his brother, adopting the clothing and slang of his peers until shortly before the 9/11 attacks, when he attended a mosque summer camp.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Khan's attraction to militant websites and a radical shift in his social and religious views alarmed his parents. Khan's family moved to North Carolina in 2004. Acquaintances in Charlotte described him as introverted, awkward, and already radicalized upon his arrival. He expressed outrage that local mosque leaders were not preaching about the injustice of the US-led war against Muslim countries.

Khan became a prolific blogger supporting the cause of violent jihadists. He took the precaution of consulting an attorney regarding the limits of his free speech and was advised to avoid directly advocating violence. There was no evidence at the time that Khan was violating the law by providing material support to terrorists. However, he leveraged his fluency in the English language and American culture to make relevant the messages broadcast by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates.

Many online jihadi forums perpetuate the myth that American forces routinely and deliberately commit atrocities against Muslim civilians. Many view the United States and its allies as waging a war not against terrorist groups, but against Islam and all Muslims. Khan believed in the value of winning what he called the "media jihad," producing propaganda that would convert terrorist sympathizers into actual operatives willing to take violent action.

Several times, vigilante groups notified Khan's Internet service provider about his extremist bloggings, causing his access to be suspended. Khan himself was surprised that the government did not directly contact him.

Khan's father tried to bring him to religious scholars in an effort to reverse his radicalization. According to one imam, Samir "would give you the impression that he would
Case Study: Samir Khan

change," before he disconnected from the mosque. Khan’s father also cut off Samir’s Internet access several times.

In 2009, Khan is believed to have moved to Yemen, the stronghold of AQAP. The inaugural issue of Inspire magazine appeared in summer 2010, and by the time of his death, Khan was able to publish six more issues.

Slain al Qaeda Mouthpiece Samir Khan's

The Westbury home where al Qaeda propagandist Samir Khan once lived. (Photo credit: Long Island Press) Foreground: Samir Khan

Samir Khan, the al Qaeda propagandist killed in U.S. airstrikes alongside militant cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen last week, spent some of his teenage years living in Westbury, Long Island, just down the road from two prime targets: Roosevelt Field Mall and the Long Island Rail Road, officials and neighbors say.

Khan, 25, was the editor of Inspire, an English-language al Qaeda magazine that publishes interviews with leading terrorists as well as how-to articles on topics such as bomb building and firing assault rifles. Khan and al-Awlaki were seen as key players in sowing anti-Western sentiment that helped in recruiting new fighters. They became the first American citizens targeted and killed in a drone strike Sept. 30.

"He's a person who was basically raised on Long Island, became radicalized and became a terrorist while he was on Long Island," Rep. Peter King (R-Seafood), the chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, tells the Press. "It really makes you wonder."

A law enforcement source confirmed that the Khan family moved from Queens to Nassau County, where they lived several years before moving to North Carolina eight years ago. It was unclear when he moved to the tidy L-shaped Plymouth Drive in Westbury, but the New York Times reported Khan began became radicalized after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks—despite his family's interventions.

"I am proud to be a traitor to America," is the title of one article reportedly penned by Khan after he moved to Yemen in 2008 to head up Inspire magazine. East Meadow Patch reported Khan graduated in 2003 from W.T. Clarke High School, where he wrote for the student newspaper. Neighbors who remembered the family were stunned at the news, but the new owners of the Khan residence saw it coming.

"I wasn't shocked when we heard about this," says the new owner of the ranch-style home, Rocco Abbateillo. The 44-year-old independent contractor tells the Press he got the first of several visits from federal investigators asking about the house where Khan had lived with his parents and older sister six months after his family moved in to the home in the fall of 2003.
“Even when we purchased the house we never actually met them,” he says. “We gutted the whole house, it’s not like we found anything.”

Neighbors did not take the news as lightly.

“It takes away the whole sense of suburbia,” says one neighbor who asked not to be named. “They tell you if you see something, say something. Are we supposed to be suspicious of every new neighbor?”

The neighbor found it odd that the family suddenly moved to North Carolina on a week’s notice, but had never suspected anything out of the ordinary. The family reportedly wore traditional garb and mostly kept to themselves.

The Khan family released a statement Wednesday defending Samir and condemning his death, according to The Charlotte Observer.

“We feel appalled by the indifference shown to us by our government,” it reads. “No U.S. official has contacted us with any news about the recovery of our son’s remains, nor offered us any condolences.”

The statement charges Samir was deprived of his Fifth Amendment rights to due process.

“Was this style of execution the only solution?” it asks. “Why couldn’t there have been a capture and trial? Where is the justice?”

King has said the killing of al-Awlaki was justifiable despite his U.S. citizenship because he was at war. He tells the Press that al-Awlaki and Khan were more dangerous in recent years than the late al Qaeda chief, Osama bin Laden, “because they knew how to talk to Americans.”

“I read his magazine every month,” King says. “It’s scary stuff. I know the impact it has.”

Khan is not the first al Qaeda member from Long Island. Bryant Neal Vinas, Patchogue native and Muslim convert, pleaded guilty to conspiring to kill U.S. nationals in 2009. That was a year after he was captured in Pakistan, where he admitted giving al Qaeda information about the LIRR for a bomb plot.

In a related case, 45-year-old Mohammad Younis of Centereach pleaded guilty in August to operating an unlicensed money transmitting business after admitting in federal court that he unwittingly provided $7,000 to Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square Bomber. Younis will be sentenced Nov. 30.

“No one was as effective as al-Awlaki and Samir Khan,” King says. “They knew American culture. They knew American hopes and fears.”

More articles filed under Long Island News, News

Tags: Al Qaeda, al-Qaeda, Anwar al-Awlaki, bomb, bomb making, Bryant Neal Vinas, Centereach, cleric, drone, drone strikes, editor, featured, Homeland Security, Homeland Security Committee, Inspire, LIRR, Long Island, Long Island Rail Road, Mohammad Younis, North Carolina, Osama Bin Laden, Patchogue, Pete King, Peter King, roosevelt field mall, Samir Khan, target, terrorist, terrorists, westbury, Yemen
Samir Khan


Updated: Sept. 30, 2011

Samir Khan, a young Web-savvy American of Pakistani origin thought to be behind the Al Qaeda magazine Inspire, was killed in the same September 2011 strike that killed the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

Mr. Awlaki, whom the United States had been hunting in Yemen for more than two years, had been identified as the target in advance and was killed with a Hellfire missile fired from a drone operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Khan was traveling with Mr. Awlaki, but it was not clear whether he was also a deliberate target of the strike.

Mr. Khan, who was born in 1986, was an enthusiast of jihad who lived with his parents in North Carolina as recently as 2007, before leaving the United States for Yemen in 2009, where he is thought to have started Inspire magazine.

Mr. Khan was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in Queens. He was an unlikely foot soldier in what Al Qaeda calls the “Islamic jihadi media.” He had grown up in middle-class America and wrestled with his worried parents about his religious fervor.

Before leaving the United States, Mr. Khan had served as a Western conduit for the multimedia productions of violent Islamic groups, a role he appeared to have continued to pursue from Yemen. At the time, he was not thought to have had terrorist ties.

In recent years, Mr. Khan had become a strong part of the information arm of Al Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He proclaimed, in an early edition of the Qaeda magazine, that “I am proud to be a traitor,” according to an ABC News report from 2010.

Inspire magazine attracted attention in September 2011 for its issue commemorating and celebrating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In the issue, the group criticized President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran for repeating conspiracy theories that diminished Al Qaeda’s role in the attacks.
ARTICLES ABOUT SAMIR KHAN

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By CHARLIE SAVAGE
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October 11, 2011
MORE ON SAMIR KHAN AND: AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, AWLAKI, ANWAR AL-, KHAN, SAMIR

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By CHARLIE SAVAGE
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MORE ON SAMIR KHAN AND: UNITED STATES DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND STATE SECRETS, TERRORISM, YEMEN, AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTEllIGENCE AGENCY, OBAMA, BARACK, AWLAKI, ANWAR AL-
2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War

By ROBBIE BROWN and KIM SEVERSON
Published: September 30, 2011

CHARLOTTE, N.C. — From his parents’ basement in a part of town where homes have lots of bedrooms and most children go to college, Samir Khan blogged his way into the highest circles of Al Qaeda, waging a media war he believed was as important as the battles with guns on the ground.

His parents — by all accounts a low-key, respected couple who had moved south from Queens in 2004 — were worried about the increasingly radical nature of their son’s philosophy and the increasing media reports that exposed it.

They turned more than once to members of their religious communities to impress upon their college-aged son the perils of such thinking and behavior.
It did not work. In 2009, he left his comfortable life in Charlotte for Yemen, started a slick magazine for jihadists called Inspire that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular, and continued to digitally dodge government and civilian efforts to stop his self-described “media jihad.”

His life ended in Yemen on Friday, when Mr. Khan, 25, was killed in a drone strike that also took the life of the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and two other men, according to both American and Yemeni officials.

At a mosque run by the Islamic Society of Greater Charlotte, few of the several hundred Muslims gathered for Friday Prayer wanted to talk about Mr. Khan.

“This is a very dangerous road when you go and kill someone like this,” said Ayeb Suleiman, 25, a medical resident. “He was just an editor. He was just writing.”

Others felt grief for a family who had lost a son, no matter the nature of the son’s activities.

Mr. Khan’s father, Zafar Khan, is an information technology executive and a respected, regular worshipper who bought his family a two-story brick house near a golf course. He often talked cricket with Yasin Raja, a fellow
Pakistani-American.

“If Samir got caught up with something, that was on his own,” Mr. Raja said.

Steve Glocke, who lives across the street from the family, watched Mr. Khan grow from a cordial teenager who played basketball with his brother in the street into a quiet, but radical, young man. When Mr. Khan moved to Yemen, he said, “I would ask if he was O.K., and they would say they didn’t know.”

His parents were worried even before the family moved from Queens. Mustapha Elturk, the imam and president of the Islamic Organization of North America, met the family in the mid-1990s during an educational program at a mosque in Flushing, Queens. Mr. Khan was interested in Islam as a way to “stay away from the peer pressure of his teenage days,” he said.
But after the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Khan’s attraction to militant sites on the Internet and his radical views grew to the point where his father intervened.

“He tried his best to make his son meet all sorts of imams and scholars to dissuade him from those views,” said Mr. Elturk, who spoke with Mr. Khan’s father on Friday to offer condolences. “He would give you the impression that he would change.”

Early intervention by members of the local community is key to preventing the radicalization of Islamic youth, said Sue Myrick, the member of Congress who represents the part of Charlotte where Mr. Khan lived.

Mr. Khan’s last issue of Inspire came out this week. It was 20 pages, smaller than the rest, and dedicated largely to the Sept. 11 attacks. It has lost some of the cheekiness of early editions, which outlined what to expect on a jihad and had headlines like “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”

In this edition, he made clear the role he believed he played in the war. “While America was focused on battling mujahedeen in the mountains of Afghanistan and the streets of Iraq,” he wrote, “the jihadi media and its supporters were in fifth gear.”

Robbie Brown reported from Charlotte, and Kim Severson from Atlanta. Matt Flegenheimer contributed reporting from New York.

A version of this article appeared in print on October 1, 2011, on page A8 of the New York edition with the headline: Drone Victim Went From American Middle Class to Waging a Media War for Al Qaeda.
October 15, 2007

An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers

By MICHAEL MOSS and SOUAD MEKHENNET

When Osama bin Laden issued his videotaped message to the American people last month, a young jihad enthusiast went online to help spread the word.

“America needs to listen to Shaykh Usamaah very carefully and take his message with great seriousness,” he wrote on his blog. “America is known to be a people of arrogance.”

Unlike Mr. bin Laden, the blogger was not operating from a remote location. It turns out he is a 21-year-old American named Samir Khan who produces his blog from his parents’ home in North Carolina, where he serves as a kind of Western relay station for the multimedia productions of violent Islamic groups.

In recent days, he has featured “glad tidings” from a North African militant leader whose group killed 31 Algerian troops. He posted a scholarly treatise arguing for violent jihad, translated into English. He listed hundreds of links to secret sites from which his readers could obtain the latest blood-drenched insurgent videos from Iraq.

His neatly organized site also includes a file called “United States of Losers,” which showcased a recent news broadcast about a firefight in Afghanistan with this added commentary from Mr. Khan: “You can even see an American soldier hiding during the ambush like a baby!! AllahuAkbar! AllahuAkbar!”

Mr. Khan, who was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in Queens, is an unlikely foot soldier in what Al Qaeda calls the “Islamic jihadi media.” He has grown up in middle-class America and wrestles with his worried parents about his religious fervor. Yet he is stubborn. “I will do my best to speak the truth, and even if it annoys the disbelievers, the truth must be preached,” Mr. Khan said in an interview.

While there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Khan is operating in concert with militant leaders, or breaking any laws, he is part of a growing constellation of apparently independent media operators who are broadcasting the message of Al Qaeda and other groups, a message that is increasingly devised, translated and aimed for a Western audience.

Terrorism experts at West Point say there are as many as 100 English language sites offering militant Islamic views, with Mr. Khan’s — which claims 500 regular readers — among the more active. While their reach is difficult to assess, it is clear from a review of extremist material and
interviews that militants are seeking to appeal to young American and European Muslims by playing on their anger over the war in Iraq and the image of Islam under attack.

Tedious Arabic screeds are reworked into flashy English productions. Recruitment tracts are issued in multiple languages, like a 39-page, electronic, English version of a booklet urging women to join the fight against the West.

There are even online novellas like “Rakan bin Williams,” about a band of Christian European converts who embraced Al Qaeda and “promised God that they will carry the flag of their distant brothers and seek vengeance on the evil doers.”

