Mr. Vice President:

I would like to give you, within the next 15 minutes, an overview on the three subjects shown on this chart -- as requested by your office.

If possible, I would like to defer questions until the end of the presentation at which time I will be happy to answer any that you may have.

During this briefing, I will try to answer three questions:

First -- What are these programs?
Second -- What are their perceived weaknesses?
Third -- What actions, if any, are we seeking from you or from the President?

Continuity of Government Law (____) assures continuity of Federal Government by designating fourteen successors to the President.
(The succession of the Secretary of the Treasury has been left vacant due to his foreign birth.)

The White House Military Office has an emergency plan to ensure the survival of the President and the Vice President.

The Federal Preparedness Agency, by authority delegated on March 2, 1977, from the White House, plans for the survival of all the successors below the Vice President.

In this briefing I will address only the successors in the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government.

Departments and agencies have been distributed into three categories reflecting the essentiality of their functions with respect to continuity of government.

Category A: Consists of agencies/departments having essential uninterruptible functions that must be performed before, during, and immediately after an attack.
CHART # 3

Indicated on this chart are the departments headed by the successors to the President as well as some independent agencies and elements of the Executive Office of the President.

These departments and agencies have instituted plans for orderly succession of their heads -- sometimes 12 deep reaching down to regional levels.
**Category B:** Consists of agencies which must be reconstituted "as soon as conditions permit after an attack."

**Category C:** Consists of all other agencies that are to defer reconstitution until directed by appropriate authority.

Since Category A is of primary interest to us today, let me just point out that this category in turn divided into five executive teams -- three of them at the Federal level and two at the regional level.

The purpose of this breakdown is to further ensure the survival of Category A functions. Let me stress that all of the above measures have a single purpose -- to provide the President with an adequate range of options for crisis management.

As an example, in a situation of rapidly escalating international crisis which dictates that the President and his successors remain in Washington he can by means of a BRAVO alert order an inconspicuous dispersal of Category A teams to their assigned locations as shown:

![Chart 4](image-url)
SHORTLY AFTER AN ENEMY MISSILE LAUNCH, THE PRESIDENT WOULD RECEIVE A "MISSILE ATTACK CONFERENCE" WARNING. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD ELECT TO EXECUTE AN ALPHA ALERT -- MEANING THAT HE AND HIS SUCCESSORS WOULD EVACUATE.

IN THIS TIME CRITICAL SITUATION, THE SUCCESSORS WOULD BE EVACUATED BY HELICOPTER TO PLACES NEAR THE METROPOLITAN AREA, AS SHOWN...

ALL DISPERSEAL LOCATIONS ARE FULLY EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL SUCCESSORS WITH ALL OF THE SUPPORT REQUIRED TO PERFORM THEIR WORKING FUNCTIONS WITH THE HELP OF THEIR TEAMS.

OBVIOUSLY, VARIATIONS ON THE ALPHA AND BRAVO ALERTS ARE POSSIBLE. IN SOME SITUATIONS IT MAY BE PRUDENT TO EVACUATE ONE OR MORE OF THE SUCCESSORS LEAVING THE REMAINDER IN WASHINGTON.

TOUCHING NOW BRIEFLY ON POTENTIAL PROBLEMS -- AS WE SEE THEM -- WITH RESPECT TO SUCCESSOR EVACUATION, THE FOLLOWING NEED CITING:

FIRST - THERE IS AN INADEQUATE HELICOPTER FORCE WHICH HAS BEEN ALLOCATED TO SUCCESSOR EVACUATION. THIS MEANS THAT SEVERAL HELICOPTERS WILL HAVE TO PICK UP MORE THAN
ONE SUCCESSOR AND THEIR IMMEDIATE STAFFS. THIS MAY DELAY TAKEOFF.

SECOND - THE CURRENT RESPONSE MAY BE INADEQUATE FOR THE HELICOPTER TO FLY BEYOND THE LETHAL RADIUS OF A NUCLEAR DETONATION.

On this point, last June 15th we initiated our first ALPHA test by evacuating a surrogate Attorney General. It took eight minutes from the office to being airborne. While this is encouraging, in my opinion the helicopter would not have survived a nuclear detonation. A thorough examination of this problem is underway by FPA.

THIRD - One must remember that these plans were originally based upon an ICBM attack.

My concern about our ability to evacuate becomes ever more acute if Washington were to be attacked by SLBM’s -- due to the much shorter flight time.

There may be solutions to this problem, e.g., evacuation under SOSUS warning. This, however, may have its drawbacks -- not desirable from a political point of view.
FOURTH - ANOTHER DEALS WITH THE VULNERABILITY OF THE HELICOPTERS TO A TERRORIST ATTACK, PARTICULARLY IF TERRORISTS ARE EQUIPPED WITH SHOULDER/SURFACE-TO AIR MISSILES.

