Report to the President


JUNE 11, 1962

SANITIZED

EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

Edward A. McDermott, Chairman
Solis Horwitz
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FOREWORD

The potential impact of modern war has become so pervasive that virtually the entire structure of the Federal Government as well as that of State and local government and the private sector of the economy would be required to cope with an emergency situation. The decision made by this Administration to undertake a serious civil defense effort has resulted in a great many proposals for Federal activities to improve our readiness in other aspects of nonmilitary defense. The assignment of major emergency preparedness functions to nine departments and agencies in February has given further impetus to agency proposals for strengthening their own programs for emergency continuity. Such programs would be vital to the emergency management and utilization of those segments of the economy falling under their purview.

A review of the various agency proposals received in connection with the fiscal 1963 budget made it clear that continuity of Government plans and policies formulated in the previous Administration needed to be revised and up-dated. Accordingly, by NSAM #127 of February 14, 1962, the Director of OEP was requested to establish a committee including a representative of the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Defense to "re-examine Federal policy with respect to emergency plans and continuity of Government in the event of nuclear attack on the U.S." The basic objective of the examination to be made by the committee was to review and make recommendations on: (a) the present relocation plan for Federal personnel, including the procedures for selecting the necessary emergency personnel, the physical relocation sites and their communications, and the evacuation plans for moving personnel to the relocation centers; (b) the relations between the proposed improvements in the National Military Command System and the plans for continuity of other U. S. Government agencies, with particular emphasis on the plans for insuring the survival of the Presidency; and (c) the present state of planning for continuity on the State and local government level, with consideration to what Federal responsibilities might be appropriate in this area.
In order to assure that the recommendations of the committee would be adequate for the full range of emergency conditions which might confront us, certain situation assumptions were agreed upon for the purposes of the study. These are set forth in Tab A.

In its evaluation of present policies and plans, the committee has been guided by the following objectives and considerations:

1. Some segment of representative civil government must remain in control of government operations; nationwide martial law is not an acceptable planning assumption; martial law as a local proposition is to be avoided wherever possible;

2. Emergency planning must take into account the most challenging situation assumption -- that of no warning of nuclear attack (or that of tactical warning only, which, for planning purposes, is much the same thing); subsequently, one should see what improvements might be realized if strategic warning were available;

3. Federal emergency plans should not substantially interfere with normal peacetime government operations prior to warning of an attack;

4. The performance of essential functions in an emergency will be required, in most cases, with little or no opportunity to reorganize and regroup;

5. Those emergency operations are likely to be most successful that are conducted by people performing the same or similar peacetime operations;

6. Emergency operations that differ significantly from normal operations require frequent rehearsal of personnel and use of necessary equipment;
7. Planning responsibilities for emergency operations in specific functional areas should be assigned to the greatest feasible extent to the regular departments and agencies of government.

The committee's re-examination of plans and policies for continuity of Government has led to the following conclusions:

1. Federal emergency plans need to be revised in the light of present assumptions as to attack warning time and the greater requirement for versatility in such plans.

2. Determinations as to which Federal functions are essential in the immediate postattack period have not been sufficiently austere.

3. Despite marked recent progress in assigning emergency planning responsibilities to the Federal departments and agencies, too many specific program responsibilities remain with the Office of Emergency Planning.

4. The central emergency resource planning function, including planning for resource control and allocation in an emergency, has been insufficiently developed.

5. There is a need to develop a survivable national communications system to serve the needs of the President, the top civilian leaders, and essential diplomatic and intelligence needs, as well as those of the Department of Defense and the military forces, over a spectrum of emergency conditions including but not limited to nuclear attack of varying duration on the United States and the seat of government.

6. The survival of the Presidency could be in doubt during a critical decision-making period if the elected President were lost, since all eligible successors normally live and work in the Washington, D.C. area and could be casualties of the same attack.
7. The issue of whether or not to recommend to the Congress standby emergency legislation is one which should be resolved. The Office of Emergency Planning will present the issue in connection with the formulation of the President's 1963 legislative program.

In the next section, under each of the conclusions cited above, are presented the recommendations of the committee. The main thrust of these recommendations is that the concept of distant relocation sites is not feasible in the face of present attack assumptions; it should, therefore, be abandoned in favor of prelocating at least one top official of each essential agency and appropriate staff outside the agency headquarters at fallout-protected sites closer to Washington but at a distance which would offer greater survivability in event of a nuclear attack. Under this plan, provision would be made for selected permanent operations of the agency at such a location. This arrangement would be supplemented by placing far greater emphasis on delegation of authority to officials at such locations as well as to the regular regional and field officials of the agencies. Special arrangements would need to be made for agencies which do not have field headquarters, principally State and CIA.) In addition, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to the making of contingent delegations of certain critical Presidential authorities to appropriate department and agency heads. A detailed discussion of each of the recommendations follows in the body of the report.

EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE

Edward A. McDermott, Chairman

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PART ONE

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion:

Federal emergency plans need to be revised in the light of present assumptions as to attack warning time and the greater requirement for versatility in such plans.

Recommendations:

1. That within 60 days after approval of the recommendation, the Office of Emergency Planning revise the proposal for the expansion of protected facilities in the relocation arc, guided by the following considerations:

   a. That wherever feasible contingent delegations will be issued to departmental and field officials located outside the Washington area;

   b. That units of personnel performing functions compatible with essential emergency assignments will be prelocated in existing and new structures outside the effective blast and thermal reach of a nuclear detonation on downtown Washington;

   c. That plans contemplate, until requirements are more specifically developed, an estimated 20 to 30 such facilities, with suitable protection, equipment, and communications for a minimal emergency operating force;

   d. That such facilities be located as close to Washington and to each other as protection against fallout radiation and moderate blast overpressures will permit, and so located or equipped as to minimize saturation of common-user services (e.g., fire protection, sewerage);
e. That these facilities encompass such an area as to require the same general magnitude of weapon expenditure for direct attack as would a similar number of separate targets;

2. That priority in the current Office of Emergency Planning—Department of Defense program for eliminating the communications weaknesses cited in Part Two, Section I.E. be given to those facilities likely to be most useful to the type of arc suggested in Recommendation No. 1;

3. That within 45 days after approval of the recommendation, the Office of Emergency Planning, in consultation with the Department of Defense, make a specialized technical review of emergency transportation plans to discover ways in which selected key officials might have greater assurance of being relocated under the present plan within very short times;

4. 

