

5.0 Testing Phase

On April 29, 2019, HTU soft tested the S.T.O.P. Trafficking outreach presentation at Woodbridge University. The target audience was a graduating class of nursing students and university Staff. The outreach presentation was well received and HTU received an invite for future presentations to graduating classes.

On October 2 and 3, 2019, HTU more thoroughly tested the S.T.O.P. Trafficking (Healthcare) presentation in Oneida, NY. The venue location was the Oneida Healthcare Hospital and the target audience consisted of hospital staff and administration. In addition, HTU delivered S.T.O.P. Trafficking at the American Nurses Association (ANA) New York Conference on October 23, 2019 in Clayton, NY. The target audience consisted of 150 nurses from multi disciplines. These two presentations were also well received. Based on this positive interaction, the HTU has been invited to present again at an American Nurses Association (ANA) Conference in Albany, NY on April 30, 2020. HTU anticipates that the PowerPoint presentation created for these venues will be the template for future S.T.O.P. outreach delivered to the field.

6.0 Operational Stage

The HTU proposes implementing the S.T.O.P. Trafficking initiative with four pamphlets: (1) General Public Awareness, (2) Health Care Professionals, (3) Hospitality, and (4) Transportation Industry. In addition, there is a poster that compliments each pamphlet that emphasizes the three R action plan of Recognize, Report and HSI will Respond. Field offices can submit a material request through HTU initially. These resources will also be available in electronic format that can be accessed on the HTU page on (b)(7)(E) under (b)(7)(E) tab. The HTU is ready to deploy this initiative in the beginning of 2020. In order to maximize results when deploying this initiative, it is required that each SAC office use the S.T.O.P. Trafficking portfolio to conduct an average of 40 outreach presentations per fiscal year within their respective area of responsibility, commencing in fiscal year 2020. HTU is working with OPA to develop an official lunge of the initiative. HTU will provide S.T.O.P. Trafficking material to Miami for the upcoming Super Bowl.

7.0 Operational Reporting

It is anticipated that the S.T.O.P. Trafficking outreach initiative will create lead development. To capture data associated with this initiative, field offices will use already established program code (b)(7)(E) in the Investigative Case Management (ICM) system to easily collect, track, and report outreach presentations and leads/cases resulting from those presentations. The HTU will employ real-time statistical measures to monitor and quantify the activities related to this effort. Additionally, Criminal Analysts may use this data to prepare statistical reports and/or intelligence reports as necessary to identify new and emerging trends.

Sections of 2015 Human Smuggling and Trafficking Investigations
Handbook Superseded by Human Trafficking Investigations
Handbook

- 3.5 – Debt Bondage
- 3.11 – Human Trafficking
- 4.4 – Unit Chief, Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit
- 4.6 – Group Supervisors (As it pertains to human trafficking)
- 4.7 – Special Agents (As it pertains to human trafficking)
- Chapter 8 (All)
- Chapter 9 (All)
- 13.7 – Continued Presence
- 13.8 – T Nonimmigrant Status and U Nonimmigrant Status
- 13.9 – Victim Assistance Coordinators and Victim Assistance Specialists
- 14.2 – TECS Program Codes (As it pertains to human trafficking)
- 15.1 – Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit
- 15.2 – Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
- 15.3 – National Human Trafficking Resource Center
- 15.4 – Victim Assistance Program
- 15.5 – Forensic Interview Program
- 15.6 – Office of Refugee Resettlement
- 15.7 – Non-Governmental Organizations
- 15.8 – HSI Office of Intelligence
- 15.9 – Human Trafficking Prosecutions Unit
- Appendix D
- Appendix E

From: HSI EAD Message
Sent: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 18:35:57 +0000
To: #HSI-All Personnel
Subject: S.T.O.P. Trafficking
Attachments: S.T.O.P. Trafficking CONOPS_update - V1 01-17-20.pdf


HSI

HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
Message from the Executive Associate Director



S.T.O.P. Trafficking

The HSI Human Trafficking Unit (HTU) has created a new outreach initiative called the Strategic Targeted Outreach Program (S.T.O.P.) Trafficking. The initiative is designed to address and mitigate human trafficking in a more focused and strategic manner by engaging key industries and raising public awareness to recognize and report trafficking. S.T.O.P. Trafficking will replace the current Trafficking in Persons (TIPs) outreach program and will utilize a multi-faceted approach to combat widespread exploitation seen across multiple sectors of industry.