Militant Islamists are turning grainy car-bombing tapes into slick hip-hop videos and montage movies, all readily available on Western sites like YouTube, the online video smorgasbord.

“It is as if you would watch a Hollywood movie,” said Abu Saleh, a 21-year-old German devotee of Al Qaeda videos who visits Internet cafes in Berlin twice a week to get the latest releases. “The Internet has totally changed my view on things.”

An Internet Strategy

Al Qaeda and its followers have used the Internet to communicate and rally support for years, but in the past several months the Western tilt of the message and the sophistication of the media have accelerated. So has the output. Since the beginning of the year, Al Qaeda's media operation, Al Sahab, has issued new videotapes as often as every three days. Even more come from Iraq, where insurgents are pumping them out daily.

That production line is the legacy of one man: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia who was killed in June 2006 by American bombs.

Mr. Zarqawi learned the power of the Internet in prison, according to a former associate who was imprisoned with him in Jordan a decade ago. Mr. Zarqawi’s jailhouse group of 32 Islamists sought to recruit other prisoners by handwriting a newsletter, Al Tawheed, when it discovered a larger audience.

“We sent them outside, to brothers in Europe and England,” who posted the newsletters on militant Web sites, the associate said, asking not be identified because he said he is involved with Islamist activities.

In Iraq, Mr. Zarqawi embraced the video camera as a weapon of war. “He made the decision that every group should have a video camera with them, and every operation should be taped,” said a Palestinian militant who went to Iraq in 2005 to teach foreign fighters from Morocco and parts of Europe how to build bombs and stage roadside attacks.

Two Lebanese intelligence officials confirmed that the Palestinian, who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Omar, had worked with Mr. Zarqawi in Iraq, and he played a video of foreign fighters in Iraq for reporters of The New York Times.
Abu Omar, 37, a muscular man who carried a Glock 21 pistol tucked into the belt of his camouflage pants during an interview at his home in Lebanon, said Mr. Zarqawi also had him tape his bombmaking classes so his expertise would not be lost if he were killed.

“We had two cameramen, people who learned how to do this before they came to Iraq,” Abu Omar said. “And after filming, we had different houses in the area where we made the videos.”

Dahia al-Maqdassi, 26, a Palestinian who said he produced insurgent videos in Iraq two years ago, said, “In every city in Iraq they had a little office where someone did film operations.” He described his “media section” as a house near Falluja where 6 to 10 people worked. “We finished the film and then sent it to jihadi Web sites,” Mr. Maqdassi said.

**Propaganda Rap Video**

One of the most influential sites is Tajdeed, which is based in London and run by Dr. Muhammad Massari, a Saudi physicist and dissident. Over lunch at a McDonald’s near his home, Dr. Massari said Mr. Zarqawi’s insurgent videos from Iraq inspired local productions like “Dirty Kuffar,” the Arabic word for nonbeliever. The 2004 rap music video mixed images of Western leaders with others purporting to show American troops cheer as they shot injured Iraqi civilians.

Dr. Massari, who helped promote the video, said similar crossover productions soon followed and made their way to his Web site.

“I never touch the videos that are on my forums,” said Dr. Massari, who wears a long white Arabic robe. “Someone with Al Qaeda uploads them, probably at Internet cafes, to password-protected sites. Then they call a friend, say, in Australia or Brasilia, and say, ‘Hi Johnny, your mom is traveling today.’ That is the code to download the video. It goes up and down like that a few times, with no trace, until someone posts a link on my site.”

Last spring, Al Qaeda made what analysts say was a bold attempt to tap potential supporters in the United States. In a videotaped interview, Ayman al-Zawahri, a bin Laden lieutenant, praised Malcolm X and urged American blacks and other minorities to see that “we are waging jihad to lift oppression from all of mankind.”

The tape quickly found an audience. Mr. Zawahri “cares about black people,” wrote a blogger with Vibe, the American hip-hop and urban culture magazine, which claims 1.6 million visits a month. “At least, I think that’s why he’s quoting Malcolm X in his latest mix tape, which dropped last weekend.”

Umar Lee, a 32-year-old Muslim convert from St. Louis, offered a stinging critique of Mr. Zawahri on his blog for Muslim Americans, criticizing “the second-class status many blacks live in right in the Arab World.” Soon, Mr. Lee’s blog churned with commentary on the parallels between Arab and black American radicals.

A four-minute version of the hourlong Qaeda video, entitled “To Black Americans,” has logged more than 1,800 views on YouTube in the four months since it was posted.
Among those who posted a link to the YouTube version was Mr. Khan, the North Carolina blogger who said he was struck by the simplicity in the messages of both Al Qaeda and Malcolm X. "They are geniuses for having the ability to mold their ideology into simple yet influential messages that can reach the grass-roots level," he said.

Mr. Khan produces his blog anonymously, but was identified by The Times through the e-mail account he used in previous online discussions. (Pictures he had posted online helped The Times distinguish him from another, unrelated North Carolina resident, about 10 years older, who has the same name.)

In an interview at a local mosque, where he sat on a prayer rug wearing a traditional Arabic robe, Mr. Khan traced his increasing militancy.

His blog has attracted enough notoriety that vigilante groups opposed to jihadi sites have gotten him shut down a few times in recent months. He said he was somewhat surprised he had not been confronted by government authorities, although, he said, "I've never told anybody to build bombs."

His early postings, beginning in 2003, promoted strengthening Islam in North America through nonviolent confrontations. But with the escalating war in Iraq, bloodshed became a recurrent theme.

He described his favorite video from Iraq: a fiery suicide-bomber attack on an American outpost.

"It was something that brought great happiness to me," he said. "Because this is something America would never want to admit, that they are being crushed."

Asked how he felt living among people who had sent soldiers to Iraq, Mr. Khan said: "Whatever happens to their sons and daughters is none of my concern. They are people of hellfire and I have no concern for them."

A Teenage Transformation

Born in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, Mr. Khan was 7 when his family moved to New York City and settled into the Queens neighborhood of Maspeth.

He mirrored his teenage peers, from their slang to their baggy pants, until August 2001 when, at age 15, he said, he attended a weeklong summer camp at a mosque in Queens, which was sponsored by a fundamentalist but nonviolent group now known as the Islamic Organization of North America (IONA).

"They were teaching things about religion and brotherhood that captivated me," Mr. Khan said. He said he went back to school knowing "what I wanted to do with my life: be a firm Muslim, a strong Muslim, a practicing Muslim."

He prayed more regularly. He dressed more modestly. He stopped listening to music except for Soldiers of Allah, a Los Angeles hip-hop group, now defunct, whose tunes like "Bring Islam Back" continue to have worldwide appeal among militant youths.
He also befriended members of the Islamic Thinkers Society, a tiny group that promotes radical, nonviolent Islam by leafleting in Times Square and Jackson Heights, Queens.

After moving with his family to North Carolina in 2004, Mr. Khan said, he attended a community college for three years and earned money selling various products, including kitchen knives.

But he began spending chunks of his days on the blog he created in late 2005, “Inshallah shahid,” which translates as “a martyr soon if God wills.” The Internet traffic counter Alexa.com, which rarely is able to measure the popularity of blogs because they do not have enough readers, ranked his among the top one percent of one hundred million Internet sites in the world.

If Mr. Khan’s extreme rhetoric has won him a wider audience, it has caused him problems at home. Last year, his father tried to pull him back to the family’s more moderate views by asking an imam to intervene.

“I tried to bring arguments from the Koran and scholars, and said, ‘Whatever you are thinking it is not true,’” said Mustapha Elturk, a family friend and the leader of IONA, the Islamic organization that first inspired Mr. Khan. But Mr. Khan did not budge, he said.

Mr. Khan said he separated from IONA over one matter: the organization would not support violent jihad without the endorsement of a Muslim nation’s leader, which Mr. Khan argues is unnecessary.

Mr. Elturk said, “His father and family are really scared that he might do something.”

**Attempts to Shut Down Blog**

From time to time, Mr. Khan said, his father also cut off his Internet access and, to placate him, Mr. Khan recently added a disclaimer to his blog disavowing responsibility for the views expressed on the site.

He has also been fending off citizen watchdogs who are working to knock sites like his off the Internet. Twice in September his blog went dark when his service provider shut him down, citing complaints about the nature of his postings.

Mr. Khan has now moved his blog to a site called Muslimpad, whose American operators recently moved from Texas to Amman, Jordan. Their larger forum, Islamic Network, is the host of discussions among English-speaking Muslims. One of their former employees, Daniel Maldonado, was convicted this year in federal court of associating with terrorists at their training camps in Somalia.

Mr. Khan said that he had dreams about meeting Mr. bin Laden and that he would not rule out picking up a weapon himself one day. In a recent essay, he argued that jihad was mandatory for all Muslims, and he cited three ways to fulfill this obligation: join fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan or Algeria; send them money; or promote militant videos as part of the jihad media.

For now, he said, he is fulfilling his obligations by helping other Muslims understand their religion. Recently he posted a video of a news report from Somalia showing a grenade-wielding American
who had joined the Islamists.

"He is an example of a Muslim who follows the Religion of Islaam," Mr. Khan wrote.
Radical blogger was 'Al Qaeda to the core'

Samir Khan, killed with Awlaki, was a skilled propagandist from North Carolina.

October 01, 2011 | David Zucchino

NEW BERN, N.C. — Before he was the Yemen-based editor of the English-language online magazine for Al Qaeda's branch in the Arabian peninsula, Samir Khan was a radical young Muslim blogger in North Carolina.

Khan, 25, a skilled propagandist, wrote virulently pro-Al Qaeda blog posts while a student at a community college in Charlotte. As a teenager, he posted blogs championing holy war from his parents' home on suburban Tradition View Drive in a modern Charlotte subdivision.

Khan was one of two American citizens killed by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen, American and Yemeni officials announced Friday. Along with Anwar Awlaki, 40, who was also reported killed, Khan parlayed his idiomatic American English and familiarity with American culture to recruit converts for Al Qaeda throughout the English-speaking world.

Khan edited Inspire, an online English-language magazine that served as Al Qaeda's propaganda arm. From his base in Yemen, Khan wrote stories with headlines such as "How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom" and "What to Expect in Jihad."

In the bomb article, Khan wrote: "In one or two days the bomb could be ready to kill at least 10 people. In a month you may make a bigger and more lethal bomb that could kill tens of people."

In late 2009, in an introductory interview article titled, "I Am Proud to Be a Traitor to America," Khan said he was "Al Qaeda to the core."

He also was quoted by Inspire as saying:

"I am a traitor to America because my religion requires me to be. We pledge to wage jihad for the rest of our lives until either we implant Islam all over the world or meet our lord as bearers of Islam."

Khan, of Pakistani descent, was born in Saudi Arabia and raised from age 7 in Queens, N.Y. He moved to Charlotte in 2004 when his father, Zafar Khan, who is now 62, was transferred.

Khan arrived in North Carolina as an introverted, awkward young man who did not make friends easily. But he was already radicalized, according to Adam Azad, who befriended Khan in Charlotte.

Khan was outraged that local mosque leaders didn't preach about U.S.-led wars in Muslim nations, Azad told National Public Radio last year.

"He was kind of critical, like, why don't they talk more about injustices that are going on around the world?" Azad said.

While attending Central Piedmont Community College in 2005, Khan began writing a radical blog titled, "inshallahshaheed," which translates from Arabic as "a martyr if God wills it."

But before he launched the blog, according to NPR, Khan hired a lawyer and asked how far he could go under the 1st Amendment in writing a blog praising Al Qaeda and jihad, or holy war. He was advised to not directly advocate violence.


"How far does someone have to go before we take them seriously?" Myrick asked. She has since criticized the U.S. intelligence community for failing to heed warnings about Khan.

Khan was so radical that local Muslim leaders met with him and his father in an effort to persuade him to renounce violence in the name of Islam.

The leaders rejected Khan's views and banned him from speaking at local mosques, Jibril Hough, a spokesperson for the Islamic Center of Charlotte, told the Charlotte Observer last year.

Hough told NPR that Khan and his father met at Hough's home with Muslim elders. The men sat in a circle and talked for hours.

Khan "mostly just listened," Hough told NPR. "I think at one time during the conversation he tried to give some kind of justification for killing innocent people, but it was a very short rebuttal. And that's why it kind of gave me the idea that we were making progress."

But Khan continued posting to his blog, and he told people that he planned to move to Yemen to teach English. In October 2009, he boarded a flight to Yemen and never returned.

Hough did not respond to telephone messages left at the Islamic center on Friday. A phone number in the name of Zafar Khan was out of service, according to the local phone company.

Samir Khan was invaluable to Al Qaeda because of his verbal skills and provocative prose. His death and that of Awlaki, an operational leader and English-
Samir Khan, killed with Awlaki, was skilled propagandist - Los Angeles...
Outreach Strategy

Case Study: Hutaree Militia

The Hutarees are a Michigan-based, anti-government militia founded by David Brian Stone Sr. in 2008. Stone and his followers believed in an interpretation of the Bible that focused on a violent end-times prophecy. The name "Hutaree" was a creation of Stone's and supposedly meant "Christian warriors." In March 2010, nine Hutaree members, including Stone's wife and two sons, were indicted on charges of seditious conspiracy; attempt to use WMDs; teaching the use of explosive materials; and carrying, using, and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

The Hutarees believed the Antichrist was former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and the New World Order working on his behalf included federal, state, and local law enforcement. The group practiced attacks and military maneuvers for more than a year and acquired weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, uniforms, communications equipment, and IED components.