5. That the departments and agencies complete the development of an order of succession of departmental officials and, where appropriate, field officials to departmental authority;

6. That Federal policy be modified to make contributions available for State and local control center construction based upon the same protection criteria as are determined for the arc;
7. That the Office of Civil Defense seek to find more effective incentives to induce State and local governments to provide emergency operating centers for their most essential services.

Conclusion:

Determinations as to which Federal functions are essential in the immediate postattack period have not been sufficiently austere.

Recommendations:

8. That the Office of Emergency Planning, in consultation with the departments and agencies, revise the list of essential functions in a nuclear attack emergency, with due consideration given to the time when the performance of such functions would be essential. OEP should furnish criteria based on an austere approach, and the Director of OEP should exercise the power of decision, subject of course to appeal to the President;

9. That a similar revision then be made of the list of key personnel; in such revision, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning should furnish criteria for selection and review the numbers required.

Conclusion:

Despite marked recent progress in assigning emergency planning responsibilities to the Federal departments and agencies, too many specific program responsibilities remain with the Office of Emergency Planning.

Recommendations:

10. That, in place of the existing Plans C and D-Minus, * the Office of Emergency Planning prepare within 120 days after approval of the recommendation a comprehensive emergency plan for the Executive Branch of the Federal Government in wartime, representing a spectrum of measures from which those appropriate to the situation can be selected;

*See Part Two, Section II.A.
11. That there be a corresponding revision of the Presidential Emergency Action Documents;

12. That the Office of Emergency Planning propose the assignment to other agencies of all emergency functions that can be appropriately planned and performed by them in an emergency;

13. That the Office of Emergency Planning vigorously follow up on emergency assignments to other agencies through an appropriate system of inspection and evaluation to assure that plans are developed in sufficient detail, that essential records and communications are in place, and that personnel are trained in emergency procedures, so that emergency programs can be executed by available officials without regard to their normal assignments and without the expert assistance that is normally available.

Conclusion:

The central emergency resource planning function, including planning for resource control and allocation in an emergency, has been insufficiently developed.

Recommendation:

14. That the Office of Emergency Planning improve its capability to control and allocate resources in an emergency.

Conclusion:

There is a need to develop a survivable national communications system to serve the needs of the President, the top civilian leaders, and essential diplomatic and intelligence needs, as well as those of the Department of Defense and the military forces, over a spectrum of emergency conditions including but not limited to nuclear attack of varying duration on the United States and the seat of government.
Recommendations:

15. That the National Military Command System (NMCS) now being planned should be recognized as and designed to be the basis for such a unified survivable national communications system and should take into account the communications requirements of all Government agencies which are essential during and after a nuclear attack and the communications resources of all Government agencies, the Nation, and the Free World;

16. That within 60 days after approval of the recommendation, a statement of the communications needs of the President and the top civilian leaders be developed by a task group within the Executive Office of the President with participation as appropriate from State, Defense, and other agencies, and that such a statement of communications needs be given to Defense as soon as approved by the President to guide the planning for the survivable national system;

17. That other agencies having communications resources and needs assign qualified staff as needed to work with Defense in planning for the survivable national communications system; and

18. That the Director of Telecommunications Management review on a continuing basis for the President the planning and implementation of the survivable national system to insure that it meets the evolving needs of the President and other national leaders.

Conclusion:

The survival of the Presidency could be in doubt during a critical decision-making period if the elected President were lost, since all eligible successors normally live and work in the Washington, D.C. area and could be casualties of the same attack.
Recommendations:

19. That consideration be given to issuing to the appropriate department and agency heads delegations of authority to take actions under specifically defined conditions and limitations with respect to those civil matters which will require immediate action (see Part Two, Section IV. C.);

20. That steps be taken to correct the defect in the succession statute in its failure to provide for the case in which no eligible successor survives;

21. That all necessary actions be taken to assure that all designated Presidential successors have access to and are firmly tied into the National Military Command System; and

22. That the Office of Emergency Planning and the Department of Defense explore the feasibility of increasing the survivability of the designated Presidential successors by providing that one or more of them, on a rotational basis, shall at all times be outside the Washington target area at one of the prelocation sites or a mobile command post.

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23. That the Office of Emergency Planning submit 60 days after approval of the recommendations a report of progress in carrying them out.

Conclusion:

The issue of whether or not to recommend to the Congress standby emergency legislation is one which should be resolved. The Office of Emergency Planning will present the issue in connection with the formulation of the President's 1963 legislative program.
PART TWO

I. REVIEW OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS FOR RELOCATION AND SUPPORTING MEASURES

In reviewing Federal emergency plans, the committee has limited its attention to those of the Executive Branch. No attempt has been made to cover plans for the emergency operations of the legislative and judicial branches. The Director, Office of Emergency Planning, has advised the responsible judicial and legislative staff officials of the changing factors which have guided the committee in its review.

The present emergency plans for the Executive Branch reflect, in varying degrees of development, the policy guidance summarized in Tab B.
B. Determination of Essential Functions

Before precise determinations can be made as to numbers and roles of emergency operations sites, key officials, emergency staffing, and other issues, a clear understanding is needed of the emergency role of government and, specifically, of the essential functions to be performed by Federal agencies.

This has been attempted before with some success but much remains to be done to pinpoint just what the Federal Government could and should do in a nuclear attack emergency. Each agency's job can best be delineated by the agency itself, given adequate guidelines beforehand and provided an objective evaluation is made afterward. These tasks of guidance and review in determining essential functions are properly the responsibility of OEP.

The committee has provided for this task some broad guidance which will permit a more austere determination of essential functions. Austerity becomes increasingly important as nuclear weaponry and delivery capabilities improve and as estimates of the postattack environment tend to limit more and more what can be done.

As used in this report, "essential functions" are those measures of the Federal Government which must be performed at particular times and places during a war-caused general emergency in order to assure the survival and recovery of the Nation, its people, and its resources.
There are a few broad objectives that must be pursued even in a period following nuclear attack:

- Maintenance of public morale and will;
- Conduct of military operations;
- Conduct of foreign relations essential to the Nation's security;
- Maintenance of internal security and basic liberties;
- Maintenance of an environment in which our political, social, and economic systems can make their optimum contributions to the national security.

There is urgent need for an up-to-date identification of essential functions. The Office of Emergency Planning, in carrying out such a project, should be guided by the following:

1. A truly austere approach should be followed;

2. Only functions which contribute importantly to the above objectives should be included;

3. The focus for identification of essentiality in terms of time should be on the emergency period of nuclear exchange and the subsequent period of hostilities. The functions thus identified should then be related to supporting actions during the periods of preparation to meet attack and of recovery from it.

