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Homeland Security Investigations

NSIDNational Security cinvestigations sm Divisionnal

EXPOSTATION U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement





OVERVIEW



OVERSTAY PRIORITIZATION



LEAD RESULTS



STATISTICS



PROFILES



TERRORIST TRACKING PURSUIT GROUP



SEVIS EXPLOITATION SECTION





Mission

To proactively scrutinize known or suspected terrorists and their associates, identify terrorist criminal enterprises, prevent terrorists and other criminals from exploiting the nation's immigration system and to expand the resource equities within the various Law Enforcement Agencies and Intelligence Communities.















Counterterrorism and Criminal **Exploitation Unit (CTCEU)**

TERRORIST TRACKING PURSUIT GROUP (TTPG)TO PROACTIVELY IDENTIFY AND DEVELOP ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ON SUSPECTED NONIMMIGRANT VIOLATORS WHO POSE POTENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY OR PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS TO THE UNITED VULNERABILITIES OF THE SEVIS SYSTEM.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT GROUPCTCEU'S ISG STATES

STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR INFORMATION SYSTEM (SEVIS) EXPLOITATION SECTION (SES)IDENTIFIES AND INVESTIGATES SCHOOLS, EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAMS, AND INDIVIDUALS WHO EXPLOIT THE

MANAGES CRITICAL FUNCTIONS THAT SUPPORT THE EFFICIENT USE OF CTCEU RESOURCES; THE ISG MONITORS, EVALUATES, AND MANAGES THE DELIVERY OF CTCEU'S CONTRACT SUPPORT SERVICES, AND COORDINATES AND PERFORMS A VARIETY OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES

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CTCEU INITIATIVES

A STATE OF THE STA

| National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Collaboration | Alien Flight Student Program |
|---|--|
| Open Source Analysis | Foreign Flight Schools |
| Visa Revocation Program | SEVP Analysis and Operations Center (SAOC) Partnership |
| International Military Students Absent Without Leave (IMS AWOL) Program | Project Campus Sentinel |
| Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) | Visa Lifecycle Program |
| U.S. Service Academy Candidate Vetting | Domestic Mantis Program |











TTPG

SES



In 2009, ICE established the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP)

Densure that it uses the latest threat intelligence to target nonimmigrant overstays and status violators who pose the greatest threats to national security and to discuss possible changes based on current threat trends.















CTCEU FY 2019 Lead Results




















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TTPG Overview

The TTPG serves as a clearing house for the intake, research, assignment, tracking and reporting of nonimmigrant investigations who pose a potential threat to the















Open Source Analysis to Intelligence Gaps











Open Source Findings

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(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E)



SES Overview

The SES combats criminal violations of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and the **Student and Exchange Visitor** Program (SEVP)The SES analyzes and refers criminal investigative leads to HSI field agents related to Immigration Fraud, Organized Crime, Counterterrorism, and Counter **Proliferation People can exploit SEVIS** vulnerabilities for nefarious purposes including human smuggling and trafficking, financial fraud, immigration and document fraud, and intellectual property crimes




















Why a Student Visa?

An analysis of 60 terrorists who have exploited F/M/J visas revealed















Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E)



Mobility



Length of Stay



Ability to Work



Schools That Lack Accountability And Oversight



Specialized Education/Training



Institutional Knowledge And Skillset To Return Home



STEM Fields Can Work Up To 36 Months

















Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(7)(E)

SEVP Analysis and Operations

Capta Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is the ICE component hat add in ster the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) that tracks international students in the United StatesThe SEVP Analysis and Operations Center (SAOC) is a section within SEVP responsible for monitoring schools for ongoing administrative compliance with regulatory reporting requirements In many cases, schools have both criminal and administrative violationsSchools not adhering to reporting requirements present a threat to the national security as their students are not properly monitored















1

Project Campus Sentinel is aimed at preventing the criminal exploitation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) by improving direct communications between designated school officials (DSOs) and local HSI agents

HSI seeks to increase school officials' knowledge of how regulatory requirements play heavily into criminal investigations and the role that DSOs may play in those investigations

2


3

HSI seeks the assistance of school officials in conducting investigations of non-compliant schools and students

HSI is also asking for assistance from school officials in identifying those who may be possible public safety and/or national security concerns

4

Project Campus Sentinel (PCS)

