Stone and his followers discussed plans to kill a law enforcement officer (LEO) after a traffic stop or at home, ambush a LEO with a fake 911 call, and attack a LEO funeral procession with small arms and IEDs. Following an initial strike against the government, the Hutaree would retreat to prepared "rally points," where they would defend against a government counterattack. These actions, they believed, would spark large-scale armed revolution against the government.

Michigan is believed to have the second largest population of militia members in the country, behind Texas. In some areas of the state, the sight of camouflaged groups training in the woods with firearms is not uncommon.

In December 2010, a potential recruit visited David Stone Sr. to practice survival skills. The recruit "got a bad vibe" after the Stone family joked about four officers shot and killed in a Washington state coffee shop.

The Hutarees initially had contact with, trained with, and shared their violent ideology with other militias, but their cult-like nature and secretiveness later caused other militias to reject them. One member of a local militia even infiltrated the Hutarees in order to keep an eye on them. Eventually, that witness cooperated with prosecutors against the Hutarees. When federal authorities began arresting Hutaree members, Stone's son turned to this witness for weapons, gear, and help in regaining access to his property to rearm. The witness notified law enforcement.

Stone wasn't afraid to proclaim his beliefs online. At one time, the Hutaree MySpace page had more than 350 friends, dozens of which were other militias. He maintained the
Outreach Strategy

Case Study: Hutaree Militia

Hutaree website, which described its core doctrine and featured videos of armed Hutaree members moving and shooting in the woods.

Stone lived in a rural Michigan town with a population of 303. He home-schooled both his sons. Although he rarely went to church, he studied the Bible nightly and memorized long passages of it. He hated "anyone with a badge," according to his ex-wife, and was wary of authorities driving by at night and shining lights at his trailer home. This ex-wife said she left him because he got "carried away" with heavy weapons and the end of the world.

It is not clear if Stone was facing financial problems at the time of his 2010 arrest, but he reportedly filed for bankruptcy protection in 1999.

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Who is David Brian Stone, leader of the Hutaree militia?

A picture of Hutaree militia leader David Brian Stone is slowly emerging. His interest in guns and religion gradually spiraled out of control, reports suggest, leading to his arrest on charges of conspiring to kill police officers and oppose the US government by force.

By Will Buchanan, Contributor / March 29, 2010

Donna Stone, David Brian Stone's ex-wife, talks to members of the media outside the Federal Courthouse in Detroit Monday. Her son, who was legally adopted by David Stone, was among several members of the Hutaree militia charged with conspiring to kill police officers.

Jerry S. Mendoza/AP
Members called him "Captain Hutaree" or, somewhat cryptically, "RD." A federal indictment calls him the "principal leader" of the Hutaree militia – an extremist group federal authorities say was preparing to "levy war" against the US government by killing police officers.

He is David Brian Stone, and early media accounts sketch a portrait of a man pulled increasing toward the militia movement and its radical fringe. His ex-wife said she left him because he "got carried away." Federal authorities allege that he researched how to build roadside bombs on the Internet. And at least one neighbor said the group that Mr. Stone leads had acquired a certain notoriety around town.

"You don't mess with them," she told the Detroit News.

Hutaree militia arrests: Why the number of militias has tripled since 2008

Monday morning, federal authorities released an indictment against Stone and eight other members of the Hutaree militia. They allege that Stone and his followers were planning an attack sometime in April, perhaps killing an police officer then targeting the funeral with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to raise the death toll. The group saw the police as the arm of a US government, which they felt was the enemy. [Editor's note: IEDs were described incorrectly in the original version of this paragraph.]

'Handguns to big guns'

It had not started out like this, said Donna Stone, David's ex-wife.

"It started out as a Christian thing," Donna Stone told reporters at the preliminary court hearing Monday morning.

"You go to church. You pray. You take care of your family. I think David started to take it a little too far. He dragged a lot of people with him. When he got carried away, when he went from handguns to big guns, I was done."

"He dragged a lot of innocent people down with him," said Donna Stone, whose son was legally adopted by David Stone and was among those indicted. "It started to get worse when they were talking about the world's gonna end in
According to the indictment, David Stone researched IEDs on the internet and e-mailed diagrams of the devices to someone he believed capable of manufacturing the devices. He then directed his son, Joshua, and others to gather materials necessary for the manufacturing of the bombs.

The indictment further concludes that in June 2009, "Stone taught other Hutaree members how to make and use explosive devices intending or knowing that the information would be used to further a crime of violence."

Other militia groups in Michigan distanced themselves from David Stone and the Hutaree.

"I've met him. He's an opinionated man who likes to share those opinions," Jim Gulliksen of the Lenaway Volunteer Michigan Militia told the Detroit News. "The Hutaree is a nationwide group, but I have met a couple of the members here, and I can say they all belong to one specific church. Our concern is the protection of our nation. Religion appears to be a big part of what they are doing."
A Christian survivalist

According to group’s website Hutaree.com, Hutaree means “Christian Warrior.” The website announces: “The Hutaree will one day see its enemy and meet him on the battlefield if so God wills it.”

Heidi Beirich of the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks militia groups nationwide, said Monday she was aware of two Hutaree chapters: one in Utah and one in Michigan. She noted Hutaree has more than 350 friends on its Myspace page, dozens of which are other other militias, and she said David Stone was planning to attend a summit in Kentucky with other militias next month.

“Hutaree is not an isolated crew,” she noted.

People in the southeastern Michigan community of Adrian, Mich., knew of the group, which would shoot guns and run around in camouflage. “Everybody knew they were militia,” resident Phyllis Brugger told the Detroit News.

The Hutaree website claims the group was “preparing for the end time battles to keep the testimony of Jesus Christ alive.”

Beirich suggests militia members like David Stone see “the end of times” occurring today: "They have extreme antigovernment beliefs. They have rage and hatred for the federal government. They fear being put in FEMA concentration camps. They’re really paramilitary organizations."
Militia Chief's Mistrust Festered, Friends Say
Portrait Emerges of Man Who Despised Authority; Undercover Agent Played a Role in Probe

By ALEX P. KELLOGG, LAUREN ETTER, KEITH JOHNSON and TIMOTHY W. MARTIN

The leader of a Michigan militia group charged this week with conspiring to kill law-enforcement officers was described Tuesday as a private, family-oriented man who nurtured a festering mistrust of governmental authority, according to people close to the family.

"On the inside of this man's brain, something evil lurks, and until you get to know him, you don't know it," said Andrea Harsh, who was engaged to David Brian Stone Sr. until the couple broke up last year.

She described Mr. Stone, a trim 45-year-old man who wears his whitish hair cropped short over spectacles and a bushy gray mustache, as having a "bubly personality." But he became consumed by the Hutaree, she said, a southeastern Michigan militia group that described its members as "Christian warriors."

In an indictment Monday, federal authorities named Mr. Stone as leader of the Hutaree and accused him and eight members with plotting to spark an uprising against the U.S. government by killing police. Along with Mr. Stone, seven other men and one woman from Michigan, Ohio and Indiana are in being held without bond on weapons and sedition charges.

The indictment said Hutaree had practiced attacks and other military maneuvers for more than a year, and had planned to kill a law-enforcement officer, then use homemade bombs to attack officers who attended the funeral.
An undercover agent played a role in the investigation that led to Monday's indictments. Grand jury testimony by a law enforcement officer referred to an "undercover FBI agent" who worked on the case. The FBI declined to comment, but infiltration is a common tactic for law-enforcement officials targeting domestic militia groups.

Those charged in the case included Mr. Stone's current wife, Tina Mae Stone, 44; as well as two sons, David Brian Stone Jr., 19; and Joshua Matthew Stone 21. Attorneys for Ms. Stone, David Jr. and Joshua declined to comment Tuesday; the senior Mr. Stone had no attorney as of late Tuesday.

The Hutaree appears based at Mr. Stone's home, a pair of dilapidated house trailers near the intersection of dirt roads in rural Clayton, Michigan—population 303—about 85 miles southwest of Detroit. The yard this week held three cars, a dog house, debris and a gun leaning on an old washing machine.

Family members and acquaintances said Mr. Stone doesn't curse, smoke or drink alcohol and was a strict disciplinarian with his sons, whom he home-schooled from a young age. While he rarely attended church, he studied the Bible nightly, memorizing long passages, said Ms. Harsh, his ex-fiancé. Several scripture passages appear on the Hutaree Web site.

On his page on the MySpace social-networking site, Mr. Stone, using the alias of "(RD) Merzonik," listed his interests as "GOD, Guns and Girls." He said he liked action and science-fiction movies and writes, "only dead people are true heroes ... so I guess I don't have any." He listed his hometown as, "Wasteland, America," and 73 MySpace friends include several state and county militias.

Mr. Stone is listed as a 1982 graduate of Sand Creek High School on an alumni Web site. Donna Stone, his ex-wife, said she met Mr. Stone in the mid-1990s when she worked at a deli counter and he was a customer. She said he was charming and funny.

But Mr. Stone increasingly displayed a stubborn streak, as well as an affinity for guns. Ms. Stone, 44, said she left him after about a decade together. "When he went from handguns to big guns, I said, 'Enough,' " she said.
Court documents reveal an undercover FBI agent was part of the investigation of a Michigan-based Christian militia group that allegedly plotted to spark an uprising against the government by killing police officers. Plus, in a major push against the health overhaul, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce plans to spend $50 million to sway election outcomes; and the News Hub discusses how a six-year high in the number of stocks hitting 52-week highs is not necessarily a bad sign for stocks.

Ms. Harsh, 40, said she began dating Mr. Stone in 2008 after meeting him at a plastics recycling factory where they worked. Mr. Stone showed her a Hutaree business card when they met, but otherwise said little about the group while they dated for several months.

After they moved in together, Ms. Harsh said, he spent hours on the computer, building the group's Web site and searching online for weapons. "His life was pretty much consumed by the Hutaree," she said.

Mr. Stone despised authority, Ms. Harsh said, particularly "anyone with a badge." She said his temper finally drove her away last year. Mr. Stone remarried a few months later.

Ron Gaydosh, 62, said he had known Mr. Stone for more than 15 years, and frequently invited the Stones over for barbecues. He described Mr. Stone as a "good guy," with "all-around good kids," and said the family enjoyed hunting and fishing.

He said Mr. Stone was easily upset by talk of the government. "Some of the things that upset Dave also upset me," said Mr. Gaydosh, who belongs to another militia group with no ties to Hutaree. They frequently discussed survivalist techniques and poked fun at government officials, he said, but "there was never any violence planned."

Mr. Gaydosh said Mr. Stone didn't like law enforcement officials driving by and shining lights at Mr. Stone's house, adding that he always referred to police as "feds." Mr. Stone also didn't like neighbors complaining about his target shooting, Mr. Gaydosh said.

It's not clear whether Mr. Stone had money troubles. Ms. Harsh said he was working at Demlow Products, an auto-industry supplier in Clayton; a person who answered the phone at the company declined to comment. Mr. Stone and his ex-wife, Donna Stone, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in 1999.
Trailers on property belonging to David Brian Stone, the leader of Midwest Christian militia Hutaree.

Over the past couple of years, Mr. Stone attracted more Hutaree members, Ms. Harsh said: "His goal was to have all of the states have at least one group of Hutaree."

But he scared off some potential recruits. Jon Killman said he visited Mr. Stone and his sons in December because he was interested in joining a militia to practice survival skills.

He said Mr. Stone was a gracious host and offered him coffee. But soon Mr. Killman "got a bad vibe" as the Stones started joking about police officers who'd been shot in a coffee shop in Washington state.

The family's dining room table was strewn with shotgun shells, Mr. Killman recalled. The elder Mr. Stone said the shells would be filled with gunpowder and tied to trip wires to simulate landmines.

At first "they just seemed like a down-to-earth hillbilly family," he said. "After 20 minutes into the meeting, I realized these guys are not dealing with a full deck."

Matt Savino, commander of the Lenawee Volunteer Michigan Militia near Mr. Stone's home, said in recent months Mr. Stone became "paranoid" and began asking other militia groups to join in military exercises.

Mr. Stone began talking more about how "the federal government was coming down on them" and the need to be on the offensive and retain the element of surprise, Mr. Savino said.

Ms. Harsh said Mr. Stone "always thought he could hide from the government. He thought he was invincible."

—James Oberman contributed to this article.

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How The FBI Got Inside The Hutaree Militia

by DINA TEMPLE-RASTON

First of a two-part series

Enlarge

David Stone Sr. and his wife, Tina, members of the Christian militia Hutaree, lived in these trailers in Clayton, Mich. Last month, the Stones and seven other militia members were indicted on sedition and weapons charges. Prosecutors say there was a plot to spark an anti-government uprising by killing law enforcement officials.

Read Part 2
America's New Kinder, Gentler Militia
April 13, 2010

April 12, 2010

The two trailers where David Stone Sr. and his wife, Tina, lived in southeast Michigan look frozen in mid-collapse. They sit on a patch of land on the border of two sleepy southeastern Michigan towns: Adrian and Clayton, about an hour southwest of Detroit.

The trailers sit side by side, as if they are leaning on each other for support. The sides of the structures are pockmarked. That's because they are riddled with bullet holes — not going from the outside in, but from the inside out — the result of accidental discharges from the cache of weapons the Stone family allegedly kept inside.

To hear the FBI tell it, more than just gunfire was coming from inside those trailers. Prosecutors say the trailers were ground zero for a sinister plan to spark a conflict with the government and perhaps inspire other militias to join in the battle.

Prosecutors say David Stone Sr., Tina, his son Joshua and a handful of others were members of a small, violent Christian militia they called the Hutaree. And they wanted to go out in a blaze of gunfire and glory.