An example of the application of this approach in identifying functions and supporting activities is offered in the case of control, allocation, and rationing of consumer supplies.

The objective of this group of functions is to (1) conserve essential consumer resources on a full austerity basis until the national situation can be evaluated; (2) insure the meeting of emergency operational needs, (i.e., civil defense, military, health and sanitation operations, etc.); (3) provide for minimum sustaining needs of the civilian population and institutions providing essential civilian services, (i.e., public utilities, food processing plants, distribution services, etc.); and (4) prevent hoarding and insure equity in availability of consumer goods and services.
## EMERGENCY PERIOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preattack</th>
<th>Nuclear Exchange</th>
<th>Continuation of Hostilities</th>
<th>Post-Hostilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop plans, procedures, and understandings among all Federal elements and suppliers and distributors of consumer supplies to permit effective postattack consumer rationing.</td>
<td>(The following would be begun during the nuclear exchange to the extent possible.) Immediately decentralize administration of program; authorize State and local direct control actions. Issue freeze and release orders, anti-hoarding and requisition orders, conservation and limitation orders. Determine the amounts and kinds of things to be rationed and who is to receive allocations.</td>
<td>Phase into national direct controls. Develop a national system, refine the system and extend control back through the distribution chain to the producers, Institute legal enforcement procedures.</td>
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### C. Selection of Key Personnel

Under present procedures, once there has been acceptance of the determination of essential functions, the heads of the various departments and agencies determine how many and which employees are required to carry them out, subject only to negotiation on the availability of space for them in relocation facilities.

Little guidance has been given for selection. Views on the duration and austerity of essential operations in a protected facility differ markedly.

A continuing issue concerns protection for the families of personnel given relocation assignments. One position argues against more provision for the families of key government employees than for those of other individuals who have important
emergency duties. The other position maintains that if a powerful and basic human factor such as personal concern for the safety of immediate families is overlooked, widespread defections may be anticipated among key personnel until they have seen to the safety of their immediate families. The policy now in effect contemplates no special Federal provision for protection of such families; nevertheless, certain agencies' budget submissions for protected facilities contemplated sufficient space for family members.

D. Transportation Plans

The committee considers even this new goal unrealistic. There can be no assurance of any attack warning at all. Any tactical warning is unlikely to exceed 15 minutes. If evacuation of key officials were to be ordered on the basis of strategic warning, a shorter time requirement would be almost certainly
unnecessary. Indeed, if it were intended that the move be taken without attracting undue notice, the JEEP plan should probably not be employed.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve a "high-confidence" solution of the transportation problem posed by a plan relying mainly on relocation. This, and other aspects of the problem, will be further discussed below.
Major reliance can no longer be placed on relocation, since there is a declining prospect of sufficient warning. Prelocation appears more suitable. This means that personnel working in suitably protected sites would carry out regular, day-to-day Federal operations as well as essential functions in an emergency. Authority to act would need to be predelegated, conditional on the unavailability of the normally authorized officials at the critical time. To the greatest extent feasible, the normal day-to-day functions of such prelocated personnel should be similar to the emergency functions to be performed. Furthermore, there should be a program of drills and exercises in the emergency operations themselves.

As long as there is a possibility, however, that the regularly authorized officials can relocate, the relocation concept should not be abandoned. While total reliance should not be placed upon the availability of warning, it is equally important that plans be sufficiently flexible to take full advantage of any warning that may be available. It would therefore be advisable for the prelocated personnel to be in protected sites within a reasonable distance from Washington to facilitate relocation there by other personnel should the opportunity arise.

With respect to the issue of special provision for the families of relocated personnel, no fundamental change is recommended in the present policy but it is suggested that more concrete and specific guidance be furnished employees to gain their acceptance of the policy. The military generally and a few civilian agencies have indoctrinated their personnel in the importance to the country of the jobs they have to do in an emergency and the necessity for the employees to provide their families in advance with means and courses of independent survival action. They do not anticipate significant numbers of defections. Other agencies should similarly indoctrinate their employees to prepare their families for independent survival actions. Such indoctrination should be closely tied in to local plans for fallout shelters in the Washington area.
There remains the question of the degree of protection for such facilities. It must be accepted that an enemy, with the expenditure of a small number of nuclear weapons, can have a high degree of confidence in his ability to destroy any target he chooses. The assignment of very few high-yield, accurate missiles to a single target would result in a high probability of its destruction if the blast resistance were no greater than that provided at the Classified Location (50 p.s.i.). Therefore, if the weapons cost were sufficiently low to make the complex of targets attractive, blast protection in the degree contemplated would not be adequate. If, on the other hand, the weapons cost were high enough to make the complex unattractive, blast protection would not be needed.

Even a very considerable effort to improve the arc will still leave many uncertainties and problems. Relocation within the available tactical warning time is highly improbable for large numbers of people. In a period of increasing tension such as might constitute strategic warning, the President might well hesitate to order government leaders, particularly Cabinet officers, to relocation sites some distance away. Such would be an abnormal procedure, likely to attract public notice and occasion public alarm.

A basic dilemma arises from the particular desirability of continuity of top leadership, and the unlikelihood that the leadership would disperse on anything other than unequivocal warning of attack (i.e., tactical warning). Such warning of a missile attack would at best be so brief as to leave the issue of the survival of the top leadership in grave doubt. An ideal solution would be one in which everyday operations of entire departments were so separated physically that a single weapon could not eliminate more than one governmental leader, but such separation would gravely hamper normal governmental business.
While not meeting this ideal criterion, an interesting and promising approach which should be carefully investigated is found in the existing and future facilities in the Washington Metropolitan area. If certain relatively self-contained functions were performed just far enough apart to constitute separate targets, but close enough together to facilitate normal government business, many advantages would accrue. The protected facilities used daily for normal operations would require no special transportation plans and would be occupied regularly by employees capable of carrying on essential emergency operations.

It would then be possible to react flexibly to different degrees of mounting tension. A "surprise drill" might be called at one level of tension. At another, Assistant Secretaries or other Presidential appointees with contingent delegations of authority might be quietly directed to oversee operations at the existing and proposed sites. At still another level, one or more eligible successors to the Presidency might be quietly sent to different sites, together with small teams of essential staff support. Finally, on tactical warning, the chances of successful relocation of the top departmental leadership over the shorter distances involved would be improved somewhat. However, honest appraisal dictates the conclusion that the prospect of successful relocation on tactical warning would still not be encouraging.