Each SAC office will be required to conduct at least 40 S.T.O.P. Trafficking

outreach events per fiscal year. To prioritize and maximize this outreach effort, the HTU has utilized a data-driven approach to identify three industries – health care, hospitality, and transportation – that frequently encounter but fail to report potential instances and victims of human trafficking. Offices should initiate S.T.O.P. Trafficking outreach engagements with these sectors first, utilizing the specific outreach pamphlets for these industries created by the HTU. All outreach engagements with the public and private sector should be referred to as a S.T.O.P. Trafficking outreach event. Quarterly reporting and ICM documentation will remain the same. The outreach program code will also remain the same. (b)(7)(E)

Additional details on the S.T.O.P. Trafficking initiative can be found in the attached Concept of Operations, and any requests for presentation materials, including outreach pamphlets, should be sent to (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov. For further information or guidance, please contact HTU Unit Chief (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) via email at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

*Acting Executive Associate Director
Homeland Security Investigations*

Terrorism Acts – Offenses

18 U.S.C. 2332g: Prohibited Activities Concerning Anti- Aircraft Missile Systems

- This statute prohibits the manufacture, sale, transfer, brokering the sale or transfer, and/or export of anti-aircraft missile systems
 - Unless such activity is licensed by the U.S. Government
- This Statute is extremely broad relative to prohibited activity associated with Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems



HVE Classification (1 of 4)

Based on a historical analysis of HVE events by an Interagency Analytic Focus Group formed by the National Counterterrorism Center, the following observable behaviors have been identified as possible indicators of an individual's preparation to engage in violent extremist activity

Group A indicators: are highly diagnostic on their own

Group B indicators: moderately diagnostic, more so when observed with other indicators

Group C indicators: minimally diagnostic on their own and require the presence of other indicators to gain diagnosticity



HVE Classification (2 of 4)

Group A Indicators – Highly diagnostic

- End of life preparations (preparing and disseminating a last will or martyrdom video/statement)
- Seeking religious or political justification for a planned violent act
- Preparing to travel to fight with or support terrorist groups
- Seeking religious or political justification for violent acts
- Communicating intent to engage in violent extremist activity; a threat with justification for action



HVE Classification (3 of 4)

Group B indicators – Moderately diagnostic; more so when observed with other indicators

- Obtaining or attempting to obtain explosive precursors
- Creating or engaging in physical or virtual simulations of an attack/assault
- Expressing acceptance of violence as a necessary means to achieve ideological goals
- Attempting to radicalize others, especially family members and close friends
- Creating or joining an exclusive group that promotes violence to rectify perceived grievances
- Conducting suspicious financial transactions
- Receiving unexplained monies from third parties overseas
- Employing countersurveillance techniques



HVE Classification (4 of 4)

Group C Indicators – Minimally diagnostic on their own; require the presence of other indicators to gain diagnosticity

- Unusual purchase of military-style tactical equipment
- Suspicious, unexplained, or illicit acquisition of weapons and/or ammunition
- Selling personal assets/belongings in an unusual manner
- Engaging in violent ideologically motivated outbursts/fights with family, friends, religious authorities, fellow employees, or students
- Blaming external factors for failure in school, career, or relationships
- Expressing frustration with employment situation
- Displaying an unstable mental state and violent behavior
- Switching from one violent extremist ideology to another



National Security Architecture

Terrorism, as a national security threat, is beyond the scope of any single U.S. Government agency to effectively respond and mitigate the threat. As a result, counterterrorism is an enterprise effort, requiring cooperation and coordination across a host of U.S. Government agencies.

- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – America’s principal human intelligence (HUMINT) agency
- National Security Agency (NSA) – America’s principal signals intelligence (SIGINT) agency
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) – a hybrid law enforcement agency and domestic intelligence agency.
- U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) – a unified combatant command under the Department of Defense
- National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) – responsible for the integration and analysis of all counterterrorism information



TIDE Nominations and Sub-Categories

TIDE Nominations

- Federal agencies nominate individuals for inclusion in TIDE through NCTC, based on intelligence and law enforcement terrorism information.
- This information is updated through continuous intelligence gathering, law enforcement encounters with watch-listed individuals, and other investigative activities.

TIDE Sub-Categories

- TIDE No-Fly: designated by TSA as posing a direct threat to aviation

(b)(7)(E)

- TIDE-Visa Revocation (VRVK): Visa revocations are issued by DOS based on reasons of national security



TIDE Nominations and Sub-Categories

- Federal agencies nominate individuals for inclusion in TIDE through NCTC, based on intelligence and law enforcement terrorism information.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)