"I think going back a couple of years ago, we kinda got wind of this group and there could be some issues with them," said Andrew Arena, the FBI's special agent in charge in Detroit. "Like any extremist group, I don't think in reality they believe that they're going to personally overthrow the U.S. government. The plan is to basically be the match or the spark to ignite the revolution."

Last month, David Stone Sr. and Tina were among nine people indicted on sedition and weapons charges in what prosecutors say was a plot to spark an anti-government uprising by killing police.
Militia Country

On the surface, it is not as crazy as it sounds. Although Lenawee County in southeastern Michigan is mostly farm country — all barns and flat fields that seem to go on for miles — it is also militia country.

It is not unusual to see armed men in camouflage emerge from the woods or gather in state parks. A couple of times a month, militia members gather to do everything from compass reading to sharpshooting in the nearby woods.

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, there are dozens of militia groups in Michigan, making it second only to Texas in terms of the number of volunteer militia members it has.

"There's people out there shooting all the time and stuff, but unless you know for sure, you think they're just hunters," said Angela Chase, who lives near the Stones' trailers. "You just never know when there are people out there who are crazy."

Local militia members had their own opinions about the Hutarees. They knew them only in an arm's length way. The Hutarees had come out occasionally to practice shooting or training in the woods with other local militia groups. But that stopped a couple of years ago when the group started getting very secretive and standoffish.

"They would always talk about putting together training sessions with other groups but they would always neglect to say when or where," said one local militia member who doesn't want anyone to know he's in a militia.

Law enforcement officials tell NPR that it may have been this low-grade concern about what the Hutarees were up to that led a member of one local militia to infiltrate Stone's group — just to keep an eye on them. That militia member ended up becoming a cooperating witness in the case.

Surveillance Tape Of Stone

An FBI surveillance tape obtained by NPR provides a glimpse into Stone's view of the vast conspiracy bubbling in the shadows. In the tape, he says he could see local cops joining forces with foreign soldiers to take over the U.S.

"Do I think all the cops out here would — they would fight right alongside some Chinese trooper, heck yeah," he says on one of the tapes. "It's all about power. It's about the authority. They see us as the little people."

The tape was made in February while the group was driving to Kentucky to attend a militia rally. Stone had prepared what A war of this magnitude will not be easy. But like the rattlesnake on the flag, we have rattled and...
he hoped would be a rousing speech for the gathering and he read it to the others in the car.

"We need to quit playing this game with these elitist terrorists and get serious because this war will come whether we are ready or not," Stone told the other members of the Hutaree as they drove back to Michigan. "A war of this magnitude will not be easy. But like the rattlesnake on the flag, we have rattled and warned the new world order. Now it is time to strike and take our nation back."

William Swor, David Stone's defense attorney, confirms his client is speaking on that tape. But he says there is nothing in what Stone said that is the least bit illegal.

"The things ... in that statement were no more radical, no more offensive or dangerous than anything any of the right-wing wackos on television and radio said the week before these folks were arrested," Swor said.

Undercover Agent And Explosives

But the FBI's Arena says the Hutarees crossed a line when they plotted to kill police. He said prosecutors will show evidence of that plan in court. This isn't about the First Amendment, Arena said.

"In this country you can say just about anything you want against the government — but when you start taking action against that government, that's a problem," he says. "How you define it, in each case, it is a little different. In this case, we define it by the fact that they were starting to plan how they were going to ignite the war."

The low-grade concern about the Hutaree escalated to a new level last fall, an NPR News investigation has found. That's when the FBI says it got word that the Hutarees were building bombs and detonating them off in the woods. For the most part, the FBI says it leaves militia groups to their own devices. But when explosives are involved, officials feel a line has been crossed.

So when the Hutaree allegedly starting making improvised explosive devices, the bureau decided to infiltrate the group with its own undercover agent. As it turns out, there was a side benefit. Arena said the undercover officer who was accepted into the group was offered membership because he said he had a special skill: He knew how to make bombs. Arena said the officer offered to take over that part of the group's operation. That meant the FBI would now have some modicum of control over what it saw as the Hutarees' most dangerous asset: explosives.

"We were very fortunate to be able to insert an individual who was able to take that role, and it certainly helped me sleep a little better at night," Arena said.

Another Militia Goes To The Police

Andrew Arena, the FBI's special agent in charge in Detroit, says prosecutors will show evidence in court that the Hutarees plotted to kill police.
There's one more twist to the story.

Four years ago, a young man named Matt Servino thought about joining the Hutaree. And he talked to David Stone about it—at length. But Servino said Stone made him a little nervous.

"You could tell he was getting really upset about anything the government was doing," Servino said. "Not to the point of, 'Let's go do this particular act or something.' But he would just say, 'Something needs to be done. These protests and things aren't cutting it anymore. ... Something serious needs to happen.'"

Rather than join the Hutaree, Servino decided to resurrect an old militia—a local unit in Lenawee, Mich. And while he and Stone would exchange pleasantries anytime they met in town, Servino tended to keep clear of whatever it was they were doing out there in the woods. And that worked just fine until the weekend before Easter. That's when federal authorities arrested Stone, his wife and six other Hutaree members. Stone's son, Joshua, was not among them, and he turned to Servino for help. He assumed, as a fellow member of a local militia, Servino would be sympathetic.

"He asked for assistance ... weapons, gear and whatnot," Servino said. "He asked us to back him up to get on his property. He knew a back way onto his property and was pretty confident in himself that he could get to weapons or supplies that were stashed on the property that the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives] wouldn't find."

Militias have generally been perceived as lying in wait for opportunities like this: Occasions when these small bands of private warriors could engage the government and go out fighting—like what happened in Waco, Texas, or Ruby Ridge, Idaho.

But that isn't what happened here.

Instead of helping Joshua Stone, Servino told him his group was staying out of it. And Servino went a step further. He brought his militia together.

"We talked about it, and we decided as a group to go to the state police department, local here, and talk to them and tell them what little information we had," Servino says.

A day later, the FBI arrested Joshua Stone in a neighboring county—without incident. Servino says what the Hutarees are accused of doing is precisely the kind of thing that gives militias a bad name. And he says militias have changed. "You use the terminology 'old school' militia and 'new age' militia and it kinda is," Servino said. "The way you look at things—they way you approach them—is a lot different than it used to be."

Arena agrees that most militias aren't like the Hutaree.

"I think their reaction to this latest incident, to the Hutaree, kinda shows what their mind-set is right now," Arena said. "I think they were appalled, to say the least, at the planning and what these people were trying to do."

That's what makes this story so unusual: Militia groups and authorities worked together to break this case.

Related NPR Stories

Growth Of Militia Groups 'Astounding' March 30, 2010
The Hutaree Militia

The indictment of nine members of a small Michigan militia on conspiracy, weapons and other charges once again has shined a spotlight on the shadowy world of anti-government militia groups.

According to the indictment, the arrests stem from a militia plot to commit a violent act against a law enforcement officer in order to set off a broader confrontation between the government and militia groups. The plot was spearheaded by a small Christian militia group calling itself the "Hutaree Militia" and based in southwestern Michigan and northwestern Ohio.

The Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism has compiled the following fact sheet on the group and its leaders:

The Hutaree Militia is a small militia group based primarily in Lenawee County, Michigan. On March 28, eight members of this group were arrested by federal agents on seditious conspiracy, weapons of mass destruction, and other charges. A ninth person, also charged, remains at large.

**Formed:** Late Winter/Spring 2008

**Leader:** David Brian Stone

**Size:** Approximately 20 members

**Organization:** Paramilitary structure, including ranks, with sub-units led by sons of David Stone.

**Location:** Most members are based in Southeastern Michigan (a traditional hub of militia activity), but some members and associates are from northwestern Ohio, as well as Indiana. In late 2008, a Texas unit formed and organized training exercises in Teague, Texas.

**Ideology:** A combination of the "standard" militia ideology centered around a desire to defend against the "New World Order," believed to be a massive conspiracy to establish a totalitarian one-world government, and a religious ideology that focuses on prophetic Christian notions of the "end times," the Anti-Christ, and the second coming of Christ.

**Activities:** Primarily paramilitary training. However, in early 2010, a Bridgewater Township supervisor, Jolea Mull, twice reached out to local anti-government militia members to help find missing people. At least three Hutaree members took part in these efforts.

**Hutaree Members Indicted:** David Brian Stone, David Brian Stone, Jr., Joshua Matthew Sorte, Tina Mae Stone, Joshua John Clough, Michael David Meeks, Thomas William Piatek, Kristopher T. Sickles, Jacob J. Ward.

**Charges:** A federal grand jury charged all nine Hutaree Militia members arrested with seditious conspiracy, attempting to use weapons of mass destruction (in this case, primarily improvised explosive devices), and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. David Brian Stone and David Brian Stone, Jr., were also charged with teaching/demonstrating the use of explosive materials. These two, as well as Joshua Stone, Joshua Clough, Michael Meeks, Kristopher Sickles, and Jacob Ward were all charged with a second count of the same violation.
Seditious conspiracy is a serious charge, rarely invoked, involving two or more persons conspiring to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States; or to levy war against the U.S. or oppose by force to prevent the execution of U.S. law or seize property of the U.S.

**Nature of the Alleged Plot:** According to the federal indictment against the nine Hutaree Militia members, the accused plotted to commit some sort of violent act against law enforcement, such as ambushing and killing an officer during a traffic stop, or killing an officer and his or her family at home. These acts would ostensibly intimidate and demoralize law enforcement. The indictment alleges that after such an action, Hutaree members would retreat to prepared “rally points,” where they would wage war against the government and defend themselves with improvised explosive devices. Such a confrontation, the indictment claims, would, in the minds of Hutaree members, serve as a “catalyst” for a widespread uprising against the government.

**The Militia Movement in 2010: A Snapshot**

**Size:** The militia movement has roughly 3,000-6,000 members nationwide, with a significant additional number of adherents who self-identify as part of the movement without belonging into any specific group. The number of militia groups has increased sharply since 2008, from around 50 in early 2008 to nearly 200 today.

**Organization:** The militia movement primarily consists of a collection of paramilitary groups, most of them small (in the range of 10-30 members). Militia umbrella groups have traditionally failed, but the movement nevertheless is well-networked, and members from different groups meet together to share ideas and expertise. In the past two years, the movement has made a concerted effort to use the new social media of the Internet in order to recruit; one result has been the influx of a number of younger people into the movement (the original militia movement was primarily a middle-aged movement).

**Reason for Growth:** The primary reason for the rapid resurgence of the militia movement was the election of Barack Obama as president. His election re-ignited a number of longstanding anti-government conspiracy theories about gun confiscation, FEMA concentration camps, and martial law, all to enslave Americans as part of the New World Order. Conspiracy theories rather than race was the dominant factor. The resurgence of the militia movement was part of an overall growth of anti-government animosity in the United States over the past 18 months.

**Association with Criminal Activity:** Since its inception in late 1993/early 1994, many members of the militia movement have been arrested on a variety of charges, most of them involving illegal weapons or explosives and/or conspiracies to use them. Militia members have also been involved in several murders, including murders of police officers. In the past four years, a number of militia members have been arrested for amassing large arsenals of illegal weapons. However, the Hutaree Militia indictments represent the first arrests of militia members for an alleged terrorist plot since the militia resurgence really began a year and a half ago.

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The Anti-Defamation League, founded in 1913, is the world’s leading organization fighting anti-Semitism through programs and services that counteract hatred, prejudice and bigotry.
Militia Charged With Plotting to Murder Officers

By NICK BUNKLEY and CHARLIE SAVAGE

CLAYTON, Mich. — David B. Stone Sr. and his wife, Tina, made no secret about the fact that they were part of a militia, neighbors say. The couple frequently let visitors in military fatigues erect tents in front of their trailer home at the intersection of rural dirt roads, and the sound of gunfire was routine.

"In Michigan, I don't think it's that big of a deal to be in a militia," said Tom McDormett, a neighbor.

He added: "They would practice shooting, but that's not a big deal. People do that all the time out here."

But last Saturday night, Mr. McDormett watched through binoculars as the police raided the Stones' home, tearing off plywood from the base of their two connected single-wide trailers to search under the floors. By Monday, the Stones were in green prison garb in a federal courthouse in Detroit, two of nine defendants facing sedition and weapons charges in connection with what Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. called an "insidious plan."

In an indictment against the nine unsealed on Monday, the Justice Department said they were part of a group of apocalyptic Christian militants who were plotting to kill law enforcement officers in hopes of inciting an antigovernment uprising, the latest in a recent surge in right-wing militia activity.

The court filing said the group, which called itself the Hutaree, planned to kill an unidentified law enforcement officer and then bomb the funeral caravan using improvised explosive devices based on designs used against American troops by insurgents in Iraq.

"This is an example of radical and extremist fringe groups which can be found throughout our society," Andrew Arena, the F.B.I. special agent in charge in Detroit, said in a statement. "The F.B.I. takes such extremist groups seriously, especially those who would target innocent citizens and the law enforcement officers who protect the citizens of the United States."

The Hutaree — a word Mr. Stone apparently made up to mean Christian warriors — saw the local police as "foot soldiers" for the federal government, which the group viewed as its enemy, along with other participants in what the group's members deemed to be a "New World Order" working on behalf of the Antichrist, the indictment said.
Eight defendants were arrested over the weekend in raids in Michigan, Ohio and Indiana, the Justice Department said. The authorities arrested the Stones' eldest son, Joshua M. Stone, 21, shortly before 9 p.m. Monday in Pittsford, Mich., about 20 miles west of his family's home, an F.B.I. spokeswoman, Sandra Berchtold, said.

A grand jury had secretly returned the indictments against the nine last Tuesday.

A law enforcement official said the plot appeared to be unconnected to recent threats against Democratic lawmakers who voted for legislation overhauling the nation's health care system.