While such an arrangement would present many new problems, it is sufficiently interesting to warrant detailed surveys of Federal lands and other sites closer to Washington than previous surveys have considered. There should also be consideration of the many other aspects of feasibility of such a system.

Continuity of Government is essential to national survival in the event of nuclear attack. Plans designed to insure it should include a number of alternative positions, in case the preferred measures fail. In addition to prelocation and relocation, such plans should also include provision for predelegation of authority for central operations to Federal officials outside the Washington area.
In developing such a flexible system, it should be recognized that the vital objective is to preserve the capability to perform essential government functions, not to assure the survival of particular individuals. Each agency's essential operations should be carefully examined and appropriate plans developed. Certain agencies would clearly be required to have top-level policy advice immediately available to the President in a nuclear attack emergency; others would not. Some agencies, such as Health, Education, and Welfare and Commerce, have substantially developed regional organizations within the U. S. to whose leadership contingent delegations could be made; others, such as State, Defense, and CIA, do not. Agency plans should be individually tailored to their requirements and to take advantage of their facilities.

In summary, emergency planning should be broadened to take greater advantage of prelocation and contingent delegation, in addition to relocation. In the event of nuclear attack, the wider the range within which improvisation is possible the better.

G. Recommendations

It is recommended:

1. That within 60 days after approval of the recommendation, the Office of Emergency Planning revise the proposal for the expansion of protected facilities in the relocation area, guided by the following considerations:

   a. That wherever feasible contingent delegations will be issued to departmental and field officials located outside the Washington area;

   b. That units of personnel performing functions compatible with essential emergency assignments will be prelocated in existing and new structures outside the effective blast and thermal reach of a nuclear detonation on downtown Washington;
2. That priority in the current Office of Emergency Planning-Department of Defense program for eliminating the communications weaknesses cited in Part Two, Section I.E, be given to those facilities likely to be most useful to the type of arc suggested in Recommendation No. 1;

3. That within 45 days after approval of the recommendation the Office of Emergency Planning, in consultation with the Department of Defense, make a specialized technical review of emergency transportation plans to discover ways in which selected key officials might have greater assurance of being relocated under the present plan within very short times;

4. That the departments and agencies complete the development of an order of succession of departmental officials and, where appropriate, field officials to departmental authority;
5. That the Office of Emergency Planning, in consultation with the departments and agencies, revise the list of essential functions in a nuclear attack emergency, with due consideration given to the time when the performance of such functions would be essential. OEP should furnish criteria based on an austere approach, and the Director of OEP should exercise the power of decision, subject of course to appeal to the President, and

6. That a similar revision then be made of the list of key personnel, in such revision, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning should furnish criteria for selection and review the numbers required.
II. EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION

A. Discussion

In an emergency precipitated by nuclear attack on this country, many extraordinary emergency powers would be exercised by the Federal Government. Some existing activities would be suspended, others would be carried on in intensified form, and new activities would be initiated -- activities which the Federal Government now has no statutory authority or requirement to perform.

Planning for this and lesser emergencies is coordinated by the Office of Emergency Planning. Responsibility for planning the several individual functions within the overall framework has been or is proposed to be assigned to appropriate departments and agencies by Executive order.

There are indications that the total effort has lacked the necessary aggressive coordination and Executive Office staff involvement. There have been sporadic reviews and reports by OEP on the mechanics of readiness and OEP is now embarked on a more substantive inventory of emergency preparedness. There is lacking, however, adequate follow-up appraisal of preparedness progress such as is furnished by the Inspector-General in the military.

Perhaps the most far-reaching and significant emergency functions to be brought into full-fledged activity are those relating to the control and allocation of resources and the stabilization of the economy. In an emergency many essential activities must be carried on simultaneously by a number of organizations whose programs must be supported by drawing upon the available resources of the country. At the same time, it is of vital importance to extract the greatest possible benefit from the use of the Nation's limited surviving resources. Without some mechanism for guiding and coordinating the allocation of resources in the best national interest, the many competing claims engendered by essential program activities would inevitably result in conflicts and confusion; seriously inhibit the national survival and recovery effort, and lead to extensive waste of essential resources at a time when the Nation can least afford it.
Provision for such a central resources programming and adjudicating role therefore is an essential part of emergency planning.

Central guidance for planning in these areas has contemplated that the goal would be to have extraordinary emergency powers exercised only by emergency wartime agencies. It has been taken for granted, however, that in a sudden nuclear attack emergency initial reliance would have to be placed on the built-in capabilities of those regular departments and agencies which have responsibility for planning for the organization and administration of the several emergency functions.

The current organizational concept contemplates that in the event of sudden nuclear attack on this country the resource functions would be performed by existing agencies, with the exception of the agency for economic stabilization, an emergency agency to be established as soon as possible following attack. The new functions of public information, economic warfare, psychological warfare, and censorship are not directly involved in resource management and they too are under present concepts to be performed by emergency agencies activated postattack.

All of the emergency agencies were to be headed by "emergency designees," as were such of the emergency functions of regular departments and agencies as might be set up subsequently in independent emergency agencies. Most of these designees were chosen from outside of government and their designation was a secret one. There is now only one such designation in force, that for Censorship, the other emergency designees having late in 1961 either resigned or otherwise had their services terminated.

Staffing of emergency functions, whether in regular or emergency agencies, was to be augmented by "Executive Reservists." These are selected individuals from outside of government who have accepted agency assignments in the event of emergency and have taken periodic training in their assignments.
One feature of the past planning for emergency organization that gives the committee concern is the reliance on OEP as the nucleus of organizations for so many emergency functions. At present, it has direct responsibility for planning for the organization, staffing, and operation of the Office of Defense Resources and the agencies to carry out the functions of public information, psychological warfare, censorship, economic stabilization, and telecommunications. (The status of the assignment for economic warfare is now under consideration, and it too may be an OEP responsibility.) The committee considers this aggregate of assignments inappropriate and an excessive assignment for a small staff agency. A determined effort should be made to find suitable agencies to assume responsibility for most of these functions. OEP should provide the nucleus only for emergency telecommunications management and for the initial resource control and allocation function.

There are two Federal emergency plans which have served as the focal point for much of the committee's discussion of emergency organization: Plans C and D-Minus.*

Plan C was developed to meet an emergency situation calling for wartime mobilization short of nuclear attack on this country. The assumed situation would permit time for Congressional consideration and action. It was for this environment that the organization concept discussed above was primarily developed.