Q&A

Protecting the Homeland with Honor, Service, and Integrity






HSI COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS TRAINING



FIELD SENIOR LEADERS



HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

National Security Investigations Division

| January 15 | (b)(7)(E) |
|------------|--|
| | Agenda Day 1: January 15, 2019 NSID |
| 0830-0900 | Arrival |
| 0900-0930 | Welcome and Introduction National Security Unit (NSU) Unit Chief (UC) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| 0930-1030 | Welcome and Introduction – HSI Headquarters Executive Associate Director Derek N. Benner |
| 1045-1130 | Break |
| 1045-1130 | National Security Unit (NSU) Overview National Security Unit (NSU) Unit Chief (UC) - NSU Overview - Section I, II and Mission Development |
| 1130-1230 | Counterterrorism Section (CTS) Overview CTS I Section Chief (SC) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - Opening Remarks - HSI Mission, Vision & Objectives - HSI NSID - CTS & JTTF - Approach to CT Investigations - (b)(7)(E) |
| 1230-1400 | Lunch & Travel Time to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) |
| 1400-1500 | TSC Tour - Driving home why CT remains HSI's number one mission, priority and objective |
| 1500-1530 | Travel back to NSID from TSC |
| 1530-1700 | Leadership from Navy Seal Perspective |

HSI COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS TRAINING



FIELD SENIOR LEADERS



HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

National Security Investigations Division

| | (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
|----------|---|
| | Agenda Day 2: January 16, 2019 |
| | NSID |
| 330-0900 | Arrival |
| 000-1015 | ASAC Perspective on the JTTF |
| | ASAC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) New York JTTF |
| | - Role/Responsibilities on the JTTF |
| | - Priorities/Reporting |
| | - CT Attack in your AOR |
| 15-1030 | Break |
| 30-1100 | Reporting in (b)(7)(E) |
| | CTS II SC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| | CTS PM (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (JTTF Detroit |
| 00-1200 | CONUS Based Attacks & the HSI's Engagement |
| | CTS II SC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| | _ (b)(7)(E) |
| | - ICE Director and HSI EAD's recent policy on post attack reporting and |
| | responsibilities |
| 200-1300 | Lunch |
| 00-1430 | JTTF Case Presentation - (b)(7)(E) |
| | NY SA[b)(6); (b)(7)(C) / NY OPLA Attorney (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| | (b)(7)(E) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| | _ (b)(7)(E) |
| 30-1445 | Break |
| 45-1600 | CTS Support to HSI JTTF Resident Agents in Charge / Group Supervisors |
| 1000 | CTS PM(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| | - Efficient Significant Case Review submissions |

HSI COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS TRAINING



FIELD SENIOR LEADERS



HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

National Security Investigations Division

| | (b)(7)(E) | |
|------------|--|--|
| January 15 | - January 17, 2019 | |
| 1430-1530 | Programmatic and Policy Discussion National Security Unit (NSU) Unit Chief (UC) - (b)(7)(E) - Subject Reports (4 Types)/Leads | |
| 1530-1545 | Break | |
| 1545-1630 | HSI's NSID / NSU / CTS - Vision and Plans for CT National Security Unit (NSU) Unit Chief (UC) - (b)(7)(E) - National Security Counterterrorism Investigations Handbook (b)(7)(E) - HSI and NSID leadership vision | |
| 1630-1700 | ASAC Round Table & Training Evaluations - Issues facing the Field | |

- Common Problems/Solutions
- Complete Evaluations





| August | (b)(7)(E) |
|-----------|---|
| | Agenda Day 1: August 13, 2018 ROOM (b)(7)(E) |
| 0830-0900 | Arrival |
| 0900-1000 | Welcome and Introduction – HSI Leadership - HSI NSID Unit Chief (UC) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - Welcome - HSI CTS I Section Chief (SC) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Opening Remarks |
| 1000-1130 | FBI CTD and HSI NSID Overviews Moderator: HSI CTS II SC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - FBI CTD - (b)(7)(E) - (b)(7)(E) - HSI NSID - CTS & JTTF - CTS & JTTF / Impact of HSI on CT |
| 1130-1230 | Lunch Break |
| 1230-1300 | Travel Time to TSC |
| 1300-1400 | Guided Tour of TSC - Driving home why CT remains HSI's number one mission, priority and objective |
| 1400-1430 | Travel Time back to LX1 |
| 1430-1600 | JTTF Case Presentation #1 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Moderator: HSI JTTF SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Tucson) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E) |
| 1600-1700 | CTS Closing Session / Administrative Panel Moderator: HSI CTS PM (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |





| Augus | st 13-24 • (b)(7)(E) |
|-----------|---|
| | Moderator: DOS NJTTF SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| | Agenda Day 5: August 17, 2018 ROOM (b)(7)(E) |
| 0830-0900 | Arrival |
| 0900-1100 | Islamic Extremism Moderator: [b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - (b)(7)(E) - (c) |
| 1100-1200 | HSI Headquarters Welcome and Operational Updates – HSI Leadership - HSI Acting Executive Assistant Director (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - HSI Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - HSI Division Chief (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| 200-1300 | Lunch |
| 1300-1400 | HSI Group Supervisor Role Moderator: HSI JTTF Group Supervisor [b)(7)(E) - Supervisor Role in Supporting the Field - (b)(7)(E) (New York) |
| 1400-1500 | Best Practices from SA/GS Perspective Moderator: HSI JTTF Group Supervisor (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - (b)(7)(E) - (c)(7)(L) - Roles and Responsibilities |
| 1500-1600 | JTTF Case Presentation #4 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Moderator: HSI JTTF SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) New York) |
| 1600-1700 | JTTF Case Presentation #5 - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Panel Moderator: HSI CTS PM (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Former JTTF Detroit) |





| Augus | t 13-24 • (b)(7)(E) |
|-----------|---|
| | Agenda Day 10: August 24, 2018 ROOM(b)(7)(E) |
| 0830-0900 | Arrival |
| 0900-1000 | Columbus Attack Presentation Moderator: HSI SA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Cleveland) (Former JTTF; Former CTS PM) - Attack timeline - An HSI CTS deployed PM's perspective |
| 1000-1030 | PWP & Me Moderator: HSI CTS PM (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Former JTTF San Francisco) - Prior PWP rating system as it relates to the JTTF agent - Guidance on PWP to assist with future ratings |
| 1030-1200 | Washington Institute for Near East Policy Moderator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| 1200-1300 | Lunch |
| 1300-1400 | Orlando Attack Response Presentation Moderator: HSI CTS PM (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - Attack timeline - An HSI CTS deployed PM's perspective |
| 1400-1500 | CONUS Based Attacks Moderator: HSI CTS I SC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(E) |
| | - ICE Director and HSI EAD's policy on post attack reporting |
| 1500-1600 | NSID NSU CTS Vision and Future Plans Moderator: HSI CTS I SC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) |
| 1600-1700 | NSID Leadership Closing Remarks |





| August 13-24 | • | (b)(7)(E) | | |
|--------------|---|-----------|--|--|
| | | | | |

Moderator: HSI Deputy Assistant Director (DAD(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



HSI Best Practice Submission

Investigative Best Practice – JTTF

Best Practice Title: SCR Submission and Maintenance for JTTF-Related Cases

Office/Program: National Security Unit, Counterterrorism Section

POC (name/contact info): CTS Program Manager Responsible for Coverage of AOR

Best Practice Details:

HSI has long struggled to statistically quantify the significant contributions by ICE personnel (including HSI special agents and ERO officers), utilizing our specific authorities in JTTF investigations. Using SCRs is one way to highlights the importance of reporting investigations utilizing ICE resources and equities, while recognizing the sensitivity of working in a classified environment and maintaining the integrity of related investigations. The SCR process provides a platform that contributes to the statistical value of PWPs, awards, individual and agency recognition, and agency funding.

| (b)(7)(E) | | | | |
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HSI Best Practices Page



| SUB- CATEGORY | DEFINITION | DATA VALIDATION |
|------------------|------------|-----------------|
| (b)(7)(E) | | |
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| ocess | | |

- 1. Open a and update with ROIs; (no classified information)
- 2. Ensure a CTS HSI subject report is completed for all identifiable targets;
- 3. Contact an NSU/CTS Program Manager (PM) to review verbiage prior to submitting an SCR to Domestic Operations;
- 4. Copy PM on all Initial/Disruption/Dismantlement SCRs emailed or submitted to Domestic Operations;

Sample SCR Verbiage

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HSI Best Practice Submission

| Investigative Best Practice – JTTF | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Best Practice Title: | Guidance for FBI Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) to ICE | | | |
| Office/Program: | HSI National Security Unit, Counterterrorism Section | | | |
| POC (name/contact info): | CTS Program Manager Responsible for Coverage of AOR | | | |
| Best Practice Details: | | | | |
| | (LHM) is generally a summary of derogatory information created by e context of counterterrorism investigations, (b)(7)(E) | | | |
| (b)(7)(Ē) | | | | |
| (b)(7)(E) | rterrorism Section (CTS) Representatives at ITOS | | | |
| Immigration laws pursuant t | to the INA are heavily nuanced. The use of FBI information for proceedings should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. (b)(7)(E) | | | |
| non-exhaustive list of whom | S, CTS also coordinates internally within ICE. The following is a CTS may coordinate with (b)(7)(E) | | | |
| D)(7)(E) | | | | |