According to the indictment, the group — apparently centered in Lenawee County, about 70 miles southwest of Detroit — has been meeting regularly since at least August 2008.

The group's Web site suggested that it was motivated by apocalyptic religious scenarios more than any secular political fears. A rare mention of earthly politics on the site is a page devoted to discussion of efforts to unite Europe, with a suggestion that one high-ranking European official, Javier Solana, might be the Antichrist.

Chip Berlet, a senior analyst at Political Research Associates, a liberal-leaning nonprofit group that tracks far-right networks, said the Hutaree's philosophy was drawn from a populist strand that fuses fear of a conspiracy to create a one-world government with a belief that a war is imminent between Christians and the Antichrist, as described in the Bible's Book of Revelation.

In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security produced a report warning of a rising threat of right-wing terrorism, citing factors like economic troubles, the election of a black president and perceived threats to United States sovereignty.

Mark Potok, who leads a program that tracks right-wing groups for the Southern Poverty Law Center, said it first took note of the Hutaree last year amid a surge in new "Patriot" movement groups, race-based hate groups, extremist anti-immigrant groups, Christian militants and other variations.

"We're seeing all kinds of radical right-wing groups grow very rapidly, especially in the militia world," Mr. Potok said.

The indictment said the Hutaree, in anticipation of a war against its enemies, had been engaging in "military-style training," from weapons proficiency drills to "close quarter battle drills" and the use of "ambush kill zones." The small group had acquired guns, ammunition, medical supplies, uniforms, communications equipment and "explosives and other components for destructive devices," it said.

After attacking the police, the members planned to retreat to several planned "rally points" and wait for the authorities to come after them. They were preparing fighting positions as well as "trip-wired and command-detonated" bombs, it said.

"It is believed by the Hutaree that this engagement would then serve as a catalyst for a more widespread uprising against the government," the indictment said.
In addition, Mr. Stone had announced "a covert reconnaissance exercise" in April, during which "anyone who happened upon the exercise who did not acquiesce to Hutaree demands could be killed," the indictment said.

The United States attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan, Barbara McQuade, said the government raided the group this past weekend because that exercise would have "had the potential of placing an unsuspecting member of the public at risk."

The Hutaree Web site features the motto "Preparing for the end time battles to keep the testimony of Jesus Christ alive" and a video showing rifle-toting men in camouflage running through woods and firing weapons.

"Jesus wanted us to be ready to defend ourselves using the sword and stay alive using equipment," the Web site says, adding, "The Hutaree will one day see its enemy and meet him on the battlefield if so God wills it."

By Monday, the Stones' house stood empty, its front door ajar and two dogs still tied up in the muddy yard, which was littered with dilapidated furniture, a washing machine and tires.

The Stones' two sons were among those arrested. Joshua, the eldest, left the local school system after the fifth grade in 1999 to be home-schooled, and the younger son, David B. Stone Jr., 19, had never been enrolled, an official said.

Also charged were Joshua J. Clough, 28, of Blissfield, Mich.; Michael D. Meeks, 40, of Manchester, Mich.; Thomas W. Piatek, 46, of Whiting, Ind.; Kristopher T. Sickles, 27, of Sandusky, Ohio; and Jacob Ward, 33, of Huron, Ohio.

They could face a maximum penalty of life in prison if convicted of the most serious charge, attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D-1 DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD,"
D-2 DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. "Junior,"
D-3 JOSHUA MATTHEW STONE, a.k.a. "Josh,"
D-4 TINA MAE STONE,
D-5 JOSHUA JOHN CLOUGH, a.k.a. "Azzurlin,"
D-6 MICHAEL DAVID MEEKS, a.k.a. "Mikey,"
D-7 THOMAS EDWARD PIATEK,
D-8 KRISTOPHER T. SICKLES, a.k.a. "Pale Horse,"
    a.k.a. "Guhighillo,"

Defendants.

INDICTMENT

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES THAT:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

At all relevant times described herein, there existed an organization known as the
"HUTAREE", based in Lenawee County Michigan, which is an anti-government extremist
organization which advocates violence against local, state, and Federal law enforcement.

The HUTAREE’s enemies include state and local law enforcement, who are deemed “foot-soldiers” of the Federal government, Federal law enforcement agencies and employees, participants in the “New World Order,” and anyone who does not share in the HUTAREE’s beliefs.

Since at least 2008, the HUTAREE has been meeting regularly to conduct military-style training in Lenawee County, located in the Eastern District of Michigan, and elsewhere. The purpose of this training has been to plan and prepare for the impending war with the HUTAREE’s enemies.

As used herein, the term “weapon of mass destruction” has the meaning set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(c)(2), including any destructive device as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 921.
COUNT ONE

(18 U.S.C. § 2384 – SEDITIOUS CONSPIRACY)

   a.k.a. “Captain Hutaree,”
D-2 DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. “Junior,”
D-3 JOSHUA MATTHEW STONE, a.k.a. “Josh,”
D-4 TINA MAE STONE,
D-5 JOSHUA JOHN CLOUGH, a.k.a “Azzurlin,” a.k.a. “Az,”
D-6 MICHAEL DAVID MEEKS, a.k.a. “Mikey,”
D-7 THOMAS EDWARD PIATEK,
D-8 KRISTOPHER T. SICKLES, a.k.a. “Pale Horse,”
D-9 JACOB J. WARD, a.k.a. “Jake,” a.k.a. “Nate,”
   a.k.a. “Guhighllo”

THE MEANS AND METHODS USED TO FURTHER
THE OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY

At all relevant times described herein, the defendant DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree," has been the principal leader of the HUTAREE and he has organized the HUTAREE into two operational units led by himself and one his sons, defendant JOSHUA MATTHEW STONE, a.k.a. "Josh." Another son, defendant DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. "Junior," served as an explosives instructor and demonstrator, and participated in operational planning and training. The defendant DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree," also established a HUTAREE rank structure, assigned HUTAREE names to members of the organization, and created HUTAREE words for various military formations and maneuvers.

The general concept of operations provided that the HUTAREE would commit some violent act to draw the attention of law enforcement or government officials and which would prompt a response by law enforcement. Possible such acts which were discussed included killing a member of law enforcement after a traffic stop, killing a member of law enforcement and his or her family at home, ambushing a member of law enforcement in rural communities, luring a member of law enforcement with a false 911 emergency call and then killing him or her, and killing a member of law enforcement and then attacking the funeral procession motorcade with weapons of mass destruction. These acts would intimidate and demoralize law enforcement diminishing their ranks and rendering them ineffective.
The general concept of operations further provided that, once such action was taken, HUTAREE members would then retreat to one of several “rally points” where the HUTAREE would wage war against the government and be prepared to defend in depth with trip-wired and command detonated anti-personnel Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), ambushes, and prepared fighting positions. It is believed by the HUTAREE that this engagement would then serve as a catalyst for a more wide-spread uprising against the Government.

The conspirators planned for and trained for the armed conflict against local, state, and Federal law enforcement by engaging in the following means and methods, among others, within the Eastern District of Michigan and elsewhere:

a. Conspirators acquired firearms, magazines, and ammunition, explosives and other components for destructive devices, uniforms, communications equipment, supply and ammunition vehicles, and medical and other supplies.

b. Conspirators engaged in military-style training in anticipation of the planned for military operations to include firearms and explosives training, weapons proficiency drills, patrolling and reconnaissance exercises, close quarter battle drills, and “man-down” drills, and prepared defensive fighting positions, ambush kill zones, and storage bunkers. During these training sessions, each conspirator in attendance carried and used at least one firearm. This training has also included instruction and demonstrations regarding the manufacturing and use of destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction.

e. On or about February 6, 2010, several conspirators attempted to travel to Kentucky to attend a summit of militia groups convened by DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree." The purpose of the summit of militia groups was to facilitate better communications, cooperation, and coordination between the various militias. In anticipation of the summit, DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree," solicited a person he believed capable of manufacturing destructive devices to provide him with four anti-personnel Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to take with them to the summit. Although weather conditions prevented them from reaching their destination, DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree," identified law enforcement officers in a specific community near his residence, and one officer in particular, as potential targets of attack.

f. On or about February 20, 2010, conspirators gathered in Lenawee County in the Eastern District of Michigan and engaged in training devoted to preparing for the planned covert reconnaissance exercise described above. Each of the conspirators in attendance carried and used at least one firearm.

The General Allegations are incorporated by reference, as if set forth in full herein, all in violation of Section 2384 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
COUNT TWO

(18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2) – ATTEMPT TO USE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION)

D-2 DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. "Junior,"
D-3 JOSHUA MATTHEW STONE, a.k.a. "Josh,"
D-4 TINA MAE STONE,
D-6 MICHAEL, DAVID MEEKS, a.k.a. "Mikey,"
D-7 THOMAS EDWARD PIATEK,
D-8 KRISTOPHER T. SICKLES, a.k.a. "Pale Horse,"

email, the internet, and telephones, were used in furtherance of the offense, such property was used in interstate commerce and in an activity that affected interstate commerce, the defendant DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree," traveled in, and caused others to travel in, interstate commerce in furtherance of the offense, and the offense and the results of the offense would have affected interstate commerce.

The General Allegations are incorporated by reference, as if set forth in full herein, all in violation of Section 2332(a)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).

COUNT THREE

(18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2) – TEACHING/DEMONSTRATING USE OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS)

D-2 DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. "Junior"

On or about June 13, 2009, in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, defendants DAVID BRIAN STONE, a.k.a. "RD," a.k.a. "Joe Stonewall," a.k.a. "Captain Hutaree," and DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. "Junior," acting without lawful authority, did teach and demonstrated the making or use, and distributed information pertaining to the manufacture or use, of destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction to other persons, and the defendant did so with the intent that the teaching, demonstration or information be used for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constituted a Federal crime of violence, to wit: seditious conspiracy; and knowing that
the persons intend to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence, to wit: seditious conspiracy, as alleged in Count One of this indictment.

All in violation of Section 842(p)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code.

COUNT FOUR

(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) – CARRYING, USING, AND POSSESSING A FIREARM DURING AND IN RELATION TO A CRIME OF VIOLENCE)

   a.k.a. “Captain Hutaree,”
D-2 DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. “Junior,”
D-3 JOSHUA MATTHEW STONE, a.k.a. “Josh,”
D-4 TINA MAE STONE,
D-6 MICHAEL DAVID MEEKS, a.k.a. “Mikey,”
D-7 THOMAS EDWARD PIATEK,
D-8 KRISTOPHER T. SICKLES, a.k.a. “Pale Horse,”
D-9 JACOB J. WARD, a.k.a. “Jake,” a.k.a. “Nate,”
   a.k.a. “Guighillo”

of violence for which they may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, that is, seditious conspiracy and attempted use of weapons of mass destruction, as alleged in Counts One and Two of this indictment, and did knowingly possess firearms in furtherance of such crimes.

All in violation of Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18, United States Code.

COUNT FIVE

(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) – CARRYING, USING, AND POSSESSING A FIREARM DURING AND IN RELATION TO A CRIME OF VIOLENCE)

a.k.a. “Captain Hutarce,”
D-2 DAVID BRIAN STONE, JR., a.k.a. “Junior,”
D-3 JOSHUA MATTHEW STONE, a.k.a. “Josh,”
D-5 JOSHUA JOHN CLOUGH, a.k.a “Azzurlin,” a.k.a. “Az,”
D-6 MICHAEL DAVID MEEKS, a.k.a. “Mikey,”
D-8 KRISTOPHIER T. SICKLES, a.k.a. “Pale Horse,”
D-9 JACOB J. WARD, a.k.a. “Jake,” a.k.a. “Nate,”
a.k.a. “Guhighllo”

is, seditious conspiracy and attempted use of weapons of mass destruction, as alleged in Counts One
and Two of this indictment, and did knowingly possess firearms in furtherance of such crimes.

   All in violation of Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18, United States Code.

   THIS IS A TRUE BILL.

   s/Grand Jury Foreperson
   GRAND JURY FOREPERSON

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Hutaree arrests are a gut-check moment for militia movement

Some are sympathetic to the group, accused of plotting to kill police, but many shun what they see as a cult-like religious fringe.

April 07, 2010 | By Nicholas Riccardi and Richard Fausset

Reporting from Atlanta and Denver — Even in the extreme world of the militia movement, the Hutaree — eight men and one woman in southeastern Michigan accused of plotting to kill police to foment a revolution — stood out.

They trained with other survivalist groups and attended at least one militia conference in Kentucky, according to court papers filed by federal prosecutors. But their neighbors in the militia movement were suspicious of the Hutaree’s Christian ideology and obsession with a coming apocalypse.

“It’s just sad,” said Lee Miracle of the Southeast Michigan Volunteer Militia, which included some of the men who later joined the Hutaree. “They kind of drifted away and ended up more with a kind of cult-like group.”

To experts who follow militias, the existence of the Hutaree — and the cool reaction it generally received from other militia groups — is a reminder that the movement is far from monolithic.

The best-known militias are mainly concerned with perceived violations of constitutional protections against government power, but there has long been a minority that, like the Hutaree, took a more religious view, said Robert H. Churchill, a University of Hartford history professor and author of “To Shake Their Guts in the Tyrant’s Face,” a history of the 1990s militia movement.

The Hutaree uses uniforms embossed with CCR, for Colonial Christian Republic, and believes that former NATO leader Javier Solana could be the antichrist.

On Friday, a federal judge ordered the nine Hutaree members to remain jailed until trial, calling evidence against them “very disturbing.”

They face charges of sedition and use of weapons of mass destruction. Authorities said they planned to act in the coming weeks; their defense lawyers counter that the group was guilty only of swagger.