*There is also the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, which forms the basis for many of the detailed departmental, regional, and State and local plans. This is currently under review by OEP, OCD, and affected departments, and has not been reviewed in detail by the committee. It would, of course, be made consistent with basic Federal planning.
Both plans are therefore based on the same concept, the chief difference being the source of authority to invoke them. In the case of Plan C, the actions would be taken under statutory authority; in the case of Plan D-Minus, under the emergency powers of the President, with legislative approval anticipated as soon as possible.

An important distinction was made, however, in the case of Plan D-Minus. The array of emergency agencies exercising emergency powers would be a goal to be attained when feasible; the initial actions would have to be taken by the agencies with planning responsibilities for the several emergency functions involved.

The question of legal authority to perform emergency functions for which there is no statutory basis has arisen in the committee's discussions. In the event of nuclear attack on this country, the President's emergency powers are sufficiently broad to take such action as is necessary for the preservation of the Nation. When the Congress could function, it would be asked, in effect, to ratify such action by a grant of statutory authority. It would, of course, facilitate planning if "standby" authority were approved in advance, to be exercised only under carefully defined emergency conditions, provided the use of such authority were not too narrowly circumscribed. From a legal standpoint, the President's authority to act in an emergency could be limited by the terms of the standby legislation, whereas he might exercise much broader authority in an emergency if the Congress had not specifically provided emergency executive powers for such a situation. This is a question which is the subject of a separate inquiry by OEP, in conjunction with other agencies. Particular attention should be given to the practical political possibilities of achieving adequate provisions.

B. Recommendations

It is recommended:

1. That, in place of the existing Plans C and D-Minus, the Office of Emergency Planning prepare within 120 days after approval of the recommendation
a comprehensive emergency plan for the Executive Branch of the Federal Government in wartime, representing a spectrum of measures from which those appropriate to the situation can be selected;

2. That there be a corresponding revision of the Presidential Emergency Action Documents;

3. That the Office of Emergency Planning propose the assignment to other agencies of all emergency functions that can be appropriately planned and performed by them in an emergency;

4. That the Office of Emergency Planning improve its capability to control and allocate resources in an emergency; and

5. That the Office of Emergency Planning vigorously follow up on emergency assignments to other agencies through an appropriate system of inspection and evaluation to assure that plans are developed in sufficient detail, that essential records and communications are in place, and that personnel are trained in emergency procedures, so that emergency programs can be executed by available officials without regard to their normal assignments and without the expert assistance that is normally available.
III. THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND SYSTEM

A. Discussion

The committee has been briefed on and has inspected certain important features of the National Military Command System. The committee's concern with the system has been limited to its relation to plans for the continuity of civil government and for the survival and effective functioning of the Presidency during and after nuclear attack.

In peacetime, the Defense communications system, including leased commercial facilities, provides about 90% of the Federal Government's communications capability. Under conditions of nuclear attack on the U.S. there would be virtually complete reliance on the Defense system, the only system which now has or plans any significant degree of survivability to nuclear attack.

To date a number of important steps have been taken or planned to improve the survivability of the military command and communications system. These include hardened command posts, airborne and seaborne mobile command posts, airborne radio relays, sounding emergency rockets, etc. However, most of the steps to date have represented separate and individual actions by the military departments to insure communications with specific weapons and military commands (e.g., SAC).

The Secretary of Defense has recently directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to set long term objectives and plan an integrated, survivable National Military Command System. Such a system operated under the supervision of DCA would utilize to the best advantage the communications resources of the services, other government agencies, and private companies and would employ varying combinations of hardness, mobility, and circuit redundancy, as well as new means of communication using satellites and other space signal reflectors. The development and investment costs of such a system will of course be formidable.
Because of the high costs of a survivable system and the quality of staff required to plan, develop, and operate such a system, there should be only one national survivable communications system. For this reason it is extremely important that the military system be responsive to the needs of the President, not only in his role as Commander in Chief, but also in his broader role, for example, as leader of the Free World Alliance and leader of a national effort to regenerate after attack. The survivable military system must also be planned so as to incorporate the essential emergency needs of other national leaders and essential diplomatic and intelligence needs under conditions of nuclear attack.

Actions required at this time appear to be: (1) a clear recognition of the need for a survivable national communications system using the military system as a basis and (2) a detailed assessment of the communications requirements of the President and other civilian leaders and agencies which could be used to guide Defense planners in evolving such a system. Planning for the national system by Defense should be undertaken in conjunction with other agencies and should be continuously reviewed by the Director of Telecommunications Management acting for the President.

B. Recommendations

It is recommended:

1. That the National Military Command System (NMCS) now being planned should be recognized as and designed to be the basis for such a unified survivable national communications system and should take into account the communications requirements of all Government agencies which are essential during and after a nuclear attack and the communications resources of all Government agencies, the Nation, and the Free World;
2. That within 60 days after approval of the recommendation, a statement of the communications needs of the President and the top civilian leaders be developed by a task group within the Executive Office of the President with participation as appropriate from State, Defense, and other agencies, and that such a statement of communications needs be given to Defense as soon as approved by the President to guide the planning for the survivable national system.

3. That other agencies having communications resources and needs assign qualified staff as needed to work with Defense in planning for the survivable national communications system.

4. That the Director of Telecommunications Management review on a continuing basis for the President the planning and implementation of the survivable national system to insure that it meets the evolving needs of the President and other national leaders.
IV. SURVIVAL OF THE PRESIDENCY

Effective national emergency preparedness planning under our Constitutional Federal System of Government is dependent in large measure on survival of the Presidency as the focal point of national leadership and the repository of our highest order of political and executive authority. Such planning must take into consideration not only problems of enhancing the capability of the elected incumbent of the office to survive enemy action against this country while effectively directing the national effort to withstand the attack and to prevail over the enemy, it must also provide positive safeguards against the failure of Presidential authority either in part or in whole during or following hostile action. The committee, therefore, has approached this part of its assignment with a clear recognition of the overriding importance of emergency planning for the survival of the Presidency as the foundation on which all national emergency preparedness planning must rest if these plans are to be effective under all conditions of national stress.

The most positive safeguard against the failure of Presidential authority in a national emergency situation is the survival and effective functioning of the elected incumbent of the office under all conditions of hostile action. Accordingly, the committee places primary emphasis on planning for the survival of the elected President to ensure his continuing leadership of the Nation. In recognition, however, of the possibility of failure in this effort even with the best of such planning, secondary consideration is given to legal succession to the office itself.