- 1) Covers any financial transactions with countries which have been designated by the U.S. State Department as State Sponsors of Terrorism
 - 2) Includes transactions with any official governmental agency or organization of that Terrorist State
 - 3) There are currently four (4) State Sponsors of Terrorism:
 - a) Iran (1984)
 - b) Syria (1979)
 - c) North Korea (2017)
 - d) Sudan (1993)
 - 4) Would cover transactions involving the central or official state banks of these countries
- e. 18 U.S.C. 2332f: Bombings of public places, infrastructure, transportation, or Government facilities
- 1) Act must be accompanied by an intent to:
 - a) Cause death or serious bodily injury, OR
 - b) Cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility, or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss
- f. 18 U.S.C. 2332g: Prohibited Activities Concerning Anti- Aircraft Missile Systems
- 1) This statute prohibits the manufacture, sale, transfer, brokering the sale or transfer, and/or export of anti-aircraft missile systems
 - a) Unless such activity is licensed by the U.S. Government
 - 2) This Statute is extremely broad relative to prohibited activity associated with Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems.
- g. 18 U.S.C. 2332h: Prohibited Activities Concerning Radiation Dispersal Devices
- 1) This statute prohibits the manufacture, sale, transfer, brokering the sale or transfer, and/or export of devices designed to disperse radiation
 - a) Unless such activity is licensed by the U.S. Government
 - 2) This statute is extremely broad relative to prohibited activity associated with devices designed to disperse radiation.



foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.

Because HVEs are acting to further the goals of a FTO, they are considered foreign intelligence threats under the authorities of both the Intelligence Community and domestic public safety entities.

- b. HVEs can be classified as either “inspired” or “enabled” by foreign terrorist organizations (see above discussion concerning directed, enabled, and inspired).
2. Based on a historical analysis of HVE events by an Interagency Analytic Focus Group formed by the National Counterterrorism Center, the following observable behaviors have been identified as possible indicators of an individual’s preparation to engage in violent extremist activity. The indicators are broken down into Group A indicators (which are highly diagnostic on their own), Group B indicators (which are moderately diagnostic, more so when observed with other indicators), and Group C indicators (which are minimally diagnostic on their own and require the presence of other indicators to gain diagnosticity).
 - a. Group A Indicators – Highly diagnostic
 - 1) End of life preparations (preparing and disseminating a last will or martyrdom video/statement
 - 2) Seeking religious or political justification for a planned violent act
 - 3) Preparing to travel to fight with or support terrorist groups
 - 4) Seeking religious or political justification for violent acts
 - 5) Communicating intent to engage in violent extremist activity; a threat with justification for action
 - b. Group B indicators – Moderately diagnostic; more so when observed with other indicators
 - 1) Obtaining or attempting to obtain explosive precursors
 - 2) Creating or engaging in physical or virtual simulations of an attack/assault
 - 3) Expressing acceptance of violence as a necessary means to achieve ideological goals
 - 4) Attempting to radicalize others, especially family members and close friends
 - 5) Creating or joining an exclusive group that promotes violence to rectify perceived grievances
 - 6) Conducting suspicious financial transactions
 - 7) Receiving unexplained monies from third parties overseas
 - 8) Employing countersurveillance techniques
 - 9) Changing behavior or using linguistic expressions that reflect new sense of purpose relating to violent extremist causes
 - 10) Engaging in suspicious travel activity



- 11) Deleting or manipulating social media or other online accounts either to misrepresent location, or hide extremist activities, group membership, or contacts
 - 12) Use of encrypted media applications to engage with unknown individuals overseas
 - 13) Surveilling potential targets
 - 14) Having an acknowledged or implied membership in, or association with violent extremist groups
 - 15) Planning or attempting to travel to a conflict zone
 - 16) Encouraging or advocating violence toward U.S. military officials, law enforcement, or civilians
 - 17) Participating in online sites or groups that promote violent extremism
 - 18) Communicating with, retweeting, or linking to violent extremists online
 - 19) Seeking relationships with convicted or incarcerated terrorists
 - 20) Sending money, electronic equipment, or survivalist gear to suspicious people or groups overseas
 - 21) Expressing desire to travel to conflict zone to fight with or support an FTO or idealizing living among violent jihadists overseas
 - 22) Conducting internet research for target selection, acquiring technical capabilities, planning and logistics
 - 23) Acquiring maps/blueprints in a suspicious manner
 - 24) Seeking information about, or applying for jobs that provide sensitive access
 - 25) Being ostracized, marginalized, or ejected from family or community
- c. Group C Indicators – Minimally diagnostic on their own; require the presence of other indicators to gain diagnosticity
- 1) Unusual purchase of military-style tactical equipment
 - 2) Suspicious, unexplained, or illicit acquisition of weapons and/or ammunition
 - 3) Selling personal assets/belongings in an unusual manner
 - 4) Engaging in violent ideologically motivated outbursts/fights with family, friends, religious authorities, fellow employees, or students
 - 5) Blaming external factors for failure in school, career, or relationships
 - 6) Expressing frustration with employment situation
 - 7) Displaying an unstable mental state and violent behavior
 - 8) Switching from one violent extremist ideology to another
 - 9) Becoming increasingly isolated by breaking contact with family and friends, particularly if believed to be associated with violent extremist doctrine or ideology
 - 10) Eschewing mainstream voices in favor of one or two violent extremist ideologues
 - 11) Promoting violent extremist narratives
 - 12) Dehumanizing people who are not in the identity group