The militia movement has been mostly out of the public eye since the late 1990s, but it began to regain strength during George W. Bush’s presidency and has experienced a renaissance under the nation’s first black president.

Since President Obama’s inauguration last year, the number of militias in the country has tripled, according to a recent report from the Southern Poverty Law Center, which monitors extremist groups. The center identified 512 active “patriot” groups in 2009.

Churchill said the Hutaree’s alienation from some of its militia brethren corresponds to a split in the movement that was also evident during its last time in the limelight, in the 1990s. The Hutaree, he said, appeared to be part of a “millenialist” militia movement largely concerned with end times prophecy and full-blown, new-world-order-type anti-government conspiracy theories.

After the recent arrest, some militia groups were sympathetic to the Hutaree, while stopping short of endorsing violence. But several militias distanced themselves from the Hutaree.

Michael Vanderboehs, a former militia member who is prominent in the anti-government constitutionalist movement, called it “mutiny.”

This separation reflects an earlier pattern. In the 1990s, Churchill said, the constitutionalist groups also made serious efforts to distinguish themselves from the millenialists.

Miracle, the Michigan militia member, said that one of his group’s affiliated organizations, called the Lenawee Brigade, was contacted by a Hutaree member seeking help when federal heat was becoming evident. Miracle said Lenawee turned the Hutaree down.

Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center contended that the Hutaree had plenty in common with the mainstream militia movement.

He said many groups fear a new world order and globalist conspiracy against the U.S., but lack the Hutaree’s overt Christian rhetoric. He also pointed to the group’s MySpace page, which he said had more than 300 friends listed from other wings of the movement.

“They weren’t viewed as the lunatic fringe two weeks ago,” he said.

Potok acknowledged that only a tiny minority of militia members seek violence.

Altan Goehm, who was part of the team that prosecuted the Oklahoma City bombing, said that when people start to act on violent rhetoric, it frequently produces divisions.

“It goes beyond fantasy and your purported ideals and becomes a real gut-check moment,” he said.

The distinctions among militia groups may hark back to the President Clinton era, but Churchill notes one new trend in the age of Obama: the increased use of patriot-style rhetoric in mainstream discourse.
Hutaree arrests are a gut-check moment for militia movement - Los Angeles... http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/apr/07/nation/la-na-militia-2010apr07

Referring to the angry vocabulary used by lawmakers and media pundits such as Glenn Beck, Churchill said the wall between the patriots’ sphere of conversation and that of mainstream conservatives “is starting to break down, is starting to erode.”

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CASE STUDY

FAISAL SHAHZAD
Case Study: Faisal Shahzad

On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad parked an SUV containing an improvised explosive device in Times Square. Although the device failed to detonate as intended, Shahzad did succeed in delivering his payload to the crowded location and was nearly airborne on a flight out of the country before he was arrested. He has admitted connections to the Pakistani Taliban and has been unrepentant about his intention to kill large numbers of Americans. Shahzad pled guilty to 10 charges, including attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, and has been sentenced to life in prison.

Shahzad was born in Pakistan in 1979 into a relatively privileged family. He entered the United States on a student visa in 1999, earning a bachelor's degree in computer science and engineering, and an MBA. A Connecticut financial marketing company employed him, but he resigned in mid-2009. Shahzad gained US citizenship in April 2009.

While building his life in the United States, Shahzad reportedly returned to Pakistan and gained the trust of members of the Pakistani Taliban, including its leader, Hakimullah Mehsud. Authorities believe he trained with the terrorist organization and learned the craft of bombmaking. He followed the teachings of former al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula operational leader Anwar al-Aulaqi justifying civilian attacks against American targets. US military action in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan deepened his hatred of America. He believed the worldwide Muslim community was under attack from the West.

In 2009, Shahzad's behavior suggested an acceleration of his operational planning. He moved his wife and children to Pakistan. He asked his father for permission to fight in Afghanistan; his father refused. Shahzad's friends recalled that he experienced a conservative religious shift and began to criticize the use of alcohol. By the time of the Times Square attack, Shahzad had suffered a foreclosure of his primary residence, was unemployed, and was bankrupt.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/04/national/main6459360.shtml
Faisal Shahzad is a naturalized American citizen from Pakistan who tried to detonate a crude car bomb in Times Square on the night of May 1, 2010.

The bomb fizzled and passers-by quickly alerted the police, who disarmed the device. Just over 48 hours later, Mr. Shahzad was arrested aboard an Emirates Airways flight to Dubai that had just pulled away from a gate at John F. Kennedy International Airport.

Mr. Shahzad was indicted on June 17 by a federal grand jury in Manhattan. He was charged with 10 counts, including attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. On June 21, he pleaded guilty on all counts. He provided new details about his training with the Pakistani Taliban, saying he had five days of instruction in explosives and translated a bomb-making manual from Urdu to English. On Oct. 5, he was sentenced to life in prison.

Remaining defiant, and smirking as the sentence was read, he told the court: “Brace yourselves, because the war with Muslims has just begun.”
A court filing by federal prosecutors in New York on September 29, 2010, revealed new details about Mr. Shahzad’s communication with his backers immediately following his failed bombing attempt. He contacted the Pakistani Taliban via computer, telling one of his handlers what he had done.

Mr. Shahzad later told the authorities that he believed that the attack on May 1 would kill at least 40 people, having monitored his target for three months through live video feeds on the Internet, to determine which areas drew the largest crowds and when they would be busiest, the prosecutors said. Mr. Shahzad’s goal was to “maximize the deadly effect of his bomb,” the United States attorney in Manhattan, Preet Bharara, told a judge in a court filing.

Mr. Bharara’s office also revealed that Mr. Shahzad told the authorities after his arrest on May 3 that he planned to detonate a second bomb in New York City two weeks later, and was prepared to conduct more attacks until he was captured or killed.

The original indictment says that Tehrik-i-Taliban, the umbrella organization for the Pakistani Taliban, helped Mr. Shahzad, a United States citizen. In December 2009, Mr. Shahzad received explosives training in Waziristan, Pakistan, from trainers affiliated with Tehrik-i-Taliban, according to the indictment.

In a video on May 2, the group claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing.

The indictment says Mr. Shahzad received about $5,000 in cash in Massachusetts on Feb. 25 from an unidentified co-conspirator who Mr. Shahzad "understood worked for Tehrik-i-Taliban." It said the same co-conspirator directed a second payment to Mr. Shahzad, of $7,000 on April 10; Mr. Shahzad then bought a weapon, material to make the car bomb and a used S.U.V.

A Privileged Upbringing in Pakistan

According to federal law enforcement officials, Mr. Shahzad entered the United States on an F-1 student visa in January 1999. At that time, one official said, the authorities ran a criminal background check but found nothing suspicious.

In nearly a dozen years in this country, Mr. Shahzad had gone to school, held steady jobs, bought and sold real estate, and kept his immigration status in good order, giving no sign to those he interacted with that he had connections to terrorists in Pakistan.
Yet Mr. Shahzad apparently went back and forth to Pakistan 13 times in seven years, returning most recently in February after what he said was five months visiting his family, prosecutors said. A Pakistani intelligence official said the suspect had traveled with three passports, two from Pakistan and one from the United States; he last secured a Pakistani passport in 2000, describing his nationality as "Kashmiri."

Mr. Shahzad was born and in Pakistan in 1979, with a privileged upbringing in a moderate family that lived in at least three places — Karachi, Rawalpindi and Mohib Banda. Officials in Pakistan said his birthplace was in Nowshera, an area in northern Pakistan known for its Afghan refugee camps.

His father is Bahar ul-Haq, a retired high-ranking air force pilot in Pakistan. Mr. Haq, now in his 70s, is believed to be hiding in the city of Dera Ghazi Khan in western Pakistan, where the family has wheat fields. The whereabouts of Mr. Shahzad’s wife, also believed to be in Pakistan, is unknown. Dawn, a Pakistani daily, reported that her father had been arrested in Karachi, but Pakistani authorities would not confirm that.

Mr. Shahzad, the youngest of four, was born into a new generation in the years after a military autocrat, Zia ul-Haq, began to inject a rigid version of Islam into Pakistan's education system. At the same time, hard-line mosques were given money and land, elevating a narrow, often sectarian world view that cast a pall over young Pakistanis.

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**SAME SCRIPT**

**Losing the Media War in Pakistan**

The Pakistani media boom is propelling anti-American conspiracy theories, with the Times Square bomb as the latest example. The United States is doing virtually nothing to counter the trend.

**Security Tour of Times Square**

A former Secret Service agent gives a tour of Times Square in the aftermath of the failed car bombing.
Based on documents discarded outside his house in Shelton, Conn., where he lived until early 2010, and found by The Times, the suspect appears to have attended a university program in Pakistan that was affiliated with the University of Bridgeport starting in 1997. A résumé said he was studying for a bachelor of science degree with "specialization in finance." He said he spoke Urdu, English and Pashto and liked to work on computers, play sports and "talk to people from different backgrounds."

He also attended a program in Karachi affiliated with the now-defunct Southeastern University in Washington. A transcript for the spring of 1998 showed that he earned D's in English composition and microeconomics, B's in Introduction to Accounting and Introduction to Humanities, and a C in statistics. In 2000, he enrolled at the University of Bridgeport, where he received a bachelor's degree in computer science and engineering, followed in 2005 by a master's in business administration.

In January 2002, the authorities said, Mr. Shahzad got an H1-B visa for skilled workers. Records show that Elizabeth Arden, the cosmetics giant, applied for a visa for Mr. Shahzad; he worked there as a temporary clerk in the accounting department in 2001, through an employment agency called Accountants Inc., according to a timecard found in his trash.

In an arranged marriage in 2004, Mr. Shahzad wed Huma Mian, a
Pakistani-American who had just graduated from the University of Colorado at Boulder with a business degree, according to Bronson Hilliard, a university spokesman. Her parents lived in the Denver suburb of Aurora. The Mians moved out in 2008, leaving a post office box overseas as a forwarding address.

Mr. Shahzad, who was granted a green card in January 2006, became a naturalized citizen in Bridgeport on April 17, 2009. The couple moved into a house in Shelton, Conn., for about three years. They had two young children, a girl and a boy, said a neighbor, Brenda Thurman.

The Shahzads tried to cash in on the real estate boom, listing it for sale for $329,000 in 2006. It did not sell, said Frank DeVecchio, an agent who picked up the listing in 2008. The price then was $299,000. Later it was marked down to $285,000, and finally, $284,500.

People who knew them, both in Connecticut and in Pakistan, said Mr. Shahzad had changed since 2009 and perhaps before, becoming more reserved and more religious as he faced what someone who knows the family well called "their financial troubles."

People who knew them, both in Connecticut and in Pakistan, said Mr. Shahzad had changed since 2009 and perhaps before, becoming more reserved and more religious as he faced what someone who knows the family well called "their financial troubles."

One Pakistani friend said, Mr. Shahzad even asked his father in 2009 for permission to fight in Afghanistan. Mr. Haq adamantly refused, saying that he disapproved of the mission and reminding his son that Islam does not permit a man to abandon his wife or children.

In September 2009, Mr. Shahzad was sent a letter notifying him that he was being sued over a $218,400 loan from a mortgage arm of Chase bank. The mortgage covered the single-family home in Shelton with an assessed value of $242,690.

Mr. Shahzad had taken a job in 2006 as a junior financial analyst at Affinion Group in Norwalk, a financial marketing services company. Michael Bush, the company's director of public relations, said Mr. Shahzad resigned in mid-2009; government officials said he was unemployed and bankrupt by the time of his arrest.

The Attempted Bombing

The incident began at 6:28 pm on May 1, when the dark green Nissan Pathfinder was recorded by a video surveillance camera driving west on 45th Street.
Moments later, two street vendors on the sidewalk saw smoke coming out of vents near the back seat of the S.U.V., now parked awkwardly at the curb with its engine running and its hazard lights on. They heard the sound of firecrackers going off inside the car, and called out to a mounted police officer, who smelled gunpowder when he approached the vehicle and called for assistance. The police began evacuating Times Square, starting with businesses along Seventh Avenue, including a Foot Locker store and a McDonald's.

Police officers from the emergency service unit and firefighters flooded the area. The firefighters, who were responding to a report of a car fire, cleared the area and readied their hoses, but then decided to leave the S.U.V. for the bomb squad. The police also learned that the Pathfinder had the wrong license plates on it.

Members of the Police Department's bomb squad donned protective gear, broke the Pathfinder's back windows and used a "robotic device" to "observe" it, said Deputy Commissioner Paul J. Browne, the police department's chief spokesman. Inside the car were propane tanks, gasoline cans, M88 fireworks — the apparent source of the "pops" — and two clocks with batteries and a gun locker filled with fertilizer. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg described the device by saying it "looked amateurish."

Most of the ingredients of the explosive device could have been bought at a home-supply store. The canisters of propane were similar to those used for barbecue grills. The firecrackers were the kind sold legally in some states, including Pennsylvania.

The device was found in the back of the S.U.V., Mr. Kelly said, with the gasoline cans closest to the back seat and the gun locker behind them. The fertilizer was in clear plastic bags bearing the logo of a store that the police declined to identify. The wires from battery-powered fluorescent clocks ran into the gun locker, where a metal pressure-cooker pot contained a thicket of wires and more M88s, Mr. Kelly said.
Investigators believed that the fuses on the firecrackers had been lighted, but they did not explode, officials said. The burning fuses apparently ignited a portion of the Pathfinder’s interior, causing a small fire that filled the inside with smoke, one law enforcement official said.

Another official said that pops heard by a firefighter as he approached the vehicle might have been made by the fireworks failing to fully detonate.