A. The Elected President

Planning for the survival and effective functioning of the elected President must be founded on taking such measures for his protection and to ensure his continuing leadership as hold the most promise of success in the face of the most massive attack assumptions. The privileged briefing given the committee on the present and developing plans to meet this requirement gave evidence that the White House Office Emergency Staff is fully cognizant of the importance to the national emergency preparedness planning effort of the survival of the elected President. It is apparent that no opportunities will be overlooked to incorporate improvements in the provisions as technical advancements make them possible.
B. Succession to the Presidency

Under conditions of general nuclear warfare we cannot safely assume that even the maximum precautionary measures taken to ensure the survival of the incumbent President will be successful. It is essential to provide a chain of succession to the Presidency which will have optimum survivability in a period of maximum crisis.

The Constitution names only the immediate successor to the Presidency -- the Vice President. It leaves to the Congress the responsibility of providing by law for succession to the office in the case of the death, absence, or inability of the Vice President. The Congress, from time to time, has adopted a variety of statutory succession plans. The present law provides the following order of succession: The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Secretaries or heads of certain executive departments in the order that their departments were established -- State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Post Office, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. Since the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was created after the enactment of the succession law, the Secretary of that department is not included in the line of succession.

There is a defect in the existing succession statute. There is no provision for the selection of a President in the event that none of the eligible successors survives. The Constitution requires that the order of succession be determined by law. If there is no Presidential successor living, then Congress at the time of the emergency could not enact the necessary law to provide for the succession. This defect can be corrected only by legislative action.

Under the Constitution and existing legislation there are in all 12 designated successors to the Presidency. Each of them is located in Washington and works within the target area centering on the White House. The same disastrous attack which could affect the availability of the incumbent President could also affect their availability. Actions should be taken to give maximum assurance that one or more of the designated successors will survive a nuclear attack.
Survivability of the succession to the Presidency can be considerably enhanced by keeping at all times at least one of the designated successors out of the Washington target area. While as a general rule one or more of the designated successors is usually away from the seat of the government, there is no assurance that on any particular day all of the successors will not be within the target area. It would be possible to obtain the needed assurance by requiring one or more of the successors to be away from Washington on a rotational basis at all times. The committee has had presented an interesting proposal that, on a rotational basis, one or two of the designated successors be stationed at, on, or with the mobile command posts or at the prelocation sites. There may be considerable merit in the proposal and it should be fully explored.

Since survivability of the Presidency involves not only the physical survival of the successors but also their ability to function, it is of the utmost importance that all potential Presidential successors be tied into the National Military Command System. The recent assumption by the Defense Communications Agency of operational direction over the Interagency Communications System and its assumption in the near future of operational responsibility for White House communications should correct many of the deficiencies now existing. Continuous effort is required to improve and further strengthen the System.

C. Delegation of Authority

We must forthrightly recognize that while we can take measures to improve the chances of survival of one or more of the successors, there are no conceivable methods of guaranteeing survivability. None may survive, and if some do they may be incapacitated or otherwise unable to carry on the Presidential function. Important decisions will have to be made almost immediately long before Congress can provide for a successor President. There will be, however, in the contingency posited, no one with authority to make the decisions which in the absence of delegation from the President only the President can make.
In the nonmilitary areas of government, there are a number of actions which at the present time only the President can take (e.g., proclamation of a national and civil defense emergency, authorizing the custody or control of alien enemies in the United States). Although many matters are noncritical and can be deferred until a new President is provided for by the Congress, some do require early and immediate action. Against the possibility that none of the designated successors may survive, consideration should be given to the feasibility and legality of delegating to the appropriate departmental and agency heads authority to take these critically necessary actions under specifically defined conditions and limitations.

The question of the extent and nature of the delegation of the President's authority for military matters is outside the scope of our responsibility. It is an integral part of the command problem, which is the subject of another Presidential study.

D. Recommendations

It is recommended:

1. That consideration be given to issuing to the appropriate department and agency heads delegations of authority to take actions under specifically defined conditions and limitations with respect to those civil matters which will require immediate action;

2. That steps be taken to correct the defect in the succession statute in its failure to provide for the case in which no eligible successor survives;

3. That all necessary actions be taken to assure that all designated Presidential successors have access to and are firmly tied into the National Military Command System; and
4. That the Office of Emergency Planning and the Department of Defense explore the feasibility of increasing the survivability of the designated Presidential successors by providing that one or more of them, on a rotational basis, shall at all times be outside the Washington target area at one of the pre-location sites or a mobile command post.
V. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT IN THE FIELD

A. Federal Regional Activities

The field establishment of the Federal Government has important contributions to make to the continuity of both Federal authority and operations. In differing degrees, regional and field offices offer resources in depth for the continuity of departmental authority in the event that prelocation and relocation plans fail.

The effective designation of field offices to serve as alternative departmental headquarters requires advance preparation in the form of (a) prelocation of emergency documents, manuals, and plans, (b) provision in advance of authority to act under defined circumstances, (c) protected operating sites, and (d) regular drills and exercises in emergency operations. Such planning in depth can add assurance of at least the minimal survival of authority.

Apart from their potential utility in preserving national authority, the regional and field offices of Federal departments and agencies represent a most important resource for the operation of Federal emergency activities on a decentralized basis. It is essential, however, that the several field emergency activities -- both planning and operations -- be coordinated at the field level. This responsibility is assigned to the regional offices of the Office of Emergency Planning, except for the operating responsibility of the civil defense program. OEP has a more detailed role in coordinating the resource management planning and preparational activities at the field level. In case of nuclear attack, there would be an immediate requirement to assemble a minimal staff drawn from each resource agency. This staff would be required to establish the data base in the field for such decentralized operations of OEP (if such be the central programming agency) as are deemed appropriate.

Since most if not all of the Federal field offices also have emergency functions to support civil defense activities, functions which would require the bulk of Federal field personnel in the immediate postattack period, it is essential that specific emergency assignments be worked out in advance by OEP, in consultation with OCD and the individual departments and agencies.
Immediately after attack, the bulk of the field operations would be directed toward survival activities, and it is fitting that the regional offices of OCD should coordinate such activities. Advance planning should assume such an arrangement.

As the immediate civil defense operations decreased, however, the requirement of and capability for resource control and allocation would grow, so there should be substantial planning for the phasing-out of the OCD coordinating role and the phasing-in of OEP coordination of field operations and activities for rehabilitation and recovery.