- 13) Replacing family and friends with violent extremist social group
- 14) Utilizing communication security techniques and tradecraft
- 15) Discussing operational security or ways to avoid law enforcement
- 16) Having an active role or increasing participation in a cluster, or in secret cluster meetings; having views reinforced by other cluster members
- 17) Praising past successful or attempted attacks
- 18) Lying to law enforcement officers/obstructing investigations
- 19) Inappropriate use of what an individual perceives as 'doctrine' to manipulate the behavior of parents, co-workers, close friends, and family
- 20) Producing, consuming, or sharing violent extremist videos and/or propaganda

Notes:

THIS ENDS SESSION 1



1) TIDE is the U.S. government's central repository for known or suspected international terrorists (KSTs), and it is maintained by NCTC.

2) (b)(7)(E)

3)

4) TIDE Nominations

a) Federal agencies nominate individuals for inclusion in TIDE through the NCTC, based on intelligence and law enforcement terrorism information.

(1) This information is updated through continuous intelligence gathering, law enforcement encounters with watch-listed individuals, and other investigative activities.

5) TIDE Sub-Categories:

a) TIDE No-Fly: designated by TSA as posing a direct threat to aviation

b) (b)(7)(E)

c)

d) TIDE-Visa Revocation (VRVK): Visa revocations are issued by DOS based on reasons of national security.

b. (b)(7)(E)

3. Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)

a. TSC was created in 2003 as a result of the 9/11 Attacks.

b. TSC is a Multi-Agency Center administered by the FBI (the executive agency).

1) Other participants include members of federal law enforcement and other IC components.



f. Interplay with CTCEU

- 1) SEVP and CTCEU are closely aligned as a large majority of CTCEU targets are present in the U.S. as SEVP participants.
- 2) SEVIS Exploitation Section (SES)
 - a) Section within CTCEU that combats criminal and administrative violations of the SEVP
 - b) SEVP Analysis and Operations Center (SAOC)
 - (1) Monitors SEVP compliance by both foreign students and the participating institution
 - (2) Conducts Data Analysis of SEVIS including visa life cycle analysis for "F" and "M" NIVs
 - (3) HSI Agents assigned to the SAOC serve as liaisons between HSI field components and HSI Headquarters as it pertains to SEVP school fraud investigations.

3) The SES carries out its mission by:

(b)(7)(E)

4) Indicators of SEVP Institutional (School) Criminal Fraud

- a) (b)(7)(E)
- b)
- c)
- d)

Terrorism Acts – Offenses

18 U.S.C. 2332b: Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries

- Prohibited Conduct:
 - Killing, maiming, kidnapping, or assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous weapon of any person within the U.S., OR
 - Creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the U.S. or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the U.S., AND
 - In violation of any State or Federal Law, AND
 - Involves conduct which transcends national boundaries
- Charge is intended to target violent international terrorist activity that occurs within the U.S. where at least a part of that activity also occurs outside the U.S.
- Provides for a broad jurisdictional basis authorizing the U.S. Government the ability to arrest and prosecute offenders
- Statute *also proscribes attempts, conspiracies, and threats* to commit the above prohibited conduct




INTERPOL RED NOTICE EXAMPLE:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED



Manila air pilot who is considered the mastermind of September 11th first entered the US as an F-1 in 1983



He attended Chowan College and North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University



In 2008, he was charged with war crimes and mass murder by the US Military


Why a Student Visa?

An analysis of 60 terrorists who have exploited F/M/J visas revealed

SES and Counterterrorism



CTCEU FY 2019 Lead Results



*4,974 from FY19 imports, 4,697 from previous FYs and/or other programs**265 arrests from FY19 Imports, 1,554 are from other FYs, associates arrested, or field initiated arrests in FY19 (COGNOS)



TTPG Overview

The TTPG serves as a clearing house for the intake, research, assignment, tracking and reporting of nonimmigrant investigations who pose a potential threat to the United States. Identifies and prioritizes foreign national overstays or status violators based on risk/targeting criteria established by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP). Coordinates with the Intelligence Community and other Law Enforcement Partners. Utilizes over 20 DHS and other agency databases in the lead vetting process.