A phone-record link underscored the combination of investigative skill, increased government integration and sheer luck that helped authorities track down the suspect. Once investigators had Mr. Shahzad’s identity, they were able to put his name on a no-fly list that ultimately led to his being pulled off a plane about to leave the country.

Investigators discovered the suspect’s name because of a phone number he provided returning to the United States from Pakistan in February, a law enforcement official said on May 5. The phone number Mr. Shahzad gave then was entered in a Customs and Border Protection agency database and came up May 3 when investigators checked the record of calls made to or from the prepaid cellular telephone used by the purchaser — at that point unidentified — of the vehicle used in the failed bombing, an official said. The VIN on the Pathfinder and the email address Mr. Shahzad gave to Ms. Colas were also linchpins.

On May 3, federal agents spoke to Mr. Shahzad’s landlord in Bridgeport, according to court papers. Soon after interviewing him, they first "got eyes on" Mr. Shahzad, according to law enforcement officials. He was in another car, one registered in his name, returning to his apartment from the grocery store.

Exactly how long investigators had him under surveillance is unclear. Mr. Shahzad emerged from his apartment, got back in his car and headed south to New York City. Somewhere along the route, the investigators lost track of Mr. Shahzad, who paid cash for a ticket on a jet bound for Dubai from J.F.K. Airport.

But as the airplane pulled away from the gate — 53 hours after the car bomb was found — investigators caught up with Mr. Shahzad. The suspect was taken from his seat and arrested.
30 year old Pakistani American named Faisal Shahzad was arrested just before midnight on Monday by members of the US Customs and Border Patrol and cooperation with the Joint Terrorism Task Force at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport, wanted in the botched (www.orkut.com)

(CBS/AP) Updated 7:23 p.m. ET

Faisal Shahzad gave the impression of a quiet family man, raising two small children with his wife in Shelton, Conn. and telling neighbors he worked on Wall Street.

Now the Pakistani-American is accused of trying to detonate a homemade car bomb in New York City's bustling Times Square. Authorities have brought terrorism and mass destruction charges against him, saying he has confessed to receiving explosives training in Pakistan.

Shahzad was expected to appear in court Tuesday. CBS News reports that officials intend to arraign Shahzad Wednesday morning in Manhattan Federal Court before a U.S. magistrate. Shahzad has been talking to investigators, officials said.

Shahzad, 30, was on board a Dubai-bound flight at Kennedy Airport when law enforcement took him into custody late Monday, officials said. One official said he claimed to have acted alone.
Despite becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen on April 17, 2009, Shahzad spent much of the past year outside of the country, mostly in Pakistan where his wife, Huma Mian, is currently living. Details of his activities abroad remain unclear, but a picture of his life in America began to emerge Tuesday.

Special Section: Terrorism in the U.S.
Read criminal complaint against Faisal Shahzad

Shahzad had been living here on the second floor of a house in Bridgeport, Conn. for a couple of months though he's been coming in and out of the U.S. for at least 11 years.

He kept a low profile in his working-class Bridgeport neighborhood where people often come and go, reports CBS News correspondent Jim Axelrod. Shown a picture of Shahzad, a neighborhood woman told Axelrod, "I never saw him before." She turned out to be Shahzad's next-door neighbor.

Before Bridgeport, Shahzad, along with his wife and children, a boy and a girl, lived for about three years in a two-story Colonial-style three-bedroom home in Shelton, Conn.

Shahzad bought the home for $273,000 and lost it to foreclosure last year. Frank DelVecchio, a broker trying to sell it for Shahzad, said Shahzad told him to let the bank take the house. He says Shahzad said he owed too much on it and planned to return to Pakistan.

Shahzad was granted a student visa in December of 1998. He graduated from the University of Bridgeport with a
computer science degree in 2000 and an MBA in 2005. He worked as a junior financial analyst for a marketing firm in Norwalk, Conn. until 2009.

"I assumed they went back to Pakistan because he had talked to me previously about going back there," said Audrey Sokol, a neighbor in Shelton. "He had parents there."

CBS News has confirmed that Shahzad worked until 2009 as a junior financial analyst at the Norwalk, Conn., office of a business named Affinion Group. An employee at the company wouldn't confirm whether Shahzad chose to leave the company or was terminated.

A spokesperson for Affinion told CBS News that Shahzad worked for the company from 2006 to June 2009. The spokesperson refused to provide any other information other than that the company was working with investigators.

CBS National Security Analyst Juan Zarate on Pakistan Links Terrorism, WMD Charges for Faisal Shahzad
Man Arrested for Times Square Bomb Attempt
Gun Found in Bomb Suspect's Car, Sources Say
Faisal Shahzad Tried to Return to Pakistan
Times Square Link Could Force Pakistan's Hand
Bomb Plot: The Limits of Video Surveillance
NYC Bomb Investigation Focus
Bomb Suspect: How Was He Caught?
In Shelton, Conn., one of Shahzad's former neighbors told The Washington Post that Shahzad said he worked on Wall Street. The neighbor, a teenage girl who only identified herself to the newspaper as the daughter of Brenda Thurman, said Shahzad would leave for work in a suit around 6 a.m. to return around 3:30 p.m.

The girl also told the newspaper that Shahzad enjoyed yardwork.

"He loved to work in his yard," the girl said. "His grass was always neat. He was always outside with his daughters."

The girl also said Shahzad moved away from Shelton in 2009, two months before his wife moved out of the house.

Neighbors offered diverging descriptions of Shahzad but agreed that he kept to himself. One, Brenda Thurman, said Shahzad had told her husband he worked on Wall Street, while another neighbor, Sokol, said she thought he worked in nearby Norwalk.

"He was a little bit strange," she said. "He didn't like to come out during the day."

Sokol, a teacher who lives next door to Shahzad's old house, said that he would wave and say hello and that he seemed normal to her.

Shahzad was currently living with a roommate in a mixed-race, working-class neighborhood of multi-family homes in Bridgeport, Conn. Authorities removed filled plastic bags from that house overnight and a bomb squad came and went without entering as local police and FBI agents gathered in the cordoned-off street.

He became a citizen in Hartford, Conn., and passed all the criminal and national security background checks required for citizenship, officials said.
The officials familiar with the inquiry say investigators plan to go through his citizenship application line by line to see if he lied about anything.

The University of Bridgeport in Connecticut released a statement Tuesday saying Shahzad earned two degrees from the school in the last decade.

Shahzad received a Bachelor of Science degree in computer applications and information systems in 2000, according to the statement. In 2005, Shahzad earned a Master in Business Administration degree.

The university has told the federal government about Shahzad's attendance at the school, according to the statement.

"The university abhors acts of violence and terrorism," Michael Spitzer, the university's provost, said in the statement. "We work to combat racial and ethnic prejudices and animosity, and believe that education in an international context is the key to understanding the values and beliefs of people from other cultures."

On June 2, 2009, Shahzad departed the U.S. for Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. In July, he reportedly traveled to Pakistan and is believed to have visited Peshawar, a city known as a gateway to the militant-occupied tribal regions of the country, according to MSNBC.

Investigators hadn't established an immediate connection to the Pakistani Taliban - which had claimed responsibility for the botched bombing in three videos - or any foreign terrorist groups, a law enforcement official told The Associated Press on Tuesday.

"He's claimed to have acted alone, but these are things that have to be investigated," the official.

Shahzad last entered the U.S. on Feb. 3, 2010 after a five-month visit to Pakistan. According to authorities he purchased the 1993 Nissan Pathfinder used in the attempted bombing three weeks ago for $1,300. He responded to a Craigslist ad and paid for the vehicle in cash.

After media reports late Monday that authorities were looking for a Pakistani-American man, Shahzad fled to Kennedy airport, boarding a flight for Dubai before law enforcement called the plane back to the terminal and the arrest was made.
According federal law enforcement official, materials related to the homemade car bomb were found in Shahzad's apartment, including the boxes that contained the alarm clocks. His car at the airport contained a 9mm handgun with extra clips of ammunition.

More than a dozen people with American citizenship or residency, like Shahzad, have been accused in the past two years of supporting or carrying out terrorism attempts on U.S. soil, cases that illustrate the threat of violent extremism from within the U.S.

Among them are Army Maj. Nidal Hasan, a U.S.-born Army psychiatrist of Palestinian descent, charged with fatally shooting 13 people last year at Fort Hood, Texas; Najibullah Zazi, a Denver-area airport shuttle driver who pleaded guilty in February in a plot to bomb New York subways; and a Pennsylvania woman who authorities say became radicalized online as "Jihad Jane" and plotted to kill a Swedish artist whose work offended Muslims.

Faisal Shahzad Tried to Return to Pakistan

By CBSNews
Faisal Shahzad, the American citizen arrested late Monday night as the only suspect in the attempted car bombing of Times Square, apparently got spooked by media reports and was trying to flee the country, sources told CBS News.

Shahzad's flight to Dubai had already pushed back from the gate at New York's JFK International Airport and was forced to return, a law enforcement source told CBS News correspondent Bob Orr. Shahzad (who, investigators believe, was traveling alone) was also booked on a connecting flight to Pakistan.

Federal law enforcement officials told CBS News that a 9 mm handgun with extra clips was found in his car at the airport.

Database information indicates shortly after Shahzad became a naturalized American citizen in April 2009, he traveled to the United Arab Emirates, CBS News has also learned.


His travels raise questions about possible ties to international terrorists, said Orr, but officials still have not established any firm links to al Qaeda or any other terror group.

The law enforcement official told Orr that Shahzad has known connections in Pakistan, but the nature of those connections - whether they are family, friends or individuals associated with any of the Asian nation's terrorist groups - remains unclear.

The New York Times reports his age as 30 years old.

At least two videos have surfaced showing leaders of the Pakistani Taliban claiming responsibility for the attempted bombing. Those claims were initially dismissed, but a Pakistani government official tells CBS News' Farhan Bokhari that U.S. intelligence officials have been in contact with their Pakistani counterparts as part of the ongoing investigation.

Sources tell Bokhari that if Shahzad does have solid links to terror groups in Pakistan's most populous province, as his name seems to suggest, that will present the American-allied government with some difficult choices as to whether they can afford a new front in their fight against extremists.

According to Orr's source, the FBI and New York police "were onto this guy early." The break in the case
apparently came from communications surrounding the sale of the SUV.

The source tells CBS News Shahzad was thought to have been at his apartment in Connecticut Monday night when details began leaking in the media that the FBI was looking for a Pakistani American. This apparently unnerved him and prompted him to try and run, although it is still unclear when he purchased his ticket to Pakistan via Dubai.

Police were still searching Shahzad's apartment in Connecticut early Tuesday morning.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- v. -
FAISAL SHAHZAD,

Defendant.

COUNTY OF OFFENSE:
NEW YORK

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.: ANDREW P. PACHTMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and charges as follows:

Count One

1. From at least in or about December 2009, up to and including on or about May 3, 2010, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, having traveled in interstate and foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly, and without lawful authority, did attempt to use a weapon of mass destruction, namely, a destructive device as defined by Title 18, United States Code, Section 921, against persons and property within the United States, to wit, on or about May 1, 2010, SHAHZAD traveled from Connecticut to New York and attempted to detonate improvised explosive and incendiary devices inside a sports utility vehicle located in the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, New York.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a, (a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(A).)
Count Two

2. From at least in or about December 2009, up to and including on or about May 3, 2010, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, in an offense obstructing, delaying, and affecting interstate commerce and which would have so obstructed, delayed, and affected interstate and foreign commerce if the offense had been consummated, and involving conduct transcending national boundaries, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly, did attempt to kill and maim persons within the United States, and did create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to others by attempting to destroy and damage structures, conveyances and other real and personal property within the United States, in violation of the laws of the United States, including Title 18, United States Code, Sections 844(d) and (i), 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii), and 2332a(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(A), to wit, SHAHZAD, after receiving bomb-making training in Waziristan, Pakistan, traveled to the United States, transported a sports utility vehicle to the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, New York, and attempted to detonate explosive and incendiary devices located inside the sports utility vehicle.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332b(a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(B).)

Count Three

3. From at least in or about December 2009, up to and including on or about May 3, 2010, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, during and in relation to a crime of violence for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to wit, the offense charged in Count Two of this Complaint, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did use and carry a destructive device, to wit, improvised explosive and incendiary devices placed in a sports utility vehicle in the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, New York.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A) and (B)(ii).)

Count Four

4. From at least in or about December 2009, up to and including on or about May 3, 2010, in an offense occurring in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did transport and...
receive, and attempt to transport and receive, an explosive with
the knowledge and intent that it would be used to kill, injure,
and intimidate an individual and to damage and destroy a
building, vehicle, and other real and personal property, to wit,
SHAHZAD transported a sports utility vehicle containing explosive
and incendiary devices to the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh
Avenue in Manhattan, New York, with the intent to kill, injure
and intimidate individuals and to damage and destroy nearby
buildings, vehicles and other property.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(d).)