To permit regional civil defense coordination of Federal emergency operations in support of State and local civil defense agencies, and the subsequent coordination of the operations of these same agencies in emergency management of resources, it is necessary that there be protected regional centers where essential field functions could be performed through even a period of attack. As was indicated in the case of the Federal arc, however, emphasis should be placed on location designed to avoid offering lucrative targets and on fallout protection with the moderate blast protection inexpensively achieved in good fallout shelter construction. As noted above, if such installations were targeted, the degree of blast protection commonly discussed for regional underground centers would probably not be adequate. If they were not targeted, it would not be necessary.

In advance of the phasing-out of survival operations, the need for operating in protected facilities would end. In the period when major attention would be given to problems of emergency resource management, other surviving facilities should be used, where adequate communications exist.

B. Recommendation

It is recommended:

That plans proceed for the seven projected regional protected centers; but that they be designed with the same protection criteria as determined for the arc and, if feasible, be located close to Federal regional centers but far enough away to constitute separate targets.
C. State and Local Government

If our constitutional Federal system of government is to be preserved, we need to place increasing emphasis on achieving greater assurance of the continuity of State and local governmental authority and operations in a nuclear attack emergency. This objective is not merely a State and local one -- it is quite properly a Federal one.

This is recognized in Executive Order 10952, which assigns to OEP responsibility to "develop plans, conduct programs, and coordinate preparations for the continuity of State and local government's in the event of attack, which plans, programs and preparations shall be designed to assure the continued effective functioning of civilian political authority under any emergency condition."

In the same order, the Secretary of Defense is charged with "protection and emergency operational capability of State and local government agencies in keeping with plans for the continuity of Government."

Federal Government programs for State and local continuity, therefore, fall into two major categories. The first is the stimulation and support of State and local action to provide for the legal continuity of executive, legislative, and judicial functions. This program is the responsibility of OEP. It includes a model constitutional amendment (already adopted by 28 States) authorizing legislation to provide for lines of succession and such other measures as may be necessary to insure the postattack continuance of civil government. Six model acts have also been developed covering executive, legislative, and judicial succession; relocation of government; and records preservation and management. The provisions of these acts have been adopted by anywhere from 21 to 30 States except in the cases of judicial succession (15 States) and records preservation and management (7 States).
The second is the matching of State and local funds for the construction of State and local control centers, now the responsibility of DOD.

Under the attack assumptions used in this study, it is obvious that certain functions of extremely high priority, such as the protection of life and property and the maintenance of law and order, would need to be carried out in many areas by State and local authorities. Such functions are traditionally State and local under our system of government. In the event of an emergency, additional functions not traditionally considered those of State and local governments may devolve upon them. They may be required to perform such functions or at least to provide substantial assistance to Federal agencies. These functions may be of almost equal priority to the traditional State and local functions. They could include price, wage, and monetary control; consumer rationing; and limited allocation of resources for production, repair, and reconstruction. The preservation of State and local government is, therefore, of great importance to the national security.

Legislative action required to advance program preparations seems to be well conceived and making satisfactory progress at the State level. However, action at the local level lags far behind.

The program for emergency control centers has not made great progress. It has been suggested that the 50% Federal contribution should be raised to as much as 90%, as in the case of the interstate highway system. It would appear, however, that the principal limitation on the progress of this program is the unwillingness of the State and local governments to participate. While some increase in the Federal contribution might be justified, it is by no means certain that the existing apathy can be overcome by larger Federal contributions. In fact, it is questionable whether full value would be received from the program without a financial burden being placed on the State and local governments sufficient to assure their full understanding and interest.

D. Recommendations

It is recommended:
1. That Federal policy be modified to make contributions available for State and local control center construction based upon the same protection criteria as are determined for the arc; and

2. That the Office of Civil Defense seek to find more effective incentives to induce State and local governments to provide emergency operating centers for their most essential services.
SITUATION ASSUMPTIONS

The examinations called for in NSAM No. 127 require agreement on certain assumptions as to the situation that would surround and result from nuclear attack on the United States.

We have not assumed a strategy for enemy attack on the U.S. Rather we have set forth ranges of capabilities and, where pertinent, have arrived at assumptions of probability within those ranges. In our examination of plans, we have assumed that they should be valid and workable for approximately 5 years into the future, as far as we can judge at this time.

A. Time of Attack

We assume an enemy capability to deliver a nuclear attack on this country at a time of day or night or a season of the year of his own choosing.

B. Weapons

We have not attempted to be precise in assumptions with respect to nuclear weapons available to an enemy. Within the ranges of pertinent national intelligence estimates, we assume that he could employ in an attack on the U.S., within the time frame involved, up to a thousand weapons of yields varying up to 100 megatons, for a total delivered attack weight of several thousand megatons.

C. Delivery

We assume the availability to an enemy of a choice of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. We assume that, within the time frame involved, intercontinental ballistic missiles will represent an increasing part of the delivery threat. Manned bombers will continue to have attractive features for many missions. Sea-launched ballistic missiles will represent a growing threat. We assume a capability for the effective clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons which is limited by risks of detection.

We assume further that the CEP for ICBM's will be approximately 1 nautical mile within the time frame involved and that the CEP for manned bombers will be not more than 1/2 n.m.
D. Warning

We assume that warning time may range from several days to no warning at all. Tactical warning of initial ICBM attack, for continuity of government purposes, if available, is unlikely to exceed 15 minutes. Strategic warning so unequivocal as to warrant that the full range of civil protective measures be instituted we regard as unlikely.

E. Targets

We assume an enemy capability to destroy any target in the U.S. if he wishes to expend sufficient weapons on it. We do not assume a capability to destroy all rewarding targets, and we assume that in the making of choices an enemy would place high priority on the requirement of allocating weapons to fixed retaliatory bases. We therefore assume that the target attractiveness of the continuity-of-government complex would tend to vary inversely with the number of installations involved in it.

We recognize the possibility, however, that there could be other types of attack (e.g., Nth countries, unauthorized, accidental) which do not conform to these target assumptions, but we consider these less likely.

F. Effects

We assume that the effects of large-scale nuclear attack on the U.S. would create substantial physical destruction. While the percentage of the land area affected by blast and fire would likely be small, there would be widespread radiological contamination (of the order of perhaps three-fourths of the land area subject to hazardous radiation). Depending on the targets chosen, this could result in substantial damage to and destruction of communication, transportation, production, and community facilities. In any case, there would result an environment in which substantial constructive activity above ground would be denied or severely limited by radiological contamination for periods ranging from a few days to several weeks after attack in the affected areas.
Tab A

We assume that the combined effectiveness of our active and passive defenses, relative to the size of the enemy force, will be such as to assure the survival of enough resources — human and material — to make possible the continuation or reconstitution of an acceptable form of government and a viable economy.