FIFTH - THE RESULTING VULNERABILITIES OF OUR LIMITED DISPERAL SITES AND DEDICATED COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (18 + FPA SPECIAL SITE + 4 COMMUNICATION SWITCHING CENTERS) EITHER TO A DIRECT MISSILE OR TERRORIST ATTACK. THIS SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY UNDER INTENSIVE REVIEW BY FPA.

The problems I mentioned are serious. While we at FPA are addressing them, let us recognize that our capabilities are limited. Therefore, I recommend that this area be given WHITE HOUSE attention. Because of the complex, interdepartmental interaction required, I suggest that consideration be given to a PRM activity.
My second topic is **Successors Emergency Instructions** — civil emergency preparedness of supporting departments.

With respect to emergency briefing to the successor — our activities are two fold:

**One**, to brief each successor on their responsibilities and tasks. This we have done for all with exception of three of them, who were briefed by their staffs.

**Two**, all successors have been recipients of an emergency folder for evacuation. This folder, and here is a sample one:

It contains evacuation instructions, a photo and a map of the helicopter pickup point, and a road map to the destination should surface transportation prove to be necessary.
As already mentioned -- continuity of government means not only the effective evacuation of the President and his successors but also the support they will receive from Category A agencies/departments.

To ensure the effectiveness of these support functions, FPA issues guidance, coordinates, and evaluates annually the proficiency of the related agencies/departments with respect to their civil emergency preparedness.

Let me state emphatically that the overall success of civil emergency preparedness is dependent upon the support that the agency/department heads give to this program and the attention and resources that each agency gives to this problem area.

How good are the agency plans?
FPA's evaluation of the CEP plans issued by the agencies/Departments responsible for continuity of government is indicated in this chart:

From the above, you can see that in a situation of dire crisis, the agencies may, with a few exceptions, falter because of inadequate civil emergency plans.

This is a major problem. The following actions are suggested to you for consideration, hopefully for action:

One - That a memorandum be sent by the President to his principal successors requesting their greater attention to the CEP planning. (I have a proposed draft on this subject.)
Two - That consideration be given to the reinstitution to FPA of Delegate Agency funding. This would enable FPA to disburse funds to agencies for their civil emergency planning activities and thus ensure proper execution and coordination of these plans.

Chart #9

My third subject is the Presidential Emergency Action Documents, or PEADS.
The PEADs I will talk about deal exclusively with general nuclear war. They form a part of the President's and Vice President's "Emergency Portfolios."

Since these PEADs are time sensitive, they are with you at all times.

The legal basis for each document is contained in existing legislation and in the President's implied powers under the Constitution.

PEADs take the form of proclamations to the public, Executive orders to the agencies, and messages for the Congress with appended legislation.

They are activated upon the signature of the President.

In toto, there are 20 regular PEADs in this general war portfolio -- which is called Emergency Plan D. The PEADs are
DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS, NAMELY:

ADMINISTRATIVE:
* Proclamation of war;
* Invoking state-of-war and civil defense preparedness;
* Convening of Congress and asking it to declare a state of war.

The second group of PEADs deals with National Security, such as:

* Control of enemy actions, protection of diplomatic personnel.
* Control of vessels in U.S. waters and the Canal Zone.
* Control of weather information
* Use of military forces to maintain law and order
* Suspension of the writ of habeas corpus -- only if absolutely necessary and even then civil law would be retained, martial law would not be imposed.
The third group of PEADs relate to wartime mobilization, such as:

* Establishment within the Executive Office of the President of an Office of Defense Resources -- the key organization for resource management in a postattack environment including price stabilization.

* Another one removes all restrictions on authorized strengths of the Armed Forces, directs registration and deals with enlistments and authorizes callup of reserve forces.

* Establishment of censorship to control international communications. Internal communications are subject to voluntary censorship.

Each of the PEADs I have mentioned were issued originally in 1957. They were reviewed most recently in the latter part of 1976 by federal agencies having primary responsibility in this area.
Most were modified to reflect changes in laws or in government organization. One -- relating to censorship -- was temporarily withdrawn pending revision.

On April 22, 1977, the revised PEADs were forwarded to OMB for approval after clearance with the Department of Justice. Once OMB has cleared them, they will be sent to the Assistant to the President for NSC for approval/recommendation to the President.

I have some concern about the OMB delay. Unless it is related to the President's reorganization plans or other policy considerations, I recommend that these revised PEADs be approved so that your "Emergency Portfolios" are all up to date.

A final word on PEADs. Their usefulness is directly related to our overall national defense policies and capabilities. Some of them, e.g., call up of reserves or the use of Selective
SERVICE MAY, IN THE LIGHT OF OUR VOLUNTEER ARMY, BE UNREALISTIC.

THIS COMPLETES MY PRESENTATION, AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND OUR INVITATION FOR YOU TO VISIT THE FPA FACILITY -- TO SEE AND EVALUATE FOR YOURSELF OUR EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES. THIS WOULD DEMAND ABOUT FOUR HOURS OF YOUR TIME.

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