**Count Five**

5. From at least in or about December 2009, up to and
including on or about May 3, 2010, in an offense occurring in and
affecting interstate and foreign commerce, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the
defendant, unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and maliciously did
attempt to damage and destroy, by means of fire and an explosive,
a building, vehicle, and other real and personal property, to
wit, SHAHZAD attempted to damage buildings, vehicles, and other
real and personal property by detonating explosive and incendiary
deVICES located inside of a sports utility vehicle parked in the
vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, New
York.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(i).)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charges
are, in part, as follows:

6. I am a Special Agent with the FBI and a member of
the FBI’s New York-based Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”).
The JTTF is responsible for investigating the attempted bombing
of Times Square on or about May 1, 2010, by means of an abandoned
sports utility vehicle filled with explosive and incendiary
deVICES. During the course of my investigation, I have, among
other things, spoken with law enforcement officials and other
individuals, and I have reviewed documents relating to this
investigation. Because this Complaint is being submitted for the
limited purpose of establishing probable cause, I have not
included details of every aspect of this investigation. Where
the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and
conversations of others are reported in this Complaint, they are
reported in sum and substance, except where otherwise indicated.
Overview Of The Investigation

7. In the course of this investigation, I have learned that, on Saturday evening, May 1, 2010, a Nissan Pathfinder (the “Pathfinder”) was discovered, abandoned, on the street in Times Square. Inside the Pathfinder were multiple, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer – as well as fireworks, clocks, wiring, and other items. When emergency services workers arrived on the scene, the Pathfinder was visibly smoking. The items in the back of the Pathfinder were smoldering; it appeared that the occupant of the Pathfinder had attempted to initiate an explosion. Hours later, when law-enforcement officers entered the Pathfinder, a number of keys were recovered, including a key to an Isuzu automobile. This investigation has revealed that FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, bought the Pathfinder with cash on April 24, 2010; that he drove an Isuzu; and that one of the keys in the Pathfinder opens the door to SHAHZAD’s Connecticut residence. In addition, and among other things, this investigation has revealed that SHAHZAD used a pre-paid cellular telephone – which has not been used since April 28 – both to call a fireworks store and to receive a series of calls from Pakistan following his purchase of the Pathfinder.

8. On May 3, 2010, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, was arrested at the John F. Kennedy International Airport (the “Airport”). After the arrest, SHAHZAD admitted that he had attempted to detonate a bomb in Times Square. He also admitted that he had recently received bomb-making training in Waziristan, Pakistan.

The Defendant

9. According to records maintained by United States Customs and Border Protection, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, a naturalized U.S. citizen, returned to the United States on February 3, 2010, via the Airport. SHAHZAD arrived on a one-way ticket from Pakistan. During an immigration inspection, SHAHZAD stated that he had been in Pakistan for the last five months visiting his parents. SHAHZAD also indicated that he intended to stay at a motel in Connecticut while he looked for a place to live and for a job. SHAHZAD further advised that his wife had remained behind in Pakistan.

The Discovery Of The Bomb

10. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to a member of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) who
responded to the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue during the evening of May 1, 2010 ("Detective 1"). Based upon my conversation with Detective 1, as well as other law-enforcement agents with whom I have consulted, I have learned the following:

a. During the evening of May 1, 2010, a police officer on mounted patrol in the Times Square area ("Police Officer 1") was approached by an individual ("Witness 1") in the vicinity of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue. Witness 1 advised Police Officer 1 that there was an unoccupied car with its engine running nearby. Police Officer 1 then saw the Pathfinder parked near the southwest corner of 45th Street and Seventh Avenue, with nobody inside of it. Police Officer 1 also observed smoke emanating from the Pathfinder. Police Officer 1 radioed for assistance. Police Officer 1 and other NYPD officers on foot patrol then began to evacuate the area around the Pathfinder.

b. After Police Officer 1 radioed for assistance, components of the NYPD bomb squad, as well as the New York City Fire Department ("FDNY"), responded to the scene. The NYPD bomb squad and the FDNY then began working to identify the source of the smoke coming from inside the Pathfinder. After approximately eight hours of work, the NYPD bomb squad and the FDNY secured the Pathfinder such that it was safe to enter. According to various NYPD evidence reports as well as other law-enforcement reports and documents, law-enforcement personnel recovered the following items, among other others, from inside the Pathfinder:

i. Several white plastic bags containing fertilizer;

ii. Two red 5-gallon gasoline canisters each containing gasoline;

iii. 152 M-88 fireworks;

iv. Three full propane gas canisters;

v. Two alarm clocks connected to wires;

vi. Three residential keys; and

vii. A key to an Isuzu vehicle.
The Investigation

11. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to another FBI agent who is a member of the FBI’s Connecticut-based JTTF (“Agent 1”). Based upon my conversation with Agent 1, as well as conversations with other law-enforcement agents, based in New York and in Connecticut, I have learned the following:

   a. The JTTF’s examination of the engine of the Pathfinder revealed a Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”). A VIN is a unique serial number used to identify individual motor vehicles. Based on the VIN for the Pathfinder, the JTTF identified the name and the address of the last registered owner of the Pathfinder (the “Owner”); this identification was made using records maintained by the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). The DMV records also indicated that the Pathfinder was registered under a different license plate from the one found on it in New York City on May 1, 2010.

   b. On or about May 2, 2010, based on information contained in the DMV records, members of the JTTF interviewed the Owner of the Pathfinder. During this interview, the Owner indicated that the Owner had given the Pathfinder to another person, and that this person (the “Seller”) had recently sold the Pathfinder.

12. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to another FBI agent who is a member of the FBI’s Connecticut-based JTTF (“Agent 2”). On or about May 2, 2010, Agent 2 and other JTTF agents interviewed the Seller about the recent sale of the Pathfinder. Based upon my conversation with Agent 2, as well as with other law-enforcement agents, I have learned the following:

   a. Beginning in early April 2010, the Seller posted advertisements on several websites indicating that the Pathfinder was for sale. These advertisements contained certain basic information about the Pathfinder, and also included the Seller’s telephone number.

   b. In or about the middle of April 2010, the Seller received a telephone call from a man indicating that he had seen one of the advertisements for the Pathfinder and was interested in buying it (the “Buyer”). The Buyer did not leave a name but asked the Seller to call him back at a telephone number (“Telephone Number”). Thereafter, the Seller and the Buyer agreed to meet in a supermarket parking lot in Connecticut on the morning of April 24, 2010.
c. On the morning of April 24, 2010, in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the Seller met the Buyer in the supermarket parking lot. The Buyer arrived at the parking lot in a black Isuzu Rodeo with tinted windows.

d. During this meeting, at which the Seller was accompanied by another person, the Seller advised the Buyer, among other things, that the Pathfinder had some mechanical problems. The Buyer inspected the interior seating and cargo area of the Pathfinder, but not the engine, and asked if he could take the Pathfinder for a test drive. The Seller told the Buyer that they could meet later that day for a test drive.

e. In the early afternoon of April 24, 2010, the Seller and the Buyer met again at the same Connecticut supermarket parking lot. The Buyer arrived again in the black Isuzu Rodeo. During this meeting, the Seller (along with a different person who accompanied the Seller) and the Buyer took the Pathfinder for a test drive. The Buyer and the Seller agreed on a price of $1300 for the Pathfinder; the Buyer paid the Seller with 13 $100 bills. The person accompanying the Seller then attempted to complete a bill of sale to memorialize the transaction. The Buyer advised the Seller and the other person that this was unnecessary, explaining that he had his own license plate; the Buyer showed the Seller a license plate. The Seller then gave the Buyer one key for the Pathfinder, and the Buyer drove out of the parking lot in the Pathfinder. At the time the Buyer bought the Pathfinder, the vehicle did not have tinted windows - as it did after being discovered in Times Square. The Buyer left the Isuzu Rodeo he had arrived in behind.

f. A few days after the sale of the Pathfinder, the Buyer called the Seller and asked about the timing of the last oil change for the Pathfinder.

13. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to another FBI agent who is a member of the FBI's Connecticut-based JTTF ("Agent 3"). On or about May 2, 2010, Agent 3 and other JTTF agents arranged for the Seller to provide a description of the Buyer to a Connecticut State Police sketch artist to generate a sketch of the Buyer. After the sketch was completed, the sketch was shown to the individual who was present for the second meeting with the Buyer on April 24, 2010, and that individual remarked that the sketch looked just like the Buyer.

14. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to another FBI agent who is a member of the FBI's Connecticut-based JTTF ("Agent 4"). On or about May 3, 2010, Agent 4 and other
JTTF agents showed the Seller a photo array of six photos, and asked whether the Seller recognized any of the individuals in the photo array. The Seller identified FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, as the Buyer to whom the Seller sold the Pathfinder.

15. As part of this investigation, I have reviewed Connecticut DMV records for "Faisal Shahzad," which indicate that he is the registered owner of a 1998 Isuzu Rodeo S/LS jeep. I have also spoken to Connecticut State Troopers who have access to a database that provides the color for vehicles registered in the state. According to that database, the exterior color of the Isuzu Rodeo registered to "Faisal Shahzad" is black, the same color as the Isuzu Rodeo driven by the Buyer.

16. As part of this investigation, I have reviewed telephone records from Verizon Wireless for the telephone number ("Telephone Number") that FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, used to contact the Seller. These records reveal, among other things, the following:

   a. The Telephone Number was assigned to a prepaid cellular telephone that was activated on or about April 16, 2010; this prepaid phone ceased to be active on or about April 28, 2010.

   b. The Telephone Number called the Seller's telephone a total of 12 times between April 22, 2010, and April 27, 2010. Five of those 12 calls were made on April 24, 2010, the day SHAHZAD bought the Pathfinder from the Seller.

   c. According to records maintained by United States Customs and Border Protection, which I have reviewed, a certain number preceded by a zero ("Pakistani Number") is a Pakistani telephone number associated with SHAHZAD. According to the Verizon Wireless records, the Telephone Number received four calls from the Pakistani Number (but without the preceding zero) on the morning of April 24, 2010. Approximately one hour after receiving these four calls from the Pakistani Number, the Telephone Number called the Seller twice; later that day, as described above, SHAHZAD bought the Pathfinder from the Seller.

   d. On April 25, 2010, at 9:43 a.m., the Telephone Number called a telephone number with a Pennsylvania area code. Based on my investigation, I have learned that the Pennsylvania number is currently used by a fireworks store in rural Pennsylvania; that store sells M-88 fireworks.
17. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to another FBI agent who is a member of the FBI's Connecticut-based JTTF ("Agent 5"). On or about May 3, 2010, Agent 5 and other JTTF agents interviewed the landlord of the building where FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, lives ("SHAHZAD Residence"). Based upon my conversation with Agent 5, as well as with other law-enforcement agents, I have learned the following:

   a. According to the landlord, SHAHZAD has exclusive access to and control of a garage behind his residence.

   b. On May 3, 2010, the landlord saw SHAHZAD enter the garage and when SHAHZAD entered, the landlord saw two bags of fertilizer in SHAHZAD's garage.

18. As part of this investigation, I have spoken to various law-enforcement agents who participated in a search of the SHAHZAD Residence, which was conducted on May 3, 2010. Based upon these conversations, I have learned the following:

   a. Agents recovered from the garage associated with the SHAHZAD Residence, among other things, fireworks and fertilizer.

   b. As noted above, see supra ¶ 10(b), various keys were recovered from inside the Pathfinder; agents used one of the keys to open the door to the SHAHZAD Residence.

The Arrest

19. On May 3, 2010, FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, was arrested at the Airport as he attempted to leave the United States by means of a commercial flight to Dubai. After his arrest, SHAHZAD stated that he had recently received bomb-making training in Waziristan, Pakistan. In addition, SHAHZAD admitted that he had brought the Pathfinder to Times Square — and attempted there to detonate it. SHAHZAD also noted that he had driven a particular car to the Airport on May 3, 2010, and stated that the car contained a gun.

20. On May 4, 2010, law-enforcement agents at the Airport located the car that FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, had described. Agents recovered from inside of the car, among other things, a gun.
WHEREFORE, deponent respectfully requests that FAISAL SHAHZAD, the defendant, be imprisoned or bailed, as the case may be.

ANDREW F. PACHTMAN
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this
4th day of May, 2010

HONORABLE KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Overview

The Group of Four, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center, have made significant progress in the past year regarding interagency coordination and achieving the goals outlined in the SIP. To build on this progress, Group of Four agencies will continue to coordinate research, dissemination of resources and best practices, and most importantly strategically coordinate CVE engagement with our federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.

Over the past year, the Group of Four has been successful in building a foundation of partnerships, establishing a network of subject matter experts, developing a compendium of training and CVE resources, coordinating the expansion of grant guidance, and establishing a common understanding of CVE in communities around the country. The challenge for 2013 is to further empower and support our state and local partners by strategically leveraging the compendium of resources that have been developed to directly support grassroots CVE efforts while continuing to do more with less given the fiscal environment in which we are operating in.

These efforts are to be driven at the local level, such as with the US Attorney, or state and local law enforcement; the Group of Four will work to add more transparency to available resources and work with state and local partners to determine how new resources can be applied and how current resources can be maximized. This will be a fully collaborative effort with full consultation with state and local partners.

Proposed Cities/Regions and Goals

Most of the current and previous CVE engagement has been based on communities and law enforcement agencies voluntarily approaching one of the agencies asking for assistance. For 2013, the Group of Four needs to build a strategic approach so we can leverage resources efficiently to support and strengthen established efforts, provide support and guidance to newly established/budding efforts, and effectively leverage resources and relationships from existing successful local programs. Goals for proposed cities would entail the following:

1) Identifying Best Practices: highlight promising efforts, recognizing them as such, and determining how the Group of Four agencies can best support these activities.

2) Institutionalizing Best Practices: as best practices are identified from across the country the Group of Four will build a compendium of best practices while also learning how current federal, state, and local tools and resources are being leveraged and applied. For example, the National Engagement Task Force (NETF), has been charged by the SIP, to coordinate engagement efforts, share best practices, and disseminate regular reports. The NETF has created a Catalog of Best Practices for Community Engagement, which will be disseminated across federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement nationwide.

3) Sharing Best Practices Through Cross Pollenization: as the compendium of best practices is being developed the Group of Four will be able to share them with other federal, state and local partners; this will be accomplished through training and via resources available to partners such as the joint DHS/FBI CVE Training and Active Shooter Resources Webportal and the NCTC Community Engagement Online Resource Center.