G. Duration of Attack and Emergency

We assume that the active period of substantial nuclear attack (including follow-on attacks) would be measured in days or weeks, but that there would be a period of years during which the emergency activities of government whose continuity is the subject of emergency planning would function.

H. Other Weapons Employed

We assume that, while the main weight of attack would be by nuclear weapons, there would be an enemy capability to use chemical and biological warfare agents, electronic jamming, high explosive weapons, and psychological warfare measures.

I. Foreign Commitments

We assume that a nuclear attack on the U. S. will involve our allies to a degree that will require substantial preparation for transattack and postattack decisions involving commitments to and from them.
PRESENT FEDERAL POLICY ON EMERGENCY PLANNING
FOR CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

A. Summary of Present Policies

Present policy which furnishes guidance for continuity-of-government planning is to be found in many sources. We have set forth below the essence of such guidance. (Immediately following will be found brief summaries of the pertinent parts of these sources.)

1. Continuity of Government, with particular reference to the maintenance of accessible decision-making capability, is of the highest order of importance in any national emergency. /1

2. Government-wide plans to insure the continuity of essential Federal operations should be developed. /2 Such plans to:

a. Be based on the identification of essential emergency functions by the several departments and agencies, under criteria developed by OEP; /3

b. 

/1 Sec. 103(b), National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Executive Order 10952; par. 59b, Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1); pars. 14 and 18, U. S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 6022/1); par. 1, Emergency Relocation Plan -- National Security Council (NSC 5521).

/2 E. O. 10952; NSC 6022/1; NSC 5906/1.

/3 E. O. 10346.

/4 NSC 6022/1; NSC 5521; NSC Action 1032.
d. "Provide a ready and certain system of attack warning, reaction and decision-making, with adequate communications and provision for conducting emergency operations"; /6

e. Be periodically rehearsed and tested for readiness. /7

3. Military, industrial, and civilian mobilization activities should be coordinated by the President, with staff advice from OEP. /8

4. Civil and military response to warning should be coordinated. /9

5. Decision on and dissemination of attack warning signals to the public in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area is a Federal responsibility, to be discharged by OCD. /10

6. Initial reliance in a sudden emergency will be placed on the built-in readiness of existing departments and agencies. However, as soon as postattack conditions permit, the goal is to have drastic emergency powers in the domestic field exercised by temporary wartime emergency agencies. /11

7. The capability of State and local governments to continue to function effectively in an emergency should be strengthened by Federal assistance in the form of guidance, direction and resources (including military forces). /12

/5 NSC 6022/1.
/6 Par. 18a—NSC 6022/1.
/7 NSC Action 1430.
/8 Sec. 103(b), National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
/9 NSC Action 1565.
/10 NSC Action 1608.
/11 OCDM Advisory Bulletin No. 245.
/12 Par. 22, NSC 6022/1.
B. Sources of Present Policies:

1. The National Security Act of 1947, As Amended. Section 103(b) of this Act provides that the Director, ODM, shall advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security. This Act also provides that the Director, ODM, shall utilize to the maximum extent the resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

2. Executive Order 10346, April 17, 1952. This Executive Order requires each Federal department and agency to prepare plans for maintaining continuity of its essential functions during a civil defense emergency. It also provides that the Federal Civil Defense Administrator shall assist the departments and agencies in this undertaking and coordinate the arrangements with National, State, and local civil defense plans.

3. Executive Order 10952, July 20, 1961. E.O. 10952 states that the Director, OEP, shall develop plans, conduct programs, and coordinate preparations for the continuity of Federal, State, and local governments in the event of attack.

4. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1), approved August 5, 1959. Paragraph 59 of this document defines the mobilization base so that it includes resources necessary to the continuity of Government. It further states that, in developing the civilian readiness base, emphasis will be placed on measures essential to continuity of Government.


a. Paragraph 14 states that it is essential to insure the survival of the decision-making machinery.
b. Paragraph 18 provides that plans and relocation facilities needed to insure the continuity of essential functions of the Federal Government should be completed and maintained in a state of operational readiness at the earliest time practicable. Plans should provide a ready and certain system of attack warning, reaction, and decision-making, with adequate communications and provision for conducting emergency operations. Emergency Federal relocation facilities should be equipped as required to permit immediate activation upon arrival of relocated personnel, and should be continuously staffed as determined by the President.

c. Paragraph 22. In order that Federal, State, and local governments may carry out their essential responsibilities during and after a nuclear attack or other grave emergency, the capability of State and local governments to function effectively should be strengthened by Federal assistance in the form of guidance, direction, and resources. Such assistance should include preattack planning for the full utilization of local resources and for support by available Federal resources, including military forces.

7. Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians (Memo for the NSC), dated January 17, 1961. The chart attached to this Memorandum, which was approved by the President on January 19, 1961, outlines the procedures to be followed by civilians under five Defense Readiness Conditions and three Air Defense Emergencies.
8. NSC Action #1565, May 24, 1956, and NSC Action #1608, September 17, 1956, deal with certain procedural aspects of Attack Warning Channels.

9. NSC Action #1430, August 11, 1955, notes that ODM will serve as the mechanism within the Executive Office of the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of integrated national readiness tests intended to test the capability of the Federal Government to function effectively in an emergency.

10. NSC Action #1032, February 11, 1954. The President by this Action agreed that the Director, ODM, should proceed with the selection of possible sites for emergency relocation and the permanent nearby relocation of essential wartime functions.

11. Cabinet Paper (CP 59-98/l) noted that the President on June 5, 1959, had approved certain recommendations with respect to the Federal Relocation Arc. These recommendations were contained in a special study made by OCDM. Cabinet Paper 59-98/l was recalled shortly before the Eisenhower Administration went out of office. A summary of CP 59-98/l is contained in Annex A of a Planning Board memorandum for the NSC, subject: Concepts of the Use of the NSC Organization in a Relocation Emergency, dated May 18, 1960.

12. OCDM Advisory Bulletin No. 245, September 28, 1959. This advisory bulletin transmits to State and local civil defense directors information on the guidelines for the activation of Federal emergency agencies in a sudden emergency, "based on policies approved by the President of the United States." The policy statement calls for initial reliance in a sudden emergency on the built-in readiness of existing departments and agencies, but calls for conversion, when postattack conditions permit, to a structure in which drastic domestic emergency powers and authorities are exercised by temporary wartime emergency agencies.