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| There are multiple reasons for CTS coordination internally within ICE and externally with DHS |
| components and FBI. CTS seeks coordination to: |
| (b)(7)(E) |
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| Contents of LHM |
| FBI LHM contents vary because the purpose of each FBI LHM can differ and the availability of |
| |
| inclassified or declassified information is highly divergent. Regardless, certain portions of FBI |
| LHMs can be standardized. |
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| Disalagura of EDLI IIM in Count | | | |
| Disclosure of FBI LHM in Court | | | |
| Please keep in mind that, with appropria | te FBI approval, ICE | may submit a FBI LHN | √as |
| evidence before the Department of Justic | | | |
| | | | |
| submitted as evidence, the FBI LHM wo | ould be provided to an | immigration judge as | well as the |
| alien (often the subject of the LHM) and | | | |
| | | | |
| provided to the court may be the only (o | r most valuable) derog | gatory evidence availat | ole to |
| support the Department of Homeland Se | | | |
| | curity's position in ac | mmstative | |
| proceedings. (b)(7)(E) | | | 911 |
|)(7)(E) | | | |
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| (b)(7)(E) | n most cases, FBI LHMs serve as extremely |
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| valuable evidence in accomplishing ICE's m | ission to successfully detain and remove aliens |
| believed to pose a threat to U.S. national secu | urity. |



HSI Best Practice Submission

| | Investigative Best Practice – JTTF | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| Best Practice Title: | ICE Counterterrorism Attack Response Considerations | | | | |
| Office/Program: | National Security Unit, Counterterrorism Section | | | | |
| POC (name/contact info): | CTS Program Manager Responsible for Coverage of AOR | | | | |
| Best Practice Details: | | | | | |
| arget the people, money, and | bunterterrorism by utilizing its unique investigative authorities to d materials that support terrorist originations. ICE does this through | | | | |
| Counterterrorism Section's (| nationwide and through its National Security Unit (NSU), CTS) partnership at the FBI (b)(7)(E) | | | | |
| (7)(E) | | | | | |
| PRE-Attack Considerations | | | | | |
| each office should dayalan a | contingency plan that could include the following suggestions: | | | | |
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| (b)(7)(E) | | | | | |
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| (b)(7)(E) | | | | | |
| (b)(7)(E) POST-Attack Response | | | | | |
| (b)(7)(E) | | | | | |
| (b)(7)(E) POST-Attack Response | | | | | |
| (b)(7)(E) POST-Attack Response | | | | | |
| (b)(7)(E) POST-Attack Response | | | | | |



| b)(7)(E) | | | | ************* | | |
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| OST-Attack Less | ons Learned | | | | | |
| e following iten | ns were found | to be important | by HSI offic | es involved in | n an attack: | |
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


HSI Best Practice Submission

| Investigative Best Practice – JTTF | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Best Practice Title: | Deconfliction of Information as partners on the JTTF | | | | |
| Office/Program: | HSI National Security Unit, Counterterrorism Section | | | | |
| POC (name/contact info): | CTS Program Manager Responsible for Coverage of AOR | | | | |
| Best Practice Details: | | | | | |
| | on the JTTF's throughout the U.S. are not legally authorized to s or entities outside the JTTF regarding national security interest. | | | | |
| After discussions with DOJ : (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) | and FBI attorneys (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) | | | | |
| b)(5); (b)(7)(E) below, there are other method (7)(E) | Deconfliction falls outside that parameter but as outlined ds outside entities can use. | | | | |
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| (b)(7)(E) |
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| p)(7)(E) |
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| This does not affect normal JTTF working relationships you may have, (i.e. OPLA, ERO, CBP, |
| other HSI programs, etc.) and does not pertain to information sharing you normally do as part of a JTTF investigation (past or present), (b)(7)(E) |
| (b)(7)(E) |
| |
| We encourage you to discuss this with and advise your local partners. Explaining the reasons why we cannot "deconflict" to our partners will also go a long way in their understanding. |
| BACKGROUND |
| ; (b)(7)(E) |
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| MOVING FORWARD - POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS |
|)(5); (b)(7)(E) |
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| (b)(5); (b)(7)(E) | |
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